Joint Force Quarterly Hans Binnendijk Patrick M

0115Cover1 8/4/97 11:01 AM Page 1 JFJOINTQ FORCE QUARTERLY

RMA Essay Contest Interservice Competition

NATO, EUROPEAN SECURITY,AND BEYOND

Military Support to Spring The Nation 97 The Son Tay Raid

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL 0215Cover2 8/5/97 7:49 AM Page C2

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur. —Guilio Douhet

Cov 2 JFQ / Spring 1997 0315Prelims 8/4/97 1:28 PM Page 1 JFQ AWord from the ■ NATO’s consultative mechanisms have been a positive force for stability on the Continent and were central to the solution of bilateral problems among its Chairman members ■ NATO forces, policies, and procedures proved to be an essential and irreplaceable foundation for the coalition’s success in Operation Desert Storm ight years ago, as the Berlin Wall crum- ■ NATO forces from 15 allied nations—backed by bled and the Cold War began to fade, 22 other countries, including Russia—are keeping order in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, a peace brought about by two themes dominated media reports the force of NATO arms. about Europe. First, many pundits ar- Egued that while our hearts might remain in Eu- In the future, Europe will remain a center of rope our central strategic and economic interests wealth, democracy, and power. For the United would lie elsewhere in the future. For some, our States, it will remain a region of vital interest. Ac- focus would be primarily on the Middle East, for cording to our national security strategy, “Our ob- others on Latin America, and for still others on jective in Europe is to complete the construction the Asia-Pacific region. But most agreed that Eu- of a truly integrated, democratic, and secure Eu- rope’s criticality had waned. Second, other observers predicted that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), absent a new overwhelming threat, would wither away or disappear. Their reasoning was simple: no threat, no alliance; no Warsaw Pact, no NATO. But three Presidents knew better. While recognizing the growing importance of other regions, the United States chose not to turn its back on Eu- rope or the Alliance. Indeed, as this issue of JFQ goes to press, heads of state of Alliance nations are about to meet to determine which of the many candidates will become new members of NATO. The future value of the Alliance has to be

calculated in light of its past accomplishments. In DOD (R.D. Ward) testament to its influence, Secretary of State During a break in the international meeting on Bosnia in July 1995, Madeleine Albright has said: General George A. Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO has always been more than a defensive reviews draft U.S. position statement with the Chairman. shield. It was the roof over our heads when we rebuilt postwar Europe. It was the floor on which the first rope with a democratic Russia as a full partici- structures of European unity were laid. It was the door pant.” This, of course, is what we started out to through which one time adversaries were welcomed accomplish fifty years ago when we launched the into our family of democracies. And because of its Marshall Plan and created NATO. strength and the courage of its members, it has been a The new strategic environment in Europe mighty deterrent to aggression. has caused the United States to change its orien- For nearly fifty years NATO’s successes have tation from deterrence of war to shaping the en- been phenomenal; and they constitute a major vironment to work against instability and the reason why it remains a powerful force for peace conditions that cause war. While we withdrew and security: two-thirds of our Cold War force, we remain com- ■ NATO has been essential to maintaining the mitted to the continuing deployment of some transatlantic link, the mechanism which was so vital to 100,000 troops in theater. Trade with Europe, of deterrence during four decades and which today keeps course, has taken care of itself, doubling in value the West united on security issues over the past decade.

(continued on page 4)

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■ CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman ■ OUT OF JOINT by John M. Shalikashvili 50 Interservice Competition: The ■ Solution, Not the Problem by Harvey M. Sapolsky 6 The 1996 RMA Essay Contest JFQ Introduced by Williamson Murray ■ JFQ FORUM

8 The Second Revolution 55 NATO, European Security, by James Stavridis and Beyond Introduced by Hans Binnendijk 14 The Profession of Arms in the Information Age 57 The New SHAPE of the by Arsenio T. Gumahad II Atlantic Alliance by George A. Joulwan 21 Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, and the Promise 62 Creating A European Security of Information Warfare and Defense Identity by James J. Schneider by Charles L. Barry

29 Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality: 70 WEU Operational A Revolution in Military Development Theory by Graham Messervy-Whiting by Antulio J. Echevarria II 75 After SFOR—Planning a 37 Technologies, Doctrine, and European-Led Force Organization for RMA by John Hillen by James K. Morningstar 80 The Looming Alliance Debate 44 General Tzu’s Army: OPFOR over Nuclear Weapons of the Future by Jacquelyn K. Davis, Charles M. Perry, by Michael R. Lwin and Andrew C. Winner 87 Ukraine as a Post-Cold War

PHOTO CREDITS Military Power by Stephen D. Olynyk The cover shows marines conducting sensor emplace- ment mission during Advance Warfighting Experiment at 29 Palms (U.S. Marine Corps/Christopher S. Cline). 95 French Military Reform and The front inside features Russian cruiser Pilkiy off the port beam of USS America in the Mediterranean (U.S. NATO Restructuring Navy/David Carter), American marines and Moldovan by Ronald Tiersky soldiers maneuvering, Cooperative Osprey ’96 (982d Sig- nal Company/M.A. Jones), Turkish officer using ground vehicular laser locator designator at Camp Dobol, Bosnia 103 EUCOM and Sub-Saharan (55th Signal Company, Combat Camera/Angel Clemons), and closeup of B–2 bomber (U.S. Air Force). The table of Africa contents shows USS Mitscher in the North Atlantic (U.S. by Nancy J. Walker and Larry Hanauer Navy/Jacob L. Hollingsworth). The back inside cover captures F–16C at Azaraq air base in Jordan (U.S. Air Force/Paul R. Caron). The back cover displays USS Scranton surfacing with USS George Washington in background to support South- ern Watch (U.S. Navy/Jim Vidrine), marines arriving in Thailand for Cobra Gold ’97 (Joint Combat Camera Center/Jacqueline Richardson), AH–64D during Ad- vanced Warfighting Experiment at Fort Irwin (28th Public Affairs Detachment/ William Cronk), and C–17 (U.S. Air Force/Ken Hackman).

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SPRING 1997 / NUMBER 15

125 In Search of Focused Logistics by John J. Cusick and Donald C. Pipp

128 Review Criteria for the Logistic Plan by Kevin R. Wheelock

■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 134 George Scratchley Brown

■ THE JOINT WORLD 135 Doctrine, Education, and History

■ OFF THE SHELF

■ 137 Jointness in Defence of the Realm: A Review Essay 108 Forgotten Mission: Military by Jeremy R. Stocker Support to the Nation by David L. Grange and Rodney L. Johnson 140 Joint Training for MOOTW: A Book Review 116 The Force-on-Force Model: by Shawn C. Whetstone An Anachronism in the Information Age 141 Riding the Toffler Wave: by Maggie Belknap A Book Review by M.E. Ahrari 120 Operation Kingpin— Success or Failure? by William C. Thomas

Joint Force Quarterly Hans Binnendijk Patrick M. Cronin Director Robert A. Silano Director for Strategy and Policy Analysis Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor-in-Chief Consulting Editor William A. Rawley Martin J. Peters, Jr. Typography and Design Division Calvin B. Kelley Production Coordinator U.S. Government Printing Office Copy Editor Art Director

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the of the Federal Government. Copyrighted portions of this journal may Please direct all editorial communications to: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, not be reproduced or extracted without permission of copyright pro- Editor, Joint Force Quarterly to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, prietors. An acknowledgment to Joint Force Quarterly should be ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuses made whenever material is quoted from or based on its contents. 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combat This publication has been approved by the Secretary of Fort Lesley J. McNair operations conducted by the unified commands, and joint force Defense. Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 development. The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and topics Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 144 for details). Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency e-mail: [email protected]

ISSN 1070–0692 June 1997 Internet: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine

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Joint Force Quarterly ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher NATO has also adapted to meet new condi- ADVISORY COMMITTEE tions. It changed its mission, altered its organization, and will soon expand its membership. At Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF ■ National Defense University Chairman the same time, not wishing to redivide Europe, NATO has improved its relations with Russia. BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman With the Founding Act, signed earlier this year, VADM Dennis C. Blair, USN ■ The Joint Staff the Alliance has created a solid basis for future relations with Russia. NATO has also widened its MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ U.S. Army War College influence through the Partnership for Peace (PFP) A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College program, which includes 27 nations. In turn, PFP Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College has created the groundwork for better interoperability and more effective peacekeeping. MG John S. Cowings, USA ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces I recently visited Cooperative Nugget ’97, the BG Robert F. Dees, USA ■ The Joint Staff third U.S.-hosted training exercise oriented on

Col Jerry M. Drennan, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College enhancing interoperability and peacekeeping. Conducted under the auspices of U.S. Atlantic BG Joseph R. Inge, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Command, this impressive exercise at the Joint Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College Readiness Training Center put platoons from 22 partner and NATO nations through a rigorous 37- Brig Gen William R. Looney III, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College task training experience. The gain in interoper- RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN ■ National War College ability and peacekeeping skills was significant, as

Maj Gen D. Bruce Smith, USAF ■ Air War College was the tangible increase in good will and understanding of how the armed forces of democratic ■ RADM James R. Stark, USN Naval War College nations operate in the gray area of military operations other than war. In all, Cooperative Nugget EDITORIAL BOARD was a visible reminder of NATO’s contribution to

Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense University peace and security from Western Europe to cen- Chairman tral Asia and beyond. The JFQ Forum on NATO and European af- Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University fairs in this issue is most timely. As we refine COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Joint Vision 2010 and implement the Quadrennial

Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University Defense Review, we must examine where we have been and where we are headed in each of our ge- COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy ographic areas of responsibility. Thus these arti- Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University cles offer an excellent primer on the problems NATO will face in the future: the pace of Alliance Col Robert J. Garner, USMC ■ Armed Forces Staff College enlargement, the management of NATO-Russian Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces relations, the future of SFOR in the Balkans, the

Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF ■ Naval War College shape of Alliance command and control architecture, and the maturation of a European security ■ Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College and defense identity. Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation In all, we will have our work cut out for us in Europe; but our vital interests there, the impor- William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College tance of the transatlantic link, and NATO’s con- CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN ■ National War College tribution to peace and security throughout the John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago world will more than justify our efforts.

LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI Lt Col Robert C. Owen, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College Chairman

James H. Toner ■ Air War College of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University

COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA ■ Marine Corps War College

COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

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THE WINNERS OF THE 1996 Joint Force Quarterly “Essay Contest on the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation, Inc.

FIRST PRIZE “The Second Revolution” by Captain James Stavridis, USN Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J–5), Joint Staff

SECOND PRIZE “The Profession of Arms in the Information Age” by Lieutenant Colonel Arsenio T. Gumahad II, USAF Office of Space and Technology, Headquarters, Department of the Air Force

THIRD PRIZE “Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, and the Promise of Information Warfare” by Professor James J. Schneider School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

JUNIOR OFFICER PRIZE “A Revolution in Military Theory: Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality” by Major Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA Future Battle Directorate, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 were presented to the first, second, and third place winners, respectively, and a prize of $500 was awarded for the best entry by a junior officer (major/lieutenant commander or below). The winning essays plus two other contributions on the revolution in military affairs appear on the following pages of this issue.

Spring 1997 / JFQ 5 0415Murray 8/4/97 1:38 PM Page 6

■ The 1996 RMA Essay Contest Introduced by WILLIAMSON MURRAY

he following articles represent (RMA) represents and what its implications the best of the 1996 JFQ “Essay are. This suggests that no one has a handle Contest on the Revolution in on what the face of battle will look like in Military Affairs” which was the next century. Consequently, the worst sponsored by the National De- path that the Armed Forces could take would fense University Foundation. be to believe that they know what is meant TThe six contributions—four prize winners by RMA and embark on tailoring forces and plus two additional essays “short listed” by acquiring weapons without experimentation the judges as worthy of publication— and serious public debate on the future of suggest that enormous technolog- national defense. Publication of a range of ical changes are underway views such as those advanced by the authors and will continue for the of the articles found in this issue of JFQ, foreseeable future. At the each singing from a different sheet of music, same time, it is difficult will stimulate that debate. We need more ex- to understand exactly change of ideas, not less. There is no school how such change will solution on RMA, and those who think they play out on the bat- possess the answers constitute a danger to re- tlefield. That is true alizing its actual as opposed to its imagined in part because we do potential. not know either when The very disparities raised by this debate or where our soldiers, suggest several other points. First, they un- sailors, marines, and air- derscore that we may not be reaching clo- men will be called upon sure on what RMA epitomizes. There may in to fight and kill, nor can effect be a number of emerging RMAs. None we possibly know the condi- of this is clear. My own prediction—from an tions under which the next war historian’s perspective—is that we will con- will take place, nor even the simplest front multiple RMAs over the coming element of the equation: who will be the decades, a state of affairs somewhat analo- enemy. Will the next major war occur ten gous to events during the last significant years from now or twenty years as was the interwar period: the 1920s and 1930s. At case for our military after World War I, or that time various RMAs evolved from the even ninety-nine years like the British expe- conceptual to reality: combined arms, ex- rienced after Napoleon’s defeat in 1815? ploitation warfare, strategic bombing, carrier What is clear is that there is a looming operations, and submarine warfare. These debate both within and among the services developments greatly changed the way war on what the revolution in military affairs was waged in the first major conflict of this century. Thus to conclude that RMA comes

Williamson Murray, professor of history emeritus at The Ohio State from one source may deny other equally im- University, will contribute an article entitled “Thinking about portant possibilities. Moreover, as Andrew Revolutions in Military Affairs” in the next issue of JFQ.

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Murray

Marshall, director of net assessment within would need to overthrow nonlinear dynam- the Office of the Secretary of Defense—and ics, the second law of thermodynamics, the the motivating force behind the JFQ RMA fundamental tenets of neo-Darwinian evolu- essay contest—has suggested, we might con- tionary biology, and all the limiting metathe- orems of mathematical logic....No small we might consider our current situation as being task indeed!” approximately what the military faced in 1923 It is likely that in the next century our enemies—both large and small—will study sider our current situation as being approxi- us carefully. They will think long and hard mately what the military of the interwar about developing asymmetrical approaches years faced in 1923. In other words, there is to thwart our capabilities on the strategic, a long way to go to work out the real possi- operational, and tactical levels. As we con- bilities and potential of coming RMAs. gratulate ourselves on the extraordinary pos- We should not forget that the future is sibilities of technology, we must not forget capable of throwing us curve balls. We are at the lessons of Vietnam, when enormous ad- the beginning of an interwar period of inde- vantages counted for very little in the final terminate length. It may last another decade; analysis. Above all it was hubris that led to it is just as likely to last fifty years. And if we that catastrophe; and since we will always be have forty-five years of sustained peace, the up against human beings, we cannot assume Armed Forces will face the most difficult of that they will act as we expect. “Big Blue” military problems: keeping prepared for the may have beaten a chess master, but that harsh Clausewitzian world of friction, ambi- computer would have gone down to defeat if guity, and fog in a time of peace. The longer Kasporov had announced that he was going the peace the more unrealistic our concepts to play checkers instead. may become. Above all, we may well forget Finally, remember that we live in a the fundamental nature of war. democracy based on individual liberties and That Clausewitzian world, which has en- the pursuit of happiness. Accordingly, it is dured for three thousand years of recorded extremely doubtful whether the American military history, will also hold sway in the people will continue to fund the Armed next century. It is not that the entire weight Forces at present levels. Some believe that of the past says so: everything we know military spending has bottomed out. But about the nonlinear, incalculable world indi- considering the pressure exerted by an aging cates that we will not ever achieve pre- population and the indeterminate nature of dictability given natural phenomena. As threats on the international scene, we may Barry Watts suggested in a recent essay, to be- well see defense budgets fall to the level of lieve we will achieve predictability, “one the late 1920s. With less money we must think strategically; and we are not doing enough of that today. JFQ

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The Second U.S. Air Force (Jeffrey Allen) REVOLUTION By JAMES STAVRIDIS

paradox is emerging as the revolution FIRST in military affairs (RMA) moves ahead: the larger the magnitude of PRIZE the revolution, the greater the possi- bleA long-term advantage to a potential enemy. Why? The answer lies in the second revolution. The system of systems—a complete architec- 96 ture of detection, selection, display, targeting, and attack—will revolutionize war. Related advances in information warfare will complement and enhance the progress made in the first revolution. We will adjust and integrate these developments with new organizations, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures, many of which will be integrated into the Armed Forces by early in the next century, and other industrialized nations will gradually follow suit. Indeed, some compo- Captain James Stavridis, USN, is a member of the Strategy and Plans nents are already entering service, and others are Directorate (J-5), Joint Staff, and previously commanded USS Barry. being aggressively purchased, programmed, and

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Stavridis

researched. Both doctrine and operational con- An enemy may have more efficiently moved cepts are undergoing study and change. Joint Vi- on to a second revolution, taking advantage of sion 2010 makes it clear that we are on the leading our efforts to develop and field the first set of sys- edge of this first revolution, evolving the military tems—because much of the technology involved in the first revolution is commercially applicable, throughout military history for every action there dual use in character, and widely available—from the Internet to the classroom. We must never has been a reaction, often stronger completely base our strategy on something that we cannot control; and the lesson to be drawn for a “challenging and uncertain future.” We are from interaction with technology is that the ex- moving into the first revolution. perience is far from controllable. We must recog- But throughout military history—in fact, all nize that actions today will drive participation in, of human history—for every action there has been and actually permit the execution of, the first rev- a reaction, often stronger and usually more impor- olution. But even as we pursue the first series of tant. In military science this is translated into of- advances, we must consider and plan for the in- fensive and defensive weapons, tactics, and systems evitable reaction—the second revolution. of war. At other times it is manifested in a revolution brought about by a sudden technological ad- The First Revolution vance. Stone was superseded by iron and bronze It is generally accepted that the first RMA as the materials of offensive weaponry; and fortifi- proffers three key instruments of national power. cations were improved in response. Then came The first is the system of systems, shorthand for the rise of organized armies and the warrior on the vast collective synergy achieved by melding horseback as a weapons system until the cannon formerly disparate means to establish battlespace and gunpowder changed everything. Firepower awareness, command and control, and precision improved, with revolutionary jumps such as the force.1 Second and equally important is extended rifle, machine gun, and tank. The great defensive information dominance, the means to control bit- barriers of the early 20th century were countered streams in the increasingly interdependent global by Blitzkrieg, the massive armored battleship was information network. The third instrument—a overtaken by carrier airpower, and one day the corollary of the first—is known as information lethal ballistic missile may be rendered ineffective warfare, which can be defined as the capability to by a new defensive system. disrupt or override enemy information systems While this analogy is not precise, it is possi- while defending one’s own.2 ble to think of the journey of RMA from now to The system of systems has received most of the early part of the next century as consisting of the attention in the RMA debate. It is marked by two distinct revolutions. The tide of the first is technologies, tactics, and organizations that rising today and will crest shortly after the turn of allow for accurate wide-area scouting (unmanned the century. It is characterized by the system of aerial and undersea vehicles, overhead sensors, systems, information warfare, dominant knowl- Aegis radars, JSTARS aircraft, acoustic sensors); es- edge, precision weapons, sophisticated process- sentially instantaneous data fusion (global coming, display capabilities, low observables, smaller mand and control system, C4I for the warrior, dispersed forces, and massed weapons effects. linked combat centers); and precision massed The second revolution will likely be differ- fires (precision guided munitions, long-range ent. By watching the first revolution, an enemy strike, enhanced effect weapons). Combining may be in a position to “skim the cream” of its these systems, the first revolution will provide advancements while simultaneously moving into dominant battlespace knowledge and the ability the second revolution. It may thus obtain much to take full advantage of it—dissipating if not of the technology at substantially lower cost after eliminating the fog of war.3 the expensive researching, prototyping, and field- Applying extended information dominance ing are complete. That is the essence of the para- through “bitstreams” is a second characteristic dox: if the current revolution really is a radical that many associate with the first RMA. Providing process requiring major investment and an ex- information—instead of military capital stocks pensive and extensive force restructuring, we may and troops—could enable us to better execute al- be left with fewer resources to pursue a second liance obligations, undertake stand-off operations, revolution. The result may be a very expensive, and realize greater combat efficiencies. For in- highly capable, but distinctly first revolution stance, we could furnish both target information force structure. and surveillance through bitstreams to allies, who could then leverage their systems far more effectively in a region, such as by launching precision

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■ RMA ESSAY CONTEST

F/A–18 flight James D. Mossman) simulator. on (

Simulated aerial chemical attack, Roving Sands ’97. Combat Camera Squadr st 1

strikes or conducting peace op- and shock.” 5 These approaches and technologies erations based on distant sur- will indeed revolutionize warfare by early in the veillance systems. next century. Information warfare, also referred to as hacker warfare or Adversarial Reaction cyber warfare (or commercially While initially costly to research, develop, as information assurance), is the and field, many of the technologies of the first third emerging instrument. As revolution will quickly become accessible. This is

U.S. Navy national systems—from bank- due to the extensive applicability of commercial ing to electric power and com- technology inherent in the revolution. A poten- munication—become increas- tial enemy could recognize this fact and be able— ingly dependent on computer networks, a huge with relative ease—to incorporate these rapidly vulnerability arises. “Digi-criminals are already disseminating elements of the first RMA into its having a great time...the outlook for protection force structure. “The low cost of many informa- is bleak.” 4 By using advanced software to attack tion age technologies will help potential adver- enemy information systems, great advantages can saries improve their military capabilities as they accrue to the state or transnational actor best posi- learn to leverage these technologies effectively.” 6 tioned for cyber warfare. Access may directly come Both extended information dominance and from satellite broadcast via integrated computer information warfare will stem from computers. networks, or the Internet itself. This could become The knowledge that drives their implementation the guerrilla warfare of the future. will be widely available on the Internet, through Combined, these technologies comprise the commercial publications, and by study at Ameri- first RMA: “a new paradigm of warfare, based can and other Western institutions. Of particular not on attrition, but on the ability to paralyze significance will be access to display systems to fuse and organize information for easy access in smaller units—essentially the function of commercial information systems. Accelerating diffusion of

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Stavridis

these technologies will be a prime element in the anabolic agents, glycoprotein hormones, and beta strategic construct early in the 21st century. blockers have battle potential. Moreover, the Likewise the system of systems, although medical literature states that “three areas of ge- large and complex, is intelligible and applicable netics hold particular promise: gene identifica- to an enemy through its component parts: “The tion, disease susceptibility, and gene therapy.”8 larger the system, The fusion of enhanced human abilities with new the system of systems is the smaller and technologies may be a central element of a sec- intelligible and applicable to an more powerful the ond revolution. important individ- Third, a second revolution enemy could enemy through its component parts ual parts.”7 But an skim the cream from the advancements of the enemy would be first. Then it would have highly precise self-navi- left with the problem of countering these por- gation units, reasonable levels of computational tions of the first RMA that are too expensive for power, and somewhat sophisticated capabilities them to acquire. This could lead to an endless to undertake regional information dominance. cycle in warfare: an enemy discovers ways to fuse This enemy would likely have some ability to de- what it can afford from the first revolution with liver precise weapons, although it would probably new ideas, technologies, and concepts—thus cre- not have extensive military capital stocks of these ating a second revolution in military affairs. assets. It would have developed operational concepts that optimize the use of a few expensive The Second Revolution and highly precise systems by mixing them with Although it is difficult to identify all the sys- area strikes by far less expensive weapons. In ad- tems that will survive and become central to the dition, this enemy might have antisatellite sys- first RMA, it is evident that precision weapons, ad- tems, dazzlers to use against our optics, and effec- vanced sensors, low observables, sophisticated tive jamming and counterjamming devices. networks, and information systems will predomi- A fourth category that must not be over- nate. The challenge is to determine what might be looked is the capability of an enemy to use sim- central to a second revolution. One approach to ple, cheap intelligence systems—and lots of this problem is to examine the broad categories of them—to counter first revolution systems. For ex- technology and military-science application in the ample, hundreds of fishing boats with only a few first revolution and then seek counters to them. It carrying intelligence and navigation suites could is also important to identify areas of study that operate in the littorals acting as markers. Civilian may be under-represented in the first revolution. Looking at counters to the first RMA is particularly instructive and will probably provide the best point of departure (see the accompanying figure The Second Revolution which lists points and counterpoints). First, an enemy would seek to place many COUNTERS key command and control nodes underground. First Revolution Second Revolution They would be joined through hardened or precision strike hardening buried connectivity links. Other nodes would burying probably be located at sites that are politically dif- dispersing ficult to attack such as hospitals, schools, and multiplying marketplaces. Their nodes would also be small information warfare primitizing and highly dispersed across large areas, perhaps isolating in kiosks located in urban centers and towns counterattacking around the country. Mobility and inexpensive dominant maneuver responsive maneuver forms of stealth would be incorporated in their advanced sensors blinding design and placement. dispersing Second, many enemies would explore bio- multiplying logical advances that have warfare applicability. quality quantity Chemical and biological weapons are the most mass obvious threats; but beyond such essentially sim- centralized display diffused display ple weapons general advances in this field over the mid to long term may dwarf the importance of first revolution systems. Human performance NEW ELEMENTS OF THE SECOND REVOLUTION enhancers—particularly those that provide the biologics, advanced materials, and nonlinear ability to process enormous levels of data and scientific advances rapidly make coherent decisions—may be the most significant advances. Stimulants, narcotics,

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M–2 Bradley digital equipment. iano)

Predator UAV over USS Carl Vinson. U.S. Navy (JeffreyU.S. Navy S. V

aircraft, both rotary and fixed wing, could operate in and among high-tech aircraft. In certain situations such primitive systems can be extremely effective, particularly in conflicts fought at a threshold below full regional war. A fifth concern is the massive use of cheap, crude, but potentially effective cruise missiles and mines (at sea and on land). Even an Aegis system or Patriot battery can be quickly depleted of anti- cruise missiles. Mines are a challenge. Flooding landing zones or littoral seas with them can be an Public Affairs Detachment (Richard Detachment Public Affairs Puckett)

effective denial strategy. Bases for forward forces th 13 can be closed by placing large numbers of crude but relatively inexpensive explosives at key points. Destroying or denying something goes a long way toward controlling it. composites, and thermoplastic resins hold extra- Weapons of mass destruction, from low-yield ordinary promise. Such scientific innovations will tactical nuclear devices to the next generation of be shared over the Internet and openly taught at chemical and biological weapons, are a possible American universities. Pre-lubricated surfaces, sixth area of concern. We must not assume that nylon composites superimposed on steel, dia- an enemy will be constrained from using such mond coated bearings, and other materials may weapons because of our superior nuclear arsenal. play in the second wave of RMA technology. All It may think we would not respond with nuclear the precision and display capability in the world strategic strikes against limited first use of chemi- will not be of use if targets are hardened beyond cal, biological, or tactical nuclear warheads—and the ability of such systems to destroy them. it would probably be right. For example, an There will also be new operational concepts enemy could indicate that it would employ tacti- associated with the second RMA, constituting an cal nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons only eighth area of interest. Clearly, if the central orga- at sea, perhaps constraining our ability to re- nizing tenet of the first revolution is maneuver spond with strikes on their population centers warfare, tactics will be developed to counter that and effectively limiting our use of similar approach. What could be called “responsive ma- weapons to the same area. neuver” may evolve, which could combine static Seventh, second RMA advancements in defenses and rapid counterattacks that seek to armor and materials may eventually counter first revolution systems and pose a significant challenge. Advances in ceramics, steel alloys, polymer

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flank, isolate, encircle, and kill maneuvering ■ Evaluate potential second revolution systems for units. Entrapment and wide-area ambush tactics research, development, and fielding. These technologies may develop beyond current levels of expecta- might include biologics and advanced materials. Non- tion. Although today we are enamored with pre- linear accelerations in technology and science should cision and maneuver, the endless competition in be considered. ■ Develop operational concepts to overcome potential enemy responses, such as the cycle of maneuver the second revolution like the first will generate countered by responsive maneuver, responding to prim- new doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures itive systems and tactics, and exploring anti-mass/quantity strikes against fewer though more precise and om- niscient systems. warfare of precision versus mass—often mani- ■ Recognize that the first revolution will include fested in new tactics—tells us that more change some costly mistakes, miscues, and maldeployments. lies ahead. The second revolution like the first Patience will be required in fielding first wave systems, will generate new doctrine and new tactics, tech- then adapting them to the second revolution. ■ niques, and procedures. Develop a hedging strategy to react as the second revolution accelerates. Finally, we must not overlook longer term research that goes beyond a second revolution for a During the early debate over the revolution truly nonlinear discovery that utterly and in- in military affairs, Admiral William A. Owens, the stantly changes the calculus of warfare. Given the former Vice Chairman, indicated that “the prob- acceleration of technological advance, it may be lem with deep, fast, and rampant innovation is possible to leap ahead to ideas that are only dimly not getting people to accept the new but to sur- glimpsed today—concepts that bend the laws of render the old.” 9 Ironically, that same sentiment physics beyond the horizon of common thought. can be applied to our preoccupation with the first Hyperpropulsion, optics, biologics, control of the revolution as a second looms on the horizon. JFQ electromagnetic spectrum—the possibilities are endless. This may be an area for hedging through NOTES research and highly limited prototyping. 1 William A. Owens, “The Emerging System of Sys- In a general sense, the essence of a second tems,” Military Review, vol. 75, no. 3 (May–June 1995), RMA is the application of asymmetrical warfare pp. 15–19. against the United States, which is the leader in 2 Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic As- first revolution technologies and systems. This is sessment 1996 (Washington: National Defense Univer- a reverse of the competitive strategic approach sity, 1996), pp. 185–90. that was pursued in the mid-1980s during the cli- 3 William A. Owens, “The American Revolution in max of the Cold War. While such actions are un- Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 10 (Winter likely to endanger our existence, they can 1995–96), p. 37. 4 Arjen Lenstra, “Communication,” Spectrum (January threaten our critical national interests in an in- 1996), p. 32. creasingly interdependent world. The second rev- 5 Thomas G. Mahnken, “War in the Information olution may thus provide an enemy with a great Age,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 10 (Winter 1995–96), p. 40. deal of asymmetric leverage—that is, influence 6 David S. Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of In- out of proportion to political, economic, and mil- formation Age Technologies (Washington: National De- itary strength. fense University, 1996), p. 10. 7 John Naisbitt, Global Paradox (New York: Morrow In sum, we must continue our progress and Company, 1994), p. 12. 8 through the first revolution. This course of action Ed McCabe, “Medical Genetics,” Journal of the provides the best hedge against a range of chal- American Medical Association, vol. 274, no. 23 (June 19, 1996), p. 1819. lenges that may confront us in the next century. 9 Owens, “Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 37. At the same time we must consider the courses enemies may pursue to achieve a second revolu- This article is an edited and abridged version of an entry tion as they search for asymmetric leverage. Ac- that received first prize in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Contest cordingly, we should: on the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation. ■ Set up analysis cells to explore possible decisions by enemies with regard to first and second RMA systems. This should be done independently by the services, Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, etc. The results then need to be compared, fused, and incorporated in upcoming strategic and procurement activities, including those stemming from the quadrennial defense review.

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Applique—Windows- based system for Force XXI.

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur. —Guilio Douhet Public Affairs Detachment (JacquelinePublic Affairs Griggs) th The Profession of Arms 28 in the Information Age By ARSENIO T. GUMAHAD II

achieve national objectives—a form of war about SECOND who knows what, when, where, and why and just SECOND how well we know both ourselves and our enemy. Its target seems to be the human mind. Informa- PRIZE tion dominance has thus become a prerequisite for fighting future wars. The use of information in war has been a basic warfighting requirement throughout his- 96 tory. Technology has made information more available, and now it may become the weapon of choice. Furthermore, a revolution in military affairs (RMA) involving information may be on the horizon. Some view information warfare only in a supporting role—enhancing traditional combat missions. Others regard it as a powerful capability any believe information is a potent on the strategic level, at a point on the conflict instrument in war. The military spectrum before general escalation and deploy- subscribes to this idea and calls it ment of combat forces for action. information warfare, defined as any In addition, some hold that information Mactions that deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy warfare can be conducted prior to conflict break- enemy information and its functions; protect us ing out. Modern strategy often perceives an from such actions; and exploit friendly military enemy state as a system of concentric rings repre- information functions. To some, information senting fielded armies, the population, infrastruc- warfare simply means using information to ture, organic essentials, and leadership with information binding them together. Disrupting the information flow by attacking internal infrastruc- Lieutenant Colonel Arsenio T. Gumahad II, USAF, serves as a project ture hinders the ability of an enemy to conduct director within the Office of Space and Technology at Headquarters, offensive operations. However, some caution that Department of the Air Force.

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advocates of information warfare ignore its unan- The United States relies upon technology and in- ticipated and perhaps counterproductive effects. formation systems to conduct its affairs. Targeting Information is increasingly becoming impor- them creates widespread confusion and terror. In tant to the power and wealth of modern society. government and industry the threat of intrusion Nations once fought for control of territory and is all too real. According to the National Com- puter Security Association, 69 percent of those firms surveyed in 1993 were infected with a malicious virus, a problem which costs American busi- What is Information? ness an estimated $3 billion annually. The government is not immune to such tam- nformation begins as derived data from observable facts or events. In- pering. An attack on the Internet by a graduate terpreting data leads to the development of information. The ultimate student in 1990 disrupted computer installations Iinterpreter is the person receiving the data. At times, though, an ob- nationwide. In the same year Australian hackers served event is too complex for the human mind to dissect. Machines are were charged with damaging data on U.S. govern- thus used to reduce data into a manageable and comprehensible set. They ment computers. The pool of potentially hostile are information systems and come in both hardware and software forms. information warriors is huge and includes former The draft of Joint Pub 3-13, Information Warfare, refers to information as any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts, data, or opinions in any medium or form. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense the pool of potentially hostile Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines it as the meaning that information warriors is huge a human assigns to data by means of the known convention used in their representation. Others conceive of it as a physical property—like mass and Soviet and Warsaw Pact intelligence operatives, energy, inherent in all matter. Under this concept military systems are seen mercenaries, unemployed technical experts, et al. as being based on, if not composed of, information. The role of informa- Eastern Europe, particularly Bulgaria, is said to be tion warfare therefore becomes apparent: “If information is a veritably the leading exporter of viruses today. physical property, then in the information age winning wars may depend on being able to hurl the most information at the enemy, while safeguard- Law and Morality ing against retaliation” (John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Information, The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald Power, and Grand Strategy: In Athena’s Camp,” in The Information Revolu- Fogleman, suggests that “because exploiting [in- tion and National Security: Dimensions and Directions.) formation systems] will readily cross international borders, we must be cognizant of what the laws allow and will not allow.” Information warfare raises questions that are difficult to address. resources; but the new battleground also involves When does war begin in an electronic environ- the information domain. As one characterization ment? How does one measure damage and define of this phenomenon has it: victory? Does a malicious probe of a computer Evolving technologies may result in a transition from system warrant response in kind or a more vio- information in warfare—information as a supporting lent response? Who decides to deploy offensive function of the traditional attrition/maneuver opera- information weapons? Would a systems attack by tions—to information as warfare—in which attrition the United States require congressional approval? and maneuver become supporting elements of mili- The vulnerabilities of traditional nonmilitary tary, political, and economic leverage through infor- targets are heightened in information warfare. mation control.1 Since enemy civilian infrastructure is a potential target, Advanced societies depend on an infrastructure that includes subways, airports, telephone ...infowar may only refine the way modern warfare networks, and electric power grids. Terrorists, has shifted toward civilian targets. Taking down a knowledgeable of these vulnerabilities, need only country’s air traffic control or phone systems might be target them to wreak havoc. The Internet is now a done cleanly with computers—but it still represents 2 popular and convenient vehicle for terrorists and an attack on civilians. rogue nations to exchange techniques for produc- As in the case of nuclear weapons, Clause- ing crude but effective weapons. witz’s notion of absolute war appears real in con- Two forms of sabotage or terrorism are possi- ducting information warfare. While the attack is ble. The first is the traditional disruption of order clean the resulting suffering may be morally un- using violence. The second and more sophisti- justifiable. Consideration of moral and legal is- cated is either electronic or information-based. sues raised by information warfare has not advanced as quickly as technology and doctrine. They span the legal spectrum and include issues of intelligence, space, use of force, and neutrality.

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■ RMA ESSAY CONTEST James D. Mossman) on ( Combat Camera Squadr st 1 Air operations center, Roving Sands ’97. Although our military justice system provides a the result of a hundred battles” he was referring limited foundation on which to base new laws to what is known today as situational awareness. and regulations in this area, the only recourse is Hierarchical organizations were a hallmark of to extend the provisions of current laws to cover the industrial age. The need to respond to the in- information warfare. Without a definitive legal novations of the industrial revolution produced a basis, however, the limits of this new form of hierarchical society. This strong structure was nec- warfare remain vague and controversial. essary to attain strict organizational harmony and discipline. The military more than any other insti- Cyber Warriors tution needed strong command structure to prose- Equipment for the cyber warrior is not sci- cute its unique mission of organized violence. It is ence fiction. Development is underway—partly as evident that order and discipline characterize the advanced demonstrations found in the Army sci- professional military, especially in combat. ence and technology master plan—and includes Futurists predict a notable shift in societal multisensor-aided technology, digital battlefield behavior in the information age. Some envision communications, intelligent minefields, precision conditions in which the individual is the center- munitions, night imaging, and integrated multi- piece—personal autonomy as the common ele- media information transport. It is only a matter ment of future social interaction—a world which of time before these systems move from the labo- becomes “multi-centered and multi-functional.”3 ratory to the battlefield. The cyber warrior is al- Here “we will socialize in digital neighborhoods most completely autonomous with tools config- in which physical space will be irrelevant and ured to provide maximum information about the time will play a different role.”4 In an address be- combat environment. As an integrated capability, fore the Association of the United States Army in the gear allows for collecting, processing, analy- 1994 General Frederick Franks stated that “as in- sis, and interpreting information critical to a mis- formation proliferates at faster speeds and is sion. When Sun Tzu stated that “If you know available to a wider array of individuals, hierar- your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear chical organizations evolve into networks and power is shifted more to individuals and groups.”

