Padmapada's Illusion Argument by S. Phillips
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Padmapāda's Illusion Argument Author(s): Stephen H. Phillips Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan., 1987), pp. 3-23 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399080 . Accessed: 06/08/2013 16:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy East and West. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 16:10:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Stephen H. Phillips Padmapida's illusion argument INTRODUCTION Advaita Vedanta's traditionof reflectionon perceptualillusion arises out of a concernwith mukti, a "liberation"or "salvation" thatis conceivedas a radical changeof awareness,thus as a "mysticalexperience." Developing the teachings of the Upanishads and the BhagavadgTta,Sankara (circa 700 A.D.) and his followerstry to articulatea worldview that would explainthe possibility of this mysticalstate and show it to be the summumbonum (paramapuruasrtha). It is problematicwhether any Advaita philosopher,even thegreat Sanikara himself, is a "mysticphilosopher," that is, one who attemptsto describehis own mystical experienceand to theorizetherefrom. But convincedthat a kindof experience, albeita mysticalexperience, is themost important matter in life,the Advaitins tryto formulatea comprehensivetheory of experience(anubhava) that would conformto theirsoteriological views. Above all, it is the topic of perceptual illusionthat forms the bridge between the Advaitins' soteriology on theone hand and theirtheory of experience on theother. The relationof the salvific experience to our everydayexperience is viewed as analogous to the relationbetween veridicaland delusivesense perception.1 Safikara,in the veryfirst sentence of his Brahmasutrabhdsya,2uses the term 'adhydsa',literally "superimposition" but also "false appearance," to capture the relationbetween the natural and mysticalstate of the self'strue experience on theone hand and worldlyexperience on theother.3 The Advaitinthen asks, "What is adhyasa?"and proceedsto givetwo characterizations(or definitions) of it. The second of these he defendswith referencesto everydayinstances of illusion. Thus in this openingpassage, and in pronouncedfashion in his Upanishadiccommentaries and his UpadesasdhasrTas well,Safikara articulates an understandingof "adhydsa"that is supposed to includeboth everydayand mysticalphenomena.4 Further, in this"adhydsa" sectionof his BSB, he men- tionssome alternativeviews of illusion,apparently for descriptive as opposed to polemicalpurposes: without disputing these views, he puts forthhis second characterizationand claims that it would be acceptable to all disputants.5 Therefore,with these characterizations,Safikara must be seen as launching Advaita "phenomenologyof perceptualillusion." However,it is only afterSafikara that Advaita phenomenologyand indeed criticalreflection overall become advanced. Safikarahimself is so much less concernedwith argument and justificationalissues than withelaborating the soteriologicalteachings of diverseUpanishadic textsthat many of his more properlyphilosophic views are too inchoateand embeddedin otherdiscussions to repayat all easilya scrutiny,6although many modern reconstructions of his positionshave appeared. His followersinherit the soteriologicaland textual StephenH. Phillipsis AssistantProfessor of Philosophyat theUniversity of Texas, Austin. AUTHOR'SNOTE: The author wishes to thankWilhelm Halbfass and RichardLarivierefor commenting on an earlierdraft. PhilosophyEast and West37, no. 1 (January1987). ( by theUniversity of Hawaii Press.All rightsreserved. This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 16:10:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 Phillips concerns,but theyalso tryto be systematicand to refuteopponents on a whole rangeof issues. It is withSafikara's disciples, Padmapada, Suresvara, and Vacas- pati,and theirfollowers that the Advaita polemics and phenomenologicalanal- ysesbecome truly astute. Advaita theoryof knowledgeand relatedphenomenology become increas- inglybroad in scope as, throughthe years, there is a shiftin thefocus of Advaita reflection.In general,more and more attentionis paid to cosmologicaland worldly(vyavahdrika) issues, while Safikara's embedded epistemological posi- tionsare enormouslyfilled out. By thetime of the Veddntaparibhdsd,the famous seventeenth-centurytextbook of Advaita epistemology,the topic of perceptual illusionis takenup not so muchwithin a