Impact of Civil War on Natural Resources: a Case Study for Somaliland
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September 29, 2005 Parliamentary Election Assessment Report
International Republican Institute Suite 700 1225 Eye St., NW Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 408-9450 (202) 408-9462 FAX www.iri.org International Republican Institute Somaliland September 29, 2005 Parliamentary Election Assessment Report Table of Contents Map of Somaliland……………………………………………………………………..….2 Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………….....3 I. Background Information.............................................................................................…..5 II. Legal and Administrative Framework………………………………..………..……….8 III. Pre-Election Period……………. …...……………………………..…………...........12 IV. Election Day…………...…………………………………………………………….18 V. Post-Election Period and Results.…………………………………………………….27 VI. Findings and Recommendations……………………………………………………..33 VII. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..38 Appendix A: Voting Results in 2005 Presidential Elections…………………………….39 Appendix B: Voting Results in 2003 Presidential Elections…………………………….41 Appendix C: Voting Results in 2002 Local Government Elections……………………..43 Appendix D: Voting Trends……………………………………………………………..44 IRI – Somaliland September 29, 2005 Parliamentary Election Assessment Report 1 Map of Somaliland IRI – Somaliland September 29, 2005 Parliamentary Election Assessment Report 2 Executive Summary Background The International Republican Institute (IRI) has conducted programs in Somaliland since 2002 with the support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of State, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). IRI’s Somaliland -
Report on Historical Climate Baseline Statistics for Somaliland, Puntland
Report on Historical Climate Baseline Statistics for Somaliland, Puntland, Vol 4 Galmudug and Hirshabelle ACKNOWLEDGMENT The report was prepared with substantial inputs and feedback from Somalia Meteorological Service, IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Center with support from the African Development Bank. Analysis of climate change data and drafting of the report was made possible with inputs from Linda A. Ogallo and Abdirashid Jama. Historical Climate Baseline Statistics for Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug and Hirshabelle 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................................................ iii LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................................................... vi 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 7 2. THE STUDY SITE .................................................................................................................................................. 9 2.1 DATA ................................................................................................................................................................ 9 3. BASELINE STATISTICS .................................................................................................................................... -
DJIBOUTI: Implementing the 10- Point Plan of Action
DJIBOUTI: Implementing the 10- Point Plan of Action Djibouti has always been a favoured destination for migrants and refugees from countries in the region, notably Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. The migrant population is estimated to represent 20 per cent of the total population of the country. The Djiboutian population shares strong ethnic links (Somali, Afar) with Somaliland, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Yemen, which explains the migratory movements between these countries. Djibouti has been described as an oasis of peace in a stormy desert, in a sub region rife with insecurity: the ongoing threat of a border war between Eritrean and Ethiopia, the continuing battle between supporters of the Government in Somalia and the supporters of the opposition Islamists, and the recent turmoil in Kenya. The economic and political stability in the country has attracted thousands of impoverished people in search of better economic prospects. The situation took a new twist over the past two to three years with the increased use of Djibouti as a transit country by smugglers and traffickers en route to the Arab Gulf States and to Europe. The country’s proximity to more prosperous countries in the Arab Gulf and the hope to continue their journey to more developed western countries has therefore equally worked as a pull factor for migrants. During the first months of 2008, a large number of migrants and refugees chose the route by boat to Yemen via Djibouti as an alternative to exposure to reckless smugglers in Bossaso, Somalia. Since January 2008, 2,213 new arrivals from South/Central Somalia have been registered by UNHCR, the peak being in February with 1,100 persons (Jan: 251; Mar: 862). -
CLAIMING the EASTERN BORDERLANDS After the 1997