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The challenge to military leaders will be inte- will favor direct lines of command with mid-level grating disparate interests and varied emotional grades eliminated. The military will be comprised levels of individuals. The traditional collective and of well trained, skilled warrior-technicians who corporate nature of armed forces is affected by a are comfortable operating with advanced elec- trend toward individualism. For armies to succeed tronic gadgetry. in war they must have a cohesive, integrated, and Conflicts in the information age will not be common objective. The military is built around a less common or less violent. On the contrary, the “team concept” wherein the well-being of the unit transition period between the industrial and in- supersedes that of the individual. Members func- formation ages is likely to be even more chaotic.6 tioning strictly as individuals undermine unit in- If committed to war, cyber warriors will fight as tegrity and threaten mission success. ferociously as their predecessors. Information will With the stroke of a key and access to an e- enhance the way they operate on the battlefield. mail address, one can easily bypass the normal These future warriors will quickly outflank and chain. Democratic principles of free speech could outmaneuver an enemy with knowledge of its po- damage the effectiveness of established channels sition and combat situation. With information if taken to the extreme. (The President has an In- age weapons at their disposal they will engage an ternet address so that anyone, anywhere, anytime enemy precisely and decisively. can send a message to him, For information to be a catalyst for a new conflicts in the information unfiltered and unedited.) But RMA, doctrinal and organizational changes must is the chain of command occur. Technology enables the application of revo- age will not be less common necessary in the information lutionary innovations to warfare. But to sustain or less violent age? Hierarchical organiza- their power and confirm their worth as strategic tion must endure for the mil- and operational weapons requires modification of itary to succeed in battle. But it is questionable organizational structures supported by doctrine ar- whether the structure of the military will survive ticulating the efficient and proper employment of if central bureaucracies disappear, and some fore- technological innovations on each level of war. see a day when traditional command and control Past conflicts yield insights into how technology arrangements will become obsolete. But unity of helps ensure victory. One aspect seems constant— command— one precept which has remained un- formulating doctrine to exploit the full potential altered in every successful war—must not be com- of technological innovation was a tedious process. promised. Thus greater discipline is required to Yet devising doctrine early is important to the ex- preserve command unity and control. pert use of information capabilities. An organizational structure grounded in doctrine guarantees Training and Doctrine the orderly development and effective employ- Information technology shapes training. ment of information age weapons. State-of-the-art technology promises to make it On the strategic level the United States seeks more cost-effective without sacrificing perfor- to acquire, exploit, and protect information to sup- mance and perhaps even improving it. Simulators port national objectives. Sectors for exploitation are more realistic and offset the high operational and protection include the economic, political, price of real-world training. and military. Cultural as well as social information U.S. tank commanders of the 21st century will train in may also be required to support U.S. interests and a virtual world more than in the real one. The result strategic goals. On the operational level informa- will be soldiers who are better prepared—by computer tion warfare consists of attacking or defending in- simulators integrated into their vehicles that will en- formation as well as exploiting it. Since informa- able them to practice just hours before combat.5 tion is critical to friend and foe alike, the object is the denial, deception, destruction, and attack of The Army is experimenting with battle labo- enemy information-critical systems. ratories using advanced technology and systems Military doctrine codifies the belief about the to simulate the complex interaction of diverse ele- best way to conduct military affairs. Doctrine is ments on the future battlefield. An Army exercise drawn most of all from experience. But past events conducted in autumn 1994, Atlantic Resolve, em- may not be relevant in the information age. Cur- ployed live, virtual, and constructive simulations rent efforts to develop Air Force doctrine tend to for training and experimentation. The method treat information warfare as merely a new tool to was positive and since then the battle laboratory enhance missions. It is not generally viewed as a has paid dividends by conditioning decisions in weapon on its own merits. Since experience in in- resource allocation and weapons acquisition. formation warfare is limited, doctrine for its use is The high-tech military of the future will be smaller but more sophisticated and specialized. In two to three decades the organizational structure

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Top Ten Information Warfare Targets Global Hawk. Teledyne Ryan(David Aeronautical Gossett) Teledyne 1. Culpeper (Virginia) electronic switch which handles all Federal funds and transactions not easily derived. Develop- years the Armed Forces will confront diverse 2. Alaska pipeline which carries ing information warfare threats from advanced states to non-state actors 10 percent of all U.S. domestic oil doctrine results from an such as terrorists. Knowing one’s enemy is a time- 3. Electronic switching system which man- analysis of all the likely uses less imperative in war. Therefore future doctrine ages all telephony of information on all levels must stress flexibility in strategy above all else. In 4. Internet of war. In other words, an Vietnam, strategic bombardment did little to 5. Time distribution system examination of how it is change the course of the events. The lesson here 6. Panama Canal used as a national strategy is important: the love of technology must not mechanism is critical in ad- deter the search for more effective and proper 7. Worldwide military command and control dition to how it is employed strategic alternatives. system (WMCSS) on the lower levels of opera- Doctrine and strategy must account for the 8. Air Force satellite control network tional art and tactics. In all diverse mix of adversaries the Nation could face 9. Strait of Malacca, the major maritime link cases, both the offensive in the future. The threats range from a sophisti- between Europe-Arabian Peninsula and and defensive nature of in- cated enemy employing information technolo- the Western Pacific and East Asia formation warfare requires gies to the same extent as the United States to a 10. National Photographic Interpretation Cen- detailed examination. rival totally devoid of high-tech capabilities. ter (Washington) Clausewitz said that —Published in Wired magazine war “is a continuation of A Sophisticated Enemy (July/August 1993) political intercourse, car- The Persian Gulf War revealed the effective- ried on with other means.” ness and power of information age technologies Wars commence when con- and weaponry. Some regional powers are looking flicting nations can no longer conduct political for ways to counter precision guided weapons, dialogue. It is the last resort if diplomats fail to computers, and space-based assets. An informa- produce an agreement. But are ideas promoted by tion warfare attack on any information-advanced Clausewitz still valid in the information age? He state may devastate its national infrastructure. stressed the relationship between industrial age Targeting financial, communications, electrical, states in politics and war. An enemy in the 21st and transportation nerve centers seriously im- century may be as ambiguous as Clausewitz’s de- pedes an enemy’s ability to conduct war. Theoret- piction of the fog of war. When nation-states give ically, victory is achieved without firing a single way to transnational interest groups, who will the shot—at least a psychological victory demonstrat- military fight? Over the next twenty to thirty ing the will and resources of the attacker. Among advocates of information war this is the most discussed scenario. Sun Tzu instructs us, “to fight

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and conquer in all your battles is not supreme ex- data enables direction of forces at the right time cellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking in support of tactical, operational, and strategic the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” operations. On the operational level information warfare seeks to distort and control the “adversary’s per- Information as Weapon ception of the battlespace by controlling or cor- A successful information warfare offensive rupting the information he uses, while providing targeted at America would be a major disaster. the friendly commander with an unambiguous Today an element of information dominance en- picture of his battlespace.” 7 Techniques are used sures that U.S. and allied systems are safe from to defeat enemy information capabilities within any attack. The government, military, and indus- battlespace constraints, including attacks on com- try must remain alert to attempts aimed at inter- mand and control network—the ability to main- rupting our activities. Enemy software penetra- tain situational awareness and decisionmaking in tion of the U.S. intelligence network or the the face of uncertainty—and the intelligence ap- communications infrastructure of a military com- paratus—the capacity to predict and anticipate mander could be fatal in war. Nations with the intentions and actions of friendly forces. De- emerging capabilities are known to target our sys- stroying these key elements at first opportunity is tems. Terrorist groups and multinational organi- mandatory. zations—to include the private business sector— Space-based systems provide significant com- also have keen interests in information sabotage. mand, control, and intelligence capabilities to an The Internet attack in 1990 was perpetrated enemy, perhaps equal to those of the United by an amateur. Professional computer hackers States. Thus a top priority of information warfare is sponsored by hostile states or groups can do much enemy space systems. Tak- more damage. And, as mentioned earlier, there are information attackers may be ing out such assets quickly many computer specialists willing to offer their and precisely is paramount. expertise to the highest bidder. Since the arena for far away from their objectives Technology and weapons hackers is the global network of computers and development in the near communications, information attackers may be as term must focus on neutralizing enemy eyes and far away from their objectives as possible, unlike ears in both air and space. Potential hardware and terrorists planting bombs. The covert nature of software weapons include anti-satellite munitions, this endeavor is especially threatening. precision bombs to strike ground stations, and Another trend hindering U.S. information software attacks against computers and networks. dominance in war is the proliferation of military- Tactically, this kind of warfare consists of elec- relevant technologies outside the United States. tronic measures and physical destruction of infor- According to one recent analysis, mation nodes. ...precise navigation and imagery in the wrong Force Enhancement hands can imperil U.S. forces. Space-based communications reduce the U.S. advantage in military com- Advanced systems can enhance our warfight- mand and control. Cryptologic capabilities could pering capability with superior command, control, mit terrorists to plan havoc undetected.8 communications, and intelligence networks. Their contribution during Desert Storm stimulated our Economically strong nations or groups freely appetite for high-tech systems. Current systems purchase advanced technologies on the open are routinely used in operations such as jamming market. Controlling the flow of such technology radars, monitoring communications, and tracking outside the United States or to radical actors is movements. Future technology could enable us to difficult. Most advanced systems have legitimate impose electronic embargoes and detect vehicles civilian applications. The military is increasingly or identify individuals on the battlefield. turning to commercial products because of de- Real-time or near real-time information on clining budgets. Dual use or sharing of commer- enemy locations, dispositions, capabilities, and cial systems to support military operations, par- indicators of intentions from surveillance and re- ticularly communications satellites, may be the connaissance assets gives commanders situational wave of the future. The fear lies in their vulnera- awareness. Wide bandwidth digital communica- bility to attack and exploitation. Military systems tion systems afford real-time command and con- are usually designed for security and survivability trol links among commanders and units and be- whereas civilian systems are not because of the tween the National Command Authorities and costs involved. globally-dispersed forces. Precision navigation systems, like the 24-satellite constellation that com- prises the global positioning system, enhance weapons and delivery systems. Accurate weather

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Testing Dismounted and annihilation of infrastructure (introducing a Soldier System. software virus). With such tools the information warrior could change the course of an action by a potential enemy to favor U.S. policy.

The Gulf War demonstrated the decisiveness of information technologies. A new RMA is emerging with these capabilities at the center. An effective information warfare campaign depends on developing the doctrine and organizations to fully exploit its potential. At national level, covert information warfare against an enemy can help achieve policy objectives before committing forces. On the operational and tactical levels, it incapacitates enemy information-based systems, leaving its military confused while giving U.S. forces an overwhelming advantage in the field. Cyber Warrior However potent such warfare is against a technologically advanced enemy, it must be used integrated headgear—collects in a judicious and calculated way. Information

information for analysis and funnels onk) warfare is not a panacea for all conflicts and can- latest intelligence to soldier in the field not replace arms in combat. As in the past, know- lightweight helmet—provides greater ing one’s enemy and how best to defeat it are cru- protection with mounted display for cial. History reveals the futility of employing night-vision sensors, miniature flat advanced technology against an ill-defined enemy video panel, and voice activation for center of gravity. Recourse to information warfare computer must be objective and highly selective. JFQ

body armor—allows room for computer (William Detachment Public Affairs Cr th

28 NOTES while protecting soldier against nuclear and chemical hazards 1 “All warfare is based on de- James R. FitzSimonds, “Intelligence and the Revolu- tion in Military Affairs,” in U.S. Intelligence at the Cross- thermal sight—sends multiple still- ception,” Sun Tzu once declared. frames back to the high command, roads, edited by Roy Godson et al. (Washington: “Hence when able to attack, we Brassey’s, 1995), p. 375. providing battlefield intelligence and must seem unable; when using 2 Douglas Waller, “Onward Cyber Soldiers,” Time, damage assessment our forces, we must seem inac- vol. 146, no. 8 (August 21, 1995), p. 44. computer—runs technology and gives tive; when we are near, we must 3 Yoneji Masuda, “Computopia,” in The Information soldier friend-or-foe identification, make the enemy believe we are Technology Revolution, edited by Tom Forester (Cam- detects mines and chemicals, and tells far away; when far away, we must bridge: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 623. exact location (embedded in lumbar make him believe we are near.” 4 Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (New York: Vin- region of body armor) Deception is a feature of war- tage Books, 1995), p. 7. 5 Judith Gunther, Suzanne Kantra, and Robert Lan- wireless connection—links weapon to fare—in the 21st century decep- greth, “Digital Warrior,” Popular Science (September 1994), tion will be information manipu- monitor in helmet allowing soldier to p. 63. take aim without exposing body lation. Targeting information 6 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democrati- infrastructure to create misinfor- zation and War,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/ mation, confusion, and panic is June 1995), pp. 79–97. an objective. The results can be 7 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Con- disruption of society, economic collapse, elimina- cepts for Information Operations, pamphlet 525-6 (August tion of decisionmaking ability, and reduced mili- 1995), p. 9. tary effectiveness. Information warfare is useful in 8 Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic As- battle and a promising weapon of choice. Clause- sessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition (Wash- witz’s dictum that war is simply an extension of ington: National Defense University, 1995), p. 155. politics by other means is also applicable to covert actions. This article is an edited and abridged version of an entry that received second prize in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Contest Far removed from physical harm, informa- on the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the tion warriors using the global network can attack National Defense University Foundation. information systems worldwide. Their strategic goals might include theft (stealing strategic plans), modification (inserting errors in databases), destruction (wiping out economic intelligence data),

20 JFQ / Spring 1997 0715Schneider 8/12/97 7:42 AM Page 21 Signal Company, Combat Camera (Kyle Davis) Signal Company, th BLACK LIGHTS: 55 Chaos, Complexity, and the Promise of Information Warfare By JAMES J. SCHNEIDER

rthur Clarke, a science fiction writer, THIRD stated that any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from PRIZE magic. Although his point may be quaintA it bears directly on the debate over the revolution in military affairs (RMA), which is long on description and short on explanation of 96 future military technology. This is most evident 96 in the promised wizardry of information warfare. The magical quality of information warfare stems from a vague understanding of the nature of information itself. Since rational discussion is predicated on the explanatory power of carefully chosen conceptual terminology, the RMA debate can be furthered only to the extent that the issues James J. Schneider is professor of military theory are viewed from a common framework. Such a in the School of Advanced Military Studies at the critical perspective allows one to see the true lim- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. its and powers of information warfare. At the

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same time a closer look at information helps clar- changes and differences can be determined ify two questions central to this debate: How do through comparison creates an inseparable link information technologies create a revolution in between control and information. Control devel- the means and methods of waging war? What ob- ops information in two reciprocal ways. First, be- jective criteria can help measure such revolution- cause control is goal-directed there must be a con- ary change? tinuous comparison between the current and intended state. This ongoing comparison gener- Information and Control ates feedback to the controlling agent. Second, Information and control represent two sides the controller engenders information in the form of the same coin. However, the discussion of in- of adjustment instructions that feed forward to formation invariably neglects the control rela- the controlled agent. tionship. Control is regulating influence directed In warfare armies ultimately seek to domi- at some predetermined goal. It thus consists of nate and control enemies by destroying their will. two elements: the regulating influence of one This struggle for control creates feedback infor- agent or actor over another in that the former mation, as the status of armies is in constant flux. causes change in the behavior of the latter; and Staffs continuously process information and as- purpose in that influence is guided toward a prior sess situations vis-à-vis overall mission objectives. objective set by the controlling agent. Since lead- Commanders feed forward information as “fra- ership provides purpose, direction, and motiva- gos” or other forms of instruction. The feedback tion it is easy to see the important role that the of information as intelligence about self and military leader plays in the control and regulation enemy and the feedforward of information as in- of forces. struction completes the reciprocal cycle of con- The notion of control exists on all levels of trol. It is only through the process of control that human activity and forms the basis of society. information has meaning or indeed objective ex- The primordial urge to dominate and regulate istence. Fundamentally, then, the object of infor- both nature and the environment puts control at mation warfare is to destroy the ability of an the center of the evolution- enemy to control while protecting one’s own. the present revolution is a ary spiral. Domination over nature was realized through Crisis and Revolution military expression of the technology that put man on Recognizing the relationship between con- latest information revolution a path from the stone axe to trol and information provides a perspective from the supercomputer. The which to regard RMA. The present revolution is a ability to produce and use military expression of the latest information revo- tools such as the axe changed human thought. As lution. James Beniger has argued that this current described by Burke and Ornstein, the “axe-mak- upheaval is the fourth to occur. According to his ing ability to do things in the proper order is one view the natural evolution of living systems like of the brain’s many natural talents.” Indeed, they armies creates a crisis in control. That crisis is re- describe it as the whole foundation of planning solved only after a sudden transformation in in- and problemsolving: formation processing and communication—an ...the axemaker talent for performing the precise, se- information revolution. The first crisis occurred quential process that shaped axes would later give rise four billion years ago as the issue of controlling to the precise, sequential thought that would eventu- reproduction arose. DNA—a complex macromole- ally generate language and logic and rules which cule deoxyribonuchic acid with programming, would formalize and discipline thinking itself. The decision, and control apparatus—became the first newly dominant sequential talent of the mind was information revolution and resolved the crisis. It able to use the “cut-up-nature-and-control-it” capabil- “organizes matter and energy at the most funda- ity to extract more knowledge from the world and then mental level of control [and is] not only the most use that knowledge to cause further change. Thanks to basic of all control technologies...but also one the axemakers’ talents and their gifts, things literally whose capabilities are unlikely to be rivaled by would never, at any time, be the same.1 technologies of our own making for many generations to come.”2 DNA is the basic building block The domination of nature through all as- of all genetic material. A one-inch strand holds as pects of technology brought change and differ- much information as 12,000 typed pages or ence to the forefront of control. The idea that two twenty 500-page books. The nucleus of a single things are recognizably different or that things human cell contains five feet of genetic code, change over time is key to the theory of control— equivalent to 2,000 such books. DNA information cybernetics—and the etymology of control, a term which comes from the Latin contrarotulare, meaning to mark similarities and differences. That

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is structured to provide feedforward executive entire feedforward-feedback cybernetic loop that control over human life by shaping and organiz- was swift, clear, and reliable. Command and staff ing it. Soldiers constitute the basic genetic mater- processes are basically poor models of the brain ial in a combat organization. Education, training, and nervous system. Evolution of the brain led to and doctrine are military DNA that forms war- modern war and human society, thus creating a riors and thus shapes the Armed Forces. third control crisis. The second control crisis emerged 600 mil- Genetic control via DNA programming does lion years ago when living things began to move have one shortcoming: the genetic blueprint is through space and time. It was resolved by an in- virtually fixed forever. The encoded information formation revolution that resulted in the brain cannot be reprogrammed, but roughly 120,000 and central nervous system. Chemistry domi- years ago humans began to reprogram themselves nated life processes for four billion years until through the use of technology. Beginning with the rapid development of simple tools they were able to extend natural capabilities and circum- vent their hardwired genetic code. By 10,000 B.C. Black Light the swift development of tools led to a crisis in the control of new technology and induced a his term refers to the invisible or “black” portion of the third information upheaval, the agricultural revo- electromagnetic spectrum which is the domain of x-rays lution. In addition to the five basic mechanical T and radio waves. “Black lights” is used in another sense, tools—lever, wheel, pulley, screw, and wedge— however. In boxing a fighter may receive a hard shot to the head cultural tools such as alphabets, numbers, laws, that causes a knockout. Some boxers report seeing “black lights” money, organized armies, towns, and states before they sink into oblivion: they see and become surrounded by emerged to extend and enhance natural capabili- a shimmering, glowing aura of darkness that is referred to in med- ties. The agricultural revolution culminated with ical terminology as a “visual scotoma.” The boxers are experiencing the rise of civilization which was, in effect, a con- the paradox of being conscious of their unconsciousness. The rea- trol system that sought to regulate four tasks. son for this phenomenon is that when the higher cognitive centers First, governance by a central government—nor- of the brain shut down, the lower areas, called the limbic system, mally headed by a king—integrated society kick in and preserve a primitive sense of awareness. Thus a kind of through a feedforward system of laws. A primitive self-organization occurs among human systems in the same ways bureaucracy afforded feedback control. Second, armies undergo self-organization after the initial clash of arms. Air security provided by armed force protected the theorists such as John A. Warden III and David A. Deptula develop state and its interests. The first RMA arose out of an argument for “parallel warfare” that is based on a fundamental this development. Third, logistics through an disregard of the ability of a military system to self-organize at economic system ensured relative efficiency in lower echelons of command. The ability for self-organization the extraction, processing, and distribution of greatly limits the practical utility of so-called parallel warfare. See scarce resources. Fourth, science—embodied ini- John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal, tially in priests—ultimately sought to understand vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 41–55; David A. Deptula, “Firing for the world and extend human fitness beyond na- Effect,” Defense and Airpower Series (Arlington, Va.: AEF, August ture by new advances in technology. At the basis 24, 1995); and Michael E. Ruane, “Wisdom of ‘Smart’ Bombs Still of this revolution was an increasingly homoge- Debated,” Philadelphia Inquirer, August 14, 1996, pp. 1, 3. neous society bound together by verbal and written flow of information. At the same time writing and simple arithmetic provided requisite information processing capabilities to guide civilization to its next control crisis. primitive electronics became important when creatures began to stir. “The first electronic sys- Lightning in the Wires tems possessed by primitive animals were essen- For over 10,000 years civilization moved tially guidance systems, analogous logically to along at the pace of a walking man. Information sonar or radar.”3 The brain and nervous system travelled at the same speed. During this period the had two advantages. First, the brain provided ex- extension of human natural fitness had reached ecutive control that feedforwarded information its limit inherent in existing technology. The con- in a dynamic lethal environment. It also lent a straint was that tools and toolmaking relied upon staff control function that rapidly assessed infor- muscle power. However, technological advances mation feedback from the outside world. Second, during the Enlightenment replaced simple tools the electronic-based nervous system provided an with complex machines which were characterized by the use of inanimate sources of power. The steam engine was the first child of the industrial revolution. That advance, rather than

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Combined arms exercise at 29 Palms, California.

USS Key West. Marine Division, Combat Camera (E.J.Marine Division, Combat Camera Young) d 2

being a revolution in its own right, was really a crisis of control. Since machines did not require muscle power, they were no longer controlled directly by a human hand. As a consequence whole elaborate control systems had to be developed to master machines, and thus cybernetics was born. “Gritty steam engines, not teeny chips, hauled the world into the information age.”4 Machines like the

steam engine were quickly integrated into complex Olive) U.S. Navy (James W. systems such as railroads. Because of their distributed nature and speed they had to be controlled in new ways. Just as nature resolved its second con- and swiftly. Of these, speed was the most impor- trol crisis with an electronic-based nervous system, tant factor and established a quantitative mile- civilization resolved this new crisis with a similar stone for the magnitude of the current informa- electronic innovation—the telegraph. tion revolution. The influence of the telegraph was profound. In one stroke it dealt with the problem of distrib- Equating Information and Energy uted control—mastering segmented cellular In 1905 Albert Einstein formulated his the- agents and activities separated by vast distances in ory on the relationship between mass and energy. space and time. For billions of years this problem We can postulate a similar relation between en- prevented single-cell organisms from being net- ergy and information beginning with the seem- worked into multifunctional distributed organ- ingly trivial observation that no two objects can isms. As with the nervous system electricity held occupy the same space at the same time, a funda- the key. In the human body nerve tissue can sus- mental characteristic of mass. Similarly no two tain an information signal at 260 miles per hour, bits of information can occupy the same space at fast enough to regulate and control distributed the same time; thus information has the physical agents like arms and legs and activities like diges- dimension of mass.6 This relationship suggests tion and reproduction.5 Degrade this flow of infor- two basic and revolutionary implications for any mation appreciably and death follows inevitably. rigorous theory of information warfare. First, as a Similarly the telegraph was able to network soci- form of mass, information flows. Second, the ety, economic markets, government bureaucracies, speed of its transmission marks a revolutionary and distributed military formations because information was able to move unambiguously, reliably,

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break with all forms of regulation and control key elements of solid mechanics.7 Dense mono- prior to the middle of the 19th century. lithic armies were controlled and regulated by the The emergence of electricity as the primary discrete and sequential movement of the written means of regulation and control radically altered and verbal word. Armies fought in a manner de- the physical characteristics of living organisms scribed by Soviet military theorist G.S. Isserson as and human organizations. Before electricity these the “strategy of a single point.”8 They collided systems were characterized by their solidity: like huge bowlingballs on small point-like battle- dense, segmented, cellu- fields. Electronic-based control and regulation dense monolithic armies were lar, and monolithic. A gave rise to parallel distributed information net- dense, solid system was works which could provide a continuous flow of controlled by the discrete controlled by information information. Coincident with the development movement of the written word collected, processed, and of black light (electromagnetic) technology, bat- distributed in a sequential tlefield lethality grew markedly and led to a phe- and linear manner. In the nomenon known as the “empty battlefield”—the military sphere armies behaved in a way de- massive dispersal of troops across an ever expand- scribed by the laws of solid mechanics. The so- ing area.9 called Lanchester equations, for example, are The use of railroads in preparing and mobiliz- mathematical analogs for torque and linear force, ing for war followed a distributed pattern that co- incided with the parallel configuration of rail networks and urban grids. As warfare became total it became protracted. Militaries had to defend—and conquer—resource, agricultural, and industrial The Telegraph areas distributed throughout the depth of warring nations. The dense, solid pre-industrial military lthough it may strike us as obvious forces began to disaggregate and be distributed to now, it took a long while for the accommodate physical characteristics of modern Aworld’s best inventors to transpose nation-states. Fundamentally, armies began to liq- even the simplest automatic circuit such as a uefy and flow to give rise to a basic characteristic feedback loop into the realm of electronics. of operational art: distributed deep maneuver. In The reason for the long delay was that from this the continuous and fluid nature of electronic the moment of discovery electricity was seen communications made operational art possible. primarily as power and not as communica- Indeed the emergence of operational art is the first tion. The dawning distinction of the two- essential stage in the current RMA. faced nature of the spark was acknowledged The last few paragraphs discussed the material among leading German electrical engineers character—the statics—of information and the of the last century as the armies it regulated. The continuous distributed na- split between the tech- ture of information supplanted the discrete, con- niques of strong current

onk) centrated form. Information and armies coevolved, and the techniques of which imparted to military art a much more fluid weak current. The amount quality ultimately revolutionizing the dynamics of of energy needed to send a war. In a fundamental way the physics of fluidity signal is so astoundingly overturned the physics of solidity. small that electricity had to Another feature of mass is its ability to move be reimagined as some- through space and time. The most significant as- thing altogether different pect of the control crisis and information revolu- Public Affairs Detachment (William Detachment Public Affairs Cr

th from power. In the camp of tion is the speed with which information was 28 the wild-eyed German sig- able to move. Only through the near-light speed nalists, electricity was a sib- of networked information can continuous control ling to the speaking mouth and the writing and regulation of distributed forces be main- hand. The inventors (we would call them tained. Imagine, for example, the brain control- hackers now) of weak current technology ling limbs and life processes like digestion at the brought forth the most unprecedented in- speed of a traveling horse: distributed control and vention of all time—the telegraph. With this regulation would be impossible and life would device human communication rode on invisi- cease. Today, for instance, the continuous fluid ble particles of lightning. Our entire society and wavelike nature of lightning-fast information was reimagined because of this wondrous can control and regulate all aspects of full spec- miracle’s [wireless] descendants. trum dominance as outlined in Joint Vision 2010. —Kevin Kelly, Out of Control

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years—theorists have yet to recognize the exquis- M–1 tank during Advanced Warfighting ite complexity of modern military systems. Com- Experiment. plexity is: a characteristic of systems made up of more than two elements, suggesting intricacy of structure and process, but not randomness, sometimes with a high degree of regularity in their dynamics up to a point of transition; usually implying a reasonable degree of predictability and controllability, which may quickly pass through a state-change into what is or seems to be chaos, such as the effect of a single accident on rush-hour traffic, the outbreak of a riot in a crowd or prison, or the political upheaval in Eastern Europe in 1989 flowing out of long maintained stable states.10 In a complex system: a great many independent agents are interacting with Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (David Detachment Mobile Public Affairs Burkle)

th each other in a great many ways....The very rich- 115 ness of these interactions allows the system as a whole to undergo spontaneous self-organization.... These complex, self-organizing systems are adaptive, in that they ...actively try to turn whatever happens to their advantage....Every one of these complex, self-organizing adaptive systems possesses a kind of dynamism that makes them qualitatively different from static objects....Complex systems are more spontaneous, more disorderly, more alive....Each of these systems is a network of many “agents” acting in parallel....The control of a complex adaptive system tends to be highly dispersed....A complex adaptive system has many levels of organization....[They] are constantly revising and rearranging their building blocks as they gain experience....All complex adap- vin Lynchard)

Mar tive systems anticipate the future....They are active....It’s essentially meaningless to talk about a complex adaptive system being in equilibrium: the

U.S. Air Force ( U.S. Air Force system can never get there. It is always unfolding, al- F–117 Stealth fighters. ways in transition.11 Complexity is a spontaneous consequence of imposing regulation and control on a highly dis- The new fluid quality of information in sup- tributed, fluid, chaotic state. Remove control in port of operational art, expressed vividly in the the military—the flow of information—and the control and regulation of distributed deep ma- force loses its cohesion and disintegrates. Because neuver, fundamentally changed the physical of its energy equivalence information performs a character of warfare. The movement and flow of control function directly analogous to the effect distributed mass armies and networked informa- of a magnetic field on a pile of metal filings. The tion often manifested a state of turbulence, ed- magnetic field shapes the filings the way informa- dies of disorganization and disorder that for the tion shapes an organization. The velocity of the first time in the history of the art of war trans- magnetic flux approaches the same speed of light formed the simple dense monolithic tactical as information moving through a communica- structures into distributed complex operational tion network. The density and velocity of infor- organizations fighting at the edge of chaos. mation flow objectively measures the complexity Control at the Edge of an organization. From the foregoing discussion it appears that The current RMA, which began in the last complexity has a number of dimensions, but all century, has led to the emergence of complexity of them ultimately turn on the way a complex as the defining characteristic of modern military organizations and operations. While complexity theory developed—especially over the last ten

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dynamic system uses information. A military sys- Finally, military technology makes modern tem uses information five ways. The first is the forces complex in two ways. In the first place, way it describes itself and its enemy. The more in- since machines of the industrial revolution, unlike formation required the more complex the de- muscle-driven tools, relied on inanimate forms of scription. Second, a complex military system uses energy like coal, steam, oil, and electricity the information to organize itself. Indeed, it is the en- movement and sustainment of armies in the field ergy aspect of information that forces and shapes drew increasingly on a complex network of dis- an organization into a particular structure. Third, tributed continuous logistics. The regulation of after the industrial revolution armies became al- this form of logistics drove the information and gorithimically complex: the number of tasks or control needs of modern forces. Second, technol- steps necessary to defeat an enemy grew dramati- ogy itself is embedded with information. Not only cally. There is evidence of this in the rapid in- do the new machines become more complex to crease in the size of planning staffs beginning use and produce, technology carries within itself with the American Civil War and the increasingly an increasingly dense and complex pattern of its protracted nature of modern war. The emergence own evolution. Since technology extends the nat- of operational art in this period is another conse- ural capabilities of humans, it gives them the po- quence of the algorithmic complexity of conflict. tential for self-evolution and self-revolution by ar- Wars could no longer be won with a few battles. tificially changing their genetic code. Give a man Instead, commanders and staffs had to program a rifle and you have extended his natural lethal and execute a whole mosaic of deep and pro- capability. Through technology humans become tracted operations to defeat an adversary. Fourth, the editor and author of their genetic character. the logistics of information—acquisition, process- Emerging technologies contain all the informa- ing, and distribution—became complex. It was no tion of newer, more advanced drafts of previous longer possible for commanders to sit on horse- programs of instruction, which shapes human na- back and gaze at battle- ture. The self-revolution of black light technology since information has the fields. They and their staffs marks the beginning of a new book of evolution had to actively seek out in- that cannot be comprehended with pre-industrial dimension of mass it must be formation widely distrib- thinking: the grammar, language, syntax, and processed like other resources uted across countless bat- logic have become too complex. Similarly, wars tles in deep theaters of can no longer be understood, discussed, and operations. Since informa- waged successfully in terms of this old paradigm. tion has the physical dimension of mass it must Complex armies inexorably lead to a revolution in be extracted, processed, and distributed like other the art of war. material resources. In this regard it is like fuel for the mind with a kind of energy or octane rating: Cybershock the greater the visual content the higher the oc- Modern armies are complex systems that tane level. The electronic battlefield seeks to pro- flow in a sea of information. They rush together vide the same total visual awareness. Because of like great rivers along wide, turbulent fronts. De- the refining capacity of the computer, informa- stroy that fluid medium and an enemy is frozen tion can be processed to attain the highest level and effectively paralyzed. This cybernetic paraly- possible in the form of images. sis is the essence of cybershock, the third form of warfare. Until the information revolution the art of war consisted of attrition and maneuver with attrition leading to annihilation and maneuver to exhaustion. Both forms Attrition, Maneuver, and Cybershock of warfare were typically applied simultaneously, with attrition -> anni- Domain of Final Pattern Effect Action Outcome hilation favoring the stronger side and maneuver -> exhaustion favoring the weaker. The rise of complex Attrition Annihilation Physical armies created a new array of vulnerabilities that information warfare now seeks to exploit. LogisticalManeuverExhaustion Disintegration Cybershock creates paralysis in five ways. First, through operations security, deception operations, and Cybershock Paralysis Cybernetic psychological operations an enemy

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is denied complete information of its adversary The significance of self-organization for in- and itself. Second, electronic warfare destroys formation warfare should be evident: destroying a enemy coherence and cohesion, basically freezing disorganized enemy may depend ultimately on its nervous system. Third, active and intense re- its physical—perhaps protracted—defeat in detail. connaissance and counterreconnaissance on If an enemy still has the will to fight, its fate will every level blinds an enemy. Fourth, the shock of have to be decided with a simple bullet rather surprise places a tremendous burden on an than a complicated piece of hardware. Iwo Jima enemy’s nervous system by creating a general and Okinawa remind us how rare and sweet vic- state of panic. Finally, the intensity and rapidity tories like the Gulf War are. Sleight of hand in of friendly operations inflicts a kind of cybernetic technology and information warfare should not stupor on an enemy. Ideally paralysis reduces an conjure up false hopes or visions of future war. At enemy to its component parts. It would be a seri- the same time the Armed Forces must unshackle ous error, however, to believe that one can defeat the limits—and challenge the promise—of infor- an enemy by paralysis alone. Patterns of war are mation war. In the end wars are won by soldiers, complementary and mutually reinforcing. Their not by magicians. JFQ synergism develops an integrated posture of attack and defense meant to destroy complex mili- NOTES tary systems by attrition, maneuver, and cyber- 1 James Burke and Robert Ornstein, The Axemaker’s shock (see figure). The outcome occurs in the Gift (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1995), p. xvi. moral domain with the disintegration and de- 2 James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution (Cam- struction of the will to fight. Failure to consider bridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 54. modern patterns of war in their totality only 3 Fred Hoyle, Man in the Universe (New York: Colum- leads to defeat. The fact is that military systems bia University Press, 1964), pp. 24–25. are rarely destroyed exclusively by paralysis. As 4 Kevin Kelly, Out of Control (New York: Addison- seen earlier one remarkable attribute of complex Wesley, March 1995), p. 115. military systems is that they are spontaneously 5 William F. Ganong, Review of Medical Physiology, 8th self-organizing. ed. (Los Altos, Calif.: Lange Medical Publications, 1977), p. 29. I am indebted to Leah J. Stevens for this key A complex system like an army has its intel- insight. ligence spread throughout itself. In war “each 6 James Clerk-Maxwell, “Remarks on the Mathemati- member reacts individually according to internal cal Classification of Physical Quantities,” Proceedings of rules [training and doctrine] and the state of its the London Mathematical Society, March 1871, pp. 224–33; local environment.”12 Armies in battle have a dis- D.C. Ipsen, Units, Dimensions and Dimensionless Numbers tributed mind or being that has a swarm or hive- (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 61–63, 131–52; like quality. Sun Tzu, the ancient philosopher of Henry L. Langhaar, Dimensional Analysis and Theory of war, noted a similar phenomenon: “In the tumult Models (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 1–11, and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there is 60–78; and Robert A. Carman, Dimensional Analysis (New no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about York; John Wiley and Sons, 1969), pp. 179–215. 7 James J. Schneider, “The Exponential Decay in circles but cannot be defeated....Apparent of Armies in Battle,” Theoretical Paper No. 1 (Fort Leav- confusion is a product of good order.” enworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, Such ideas highlight an essential quality of April 23, 1985). modern forces—that overall systemic paralysis 8 James J. Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolu- and disorganization can be offset to a point by tion (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994), pp. 11–12. self-organization and reorganization on lower lev- 9 James J. Schneider, “The Theory of the Empty els of command. Thus militaries have the fractal Battlefield,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute quality of a holograph, a photo taken with laser- (September 1987), pp. 37–42. light that when shattered into pieces still retains 10 Roger A. Beaumont, War, Chaos, and History (West- the image of the whole in each fragment. There is port, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), p. xiv. 11 M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Sci- thus a distinction between self-organizing mili- ence at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York; Simon tary systems and biological systems. For an organ- and Schuster, 1992), pp. 11–12, 145–47. ism like the human body paralysis is total in the 12 Kelly, Out of Control, p. 22. sense that a person with a broken neck does not

experience sudden self-organization and sponta- This article is an edited and abridged version of an entry neous control of limbs. A joint force, on the other that received third prize in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Contest hand, may suffer complete cybernetic collapse— on the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the the analog to a broken neck—but spontaneously National Defense University Foundation. reorganize at lower echelons and continue with its mission. The efficacy of the German idea of auftragstaktik is based on the self-organizing ability of subordinate leaders and units.

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Tandem Thrust ’97, Queensland, Australia. Dynamic DOD (Gary A. Bryant) Inter-Dimensionality: A Revolution in Military Theory By ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II

he debate over the revolution in mili- JUNIOR OFFICER tary affairs (RMA) has become one of whither rather than whether. Most PRIZE commentators agree that profound and Tinescapable changes are taking place in warfare. The discussion now focuses on defining this revolution more precisely, determining the extent and 96 type of changes that it will effect in the near and long term, and what if anything should be done about them. Much effort has gone into determining how technology will alter the conduct of war in the information age from the National Com- mand Authorities to the individual soldier. Yet no one has addressed the central issue of how this revolution will affect military theory—the founda- Major Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is assigned to the Future Battle tion of doctrine. The exploitation of new technol- Directorate, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and formerly ogy demands a corresponding revolution in mili- taught history at the U.S. Military Academy. tary theory that explains war as a broad-based,

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dynamically interactive continuum. It must pro- Dimensions of War vide a holistic view of war that represents its var- RMA has introduced a number of new condi- ied dimensions and accommodates new ones tions into the conduct of war. For one thing, the which emerge; and, similar to the paradigmatic ability to strike simultaneously throughout an shift that is occurring in science, it must depict ever-expending battlespace has made sequential the normal state of war as vigorous interaction operations all but obsolete. This simultaneity will and continuous change rather than static equilib- continue to blur the already tenuous distinctions rium. This approach must in turn form the con- among tactical, operational, and strategic levels ceptual framework for future military doctrine. of war. Moreover, future operations will involve Before proceeding, the terms military thought, an indefinite extension of the battlespace—the theory, and doctrine should be defined. For our pur- depth, breadth, and height of a battlefield— poses, military thought consists of the aggregate of brought about by increases in the range, accuracy, developments, theories, approaches, perceptions, and lethality of new weapons systems. This ex- patterns, and frameworks (paradigms) that belong pansion reflects an evolutionary tactical trend ac- to a particular era, community, or person. It re- celerated by rapid technological advances. It sponds to and borrows from values and assump- threatens to remove safe areas from the battle- tions in its socio-cultural milieu and represents the field, intensifying danger and uncertainty. Future solution or analysis of military problems in the ab- conflicts might well consist of a single, continu- stract. Military the- ous strike lasting hours, days, or even months the ability to strike simultaneously ory involves the his- rather than a series of battles or campaigns. Oper- will continue to blur distinctions torical observation ations in Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait hint at and the systematic what simultaneous or near-simultaneous strikes among levels of war study of organiza- can achieve. tions, strategies, tac- Digitization is transforming command and tics, techniques, and procedures from antiquity to control on the tactical, operational, and strategic the present. It educates warfighters and policymak- levels. Digital systems are rendering battle com- ers alike and also provides a basis for developing mand nonhierarchical. Organizations process and doctrine that in turn creates a common philoso- disseminate information in nontraditional pat- phy and practice for solving problems in the phys- terns so that others can exploit it in a timely ical world, either through fighting or other means. manner. Situational awareness will soon become Doctrine, in sum, is the accepted canon: it repre- automatic and the transmission of the comman- sents what the institution teaches officially and der’s intent instantaneous. Digital displays will tacitly. It remains authoritative in nature but re- soon depict individual vehicles and weapons sys- quires judgment when applied. Doctrine also tems with precise logistic and geographical infor- shapes dialogue, defines capabilities, accommo- mation, all constantly and automatically updated dates threats, and influences force disposition and and shared with other systems. The goose egg will resource allocation. become obsolete and unit boundaries, combat Professional publications such as Field Man- formations, and battlefield graphics unnecessary. ual 100-5, Operations, Field Manual 100-6, Infor- In addition, information-age technology is mation Operations, U.S. Army Training and Doc- making the environment in which future military trine Command Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI operations occur more dynamic and unpre- Operations, Fleet Marine Force Manual-1, Warfight- dictable. It renders national economies more sen- ing, Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine sitive to global developments, heightens cultural of the U.S. Air Force, and Joint Publication 3-0, and political awareness on the part of world popu- Doctrine for Joint Operations reflect common lations, and fuels radical movements that promote warfighting philosophies for specific services or world-wide political fragmentation and destabi- forces, functions, and levels of warfare. They thus lization. Information-age technology can deliver draw from accepted or newly developed theories the effects of military actions, large and small, to a or concepts to describe official practice relating to global audience almost immediately. Images of current or potential problems. This theory in turn war and peace—either real or contrived—can deci- reflects concerns in military thought, such as sively influence national will or public opinion how to incorporate expanding capabilities of in- before authorities confirm or repudiate their au- formation-age technology into all types and lev- thenticity. Paradoxically, a flood of real or near- els of warfare. This article considers the impact of real time information puts greater demands on in- new theory on FM 100-5. telligence gatherers and decisionmakers alike, forcing them to rely more on their intuition and Clausewitzian coup d’oeil than ever before.

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discuss the influence of politics as a process on the planning or execution of military operations. The social dimension—the attitude and the commitment of people—also remains essential to warfighting. The Peloponesian and Punic Wars demonstrate the importance of popular support even when only limited segments of society actively participate in combat. The significance of the social dimension receded to a certain extent in the medieval era when knights assumed the principal roll as warfighters. It emerged again in the 17th century as armies grew larger, levelled in the 18th century “cabinet wars” which relied

Paul A. Hawthorne) somewhat less on popular support, and grew y ( once again in the 19th century as states moved toward the concept of a nation in arms. Indeed, the increase in army size combined with the emergence of mass politics has made the cultivation, if

Combat Camera Imager not manipulation, of public opinion essential in Airborne battle staff warfighting. FM 100-5 recognizes the “attitude during Deny Flight. and commitment of the populace” as the human Since the classical age enemies have waged (physiological, psychological, and ethical) dimen- war in five overarching dimensions—political, so- sion of war. cial, technological, operational, and logistical— Technology affects every dimension and all which approximate the four elements of national levels of warfare. It interacts with culture and power—political, socio-psychological, military, and physical events in time and space to influence the economic—and indeed serve as conduits for direct- duration, nature, shape, and outcome of conflict. ing that power. Neglecting one can lead to cata- Technological advances, while always important, strophic defeat as in the case of the infamous take on greater significance when a “gap” exists Schlieffen Plan, which dismissed the German polit- between one force and another, as the Battle of ical situation as irrelevant, or Hitler’s war with the Omdurman demonstrated in 1898. Such advances Soviet Union, which egregiously underestimated also produce military technical revolutions that economic and socio-psychological elements. can lead to larger, more inclusive RMAs such as The political dimension consists of political the one launched by Gustavus Adolphus in the aims and politics as a process. Political aims, early 1600s. Gustavus actually capitalized on the whether manifested in terms of protecting na- effort by Maurice of Nassau to effect military re- tional security interests, an aggressive policy for form in the 1590s. Maurice developed a system economic expansion, a commitment to worldwide with linear formations, discipline, drill, and volley religious or ideological conversion, a desire for re- fire based on the Roman model to which Gus- taliatory assassination, the promotion of state- tavus added pike and musket, the perfection of sponsored terrorism, or mere entertainment, have the salvo, lighter and more maneuverable field ar- always directed war, though not always coher- tillery, and smoke and direct-fire suppression in ently. In addition, politics as a process influenced the attack. This led the Swedish king to many vic- by culture, geography, and personality has always tories and the title Father of Modern Warfare. It affected the direction of war, though not always also affected the strategic, organizational, and constructively. While the decisionmaking that socio-political realms of warfighting, resulting in Tartar bands used to formulate policy might ap- an early modern European RMA. FM 100-5 ad- pear less sophisticated than those of modern dresses the role of technology in warfare and doc- states (which is debatable), they proved no less ef- trinal development, but not as a warfighting di- fective in developing strategies and direction for mension; and it confuses the roles of doctrine and military force in pursuit of political goals. These theory in the exploitation of technology. Doctrine objectives emerged as a product of resources avail- never truly initiates or drives change per se but at- able to the Tartars, their geopolitical position as a tempts to channel or focus it through the identifi- composite of Turkish and Mongol nations located cation of appropriate warfighting tasks. The rela- in Central Asia, their nomadic culture and tradi- tionship between doctrine and technology is tions, and the influence of Islam. FM 100-5 recognizes the role of the political dimension in direct- ing force to achieve strategic goals but does not

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subsumed in the reciprocity between military the- thus constrained—to think in terms of static, ory or concept and desire for—or emergence of— two-dimensional maps and symbols, full integra- enhanced or increased capabilities. tion of these dimensions into a comprehensive The operational dimension refers to the con- theoretical framework has not yet occurred. Accu- duct of war. It consists primarily of attempts to mulating dimensions one upon another has only dominate the physical space of the battlefield with made visualization of the battlefield more com- combat power and to destroy an enemy’s will to plex instead of more sophisticated or complete. fight. From antiquity to the modern age, comman- In short, theoretical frameworks have remained ders and staffs have conceptualized the battlefield linear—closed, balanced systems oriented on se- primarily in physical terms. Great captains from quential events. Alexander to Napoleon generally had to consider RMA has also made it possible—and thus only two dimensions—breadth and depth—in de- necessary—to view military operations through ploying forces. But with the 20th century aircraft two newly emerging dimensions for which cur- had extended battlespace to three dimensions, and rent theory does not account. We can now effect submarines arguably added a fourth. Spacecraft action across a broad spectrum of options within now make it five. In addition, FM 100-5 recognizes the domains of information and force (lethality the operational dimensions of tempo, depth, and and violence). While armies have traditionally synchronicity. It must go one step further, how- conducted military operations within these ever, and acknowledge information and force as realms, the dynamic and fluid conditions of 21st warfighting dimensions as well. century warfare have made deliberate considera- The logistical dimension has evolved from lit- tion and doctrinal recognition of them essential. erally living off the land and ad hoc foraging to in- Obviously, the increased speed and precision tricate if cumbersome depot/supply and push and of modern weaponry make information—the pull systems. Subsistence, ac- heart of RMA—an essential dimension of warfare. couterment, ammunition, Commanders must win the information war to theoretical frameworks have fuel, and transport provide succeed today. Domination of the electro-mag- remained linear—closed, the stuff of war, the lifeblood netic spectrum will play a critical part in war as balanced systems oriented of armies. These essentials will position cloaking and deception. However, have affected the size, range, we must not treat information as a physical di- on sequential events and potency of forces mension like land, sea, or air. Information superi- throughout history. Con- ority does not function like air superiority. sumption rates for fuel, ammunition, and water Additionally, non-lethal weapons including have increased more than ten-fold since 1945. A sticky foam, antitraction materials, infrasound, division consumes as much today as a field army anesthetics, and microwave transmitters provide a during World War II. The successful projection of range of options under force application. Within force across the globe also depends on logistic and certain limitations, commanders can now decide support infrastructures such as airfields, seaports, what level of lethality to introduce in an opera- and ground transportation networks. Had Iraq es- tion as well as how and when. However, recent tablished even a modicum of control over South- observations indicate that there are numerous west Asian sea and airports through alliances or glitches to be worked out before such weapons other means, coalition forces would have found it prove truly useful. Nonetheless, by deliberately much more difficult to execute Desert Storm. Until raising levels of violence and tempo we can attack alternatively powered vehicles and weapons are de- the “state of being” of an enemy, ultimately push- veloped, logistics will remain the decisive problem ing it into chaos where its rate of tactical, opera- for Force XXI operations. FM 100-5 recognizes that tional, and strategic errors increases decisively. logistics operations are a critical element of The fact that linear forms of conceptualiza- warfighting, devoting an entire chapter to the sub- tion have dominated military thinking through- ject. It does not, however, address logistics as an out history should not surprise us. Our educa- interactive dimension. tional institutions have taught us to convey and process information in a rigidly structured, step- New Trends by-step, left-to-right, or top-to-bottom sequence Although the nature and significance of each in which input remains proportional to output. of these dimensions has varied from era to era, We study major disciplines like economics, soci- each has clearly remained essential to the con- ology, and psychology separately, as closed sys- duct of war. Commanders have deliberately, tems, as if knowledge and developments related though not absolutely, influenced activities to one have no bearing on the others. Each field within these dimensions to impact their own and presupposes equilibrium as its norm and flux as the enemy’s combat power. However, due to limi- an aberration. tations imposed by human beings trained—and

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Unfortunately, the nature of war doesn’t fit Figure 1. Optimizing Force in the limits of a linear system. As Clausewitz ex- Lethality / Violence plained, war has a “dual” nature consisting, in the first place, of several internal constants—fog, friction, chance, uncertainty, physical exertion, danger—that render it unavailable to mathemati- Chaos cal calculation. Such imponderables result from the interplay of opposing forces, nearly simultaneous and continuous action, and propensity toward escalation. The second nature of war, a chameleon-like character according to Clause- witz, consists of a capacity to assume various Critical Point forms over time as enemies introduce new weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Thus warfighting remains in a constant state of flux. A successful approach in one era may yield Tempo little in another. Combined, the internal and external characteristics of war make it a complex of independent and dependent variables that interact in unexpected ways to produce multiple outcomes in a range of dimensions.