soteriologicaldiscussion as withina wide-rangingexplanation of "meansof knowledge"(pramana) in general.7The Veddntaparibhdsdincorporates centuries of reflection-muchof whichorigi- natesin rivalschools-on topicsranging from particulars and universalsto the foundationsof claims about the nonpresenceof somethingx. (Do I directly perceivethat thereis not an elephanthere?) Thus one should not thinkthat Advaitaepistemology is limitedto a concernwith perceptual illusion, particularly in thelater period. Yet in the Veddntaparibhdsdand in manyintermediate works, theearly phenomenology of perceptualillusion, and in particularthat contrib- uted by Padmapada, informscrucially the theory of knowledge,somewhat like theinfluence of Descartesand Hume in theWest.8 It clearlyforms the mainstay of thecentral Advaita positions. Padmapada is generallyadmitted to have been Safikara'syounger contempo- raryand his student.Along with Suresvara (who mostlikely was also a student of Safikara)and Vacaspati Misra (who was probablyat leasta generationlater), he is theoriginator of a distinctline of Advaita commentary. These threeare the foundersof the prasthdnatraya,"three lines of interpretation[of Safikara]," knownto studentsof Advaita. Padmapada launcheda traditionof commentary and understandingof Safikarato whichseveral prominent philosophers belong, includingPrakasatman (circa 975), the title of whose lucid (but often unfaithful- see note 12 following)commentary Vivarana has becomethe name by which this branchof Advaita is commonlyknown; Citsukha (circa 1275),the logician and polemicistwho purportsto refuteall the late schools; Madhava (circa 1350), who is bestknown for a wide-rangingsurvey of Indian schools;9 and Dharmara- jadhvarindra,the author of the Veddntaparibhdsdpreviously mentioned. There are also severallesser figures who belongto Padmapada's "line,"and thenumber of Sanskritcommentaries written on his workis large.'1 In thisarticle, I wishto examinePadmapada's thoughton illusion-with an eye to evaluatinghis metaphysics.Despite the sophisticationof Padmapada's analysis,the marriage between the metaphysics and theunderstanding of illusion is an unhappyone. Yet thispoint could be turnedaround: although, as I shall show, Padmapada is unsuccessfulin his attemptto show throughan illusion analogythe possibility(sambhava) of his viewsabout theAbsolute (brahman), This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 16:10:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 his meticulousphenomenology of the mentallife has meritsof its own. I shall not slightit by jumpingtoo quicklyinto an examinationof the metaphysics. Only afterpresenting with some detail Padmapada's analysisof everydayillu- sionsdo I takeup themetaphysics of Advaitaand demonstratethe failure of his illusionanalogy. Anotheraim of thisarticle, overlapping the evaluative concern, is historical. I contend that Padmapada's view of illusion illumineshis metaphysicsof brahman,the "Absolute," and of brahman'srelation to maya, the "cosmic illusion."This metaphysicshas been misunderstoodby some scholarsof'Indian philosophy." By elaboratingPadmapada's use of theillusion analogy, I intend to show preciselywhat his viewsare on thenature and onticstatus of "mdyd." Whileit is a matterof debate to whatdegree he departson thisscore from Safikara, his views on mdya are not the same as those of Prakasatman,his famous "follower"who livedabout twocenturies later.12 Also, Padmapada's insistence on defendingthe possibility(sambhava) of the truthsrevealed by sruti,"scrip- ture," along with the phenomenology,achieves a quantum leap in Advaitic philosophicprocedure. This typeof reasoning,in additionto the phenomeno- logicalarguments, represents a majordevelopment over Safikara. 3 This article is not directedprincipally to questionsof Padmapada exegesisor of his place in theevolution of Advaita,but it is intendedto investigatefurther what is hardly a fullyworked mine.14 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ILLUSION AND MEMORY Padmapada's principalwork, the Paicapddika, is a commentaryon thatportion of Safikara'sBSB whichexplains the firstfour sutrasof the Brahmasutra.5 Presumably,the work was to take up the firstfive sections of Safikara'sBSB (that is, the entirefirst chapter and the firstsection of the second),but all we have is a commentaryon Safikara'streatment of siitras1.1.1-4. As noted,at the beginningof Safikara'sBSB the key topic is illusionas the appropriateanalogue for the Self's true experience in relationto one's experience