CHAPTER SEVEN CLAIMING THE EASTERN BORDERLANDS After the 1997 Hargeysa Conference, the Somaliland state apparatus consolidated. It deepened, as the state realm displaced governance arrangements overseen by clan elders. And it broadened, as central government control extended geographically from the capital into urban centres such as Borama in the west and Bur’o in the east. In the areas east of Bur’o government was far less present or efffective, especially where non-Isaaq clans traditionally lived. Erigavo, the capital of Sanaag Region, which was shared by the Habar Yunis, the Habar Ja’lo, the Warsengeli and the Dhulbahante, was fijinally brought under formal government control in 1997, after Egal sent a delegation of nine govern- ment ministers originating from the area to sort out local government with the elders and political actors on the ground. After fijive months of negotiations, the president was able to appoint a Mayor for Erigavo and a Governor for Sanaag.1 But east of Erigavo, in the area inhabited by the Warsengeli, any claim to governance from Hargeysa was just nominal.2 The same was true for most of Sool Region inhabited by the Dhulbahante. Eastern Sanaag and Sool had not been Egal’s priority. The president did not strictly need these regions to be under his military control in order to preserve and consolidate his position politically or in terms of resources. The port of Berbera was vital for the economic survival of the Somaliland government. Erigavo and Las Anod were not. However, because the Somaliland government claimed the borders of the former British protec- torate as the borders of Somaliland, Sanaag and Sool had to be seen as under government control. -
Somali Fisheries
www.securefisheries.org SECURING SOMALI FISHERIES Sarah M. Glaser Paige M. Roberts Robert H. Mazurek Kaija J. Hurlburt Liza Kane-Hartnett Securing Somali Fisheries | i SECURING SOMALI FISHERIES Sarah M. Glaser Paige M. Roberts Robert H. Mazurek Kaija J. Hurlburt Liza Kane-Hartnett Contributors: Ashley Wilson, Timothy Davies, and Robert Arthur (MRAG, London) Graphics: Timothy Schommer and Andrea Jovanovic Please send comments and questions to: Sarah M. Glaser, PhD Research Associate, Secure Fisheries One Earth Future Foundation +1 720 214 4425 [email protected] Please cite this document as: Glaser SM, Roberts PM, Mazurek RH, Hurlburt KJ, and Kane-Hartnett L (2015) Securing Somali Fisheries. Denver, CO: One Earth Future Foundation. DOI: 10.18289/OEF.2015.001 Secure Fisheries is a program of the One Earth Future Foundation Cover Photo: Shakila Sadik Hashim at Alla Aamin fishing company in Berbera, Jean-Pierre Larroque. ii | Securing Somali Fisheries TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES, BOXES ............................................................................................. iii FOUNDER’S LETTER .................................................................................................................... v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. vi DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................ vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Somali) ............................................................................................ -
Somalia and Somaliland: the Two Edged Sword of International Intervention Kenning, David
www.ssoar.info Somalia and Somaliland: the two edged sword of international intervention Kenning, David Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Kenning, D. (2011). Somalia and Somaliland: the two edged sword of international intervention. Federal Governance, 8(2), 63-70. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-342769 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Basic Digital Peer Publishing-Lizenz This document is made available under a Basic Digital Peer zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den DiPP-Lizenzen Publishing Licence. For more Information see: finden Sie hier: http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/ http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/ Special Issue on Federalism and Conflict Management edited by Neophytos Loizides, Iosif Kovras and Kathleen Ireton. SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND: THE TWO EDGED SWORD OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION by David Kenning* * Queen’s University Belfast, Ireland Email: [email protected] Abstract: Since the collapse of the state in Somalia in 1991 the country has been the recipient of numerous international interventions and operations but has not as yet reached a sustainable peaceful settlement, despite at one point costing the UN almost two billion dollars a year in its operations. In contrast Somaliland, the area that seceded in the north, despite not being recognised by international governments and having been on the brink of several civil wars, has reached a level of political reconciliation and economic growth that compares favourably to the rest of Somalia. This article argues that the international actors’ misinterpretation of Somali social and political organisation during intervention, Somaliland’s ability to engage in a form of democracy that is based on traditional politics and the different experience the area had during colonialism has meant that its society has reached an unlikely level of peace and reconciliation. -