Likewise, warfighting schools have taught Inter-Dimensionality commanders to view battle as sequential, as a rela- To grasp this interplay, military theory must tively closed system with identifiable start and assume an inter-dimensional approach. Inter-di- endpoints and comprised of forces that produce mensionality is more than adding one dimension proportional effects. For example, to facilitate com- to another: it requires rotating, translocating, and mand and control, military missions began with a transforming axes in multiple ways to examine specific not-later-than (NLT) start date and time, a the effects of various combinations of events at set of clearly delineated phases or phase lines, and different times (figure 1). This sort of thought a presumably attainable goal or objective, also gen- process stretches intellectual capacities to the erally associated with a NLT date and time for its limit. However, advances in information-age accomplishment. Moreover, the desired outcome technology can assist in multidimensional con- or endstate of a mission drove the amount of force ceptualization by allowing us to construct com- required; that is, successful attacks usually require puterized models to simulate the battlefield (for a 3:1 force ratio of attacker to defender. Although example, JANUS) and rapidly wargame scenarios we recognized such measures as artificial, until the from as many perspectives as can be built into advent of information-age technology few reason- the system. On the other hand, such simulations able alternatives for exercising command and con- will probably never accurately replicate Clause- trol and calculating force disposition existed. Until witz’s imponderables which by definition defy recently, the wherewithal to calculate the myriad quantification. Multidimensionality must thus outcomes of nonlinear systems simply was not include the commander’s intuition and coup available. A small change in a nonlinear system d’oeil. Finally, we must never use it to predict, can produce an exponential number of new out- only to problematize. come possibilities, each of which might branch Hitherto, theory has not addressed the inter- into any number of additional likelihoods. Each dimensional nature of warfighting or war itself as subsequent path and combination would then re- a broad-based, interactive, and dynamic contin- quire thorough mathematical investigation that uum. Military theorists have always viewed war might literally take a lifetime to calculate. Conse- in a segmented and compartmentalized fashion. quently, we embraced linear analytical systems not They have analyzed warfare by breaking it into its only because our intellectual conditioning led us essential parts and classifying it. Such analyses in that direction, but for practical reasons as well. have addressed issues ranging from the complex Thus military thought, like its civilian counterpart, relationships between politics and strategy to the became inseparable from closed, well-ordered sys- practical conduct of war—whether conventional, tems, from structure and sequence, from balance nuclear, or some other variety. Overall, these and equilibrium. analyses have contributed immensely to the way we see war. However, with the notable exception of Clausewitz’s On War which remains incom- plete, these contributions either left their subject

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in a disassembled state or never approached war shatters the paradigm of a “clockwork universe” as an interactive whole in the first place. expressed in Newton’s laws of motion whereby A brief and by no means conclusive review of equilibrium formed the natural state of the physi- their efforts will serve to illustrate the major cal world. trends of military theory. Vegetius, like others, ap- This new paradigm assumes that continuous proached war to reform its methods of conduct. change and dynamic interaction, rather than His classical work, On Military Affairs, enjoyed equilibrium, represent the normal state of the more influence a millennium after it was written, universe. It employs an interdisciplinary rather but suffered from numerous misunderstandings than segregated approach to science, borrowing and impracticalities concerning weapons systems from disparate disciplines to explain the dynamic of the period. Machiavelli, too, advocated military nature of physical phenomena. The fundamental reform; he developed principles derived from the principles of this new paradigm maintain that: ancient Roman model and insisted on applying ■ every system component, no matter how small them to Renaissance warfare. Montecuccoli con- or insignificant, plays a part in deciding the outcome; cerned himself with reducing military expertise to thus we must treat systems holistically rather than fo- fundamental rules and incorporating them in a cusing only on key players theory of war. Clausewitz, perhaps the most pro- ■ predictable and nonpredictable phenomena co- found military thinker, came nearest to actually exist and interact in the physical world to produce com- developing such a theory plex networks with too many variables or relations to intellectual revolutions within of war, one that reflected consistently calculate outcomes ■ a small change in the input to a system can re- the multidimensional and the larger milieu will often sult in disproportionate effects dynamic character of con- ■ systems—individuals, armies, bureaucracies— inform military theory flict. Due to an untimely tend to evolve toward greater complexity death, his work went un- ■ complex adaptive systems spontaneously reorga- finished and remains largely misunderstood. Basil nize themselves when confronted with challenges; at Liddell Hart, deeply affected by the catastrophic such moments systems are generally found at their loss of life in World War I, also sought to reform most innovative and creative. the conduct of war. He developed an indirect ap- This paradigm shift offers unique opportuni- proach to strategy which he argued would be ties to theorists. We now possess the tools and in- more effective and less costly than head-on coun- tellectual framework to construct a theory of war- terparts. Edward Luttwak’s historical studies pro- fare that more accurately reflects the dynamic vide thorough and painstaking analyses of the and inter-dimensional nature of conflict. A new way that governments from Rome to the Soviet theory in turn will lead to a better understanding Union developed and executed strategy; however, of war and a more realistic representation of war- his work amounts to a theory of strategy as a fare in professional study and instruction. Of process rather than of war as a phenomenon. Not course, as Clausewitz warned, no theory can pre- surprisingly, the views of each of these thinkers re- dict the outcome of a conflict. flect one or more of the intellectual undercurrents of their own day as well as their experiences. Our Historical Perspectives efforts to place war within a theoretical framework New military theory contributes three addi- rarely transcend their socio-cultural milieu. On tional characteristics to an understanding of war. the contrary, it is that very milieu which provides First, it proceeds with the assumption that war op- the substance and context of meanings for devel- erates as a continuum. In other words, war as a oping and communicating ideas. Paradigm shifts state of being exists before the first clash of arms and intellectual revolutions within the larger mi- or official declaration of war and may continue lieu will often, in one way or another, inform mil- beyond the final treaty or cease fire. We identify itary theory. September 1, 1939 and August 15, 1945 as the The scientific community is on the verge of start and the conclusion of World War II; yet these a paradigm shift. Information-age technology in dates omit a great deal. They do not account for the form of computer simulations and math co- Germany’s military build-up in violation of the processors makes nonlinear calculations a matter Versailles Treaty, the invasion of the Rhineland, of routine. Scientists in every field have begun to the annexation of the Sudentenland and Czecho- re-examine or in some cases jettison traditional slovakia, or the so-called Anschluß with Austria. linear models in favor of more dynamic, open- They also exclude Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia and ended, nonlinear ones. Consequently, informa- Japan’s invasion of Manchuria. In fact, to fully un- tion-age technology has launched a scientific rev- derstand the conditions that gave rise to World olution equal to that which brought 16th and 17th century Europe from a theologically to a mathe- matically described universe. This revolution

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USS Lake Erie leading ships in the Pacific.

Figure 2. Multi-dimensionality

YYY U.S. Navy (James W. Olive)(JamesU.S. Navy W.

XXX expressed violently via aggressive channeling of national power (see figure 2). Indeed, war be- ZZ comes nothing more than a deliberate focusing of Z national power to achieve an objective. Second, the multiple dimensions of war interact dynamically. Events from one flow into others. Decisions made in the political domain can impact events in the operational dimension War II one must go back at least to the end of and vice versa. Bismarck’s decision to storm the World War I, to the provisions of the peace treaty, fortress of Düppel in the Schleswig-Holstein War the issue of war guilt and reparations, the global of 1864 emerged purely from a desire to acquire depression of the 1930s, and the ultimate failure political clout by demonstrating Prussian resolve. of the Weimar Republic. Moreover, the struggles Political circumstances in early 1916 dictated the between the Soviet Union and the West which execution of the Somme offensive at a time and ushered in the Cold War period had their origins place—one of the strongest points in the German in World War II. Key players changed roles line—that neither Douglas Haig nor Ferdinand slightly, but a new state of war began to emerge Foch wanted. In each case, decisions made in the before, and continued well after, 1945. Thus we political domain directly affected events in the might extend Clausewitz’s definition of war as a “contest between opposing wills” to include the idea of war as a contest between opposing wills

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operational dimension. On the other hand, the als of all services. Accordingly, it must clearly battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg) in 1862 is a case convey the nonlinear nature of war and recom- of operational events affecting other dimensions. mend suitable tactics, techniques, and proce- Antietam ended in a tactical draw when McClel- dures. It must encourage a multidimensional ap- lan failed to take advantage of several opportuni- proach to military problems and emphasize that ties to annihilate Lee’s army; but clever manipula- wars do not occur in a vacuum. tion of the outcome by Lincoln yielded a The changes wrought by RMA will likely strategic, political, and moral victory for the make warfighting more rather than less difficult. North. Antietam resulted in the continued isola- The means, environment, and dimensions of fu- tion of the South from Europe, prevented Mary- ture war continue to transform it. To keep abreast land’s secession from the Union, and gave rise to of such changes, we need an integrative, multidi- a moral victory with the Emancipation Proclama- mensional approach to military theory—one that tion a few days later. Thus an essentially indeci- remains relevant to developing practical warfight- sive event in the operational dimension produced ing doctrine. Thus theory must approach warfare conspicuous effects in the logistical, political, and as a phenomenon comprised of continuous social dimensions of war. change and dynamic, interactive dimensions Third, all events in war have weight; even rather than as a closed system predicated on the the least can have disproportionate effects. For notion that balance and equilibrium represent the example, the personality of a commander looms natural state of the universe. Thanks to revolution- as large as the size and preparedness of an army. ary developments in computer-age technology and Prussofilia on the part of Czar Peter III saved Fred- a shift in scientific thinking, we have the means to erick the Great from probable defeat in 1763. develop, sustain, and use an inter-dimensional ap- Peter, a prince of Schleswig-Holstein, an honorary proach to war. Doing so amounts to nothing less general in the Prussian army and a long-time ad- than a revolution in military theory. JFQ mirer of Frederick, assumed the throne on the death of Empress Elizabeth and reversed Russia’s This article is an edited and abridged version of an entry political course away from participation in the that received the prize for the best submission by a Seven Years’ War, an endeavor which many in his junior officer in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Contest on the Revo- lution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the National court considered little more than a near-ruinous Defense University Foundation. expedition to further the glory of an ally, Austria. The fortuitous discovery of Lee’s “lost order” (special order 191) by Union troops before the battle of Antietam gave McClellan the information he needed to attack and destroy the Army of North- ern Virginia. Nonetheless McClellan’s dilatory nature saved Lee from utter defeat. Likewise, an event as simple as an undelivered message can be catastrophic. Soldiers of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment failed to get word that their attack on the afternoon of July 1, 1916, the first day of the Somme offensive, had been canceled. Conse- quently, they advanced unsupported and in single-file through narrow gaps in their own wire that were covered by German machine guns. The regiment suffered 85 percent casualties launching an attack that should not have occurred.

A dynamic, inter-dimensional approach to military theory requires corresponding changes in doctrine. Specifically, doctrinal vehicles such as FM 100-5 must stress the interconnectedness of the dimensions of war. Doctrine forms the basis of the Army’s warfighting philosophy and instructs, guides, and educates military profession-

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TECHNOLOGIES, DOCTRINE,AND ORGANIZATION DOD

o fully realize the revolutionary poten- for RMA tial of new military technology we must develop doctrine that incorpo- By JAMES K. MORNINGSTAR rates innovative operational concepts Tas well as organizational structures that are joint, deployable, and informationally smart. Techno- logical upheaval is already reverberating throughout many critical military functions. As a result doctrine must reflect changes in time and space relationships on the battlefield, the balance between capability and manpower, and the nature of command and control. This article examines these changes and organizational structures capable of integrating new technologies and maximiz- ing their warfighting potential. To understand the need for change, we must first grasp its causes. New technologies are recon- structing the world. Just as military institutions reflect society, they also experience change. Com- Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (DavidMobile Public Affairs Burkle)

th puters, digital technology, and improved perfor-

115 mance of equipment are creating enhancements Javelin anti-tank in many areas. Tomorrow we will shoot, move, weapon system. and communicate differently than we do today.

Increasing the Tempo Perhaps the most visible effect of modern mechanics is firepower. The Gulf War left us with images of smart missiles flying thousands of miles Major James K. Morningstar, USA, has served in a before destroying selected targets. But the lasting variety of armor and cavalry assignments and is importance may be their impact on operational a Second Fleet plans officer (J-51) on board USS Mount Whitney.

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tempo rather than their destructiveness. To ap- of an enemy and allow the round to spot its own preciate the potency of precision munitions, one target. These systems will eventually achieve an has only to compare the amount of ordnance em- expected performance level of one kill per round. ployed to destroy targets in past wars. While it Target areas will no longer depend on terrain; took several hundred bombs to destroy a bridge they will encompass the entire battlespace. Accu- during World War II it takes only one guided rate fire-and-forget systems such as the anti-tank bomb today. This simple fact has tremendous Javelin will enable commanders to deploy skir- repercussions for speed in combat. In World War mishers far beyond the main line of defense, thus II it took an extensive air campaign to destroy increasing their coverage of terrain. Former delin- several bridges; a few aircraft can do it in hours eations of area responsibilities by weapon systems now. Commanders must be ready to move to the will become indistinguishable. next phase of operations much faster than they Guided munitions will bring other players to did fifty, thirty, or even ten years ago. Increased the tactical battlefield. Because of difficulties in accuracy has robbed planners of the time to ad- coordinating accurate application near friendly just to evolving conditions. troops, only the far reaches of battlefields have During Desert Storm we attacked Iraqi de- experienced many powerful long-range systems. fenses with a preparatory bombardment of high- This will change as new, highly accurate cruise explosive artillery rounds followed by concentra- missiles begin to support commanders. Someday tions of conventional rounds from Abrams tanks a Ranger unit pinned down by a machine gun and Bradley fighting vehicles. Physically the at- from a nearby highrise may call upon support tack was a refined version of the sort conducted from a GPS-guided tactical cruise missile in the fields of France over launched from a ship. Elsewhere, a corps may fire precision munitions must seventy years earlier. In the missiles at strategic objectives which other ser- application of weapons, vices or the National Command Authorities lead us to revise our doctrinal only the addition of attack (NCA) want destroyed. As the military learns to definitions of battlespace helicopters would have dis- do more with less, interservice support will be tinguished it from Blitzkrieg common on lower levels of command. in 1939. Allied forces were When the Navy and Air Force adopted guided overrun by the Germans because their leaders missiles they learned to incorporate defenses were accustomed to a horse cavalry and foot sol- against such weapons. Systems such as rapid dier pace of combat. In the future, anyone whose blooming on board chaff and anti-missile elec- operational tempo is at the dumb bullet speed of tronic jamming equipment are present on all Navy battle will fall behind in a combat parade where ships. In the future special vehicles will carry such precision munitions call the cadence. devices to protect against enemy missiles. Armor, Precision munitions must lead us to revise infantry, air defense artillery, and the Signal Corps our doctrinal definitions of battlespace. Ground will compete for the control of such systems. forces have always been responsible for the ter- A second radical change in perceptions of rain that they effectively covered with fire. In the battlespace results from robotic reconnaissance. past the range of weapons, the probability of kill As units apply combat power at greater ranges, per weapon, and the number of systems available they must see at greater ranges. In many cases limited that effectiveness over space. A tank com- these distances exceed the supportable limits of pany commander in the defense would position scouts. Already unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) his vehicles to mass fires within range on a partic- can provide reconnaissance imagery down to ular piece of ground where an enemy was likely units in the field. Digital links will provide real to cluster. He would have to rely on terrain or ob- time pictures from airborne platforms such as stacles to force enemy forces into a kill sack and Navy UAVs and Army and Air Force joint surveil- use mass fires to increase the likelihood of de- lance target attack radar system (JSTARS) capabili- stroying targets. The more bullets fired at a point, ties to ground headquarters as they maneuver the better the chances of a hit. This meant that against an enemy. Soldiers will one day carry the area beyond his focus would have to be ad- small screens displaying symbolic representations dressed by artillery, air support, or other means. beamed from satellites showing what lies over the Likewise each artillery piece would wait until for- horizon. Accurate intelligence pictures that ward observers spotted enemy forces on one tar- higher headquarters could once only dream of geted area so they all could fire together and in- will be available to front line troops. crease the probability of hitting targets. Battlespace has been a slave of weapon precision. Guided tactical munitions will emancipate our use of the battlespace. Smart projectiles will enable tanks and artillery to fire in the direction

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Morningstar

New Possibilities day such systems will have voice synthesizers that Technology has also altered combat by in- verbally draw attention to informational changes creasing potential rates of movement. Vehicles so that drivers need not constantly watch screens. like M–1 Abrams tanks are fully 33 percent faster Combat and peacekeeping units will wonder how than their predecessors. The effect on maneuver they ever got along without such systems for is obvious, yet the effect on command and con- maintaining common situational awareness. trol is perhaps more subtle but decisive. General Digital communications will change many Schwarzkopf’s maneuver known as the “Hail aspects of military operations. Because they will Mary” displayed the unprecedented ability of augment rather than completely replace radio sys- large forces to displace over great distances at tems, technical and logistical support to field speeds that outpaced the enemy’s ability to react. units will necessarily increase. Most importantly Field headquarters must not only plan and con- the information flow between communication duct these rapid operations but also physically nodes will become a torrent in all directions, plac- move with them. Modern rates of speed can have ing greater strain on decisionmakers. Consider a similar concrete impact on other operations. that there currently exist technologies by which Since C–17s fly as much as 50 percent faster than medics at accident sites can hook up by TV to ex- C–130s, planners must ensure that cargo does not perienced doctors at hospitals to receive guidance pile up at airheads. Greater speeds allow wider and prepare hospitals for incoming casualties. The maneuvers that, in turn, require more bulk fuel. medics can pass vital signs digitally to emergency Increased speed of action intensifies the planning rooms, saving critical time. Imagine that type of and coordination burden carried by staffs. system with SEAL teams on patrol, F/A–18 cock- Traditional ideas for employing forces give pits on a bombing run, or fire support teams at way to new possibilities introduced by technical outposts, talking directly to headquarters as NCA advancements. The V–22 Osprey and similar air- monitors from around the world. Picture the sheer craft may make it routine for infantry companies volume of information pouring into a brigade to move five hundred miles per day. Remotely pi- headquarters from above and below as automated loted aircraft firing guided munitions may be digital reports arrive at light speed. It is easy to en- their primary source for reconnaissance and fire vision brigade commanders having to fight the support at such ranges. Headquarters for such urge to bypass less experienced battalion and units will need specialized abilities to command company commanders to guide platoon leaders at and control these operations. objectives via direct digital links. The increasing Enhancements in command and control are volume and velocity of information raises the already upon us. Digital and computerized com- need for more understanding on the part of re- munication systems now exist but only as a pre- ceivers. For decisionmakers to understand the va- view of what lies ahead. Voice encryption is riety of incoming data, they must have people evolving into burst transmissions of pre-format- with specialized knowledge available to translate ted reports. Comput- that data into usable information. This requires emerging technologies are driving ers on vehicles will innovation in the way we operate. allow crew members Time, Space, and the Battlefield doctrinal changes in battlefield to key in or select time-space relationships from menus items Emerging technologies are driving doctrinal that software will in- changes in battlefield time-space relationships, corporate into report formats and send at a touch the balance between combat power and man- of a button to headquarters. Future versions will power, and the nature of command and control. allow headquarters to extract information from Yet perhaps the greatest change is occurring in sensors on the vehicle without bothering crew our concepts of time-space relationships on the members with extraneous reports. Position loca- battlefield. We have built our warfighting struction devices on supply trucks, for example, will ture on doctrine composed of tactical, opera- routinely report to a headquarters where a com- tional, and strategic layers. Recent publications puter screen display will enable commanders to such as the universal joint task list define war on see where their assets are at any given time. three levels: strategic, national security objectives; Adapting existing technology will allow trucks to operational, campaigns and major operations; carry digital maps that can help drivers see their and tactical, battles and engagements. These lev- location, select routes in unfamiliar areas, and els evolved over centuries and involved large keep track of units around them. Beyond that dri- armies with limited weapon ranges and ponder- vers will be able to update screens by noting ob- ous rates of movement. Advancements today stacles, report enemy positions, or even depict have cracked such doctrines. the delivery of supplies and transmit that information via computer net to other screens. One

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Drawing tactical-strategic distinctions from tired ideas about maneuvering within or beyond weapon ranges is no longer practical. The doctrinal battlespace responsibilities allotted to different levels of command are based on the ability to see and affect an enemy. In large measure they result from an outdated concept of strategy and tactics. FM 100-5, Operations, defines strategy as, “The art and science of employing the Armed Forces and other elements of national power during peace, conflict, and war to secure national objectives.” It also defines tactics as, “The art and science of employing means to win battles and engagements.” The difference between the two is largely in the scale of operations. One can see how in war strategy can beget tactics—that is, national authorities position forces that fight the battles. To fill the gap between them we adopted a convoluted idea of operational art contained in FM 100-5: “The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals, through the design, organization, integration, and execution of battles and engagements into major campaigns and major operations. In war operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight over time.” To understand these concepts requires research into their origins. Having done that, let’s cut straight to the chase. In his seminal 1835 manual, Infantry Tactics, General Winfield Scott opened these definitions from von Bulow: I call strategy the hostile movements of two armies made beyond the view of each other; or—if it be preferred—beyond the effect of cannon. Tactics I call the science of movements which are made in the presence of the enemy, that is, within his view and within the reach of his artillery. The contemporary division of doctrine into three levels of war, with its appropriate segrega- tion of responsibilities, is a logical extension of Scott’s ideas. U.S. Navy (Wayne W. Edwards) (WayneU.S. Navy W. We can start to create a new foundation by Tomahawk being understanding that strategy and tactics exist on launched from all levels of war. Strategy is the positioning of USS Laboon. Modern range, speed, and method render combat power to influence the will of a competi- older notions of battlefield spatial responsibilities tor. Tactics is the application of fire power to de- no longer meaningful. A Marine expeditionary feat enemy force. A company commander em- unit is only a tactical level unit of battalion size; ploys strategy by sending a platoon around an yet we can introduce it on foreign shores to se- enemy’s flank. A coalition commander applies cure an embassy on what is essentially a strategic tactics by destroying airfields with cruise missiles. level operation. In recent joint exercises we have Regardless of the level of combat, the principles deployed tactical level single airborne battalions are the same. The attempt to categorize units as and small groups of attack helicopters on opera- levels on the battlefield prevents developing in- tional level deep attacks. Future commanders in teroperable organizations. The Marine expedi- ground fights on the tactical level will have the tionary unit can never be organized to conduct a ability to receive fire support from new Navy arsenal ships firing operational level munitions such as cruise missiles.

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national mission if the unit is not considered to once was the task of lines of battleships is now ac- be on the proper level even though future tech- complished by one aircraft carrier. In each case the nology may give it the tools and reduced force new unit needed fewer men, aircraft, or ships be- levels may give it the mission. cause it had control of rifles, missiles, or planes. Adjusting organization to technology must Missions formerly reserved for divisions will be ac- begin with compensating for tempo. Just as we complished by smaller units if those units can learn from physics, time as defined in terms of control the sources of modern combat power. rate of movement and distance grows smaller as As technical advances increase the ratio of rate increases. We have seen that technology has firepower per man, the capability to apply that expanded the rate of battlefield events, decreased firepower effectively must stay abreast. Increased the resultant time, and accelerated the potential communications will enable the command and tempo of operations. The speed of decisionmak- control required to manage the sources of combat ing is fairly constant though dependent on infor- power. When it becomes necessary to conduct mation. If there is less time we tend to make forcible entry operations with battalion-sized fewer good decisions and more hasty ones. We units, the troops can coordinate combat power can compensate by anticipating events. In effect from multiple sources provided that they know we think at greater distances to compensate for where to look and what they need. Imagine an the pace of events. The increased range in airborne battalion seizing a vital location as an weaponry, reconnaissance, and communication Aegis cruiser provides air defense, Air Force have enabled us to keep this balance so far. It is JSTARS relays information on nearby troop move- only a matter of time until we surmount the lim- ments to the commander on the ground, and an its of small unit commanders to effectively com- airborne joint targeting cell coordinates long mand and control the space over which they range air and missile fire support to isolate the make decisions. Only refinement in organization area of operations. Forcible entry with smaller can ensure that decisionmaking keeps pace with units is possible provided unit commanders have the tempo of operations. joint combat power support at their fingertips. Today the sources of joint combat power are More with Less collocated at the highest levels of command. Ma- It is commonly claimed that the Armed rine battalions cannot conduct forcible entry op- Forces are required to do more with less. That is erations without adequate combat power. In a typ- not good if you are a commander with less. Force ical scenario, a battalion commander ashore needs reductions have altered the routine at the Na- to coordinate pre-planned air support through the tional Training Center staff of an amphibious task force afloat in the am- sources of joint combat power where brigades now rou- phibious readiness group. They in turn pass the tinely bring two battalions request through the joint force air component are collocated at the highest rather than three. In joint commander, usually located with the staff of the levels of command task force exercises we JTF commander aboard another ship. They would commonly have battalion- apportion support through an air tasking order sized elements conducting some 72 hours in advance. The order is then sent forcible entry operations which doctrine says to the carrier battle group whose air wing would they are not large enough to do on their own. In fly the mission. Future communications may these exercises it is normal for marines to experi- make it easier to coordinate such support, but the ence a lack of air cover at times because we train chain of control must change to facilitate the bat- with one carrier wing instead of two and it re- talion commander at the front. quires flight deck down time. Reduction in Futurists Hiedi and Alvin Toffler note that strengths and budgets causes alterations in train- the “de-massification” of production systems is a ing, forcing small units to take on larger missions. trademark of effective third wave societies. As we While our stated goal is always to train as we embrace technologies we must also adapt to use fight, we must face the more likely reality that we them. One of the most important military adap- must fight as we train. tations will be the de-massification of the produc- Technology has always enabled units to do tion of combat power. Smaller units must be able more with less. The number of men required per to use modern means to produce more combat mile of a line dropped dramatically when rifles re- power by applying joint sources. This translates placed smooth bore muskets. The number of air- into the need to reconstruct command organiza- craft required to destroy a target fell when missiles tions to provide the small unit commander with and later smart munitions replaced bombs. What the expertise to use this combat power and still not suffer paralysis from information overflow. New command and control organizations can provide maximum battlefield effectiveness by

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■ RMA ESSAY CONTEST U.S. Air Force (E.H.U.S. Air Force Litlejohn) C–17 Globemaster III.

integrating new technology. Current structures are combat power while decentralizing decisionmak- not well suited to efficiently utilize the firepower, ing. Added levels of command and control with maneuver speed, and communication abilities of specified responsibilities and specialized func- the future battlefield. Army brigade headquarters, tions will enable the combat brain to keep pace for example, are stretched to their limits by the with the growing strength of the combat body. high tempo environment of the National Training An examination of a possible command and con- Center where commanders and staffs are overbur- trol structure for an Army brigade provides an ex- dened. They must simultaneously fight deep with ample of incorporating new technologies and few reconnaissance assets, coordinate maneuver doctrine to fully realize the promise of RMA. battalions, integrate sources of fire support, and oversee a range of logistics. The brigade command Redistributing Responsibilities structure manages more diverse decisions with To ease the burden of decisionmaking on fewer people than other levels of command. Yet brigades it must be reorganized. This is not new: technological advances and manpower decreases in Europe during World War II, the Army scrapped will make such units the type deployed to accom- brigades in favor of combined arms formations plish future independent missions. The dilemma known as combat commands. As the flow of bat- of new technologies is that they push combat po- tlefield information increases and combat power tential beyond decisionmaking abilities. becomes more specialized, we must equitably re- The solution to this dilemma lies in organi- distribute responsibilities. Adding a headquarters zation. We must “de-massify” the production of to the chain of command would increase flexibility and responsiveness. Returning regiments to the chain, for example, would free brigades from coordinating maneuver battalions and allow them

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to concentrate on applying combat power from this reorganization has a hidden benefit. Being multiple joint sources. Planning two levels down faster than an enemy in any phase provides an in accordance with doctrine, brigade headquarters edge in decisionmaking. Making faster decisions, would position battalions against enemy forces the true aim of increased information, enables us while regiments applied the combat power of to act faster than an enemy and decreases its abil- companies. Brigades would predominantly con- ity to influence our operations. Force protection duct battlefield strategy while regiments would is thereby enhanced. focus on battlefield tactics. Under this organization brigade headquarters A digitally smart, joint, and deployable orga- becomes the focal point for reconnaissance. As nizational structure and doctrinal innovations are technology brings satellite and airborne intelli- only some examples of fully realizing the revolu- gence to the brigade, increased staff specialization tionary potential of technologies. Changes are unwill be needed to translate data into usable infor- derway in how we shoot, move, and communi- mation. This intelligence will drive the direction of cate. Resultant changes in relationships between ground reconnaissance assets. If JSTARS reports a battlefield time and space, combat power, and mass of vehicles moving on an unexpected avenue manpower, and command and control have not of advance, a brigade commander will want ob- been completely appreciated. To capture the po- servers to cover that route. This necessitates col- tential of technology we must establish a better lecting scout platoons from battalions to form a doctrinal basis in areas such as strategy and tactics scout company brigade control. Such a unit will and then organize to fight accordingly. Redefined also have platoons for UAVs and robotic reconnais- levels of battlefield headquarters will increase the sance assets which illustrates “de-massification” at information flow and maintain cohesive direction battalion level and creation of specialized units. while enhancing freedom of action. In an era of Adding fire-and-forget anti-tank missiles will allow smaller forces, we must enable commanders to battalions to adopt skirmish units to conduct mis- draw on joint resources to compensate for a loss sions normally done by scout platoons. of manpower. By de-massifying the production of Brigade staffs will require greater specializa- combat power and decentralizing command and tion. Force XXI concepts rely on modules of units control we can increase specialization and the from which to quickly tailor forces to suit a mis- speed of the decision cycle and force protection sion. Staffs can do the same. If an airborne through action. Force reductions will impose large brigade were jumping to seize an airfield near a missions on small units and technology will give coast and then conducting operations with a Ma- such units the potential to accomplish missions. rine expeditionary unit assaulting from the sea, Only changes in doctrine and organization will that brigade staff should receive augmentation to give them the ability to succeed. JFQ enable command and control. Imagine augmentation staff liaison modules assigned to division This article is an edited and abridged version of an entry that are chopped to brigade for such missions. in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Contest on the Revolution in These would include Air Force liaisons, air and Military Affairs” that was recommended for publication by the judges. naval gunfire liaisons, theater ballistic missile defense representatives to coordinate with offshore Aegis missile cruisers, liaisons for national intelligence assets, and other specialists as required. Di- visions would maintain working relationships between such specialists and brigade staffs in garrison training. Once deployed, digital communications would link liaisons to nodes of expertise and authority supporting brigade. Similar organizations would conduct tailored logistical support. The deployed regimental commander maneuvers battalions as brigade integrates combat power support. Until larger forces arrive on the scene, a brigade commander could act as a joint force land component commander. Decisions are effectively distributed among a larger number of skilled people increasing the overall speed of action. The increased tempo from

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General Tzu’s Army: U.S. Army OPFOR reat expectations surround the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The of the Future Chairman has stated that taking advan- By MICHAEL R. LWIN tage of it means providing “America Gwith the capability to dominate an opponent across the range of military operations.” Al- though we may seek to acquire such dominance potential enemies will also be busy. How might an opposing force (OPFOR) attempt to defeat the Armed Forces of the 21st century? This article provides a scenario for examining the strategies of future OPFOR and concludes by analyzing enemy strategy in relation to maneuver warfare theory and looking at its implications for future defense planning.1 Setting the Scene For the commanding general of the Ameri- Captain Michael R. Lwin, USA, an infantry officer with OPFOR experience can division, the battle had not really begun. His at the National Training Center, is a student in the SO/LIC program at the mobile strike force had been deployed to a far Naval Postgraduate School. away theater to deter an aggressor from the

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north, or to fight and repel it if necessary.2 De- into enemy territory. Secretly, Tzu had turned this spite a few teams of OPFOR reconnaissance sol- doctrine on its head. Two divisions of infantry diers crossing the border, hostile mechanized had undergone training deep in the homeland to forces were still posturing on their territory. To learn the art of infiltration, raids, and ambushes. provide maximum time to pursue deterrence and Tzu’s plan was simple: create enough casu- diplomacy, U.S. forces could not begin combat alties to crush American will to keep their forces operations until a credible offensive threat (for in the theater. Unknown to his opponents, Tzu instance tanks) crossed the border. had already committed two light infantry divi- The commander reviewed his intelligence sions across the border. Although the enemy and options with Battle Staff Bravo. Indeed, the had captured a few squads and platoons, Tzu enemy appeared to be operating pretty much as its doctrine indicated. Although thick cloud cover prevented real-time visual and infrared Patriot launched during downlink from satellites, the feed from the Roving Sands ’97. joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS) II showed a long procession of armored fighting vehicles moving out from their assembly areas. Despite attempts by the enemy to destroy or deceive them, the division’s long range unmanned aerial vehicles had already spotted most of the OPFOR tanks. The video images of moving tanks on display two of his multifunctional command display told the commander exactly what he thought he needed to know. The general reviewed the concept with his staff. The wide valley corridor which canal- ized the approaching enemy division would Combat Camera Squadron (James D. Mossman) Combat Camera Squadron

soon become a virtual valley of death. The di- st 1 vision cavalry squadron would delay lead OPFOR elements long enough to set them up for the kill. At H-hour, an attack helicopter battal- knew that the Americans would not consider ion would hit from the west to destroy the sec- them more than reconnaissance elements for a ond regiment. A rocket strike with precision mechanized force that he was massing across the guided submunitions would attrit another. At border. Tzu’s tanks and artillery would draw H+2, the ground brigade with two armored task American attention. forces would launch a flank attack from the east In the three days since his soldiers had infil- to complete the destruction of OPFOR mecha- trated Tzu had no contact with them. He knew nized forces. that to communicate would expose their position. His mission-type orders were simple and did not What Tzu Knew require constant control. On Tzu’s side of the bor- The OPFOR army, under General Tzu, had the der, however, radio traffic maintained a steady mission of defeating our forces to end U.S. involve- crescendo. Although his mechanized forces used ment on the peninsula, allowing follow-on forces some cursory encryption and frequency-hopping to subdue overrun territory. The general wanted to measures, he wanted it clearly known that he was give Americans everything they expected and preparing to attack. Other deception measures por- more. From his study of the recent war in south- trayed an entire mechanized corps ready to move.3 west Asia, he knew U.S. capabilities provided a As lead OPFOR tanks began crossing the bor- near perfect view of the entire battlefield—or at der, the U.S. commander received warning of an least its mounted battlespace. Tanks and artillery incoming ballistic missile attack. He was certain could not hide. With those facts in mind, Tzu had of the protection of his air defense umbrella. Five spent years preparing for this battle. years ago an enemy in another theater of war In the past, the doctrine of Tzu’s nation had used similar archaic modified Scud missiles in fu- stressed that dismounted infantry forces were pri- tile efforts to strike our forces. Unlike Desert marily used to defend the rugged terrain of the Storm there was no debate about the effectiveness homeland while mechanized forces would slice of the missile defense; not a single warhead detonated on, over, or near any American soldier. The division air defense officer was surprised when a incoming missile did not begin to arc

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down into the air defense coverage sector. His The OPFOR infantry battalion commander first impression that his display was incorrect was facing Johnson was satisfied. The Americans had erased as he saw the missile detonate in the been halted without any losses to his troops, who stratosphere above the division sector. OPFOR were armed with advanced anti-tank missiles fired had launched the first of many low-yield nuclear from cover and guided to the target via fiber-op- weapons to generate an electromagnetic pulse tics. The OPFOR colonel noticed the platoon mov- (EMP) to jam or degrade C4I systems. ing forward and, having inspected every fighting The day started well for Comanche 34, a pilot position, knew his men were ready.4 in the attack helicopter battalion. Looking at the Lieutenant Smith, carrying a thirty-pound display in his cockpit before take off, he saw a radio/digital control pack on his back and leading computer generated map depicting every enemy the platoon, began climbing the ridge. As his lead air defense radar and missile system in his area of squad took fire, he knew what was happening as operations. Significantly, the digital download into a small arms fire locator automatically sent a re- his system revealed that each one was destroyed, port back to him via digital link. In turn, Smith jammed, or forced off the air. From his experience used the information to digitally request artillery in the second Gulf War, he knew that any radar fires. By then the platoon leader and his first two which was turned on would receive an unhealthy squads were in dense woods. Next a mortar bar- dose of 155-mm or rage fell on the trail squad still in the open. Smith his battalion’s main task had multiple-launch quickly ordered them into the woodline and switched from attack to protecting rockets. A few hours began executing a maneuver to flank the enemy. later reality shattered As they moved, Smith wondered where his search and rescue efforts his faith. Hovering artillery fires were. For some reason the digital on the reverse slope link was down. Whether it was EMP from the nu- of a wooded ridge to provide cover to a search and clear skyburst overhead, the mountains masking rescue mission, he struggled to understand why the communication links, or simple equipment their losses were so high. A few years earlier in the failure, he would never know. He received a fran- Great Desert War not a single aircraft was lost to tic report: the flanking squads had run into a the enemy. Now his battalion’s main task had minefield. Now he really needed artillery. Fum- switched from attack to protecting search and res- bling for a map, Smith estimated his position and cue efforts for downed air crews. that of the target and called for immediate sup- General Tzu had adopted a decidedly low pression fires by voice over the radio. tech air defense concept. His plan called for 40 The colonel observed the Americans below. dismounted platoons, each with a man-portable He expected to lose his forward line of fighting po- missile system, heavy machine gun, and blinding sitions. American sensors and small arms were too laser system to screen likely air avenues of ap- powerful. But he knew that the difficulty of fight- proach. Acquisition was by sight or sound. Later ing through an entrenched enemy, climbing a analysis would show that of 120 missiles fired steep slope, and breaching the minefield would ex- only three found their mark. Three other aircraft haust and ultimately stop the heavily-laden Ameri- were shot down by machine gun fire, and two cans. This gave him time to adjust his mortars the crashed after their crews were blinded by lasers. old-fashioned way. Then the artillery and mortars Many other aircraft were damaged. Unfortunately came into play. The mortars fell on the Americans, the U.S. commander’s high resolution computer American counterbattery fires destroyed the wargaming model totally discounted this mix of OPFOR mortars, and a barrage of American im- “obsolete” and high tech weapon systems. proved conventional munitions fell on everyone. The grid location Smith had called in was incor- The Digital Link Was Down rect—he was dead, the platoon was depleted to Abrams tanks could count on kills at 3,500 combat ineffectiveness, and tankers would have to meters and kills in excess of 4,000 meters were wait for more infantry to clear the ridge. not uncommon. But the local terrain limited Specialist Jones drove her high mobility re- most shots to 2,000–2,500 meters. And here supply truck in support of the ground attack. enemy tanks were not the major threat. As Cap- Trailing the combat battalions in a convoy of ten tain Johnson and the lead company team ap- trucks, she was apprehensive but felt relatively se- proached the defile before their main objective, a cure with two battalions of tanks and Bradleys barrage of anti-tank missiles literally fell on them. clearing the road. But as she rounded a corner, After losing three tanks, Johnson ordered a halt the sound of gunfire told her they might not and dismounted his infantry. Thirty-four men with the world’s most advanced infantry equipment moved out to clear the ridges on either side of the defile.

46 JFQ / Spring 1997 1015Lwin 8/7/96 7:39 AM Page 47 ee) Joint Combat Camera Center (Aaron N. Bauldr Joint Combat Camera Center (Aaron UH–60s landing in central Thailand.

have finished the job. Three battalions of OPFOR the value of the media. Because of his actions the infantry had infiltrated to positions astride the scenes of exploding supply trucks and fuelers and main supply routes. Tzu’s template and instruc- dead American soldiers, men and women, were tions were well rewarded. The OPFOR company broadcast on television in the United States two commander initiated an assault with ten enemy hours later. The commander later received his trucks in the kill zone. Targeting antitank missiles country’s second highest award for this act. on security vehicles, he had stripped the Ameri- The outcome of this hypothetical battle is cans of the capability to respond in under thirty left to the reader’s imagination. It is presented to seconds. Well-placed machine gun fire brought illustrate potential vulnerabilities in the digital the trucks to a halt. As he blew his whistle, his force and possible enemy actions to exploit them. company assaulted into the kill zone. The division public affairs officer was in a Functional Dislocation HMMWV behind Specialist Jones. Her mission Maneuver warfare theory holds that one was to escort the media forward to record the method to defeat an enemy is through disloca- American victory. As the firing started, her driver tion, “the art of rendering the enemy’s strength was wounded and veered irrelevant.” 5 Dislocation itself comes in different maneuver warfare theory holds off the road. The firing forms: temporal, positional, functional, and 6 that one method to defeat an slacked, and the enemy moral. Surprise is key to each; without it an began to assault through enemy can react to avoid dislocation. In this sce- enemy is through dislocation the decimated convoy. nario the OPFOR commander uses all four types Without any means to of dislocation to fight the Americans. resist, she chose to surrender. As she got out of The fictional enemy has the initiative be- the vehicle, arms raised, an OPFOR soldier shot cause of American emphasis on pursuing diplo- her dead where she stood. matic initiatives to the end and a reluctance to The enemy infantryman next turned to the use preemptive strategies. With the initiative, TV crew sitting in the back of the HMMWV. As he General Tzu renders U.S. forces temporally irrele- was about to squeeze the trigger, the OPFOR com- vant by infiltrating main attack forces early. His mander knocked the weapon out of his hands. troops gain surprise through stealth and Ameri- “Fool,” he shouted, “move out and clear the truck can failure to recognize them as the main attack. over there!” The soldier, not understanding his almost fatal mistake, ran off to execute the new order. The OPFOR commander, however, knew

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Marines landing at Kauai, Rimpac ’96. U.S. Navy (Jeffrey S. Viano) U.S. Navy (Jeffrey

By introducing only dismounted forces across the In the foregoing fictional battle, General Tzu border Tzu postpones the outbreak of hostilities directly and indirectly functionally dislocates our and gains time to infiltrate farther into our terri- forces. By launching multiple EMP weapons, he tory. By the time combat commences, the enemy degrades our sensors, computers, and digital links virus is already deep in our system. and plays on our dependence on these systems. Tzu achieves positional dislocation by the na- The young American officer, dependent on the ture of his forces. Using armored elements to at- global positioning system and digital links, loses tract attention and engage from the front, his in- his ability to navigate by map and compass and fantry maneuvers deep on the battlefield to strike to call in fires by voice. relatively soft targets in mechanized units: logisti- The use of nuclear weapons in a non-casualty cal centers, command posts, and communication producing role further dislocates our forces. The nodes. Tzu’s force uses weapons that bypass tanks deterrent effect of the U.S. nuclear arsenal has and armored vehicles by venturing into terrain failed; Tzu gambles that America will not use a where vehicles cannot go—infantrymen.7 weapon of mass destruction to retaliate for a Functional dislocation is achieved by making weapon that has not directly killed a single soldier our forces work improperly. This is done with or civilian. Is there another form of deterrence that both low- and high-tech weapons. A recent exam- could prevent this type of nuclear attack? What is ple was the Army’s experience in Somalia. The the response to the use of nuclear weapons as EMP use of low-tech rocket propelled grenades, an un- generators rather than mass destruction? guided, man-portable weapon designed to kill Indirectly, Tzu dislocates opposing troops by tanks, allowed poorly trained Somalis to shoot attacking with forces and weapons that they are down dislocated special operations helicopters.8 not fully prepared to fight. JSTARS and unmanned aerial vehicles may see tanks miles away, but how far off can they see soldiers walking under triple

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canopy jungle? Tzu’s use of a purely man-portable in technology will not ensure dominance. Under air defense concept is unpredicted by the staff and some conditions it may be achievable without its computers. He also uses blinding laser and the latest computers, communications, and mine weapons assumed banned by international weapons. Like General Tzu, we will have to find convention. Finally, he uses an infantry heavy the proper mix of organization, doctrine, and force in close terrain, a situation in which the mo- technology. Only with a thorough understanding bile strike force is not optimized to fight. of the enemy, well configured and trained forces, The question today is whether we are func- and unified action can the Armed Forces be dom- tionally dislocating ourselves in designing future inant over OPFOR of the future. JFQ forces. Force XXI technologies appear to add tremendous capability to fight a mounted enemy NOTES in open terrain like that at the National Training 1 This hypothetical scenario abstracts the use of Center or in Kuwait and Iraq. But what is being naval, air, and allied forces. Moreover, OPFOR organiza- done to counter dismounted soldiers in close ter- tions and characteristics are not meant to represent the rain, the type of enemy who confounded U.S. future forces of a particular nation. The author would forces in the hills of Korea and the rain forests of like to thank Paul Stockton of the Naval Postgraduate southeast Asia? School for help in bringing this article to fruition and Moreover some observers think future ene- Chris Layne and John Arquilla for their comments. mies will choose forces that inherently dislocate 2 For the latest information, see Prairie Warrior ‘96 us.9 Guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists use a dif- (on-line at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff ferent form of combat, one which the so-called College web site). 3 For deception tactics against an experimental digi- RMA and Force XXI have very little to say about. tal force, see Richard A. Jodoin, “Opposing Force Decep- As we gain dominant capabilities in one type of tion Operations during Rotation 94–07,” Red Thrust Star battlespace, it only makes sense for an enemy to (January 1995), pp. 11–14. (Red Thrust Star is the Army choose an alternative battlespace. OPFOR magazine at the National Training Center.) The last form of dislocation is moral, break- 4 This passage owes its inspiration to John A. Eng- ing enemy will to continue the fight. Whether lish and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry, revised because of a failure to create and sustain national edition (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), pp. 176–77. will, an increasingly strong reluctance to risking Chapter 10 contains insights on the importance of in- American lives for any but our most vital inter- fantry on the future battlefield. 5 ests, or the faster transmission of news and im- Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1991), p. 66. ages, the United States appears to be highly vul- 6 The subdivisions and definitions of dislocation are nerable to moral dislocation. We have set the from Robert R. Leonhard, “Force XXI and the Theory of conditions for wars to be short and have few ca- Winning Outnumbered,” Army, vol. 46, no. 6 (June sualties. Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia bear 1996), pp. 60–62. this out.10 And Saddam’s strategy in the Gulf indi- 7 For a similar scenario and details on this form of cates that these lessons were not lost on others.11 maneuver see Charles S. DeVore, “Countering U.S. The future holds variables that will exercise Heavy Forces in Rough Terrain,” Red Thrust Star (July an undetermined effect on our will. We have near 1991), pp. 10–14. instantaneous media coverage already. As this 8 See Rick Atkinson, “Night of a Thousand Casual- trend approaches its limits and news permeates ties,” The Washington Post, January 31, 1994, pp. A10–11. During the October 3, 1993 raid in Mogadishu, every corner of the Nation, how will the public two MH–60 helicopters were shot down and two were react in a crisis? Will information warfare involve seriously damaged by rocker propelled grenades. an enemy that puts harrowing images on our TV 9 For commentary on irregular warfare see Martin screens? The integration of women into all areas van Crevald, The Transformation of War (New York: The of the military adds another variable. What will Free Press, 1991). be the public reaction when both men and 10 See Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro, “Ca- women suffer mass casualties on some far away sualties, Technology, and America’s Future Wars,” Para- battlefield? If the images relayed from Somalia in meters, vol. 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 119–27. October 1993 had included dead American fe- 11 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, “How male soldiers would it have made any difference? Kuwait Was Won,” International Security, vol. 16, no.2 (Fall 1991), p. 15. Many questions raised in this article indicate that there is still an area of uncertainty about the This article is an edited and abridged version of an entry in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Contest on the Revolution in future despite the promise of RMA. In dislocation, Military Affairs” that was recommended for publication there are variables that could put dominance at by the judges. risk. A perceptive enemy will take advantage of them. Friction and the fog of war will provide ample opportunities to do so. Maintaining a lead

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Interservice Competition:

Air Force F–16. out of joint U.S. Air Force (ShonnaU.S. Air Force Ridings) The Solution, Not

the Problem e do not know what the future By HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY holds. Although our Nation is vastly stronger today than at any time in the past, we are likely to faceW major challenges. But we do not know how or when. To deter such challenges and respond effectively if aggression does occur, the Armed Forces need a policy planning system to identify and cor- rect weaknesses in our security as they develop. Intuitively we know the sort of planning to do. Americans prefer a free market system to controlled markets, competition to monopoly. We believe in competitive elections rather than one- party rule. And when an international security crisis befalls us, we never have the will to sup- Harvey M. Sapolsky directs the Defense and Arms press competitive urges among the services—the Control Studies Program at the Massachusetts same urges usually labelled wasteful duplication Institute of Technology. when the threat is not so obvious. Recall that

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Sapolsky

three commands fought independently and suc- Marines already have and intend to expand. Bil- cessfully in the Pacific during World War II. And lions could have been saved in each instance if because three services developed ballistic missiles, the public had been made aware of the overlap we were able to meet the Soviet challenge of the and advantages of one alternative over the other. 1950s rapidly and effectively. The problem, of course, is that competitors Interservice competition offers civilians sev- don’t like to compete. They prefer to collude, to eral major advantages. First, it helps generate vital work together for mutual benefit. Antitrust laws information. What the Navy won’t tell us about only protect us from collusion among business its vulnerabilities, the Army and Air Force might. firms to the extent they are enforced. There is, Are aircraft carriers easy to attack? Should an up- however, no similar shield against collusion graded Aegis system form the heart of our theater among nonprofit organizations and government ballistic missile defense? Can naval forces sta- agencies. “Give the United Way” really means tioned off a coast exert significant influence in an “Give the Charity Cartel Way” as charities collude evolving crisis? Ask the Navy; but ask the Army to prevent performance comparisons and any ex-

and Air Force as well. pression of donor choice. The Armed Forces, which out of joint Second, it gives civilians leverage in their ef- became sensitive to being manipulated at the fort to control defense policy. It is extremely diffi- hands of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, cult to face down a unified military. Ranks of gen- have now become the champion of jointness, their erals and admirals who shield against being played off against one another the problem is that competitors are in agreement on the by civilians. Joint approval means all the tradeoffs same issue position are a are made on the friendliest possible terms under prefer to work together formidable force to out- which each service threatens retaliation if its most maneuver in any Wash- important needs are not considered. ington policy debate. Interservice competition But the Armed Forces may overestimate the gives civilians the possibility of informed and willingness of civilians to foment competition. In- powerful military allies in defense strategy and terservice friction produces a lot of political heat budget discussions. It allows them to play one because it usually involves appeals to Congress service against another when particular policies and recruitment of partisan supporters among are preferred. If the Army begins to complain military retirees, contractors, and friendly re- about peace operations which the Clinton admin- porters. The resulting turmoil often reflects badly istration appears to favor, perhaps the Marine on civilian officials, leaving a public impression Corps will sign up to conduct them. that they fail to manage effectively. This is partic- Third, competition spurs innovation. When ularly true when accusations are made over the there is expectation of significant reward or loss, duplication of capabilities, which adds to the gen- the services may offer up not only information eral perception of waste in government; but it also about their bureaucratic rivals but new ideas, ways extends to criticism by one service of another. Too of both improving their military capabilities and many inside and outside of government confuse protecting their roles and missions. It was the audible debate over policy alternatives with inde- Navy’s fear of losing the nuclear deterrent mission cisiveness when it should be seen as the necessary entirely to the Air Force in the 1950s that gave us prelude to informed political judgment. the Polaris submarine that in turn reduced the Our four air forces, three armies, two strate- need to deploy hundreds of vulnerable and costly gic missile forces, and one and a half navies are strategic bombers and most of the liquid fueled indeed wasteful luxuries if they are not harnessed missiles that the Air Force was developing. to generate policy options and comparisons. In The benefits of competition are not always an uncertain world it is better to have multiple grasped. As one recent analysis of innovation the- perspectives on defense issues, but how can this ories points out, the Navy chose not to challenge be achieved short of a major crisis? Congress was Air Force plans to field either new bombers or once thought to be the champion of the competi- highly accurate—but difficult to base—MX ballis- tive approach but instead enacted the Goldwater- tic missiles in the early 1980s even though it was Nichols reforms, the 1986 blueprint for jointness developing an equally capable missile system for now so warmly endorsed by defense officials and its submarine force. Similarly, the Marine Corps senior officers as their shield against public decided after a brief fight not to oppose Army scrutiny. Apparently, the potential for serious plans for prepositioned ships laden with equip- oversight that a competitive structure might re- ment for mid-level contingencies even though quire was too exhausting for Congress to contem- this fleet largely duplicates capabilities the plate, absorbed as most members have become by ideology and the quest for reelection, and it sought to stamp it out. How then can a competitive defense system be maintained?

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■ INTERSERVICE COMPETITION

Marine AV–8B. Marine Division, Combat Camera (B.E. Van Cise)(B.E.Marine Division, Combat Camera Van d 2 out of joint U.S. Navy (StephenU.S. Navy Batiz) Navy F–14.

Fiscal austerity fortunately works in favor of weapons that provide a power base from which to increased competition. The social entitlement develop and promote alternatives. battle in the face of the deficit reduction effort is The services potentially offer us the condi- bound to draw attention to the fact that defense tions that Sanford Weiner has identified as crucial expenditures in real for effective competition—a set of relatively se- the services offer the conditions terms have yet to fall cure organizations that can be made to feel un- crucial for effective competition— below their Cold War certain about their future—“constrained auton- lows despite the fact omy.” Organizations threatened by immediate “constrained autonomy” that neither the So- demise cannot function. Their strength to plan is viet Union nor the diminished by the need of their employees to Warsaw Pact still exist. Collusion functions best find jobs. Conversely, totally secure organizations when hard choices can be evaded. Logrolling will are subject to the lethargy of tenure where the stop when one of the services discovers that its creative idea is a rarity and the urge to action is vital interests are being jeopardized by the need difficult to arouse. Pushed to worry about their for further reductions. futures but not slated for quick disbandment, the Luckily, the services have not entirely lost services would have the resources, time, and need their identities although some promoters of joint- to think hard about their special talents and con- ness wish they had. Relatively simple and inex- tributions to national security. pensive features such as separate academies, dis- Competition is not its own reward. The ser- tinctive uniforms, and unique military traditions vices will be reluctant to provoke one another maintain public support for the Armed Forces. even on the promise of specific benefits such as More important, each has a service staff, an affili- budgetary increases or the preservation of favored ated civilian secretariat within its department, assets. The risks of significant losses are high for and continuing attachments to particular all once the war among them resumes. And the services are not alone in fearing competition. De- fense civilians have not shown interest in forcing

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Sapolsky out of joint McDonnell Douglas Army AH–64A.

a competitive search for savings or new insights. have to forfeit defense. Ships may have to be tied Witness their recent recommendation to pur- up, troops called home, and planes grounded. chase the full complement of C–17 transports But this sacrifice in military readiness will when a buy of off-the-shelf Boeing 747s would do not be totally in vain. With fewer dollars and nearly as well at $6 to $8 billion less. Congress more friction, the services will have to think also seems uninterested, believing that the opera- harder about the threat and how the Armed tional unity mandated by Goldwater-Nichols Forces can meet it. There is no better incentive to gave us victory in the Persian Gulf despite the candor, error correction, and creativity in defense contradictory strategies which the services actu- planning than a tight budget and a few smart ri- ally pursued. Moreover members of Congress, vals competing for a share of the pie. JFQ deficit reduction pledges notwithstanding, are seeking increases in defense spending to keep the This piece was adapted by the author from an earlier orders flowing for their favorite weapons or con- article entitled “The Interservice Competition Solution” tractors. President Clinton is not likely to push which appeared in Breakthroughs, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1–3. the issue, having worked hard to gain the support of the military after early missteps. The unintentional initiator of the next wave of interservice competition may well be average middle class citizens, who we know from opinion surveys want taxes cut, their parents’ Medicare and Social Security benefits preserved, their police, schools, environment, and recreational areas maintained, and welfare—foreign and domestic— drastically cut. To get their vote, politicians may

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JFQ Forum

SFOR honor guard, Tuzla. 1st Combat Camera Squadron (David W. Richards) NATO European Security and Beyond

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Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe is German. Mechanisms have NATO, European been established to strengthen political control over military operations. More- over, as General Joulwan notes in his ar- Security, and Beyond ticle, a new array of concepts such as the combined joint task force, Partner- Introduced by HANS BINNENDIJK ship Coordination Cell, and ACE Mobil- ity Coordination Center were put in place to deal with new partners and new missions. Closely related to the NATO core ong-discussed change in Euro- realities of Europe and have been is the process of making the relation- pean security architecture is tested by the NATO experience in ships among Alliance members more underway. While it may lack Bosnia. With adroit diplomacy and po- equitable. While Europe continues to elegance and simplicity, this litical cohesion, this architecture can struggle with monetary union and a L“new order” should prove useful in provide agile responses and can evolve common security policy, articles on Eu- meeting security problems that face into an even more inclusive system. ropean security and identity and the Europe. Its strengths are inclusiveness Despite a reduction of more than Western European Union (WEU) in this and a NATO core, and its potential two-thirds in the number of U.S. troops issue note that progress has been made weaknesses are dissatisfaction by lesser based in Europe, NATO is the most ca- in creating a “separate but not separa- included nations and lack of political pable military organization in the ble force” based on a revived WEU. cohesion to deal with new threats. world. The United States is committed Now that the future rests squarely on This JFQ Forum examines a range of to the continuing deployment of about NATO, analysts on both sides of the At- security considerations that have been 100,000 troops. And while NATO re- lantic applaud enhancing Eurocorps clarified in the wake of summit meet- tains some of its Cold War structure— and efforts like the Italian-led opera- ings over the last few months. including large armor and mechanized tion in Albania. But some transatlantic The new architecture can be seen formations—it is adjusting to a new era problems remain, as highlighted by the as five concentric circles, with NATO with emphasis on mobility, rapid reac- Franco-American dispute over who command structure and military capa- tion, and peace enforcement. commands at Allied Forces Southern Europe. Theater commands are much more important today than during the Cold War, and relinquishing the only theater command in Europe under Ameri- can leadership could

bilities at the center, surrounded in turn by a NATO-based European security and defense identity, NATO enlargement to include new members, an enhanced Partnership for Peace program, and NATO agreements with NATO is being both streamlined undercut public support for NATO in Russia and Ukraine. Most of these and Europeanized. Headquarters staffs the United States. arrangements have been formalized have been cut by a third and the num- Enlargement forms the next con- through various institutional relation- ber of commands has similarly de- centric circle. Poland, Hungary, and the ships between the nations of Europe clined. Even with downsizing, 75 per- Czech Republic are seen as consensus and the NATO core. They reflect the cent of senior military positions are candidates for early membership in the now held by European officers. The Alliance at the Madrid summit while Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Eu- Romania and Slovenia have garnered Hans Binnendijk is director of the rope, who has responsibility for strate- strong support within Europe. Some Institute for National Strategic gic planning and European-led opera- Studies and editor-in-chief of JFQ. tions, is British and the chief of staff at

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critics argue that enlargement is unnecessary for central Europe and dangerous for relations with Russia, but time has proven them wrong. The process of qualifying for membership in the Al- further membership. Second, former may use the consensus process to its liance has solidified democracy as well neutrals such as Austria, Sweden, and advantage by convincing other nations as civilian control of the military in Finland will be admitted when they to oppose proposals that it does not candidate countries. In addition, it has become convinced that neutrality favor. NATO must make it clear to Rus- eased ethnic and border tensions within the new Europe is an anachro- sia that any abuse of the new council among candidates as they realize that nism. Third, the Baltic States have will not be tolerated. Ukraine too has Europeanization is more critical than made significant economic and politi- negotiated a new agreement with local politics. And Russia, though still cal progress, but their status as former NATO and with Russia as well. uneasy about enlargement, has ac- republics of the Soviet Union could The major test of the emerging quired a number of security advantages create such a negative reaction in Rus- European security architecture will be under the Founding Act that it might sia that overall security might not be Bosnia. Differences of opinion exist on not have gained otherwise. But the de- helped by their membership. And both sides of the Atlantic on when Sta- bate about enlargement is far from over fourth, Balkan nations such as Bul- bilization Force should be terminated as legislators on both sides of the At- garia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of and what to do in the interim. Many lantic determine what price they must Macedonia, and Albania may need a Americans want the mission to end on pay for ratification. The cost is esti- decade or longer to prepare for mem- schedule next summer and be replaced mated to be about $30 billion over the bership. To help maintain security by a European-led force. But it is next 12 years, of which the United among these groups, NATO will de- highly unlikely that many Europeans States would pay less than 10 percent. pend on enhancing the Partnership for will revise their “in-together, out-to- The debate will probably start in the Peace. With enlargement, however, gether” stance, so an all European Senate, and Europeans will wait to see if this program could be weakened as its force for Bosnia may be stillborn. A President Clinton gets the required two- key members join NATO. So a larger- complete withdrawal is likely to thirds vote. In the end, the Senate will than-planned effort—including signifi- reignite conflict among Bosnia’s ethnic probably support enlargement, but the cant funding—may be required to groups. Meanwhile, we must avoid the debate could start a new transatlantic shore up security for countries that pitfalls of Somalia—taking sides and burden-sharing dispute that the rapidly face a long period of preparation. The expanding the mission as force struc- changing Alliance ought to be spared. new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council ture declines. Most central and east European will help if it does not become mori- This JFQ Forum also examines nations will be left out of the first bund as did its predecessor, the North issues that are likely to confront the round of enlargement, and measures Atlantic Cooperation Council. Atlantic Alliance in the future includ- must be taken to promote reform and Finally, NATO has established a ing the continued presence of U.S. security enhancement in the region. new relationship with Russia, formal- dual-capable aircraft and nuclear Although the process will remain ized by the signing of the Founding Act weapons in Europe and instability in open, many countries will take little in Paris. The act builds on NATO’s ear- Sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, the comfort from this promise since they lier 16-plus-1 consultative arrangement articles that follow cover both the high fear that some time must pass before with Russia and on close NATO-Russian and low ends of future NATO security the Alliance adjusts to the first military cooperation in Bosnia. Al- problems. The new security architec- tranche. Future candidates can be di- though NATO made no concession that ture will need to deal with a broad vided into four groups. First, Romania allows a veto of non-article V opera- array of threats in order to succeed. JFQ and Slovenia were strong contenders tions, Russia will have a voice through in the first round of expansion, but the Joint Council. Those critics of the their membership is expected to be de- Founding Act who generally support layed. They need a clear perspective for enlargement, such as Henry Kissinger, fear that once Russia is formally a member of NATO-related councils, it

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SFOR activation ceremony, Sarajevo.

The

New SHAPE (MichaelU.S. Air Force Featherstone) of the Atlantic Alliance By GEORGE A. JOULWAN

he new streamlined military defense identity (ESDI) within a structure that has emerged broader transatlantic framework. This under the Supreme Head- transformation did not occur overnight quarters Allied Powers Eu- but has been underway over the last Trope (SHAPE) is a worthy successor to three years. Because of these changes the organization which kept the peace SHAPE and ACE now can respond to for more than four decades. Today it crisis or conflict across a full range of has both a crisis response center and a contingencies—from humanitarian or joint operations center and provides peace operations to collective defense. oversight and guidance to components SHAPE will ensure that the Alliance is of Allied Command Europe (ACE), in- not soft anywhere or anytime it is com- cluding Stabilization Force (SFOR) in mitted—from peace operations to col- Bosnia. In addition, SHAPE has devel- lective defense. This article details oped a strong European security and changes in this dynamic headquarters and the role which it is now playing for General George A. Joulwan, USA, is the Alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Organization (NATO). and commander in chief, U.S. European Command.

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The Brussels Summit place and right time as needed by Military Committee and North At- Based on political guidance which major subordinate commands (MSCs) lantic Council. The quick response re- emanated from the January 1994 which are responsible for the training- sulted from several innovations in NATO summit meeting held in Brus- to-mission of NATO forces and certifi- SHAPE methods of operation. Of par- sels, SHAPE developed an operational cation of non-NATO forces. MSCs also ticular interest was the increased use of concept to link the Partnership for mount key headquarters, such as the the Deputy SACEUR (a British four- ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, and assist star) and chief of staff (a German four- SHAPE developed an in movement control of earmarked star). First, a revitalized ACE Reaction units. In addition, the headquarters Force planning staff (ARFPS) under the operational concept to link provides the flexibility to augment the Deputy SACEUR was directly responsi- the PFP program and the staffs of committed headquarters with ble for strategic planning. Second, the hundreds of officers and non-commis- SHAPE Crisis Response Center was acti- CJTF initiative sioned officers. SHAPE and ACE did vated in winter 1993–94 to monitor that for Implementation Force (IFOR) the worsening crisis in the former Yu- Peace (PFP) program and combined headquarters and now SFOR. Opera- goslavia. joint task force (CJTF) initiative. The tions Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard The Crisis Management Organiza- guidance called for evolving PFP to en- have proven that our post-Cold War tion (CMO)—which has existed on able missions to be executed by PFP organization theory is sound. This is paper since SHAPE was established— members and NATO forces. The ratio- SHAPE: dynamic, flexible, and relevant was activated late in 1995 to coordi- nale underpinning this operational to the challenges of a new NATO and a nate Joint Endeavor for SHAPE. It con- concept was to exercise with our new new Europe. Indeed we have put the- sists of cells from the peacetime SHAPE partners by training to common stan- ory into practice. organization with operations, intelli- dards, doctrine, and procedures. Estab- gence, logistics, mobility, resources, From Theory to Practice lishing this solid foundation would public information, communications, prepare our partners to operate under a SHAPE has responded well to and systems divisions, plus IFOR liai- NATO or non-NATO led CJTF. The op- planning and support for operations in son teams, making up most of CMO. It portunity to put theory into practice Bosnia. When the Supreme Allied not only coordinates the IFOR effort came just over two years later when Commander Europe (SACEUR) was but advises both SACEUR and NATO NATO led an implementation force to given overall responsibility for the headquarters on significant events or bring peace to Bosnia. Bosnian mission, SHAPE rapidly devel- any change in the situation. The chief Under this concept, SHAPE must oped a concept of operations and oper- of staff and the assistant chief of staff quickly translate political and military ation plan that was approved by the for operations and logistics at SHAPE instructions from NATO headquarters direct the CMO effort. into guidance and operation plans for its subordinate commanders to execute. This is essential to the success of Figure 1. NATO Military Command Structure in Europe all NATO missions—from article 5 operations to less traditional missions SHAPE such as peacekeeping, humanitarian SACEUR assistance, and disaster relief. NATO headquarters and SHAPE have adjusted DSACEUR to the post-Cold War environment.

Far-sighted diplomats, strategists, and Chief of Staff defense planners have kept abreast of changing security requirements. It is clear that the threat of attack against members of the Alliance is low. But collective defense and force projection CINCNORTHWEST CINCENT CINCSOUTH must continue to buttress a strong and stable Europe. The need for a robust and flexible NATO remains because of COMHQSNORTH COMLANDCENT COMLANDSOUTHEAST COMLANDSOUTH uncertainty and instability. SHAPE has adapted to meet these challenges and has taken advantage of the proven se- COMNAVNORTHWEST COMBALTAP COMNAVSOUTH COMSTRIKFORSOUTH curity architecture that NATO has provided over so many years. In brief, SHAPE must identify, bal- COMAIRCENTCOMAIRNORTHWEST COMLANDSOUTHCENT COMAIRSOUTH ance, generate, and move NATO and non-NATO forces to arrive at the right

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Joulwan

Danish Stinger missile radar tracking team.

F–15s over Denmark, Tactical Weaponry ’95. U.S. Air Force (RobertU.S. Air Force Stuart)

led in this critical NATO, together with many of its

Jeffrey Allen)Jeffrey area and, with partners and friends, deployed 50,000

on ( AMCC, he has re- troops to Bosnia to help establish the sponsibility for conditions for a just and lasting peace. generating, bal- IFOR, under the strategic direction of ancing, and de- SHAPE and with proven NATO proce- ploying the force. dures, deployed and closed the force Combat Camera Squadr st

1 The AMCC within 60 days. Well over 2,000 flights, multinational 50 ships, and nearly 400 trains moved staff relies upon more than 200,000 tons of cargo and In the key area of force generation the allied deployment and movement 50,000 troops into very difficult terrain and movement, the ACE Mobility Co- system to coordinate force deploy- under severe winter weather condi- ordination Center (AMCC) is an exam- ment. This state-of-the-art software, tions. IFOR engineers skillfully and ple of the new SHAPE; it is effective operated by the NATO C3 Agency (for- courageously spanned the swollen and efficient in its operational mission. merly the SHAPE Technical Center) at Sava River. Under the watchful eye of Since December 1995 the center has The Hague in the Netherlands, fur- SHAPE, troops poured into Bosnia and worked closely with participating nishes NATO nations with a common Croatia—simultaneously and safely— NATO nations to ensure that all de- deployment planning tool. The system via land, sea, and air. Many non-NATO ployment plans and force movements reduces deployment time and permits nations also have joined the effort in- match the priorities set by the IFOR users to control and deconflict deploy- cluding 17 troop-contributing coun- commander. It has also deconflicted ment plans. It is installed in the capi- tries. Counting NATO members, more movement problems, such as too tals of most member nations and al- than thirty nations have committed many ships in a limited port, through lows AMCC to accurately track forces, making Joint Endeavor a truly negotiated solutions with both the na- movements of troops, equipment, and international effort. tions involved and the Joint Move- logistical support into theater. This sys- Due in large part to the profes- ment Control Center in theater. AMCC tem has been invaluable to the simul- sional deployment and robust response also coordinated with non-NATO na- taneous movement of multinational by IFOR troops when NATO assumed tions—Russia, for example—to match forces into the IFOR area of operations. their deployment plans with the over- The results have been truly impressive. all flow of forces. The Deputy SACEUR

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the mission on December 20, 1995, Working with these agencies we broke still under the strategic guidance of the former warring parties immediately the cycle of war to provide a secure en- SHAPE, continue this NATO peace- began to comply with provisions of vironment. The civilian agencies con- keeping effort. tinue to implement their plans NATO forces have assisted and take advantage of the mo- New Partners and Friends civilian agencies with economic mentum for peace in Bosnia. The It was encouraging to see the September 1996 elections, an inte- readiness of so many non-NATO coun- development and other activities gral part of the Dayton agreement, tries to contribute forces, provide logis- were a significant milestone and tics support, and allow transit of IFOR the Dayton accords. And since our ini- validated our efforts in that war-torn contingents. The contributions by our tial deployment the operation has country. partners demonstrated the validity of been an overwhelming military suc- The 12-month IFOR mission PFP as a firm basis for planning and cess. The warring factions were sepa- ended in December 1996. To maintain coordinating with them. Our new part- rated by 4 kilometers in 30 days, land the peace momentum, the North At- ners—including former adversaries— transferred in 90 days, and heavy lantic Council authorized a follow-on provide units and personnel to meet weapons moved to storage sites in 120 force to ensure a secure environment vital SFOR requirements. It is no days. In addition, illegal checkpoints for civilian agencies to complete the longer “us versus them”—but one were eliminated and freedom of move- mission. Today some 31,000 troops, team working to bring peace to Bosnia. ment improved by the reopening of International support has been Sarajevo airport plus the reconstruc- critical to IFOR and SFOR, but perhaps tion and repair of many railways, no factor is more historically significant roads, and bridges. The cooperation than the NATO-Russian cooperation between military forces and civilian that developed with Joint Endeavor and agencies responsible for rebuilding the continues in Joint Guard. This relation- nation was truly significant. Together ship has fostered trust and understand- we began the process for ensuring a ing between Russian officers and their lasting peace in Bosnia. Alliance counterparts at all levels of Specifically, NATO forces have as- planning and execution. With Colonel sisted the civilian agencies with eco- General Shevtsov as my deputy for nomic development, reconstruction, Russian forces at SHAPE, we have forged police, and other activities essential for command and control arrangements to mission success. The military has preserve unity of command and effort. I helped the United Nations and other exercise operational control over the in- non-governmental organizations to es- dependent Russian brigade and assign tablish the best conditions for success. missions to it through General Shevtsov. In theater this Russian unit is under the tactical control of Multina- Mine detection tional Division North. training along This arrangement proves that two Signal Company, Combat Camera (Jon Combat Camera E. Long) Signal Company,

Route Arizona, Bosnia. th former adversaries can work together

USCG Gallatin in 55 to achieve peaceful goals through mili- German port, Baltops ’96. tary cooperation. This mutual trust is a direct—and natural—result of a genuine partnership in a common mission. Moreover, this shared mission has increased contacts between NATO and Russia. Dealings that once took place only every 18 months have become everyday occurrences as the SFOR mission continues. General Shevtsov meets routinely with me and the SHAPE staff, which provides us with a forum to address issues of mutual interest. In addition, he visits t Wyman) NATO member nations as well as partner countries. Clearly this relationship is a giant step toward building trust U.S. Coast Guard (Rober U.S. Coast Guard

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Joulwan

and confidence between former adver- Figure 2. SHAPE Command Group saries and a significant indication of SHAPE’s adaptation to the realities of a new Europe. SACEUR The Future DSACEUR The Partnership Coordination Cell displays 43 flags, 16 from NATO EACOS NMR Chief of Staff, ACE members and 27 from countries which Reaction Force Chief of Staff Planning Staff have joined the PFP program, arranged alphabetically from Albania to Uzbek- EACOS COOP istan. Twenty of these nations have li- Deputy Chief of Staff aison officers in the cell who underpin a new European security structure— one based on mutual trust and confidence from working together for com- Operations and Intelligence Policy and Resources Communications and Budget and Finance Logistics Requirements Information Systems mon goals and missions. This security (Civilian) relationship is replacing decades of mistrust in Europe and is grounded in cooperation rather than confrontation. This new spirit of NATO is thriv- ing at SHAPE. Such multinational mili- staffs meet and discuss procedures and With new friends and the experi- tary cooperation, together with politi- techniques. I have addressed the WEU ence of the mission in Bosnia, we have cal guidance and control, provides the Assembly in Paris and WEU Council in an opportunity to revamp our security best approach to crisis management Brussels. In fact, the latter body has arrangements in Europe—based on a and preventing narrow nationalistic been briefed at SHAPE, and more ro- vibrant transatlantic alliance and bust terms of reference are strong ESDI. While we adapt and NATO, ACE, and SHAPE are as being drafted for the Deputy maintain flexibility in force structure, SACEUR consistent with the SHAPE will continue to build on a relevant today as they were during principle of unity of command. foundation of over 45 years of military the height of the Cold War Most important, SHAPE is eager cooperation based on continued to continue its adaptation to shared values, ideals, and respect for enhance ESDI while improving the worth and dignity of the individ- concerns from dominating European the Alliance’s ability to execute mis- ual. This is a relationship that we are security and defense thinking. sions across the entire contingency prepared and eager to develop with One clear objective of the new spectrum. our new partners and friends in Eu- SHAPE has been the development of It is apparent that the Alliance is rope. For NATO is more than a group ESDI within a strong transatlantic al- flexible and has adapted to the security of allies—we are friends united in a liance. As mentioned earlier, both the realities of our day. We have shown common vision with a common pur- Deputy SACEUR and SHAPE chief of that given clear political guidance pose and objective. SHAPE is approach- staff are Europeans who have substan- NATO’s operational military arm can ing the 21st century with confidence, tive terms of reference. From 1951 to perform new missions and accomplish optimism, and commitment to a su- 1993 the chief of staff was an American any tasks assigned by its political lead- perb alliance. We are truly creating one four-star; now the post is held by a Eu- ership. SHAPE is a dynamic headquar- team with one mission—and the NATO ropean officer (see figure 2). The chief ters attuned to new requirements and mission continues. JFQ of staff of ARFPS and the Combined organized to meet the challenges of Joint Planning Staff is a European the next century. This is an updated version of an article that three-star and the PFP Coordination As I have pointed out many times, was originally published in Dawn of a New Cell is headed by a European two-star. NATO, ACE, and SHAPE are as relevant Europe (November 1996). Both have played critical roles in the for security today as they were during success of Joint Endeavor. Likewise the height of the Cold War. Our new these officers would bring a distinct Eu- missions will take us well beyond the ropean identity to the planning and ex- collapse of the Berlin Wall, the fall of ecution of any future Western Euro- the Iron Curtain, and the defeat of an pean Union (WEU) operation. ideology. SHAPE and ACE have stream- Moreover, the Deputy SACEUR lined their operations and command serves as the official contact between structure to meet future challenges. SHAPE and WEU, a relationship that is being institutionalized. The respective

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■ CREATING A European SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY By CHARLES L. BARRY

he notion of a unified Euro- and defense identity (ESDI). Now ten pean military is nothing years old ESDI seems here to stay. new. It was raised after Initial American reactions to ESDI World War II as a means of were polite but proscriptive, emphasiz- Tridding the Continent of its legacy of ing that it should be transparent and internal warfare and nearly succeeded complement NATO. Moreover, the before falling victim to fears of lost United States saw it as an internal Eu- sovereignty. Forgotten but not com- ropean matter unlikely to have major pletely abandoned, it was revived in implications for the Alliance. But 1987 under more favorable conditions France, always an advocate of greater after the awakening of a long-dormant independence from the United States, defense institution, the Western Euro- saw ESDI as a means of reducing Amer- pean Union (WEU). ican influence after the demise of the The born again WEU called for Soviet Union. Future U.S. force levels greater cooperation on security and de- in Europe were unpredictable, and fense (including arms production) not- France pointed to the possibility of a ing that, “Europe’s integration will complete American pullout, raising the never be complete so long as it does fear among Europeans that they might not include security and defense.” The be left to fend for themselves and thus effort moved slowly at first but then need their own defense capability. gained momentum with the end of the Simultaneously, American politi- Cold War. With the final outcome still cal interest in Europe appeared to uncertain, however, the idea of por- wane. Key U.S. posts at NATO went traying Europe as a more or less free- unfilled for long periods in 1993 and standing pillar of NATO assumed the Washington was focused on the Asia- awkward rubric of European security Pacific region and domestic affairs. Po- litical interest in Europe seemed rele- gated to central and eastern Europe and Russia. America’s limited participa- Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Barry, USA (Ret.), is a visiting tion in Bosnia and differences with its research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies allies were taken as more evidence that at the National Defense University.