Somaliland – a Walk on Thin Ice 1
7|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 79 SOMALILAND – A WALK ON THIN ICE 1 Harriet Gorka “Northerners can in no way claim that the 1960 merger with the South was a shotgun wedding – by all accounts unification was wildly popular. Northerners could argue, however, that they asked for an annulment of the union prior to the honeymoon and that their request was unjustly denied.”2 This statement by a legal scholar reflects the prevailing balancing act of the conflict in Somaliland, which some might say started with the voluntary unification of Harriet Gorka worked Somaliland and the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia. Yet from February to April 2011 at the Konrad- the conflict goes deeper and is more far reaching than Adenauer-Stiftung in “just” the desire to secede from the Somali state. It is Windhoek, Namibia. an ongoing debate whether the right to self-determination should prevail over the notions of territorial integrity and sovereignty. May 2011 marked the 20-year anniversary of Somaliland’s proclamation of independence. However, its status has not officially been recognised by any state, even though it has a working constitutional government, an army, a national flag and its own currency, which should make Somaliland a stand out example for other entities seeking independence. The territory also sets itself apart from the rest of Somalia because it is stable and peaceful, which has been achieved by integrating clan culture into its government. The accom- plishments of the past two decades are impressive, despite 1 | The opinion expressed by the author is not in all points similar to the opinion of the editors. -
Rethinking the Somali State
Rethinking the Somali State MPP Professional Paper In Partial Fulfillment of the Master of Public Policy Degree Requirements The Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs The University of Minnesota Aman H.D. Obsiye May 2017 Signature below of Paper Supervisor certifies successful completion of oral presentation and completion of final written version: _________________________________ ____________________ ___________________ Dr. Mary Curtin, Diplomat in Residence Date, oral presentation Date, paper completion Paper Supervisor ________________________________________ ___________________ Steven Andreasen, Lecturer Date Second Committee Member Signature of Second Committee Member, certifying successful completion of professional paper Table of Contents Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 3 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 5 The Somali Clan System .......................................................................................................... 6 The Colonial Era ..................................................................................................................... 9 British Somaliland Protectorate ................................................................................................. 9 Somalia Italiana and the United Nations Trusteeship .............................................................. 14 Colonial -
Djibouti: Z Z Z Z Summary Points Z Z Z Z Renewal Ofdomesticpoliticallegitimacy
briefing paper page 1 Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub David Styan Africa Programme | April 2013 | AFP BP 2013/01 Summary points zz Change in Djibouti’s economic and strategic options has been driven by four factors: the Ethiopian–Eritrean war of 1998–2000, the impact of Ethiopia’s economic transformation and growth upon trade; shifts in US strategy since 9/11, and the upsurge in piracy along the Gulf of Aden and Somali coasts. zz With the expansion of the US AFRICOM base, the reconfiguration of France’s military presence and the establishment of Japanese and other military facilities, Djibouti has become an international maritime and military laboratory where new forms of cooperation are being developed. zz Djibouti has accelerated plans for regional economic integration. Building on close ties with Ethiopia, existing port upgrades and electricity grid integration will be enhanced by the development of the northern port of Tadjourah. zz These strategic and economic shifts have yet to be matched by internal political reforms, and growth needs to be linked to strategies for job creation and a renewal of domestic political legitimacy. www.chathamhouse.org Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub page 2 Djibouti 0 25 50 km 0 10 20 30 mi Red Sea National capital District capital Ras Doumeira Town, village B Airport, airstrip a b Wadis ERITREA a l- M International boundary a n d District boundary a b Main road Railway Moussa Ali ETHIOPIA OBOCK N11 N11 To Elidar Balho Obock N14 TADJOURA N11 N14 Gulf of Aden Tadjoura N9 Galafi Lac Assal Golfe de Tadjoura N1 N9 N9 Doraleh DJIBOUTI N1 Ghoubbet Arta N9 El Kharab DJIBOUTI N9 N1 DIKHIL N5 N1 N1 ALI SABIEH N5 N5 Abhe Bad N1 (Lac Abhe) Ali Sabieh DJIBOUTI Dikhil N5 To Dire Dawa SOMALIA/ ETHIOPIA SOMALILAND Source: United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, Djibouti Map No. -