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Figure 1. European Military Formations

European Force Eurocorps (EUROFOR)

■ France, Italy, Portugal, Spain ■ operational since November 1996 Headquarters 42nd French 10th French 6th French ■ division-size reaction force Support Signal Engineer Maintenance ■ headquarters: Florence, Italy Battalion Regiment Regiment Regiment

■ strength: 10–15,000 personnel (Composite) ■ earmarked light forces: — infantry 10th German 1st Belgian 1st French Spanish Franco- — armor Armored Mechanized Armored Mechanized German — artillery Division Division Division Brigade Brigade — special operations

Luxembourg ■ headquarters: Strasbourg, France Motorized ■ operational since October 1995 Company ■ strength: 50,800 personnel Europe would need its own resources in the new era. ESDI was not based exclusively on European Maritime Force an American-related rationale. Euro- (EUROMARFOR) peans worry more than Americans ■ France, Italy, Portugal, Spain about a resurgent Russia, and ESDI ■ operational since late 1995 may be a hedge against Russian intimi- ESDI, although many outstanding is- ■ maritime reaction force dation in regional affairs. Last but not sues remain. Washington is at last tak- ■ headquarters: Toulon, France (rotational) least, securing Germany’s emerging ing serious note of the ESDI phenome- role in collective security is regarded non on both the strategic and ■ typical task force: by most Europeans—including the operational levels. — aircraft carrier Germans—as essential. — 4–6 escort ships At the NATO summit in January Defining ESDI — landing force 1994 the United States joined its allies Why can’t Europeans move be- — amphibious force in endorsing ESDI. However, this was yond the ungainly acronym ESDI in — supply ship describing their search for mili- to many people ESDI is only a tary cohesion? The answer is that the intended endstate remains vague theory on the periphery of uncertain. Many nations in Eu- decade-old ESDI initiative, while seem- serious military activities rope still adhere to the concept of ingly at a standstill on occasion, shows independent action even as na- no sign of vanishing. In fact, the oppo- tional militaries become less and site is true, with our most stalwart ally, less a shift in the American or Euro- less tenable within the transatlantic Britain, backing ESDI. Third, the origi- pean position than it appeared. There framework. nal motives for creating ESDI endure: followed a two-and-a-half year struggle To many people ESDI is only a to counterbalance the United States to agree on the means to fulfill the vague theory on the periphery of seri- and Russia in European affairs, provide summit pledge that NATO assets ous military activities. A consistent an option when American and Euro- would be provided to WEU as neces- caution heard on both sides of the At- pean interests diverge, and pursue the sary to field an ESDI force under the lantic is not to make too much of it logic of bringing integration to the combined joint task force (CJTF) con- too soon. However, three realities must fields of security and defense. cept. A definitive endorsement of ESDI be understood in assessing its potential Another rationale has emerged of was finally reached at the June 1996 or even its survival. First, there are late. Economic strains have left some NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, many obstacles to creating one force countries in Europe with no alternative and the way was cleared to provide a from many. The most salient remains to consolidating declining military es- European defense capability without sovereignty. Yet Europeans reject rena- tablishments and defense industries. the cost of duplicative military struc- tionalization of defense and have Some national forces are all but unsus- tures. Since then there has been a dis- steadily surrendered sovereignty since tainable. Defense industries can no play of transatlantic unanimity on integration began in 1951. Second, the

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has been limited to lightweight activi- Figure 2. European Arms Cooperation Activities ties such as aligning EU political influ- Western European Armaments Group ence around the world through finan- (WEAG) cial contributions. Its most significant actions have been to establish a frame-

Defense Ministers work for EU relations with Burundi, (guidance) Rwanda, and Ukraine. Under CFSP, EU has arranged humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, administered the National Armaments town of Mostar (with WEU), and sent Directors observers to elections in Russia, South (coordination) Africa, and the Middle East. But this is thin gruel in terms of security affairs, even for a mechanism not yet four years old. The diverse cultures, history Panel I Panel II Panel III Ad Hoc Study Group of war among EU members, and differ- Equipment Research and Procedures and ing concepts of integration dictate that Programs Technology Economic Matters CFSP initiatives will remain small, es- • 11 sub-groups • Euclid program • European defense • European Armaments pecially in peacetime when national • 8 current projects • 55 current projects equipment market Agency initiative priorities come to the fore. • Eurofinder initiative • technology transfer An effort aimed at strengthening CFSP decisionmaking was sought at the 1996–97 EU intergovernmental conference. But the agreement to be Western European Armaments Organization reached at the Amsterdam summit in (WEAO) June 1997 had very little import for CFSP. One shortcoming addressed in WEAO Amsterdam was the planning staff. A (13 countries) small group will be formed by dual- hatted council secretariat personnel and civilian and military national rep- Research Cell Board of Directors resentatives. Advances in other areas (initial executive body) may also strengthen CFSP. Procedures Joint Armaments were accepted for qualified majority Cooperation Structure (November 1996)

• Britain • France Major European Joint Ventures • Germany • Italy ■ Tiger attack helicopter ■ family of wheeled ■ NH–90 utility helicopter armored vehicle ■ future large aircraft ■ Tornado fighter ■ Eurofighter 2000 ■ Euromissile longer operate independently, nor can under the common ■ Horizon frigate new systems be fielded by a single na- foreign and security tion. For the United States, which policy (CFSP), a wider needs a stronger partner in Europe, WEU role visibility inside NATO, ar- voting on minor decisions, and “con- ESDI is an initiative to encourage. maments cooperation, multinational structive abstention,” whereby unwill- formations, and military operations. ing members would agree to not block Hard Evidence The place to begin a description of actions by willing members, might be The value of ESDI will ultimately ESDI is with common EU security agreed upon. be measured by the forces that Europe policies where political agreements Western European Union. Responsi- actually deploys. As military analysts are embodied. bility for developing ESDI opera- know, however, forces are embedded Common Foreign and Security Policy. tionally inside NATO and as a separa- in institutions and capabilities. In This pillar is the most visible evidence ble but not separate capability rests fact, ESDI is manifest in several of collective political will to create a with WEU. Since moving to Brussels in venues of security and defense, politi- recognizable European identity in 1993, a new WEU has steadily evolved, cal and military. The evidence is broader security terms. Thus far CFSP though its main effort has been inter- found in at least five broad areas: Eu- nal: institutional structures, staff pro- ropean Union (EU) political actions cedures, data collection, and military

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November 1996, the Western European Italian guided missile destroyer Impavido. Armaments Organization became a subsidiary activity. These structures, as well as WEU itself—which has interests in space intelligence initiatives because of investment in the Torrejón Satellite Center—represent the state of ESDI in defense industrial base cooperation. More than any other area of defense, arms production cuts close to the bone of sovereignty. The major arms-producing nations—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—defend less efficient capacities on political, security, and economic grounds. Jeal- ously over taxes and jobs and the lack of common business law have pre- cluded mergers to rationalize European defense industries. While cooperation exists it comes via costly and time-con- suming joint ventures. Industrial consolidation in America is well ahead of that in Europe because it is not saddled by pluralistic political structures. U.S. Navy Multinational Military Forces. The key indicators of ESDI are multinational, particularly Eurocorps, European planning. Externally, WEU has built cautions must be overcome. Exercises, Force (EUROFOR), and European Mar- ties to EU and NATO and has created defense investments, and working itime Force (EUROMARFOR), and there several types of WEU-related standing closely with the United States are re- are also other units, including NATO for the non-union members of both, quired. WEU has completed its first se- corps. Except for NATO Allied Com- along with central and east European ries of crisis management exercises mand Europe Rapid Reaction Corps— countries (including Russia and with satisfactory results. Given fiscal which has potential as an ESDI force Ukraine) and some southern Mediter- constraints and the need to maintain under NATO—no other formation has ranean nations. The union meets rou- momentum toward the first real “Pe- representation from more than five tinely with non-WEU states and in- tersberg” operation, WEU will have to countries and several are bilateral.1 cludes them when developing rely on simulations. As NATO and the Some have specific headquarters while positions on European security, thus United States learned, simulations not others are simply planning and coordi- adding to the weight of those views. only enhance staff skills but nating arrangements which allow for More than twenty countries have strengthen political-military decision- combined training and operations. pledged forces to WEU to conduct Eu- making and organizational confidence. Eurocorps, EUROFOR, and EURO- ropean-led crisis response operations. Armaments Cooperation. Until the MARFOR are salient in assessing ESDI Since 1988 the union has con- functions of the Independent Euro- because they were established outside ducted several military operations. But pean Program Group (IEPG) were of NATO; and although available to overall decisions to engage militarily transferred to WEU in 1992, coopera- the Alliance, their priority is to WEU. have been marked by political caution tion in armaments existed only as a Of course, including Euro in a title is rather than a desire to further ESDI. forum for information sharing for 16 another indication of a desire for Euro- While the reasons for caution are com- years. With the ultimate aim of creat- pean identity even in loose bilateral plex, two predominate. One is a reluc- ing a strong European Armaments arrangements like the Franco-British tance to undercut American engage- Agency, the Western European Arma- Euro Air Group. One common charac- ment by signalling a substantial ments Group (WEAG) seeks to coordi- teristic of Euro formations is that they capability for Europe to act alone. The nate not only research and technology are open to other nations that may United States might then use ESDI as a but cooperative equipment programs want to join later. The five-nation Eu- pretext for further reducing its pres- and common economic policies (see rocorps, along with EUROMARFOR ence in Europe. The other is an aver- figure 1). WEAG coordinates with arms and EUROFOR and other efforts sion to risking action where success is industries through the European De- demonstrate a desire to move beyond not guaranteed. To field ESDI both fense Industries Group. Recent reforms agreement and field real capabilities. have increased the number of programs implemented and cut delays. In

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but there are few signs of growth, espe- Norwegian Leopard cially in modernization and research. tank, Strong Resolve. Contributing factors are slow recovery from recession and the struggle to achieve monetary union in 1999. Be- sides new capabilities, ESDI calls for investing in a deployable logistics system, training and exercises, and a host of related costs, not least for the pending shift of some European countries to a professional force. The more costly part of ESDI lies in strategic assets—capabilities such as command and control structures, strategic lift, space- based intelligence, communications, and automation-information processing systems. There are European proposals to procure at least some capabilities. But decisions thus far tend only to pool meager resources to achieve optimum output from current assets.

U.S. Navy (MarkU.S. Navy Therien) Little is being invested to acquire added capabilities. Yet it is a misperception that Eu- Military Operations. In the final even for the major powers. In that re- rope is militarily impotent today. Its analysis the forces which Europe actu- spect alone, Europeans have few alter- active forces are well equipped and ally deploys are the measure of its col- natives to some form of ESDI. In the highly trained, and both France and lective defense. WEU has launched a long run, that bodes well for Europe the United Kingdom maintain rapid number of operational initiatives to deployment capabilities. As “show the WEU flag.” In the 1988 there are significant obstacles to demonstrated in Albania, by Iran-Iraq war it sent minesweepers to the U.N. Protection Force (UN- the Persian Gulf. In the Persian Gulf overcome before a capable and PROFOR) mission in 1993–96, War, it deployed a modest flotilla to as- dependable ESDI becomes a reality and with the rapid deploy- sist the American-led task force. Subse- ment force sent to Bosnia in quently, WEU showed the flag in the 1995, Europe can cobble to- Kurdish rescue operation in northern and the United States. Nonetheless, gether its national forces for limited Iraq. In the Balkans, WEU took part in there are significant obstacles to over- crisis response. the maritime arms embargo. It also as- come before a capable and dependable A third challenge is nuclear sisted EU in the Danube River arms ESDI becomes a reality. weapons. In ESDI developments thus embargo operation and policed Mostar The first problem is the struggle far there has been scant mention of with EU. Although not under WEU, between supranationalism and sover- these arms. Can Europe’s common de- the Italian-led humanitarian operation eignty. What kind of political-military fense identity be complete without in Albania can be seen as a collabora- decisionmaking is possible within EU arrangements that address a common tive effort by some European nations or WEU? The acceptable solution over nuclear umbrella? Indeed, article 5 of to act together. the next decade or so appears to be the 1948 Brussels Treaty, on which strict intergovernmental political rela- WEU is established, calls for all mem- A Common Identity tions in EU and almost totally ad hoc bers to “afford the party ...attacked all The evidence demonstrates that operational military commands under the military ...assistance in their there is a nascent European identity in WEU for crisis response. Though such power.” France and Britain, both nu- security and defense. How strong ESDI arrangements will work in some crises, clear powers, have only the barest bi- will become in a federalized Europe or they fall far short of the homogenous lateral collaboration on nuclear arms. a Europe of nation-states—or a Europe U.S. model or the fully integrated mili- Would a European military not have somewhere in between—is impossible tary structure of NATO. access to the most powerful weapons to foresee. What is crucial is that the The second concern is resources. of two member states? If so, would independent defense establishments Falling European force levels and de- non-nuclear states effectively have a of European states are fast becoming fense budgets may soon bottom out, veto over nuclear employment? There unsustainable on any useful scale, is much to do in this area before ESDI becomes whole.

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There are issues external to ESDI German MiG–29s and as well. The first is the potential for American F–16s. competition between NATO and WEU. With special emphasis on planning, resource allocation, and political military concepts, which security issues are seen as transatlantic and which as Eu- ropean? Another external issue, of particular concern in dealing with Con- gress, is the danger of overselling ESDI as a stand-alone European capability. The effect of such a perception is predictable: increased pressure or legislation on the withdrawal of forward deployed forces.

These concerns weigh heavily on ell) the U.S. attitude toward ESDI. Wash- orr ington is wary of any initiative that competes with NATO for the shrunken defense resources available in Euro-

pean capitals. Any investment in forces (Sean U.S. Air Force W NATO CJTF or capabilities outside the Alliance will likely translate into fewer resources for NATO. Solutions to the challenges fac- ■ a military doctrinal concept ing ESDI are not readily apparent. adopted by NATO that will be and trials under three NATO com- They will require time and compro- wedded to the existing, proven— mands. But like collective defense dur- mise to resolve. though much smaller—Integrated ing the Cold War, embedding the doc- Military Structure trinal concept of CJTF within the CJTF Potential ■ primary purpose—to provide Alliance is a long-term effort. CJTF will The primary aim of the NATO the Alliance with a more mobile, serve as the basis for military activities CJTF concept is to adapt the integrated flexible military to conduct and resources within NATO indefi- military structure for new missions by contingency operations beyond nitely. With the Berlin agreement, the giving it a crisis response capability.2 A NATO borders same will now be true for WEU. second aim is that it helps WEU realize ■ secondary purpose—with For ESDI, deploying CJTF repre- a European-led capability under ESDI. agreement by the Alliance, to pro- sents its operational ability to imple- Soon after the concept was approved vide NATO resources in support of ment WEU political decisions. A WEU- two opposing camps emerged, one fo- WEU operations for crisis response controlled operation, and hence the cused on the primary role of CJTF and ■ concept agreed upon in Jan- composition of the CJTF headquarters the other intent on its secondary role. uary 1994 and implementation and forces deployed, is expected to be As the camps worked to thwart each approved in June 1996 smaller than a NATO-led mission. But other, CJTF languished in indecision ■ three NATO commands assuming that the crisis is large for two and a half years and was occa- initially involved in CJTF testing— enough to concern all its members sionally pronounced dead. It had be- AFCENT, AFSOUTH, and (not just Europeans), NATO would di- come mired in the larger debate over STRIKFLTLANT rect the operation. A related factor in ESDI and the future of NATO—purely ■ doctrinal and procedural allocating operations to WEU is that it collective defense, or both collective development of CJTF concept and is only in the initial stage of adapting defense and crisis management. modalities for providing assets to to its new role and has no operational 2 Fortunately, the great potential of WEU will be continuous military C structure similar to NATO. ■ current status—implementa- CJTF for NATO and WEU was salvaged An Alliance Strategy in June 1996. At a meeting in Berlin, tion proceeding under NATO and France agreed to the creation of ESDI WEU collaboration; trials and With a NATO-Russian charter in inside NATO and the United States exercises commencing for NATO place and enlargement in train, the agreed to both afford it adequate visi- in 1997 and WEU at a later date. major unfinished business of NATO is bility within the Alliance and establish to clarify the future U.S.-European bal- procedures for realizing a capability for ance within the Alliance. That suggests WEU use in the near term. At present, a bipolar relationship, one that is equal CJTF is progressing toward implemen- in terms of capabilities, responsibili- tation through planning, exercises, ties, burden sharing, and notably influence in European security affairs. This

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to European security and defense British marine, CJTF Exercise ’96. through NATO. Until Europe can acquire capabilities in such areas as intelligence, information warfare, and strategic lift, its military reactions will be largely tethered to U.S. commitments of support in these functions. In principle, when a crisis is small in scale, European-led diplomatic and military initiatives could end a predicament before it reaches either regional or global proportions. Europe assumes greater responsibility for regional stability, with an engaged, col- laborative United States in a close supporting role. When article 5 of the NATO treaty is invoked—or a fast- building crisis takes on global implications—the United States would engage .) as the logical leading partner. When a crisis recedes to a level where regional management is possible, the United States should disengage. An ESDI Force in Bosnia? Could ESDI send a European-led U.S. Marine Corps (R.L.U.S. Marine Corps Jr Kugler, force to Bosnia in June 1998? With the termination of the 18-month Stabiliza- tion Force (SFOR) mission under a year new balance must be achieved to- While EU will be the central secu- away, the question is being asked. Both gether with an extension of the West- rity-identity organization, WEU will military and political factors are at ern security systems eastward over the be the principal actor for crisis re- play. The military issues can be ad- next 18 months. NATO will find it sponse and collective defense in mat- dressed successfully if a concerted much more difficult to bring in new ters from former Yugoslavia to security planning effort begins soon. Political members and then recast the transat- relations with central and eastern Eu- issues are more problematic. lantic relationship. At present the allies rope. WEU has gained momentum by Militarily there is little question find it easier to focus on the East, operationalizing its headquarters in that an ESDI force could be deployed where hopeful states are eager to join Brussels, absorbing armaments cooper- under WEU, NATO, or even a lead na- the club. Yet as cooperation partners tion such as Italy in Al- reach the threshold, NATO, WEU, and the United States wants Europe to begin bania. UNPROFOR was EU may still be reorganizing and un- overwhelmingly Euro- ready for new arrivals. Both tasks making military responses to crises pean, and both the should proceed simultaneously. 60,000-strong Imple- The central elements of a new ation, and actively engaging in WEU- mentation Force (IFOR) and 33,000- transatlantic security partnership will NATO relations. It will be the expres- strong SFOR are predominantly Euro- be a greater role for Europe in Alliance sion of European security and pean in terms of forces on the ground. decisions, responsibilities, and burdens decisions to act militarily. All EU countries, NATO members (ex- and a continuing senior partner role These developments notwith- cept the United States), and ten central for the United States wherever its in- standing, political Europe—slowly coa- and east European countries have terests are at stake. The agent for a lescing toward political union—will agreed in principle to provide assets for more unified and independent Europe not be distinguishable for some time. WEU-led operations. In addition, will be EU. There is no way of predict- It will need a senior partner in the se- NATO (including the United States) ing when European integration may curity field and not just as a cata- has stated that if approved in the plateau, but the surrender of national strophic insurer. The United States North Atlantic Council its resources sovereignty in defense will take a long wants Europe to begin by taking on will be used to support a WEU-led time if it happens at all. crisis prevention and making initial CJTF. WEU often refers to the “low end military responses to crises. In turn, of the Petersberg tasks” as a desired Europe needs assurance that the CJTF capability, which means roughly United States remains fully committed a division-size land force component.

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A post-SFOR force might be as large as While there is currently no alternative NOTES SFOR overall; however, actual combat to U.S. leadership, if ESDI succeeds— forces could be significantly smaller, especially on the volatile subject of the 1 This corps can draw upon ten divisions depending on the situation and risk-as- southern flank—Europe will be able to to form a reaction force with contributions sessment as June 1998 nears. For the manage crises or mount initial collec- from every NATO member save for Iceland and Luxembourg. anticipated peace enforcement mission tive defense. Ideally, it will also assume 2 For assessments by the author, see of a post-SFOR force, there is little an active role with America in meeting “NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces in doubt that Europe could provide the crises outside Europe. When that day Theory and Practice,” in Survival, vol. 38, required combat forces. The United arrives, the French perspective will no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 81–97, and States would have to augment a Euro- begin to be realized. Today the chal- “NATO’s CJTF Command and Control Con- pean-led force with C4I, strategic logis- lenge is harmonizing transatlantic cept,” in Command in NATO after the Cold tics, intelligence, and lift, and also lead views and furnishing capabilities that War: Alliance, National, and Multinational an over-the-horizon rapid reinforce- the United States and its allies can pro- Considerations, edited by Thomas-Durell ment force, which is within current vide under ESDI to protect their inter- Young (Carlisle Barracks, Penna.: Strategic NATO abilities. ests. However, with more missions and Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 1997), pp. 29–52. Notwithstanding military capabil- lower force levels we must not miscal- 3 For a discussion of the options after ities, there are significant political ob- culate by depending on ESDI either U.S. disengagement, see the author’s “After stacles to a European-led CJTF for too soon or too late. The first test may IFOR: Maintaining a Fragile Peace in the Bosnia. The firm European “in-to- arise in post-SFOR Bosnia when ESDI Balkans,” Strategic Forum, no. 62 (Washing- gether/out-together” position reflects becomes a reality and the transatlantic ton: Institute for National Strategic Studies, the deep scars of past disagreements balance is decisively recast forever. JFQ National Defense University, February over UNPROFOR. But the United States 1996). wants a crisis response strategy where regional capabilities are tapped first and U.S. forces are committed only to ensure that regional capabilities are INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES not at risk of being overwhelmed. Once a crisis recedes to a point where NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY regional capabilities are adequate, the United States wants the flexibility to disengage and go on to other tasks. For The 1997 Topical Symposium that to work in post-SFOR Bosnia, it will be necessary to shift from a U.S.- led to a U.S.-supported (European-led) “Strategy and the force without rekindling the conflict.3 As senior partner, the United Formulation of National States must take the initiative in post- SFOR planning. It should present its al- Security Policy” lies with a workable transition plan, an assurance of robust U.S. support, and a October 7–8, 1997 credible commitment to allow Europe National Defense University to take the lead. Military commanders Washington, D.C. recognize that developing leaders means giving them the tools to succeed as well as the freedom to fail. Congres- sional ultimatums and intra-NATO For details on future symposia or registration material on the above events, confrontations will not build ESDI. If please contact: the United States wants to leave Bosnia National Defense University in June 1998 it will have to work with ATTN: NDU–NSS–SY its allies toward the first bona fide ESDI 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) operation and accept the risk that post- Fort Lesley J. McNair SFOR Bosnia is likely to evolve some- Washington, D.C. 20319-5066 what differently without U.S. leader- Telephone: (202) 685–3857 / DSN 325–3857 Fax: (202) 685–3866 / DSN 325–3866 ship—a risk worth taking. Internet: [email protected] In the rarely mentioned but ever Information on symposia is available via the National Defense University World present contest between the United Wide Web server. Access by addressing http://www.ndu.edu. Symposia programs and registration material are normally posted on the server 90 days prior to events. States and France for influence in Eu- ropean affairs, ESDI is a bellwether.

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HMS Bridport lifting anchor. Royal Netherlands Air Force F–16. fner) Combat Camera Imagery (H.H. Combat Camera Imagery Def d) U.S. Navy (Elizabeth S. Stewar

OperationalWEU Development By GRAHAM MESSERVY-WHITING

ne aspect of European secu- them, WEU has developed a politico- rity and defense identity is military decisionmaking process in the the evolution of a strong Permanent Council, supported by both Western European Union a politico-military and a military dele- O(WEU) to provide the political control gates group; strengthened the planning and strategic direction for Petersberg- cell under the Permanent Council; and type operations as foreseen in the established a situation center (SITCEN) Maastricht Treaty. Such operations in- responsible to the Secretary-General via clude humanitarian and rescue (evacu- the planning cell director and a satellite ation and disaster relief), peacekeeping, center (SATCEN) at Torrejón in Spain and crisis management. To execute (figure 1). WEU has ten full members who Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting is a British army also belong to both the European officer who currently serves as deputy director/chief of staff Union (EU) and NATO (see figure 2). of the planning cell at headquarters, Western European Only these EU and NATO members Union, in Brussels.

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have the right to make or veto deci- Figure 1. WEU Organization sions in the Permanent Council. How- ever, although EU membership is Secretariat General mandatory for WEU admission under WEU Headquarters the Brussels Treaty, NATO membership Situation CENTRF Council of Ministers is a firm albeit unwritten rule. There are three associate members who are Satellite Center (Torrejón, Spain) Permanent Council the planning cell is the only Planning Cell WEU Headquarters military element of WEU that operates in normal times

Politico- Military Special Defense Military Delegates Working Representatives NATO but not EU members and five Group Group Group Group (PMG) (MDG) (DRG) observers who are in EU but not in Council NATO (except for Denmark). In addi- Working tion there are 10 associate partners, Group Open Skies Group Politico- Military Mediterranean making a total of 28 WEU nations. Group (CWG) Military Delegates Working Working Verification Group Command and Control Group Group One key difference between NATO (PMWG) (MDWG) Security Committee Space Group and WEU is that no permanent military structures exist within the latter except for the planning cell. This is because no forces or command and control assets are permanently assigned. However, this offers a degree of flexibility since WEU has three means of Figure 2. Interlocking European Organizations achieving its tasks: ■ national Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) which are potentially available for Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe planning purposes and would be employed European Union on a case-by-case basis ■ one of five multinational FAWEU— Western European Union namely EUROCORPS, Multinational Divi- Ireland2 sion Central (MND–C), United Kingdom- Partnership for Peace Netherlands Amphibious Force, European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), and Euro- Austria2,4 Finland2,4 Sweden2,4 Malta pean Force (EUROFOR) Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council ■ since the Berlin ministerial meeting North Atlantic Treaty Organization Albania in 1996, NATO assets and capabilities, in- Armenia cluding the combined joint task force (CJTF) 2 Azerbaijan Denmark Netherlands Luxembourg United States initiative. Belgium Spain Portugal Canada Belarus Germany France United Kingdom Georgia Once the WEU Permanent Coun- Italy Greece Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan cil has decided to conduct a particular Norway1 Turkey1 Iceland1 Moldova operation, national, multinational, or Russia alliance assets would provide a military Bulgaria3 Czech Republic3 Poland3 Turkmenistan command and control chain which 3 3 3 Uzbekistan Hungary Estonia Slovakia would consist of the out-of-theater op- Lithuania3 Latvia3 Slovenia3,4 Ukraine Romania3 erational commander (OPCDR) and his headquarters with a point of contact who provides the personal link be- 5 Bosnia-Herzegovina Cyprus Liechtenstein San Marino F.R. Yugoslavia tween OPCDR and the Permanent Croatia Holy See Monaco Switzerland Tajikistan Council; the in-theater force commander (FORCDR) and his headquarters;

1 WEU Associate Member 4 EAPC Observer and assigned national forces (figure 3). 2 WEU Observer 5 Suspended Member 3 WEU Associate Partner

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Planning Cell Organization Figure 3. WEU Command and Control—Operations The four-year-old planning cell is the only military element of WEU that operates in normal times. It provides Politico-Military / WEU Headquarters National Multinational advice on the strategic level to the Per- Grand Strategic Council Point Forces Forces NATO of Answerable Answerable manent Council and has a joint com- Contact bined staff of 55 members, of whom 40 Military Strategic / Operational are military officers (O5s or above) or Commander Operational (OHQ) civilians of equivalent rank including a Norwegian police superintendent and a Force French coast guard officer. It is impor- Operational / Tactical Commander CJTF (FHQ) tant to note that this cell works “at 13”—that is, it only includes European Land / Sea / Air Units National members of NATO (full or associate WEU members). It has six functional sections (see figure 4) making it fully compatible with the nearby NATO headquarters and can be reinforced by additional experts when required. Figure 4. Planning Cell, WEU Headquarters Communications and Information Systems Section. WEU is linked to secure and insecure NATO voice and data net- Director Spanish Navy Executive Officer works under the terms of a memo of Colonel/Belgian Army understanding (MOU) which became + 4 Deputy Director/ effective in December 1996, immedi- Chief of Staff ately prior to phase 3 of the first WEU British Army crisis management exercise (CRISEX). A secure video-conference link was es- Communications and Operations and tablished between WEU headquarters Intelligence Information Systems Exercises in Brussels and an operational com- Colonel/Greek Army Colonel/Portuguese Air Force Colonel/German Air Force mander with headquarters at Metz- + 5 + 5 + 7 Guise during the exercise. The Perma- nent Council has approved a Coordination Logistics and Plans comprehensive five-year plan for WEU Movements Colonel/Italian Air Force Colonel/Dutch Army communications and information + 5 Colonel/French Air Force + 8 technology development. + 7 Coordination Section. This element of the cell is responsible for WEU rela- Administration personnel 55 tionships with other international or- 5 nations 12 ganizations. Last year a long-awaited agreement was signed with NATO that allowed for the release of documents between the two organizations. Initial exchanges took place between the NATO International Military Staff and which have been held for years were Logistics and Movements Section. WEU planning cell in September 1996. formalized in January 1997 and are With increased activity among mem- This was followed by an explosion of now co-chaired at the one-star level. bers, partners, and associates in strategic working-level contacts between WEU Intelligence Section. Established in mobility, this section is developing doc- functional cells and relevant sections 1995 and staffed in autumn 1996, this trine, expanding medical expertise, and in both NATO headquarters and section receives intelligence from sev- creating a network of logistics experts in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers eral WEU nations and issues weekly both international organizations and Europe (SHAPE), as well as a number of classified intelligence summaries. It national capitals. It has gotten access to outreach programs. WEU modules has been tasked by the Permanent the NATO deployment and movement have been incorporated in the syllabus Council to monitor Albania, the for- system in cooperation with SHAPE and of the NATO school at Oberammergau mer Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes region the new NATO communications and there have been extensive bilateral of Africa, and Somalia. It also main- agency. A mobility working group was sessions with the NATO Combined tains close working relationships with formed for the 3000-kilometer air Joint Planning Staff at Mons. The in- both SITCEN and SATCEN. movement of elements of a force head- formal monthly coordination meetings quarters during CRISEX. Important

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Messervy-Whiting

Western European Union (WEU) U.S. Navy (MichaelU.S. Navy Gallagher)

FGS Schleswig- March 17, 1948. Foreign ministers from the United Kingdom, France, the Nether- Holstein in the Baltic. lands, Belgium, and Luxembourg sign a treaty to last a minimum of fifty years in Brussels “for collaboration in economic, social, and cultural matters and for col- links have been forged with interna- lective self-defense” thus creating the Western European Union. tional agencies including the U.N. De- December 20, 1950. WEU defense functions are transferred to NATO command, but partment of Humanitarian Affairs and it is decided that the reorganization should not affect the right of defense minis- the European Community Humanitar- ters and chiefs of staff to meet to consider matters of mutual concern to Brussels ian Office. Treaty powers. Operations and Exercises Section. In October 20–23, 1954. At a conference of WEU ministers in Paris four protocols anticipation of a possible intervention which modify the Brussels Treaty are adopted: the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy will accede to the Brussels Treaty, the occupation of West Germany will in the Great Lakes region of Africa, this end, West Germany will be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty; and pro- section conducted hot planning on the visions concerning arms control and British military presence in Europe. These politico-military level at the end of last come into force on May 6, 1955. year and provided military advice to the October 26–27, 1984. WEU ministers adopt the Rome Declaration and also a docu- Permanent Council on possible options. ment on institutional reform. Members support reactivation of the organization to This advice was developed by liaison of- strengthen Europe’s contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance and improve de- ficers who visited U.N. headquarters in fense cooperation among the countries of Western Europe. New York, the Multinational Force October 27, 1987. WEU adopts the “Hague Platform on European Security Interests” (MNF) planning team in Stuttgart, and which defines conditions and criteria for European security and responsibilities of MNF headquarters in Kampala. Lessons WEU members. also have been developed from three June 1992. Ministers adopt the Petersberg Declaration agreeing that WEU should small WEU operations in the former Yu- have a military capability in order to take part in peace and humanitarian opera- goslavia concluded last year: the tions at the request of other international organizations. Danube sanctions operation with Bul- garia, Hungary, and Romania; the joint Source: The Statesman’s Year-Book, 1996–1997 (133d edition), edited by Brian Hunter. Adriatic sanctions operation with NATO; and the Mostar police operation in support of the local EU commis-

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With regard to defense planning, the cell has been analyzing the returns submitted in 1996 by WEU nations of headquarters and units available for Petersberg-type operations. The database currently lists some 2,000 such units from 24 nations, including associate partners and observers. These are mainly national assets, but the five multinational formations are included and MOUs have been signed with each of them. The potential joint operation headquarters are being assessed and discussions are under way with NATO on how WEU requirements can be included in its defense planning process for non-article 5 tasks at the higher end of the Petersberg spectrum. French marines.

U.S. Marine Combat Camera (S.M.U.S. Marine Combat Camera Andrews) The military aspects of WEU operational development are progressing well and will contribute to a stronger sioner. The section also has monitored Eurocorps headquarters at Strasbourg. European capability to undertake Pe- both Implementation Force (IFOR) and Thus by the end of the year all levels of tersberg tasks. The WEU role as a Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations. WEU had been tested in a combined bridge between the Alliance and the This section of the cell conducted crisis management, command post, European Union is strengthening. a politico-military fact-finding mission and live exercise. In March 1997 a post- After all, WEU is the only institution to Africa last year, visiting the Organi- exercise seminar in Brussels examined in which Europeans can discuss the zation of African Unity and four coun- lessons from CRISEX. full range of security and defense is- tries to determine ways that Europe Plans Section. Over the past 18 sues among themselves. However, the can help enhance the peacekeeping ca- months generic plans for all Petersberg organization is still small and must de- pability of key troop-contributing na- tasks have been completed. These plans velop much further before it can take tions in Africa. A database was created include evacuation, humanitarian and on more substantive tasks such as the to identify available training in Eu- disaster relief, peacekeeping, and crisis replacement of SFOR in Bosnia. In par- rope. Other databases also have been management operations. Phase 1 of ticular it must test the viability of set up, for instance on joint use of CRISEX practiced the transition of a using NATO assets in a major exercise. training facilities by WEU nations and generic plan into a contingency plan To send it into an enforcement-type for a specific scenario utilized by action prematurely would clearly be a over the past 18 months generic the Permanent Council to prepare bold and risky decision. JFQ plans for all Petersberg directives for selected operational commanders. Under the WEU sys- tasks have been completed tem, operational commanders and staffs, not the planning cell, carry training in land mine clearance. A out detailed planning. This occurred council-approved exercise policy has during phase 2 of CRISEX when the been developed in consultation with commander presented an outline plan NATO planners and is based on a to the Permanent Council for approval. three-year rolling program. In August 1996, generic plans were de- CRISEX, the first major WEU exer- veloped in some 20 illustrative profiles, cise, tested crisis management on the with an evaluation of each in order to politico-military level. The first phase determine what NATO assets and capa- in December 1995 created exercise in- bilities might be required. The Perma- terplay between the Permanent Coun- nent Council selected six to be submit- cil, its subsidiary bodies, and the capi- ted to the NATO Joint Planning Staff tals of the participating nations. Phase for assessment. II in June 1996 involved a similar exercise but added an operational commander and headquarters. The third was the same but with a force commander,

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After SFOR—

WEU poll watcher in U.S. satellite link for Mostar town center. Joint Endeavor. U.S. Air Force (LisaU.S. Air Force Zunanyika-Carpenter) 55th Signal Company, Combat Camera (Brian Gavin) Planning a European-Led Force By JOHN HILLEN

he decision by the President However, eighteen months on, to commit over 35,000 U.S. NATO is still firmly mired in Bosnia troops to backstop the Day- with no end in sight. Moreover, de- ton peace agreement in au- spite numerous pronouncements from Ttumn 1995 was remarkable given the Secretary of Defense William Cohen domestic controversy over the mission about an imminent U.S. exit in 1998, and the sad history of intervention in there are no plans, political or military, the Balkans in the past. Nonetheless, for making the transition from the American leadership of the NATO Im- U.S.-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) to a plementation Force (IFOR) was key to European-led peacekeeping force both the deployment during 1996 and (EFOR). Although a conversion to a keeping a tight lid on further military predominantly European force is action by the various factions in Bosnia. broadly supported by both parties in Congress, American allies in Europe have clearly communicated their reluc- John Hillen is a fellow for national security at the Council on tance to take the lead. Foreign Relations and author of Blue Helmets: The Strategy The need for the United States to of U.N. Military Operations (forthcoming). plan for a hand-off to a European-led

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force is manifested on two levels. On goal of Dayton was to unify Bosnia likely that SFOR and succeeding forces the micro level, the situation in Bosnia into a multi-ethnic state with shared will settle into a Cyprus-type peace- underscores the fact that while a gen- political, economic, and judiciary in- keeping mission. By the end of the eral peace has been maintained under stitutions. These goals were irreconcil- SFOR mission in 1998, the outside both IFOR and SFOR, there is little evi- able unless IFOR acted to forcibly pro- world may decide that it is worth an dence that it is sustainable without the mote unification—such as stringently international effort to keep peace in continued presence of a robust interna- enforcing the right of refugees to re- Bosnia for years to come even if this tional force. On the macro level, the turn to their homes. means supporting de facto separation. strain on an ever shrinking and glob- Instead IFOR, mindful of the If that is the outcome, the unique and ally engaged U.S. military demands a “mission creep” that beset operations decisive role played by the United smaller commitment by Washington to in Somalia, sensibly stuck to an achiev- States over the last few years must a regional security mission such as con- able military goal—keeping various come to an end. If Bosnia is to be a tinued peacekeeping in Bosnia. More- factions apart by imposing a zone of ward of the international community, separation. In addition, un- then Secretary Cohen’s statement it is likely that SFOR and succeeding dertaking a controversial mis- about who should take responsibility forces will settle into a Cyprus-type sion in an election year meant for heavy lifting in a protracted peace that self-preservation and ca- operation should be put into action. peacekeeping mission sualty-avoidance were of concern to U.S. strategists. This The U.S. Role over, the growing differences in secu- resulted in a passive and risk-averse On the macro level, there are even rity interests and military capabilities strategy that earned U.S. forces in IFOR more compelling reasons for rethink- between the United States and its Euro- the nickname of “the turtles” for their ing U.S. leadership in Bosnia over the pean allies suggest a better division of emphasis on force protection and un- past two years. In particular, the con- labor between a global superpower and willingness to take chances. fluence of several geopolitical and se- its partners. U.S. forces suffered only one curity trends demands a reappraisal of If, as Secretary Cohen said during death from hostile incidents, but their the role of the United States in re- his confirmation hearing, America operations left IFOR well short of the gional alliances and the “one-size-fits- should send “a signal and strong mes- political conditions that could bring all” approach to calling on NATO as sage to our European friends [that] we about the administration’s oft-stated the solution to every European security are not going to be there...that it’s goal of a December 20, 1996 exit date. dilemma. time for them to assume responsibility Indeed, the elections of September The first trend, the strategic strain [in Bosnia]...and that we are not 1996, in which over 80 percent of on the Armed Forces, was stressed by going to make an unlimited commit- Bosnians voted in solid ethnic blocs Secretary Cohen during his first week ment to that region,” then EFOR plan- and few refugees crossed lines to cast at the Pentagon when he indicated ning should begin now. It is certainly votes in their pre-war districts, merely that the demand for American involve- in the realm of the possible, and devel- confirmed the de facto victory of sepa- ment far exceeds our resources. In fact, opments such as the NATO combined ration over unification. By claiming in attempts to close the supply-de- joint task force (CJTF) were intended with ballots what they had fought for mand gap, the military—almost 40 precisely for this sort of contingency. with bullets, Bosnians effectively killed percent smaller than in 1991—is oper- To not undertake planning on the po- the Dayton accords, or at best kicked ating at its most frenetic pace since litical and military level not only de- the can down the road for the SFOR Vietnam. The services routinely exceed nies the realities of Bosnia but flies in political component to resolve in 1997 targeted and budgeted operational the face of several geopolitical and se- or 1998. tempos, especially in frequently de- curity trends that make changing the Under these circumstances, it was ployed units. As a result, exercises have balance of responsibility in all future self-evident that the international been scaled back, combat readiness has Bosnias a U.S. strategic necessity. community would have to maintain a suffered in many units, and problems presence in some strength in Bosnia. with morale, quality of life, recruit- Bosnia 1997 SFOR was envisaged as a smaller IFOR ment, and retention are on the rise. IFOR was a military success in with the same basic mission: to keep The procurement account, down that it prevented the resumption of a the sides from renewed fighting while some 70 percent the past decade, has destructive conflict but a political fail- fostering a climate of peace and stabil- yet to rebound from what the Congres- ure in that it did not pave the way for ity conducive to reunification. Given sional Budget Office terms a “procure- the multi-ethnic Bosnia envisaged by the elusiveness of that goal, which ment holiday.” The FY98 budget the Dayton accords. This is rooted in seemingly has far more support from shows, despite a long-promised in- the fact that the political and military outsiders than Bosnians, it is more crease, a decline in procurement dol- provisions of the agreement always lars for the fourth consecutive year. worked at cross purposes. The IFOR Operations in Bosnia, originally esti- mission was to separate Serb, Croat, mated to cost $1–2 billion in autumn and Muslim forces while the political

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Italian army Leopard 1 tanks. U.S. Air Force

1995, are now forecast to exceed $6 For the most part, the United States is the United States the only NATO mem- billion through FY98, forcing the Pen- becoming the only allied power that ber with such capabilities as large air- tagon to defer maintenance, change or can organize or lead significant combat craft carriers, long-range strike aircraft, cut training, and fleece the budget for operations. This predominance has fielded stealth technology, space-based operations and maintenance funds. come about principally because of the C4I satellites and sensors, advanced Meantime, assets like quarter-century stringent fiscal standards that Euro- aerial surveillance and reconnaissance old C–130s fly in and out of Bosnia at pean Union nations must meet to be systems, global lift, strategic logistics twice their normal rate while replace- eligible for monetary integration. Since assets, and advanced weaponry based ments are pushed farther back in the only Ireland and Luxembourg cur- on the nascent revolution in military procurement pipeline. Protracted oper- rently meet those standards, our chief affairs. In Bosnia, 46 of 48 satellites ations such as Bosnia prevent the ser- NATO allies have been busy cutting de- which have been used by IFOR and vices from recapitalizing for eventuali- fense since the Cold War by an average SFOR for C4I functions belonged to the ties that may have greater defense of 35 percent. European R&D accounts United States. consequences than peacekeeping. are half the percentage of that in the Moreover, doctrinal and organiza- The second trend that militates in U.S. defense budget; and even procure- tional shifts in emphasis among allies favor of reduced commitment to a pro- ment funds are more scarce in Europe are profound—from larger forces for longed operation in Bosnia is the than the starved recapitalization dol- territorial defense and combat opera- evolving divergence in military compe- lars in the U.S. budget. More impor- tions to much smaller forces for peace- tencies between America and Europe. tantly, European cuts are most keenly keeping and military operations other felt in critical areas such as power pro- than war (MOOTW). As the Canadian jection and sustainable combat power. defense minister recently said, “I am a This pattern of European defense peacekeeper, not a warrior” (Canada spending over the last six years has left

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has only 21,500 active members in its interest to assume the lion’s share of United States must begin planning for land forces). This new military reality intervention burdens. To pretend that a transition to EFOR in 1998, a Euro- leaves the United States increasingly a heavily enforced peace in Bosnia for pean-led force that could operate with alone in the ability to form and direct ten or twenty years is as much in the limited but critical U.S. support. Given a Desert Storm type operation—a interest of America as Europe is fatu- the unlikely prospect of a short-term warfighting enterprise in which it pro- ous. The United States is involved in solution in Bosnia and finite U.S. pa- vided 70 percent of ground troops, 76 European security as the leader of tience for an extended American pres- percent of combat aircraft, two out of NATO to protect its immutable vital ence, handing off Bosnia to a credible three warships, all six aircraft carriers, interests on that continent—to prevent European force with the forbearance and over 90 percent of the advanced Europe from being dominated by a and resolve to see the task through C4I and support systems. Despite talk hostile power or bloc. America should would be the most sustainable and of a growing European defense iden- serve as a balancer and defender of last achievable goal for a superpower. tity, this imbalance seems likely to be- resort in Europe—not a gendarme for The vehicle for this transition can come even more tilted in America’s its ethnic squabbles. be found in the NATO combined joint favor. However, the United States be- task force (CJTF). A U.S. initiative, the Instead of bemoaning divergence came indefinitely committed to Bosnia concept was conceived in 1993 and in military competencies between itself through a circuitous logic that exposed after much negotiation was approved and its European allies, the United the lack of flexibility in NATO and Eu- in June 1996. CJTF will allow for a mix States should take advantage of this ropean security architecture: Bosnia is and match of “separable but not sepa- evolution. If the overall effect of an al- a European security problem, NATO is rate” NATO units that can be led by ei- Europe’s only credible military ther an American or European com- lesser threats like a Bosnia affect organ, the United States is the mander, a force structure dominated the interests of alliance partners leader of NATO, thus it must lead by either the United States or Europe, the Bosnian mission. This ap- or even a smaller CJTF put together very differently proach makes no distinction be- under the auspices of a reinforced tween threats large or small, inter- Western European Union (WEU) or Or- liance is intended to be more than the ests vital or non-essential, or strategic ganization for Security and Coopera- sum of its parts, then it makes sense responsibilities local or global. Despite tion in Europe (OSCE). The U.S. am- that the roles and responsibilities of profound changes in Europe’s eco- bassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, has differing members should be matched nomic, political, and military circum- called CJTF “the first significant to their capabilities and interests. Thus stances, its security architecture seems change in the way the Alliance does rendering to the peacekeepers what is stuck on Cold War autopilot. For in- business since 1966.” This is because theirs and to the warfighters what is stance, at the onset of the recent Al- the concept introduces the sort of op- theirs not only reflects a shift in mili- banian crisis, the Italian press com- erational flexibility NATO will need to tary capabilities but a third geopolitical mented little on what Italy and other address a range of post-Cold War secu- trend. National interests today are G-7 European powers should do. In- rity problems in Europe—a flexibility achieved very differently even among stead, editorial writers chastised the that can accurately reflect both na- close allies and thus inspire very differ- United States and Russia for failing to tional interest and military capability ent levels of will and sacrifice. Unlike show any initiative. One-size-fits-all in each member country’s strategic re- the Soviet threat that provided a cen- strategies may have worked for Europe sponsibilities. Moreover, a functioning tripetal force to hold NATO together, over the last fifty years, but the many CJTF will have the practical effect of Bosnia never inspired an “all for one calls for a reappraisal of the U.S. role in stiffening the political resolve of Euro- and one for all” call for action from Bosnia point to the need for a more peans in their ability to handle small members. flexible approach—what British racing crisis management, humanitarian re- Lesser security threats like a enthusiasts might call “horses for lief, and peace operations in the region Bosnia affect the interests of alliance courses”—in the post-Cold War era. (such as the Albanian mission). partners very differently. While Sad- To create EFOR, CJTF must be dam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait Exit Strategy—CJTF and EFOR taken off the drawing board and put proved threatening enough to tem- If America is to alleviate strategic into practice instead of atrophying in a porarily unify a disparate 31-member strain, concentrate on the global secu- planning cell at Mons (EFOR evolution coalition, his September 1996 actions rity tasks only its forces can accom- is represented in the accompanying against the Kurds did not. In fact, the plish, and ensure that its European sac- figure). IFOR and SFOR have been U.S. cruise missile response of last year rifices reflect national interests and CJTFs in all but name. The move to only found support from Britain and military capabilities in the post-Cold EFOR will require a change in the Germany and was condemned or not War era, then it must press for a new American role from leader and domi- supported by Turkey, France, and Saudi bargain in Bosnia. Specifically, the nant partner to supporting player with Arabia. This is natural in a world of di- unique and decisive capabilities. EFOR verse threats and should be exploited might well be much smaller than SFOR by encouraging those with the greatest and backstopped by the United States

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then Europeans will be content to de- Spanish navy AV–8S Matador. pend on a U.S.-led NATO response for every security issue that arises on the continent. Eventually the American people will become disillusioned with a security role that does not accurately reflect post-Cold War interests and capabilities of the United States or its partners. Already, many voices on both the left and right have called for a total end to the American commitment to European security. Reappraisals of the U.S. role in Eu- ropean security often evoke panicky responses at home and abroad. How- ever, this reaction tends to make Amer- ican leadership not a means but an end. If the situation in Europe is so in- flexible that it precludes development of a supporting security system—and U.S. Navy (John Leenhouts) holds America permanently responsible for peacekeeping in Europe—then in areas such as Civil Affairs, intelli- Bosnian peacekeeping mission in the this proposition should be reexam- gence, logistics, air and sea support, future, thereby releasing NATO from a ined. Supporting efforts by regional al- communications, and transport. Given burden that should have only been lies can free those farther up the secu- the embryonic state of European secu- temporary duty for a U.S.-led alliance rity hierarchy for problems that only 1 rity and defense identity and the con- of collective defense. they have the power to solve. dition of organizations like WEU and Bosnia has shown that post-Cold European allies cannot replace the OSCE, the first iteration of EFOR will War Europe needs a variety of institu- United States in the larger tasks of re- tional alternatives for a gional or global security. Moreover, these allies are allowing their capabili- the first iteration of EFOR will have to range of security issues. The imperatives are that ties to support such endeavors to de- be “stood-up” under the aegis of NATO institutions should com- crease. It therefore is incumbent on the plement each other, over- United States and its partners to build have to be “stood-up” under the aegis lap in responsibility, and above all ac- a credible supporting system for any of NATO. However, it is possible that curately reflect the different interests future Bosnias. Planning for a transi- OSCE and WEU could mature to a and capabilities of each member. For tion to EFOR should start taking ad- point at which they could field a small the United States this means an endur- vantage of divergent interests and ca- ing interest in ensuring that Europe is pabilities and foster a wider sense of not dominated by a hostile power or responsibility for security affairs. Such Evolution of Bosnia Force bloc—even if the threat is not immedi- a system would not be built to shirk ate. A U.S.-led NATO focused on collec- international responsibilities but create IFOR (1996) tive defense and deterrence is the best means to complement the unique and 53,000 troop U.S.-led NATO task force insurance against such a threat. At- demanding U.S. role of deterring major 16,000 U.S. troops in Bosnia tempting to turn the American role in conflicts in Europe and other parts of 15–18,000 U.S. troops supporting in Hungary/ NATO into a long-term commitment the globe. JFQ Croatia/Italy/Adriatic Sea to peace operations in Bosnia has ex- NOTES posed the foible of trying to insert a SFOR (1997–98) square peg in a round hole. 1 See John Hillen, “Superpowers Don’t 31,000 troop U.S.-led NATO task force Instead, the United States must, Do Windows,” Orbis, vol. 41, no. 2 (Spring 8,500 U.S. troops in Bosnia through mechanisms like CJTF, en- 1997), pp. 241–57. 10–15,000 U.S. troops supporting courage development of round pegs like WEU and OSCE through which EFOR (1998–?) prosperous partners can take the lead 12,000 troop European-led CJTF in smaller collective security missions. <1,000 U.S. troops in Bosnia If the United States does not offer strong leadership in this enterprise, <4,000 U.S. troops supporting

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USS Arkansas.

The Looming Alliance Debate over Nuclear U.S. Navy (David Blencoe)

n talks with Russia on the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Weapons Organization (NATO) and in Al- liance debates on restructuring, Imembers have endeavored to keep the By JACQUELYN K. DAVIS, question of nuclear weapons off the CHARLES M. PERRY, and ANDREW C. WINNER table. Thus far they have done that by devising a “three no’s” policy, stipulat- ing that NATO has no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy such Jacquelyn K. Davis is executive vice president, weapons on the territory of any new Charles M. Perry is vice president and director of studies, member either now or in the future.1 and Andrew C. Winner is a senior staff member with Based on an American initiative, the the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Allies adopted this policy for a number

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of fairly sensible but largely tactical institutional credibility. The last “new missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to motives. For one, the United States strategic concept” was debated by include confidence-building and trans- and some of its European NATO allies NATO for nearly two years. parency measures.3 Although the exact did not want the politically volatile Yet while the decision to skirt the nature of such measures was not stated, question of the forward stationing of issue of nuclear weapons was tactically some have suggested that prospective nuclear weapons or delivery systems to astute, the reality is that many factors transparency measures might involve bog down the expansion initiative. In make it unlikely that Alliance mem- broader exposure by Russia to NATO addition, with under 500 U.S. nuclear bers can avoid a more explicit discus- vault safety and security procedures as weapons in Europe and Russian efforts sion of the fundamental question of well as mutual visits to stockpile sites in to either limit or eliminate NATO nu- nuclear deterrence and its place in the hope of bringing the Russians closer clear forces during previous negotia- NATO strategy for much longer. At to meeting NATO standards. tions, Alliance officials probably feared some point, moreover, this should in- In any event, the Helsinki agree- that formal negotiations on tactical clude developing a mechanism for ments clearly reflect the intentions of nuclear systems in the context of preparing new members to participate both Presidents to put START III on the NATO enlargement could lead to a effectively in the Alliance nuclear plan- fast track, and this could have pro- “third zero” in Europe2—elimination ning process. found implications for nuclear force of Alliance dual-capable aircraft (DCA) structure in NATO, particularly for and stocks of their nuclear bombs in START and Tactical Systems U.S.-provided weapons stockpiled in NATO vaults in several member coun- There is every indication that the Europe. The wording of the joint state- tries. Moreover, given the vast differ- United States and Russia are accelerat- ment on these issues is ambiguous in ence in the sizes of Russian and NATO ing the arms control process by devel- places and, as usual, covers over some oping a framework for key differences of approach between the probability of an agreement on START III reductions, mea- the sides. On the one hand, the United deployment limits for tactical systems sures to induce the Russian States wants any measures relating to Duma to ratify START II, nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise is considerable and agreement on demarca- missiles and tactical nuclear systems tion issues related to missile limited to confidence-building and stockpiles, the Alliance would be at a defense research, development, and de- transparency measures. Russia, just as distinct disadvantage in the bargaining ployment. Expedited discussions on sig- clearly, wanted the statement to allow that any substrategic negotiations nificantly reducing strategic nuclear for the exploration of possible reduc- would likely entail. stockpiles under a START III rubric is tions or operational constraints on With the demise of the Soviet likely to pressure NATO to think more these systems; for example, limits on Union and dissolution of the Warsaw concisely about how nuclear weapons deployment locations or range capabil- Pact, the utility of the remaining NATO fit into its plans for the next century. ities. Which side succeeds at the bar- forward-based tactical nuclear weapons On March 21, 1997, at the Helsinki gaining table has yet to be determined, could be challenged by a disparate summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin but it is possible that limitations on group of anti-nuclear, pacifist, and en- agreed that after START II enters into numbers or deployment modalities of vironmental activists and exploited by force the United States and Russia will tactical nuclear weapons in Europe Moscow in the debate over NATO ex- begin negotiations on a START III agree- could be negotiated in the near future pansion—or so many Alliance officials ment to lower the ceilings of strategic with obvious implications for the thought. In an attempt to eliminate nuclear inventories to somewhere be- NATO strategic concept and nuclear any prospect of debate, which promises tween 2,000–2,500 warheads. They also risk-sharing in the Alliance. Hence, to be contentious, Alliance officials de- agreed to enhance the transparency of while maintaining a low-profile policy vised the three no’s policy while hold- their nuclear inventories and, for the with regard to substrategic forces, the ing to the line that the peacetime role first time, to include a provision on the Alliance nevertheless needs to quietly of nuclear weapons in NATO planning actual destruction of strategic nuclear consider its options lest it be caught remains essential for Alliance cohesion. warheads to promote irreversibility in off guard. From this perspective, if the size or the cuts. Perhaps most important in The probability of an agreement composition of the NATO nuclear force terms of extended deterrence, or the on deployment limits for tactical sys- is going to be changed it should only U.S. nuclear guarantee to protect NATO tems is considerable, in part since it is be in the context of adopting a new or Europe, was the agreement that, in the not only Russia that is interested in ap- revised strategic concept or, if pressed, context of START III, Washington and plying some sort of arms control mea- through far-ranging discussions with Moscow would explore as separate is- sures to NATO tactical nuclear weapons. Russia to address more than nuclear issues the possibility of added controls on The United States and its partners have sues. If the Alliance re-opened the sub- nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise an obvious stake in seeing the large strategic issue in the midst of discus- stock of Russian tactical nuclear sions on expansion and internal weapons—by some estimates over adaptation, the process might be debili- tating for both Alliance cohesion and

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Waning Asset? The European view of these tradeoffs may well depend on whether government officials are wearing their strategic hats or green eyeshades. Bud- get cuts and force restructuring in virtually every allied nation raise the question of whether a continuing nuclear role is feasible for countries with dual-capable certified squadrons, particularly Belgium, Italy, and Greece. Each faces difficult military modernization choices with little stomach for increased defense spending as it attempts to meet stringent monetary criteria for entry into the European Bombers destroyed Monetary Union. Converting nuclear- under START I. tasked squadrons into truly effective

DOD (R.D. Ward) conventional assets (for example, based on stand-off missiles) might prove more costly than maintaining 10,000—reduced or put under strict and render those that remain more safe current nuclear assignments. However, transparency and control regimes for and secure. The Netherlands, for exam- this fact is not likely to dampen incen- 4 two reasons. First, it is generally ple, has proposed initiating some sort tives to shed the nuclear role in an ef- thought that central Russian govern- of Nunn-Lugar program targeted specif- fort to reduce military expenditures. ment control over these weapons is ically on assisting Russia in the secure Even in more prosperous DCA-deploy- much more tenuous than over strategic containment and dismantling of war- ing countries, including Germany, systems. The United States and its allies heads on theater and intermediate- anti-nuclear sentiments combined would like to increase that control and, range missiles. with a desire to assuage Russian con- at the same time, enhance their infor- But precisely how efforts to redi- cerns over NATO expansion could mation on these systems to decrease rect Moscow’s increasing reliance on erode government support for contin- chances of nuclear materials being nuclear weapons ought to proceed— ued participation in this aspect of Al- stolen by or diverted to pariah states or under the rubric of a START III agree- liance defense cooperation. used by some rogue actor. ment, perhaps in conjunction with re- Most European NATO members re- Second, NATO members are aware vision of the Conventional Forces in gard DCA as a necessary evil, perceiv- that stability in Russia is tenuous, with Europe Treaty or as part of less formal ing that deterrence is existential and the military less and less satisfied by transparency talks—is open to debate. thus rather immune to the number of their status in the country’s fragile de- Equally uncertain is how the European systems or specific deployment modali- mocratic development. In this context, members of NATO would view trade- ties. Yet even with sizable anti-nuclear and against the disastrous outcome of offs that would increase the trans- minorities in their countries, govern- the Russian foray into Chechnya, parency of Russian tactical nuclear ments tend to accept Alliance sub- NATO officials are all the more con- forces or cut their number versus a re- strategic capabilities as crucial to the cerned over Moscow’s apparent adop- quirement for the Alliance to reduce theory of deterrence and, more impor- tion of the old NATO doctrine of flexi- further or restrict the deployment of its tantly, to the political cohesion of the ble response. Many Europeans believe own greatly diminished nuclear capa- Alliance. Viewed from this position, the that renewed Russian interest in re- bility. Nevertheless, pressure does exist sense of shared risks and responsibili- liance upon nuclear weapons to offset to support just this type of arms con- ties embodied in NATO planning, both conventional inferiorities, with mod- trol initiative toward Russia, and it is in the conventional and nuclear ernization programs to match, must be likely to grow. Such pressure, more- realms, is basic to maintaining consen- redirected if stability is to be main- over, could prove irresistible to Al- sus on many strategic issues. That said, tained on the Continent. liance members when presented as for many in Europe the deployment of Thirdly, since it is the 10,000-odd part of a package of incentives to ease Alliance nuclear weapons is not sacro- Russian tactical nuclear weapons that Russian objections to NATO expansion sanct, as attested by the British decision pose a special threat to NATO European and/or reconfigure the Alliance—both to dismantle DCA assets in favor of de- states—given the ranges associated structurally and with regard to core ploying a substrategic Trident—a deci- with their likely delivery systems—it missions—in ways that Moscow would sion based on both the longer range stands to reason that U.S. allies would find less threatening. and enhanced precision of submarine- seek other avenues to reduce the Russ- launched ballistic missile platforms ian inventory of substrategic warheads that give them the capability to target a

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F/A–18E conducting in-flight tests. McDonnell Douglas (KevinMcDonnell Douglas Flynn)

wider array of aimpoints in any num- option might re- ber of potential adversary countries. quire basing indi- However, this decision by the vidual national con- United Kingdom to opt out of DCA tributions at a single taskings—a transition that should be site, thus increasing complete by the end of 1998—may vulnerability and re- Su–27 on flight deck reignite similar debates in other DCA- stricting flexibility. of Admiral Kuznetsov.

deploying countries, particularly those And yet, with Summerlin) (Todd U.S. Navy in which air force structures are prov- no decision to mod- ing unable to cope with the general de- ernize the NATO The Promise of RMA cline in defense budgets. Of course nuclear arsenal on the horizon, Al- only the British have the option of sub- liance DCA platforms will become wan- Aside from arms control and Al- stituting one mode of platform deploying assets over time by sheer obsoles- liance cohesion, there are doctrinal and ment for another. A decision by any cence. Meanwhile, barring any technological issues that may persuade other member for a submarine- negotiation that would reduce the cur- NATO to take a new look at nuclear launched capability would require rent stockpile, more than one DCA-de- weapons and how they fit into its de- transferring sensitive technology from ploying nation can be expected to do terrence posture. Some advocates of the the United States, Great Britain, or everything possible to retain this mis- so-called revolution in military affairs France and would be more expensive sion (albeit at a reduced level of readi- (RMA) argue, for example, that the rele- for the DCA-deploying nations. But ness) since it justifies force structure vance of nuclear systems and tradi- apart from platform changes these which otherwise would be cut from ac- tional concepts of deterrence more gen- countries might choose to keep fewer tive inventories. For this reason alone, erally has been eroded in the wake of aircraft—perhaps one rather than two there will be mixed feelings on a debate qualitative advances in conventional squadrons—at a high state of readiness over the future of NATO substrategic capabilities. These new generation non- for a nuclear mission. Alternatively, forces, even though there are powerful nuclear technologies may, when support may grow for a consolidated rationales for doing so. multinational DCA wing, though this

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weaponized, provide a more credible States that chooses to spend the Libya, Syria, and other states are up- basis for deterrence against regional ad- money to field advanced non-nuclear grading the range of their missiles and versaries than using the nuclear threat systems. will soon be able to strike Europe, per- as a crisis management instrument. haps even with chemical and biologi- Proponents of this view claim that the France and NATO cal weapons. NATO has considered central issue is nuclear credibility in a Of course one Alliance member, counterproliferation and nonprolifera- world in which public sensitivity to ca- France, would argue vehemently tion for years—mostly prompted by sualties is high and compellance and/or against any minimization of the role of the United States but also with support denial can be accomplished for the nuclear weapons in deterrence. At pre- from the southern tier, notably France, most part by non-nuclear means. From sent France’s view of Alliance nuclear Italy, and Spain. But recent discus- this perspective, it is not so much the policy is more academic, given the lim- sions—largely through the Senior De- concept of deterrence that needs to be ited status of its membership. However, fense Group on Proliferation—have fo- overhauled as its one-dimensional asso- with its leading role in Europe and its cused on passive and active defenses, ciation with nuclear weapons, which is close partnership with Germany in par- with the adoption of a military opera- seen as destabilizing and, in the case of ticular, France entertains ideas which tional requirements document circu- cannot be dismissed out of hand. If lated by Supreme Headquarters Allied France would argue vehemently anything, French perspectives on Powers Europe (SHAPE) on counterpro- against any minimization of nuclear weapons and concepts of liferation that has since become mired deterrence are being more widely in national politics, budgetary issues, nuclear deterrence heeded since the strategic situation and most recently the debate over on the Continent has changed and NATO expansion. Russian deployments, subject to ques- continuing U.S. engagement is per- Preliminary reviews by the NATO tionable command and control proce- ceived to be more tenuous than during Nuclear Planning Group notwithstand- dures and technology. Those who hold the height of Cold War tensions—a ing, the issue of how nuclear weapons this position will argue that NATO can time, it is worth remembering, when fit into the Alliance counterprolifera- afford to shrink its nuclear force struc- many Europeans feared the United tion calculus has not been fully ad- ture even further and should readjust States would never really “trade New dressed. SHAPE has included nuclear its strategic concept to allow for a York for Hamburg.” deterrence assets as one leg of its new broader view of deterrence which in- Notable in this regard is the counterproliferation triad—the other cludes advanced conventional weapons French initiative to engage the British two being theater missile defense and and new operational concepts. more intensively in talks on coopera- conventional attack—but there has Notwithstanding their growing tive deterrence and President Chirac’s been little talk of their relative value in awareness that new and emerging non- efforts to include Germany in his na- various WMD settings or of new opera- nuclear technologies offer great poten- tion’s concerted deterrence concept. At tional concepts to render the deterrent tial for deterrence and defense plan- their Nuremberg summit in December leg credible in the future. Moreover, ning, European elites also believe that 1996, Chirac and Chancellor Kohl of whatever SHAPE and NATO headquar- nuclear weapons still count in tackling Germany signed a “common strategic ters think, countries such as Italy— certain prospective risks, from the pro- concept” which includes provisions for which is key to Southern Region per- liferation of weapons of mass destruc- reassessing the role of nuclear deter- spectives—may be of two minds. On tion (WMD) to the revival of a coher- rence in European security planning.5 the one hand, the presence of U.S. nu- ent Russian threat. The ambiguity of a Playing on European fears of an ero- clear weapons and bases on Italian soil response related to nuclear deterrence sion in the transatlantic security link, could proffer targets for possible attacks in an existential mode, which is partly particularly if Alliance expansion di- by an adversary like Libya.6 On the rooted in the Alliance’s refusal to lutes the capacity for concerted action other, the continuing presence of these adopt a sweeping “no first use” pledge by NATO as expected by some, the weapons as part of the NATO Euro- and in support for a declaratory policy French are promoting the notion of a pean-based force structure could pro- on nuclear weapons use in extreme cir- “concerted deterrence” as central to an vide a degree of security that would be cumstances, gives non-nuclear NATO independent European security and difficult to replicate otherwise, given members a sense of security that is un- defense identity (ESDI)—one that the uncertainty surrounding conditions attainable from conventional weapons could become more directly tied to the under which such weapons would be alone. And even if advanced conven- European Union than to NATO. used. Beyond security-minded anxi- tional weapons were woven into the eties, Italy, like other smaller countries, NATO deterrence concept, key issues Counterproliferation Policy sees participation in the DCA posture about their availability in crisis—and A final factor that may cause of NATO as essential to retaining its by extension their credibility as deter- NATO to reexamine how nuclear seat at the table in important Alliance rence assets—might remain unre- weapons fit into its security strategy is deliberations. To forfeit a role in DCA solved, as it may be only the United the growing WMD threat, particularly planning and execution could relegate from states on the southern and east- Rome to second-tier status in NATO cir- ern littorals of the Mediterranean. cles according to this view.

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outcome of the NDP report and con- Breaking down gressional deliberations, other cuts such submarine in as reductions in dual-capable air assets Severodvinsk, Russia. or infrastructure to support the nuclear mission remain a possibility. However, changes in tactical nuclear forces may not drive a broad-based Alliance review of its deterrence posture. So too, U.S. changes in nuclear strategy cannot be ruled out as the Na- tion contemplates its deterrent force under a START III regime of 2,000– 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads that may also limit certain delivery platforms or deployment modalities. What- ever path we choose with regard to our nuclear arsenal and strategy, we must recognize that there will be consequences for European security, directly over NATO nuclear planning or indirectly in the context of broader moves U.S. Navy (Todd P. Cichonowizc) P. U.S. Navy (Todd toward a notion of ESDI that stands apart from NATO. In fact, the emergence of an independent European se- Indeed, in the wake of substrategic- overwhelmed by the politics of both curity identity centered around British level consultations in Helsinki and internal adaptation and expansion, and French national nuclear forces among larger NATO powers (for exam- and NATO as an organization is very could be accelerated if there is a percep- ple, France, Britain, and Germany), adept at avoiding discussions on issues tion of significant erosion in the U.S. smaller DCA-deploying countries are that appear logically necessary to out- commitment. There is already growing likely to increasingly press for a voice as siders. It may be able to hold off this concern in Europe that as America occurred when the infamous “quad”— discussion for two to three years, de- draws down its active force structure the United States, Britain, Germany, pending on whether the U.S.-Russian forward-based deployments will be fur- and SHAPE—was said to be exerting arms control agenda moves forward or ther trimmed or eliminated, lending undue sway over NATO nuclear poli- if the United States undertakes any sig- support to Allied concerns over U.S. cies. Dutch officials have argued, for ex- nificant unilateral initiatives related to disengagement. ample, that there is little value in work- its national nuclear deterrence strategy Worse still from a European pering hard to retain the “special weight” or its force structure—either conven- spective is the likelihood that the that DCA participation is presumed to tional or nuclear—in Europe. United States, in efforts to develop an confer if it only comes to bear in the The prospect that the United States off-shore-based power projection force unlikely instance of consultation on ac- might make some sort of largely unilat- posture, would unilaterally withdraw tual nuclear use. Instead, it is peacetime eral adjustment in its European force its land-based air systems from Europe, deliberation on substrategic forces—in- posture that could have an impact on forcing the Alliance to rely on off- cluding deterring a potential use of NATO deterrence thinking cannot be shore assets for deterrence. The effec- WMD against NATO’s Southern Region ruled out. Both deterrence and nuclear tive dismantling of the NATO land- and the contours of future arms control forces were examined in the Quadren- based substrategic force structure in and transparency talks—that matters nial Defense Review (QDR) and will be this manner would create a situation most, many argue, now that the assessed by the National Defense Panel in which deterrence in Europe would prospect of a nuclear exchange at the (NDP), which follows an earlier nuclear thereafter be based essentially on theater level has receded. If such senti- posture review that was conducted par- American and British off-shore plat- ments are not fully appreciated by the allel to the Bottom-Up Review and left forms and French nuclear forces, larger NATO states, holding the line untouched DCA deployments in Eu- whose nuclear-tasked aircraft would be against a future “third zero” will be- rope. In terms of conventional capabili- the only land-based nuclear assets in come all the more difficult. ties, the QDR report contains modest NATO Europe. Neither the substance cuts in end strength and infrastructure NATO Nuclear Posture nor symbolism of this new reality in order to adequately fund readiness would be lost on NATO’s non-nuclear The above factors point to a need and modernization. Depending on the partners—one or two of which might for NATO to reconsider its nuclear de- be moved to reconsider their own nu- terrence posture and strategy. How- clear options—nor on potential global ever, as noted the Alliance is currently adversaries, more than one or two of

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adoption of a new deterrence concept Slava-class guided missile cruiser that embraces nuclear and non-nuclear Marshal Ustinov. options for deterrence and crisis management. When and how that discussion and evolution will take place has yet to be determined, but several trends suggest it should be sooner rather than later, lest we risk having some options foreclosed. More importantly, we also risk the effects that avoiding a timely debate could have on an enlarged Alliance. It will be important to show new members that NATO can step up to the plate and handle difficult questions such as nuclear deterrence in a way that preserves Alliance cohesion as well as the security of individual members. JFQ

NOTES

1 North Atlantic Council communiqué, December 10, 1996. 2 The first two zeros resulted from the In- termediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (which en-

U.S. Navy tered into effect in 1988) that eliminated long-range (1,000–55,500 kilometers) and short-range (500–1,000 kilometers) intermediate nuclear forces from U.S. and Soviet in- whom are known to be involved in assets. While there is certainly great at- ventories. Subsequently, President Bush tac- concerted efforts to develop national traction in embracing the conven- itly agreed to a third zero of sorts—for WMD postures. tional deterrence concept, for the Al- missile systems under 500 kilometers in The psychology and politics of de- liance this is really a nonstarter given range—when he decided to forego modern- terrence rest on extremely subjective the extent to which national forces are ization of the Lance missile system. factors, and there is little solid data on being reduced and the fact that re- 3 President of the United States, “Joint the precise role of nuclear weapons in sources are lacking to implement re- Statement on Parameters of Future Reduc- deterring chemical or biological search and development programs tions in Nuclear Forces” (Helsinki, Finland: weapons use or affecting strategic cal- needed to field non-nuclear technolo- Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, March 2, 1997). culations by non-Western leaders. gies to influence national perceptions, 4 Robert S. Norris and William Arkin, Apart from a limited understanding of particularly in crisis situations. “Estimated Russian Nuclear Stockpile, Sep- what occurred behind the scenes in If NATO is to remain an effective tember 1994,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- Desert Storm with regard to deterrence alliance with a strategy that embraces a tists, vol. 50, no. 5 (September/October nuclear deterrent, it must ad- 1994), p. 61. More recent sources put the it will be important to show that dress the various issues dis- number of deployed tactical weapons at cussed above in a coherent much lower levels—approximately 3,200— NATO can handle difficult questions manner before events in indi- but the number of nondeployed but not yet such as nuclear deterrence vidual countries or negotia- dismantled weapons is unclear. See Robert tions which do not directly S. Norris and William Arkin, “Estimated Russian Stockpile, September 1996,” Bulletin concern the Alliance dictate of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 5 (Sep- calculus and intuitive efforts to de- outcomes. At the end of the day, it tember/October 1996), pp. 23–28. velop a correlation between U.S.-Soviet takes the political will to tackle tough 5 The text of this agreement was reprinted Cold War experiences and hypotheti- issues and reach a consensus—no mat- in Le Monde, January 30, 1997, pp. 12–13. cal contingencies centered around 21st ter how fragile—that has greater im- 6 This was brought home in 1986 when century threats, empirical data that ei- portance than any given weapons de- Libya fired two Scud missiles at the Italian ther supports or contradicts various deployment or defense concept. The island of Lampedusa, in apparent retaliation terrence paradigms is inadequate to capacity of a group of sovereign demo- for American raids on Tripoli in the wake of guide anything except the most gen- cratic nations to come together to en- the bombing of La Belle Disco in Berlin. eral projections of deterrence plan- sure stability, manage crises, and pre- ning. Yet there is to date no credible al- vent crisis escalation is the core ternative to retaining effective nuclear requirement of the new NATO. Hence the maturation process will require

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Tu–160 bomber at Borispil airport.

Ukraine DOD (R.D. Ward) as a Post-Cold War Military Power By STEPHEN D. OLYNYK

ifteen new independent enti- new geopolitical environment of east- ties were propelled by na- ern and central Europe. tional security imperatives to The speed of the Soviet Union’s create their own armed forces breakup left its forces practically in- Fonce the Soviet Union was dissolved. tact where they were deployed. While That process varied from state to state Russia proper retained the second-rate because of differences in interests and forces that were previously part of the resources—ends and means. An in- central strategic reserve, the former structive example is Ukraine, perhaps republics on the western frontier, es- the most important of the emergent pecially Ukraine and Belarus, inher- states after Russia. A country of 52 mil- ited first-class force packages which lion people, the size of France, and were part of the second strategic eche- rich in natural resources, it could be lon of the former western and south- destined to play a central role in the western theaters of operation of the Warsaw Pact. Each of the newly independent Colonel Stephen D. Olynyk, USAR (Ret.), served on both the states has dealt differently with its mili- Army and Joint Staffs and has been a consultant on national tary inheritance. On one extreme, the security to the Ukrainian government.

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policy. This is in stark contrast to Russ- New Ukrainian Military Districts ian doctrine, which anticipates inter- RUSSIA Vilnius Smolensk vention outside its borders under con- LITHUANIA ditions of a peripheral conflict or Minsk protection of Russian minorities in RUSSIA neighboring states. Because of political BELARUS sensitivity, military doctrine—like 0 100 200 Kilometers Warsaw Ukrainian security policy—avoids iden- Brest 0 100 200 Miles tifying a specific threat. Rather it refers POLAND Shostka to a “state whose consistent policy pre- Chernihiv Kursk sents a military threat...[or] leads to Kovel’ Chornobyl’ Konotop interference in the internal affairs of Luts’k Rivno Sumy Korosten’ Ukraine, or encroaches on its territorial Northern Operational/ Carpathian Zhytomyr Kiev integrity and its national interests.” Military District Territorial Command Kharkiv L’viv Military doctrine reemphasizes a Ternopil’ Poltava Cherkasy statutory and political commitment to SLOVAKIA Khmel’nyts’kyy Kremenchuk Ivano-Frankivs’k a non-nuclear status. It stresses the Vinnytsya Uman’ Uzhhorod Kramators’k Luhans’k principle of “reasonable defense suffi- Chernivtsi Kirovohrad Dnipropetrovs’k HUNGARY ciency” in determining the number Kryvyy Rih Pervomays’k Zaporizhzhya Donets’k and types of forces as well as the quan- MOLDOVA Nikopol’ Rostov Odesa Military District tity and quality of conventional Mariupol’ Chisinaˇu weapons. It puts a priority on develop- ROMANIA ´ Mykolayiv Melitopol’ Berdyans’k ing modern, well-trained, and highly Kherson Odesa mobile forces with emphasis on preci- Sea of Azov sion weaponry, intelligence and elec- Black Sea Kerch CRIMEAN Bucharest PENINSULA tronic warfare, air and space defense, Yevpatoriya Feodosiya and airpower and seapower. To accom- Simferopl plish these objectives, this doctrine Sevastopol’ Yalta calls for a modern and economically BULGARIA rational defense industrial base. In January 1997 the Rada adopted “The Concept of National Security of Ukraine,” a policy and strategy that Baltic states insisted that all former So- brief decree Ukraine nationalized all contains principles, national interests, viet forces leave their territory as they conventional forces on its territory, the unspecified threats, objectives, organi- built their own from scratch. Russia and first former Soviet republic to do so. In zation and functions, and the roles of the central Asian states were slower to the months that followed legislative government agencies in security policy form national forces, with some of the acts provided a legal basis for the armed formulation. This document is very latter still not having accomplished that forces and created a rudimentary na- general in tone and reflects the contin- thus far. At the other extreme, Ukraine tional security structure—with a min- uing ambiguities present in defining decided to nationalize former Soviet istry of defense, defense council, and Ukraine’s security interests, threats, forces stationed on its territory except national security council (the latter two and policy objectives. for strategic forces. Over 700,000 were combined in 1995); the general The Soviet Legacy ground, air, and air defense forces along staff of the armed forces of Ukraine; and with 500,000 paramilitary troops were three services. The laws also outlined a Ukraine inherited only two ser- based in Ukraine. Motivated by na- basic Ukrainian defense policy and the vices from the Soviet Union—an army tional (regional) patriotism and eco- defense responsibilities and functions of and air force. Black Sea Fleet (BSF) as- nomic considerations, most remained various agencies and officials. sets remained under the de facto con- and swore allegiance to the new state. As approved by the Rada, the trol of Moscow. On the ground, Only 20,000 officers departed to Russia major tenets of military doctrine are Ukraine gained control over five or other former republics. preventing war, building the armed armies, one army corps, eighteen divi- forces, and repelling aggression. sions (twelve motorized, four tank, and Legal Basis Ukrainian security policy is defensive two airborne), three airborne brigades, Having declared complete inde- and based on nonintervention, respect three artillery divisions, and a host of pendence on August 24, 1991, two days for the national borders and indepen- combat support and combat service after the collapse of the putsch in dence of other states, and rejection of support units. It also inherited four air Moscow, the Supreme Rada (parlia- the use of force as an instrument of armies with assets that gave Ukraine ment) realized that there was no mili- the third largest air force in the world, tary to protect the new nation. With a including an inventory of long range

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Olynyk

bombers, transports, strike aircraft, reconnaissance and electronic warfare planes, tactical and air defense fighters, and training aircraft. The air defense contingent consisted of one air defense army and three air corps. It was part of the air force but since has been made into a fourth service branch. In autumn 1991 there was a Ukraine navy in name only, with the command and control structure being formed and negotiations just starting over the division of the Black Sea Fleet. But the new nation did inherit and get control of a substantial part of Soviet shipbuilding capacity as well as Black Sea shore naval facilities. As for strategic forces, Ukraine became by default the world’s third Ukrainian and largest nuclear power, with 176 land- U.S. marines.

based ICBMs (1,240 warheads), 41 iysko Ukrainy V strategic nuclear bombers (460 warheads on bombs and cruise missiles), and tactical nuclear weapons; the latter were transferred to Russia in 1993. forces were gradually reduced and re- limits in personnel and selected con- After intensive negotiations by settled in housing provided with U.S. ventional weapons. Reformers reconfig- Ukraine, Russia, and the United States, and German financial assistance. ured the old Soviet “army” structure of and with the U.S. and Russian acces- the ground forces into army corps as sion to three key Ukrainian demands The State of Reform the highest echelon of command and (security guarantees after Ukraine be- There have been several attempts control, and personnel have been re- comes non-nuclear, financial assis- at military reform since the armed duced to 161,000—down from 245,000 tance to dismantle missiles, and com- forces were organized. The first three in 1992. Plans are also underway to fur- pensation for the missile material), a ministers of defense have had a master ther shrink these ground forces to tripartite agreement was signed in Jan- plan, but each failed to have it imple- 95,000 by 2005. uary 1994 that provided for Ukraine to mented before leaving office because The four Soviet air armies have de-nuclearize itself within seven years. of a lack of funds and indecisiveness been restructured into two aviation One month later parliament ratified on the part of the defense leadership. corps and one naval aviation group. the START I treaty and in November What these plans had in common was Air force personnel are being reduced a call for force reduction, de- to 78,000 this year. Combat planes will fense industrial conversion, be cut from 1,090 to 590 by 2005. The the only truly successful reform has and force modernization. Each air defense forces, which have become been in the area of force reduction reform package proposed reor- a separate service, have been reorga- ganizing administration and nized into three air defense corps with command, redeploying forces an anticipated strength of 36,000 by 1994 a new parliament overwhelm- to adapt them to new military and 2005—down from 67,000 in 1992. ingly approved the Non-proliferation geopolitical realities, reconfiguring the Building a navy has been plagued Treaty thereby underscoring the intent force structure, and reducing man- for years by a tug of war between to become a non-nuclear state. By June power and equipment to maintain Ukraine and Russia over their shares of 1996 Ukraine had transferred all strate- “reasonable defense sufficiency” and BSF and basing rights. Early on, the gic nuclear warheads to Russia, ahead meet the ceilings imposed by the Russian command surreptitiously trans- of schedule. The bombers went to Rus- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces ferred some of the better ships to its sia in payment for outstanding debts. in Europe (CFE). Northern Fleet. After several summit But the expensive destruction of mis- The services. The only truly suc- meetings and agreements that were siles and silos and environmental cessful reform so far has been in the never implemented, Presidents Boris cleanup (especially of liquid rocket area of force reduction. In October Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma agreed at propellants) had just begun. With the 1993 the Rada approved an end removal of the weapons, strategic strength of 450,000. This strength is currently 371,000—down from 726,000 in 1992. By July 1995 Ukraine met CFE

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Sochi in June 1995 to divide BSF in Odessa) and one administrative (Cen- Sociological Concerns half; then Ukraine would give Russia 32 tral Command in Kiev). Odessa was ex- The military leadership must con- percent of its share as payment for tended to cover the southeastern front some serious issues before they debts and use the remainder either to length of the Ukrainian-Russian bor- can claim success in making reforms. refurbish its own nascent navy or sell it der, but for reasons of political sensi- When the armed forces were national- for scrap. tivity no separate district was estab- ized, they inherited a number of prob- This agreement was solidified by lished in eastern Ukraine to cover the lems related to morale, discipline, the two presidents in a comprehensive length of its border with Russia. How- readiness, and combat sustainability. treaty of cooperation between Russia ever, a limited number of restructured Force conversion and quality of life. and Ukraine signed on May 31, 1997 in operational forces were deployed to While equipment reductions man- Kiev. Under the terms of the treaty Rus- eastern regions. dated by CFE were carried out quickly sia formally recognized Sevastopol as In autumn 1996 a new experi- and smoothly, reducing personnel has an integral part of Ukrainian territory mental type of military district was es- been a daunting task. It is complicated and Ukraine agreed to lease three bays tablished in the northeast, centered in by a commitment to generous entitle- at Sevastopol naval base to Russia for Chernihiv and designated as the ments which provide quarters, retrain- BSF use over the next twenty years. Northern Operational/Territorial Com- ing and job placement, or social secu- Ukraine will also have basing rights at a mand (OTC), with an army corps-level rity for thousands of commissioned separate bay in the port for its navy. headquarters. This was an apparently and noncommissioned officers re- This development may have resolved makeshift way of filling the void in leased since 1992 in downsizing. More what was a highly charged political this critical defense perimeter. The cur- significantly, it has made officers still issue in both countries. rent reform program envisions con- on active duty unsure of the future The nucleus of an independent verting the present districts into three and has eroded their morale and inter- navy is being formed primarily around OTCs (Western, Southern, and Central) est in a military career. coastal defense ships built in Ukraine’s by 2005. The military shares the economic shipyards and the BSF craft already Military education. Ukraine inher- hardship of the entire population. under its operational command and ited 34 military schools and faculties at They get comparatively low salaries control. Meantime, some of its new 78 institutions of higher learning, far which often have been delayed since ships have been taking part in regional too many for its needs. Many reforms 1995, in many cases for months. They naval exercises with neighbors and se- have been attempted and Kuchma has line up to rent apartments like other lected NATO naval exercises under the criticized the excessive turbulence in prospective tenants. Some officers have Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. the military education system. By the organized illegal associations to lobby Finally, while Ukraine has taken over end of 1996, after false starts and for their personal welfare. There have most BSF shore-based facilities, it is un- squandered resources, these institu- been demonstrations by officers and able for the time being to allocate the tions were reduced. Survivors include their families. In recent years the better resources necessary to sustain a sub- the Academy of the Armed Forces of qualified officers, especially in the stantial shipbuilding capability. Ukraine (Kiev), Military University ground forces, have left the service in At the direction of the president, a (Kharkiv), and Medical Academy; three search of opportunities in the private plan known as the “State Program for joint (interdisciplinary) military col- sector. This has especially been true of the Building and Development of the leges; and five service branch colleges. new officers, a native product, who Ukrainian Armed Forces for the Year In addition, there are six lyceums (mid- after receiving a good education be- 2005” was adopted in December 1996. level military schools) and military fac- come disenchanted with economic It is the most serious reform to be at- ulties (departments) at 48 institutions conditions and leave on completing tempted so far and covers roles and of higher learning. Research centers their short-term military obligation. missions, force structure, budgeting, also will be maintained in space and President Kuchma recently called for 3 modernization, and the organization military meteorology, C and electronic the extension and enforcement of offi- of the ministry of defense and general warfare, air defense, air combat, naval cer obligations. staff. Initial emphasis for 1997 is on operations, procurement, and educa- All members of the armed forces upgrading the air force and navy and tion and socio-psychological service. have sworn allegiance to the Ukrainian developing a “rapid reaction force” as In June 1996 the new Academy of state. But how many did so out of loy- the nucleus of Ukrainian defense pos- the Armed Forces of Ukraine graduated alty rather than because of economic ture—a fully manned, equipped, and its first class of 178 officers who will or opportunistic motives is difficult to ready contingent. Details of the pro- assume senior positions in the armed determine. The downturn in the econ- gram have not as yet been released. forces and ministry. At the same time omy has harmed morale and opera- Military districts. In 1992 the three 15 universities and institutes graduated tional readiness, strained civil-military former Soviet military districts in 4,700 junior lieutenants in 150 mili- relations, and called into question the Ukraine (Carpathian, Odessa, and tary specialties. loyalty of the military in a crisis. It has Kiev) were reorganized into two opera- also led to declining discipline. The tional districts (Carpathian and rate of no-shows among recruits has gone up as has absenteeism without