Somalia - United States Department of State
Somalia - United States Department of State https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/somalia/ Somalia remains a Special Case for the 18th consecutive year. The country continued to face protracted conflict, insecurity, and ongoing humanitarian crises during the reporting period. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) controlled its capital city, Mogadishu, and Federal Member State (FMS) governments retained control over most local capitals across the country. The self-declared independent region of Somaliland and the Puntland FMS retained control of security and law enforcement in their respective regions. The FGS had limited influence outside Mogadishu. The al-Shabaab terrorist group continued to occupy and control rural areas and maintained operational freedom of movement in many other areas in south-central Somalia, which it used as a base to exploit the local population by collecting illegal taxes, conducting indiscriminate attacks against civilian and civilian infrastructure across the country, and perpetrating human trafficking. The FGS focused on capacity building and securing Mogadishu and government facilities from attacks by al-Shabaab. The sustained insurgency by al-Shabaab continued to be the main obstacle to the government’s ability to address human trafficking. The government continued to modestly improve capacity to address most crimes; however, it demonstrated minimal efforts in all regions on prosecution, protection, and prevention of trafficking during the reporting year. The FGS, Somaliland, and Puntland authorities sustained minimal efforts to combat trafficking during the reporting period. Due to the protracted campaign to degrade al-Shabaab and establish law and order in Somalia, law enforcement, prosecutorial personnel, and judicial offices remained understaffed, undertrained, and lacked capacity to effectively enforce anti-trafficking laws. -
Somalia MIPS Evaluation Final 2013 02 19
U N I D O EVALUATION GROUP Independent Evaluation Report S O M A L I A Integration and progress through skills and employment for displaced groups in Somalia UNIDO Project Number: TF/SOM/11/001 UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION UNIDO EVALUATION GROUP Independent Evaluation Somalia Integration and progress through skills and employment for displaced groups in Somalia UNIDO Project Number: TF/SOM/11/001 UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION Vienna, 2013 Distr. GENERAL ODG/EVA/12/R.9 February 2012 Original: English The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this document does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Mention of company names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of UNIDO. The views and opinions of the team do not necessarily reflect the views of the involved Governments and of UNIDO. This document has not been formally edited Table of Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ v Abbreviations and acronyms ............................................................................... vi Glossary of evaluation related terms .................................................................. vii Executive Summary ............................................................................................. -
Between Somaliland and Puntland Marginalization, Militarization and Conflicting Political Visions
rift valley institute | Contested Borderlands Between Somaliland and Puntland Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions MARKUS VIRGIL HOEHNE rift VALLEY institute | Contested Borderlands Between Somaliland and Puntland Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions MarKus virGil HoeHne Published in 2015 by the Rift Valley Institute 26 St Luke’s Mews, London W11 1DF, United Kingdom PO Box 52771 GPO, 00100 Nairobi, Kenya tHe rift VALLEY institute (RVI) The Rift Valley Institute (www.riftvalley.net) works in Eastern and Central Africa to bring local knowledge to bear on social, political and economic development. tHe autHor Markus Virgil Hoehne is a lecturer in social anthropology at the University of Leipzig. This work is based on research he carried out during his time at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle/Saale, Germany. Between soMaliland and puntland The Rift Valley Institute takes no position on the status of Somaliland or Puntland. Views expressed in Between Somaliland and Puntland are those of the author. Boundaries shown on maps in this book are endorsed neither by the Rift Valley Institute, nor by the author. RVI exeCutive direCtor: John Ryle RVI Horn of afriCa and east afriCa reGional direCtor: Mark Bradbury RVI inforMation and proGraMMes adMINISTRATOR: Tymon Kiepe editorial ManaGeMent: Catherine Bond editors: Peter Fry and Fergus Nicoll report desiGn: Lindsay Nash Maps: Jillian Luff, MAPgrafix isBn 978-1-907431-13-5 Cover: Amina Abdulkadir The painting depicts the complexities of political belonging since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. The yellow lines indicate the frontiers claimed by Somaliland and Puntland. The colour closest to gold portrays the contest for resources.