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Removing SS–19 BTR–80 APC on missile from silo. the Dnipro. Viysko Ukrainy Viysko

By September 1995 military schools had graduated 27,000 new officers, the majority of Ukrainian nationality. Dur- ing this period 33,000 Ukrainian officers were brought in from other Com- monwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, mostly from Russia. As of July 1995, ethnic Ukrainian officers accounted for 63 percent of regimental commanders, 72 percent of division commanders, 69 percent of corps commanders (seven corps), all directors of

DOD (R.D.Ward) main directorates of the ministry, and all deputies to the minister of defense. Moreover, 67 percent of all generals leave and outright desertion. Crime grade officers, and 50 percent of gen- and admirals were Ukrainian, 26 per- committed by servicemen also has eral staff officers in the Ukrainian cent Russian, and 6 percent other na- risen. Exacerbating low morale in the armed forces. The situation gradually tionalities. enlisted ranks is the continuation of became more favorable to ethnic Language of command. Closely re- an often brutal barrack hazing wide- Ukrainians of company grade, espe- lated to ethnic composition is the lan- spread in the former Soviet forces and cially as schools graduated cohorts of guage of command and communica- passed on to post-Soviet armies. native Ukrainian commissioned and tion. Russian was always the language Ethnic relations. In the early years warrant officers. But the ministry of of the Soviet armed forces which made of independence there was a serious defense estimates there are still more it a powerful tool of Russification. That than 150,000 ethnic officers was abetted by an intensive Russifica- the Ukrainization of the officer corps serving outside Ukraine, tion program in society at large, espe- mostly in the Russian Feder- cially during the 1960s and 1970s. It has shown great improvement ation, many of whom want not only hindered development of to come home. The situation non-Russian military and technical ter- ethnic imbalance within the armed has improved in the enlisted ranks, minology but also the use of non-Russ- forces resulting from a deliberate So- which since independence have been ian languages in the armed forces. It viet policy of intermixing officers of drawn from within the country, mak- will be some time before Ukrainian be- various nationalities following World ing them a better ethnic reflection of comes institutionalized as the lan- War II. Non-Russians were assigned to overall society, which is 73 percent guage of command and communica- the Russian Republic and Russian offi- ethnic Ukrainian. tion. Until then it will remain a source cers, especially generals, were over- The Ukrainization of the officer of dissonance within the military. whelmingly assigned to non-Russian corps has shown great improvement. Reeducation program. All senior offi- republics. In January 1992 ethnic Rus- cers were brought up in a closeted envi- sians reportedly comprised 90 percent ronment and indoctrinated with com- of general officers, 60 percent of field munist ideology and a Soviet world

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Civilian control over the military BTR–70 APC, Bosnia. is not fully institutionalized. Tradi- tional control—through the president and parliament—needs to be extended to the level of the defense establishment as it is in all democratic states. From 1991 until 1994, all the ministers of defense and their deputies were military officers in the Soviet mold. In Au- gust 1994 Kuchma named a civilian, Valeriy Shmarov, as minister of defense, making Ukraine the first CIS country to take that step. Shortly thereafter, two other high-level defense posts—for the military-industrial complex and foreign relations—also were occupied by civilians. But the responsibilities of both the minister of defense and chief of the general staff were not legally delineated, and the ministry became ridden

Viysko Ukrainy Viysko with internal civil-military conflict. Fi- nally in July 1996, as a result of controversy over proposed military reforms outlook. They were taught to think of tension within the armed forces, and the public outcry over alleged mis- themselves as part of an elite social largely due to an ambitious initial pro- management, corruption, and retreat class in Soviet (not national) society gram under the first minister of de- from the “Ukrainization” of the armed and imbued with Russian military tra- fense. It has been toned down under forces, Shmarov was replaced by Gen- ditions and history. This was a socio- subsequent ministers to make it more eral Kuzmuk. This was viewed in many psychological view in which there was marketable (particularly to old-time quarters both at home and abroad as a no room for any reference to Ukrainian former Soviet officers). The fourth regressive step in democratization of military tradition or history prior to minister, General-Colonel Oleksandr the armed forces and the enhancement 1917. After August 1991 many of these Kuzmuk, has pledged to reinvigorate of civilian control of the military. officers, largely disoriented by the rapid such efforts; but the languid economy Since independence the armed collapse of the Soviet Union, found and social privations of the military forces have been held in relatively themselves in the Ukrainian national temper any enthusiasm for them. high esteem by society at large, though armed forces and asked to swear alle- this feeling has not extended to young giance to a new state that could hardly Civil-Military Relations men of draft age. The recent increase have been imagined only a few months During five years of independence in desertions and voluntary departures earlier. Thus the military leadership of civil-military relations have generally by junior officers is mostly due to eco- Ukraine has been faced with a giant been normal. The armed forces have nomic hardships and not the prestige and sensitive task—the political reedu- not been politicized although the con- of the army. There are examples of cation of its inherited officer corps. ditions for politization exist. Members civilian support of the economically The Rada abolished the former So- of the armed forces, for example, are struggling military: regional adminis- viet political officer structure and elected to parliament while on active trations agreeing to build one ship adopted the Educational and Socio- duty although unassigned. The large each for the nascent Ukrainian navy; Psychological Service (ESPS), a struc- and influential Association of Ukrainian private enterprises donating funds to ture organized down to company level Officers, with its active, reserve, and rebuild quarters, schools, and other or its equivalent. It was designed to tired members, has been involved in amenities; and cultural groups touring impart the basic tenets of Ukrainian electoral politics. There are also signs of bases at their own expense to entertain history, language, and military tradi- a wider destabilization in civil-military the troops. tion and promote democratization of relations because of the inadequate de- Force Structure the armed forces. The university-level fense budget, pay problems, alienation Kiev Institute of Humanities was estab- in the officer corps, dissension among By the end of 1996 the Ukrainian lished to train officers for ESPS duty in the top leadership, rumors of corrup- armed forces consisted of the following units and commands. tion, and squandering of resources. strengths (declared strengths for 1992 Reeducation efforts, especially at- are shown in parentheses): personnel, tempts to strengthen national identity 395,000 (726,00), not including para- and promote the use of the Ukrainian military formations such as national language, has understandably created

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guard or various internal, border, rail- force packages to meet specific opera- 700 enterprises during the Soviet pe- road, or construction troops; tanks, tional requirements. In contrast to So- riod to 400 in 1996, and production 4,026 (6,300); air cushioned vehicles, viet force structure, Ukrainian plans do has fallen to 10 percent of 1991 levels. 5,050 (6,170); artillery, 3,727 (3,080); not include either cadre or partially Research, development, and evaluation anti-tank weapons, 6,000; surface-to-air manned units. By reducing the number is largely underfunded, especially in missile sites, 934; aircraft, 1,090 of tank divisions and converting ar- areas such as anti-tank weapons, air de- (1,380); combat helicopters, 240 (240); tillery divisions to artillery brigades and fense systems, support of airborne and and ships, 73. It is the largest force in airborne units to air mobile forces, air mobile operations, and C3I. With Europe after that of Russia. But it has planners have stressed defensive in- improvements in the national econ- deficiencies. Ukraine, like Russia, cloaks stead of offensive combat or force pro- omy and an increased budget, the de- its defense budget in secrecy. Informa- jection capability in ground forces. The fense sector has the potential for reme- tion is only made public when the ongoing albeit fiscally constrained con- dying these shortfalls. It has the ministry or its supporters complain version of motorized rifle divisions and production capability, material re- about inadequate appropriations. The brigades into mechanized divisions and sources, and trained manpower. But as budget for 1996 was 1.9 percent of brigades will afford them greater mobil- the president indicated in his speech to GNP and estimates for 1997 were 1.3 ity and maneuverability. the military collegium, defense leaders percent. This was a quarter of the ac- There is an adequate force recon- have failed to develop a master plan to tual amount requested and left nothing stitution capability. The Soviet mobi- reform the military-industrial complex for modernization after military pay. lization structure with its commissari- and its capacity to generate new tech- Speaking to senior officers in De- ats is still basically intact. Ukraine has nology. As a result he ordered that such cember 1996, President Kuchma a pool of a million men who have a plan be completed by mid-1997. painted a bleak picture of the current served in the military within the last Readiness. The Ukrainian military military posture. He addressed four five years, which would permit the inherited sufficiently equipped and major areas—force structure and orga- generation of new forces. qualified personnel. It has excellent nization, modernization, readiness, Modernization. Ukraine inherited a training facilities and more than and sustainability—and judged each as vast military-industrial complex— enough professional schools. But unsatisfactory. roughly one third of the Soviet total. It forces have been downsizing and re- Force structure and organization. In also contains some 15 percent of for- structuring under the deteriorating the five years since the formation of mer Soviet defense industrial and mili- economy, which affects near-term the armed forces, planners have not tary research and development facili- readiness. Primarily for budgetary rea- succeeded in developing tables of orga- ties and ranks as the second-largest sons the army has had trouble holding nization for various levels of military producer of arms and military equip- scheduled field training exercises to units and staffs to reflect new roles and ment after Russia among the successor maintain its combat proficiency and missions, a point on which the presi- states. It can assemble all major cate- conduct operational testing of major dent was highly critical. Many units gories of military hardware, and some equipment. Although Ukraine is sec- facilities have unique ond to Russia in military fuel storage Ukraine inherited a vast military-industrial capabilities such as capacity and has large strategic fuel re- shipbuilding and serves, current operational fuel short- complex—one third of the Soviet total missile production. age has constrained normal training in Ukraine has sold the ground army and air force, restrict- are not properly manned under exist- main battle tanks (T–72 and T–83) to ing military vehicular and airplane ing tables, which impacts on readiness. the Third World (for instance, 300 traffic to the bare minimum. Pilots Similarly, reformers have failed to T–83s to Pakistan in 1996) and is ac- have not been able to log sufficient agree upon a new force structure in the tive in the foreign arms market (14th in hours. The ground army and air force ground army, which is still in part So- the volume of its arms trade). have weak logistical infrastructures viet-vintage and does not meet na- On the down side, the breakup of that have not been fully reconfigured tional defense requirements. the Soviet Union and economic reform to meet specific defense needs. On a more positive note, emphasis caused a hiatus in modernization as the Kuchma revealed in a December has been placed on developing a quick industrial base endured disruptions in 1996 speech that as many as 191 reaction force with emphasis on mobil- research, development, production, mechanized infantry and tank battal- ity and maneuverability. By abolishing and fielding systems. A major short- ions were rated not ready, adding, the operational armies, establishing the coming is that only a very small per- “This is especially dangerous in the corps as the primary command and centage of military production was “a forward-based units securing the na- control maneuver organization, and in- closed cycle.” As a result of deliberate tion’s borders.” In the last two or three creasing the number of independent manufacturing interdependence in the years the air force lost 2,500 air crew brigades, planners have favored former Soviet Union, Ukraine still de- members via voluntary departures; in smaller, lighter units that can form pends on Russia for many components and subassemblies. Its military-industrial complex has been reduced from

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the bomber units only every third crew limited experience in the field and at Harvard for defense officials and senior is rated ready; in the combat air units sea as well as an introduction to NATO officers. Finally, Ukraine has been ac- only three are combat ready while 25 military organization and operations. tive in PFP with U.S. assistance. are rated barely ready and 17 not Sustainability. Given the weak- ready. Air defense forces have con- nesses indicated above, sustainability— The armed forces which Ukraine ducted their first exercise since 1991; the ability to deploy sufficient forces inherited from the former Soviet and since independence the leaders of and conduct sustained combat opera- Union have provided the nation with the armed forces have failed to estab- tions—can be rated as fair to poor. This military leaders, manpower, and lish a single air defense system cover- will persist until adequate numbers of matériel to qualify as a major regional ing Ukrainian air space. operational maneuver units and com- actor. Unless the national economy Semi-annual call ups have been bat service support elements are reor- improves very soon, however, this barely adequate, primarily due to de- ganized, equipped, and trained. Both force will lack the foundation to re- ferments (for example, in autumn the army and the air force must reform, maintain readiness, and modern- 1993 two-thirds of all eligible men rebuild their logistic infrastructures in ize. In fact, as weapons and military ceived some form of reprieve). In addi- order to field and sustain forces for a equipment age modernization will be a tion, both no-shows and desertions high-intensity conflict. The current burden on the frail national economy have been on the rise. The short post- force could conduct short-term combat and will stifle recovery. commission obligation has resulted in operations but not a long war. Never- The Ukrainian military constitutes massive departure of junior officers, theless, Ukraine is a serious regional an important arm of the state structure creating a serious shortfall in second military power even in its present situ- and has played a major role in nation- and first lieutenants. As Kuchma said, ation. It can defend its western borders building. The armed forces ensure na- “In general, I judge the state of combat and provide a credible near-term deter- tional defense in a region suffering and mobilization capabilities of the rent on its eastern borders. This capa- from a security vacuum since the col- army as unacceptably low.” He as- bility will be improved by reforms and lapse of Soviet power and provide the cribed this not only to the economy other components of military power— government and society with a large but lack of initiative, imagination, and force structure, readiness, and modern- pool of educated and trained profes- decisiveness as well as “dilettantism” ization—as they achieve normal levels. sionals. As in most new states, the mil- on the part of high-level staff officers, itary is a symbol of national pride, pro- commanders, and the top echelons of The U.S. Connection fessing strong patriotism and setting the ministry of defense (which he has Defense and military contacts be- an example of unselfish support to the ordered cut by 1,000 officers). tween the United States and Ukraine common good. It serves as a school for Nonetheless, Ukraine should be have been substantial since a memo of acculturation and socialization by pro- able to forge a ready force. Many understanding and cooperation was viding its soldiers, sailors, and airmen troops have had combat experience in signed by Washington and Kiev in July with a shared national and social mi- Afghanistan, including some 3,000 1993. These contacts have included vis- lieu. In a weakly-defined nation, the generals and other officers on active its by the senior leadership and high armed forces are a positive integrating duty. In the last four years, over 7,000 level staff exchanges; service and com- influence. At the same time, unlike have performed U.N. peacekeeping batant command visits and staff ex- some former Soviet republics, espe- missions worldwide, especially in changes; major combined exercises cially Russia, they have not been sig- Bosnia and Africa, at times under com- such as Sea Breeze ’96, Peace Shield ’95 nificantly politicized and in many bat conditions. Ukraine has con- and ’96, and Cooperative Nugget ’97 ways are a stabilizing factor. In accept- tributed support helicopters and is the which is currently underway; unit level ing a civilian minister of defense, the third largest provider of strategic air visits and exchanges; port calls and military consented to another level of transport to such operations. ship visits; student exchanges; and vari- control and paved the way for further Ukraine joined the PFP program ous relationships involving members of democratization. In general, Ukraine in February 1994. Since then it has the national guard, civil defense, and has enjoyed normal and sound civil- taken part in various exercises with border guard units from Ukraine and military relations with good prospects central and eastern European and the Army National Guard from the for the future unless its security is ei- NATO forces. This year a special battal- United States. ther destabilized or its economy fails to ion-size unit was organized to provide One new initiative is planning for improve. JFQ mission-oriented training for peace op- an NCO development and education erations. Bilaterally, Ukraine and program to upgrade the Ukrainian Poland have organized a combined NCO corps. Senior officers have at- mechanized infantry battalion under tended courses at the George C. Mar- rotational command. These activities shall European Center for Security are giving the military added albeit Studies in Germany since it opened its doors in 1994. A seminar program is being developed by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at

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French Military Reform and

F/A–18 and Mirage 2000s being refueled, Southern Watch.

NATO Pickett)U.S. Navy (Tom Restructuring By RONALD TIERSKY

ownsizing and restructuring The issue is: will revamped, profes- are part of a NATO-wide sional, quick-reaction forces be up to trend. In France, all compo- new missions or will budget cuts result nents of the armed forces are in a hollow military organization? Suc- Daffected, including the nuclear force de cess will depend on relaunching strong frappe. Three factors are shaping Euro- economic growth and the govern- pean militaries: the demise of the ment’s determination to withstand Soviet Union; budgetary constraints, current tensions until a single Euro- especially in the realm of Euro-integra- pean currency is introduced and less tion versus security (to meet Maas- constrained budgets return. tricht “convergence criteria”); and new Ronald Tiersky is Eastman professor missions which are replacing the old. of politics at Amherst College.

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Economics and Defense These aspects of integration are criticism from most members of the When Jacques Chirac succeeded connected with Chirac’s military reform European Union (EU), though publicly socialist François Mitterrand in May and turn toward the NATO command Britain and Germany kept silent. The 1995 questions were raised over the in European security policy. His down- tests, conducted in the isolation of balance of continuity and change in sizing and restructuring of the armed French Polynesia, had been conceived French foreign and defense policy as forces and return to an integrated com- from the start—yet badly explained— well as over European integration. Sim- mand—long recommended by military as the last. The objective was to perfect ilarities and differences between neo- leaders (who realized how much tech- software for simulations as was done Gaullist and socialist policies some- nology and training the French military by the United States which would help times do not conform to stereotypes. were missing)—was provoked by the ensure the long-term reliability of the On the one hand, European integration need to finance Maastricht commit- force de frappe without future testing. ments. It was also a reaction to inade- These tests were completed in quate military performance in the Gulf time for Chirac’s state visit to Wash- downsizing and return to War and in Bosnia, where French tech- ington in January 1996, which allowed the integrated command nology, weapons, interoperability, and him to tell a joint session of Congress the constraints of a conscript army all that his nation was ready—together was provoked by the caused difficulties. Chirac has launched with the United States—to lead the Maastricht commitments a wholesale recasting of security, de- diplomatic campaign for a comprehen- fense, and military policies that Mitter- sive test ban treaty. France, given cer- rand had only begun. Examples of Mit- tain guarantees by the United States, and security policies under Mitterrand terrand’s intentions were European also accepted a provision prohibiting were quite realistic from the beginning, agreements to build advanced satellite even very low-yield testing under the leading to unexpected continuity. On intelligence capabilities and a large so-called “zero-yield option.” The the other, since Gaullism has always transport aircraft—both designed to re- French also worked to get the Russians been more a disposition than a policy, duce the Continent’s dependence on and Chinese to accept this provision. the neo-Gaullist policy of Chirac, like American products. In the U.N. General Assembly, 158 de Gaulle’s own stance, is a remarkably Only weeks after taking office countries voted in favor of a resolution flexible pragmatism based on a few Chirac, determined to revive French on the test ban treaty while three principles, above all the pursuit of na- defense efforts, broke with Mitterrand’s voted against (India, Libya, and tional interests. moratorium on nuclear testing. A se- Bhutan) and five abstained (including ries of six underground tests met Syria, Lebanon, and Cuba). Chirac an- worldwide protests against French “ar- nounced that France would join the rogance.” This included much-resented other declared nuclear powers (four in all) by signing the treaty on September 24, the earliest possible date. Figure 1. Defense Expenditures, 1990–1997 (in constant 1997 francs)

(minus pensions) Downsizing During his last few years, Mitter- Billions Procurement and Infrastructure Payroll and Operations rand’s attention to military reform had 120 been piecemeal and the cohabitation government led by Eduoard Balladur (1993–95), despite issuing a white 100 paper, did not make widespread reform an immediate issue. Military 80 adaptation to post-Cold War conditions lagged behind Britain and Ger- 60 many. By contrast, the reforms announced in February 1996 were a 40 general plan that affects all services and every type of weapons system. The size, capabilities, and budget of 20 the military, including the force de frappe, are being significantly stream- 0 lined (figure 1). Though the govern- 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 ment is taking the same actions as Service Procurement Cuts most EU and NATO members (including the United States), France’s exces- Army: 7 percent reduction Air Force: 3.7 percent reduction Navy: 0.8 percent reduction sive unemployment rate (over 12 per- to 19.5 billion francs to 21.6 billion francs to 22.3 billion francs cent) and slow increase in GDP

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T iersky

Tanker FS Var and aircraft carrier FS Clemenceau. U.S. Navy (John Bouvia)

Helicopters in Goma, Zaire.

(around 2 percent) for over a decade have exhausted popular patience, with the result that strikes and demonstrations against downsizing have contributed to the general debate on the economy. Gempis) (Val Combat Camera Imagery Reform was not an easy political decision. Downsizing represented even more job losses for an economy in will be distressed by installation clo- reductions, especially joint projects, which successive levels of unaccept- sures than in other countries. have had to go further than in prosper- able unemployment (2 million, 2.5, The French and other Europeans ous economies. For France, Germany, then 3) have been reached. Further- increasingly see Maastricht as the and other European members of NATO more, because the military is based do- cause of unemployment and austerity. this vicious cycle must be broken. The mestically near towns that have be- The single currency project (the Euro problem is relaunching strong growth come economically dependent on scheduled to appear in 1999) is threat- while sticking to Maastricht. them, especially in France’s “rust belt” ened by growing popular resistance. Chirac’s plan of February 1996 for of the north and east, more localities Moreover, weak economic growth and downsizing and modernization, com- smaller tax receipts mean that military bined with similar British and German

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efforts, outlines the European military of the future. His model is the British Key Elements of the Chirac, with Chirac calling for two regional military, which he has publicly NATO commands that would be “entrusted praised. The gap between British and to Europeans” and Clinton responding that French performance during Desert AFSOUTH the United States should retain command Storm was not lost on the new French Debate of AFSOUTH. The exchange of Presidential president, not to say the high com- correspondence has made subsequent mand. The reform plan calls for mov- lower level negotiations very difficult. ing from a Cold War, central front, de- Progress on NATO internal adap- Progress in adaptation. Setting fensive force to a rapid-reaction tation has slowed. After extremely aside the AFSOUTH issue, there has military that can be combined with promising efforts to strengthen the been significant progress in the area the British and a German quick reac- NATO military structure, progress has of NATO adaptation—that is, strength- tion conventional force that is also in been slowed by demands to convert ening of ESDI in NATO. For example: the works. This fundamental reconfig- AFSOUTH at Naples from a U.S.-led to ■ Three-fourths of the most senior uration plus the declaration that a European-led command. NATO general officer positions in Europe France is prepared to discuss all mat- Theater commands are key. The are now held by Europeans. ters within NATO, even nuclear deter- role of NATO regional commanders has ■ NATO-designated positions at all rence, indicates that in principle been enhanced significantly since the NATO headquarters in Europe were re- Chirac is serious about returning to an duced from 18,354 in 1990 to 12,919 in end of the Cold War. As NATO broad- integrated command. Some organiza- 1996. This has resulted in a corresponding ens its focus, adding crisis manage- tional reforms proposed by France, budget reduction from U.S. $621.6M (1990) ment operations to its core mission of however, such as European command to U.S. $482M (1996). collective defense, it is the theater of Allied Forces Southern Europe ■ WEU has been empowered to lead commander who has been called upon combined joint task forces in cases when (AFSOUTH), are problematic. As a re- to deal with conflict at the regional the North Atlantic Council so decides. sult, despite Chirac’s NATO-friendly level. The United States has but one ■ The European Deputy SACEUR goal, serious disagreements appear to major subordinate commander in could command such WEU-led operations. be locked in negotiation. Europe, at AFSOUTH. Therefore the ■ Mechanisms have been established The Chirac reform shrinks the proposal to make AFSOUTH a Euro- to strengthen political control over military military from about 500,000 to operations, something long sought by the pean-led command would weaken the 350,000, or—excluding the gen- French. Alliance by weakening the U.S. leader- darmerie—from 400,000 (about half ship role in regional affairs at a time U.S. military strength remains being 10-month conscripts) to when that command is becoming in- crucial. The military assets and capabil- 250,000. This constitutes a manpower creasingly important. ities that the United States makes cut of one-third and budget cut of one- Negotiations have been difficult. available to AFSOUTH warrant a U.S.- fifth, though some analysts think the The AFSOUTH issue has become diffi- led command: new army will be more expensive. This cult to manage for at least three ■ The Sixth Fleet—which includes a smaller force is to be built around four reasons. As a result, a high level effort carrier battle group, an amphibious ready elite units with a capacity for rapid de- may be required to break the dead- group, and several submarines, all backed ployment to face ad hoc crisis situa- lock. The reasons are: by U.S. Atlantic Fleet—is the single most tions which planners see as the most important asset of AFSOUTH. The seamless ■ The United States believes the likely missions. connections created by dual hatting the changes it accepted in strengthening the Chirac is also abandoning the U.S. commander of Naval Forces Europe role of the Deputy SACEUR (who is a Euro- longstanding Gaullist goal of main- and CINCSOUTH can be critical in time pean), adding other Europeans in command of crisis. taining self-sufficiency in all categories positions, and empowering the Western ■ U.S. air assets in Italy and Turkey of weapons, especially in those areas European Union (WEU) were important have been critical to operations such as where French manufacture has been enough by themselves to warrant French Deny Flight, during which in a typical week particularly weak or nonexistent: satel- reintegration into the unified command. the United States flew 43 percent of the lite intelligence; command, control, ■ Some Europeans interpreted articles air missions. 5, 7, and 8 of the June 1996 Berlin commu- and communications equipment; and ■ The importance of U.S. leadership nique, which call on the parties to identify strategic lift. There are also projects and expertise in managing modern C4I headquarters to support the European such as satellite intelligence (Helios) systems was demonstrated in the Bosnia security and defense identity (ESDI), as a that the French want to share only operation. de facto pledge to transform AFSOUTH into with Europeans, thereby creating a ca- ■ The growing need for advanced sys- a European command. The United States tems to counter ballistic missile prolifera- pability independent of U.S. assets. considers that interpretation a misreading tion targeted primarily at the AFSOUTH re- This in turn drives restructuring of of those articles. gion will require continued American the defense industrial base, with several ■ The issue was elevated in the au- leadership and capabilities. state-sponsored mergers of nationalized tumn of 1996 by an exchange of correspon- and private-sector companies. However, dence between Presidents Clinton and

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decline, along with support for NATO in general. Simple command arrangements are best. The U.N. operation in Bosnia reinforces the lesson that complex command arrangements can contribute to failed operations. The thrust of NATO’s command structure review has been to simplify lines of command. The solution to the AFSOUTH political problem should not result in complex command arrangements that could fail in time of crisis. Summation of arguments. The arguments for retaining a U.S. comman- AMX–30 tanks outside der at AFSOUTH are: Al-Salman during Desert Storm. ■ AFSOUTH has emerged as a very important region in NATO and must remain a

U.S. Air Force (Dean Wagner) U.S. Air Force strong symbol of trans-Atlantic resolve and capabilities. ■ By its nature the NATO command Given its strategic importance, diplomacy with military capability, and structure is intended to respond to risks AFSOUTH will remain a strong symbol a U.S. commander at AFSOUTH will that threaten the shared interests of all of trans-Atlantic resolve. U.S. leader- be one demonstration of that military NATO members. ship will be essential at least until capability. It will be in the interest of ■ This is the only U.S.-led regional there is evidence that European lead- NATO for the United States to have command in Europe and losing it will ership would be backed by European this combination of diplomatic and weaken U.S. operational and political support for NATO. capabilities and resources commensu- military clout. The U.S. command at ■ Significant measures have already rate with the importance of the re- AFSOUTH enhances the ability of been taken to enhance ESDI within NATO. gion. With the recent and projected NATO to stabilize crises in the Mediter- ■ Removing the command link trends in European defense invest- ranean basin. between AFSOUTH and Sixth Fleet will in- ments, it cannot be foreseen when ad- Because of the volatility of the re- crease reaction time in crises. equate capabilities and commitment gion and the historical importance of ■ IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the contin- of resources would become a reality. AFSOUTH, there is a strong conver- ued need for U.S. leadership in the area. U.S. leadership is indispensable. gence of interests in maintaining an ■ Successful U.S. diplomacy in this A review of the recent history in the effective U.S.-led command. By its na- vital region has been strengthened by the Balkans, Aegean, Persian Gulf, and ture, the NATO command structure is U.S. command at AFSOUTH. ■ U.S. command at AFSOUTH can help Middle East indicates the indispensable intended to respond to risks that stabilize tensions throughout the Mediter- nature of U.S. diplomacy and military threaten the shared interests of all ranean. engagement in key regions surround- NATO members. ■ NATO responses to new ballistic ing the AFSOUTH area of operation. U.S. public is concerned. There re- missile proliferation threats against the In the case of Bosnia, for example, mains considerable support for NATO AFSOUTH area will benefit from a U.S. European powers in NATO were un- among the U.S. public, the Congress command. willing to undertake the follow-on and the academic community. There is ■ U.S. command facilitates participa- Stabilization Force (SFOR) without sig- also support for a U.S. leadership role tion by partner countries, including Russia. nificant U.S. participation. In Desert and for increased burden-sharing. ■ U.S. command maximizes the effec- 4 Storm AFSOUTH played a critical sup- Given the increasingly operational na- tiveness of modern C I assets. ■ Complicated command arrange- porting role which was enhanced by ture of AFSOUTH, and the military and ments, such as a bifurcated regional and the U.S. command. political requirement to have American functional command at AFSOUTH, can harm The region is vital and volatile. forces engaged as a key part of future NATO responsiveness in crisis. JFQ An assessment of future prospects for operations, loss of the command these same areas suggests that they would probably be seen by the U.S. —From Allied Command Structures in the are both highly unstable and vital to public as loss of U.S. leadership. As a New NATO (Washington: Institute for both U.S. and European interests. result, U.S. public support for opera- National Strategic Studies, National In command of AFSOUTH, the United tions in this critical region would Defense University, April 1997) States is positioned to strengthen its

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Changing Adversaries and Figure 2. Military and Civilian Personnel: 1995 and 2015 (projected) Structures 1995 2015 Conventional military strategy is Army military ...... 239,100 military ...... 136,000 being reoriented from defense of the civilian ...... 32,400 civilian ...... 34,000 central front within a divided Europe 271,500 170,000 to general security problems, including terrorism. For example, the much-de- 9 divisions, 129 regiments 85 regiments in 4 forces rided Eurocorps, theoretically opera- 927 heavy tanks 420 heavy tanks tional since 1995 as a force whose pur- 350 light tanks 350 light tanks pose is strategic defense, may after an 340 helicopters 180 helicopters inauspicious beginning become the Navy military ...... 63,800 military ...... 45,500 core of an after-implementation force civilian ...... 6,600 civilian ...... 11,000 70,400 56,500 by 2002 a French force of 101 vessels (-SNLE) with 2 aircraft 81 vessels (-SNLE) with1 or 2 50–60,000 troops is scheduled carriers and air group aircraft carriers and air group to be deployable—quickly 6 nuclear-fueled and 7 diesel-powered (+3 Hawkeyes) submarines, 15 first-rate frigates 6 nuclear-fueled submarines, and at great distances displacement: 314,000 tons 12 first-rate frigates 33 sea patrol aircraft displacement: 234,000 tons 22 sea patrol aircraft body. The Chirac plan is not a mere shrinkage of numbers and budgets but Air Force military ...... 89,200 military ...... 63,000 part and parcel of a cooperative allied civilian ...... 4,900 civilian ...... 7,000 restructuring of major EU military ca- 94,100 70,000 pabilities in which national force levels, capabilities, and strategies are in 405 combat aircraft 300 modern Rafale aircraft theory being harmonized—and made 86 transports 52 modern transports more Europeanized. 11 C–135 tankers 16 tankers 101 helicopters 84 helicopters The less lustrous causes of downsizing are also clear: France, like other Gendarmerie military ...... 92,230 military ...... 95,600 European powers, simply cannot (paramilitary) civilian ...... 1,220 civilian ...... 2,300 mount full-blown military operations; 93,450 97,900 and in the Gulf War it learned some difficult lessons. France had trouble de- with over 300 armored cars and APCs, ploying 12,000 troops during Desert plus patrol boats, helicopters, etc. Shield/Desert Storm, whereas Britain Common military ...... 18,130 military ...... 12,600 deployed double that number quickly Services civilian ...... 29,780 civilian ...... 27,000 despite having an overall smaller army. 47,910 39,600 The French were also a less effective force (for example, they were unable to Totals military ...... 502,460 military ...... 352,700 fly fighter-bomber raids at night for civilian ...... 74,900 civilian ...... 81,300 lack of radar). French units were 577,360 434,000 obliged to rely on American logistics and intelligence. By 2002 a French force of some 50–60,000 troops is scheduled to be government repositionings, some bud- cal, social, and ideological commit- deployable—quickly and at great dis- get driven, have created serious Franco- ments to conscription as patriotic, re- tances. No longer will typical opera- German friction in joint projects. publican, and egalitarian on the part tions consist of a few hundred soldiers French arms exports will likely suffer, of the right and the left. Opinion polls, jerry-dispatched to former French adding to unemployment and balance however, found that almost 70 percent Africa to put down a coup or replace a of trade difficulties. favored ending conscription—another failing president. Germany, as already Military reform stretches from sol- case of waning ideological attachment noted, is also developing a crisis reac- diers to the nuclear deterrent. Profes- in a “normalized” France. An all-vol- tion force of 55,000 to be in place by sionalization meant, first of all, aban- unteer army is planned by 2002. 1999. With the British and other EU doning conscription. This decision did forces, a European rapid reaction force not raise as much controversy as one of 250,000 is foreseeable. might expect, especially given histori-

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Even the once sacrosanct force de largely a struggle inside NATO for the and visible as possible. Franco-Ameri- frappe has not been spared. The 18 Europeanization of security and de- can antagonism was thus inevitable in land-based Albion Plateau (Provence) fense matters in Europe after the aban- that Chirac was determined to advance missiles stood down last summer. One donment of plans for a free-standing ESDI in NATO just as he had con- leg of the nuclear triad, albeit the least WEU–ESDI because events in Bosnia vinced Washington to take the lead in useful, was dropped along with a doc- prove, even to the French, that there Bosnia. Many changes occurred before trine that France would not renounce was a continued need for American the clash over the French proposal to any weapon possessed by other states. leadership in European security affairs. turn AFSOUTH into a rotating Euro- Both air-launched missiles and, impor- But the French stand on AFSOUTH pean command. This was in fact the tantly, nuclear submarines remain—a has received only half-hearted support last serious issue and most observers fleet of four submarines will be opera- from its main politico-military part- assumed that France would compro- tional early in the next century. Chirac ners, Britain and Germany. This is be- mise prior to the NATO summit in also decided to dismantle the short- cause, while London and Bonn also can summer 1997. range Hadès missiles as a gesture to find Washington overbearing, they be- AFSOUTH became a test of wills. German sensibilities. lieve that American leadership is more Washington thought the French pro- important than playing dare-devil posal unacceptable: too much too Playing the NATO Card diplomacy to counterbalance Washing- soon. In Paris U.S. unwillingness to ne- The Franco-American dispute over ton’s influence in NATO. Bosnia proved gotiate—President Clinton’s flat no— AFSOUTH—the NATO command with that the United States is, in President was seen as a lack of reciprocity for the headquarters in Naples—has led to a Clinton’s words, the “indispensable na- Atlanticist policy and attitude changes rancorous diplomatic exchange. This tion” for European security. that Chirac had initiated. In June the dispute is much larger than the issue of The French demand on AFSOUTH new cohabitation government formed the nationality of one commander. arose from three security policy events with Lionel Jospin’s Socialists—who The fact is that long-term issues are at during Chirac’s first twelve months in have never been accused of being pro- stake. AFSOUTH is not an isolated case office. The first was his unexpected NATO—contributed to speculation in creating a new NATO. In itself, there success—applauded all around—in that a deal on reorienting the inte- is no reason why it should be a stick- prodding Clinton to lead the two days grated command structure would not ing point in NATO reform, or whether of air strikes needed to bring an end to be immanent. Ultimately, Paris will France finally returns to the integrated fighting in Bosnia, thus intimidating want to see European leadership posi- command structure. the Bosnian Serbs into a truce and an tions in NATO regardless of the AF- Seen in proper context, AFSOUTH eventual peace agreement. The second SOUTH debate. And France wants to is just the latest episode in a broader was the announcement of a plan for achieve this shift in equilibrium and attempt—French though also Euro- wholesale military reform. Paris was be seen by the United States and espe- pean—to develop a “more visible” Eu- lagging behind other nations in over- cially by Europe as having achieved it. ropean security and defense identity hauling its forces and Chirac’s bold de- Thus the ambivalent support of (ESDI) within the Alliance. Thus this sign aimed at organizing a rapid-reac- his tactics and plans by Europeans debate resulted from the larger June tion, downsized, leaner-but-meaner worries Chirac. Britain and Germany, 1996 NATO Council European agree- military within five years. The third like other nations, clearly recognize ment with Washington to build ESDI was a seemingly un-Gaullist decision France’s military and economic weak- inside NATO rather than the earlier Eu- to bring France back into the inte- nesses as well as perceive the domestic ropean plan for a free standing West- grated command structure that Chirac political fragility of Chirac’s presidency ern European Union (WEU) force that announced in the wake of the Dayton and parliamentary coalition. They would be a military arm of the Euro- accords during a February 1996 speech must doubt whether France could ac- pean Union (EU)—WEU working with to a joint session of Congress that re- tually deliver on its grasp for greater NATO but outside it. ferred to the “necessary” leadership leadership, whether vis-à-vis America The French have tried, with frus- role played by the United States. or inside the European Council. For tration, to make the case in politico- “NATO,” he proclaimed on Capitol Europe as well as the United States, the military negotiations with the United Hill, “simply doesn’t work without Chirac gambit on AFSOUTH may in- States for greater European leadership American leadership.” deed be over-reaching and asking for balance inside a NATO structure which too much too soon. will include ESDI. But this new balance Integrated Command As for Franco-American diplo- is also a French code word for limiting Chirac accepted that Europe’s in- macy, misunderstandings over what American participation in the inte- adequacy in political coordination, de- France wants as well as the precipitous grated command and especially what termination, logistics, intelligence, and escalation of the issue by Chirac to the they see as “American unilateralism” in communications meant that any Euro- presidential level in an exchange of the way NATO functions. The French pean defense identity must be created letters that became public created a cri- campaign over AFSOUTH has been inside NATO. The French then had to sis atmosphere. For example, contrary insure that a European dimension of NATO—ESDI—would be as genuine

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to first impressions made last August, an operational sense this command is than American idealism because the Paris never asked for the AFSOUTH probably more significant than SHAPE “objective factors” approach—power command for themselves alone. They because the Mediterranean and adja- and the capacity to use it for policy proposed a rotating European com- cent areas have become a region of po- ends—nearly always results in U.S. mand. The French say, furthermore, tentially more serious security problems dominance. “Gaullism for everybody” that they never envisaged European than central Europe. is an intrinsically dangerous maxim for control of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, but that Thus a more visible ESDI inside weaker powers. their proposals always assumed mecha- NATO is not only institutionally possi- nisms to hive off the fleet in such a ble and politically desirable, it has to The history of this century favors way that it would remain under U.S. an extent already happened. The prob- American reluctance in the face of en- command. And France also conceded lem is the “extra” French proposal thusiastic European demands to be about AFSOUTH which came more visible and in control of security a more visible ESDI inside NATO is after the initial negotiations on the Continent. Through two world were concluded. Washington wars, the Cold War, the Gulf War, and not only possible and desirable, it felt wronged by this added de- Bosnia, Europe has needed U.S. mili- has to an extent already happened mand while Paris argued that tary power and guarantees. Not sur- successful conclusion of the prisingly French negotiators in the AF- initial talks did not preclude SOUTH dispute want to talk less about that American doubts about European further proposals. America criticized the past than the future. Seen from command experience, competence, France by stressing that command re- that perspective, Franco-American fric- and credibility were relevant and de- sponsibilities ought to reflect national tion over this command can be, if not manded answers. The Europeans, they capacities and genuine contributions resolved, at least understood. Some assert, could get up to speed in two or to NATO. This throws French commit- French officials have admitted that three years. Therefore they asked for ments into doubt and indirectly asserts their AFSOUTH proposal was too much agreement in principle with imple- that only the United States can carry too soon. But for Paris it is not un- mentation over time and thought that out the AFSOUTH mission. Americans thinkable, let alone wrong, to adopt a this was a quite reasonable request. point out that the French, although conflictual attitude even with a most U.S. policy, for its part, has three they started to rejoin integrated com- important ally, to re-open negotiations principles: military optimization must mand institutions over the last year, for a good purpose. The problem is take precedence over any politically- have not yet shown their commitment that Chirac perceived restructuring, motivated award of extra positions, by formally earmarking forces for particularly of AFSOUTH, against the which is an honored NATO tradition; NATO. The United States, in other backdrop of Bosnia. He forced his luck there must be an unbroken U.S. chain words, was wary of stated intentions and lost, at least for now. He either of command over the Sixth Fleet sta- that may or may not be fulfilled. miscalculated or just chose badly, per- tioned in the Mediterranean and the French proposals for NATO re- haps because he was poorly informed most important asset in AFSOUTH; structuring might seem set in a sort of by his advisors on the U.S. commit- and there must be no politico-military traditional geopolitical thinking that ment in this matter. JFQ constraints on American action in de Gaulle summed up with the apho- extra-NATO security responsibilities, rism: “A nation has neither permanent missions that only the United States enemies nor friends, only permanent can take on, in the Middle East and interests.” Whether that was true in the Persian Gulf. the 1960s, it may be less pertinent today in a world where major conflicts NATO Leadership seem unlikely and economic competi- American officials willingly accept tion has replaced force as the primary the idea of a new NATO leadership con- instrument of achieving national figuration which comports with a more power. As for the absence of a Gaullist visible ESDI. In fact, although often ig- pedigree, even Chirac does not mind nored by the focus on AFSOUTH, Euro- being seen as an Americanophile. Nev- peanization has already occurred as ertheless, the defense of French na- demonstrated by the appointment of a tional interests and European integra- powerful European deputy commander tion may yet require taking on one’s at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers friends. Europe (SHAPE). But AFSOUTH has France tends to stereotype U.S. taken on greater importance since the foreign policy as sometimes neo- Cold War. Some specialists agree that in Wilsonian and other times Realpolitik Washington-style. However European- derived American realism is paradoxically less in favor among our allies

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Unloading supplies at Goma, Zaire.

EUCOM (AndyU.S. Air Force Dunaway) and Sub-Saharan Africa By NANCY J. WALKER and LARRY HANAUER

States. The task of containing or preventing conflict while supporting successes requires a skillful balance of diplomacy, military resources, and humanitarian assistance. ub-Saharan Africa is a region The Armed Forces are uniquely marked by both great promise positioned to play an important role in and great peril. While some U.S. engagement in Sub-Saharan Scountries on the continent Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, have begun to embrace democracy, we have deployed forces to Africa to move toward a market economy, and evacuate Americans, provide humani- resolve long-standing conflicts, others tarian assistance, and assist the United suffer from ethnic tension, corruption, Nations and other organizations in economic collapse, and waves of multinational peace operations. In ad- refugees. Both these prospects and dif- dition to efforts on the ground, the ficulties pose challenges for the United U.S. military can help African states and regional organizations develop the political maturity, military profession- Nancy J. Walker is director and Larry Hanauer serves as policy alism, and economic growth necessary analyst in the Africa Region Office within the Office of the to solve their own problems and attain Secretary of Defense. long-term stability.

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As U.S. Government agencies EUCOM Area of Responsibility in Sub-Saharan Africa make tough decisions on mission priorities, the Department of Defense (DOD) has become, in the eyes of EUCOM many in both Africa and America, the agency with the deepest pockets and highest-profile activities on the conti- Mauritania Niger nent. In this age of declining budgets Mali and scarce resources, however, it is im- Senegal Chad portant that DOD assets intended for Burkina Africa be strategically and carefully al- Guinea The Gambia Ghana CENTCOM located to further U.S. priorities. Guinea Bissau Ivory Nigeria The proactive role performed by Coast Central African Republic U.S. European Command (EUCOM)— Sierra Leone Benin Cameroon Togo which has an area of responsibility Liberia Uganda Equatorial Democratic (AOR) that includes 37 of the 48 coun- Congo EQUATOR Guinea Gabon Republic tries in Sub-Saharan Africa—is central of Congo Rwanda to U.S. strategy in the region. Its over- Burundi all commitment to robust and forward- Cabinda Tanzania looking engagement on the continent and willingness to dedicate resources South Atlantic Ocean to it helps shape U.S. policy there. Angola Zambia Malawi Unique Challenges Mozambique While the United States has lim- Zimbabwe ited strategic interests in Africa, events ACOM Namibia there might require significant Ameri- Botswana can involvement and resources. Prob- lems in this region are political, eco- Swaziland nomic, social, and military in nature Lesotho Indian South Africa Ocean

problems could come from failed states PACOM and the fragility of nation-building 17ϒE

and stem from both external sources and internal instability. Future problems could come from failed states countries such as The Gambia where ac- extremely important role in stabilizing the and the fragility of apparent successes tions deemed unacceptable by the interna- situation across Sub-Saharan Africa. in nation-building. Specific difficulties tional community (like rigging elections) A range of political, economic, and have resulted in the receipt of few resources include: military assets are required to address from abroad ■ the collapse of Zaire, Angola, Nige- ■ ethnic tension, weak economies, these challenges and achieve primary ria, Sudan, and other countries which could narcotics smuggling, unequal income distri- U.S. objectives. The United States Security set off civil wars, halt the flow of oil, create bution, poor infrastructures, dysfunctional Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa issued by waves of refugees, and threaten resident governments, and various other factors the Secretary of Defense in 1995 out- American citizens which have negative impacts on the stabil- lines three policy goals that invite sub- ■ ongoing politico-military conflicts ity of governments and the health and stantial and direct involvement: pro- and resulting humanitarian crises in the prosperity of indigenous societies moting peace by preventing, managing, former Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, ■ the opposite situation in countries Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, or resolving conflicts; providing hu- such as Senegal and Botswana where the mil- manitarian assistance to alleviate suffer- Sudan, and Uganda itaries are professional and contribute to po- ing and hunger; and fostering democ- ■ unprofessional, overstrength, and litical development and long-term stability underpaid militaries with the potential for ■ the emergence of democratic insti- racy and respect for human rights. promoting coups d’état, human rights tutions in Mali, Zambia, and Benin as well The objectives of the EUCOM the- abuses, and political instability as the corruption of “free” elections in The ater strategy, as found in the Strategy of ■ the increasing influence of Libya, Gambia, Niger, and Nigeria Engagement and Preparedness, include Iran, and other pariah states, particularly in ■ support for and proactive partnership with the defense establishment in post-apartheid South Africa, which plays an

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W alker and Hanauer

Rwandan refugee camp at Kigali. al Gempis) y (V

Marines arriving in Combat Camera Imager Brazzaville, Congo.

assisting democratization, responding to humanitarian crises, and playing a role in pursuing vital U.S. interests, especially protecting American citizens. Many assets for attaining these objectives come from the arsenals of the

four geographical commands with as- ) signed responsibilities for Sub-Saharan Africa—EUCOM in the vast majority of the region, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Horn of Africa, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Mada- gascar and island states along the coast (Greg U.S. Air Force L. Davis of the Indian Ocean, and U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) in the nations of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe commander in chief, U.S. European civilian defense officials and senior mil- (see map). Command (CINCEUR), General George itary officers. His visits to Angola and Joulwan, the command has dramati- active role in the peace process, for ex- EUCOM Activities cally increased its activities there. Gen- ample, helped further rapprochement Because EUCOM has focused its eral James Jamerson, the deputy com- in that country’s long-standing civil resources and attention on addressing mander in chief, has spent more time war. The contacts he cultivated during U.S. interests in Europe both during the on the ground in Africa than his imme- a trip to Uganda in 1996 facilitated the Cold War and in the post-Cold War pe- diate predecessors, building relation- swift approval by that country of the riod of NATO expansion as well as ships with and improving access to U.S. request to utilize Entebbe airport peace operations in Bosnia, Africa has during Operation Guardian Assistance, not been a major priority. Under the a multinational humanitarian relief

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Finally, in an effort to establish a Special Forces protecting fire fighters, course for African civilian officials and Liberia. military officers on defense planning and management in democratic societies, EUCOM is working with the Of- fice of the Secretary of Defense to explore the establishment of an African security studies center.

Humanitarian Assistance EUCOM is helping Mozambique, Rwanda, and Namibia develop sustainable humanitarian de-mining efforts to reduce civilian suffering and economic

Paul R. Caron) hardship. U.S. forces employ a train-

on ( the-trainer approach which enables host countries to continue these programs after their departure. Americans were pre-deployed for Guardian Assistance to Uganda, Combat Camera Squadr st

1 Rwanda, and Kenya in support of a multinational force organized to assist hundreds of thousands of Rwandan mission mounted in eastern Zaire dur- Fostering Democracy refugees in eastern Zaire. The main ing November 1996. These efforts have Efforts to professionalize African body of the force was never deployed been assisted by the EUCOM political militaries are crucial tools in promot- since more than 100,000 refugees re- adviser, Ambassador Joe Wilson, a for- ing democratic values and institutions. turned to Rwanda on their own. eign service officer who has spent Joint combined exchange and training In the wake of a Hutu-led genocide much of his career in Africa. exercises (JCETs) are integral to that claimed hundreds of thousands of EUCOM activities from joint exer- EUCOM engagement in Africa. De- Rwandan lives, several hundred Rwan- cises to chaplain exchanges are crucial signed to provide training for U.S. dan refugees faced death from cholera to U.S. objectives in Africa. The com- troops, these exercises have the added each day in overcrowded camps on mand’s strategic vision states that benefit of training African forces. The both sides of the Rwanda-Zaire border. “port visits, combined exercises, and approximately 25 exercises conducted EUCOM deployed water purification visits by general officers play an impor- each year—on light infantry tactics, units to the area for three months tant role in maintaining our relation- leadership, and the role of apolitical which ended the health crisis and en- ships and influence. Security assistance military institutions in a democratic abled nongovernmental agencies to in all its forms is often the prime form system—have been cited by senior again provide relief services during Op- of our interaction with the nations of civilian and military leaders as critical eration Support Hope in July 1994. this region.” Its activities include: in professionalizing African militaries. EUCOM also is key to accomplish- ■ promoting peace by preventing, EUCOM conducts two multina- ing the unstated but perhaps most cru- managing, or resolving conflicts tional regional exercises each year cial U.S. objective, ensuring the safety ■ supporting development of an which provide training in command of Americans and third-country nation- African crisis response initiative (assess- and control and give Africans experi- als by evacuating U.S. Mission and ments by EUCOM teams in several African ence in operating in a multinational other personnel from danger spots. nations as an effort to enhance the capabili- environment and with U.S. forces, Most noncombatant evacuations and ties of regional militaries for timely and effi- embassy departures have arisen in cient participation in international peace which will greatly facilitate their par- Africa, including the Central African and humanitarian operations) ticipation in future international con- Republic (1996), Liberia (1996), Sudan ■ establishing a military liaison office tingency operations. FY97 will feature in Monrovia where EUCOM is evaluating exercises in Mali and Namibia. In addi- (1996), and Zaire (1991, 1993, and the needs of the West African peacekeeping tion, medical exercises are conducted 1997). Excellent and proactive contin- force in Liberia, supervising delivery of U.S.- twice each year to provide training in gency planning—sometimes conducted provided equipment, and furnishing mili- preventative medicine as well as im- in conjunction with allies such as tary advice to the U.S. ambassador prove overall health services. An exer- France in the Central African Repub- ■ helping the Organization of African cise was held in Mali in September lic—help to guarantee that these opera- Unity (OAU) develop a conflict manage- 1996, and Benin and Sierra Leone will tions go smoothly. EUCOM teams also ment center and, in particular, a conflict management exercise. receive training during FY97.

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or a zealous desk officer in Washington influence the military and others who allocate resources to support programs in countries in which there are few U.S. interests and only limited security concerns. As available resources decline and many agencies continue to reduce their presence overseas, DOD is often perceived as the only U.S. Gov- ernment agency with available assets. On balance we must resist pressure to allocate scarce defense resources to countries in which the United States has limited interests. Unloading C–141 at Libreville, Gabon. U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan U.S. Air Force (Andy U.S. Air Force Dunaway) Africa have changed greatly since the end of the Cold War, yet our security strategy for the region has only begun travel to the region to work with our comprehensive strategy for engage- to respond to new challenges. Rather embassy staffs to ensure emergency ment in Africa. It will identify U.S. in- than simply distributing resources to plans are thorough and up to date. terests and provide a blueprint for allo- pro-Western or anti-Soviet clients, the cating resources to pursue them. It will United States has started to construc- Resource Allocation also identify countries in which an in- tively address Africa’s security problems EUCOM is only one of many fusion of resources could either save a and has thus worked to minimize new DOD components active in Sub-Saha- state from disaster or help a capable challenges to U.S. security. Programs ran Africa. In addition, a dozen agen- military enhance its skills to become a that professionalize African militaries, cies administer various programs. valuable partner in international oper- encourage democracy, alleviate suffer- Training and assistance programs are ations. A central element of this strat- ing, mitigate humanitarian disasters, conducted by the Office of the Secre- egy is thus prioritizing U.S. interests so and allow governments to solve their tary of Defense, the military services that resources can be allocated to own problems have had a tremendous (including the Reserve components), countries where we have the greatest impact on the effectiveness of U.S. pol- and U.S. Special Operations Com- stakes and can make the largest im- icy in the region. The major role played mand; Departments of State, Com- pact. This is a crucial step since the by EUCOM and other regional com- merce, Agriculture, Justice, Labor, Cold War tactic of providing resources mands in Sub-Saharan Africa has made Transportation, Treasury, and Health to virtually every country in Africa to these efforts possible. keep the Soviet Union from As the United States continues to gaining a stronghold can no interagency communication must develop partnerships with the defense longer apply. The EUCOM improve to increase the effectiveness establishments of this region, EUCOM strategy echoes the need for and other DOD components must im- prioritization by pointing of U.S. programs on the continent prove their process of setting priorities out that engagement re- and allocating resources. A continued and Human Services; and Agency for quires us “to systematically focus our high-level commitment to Africa by ge- International Development, Peace efforts where we feel that they can ographical commands and Washington Corps, and U.S. Information Agency. make a difference.” JCETs, interna- is instrumental to furthering U.S. en- Overlap and lack of coordination and tional military education and training, gagement and achieving objectives. JFQ collaboration often mean that differ- and other resources thus should go to- ent agencies may duplicate efforts or ward professional development. even work at cross-purposes. In a pe- Prospective partners such as Senegal, riod of diminishing resources, intera- Ghana, and Ethiopia—which have of- gency communication must improve fered to contribute forces to an African to increase the effectiveness of U.S. crisis response initiative and share the programs on the continent. burden of conducting peace operations The Office of the Secretary of De- in the future—should receive priority fense, working in concert with other assistance. DOD components, is developing a EUCOM and other U.S. Govern- ment agencies operating in the region must better prioritize the allocation of resources. All too often an ambassador

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Diving at TWA flight 800 crash site.

Forgotten Mission: Military Support U.S. Navy (CharlesU.S. Navy L. Withrow) to the Nation By DAVID L. GRANGE and RODNEY L. JOHNSON

hroughout U.S. history the military has (DOD) has responded in recent years. Extensive been used to suppress insurrection and support by the services and defense agencies is rebellion, enforce the law, and perform important to minimizing loss of life and property various other roles at the request of in a range of operations which frequently go un- TFederal, state, and local officials. The role of the publicized. This article outlines responsibilities Armed Forces in crises is mandated under the for Federal support, the system which facilitates Constitution and has been exercised since the that support, and the extent of DOD assistance in Shay Debtor Rebellion in 1786. selected domestic operations. While support to the Nation is often over- shadowed by the high-profile role of defending it, Federal Responsibilities military support is a critical, long-standing mis- Article I, section 8 of the Constitution states, sion that continues to grow. This is revealed by “Congress shall have power ...to provide for call- the number and variety of domestic disasters and ing forth the militia to execute laws of the Union, events to which the Department of Defense suppress insurrection, and repel invasions.” Arti- cle IV, section 4 expands this authority: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Major General David L. Grange, USA, is director of operations, Union a republican form of government, and readiness, and mobilization at Headquarters, Department of the Army, shall protect each of them...against domestic vi- and Lieutenant Colonel Rodney L. Johnson, USA, serves in the olence.” The modern authorization for Federal Directorate of Military Support on the Army Staff. support to civil authorities is based on the Robert

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T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assis- departments and agencies will supplement state tance Act (public law 93–288) and the Economy and local government responses. Act. The former enables the Federal Government In order to manage Federal assistance, FRP to “provide assistance to U.S. states, territories, classifies assistance into 12 emergency support and possessions to alleviate suffering and mitigate functions and assigns primary responsibility for damage resulting from major disasters and civil them (see figure 1). DOD is the primary agency for emergencies.” The latter empowers Federal agen- public works and engineering and has named the cies to provide routine support to each other U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as operating agent under certain conditions if reimbursed. The key for planning, preparedness, and response. In addi- agency for emergency assistance to civil authori- tion, DOD provides support to designated lead ties is the Federal Emergency Management agencies in responding to all other functions. Agency (FEMA). By executive order the President FEMA is also tasked as LFA for consequence man- appointed FEMA as the lead Federal agency (LFA) agement, defined as actions taken to provide an for disaster and emergency assistance and as pro- immediate response to an incident to contain and ponent for the Federal response plan (FRP). Pub- mitigate its effects. By contrast, the Federal Bureau lished in 1992, that plan details how 28 Federal of Investigation (FBI) is LFA for crisis management, defined as measures to resolve a hostile situation, investigate, and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under Federal law. Figure 1. Federal Response Plan When a domestic disaster occurs, the first relief assistance is provided by the local police, fire Support Function Lead Agency departments, and rescue organizations. Depend- ing on the severity of the disaster, the next level transportation Department of Transportation of aid is normally through state disaster relief or- communications National Communications System ganizations that can call upon all state assets. The public works and engineering Department of Defense governor will appoint a state coordinating officer firefighting Department of Agriculture (figure 2) in major disasters and can also put the information and planning Federal Emergency Management Agency National Guard on state active duty which is a mass care American Red Cross tremendous asset and is used extensively in most resource support General Services Administration states. As an example, the daily employment av- health/medical services Department of Health and Human Services erage for National Guard assets in FY96 was 1,760 man-days. The governor may request help from urban search and rescue Federal Emergency Management Agency the President when local needs exceed state re- hazardous materials Environmental Protection Agency sources. When required, FEMA will appoint a co- food Department of Agriculture ordinating officer to correlate Federal disaster re- energy Department of Energy lief assistance. FEMA and that officer then function as the vital link between state requirements and DOD assistance.

Figure 2. Disaster Support Relationships Organization The Secretary of Defense delegates authority to provide military support for civil authorities to President the Secretary of the Army who, as executive support requests agent, exercises operational control over all DOD coordination Secretary of Defense components including the services and defense agencies. Specific requirements include develop- Joint Staff ing planning guidance, plans, and procedures for Secretary of military support; tasking components to plan for the Army/ and commit resources in response to requests State Director DOMS from civil authorities; and developing (and task- Governor FEMA ing DOD components to develop) generic and incident-specific support plans. The Assistant Secre- CINCs tary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment is responsible for oversight of military support to civil authorities (MSCA). The Di- rectorate of Military Support (DOMS) is the DOD State Federal Defense action agent for planning and coordinating this Coordinating Coordinating Coordinating Officer Officer Officer support on behalf of the Secretary of the Army.

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DOMS is led by an Army major general who responsibility. When deployed these officers, who is also the director of operations, readiness, and are usually Army colonels, are the DOD represen- mobilization in the Office of the Deputy Chief of tatives on the ground with authority to validate Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, De- all requests for support. They forward validated partment of the Army. DOMS and its designated requests to either a joint task force (JTF) or re- staff element, the Military sponse task force (RTF), if constituted, or to DOMS and the Military Support Division, essentially higher headquarters. DOMS will then staff the re- Support Division essentially function as a joint staff, with quest and if appropriate task a defense element to both Air Force and Navy one- provide the support. function as a joint staff star officers serving as deputy JTFs are normally formed for command and directors. The DOMS staff has control of operations when significant forces the responsibility to plan, co- from more than one service are deployed. Recent ordinate, and manage the full range of MSCA op- examples of JTFs include the Los Angeles riots erations. It routinely coordinates with FEMA and (1992), Hurricane Andrew (1992), and the the other Federal departments and agencies and Olympics (1996). RTFs are formed to support Fed- also participates in interagency disaster relief ex- eral responses to terrorist incidents which involve ercises. In this capacity its staff is represented on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The ele- the FEMA catastrophic disaster response group ments of RTFs were prepositioned during the executive committee. Olympics and the last Presidential inauguration.

Standing and Directed Missions The Secretary of the Army has seven standing missions as the executive agent for support. They include disaster relief, wildland fire fighting, civil disturbances, immigration emergencies, postal disruptions, animal disease eradication, and military assistance to safety and traffic (MAST). Among them, support to the Postal Ser- vice during labor disputes is potentially the most personnel-intensive albeit the least likely. If fully implemented, more than 190,000 military personnel would be committed to safeguard, process, and deliver mail. The MAST program provides aeromedical evacuation for civilian communities. Army and Air Force medical evacuation units have flown in excess of 100,000 hours since the program began in 1973. Any disaster requires a swift response to minimize suffering and loss of life, and military units are ideally suited for this

U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)U.S. Air Force role. DOD has supported more than 200 domestic Fighting forest fires in disaster relief operations since 1975. It also sup- Clear Lake, California. ports Federal fire fighting efforts. For example, The executive agent has designated the com- more than 1,200 active duty soldiers and marines manders in chief of U.S. Atlantic Command fought fires in California and Oregon during (ACOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and 1996. Military assistance in civil disturbances is U.S. Southern Command as the DOD operating probably the most sensitive mission since use of agents for MSCA for states, territories, and posses- the Armed Forces to reestablish law and order re- sions in their areas of responsibility. ACOM, with quires involvement at the highest national level. the contiguous 48 states, assigns lead operational The last mission of this type was conducted in authority (LOA) to its Army component, Forces 1992 when 13,000 active duty and Army National Command (FORSCOM), which accordingly can Guard personnel were employed in efforts to re- task other ACOM component commands. More- store order in the Los Angles metropolitan area. over, in coordination with DOMS and the Joint In addition to standing missions, the Secre- Staff, it can task supporting CINCs such as U.S. tary of the Army also executes directed domestic Transportation Command and supporting de- support missions. The Atlanta Olympics set a fense agencies. precedent for the level of both military and civil- Both PACOM and FORSCOM have desig- ian agency contingency support. DOD support nated defense coordinating officers (DCOs) for states and territories in their respective areas of

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included 14,653 active and National Guard per- Requests for Support sonnel from 47 states and territories, over 300 DOD support to civil authorities is requested aviation support missions, and more than almost daily. While most requests come from the 300,000 items of equipment for use by state and appropriate LFA, some are received directly from local authorities. local civilian or state authorities and directed to Planning for the Presidential inauguration in the right channels. In an ideal world requests January 1997 involved six months of intense would be submitted formally in writing, but swift work by DOMS. Although the Armed Forces Inau- response is often essential and DOMS begins to gural Committee is historically responsible for coordinate requests after an initial phone contact. routine military support The entry point for written requests is the Office DOD support to civil authorities to the inaugural, the Sec- of the Executive Secretary which processes them, retary of the Army was is requested almost daily conducts an initial evaluation, and forwards the responsible for ensuring requests to the Secretary of the Army for action. a coordinated DOD re- By exception all requests related to counterterror- sponse for contingency operations during that ism are forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of period. Critical tasks included development and Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity coordination of command, control, and commu- Conflict for evaluation and action. nication procedures for possible contingency op- DOMS is tasked to ensure that requests are erations; interagency meetings to clarify responsi- staffed with all the parties concerned and that bilities and support requirements; execution of a any action meets six criteria: legality (authoriza- tabletop exercise for 80 action-level attendees tion and applicability of posse comitatus); lethality from numerous agencies to discuss, clarify, and (use of force by or against military personnel); coordinate roles; conduct of a decision session to risk (safety of personnel); cost (responsibility for finalize plans in November 1996; and distribution expenditures and their budget impact); readiness of an execute order outlining extensive DOD re- (implication for performing primary mission); quirements. and appropriateness (mission best served by DOD The latest directed mission is implementa- or other means). Requests are coordinated with tion of the Nunn-Lugar II Domestic Preparedness the Joint Staff, services, general counsel, and sup- legislation. The Defense against Weapons of Mass ported commands which provide support as well Destruction Act of 1996 requires the Secretary of as supporting commands and defense agencies. Defense to execute a program to enhance Federal, Once coordination is complete, DOMS is respon- state, and local agency capabilities to respond to sible for finalizing the execute order and submit- incidents involving WMD. As DOD executive ting it to the appropriate official for approval. agent, the Secretary of the Army is tasked with The Secretary of the Army can approve most developing and implementing guidance, plans, requests for DOD support as executive agent; and procedures to establish a coordinated na- however, the Secretary of Defense must person- tional program. As action agent, DOMS is initiat- ally approve responses in cases of terrorism or ing extensive interagency coordination and plan- civil disturbance, use of CINC-assigned forces, ning to sustain this program. Specific tasks and support to law enforcement when confronta- include providing emergency response training, tion or use of lethal force is anticipated. For re- advice, and assistance; activating a chemical-bio- quests which require approval by the Secretary of logical hotline; assisting in the development and Defense, DOMS prepares a recommended course maintenance of rapid response teams; testing and of action and forwards it to the Secretary through evaluating preparedness; helping in the inventory the Joint Staff and Chairman. Following a deci- of physical equipment and assets; and procuring sion, the Chairman will send the order through equipment to interdict WMD movement. DOMS to the appropriate CINC for execution and DOMS is charged with integrating all capa- management by the Secretary of the Army. bilities in a consolidated program and is currently Such support to civil authorities is extensive staffing additional guidance on timelines, budget and occurs on an almost daily basis. The eight procedures, reporting requirements, and specific most extensive support requirements during FY95 responsibilities associated with the above tasks. and FY96 are summarized in figure 3. It should be The Secretary of the Army recently appointed the noted, however, that DOMS spends considerable Army Chemical Biological Defense Command to time coordinating relatively small yet critical re- implement the program. Other key assets include quests for particular types of expertise or equip- the Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Inci- ment. This support is normally requested when it dent Response Force, Naval Medical Research In- would be too costly to procure the skill or equip- stitute, Air Force Technical Application Center, ment required for one-time use or when timeli- and Army Technical Escort Unit. ness does not allow for normal procurement. Re- cent cases include a technical escort unit to

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Sandbagging Grand Communications Squadron (CharlesCommunications Squadron Mor

th Forks, North Dakota. 319

Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. U.S. Army (Zedrick G. Rockett)

Hurricane Fran Figure 3. DOD Support to Civil Authorities, Selected Operations: 1995–1997 The hurricane that struck near Cape (peak DOD strength) Fear, North Carolina, on the evening of Active National Corps of September 5, 1996 had maximum sus- Event Date Duty Guard Engineers tained winds of 115 mph. Although its Oklahoma Bombing April–May 1995 457 545 48 strength quickly diminished, in the next 12 hours it caused 26 deaths, severe Hurricane Marilyn September–November 1995 1,227 930 200 flooding from up to 15 inches of rain, Summer Olympics June–August 1996 1,277 13,376 – $1.5 billion in damage, and a power loss TWA Flight 800 July–November 1996 740 170 22 to 800,000 households across five states. National Conventions August 1996 328 1,397 – The response to Fran started prior to Western Forest Fires August–September 1996 1,265 930 – its actual arrival. FEMA (the lead Federal Hurricane Fran September–November 1996 756 4,134 397 agency) and DOMS began 24-hour operations at 0700 hours on September 4. That Presidential Inaugural January 1997 4,736 540 – same day DOMS received five formal taskings for DOD support and released an execute order for it at 2000 hours with the commander in chief, ACOM, tasked support a Ricin chemical agent seizure by the Fed- as supported CINC. Initial actions required a eral Bureau of Investigation in Missouri; engineer C–141 to move a prepositioned forward assess- support after a dam break in New Hampshire; ment team from Texas to North Carolina on Sep- personnel and metal detectors to conduct a tember 5, the use of Fort Jackson to billet and search by the Secret Service for counterfeit money support the emergency response team-national in Michigan; and providing air transport for until mission completion, and nine helicopters to FEMA urban search and rescue teams responding transport the team and support other missions. to disasters. Every request must be properly All missions were completed as required prior to staffed to ensure that the support is appropriate the arrival of the hurricane. and not in violation of posse comitatus (title 18, U.S. Code, strictly prohibits the use of Federal troops for law enforcement).

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active duty support was provided by DCO and DCE from the Federal mobilization site at Fort Bragg and also by elements of XVIII Airborne Corps which removed debris and provided relief assistance. Of particular note was support by the Corps of Engineers that included damage surveys, power restoration, water and ice delivery, dredg- ing operations, and debris removal. As of Novem- ber 13, it had taken away 3,411,695 cubic yards of debris, provided over 200 generators for emergency power, and delivered some 3.5 millions pounds of ice and 550,000 gallons of water. In addition, the Corps of Engineers dredge McFarland removed 170,000 cubic yards of material in efforts to clear Wilmington harbor.

Oklahoma City The bomb that was detonated outside the Al- fred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 resulted in 167 dead, 467 in- jured, and two missing. Unlike a hurricane there was no warning. The event highlighted the ability to provide technical support on extremely short notice in support of civil authorities. Fort Sill dispatched two medical evacuation helicopters and Tinker Air Force Base deployed a 66- man rescue squad. Under his immediate response authority, the Secretary of the Army directed DOMS to establish the 24-hour crisis action team one hour after the explosion and sent a liaison officer to FEMA headquarters. DOD ultimately provided technical support and equipment to many agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation as LFA for crisis management and FEMA as LFA for consequence management. DOMS received its first request for support three hours after the bombing when FEMA requested transportation for an urban search and U.S. Air National Guard (MarkU.S. Air National Guard A. Moore) rescue team from Phoenix. An airborne C–141 Oklahoma City, from McCord Air Force Base was immediately di- April 1995. verted to Luke Air Force Base to support the team DOMS coordinated all support operations di- tasking and further actions were initiated in an- rectly with FEMA until September 6 when the Pres- ticipation of a Presidential declaration of emer- ident issued a major disaster declaration for por- gency. Following the declaration later in the day, tions of North Carolina. At that time ACOM DOMS staffed and issued an execute order tasking deployed a DCO and a disaster coordination ele- the commander in chief, ACOM, as supported ment (DCE) to Fort Bragg to handle requirements CINC. DCO and the nucleus of DCE arrived at for support. Until it stood down on September 28, 1800 (eight hours after the blast) and began coor- DCE coordinated all support and forwarded re- dinating all on-site requirements for support. The quests to higher headquarters or DOMS only when team from Phoenix reached the site at 2130 and they exceeded local capabilities. Ultimately DOMS other support arrived throughout the night. worked 16 formal requests for support prior to Although the last formal request for support ceasing 24-hour operations on September 9. was received on April 29, DOD continued to as- DOD support to Fran recovery operations sist in rescue and law enforcement efforts until was extensive and critical to minimizing the loss the end of May. The peak strength reached 1,002 of life and suffering. Peak strength included 756 personnel and included a large amount of avia- active duty soldiers, 4,134 National Guardsmen tion and ground transport, specialized equipment from eight states on active duty, and 397 mem- with operators, and life support items. bers of the Corps of Engineers. The majority of

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Olympic Games A tremendous effort was made to ensure a During the olympic coordinated, immediate response for emergency games, held from July 19 contingency operations. Assets prepositioned to August 4, 1996 at 96 and/or forward deployed to the Atlanta area for venues in four states and the Olympics included 26 explosive ordnance dis- the District of Columbia, posal teams, three chemical-biological technical the focus of planning was escort units, a response task force advance ele- on Atlanta. It was there ment, DCO and DCE liaison officers, FORSCOM that organizers projected and First Army emergency operation centers, heli- 300,000–600,000 visitors copters for current and on-call missions, and a per day as well as the pres- chemical-biological pharmaceutical package. ence of 40,000 volunteers Moreover, DOD developed detailed plans to and 15,000 media. As ensure that critical assets were readily available could be expected, the for deployment to the area. This included a re- competition set a prece- sponse task force, chemical-biological advisory dent for the level of sup- and response teams, chemical-biological labora- port requested and pro- tory and diagnostics capability, added air evacua- vided by DOD and other tion and medical triage teams, and other specialty Federal agencies. assets. Clearly, DOD support was essential to the DOD planning was success of one of the largest and most complex initiated in response to a peacetime events of this century. memo issued by the Secre- TWA 800 tary of the Army in Au- gust 1995 that outlined a On July 17, 1996 a flight bound for Paris ex- Air National Guard framework for support. ploded in midair and crashed off Long Island with Standing watch The Secretary was also the loss of all 230 passengers and crew members at Olympic games. designated executive agent for all DOD support, on board shortly after it took off from JFK Interna- and DOMS was tasked as the action agent for exe- tional Airport in New York. This tragedy high- cuting all missions involving the Olympics. In ad- lights the ability to provide a range of multi-ser- dition, the commanding general, FORSCOM, was vice technical support and specialized equipment. tasked to furnish general officer oversight and a The National Transportation Safety Board was task force commander. The specific mission was designated LFA while the Federal Bureau of Inves- twofold: provide DOD non-emergency support tigation conducted a collateral investigation. The and prepare to execute appropriate emergency first military support was provided almost imme- contingency plans to assist civil authorities. diately by the New York National Guard which ac- The impact of support to the Olympics was tivated an emergency operations center and dis- significant. More than 14,000 active, Reserve, and patched a C–130 with illumination flares and a National Guard personnel were directly commit- helicopter with forward-looking infrared radar. ted in Atlanta and other sites. The majority of mil- Support was coordinated, approved, and funded itary personnel were members by the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center. The more than 14,000 personnel of the Army National Guard National Guard continued to provide support over from 47 states and territories the next three months with a peak strength of 170 were directly committed who supported security opera- personnel, two helicopters, and 27 vehicles. Its in Atlanta and other sites tions at the 96 venues. More critical support included assisting in search and re- than a thousand active duty covery, roving patrols, cleanup and sustainment, soldiers, sailors, marines, and and passive security which was provided under airmen transported athletes, officials, and law en- state authority at the governor’s direction. forcement personnel among various olympic vil- The Navy received its first request for sup- lages and widely dispersed venues. port in accordance with a memo of understand- The military flew over 300 missions in sup- ing between the Navy supervisor of salvage and port of law enforcement and security operations. the National Transportation Safety Board. Under DOD also provided more than 300,000 items of that agreement, a pinger locator system, side scan equipment and supplies to more than 60 Federal, sonar mapping system, remotely operated vehi- state, and local law enforcement agencies and or- cle, salvage ship (USS Grasp), search vessel (MV ganizing committees. Bomb disposal personnel Pirouette), and 53 divers were provided initially. responded to 490 calls about suspicious items. Lo- On July 22 the FBI requested a helicopter gistical support was provided to DOD personnel and non-flying crew chief for the investigation. at nine base camps by a joint logistical task force with 1,300 members.

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Diver inspecting

crash site. (GordonU.S. Navy Peterson) Retrieving parts of TWA flight 800 fuselage. and directed the establishment of a disaster relief task force to assume operational control. Over the next two months this structure provided extensive support to recovery operations and aided in the eventual recovery of the remains of 213 vic- tims and 95 percent of the aircraft. Navy strength at the site peaked at 740 and included 140 divers. U.S. Navy (MarkU.S. Navy M. Reinhard) The Armed Forces are trained and equipped to provide immediate response during disaster and emergency response operations. In fact, in The National Guard Bureau coordinated for the many cases DOD is the only Federal agency that Delaware Army National Guard to execute this can immediately provide some kinds of support. mission. A forensic anthropologist from the The military clearly recognizes the importance of Armed Forces Institute of Pathology was provided this mission; however, there is a price to pay. to assist with autopsies and identify remains. In Time, personnel, training, and funds spent for addition, the Corps of Engineers furnished a such support compete with our limited assets. barge to collect drift from the wreckage. Leaders on all levels must weigh the impact of Ultimately, support to the crash site contin- such missions on their organizations and make ued to increase, and DOMS staffed and issued an the necessary adjustments. Support to the Nation execute order approved by the Secretary of the is a demanding mission that the military must Army on July 23 which designated the comman- continue to plan for and execute. JFQ der in chief, ACOM, as the supported CINC for site operations. He, in turn, tasked the commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet as supported CINC

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■ The Force-on-Force A much promised peace dividend and consensus on the dawn of the information age raised expectations that we could anticipate significant decreases in defense budgets and force structure. Model: While the military has indeed been downsized, this has been a response to budget cuts and the end of the Cold War, not to investments in information technologies. The Armed Forces are smaller, but we have not restructured to realize savings in the same way as the private sector. This reflects the failure of decisionmakers and those An Anachronism operations research analysts who support them to abandon the industrial age force-on-force models of the past. in the Information Age The information revolution sweeping our lives will also sweep the battlefield of tomorrow. By MAGGIE BELKNAP Yet budget decisions on force structure and military technology depend on decades-old industrial- age attrition models. Such models were intended to measure incremental

f confronted with an enemy sniper in a dark- change and not to explore revolutionary ad- ened room would you want more ammuni- vances. The longer decisionmakers take to adapt, tion, a larger caliber weapon, or night vision the less likely it is that we will attain the security goggles? Those who make decisions on how innovations that capitalize on emerging tech- Ito man and equip our forces depend on models nologies. Moreover, we risk failing to demonstrate that cannot answer this question. Built during the tangible cost benefits associated with infor- the Cold War to respond to concerns over incre- mation technology. mental changes in force structure and weaponry, these models are unable to measure the impact of Changing Models revolutionary advances in information technolo- Knowing why a particular model was built is gies. Born of the industrial age, they are inade- key to understanding the types of questions it quate for the information age. At stake is opera- can answer. Generally models were designed to tions research, a product of the industrial age, measure the impact of improvements in weapons and more importantly our national security systems or estimate force structure requirements. which depends on this discipline. Force structure models served a variety of useful purposes during the Cold War when incremental Major Maggie Belknap, USA, teaches at the Naval War College and changes in either force structure or moderniza- is an academy professor in the Department of Systems Engineering at tion occurred. Large contests by land and air the U.S. Military Academy. forces along the inter-German border or smaller

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but more compressed clashes along the 38th paral- virtual reality has propelled enhancements in lel in Korea were ideal for conversion into linear computer models, highlighted by the exact repli- models which is why steady state assumptions cation of portions of the “hundred-hour war” in were acceptable. (But what does war conducted at time and space using the most advanced com- a steady state look like?) The builders of such puter graphics. models never claimed that they could accurately predict the outcome of combat in terms of casual- Reengineering War ties or geographical displacement. They simply It is ironic that none of these advancements asserted that they could demonstrate a relative can measure the impact of the greatest emerging advantage of one force over another or help dis- technology on warfare today—information tech- tinguish between alternatives for force sizing and nology. Instead, in aid of better and arguably modernization. more user-friendly models, such advancements Model building focused on combat forces. bury the flawed assumptions of industrial-age, at- Thus many combat support and service support trition-based warfare under a sophisticated veneer functions were not included at the outset and of information-age computer interfaces. were added only as an afterthought or—in the Although C4I is often seen as a force multi- case of logistics—modeled by separate simula- plier, we are only beginning to explore its force tions and then used as input to combat models. structure implications.1 In failing to realize the The force-on-force, attrition-based notion of war real benefits of information technology invest- emphasized kill rates ments we join white-collar workers who have if decision support models are and weapon efficiency similar trouble identifying processes and measur- factors such as accuracy ing output. Many businesses have learned from simply retooled they will fail to and circular error proba- automation and begun to reengineer, which means capture potential innovations ble. In the industrial age optimizing a process and automating it, as op- this mirrored manufac- posed to installing automation to support an ex- turing problems of opti- isting process. mizing processing rates and outputs in light of This coincides with an apparent divergence scarce resources. It also supported decisions on on how the military looks at technology. If its pur- which technology advancements in weapons impose is to support warfare as we know it, that is to provements should be explored. simply automate it, there are only costs. If, how- While there have been changes in the mod- ever, there is a tremendous advantage to be har- els over the past decade none were a result of the nessed, then we have a revolution together with a end of the Cold War or a commensurate change reengineering of warfare. Similarly, if decision sup- in national security strategy. One can be attrib- port models are simply retooled to fit C4I to exist- uted to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in ing force-on-force, assumption-based models, they 1986 which saw an end to models designed to will fail to capture potential innovations and com- support service-specific budgets and force struc- mensurate force structure and cost savings. ture allocations. TACWAR is a model adopted by This sets the stage for civilian and military the Joint Staff in 1988 that marked the recogni- leadership to direct the analytical community to tion of a need to demonstrate the impact of such advance decision support models in two possible decisions in a joint environment. It models land directions. The first is to improve current models and air components in a single theater-level to incorporate C4I or build new C4I models. The model. Widely used because it is joint, this model second is to challenge military analysts to apply falls short of realizing joint warfare synergies, let their skills to support experimentation, explo- alone incorporating enhancements produced by ration, creativity, and innovations in warfare information technology. In fact, it is a low resolu- that may provide the basis for the next generation model that is not sophisticated enough to be tion of models. used as service-specific model. Like its predeces- To illustrate deficiencies in the first course, it sors, TACWAR does not account for much beyond is worth noting the hypothesis that “If we have the force-on-force, attrition-type warfare. dominant battlefield awareness, we win,” as ad- At the opposite end of the spectrum, en- vanced by the former Vice Chairman, Admiral hancements in computerization and simulation William A. Owens.2 Attaining this dominance re- have led to higher resolution models. Precise quires enhancements in intelligence, surveillance, computer mapping and graphics have made bat- and reconnaissance (ISR) and in C4I—neither of talion-level models possible, such as Janus which which is considered today.3 But there are several can account for the impact of terrain on troop methodologies used to compel models to provide movements and weapons systems in various sec- insights on the possible impact. tors of the battlefield. The growing infatuation with Nintendo-like computer graphics known as

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One approach is to front-load the model quickly to the National Command Authorities based on some gross assumptions by invoking an could have saved the cost of deploying troops in “efficiency factor” for either side. That is, analysts 1994. Investment in processing and integrating may multiply weapons effectiveness indicators on information might be compared with such de- one side (but not the other) by some value to ex- ployment costs. Obviously this kind of analysis press a relative difference between protagonists. goes far beyond force-on-force models. But it also This method requires front-end analysis; and it surpasses the “man-in-the-loop” wargames that could be argued that it leads to convoluted results. one might try to support with these models. Another method allows one side to find tar- The inadequacy of such models with regard gets immediately. Combined with old doctrine to advances in information technology justifies and battlefield arrays, this results in faster force- discarding them in favor of new ones. Leaving on-force wars. Targets are ac- aside the tremendous time it takes to build a those who continue to use quired and destroyed faster model that is valid and accepted, it is impossible force-on-force models are and with greater precision, to stay abreast of emerging information technolo- mirroring the type of war con- gies that are improving exponentially. Some at- breaking a fundamental rule ducted in the Persian Gulf. tempts to model C4I are only representations of Hence the universal accep- information flow, much like logistics. These are tance level of the results is placed over existing force-on-force models and do supported by real world experience. Such model- not model the significance of information capa- ing techniques might suggest that dominant bat- bilities nor the impact of denial of information. tlefield awareness increases ammunition requirements because more targets become available and Emergence of C4I that ammunition costs may thus increase. All these approaches simply layer dominant battlefield awareness, or any information age ca- Dominant Battlefield Awareness pability, over old doctrine and battlefield arrays. But what if this dominance enables us to Models were not designed to identify critical vul- identify major enemy vulnerabilities? Such issues nerabilities or exploit them—they can’t reinvent are beyond the capacity of current models that, Blitzkrieg. Once breakthroughs occur military ana- for example, cannot simulate targeting and de- lysts can account for innovations in modeling or stroy a command headquarters. However, while build models that simulate such processes, but such a strategy cannot be simulated with models they cannot find them with models. Old models today, it might result in lower ammunition re- did not even account for basic synergies realized quirements. Finding critical vulnerabilities re- from combining land and air operations. quires network analysis, which is not beyond the These old models provided important ana- ability of operations research analysts. Many net- lytic tools to support resource allocation decisions work analysis tools are available but simply have during the Cold War. Built without consideration not been used or are not compatible with force- of command, control, and communications they on-force models. were sufficient for making decisions on weapons Another method is to employ a “man-in-the- systems and force structure in the industrial age. loop,” which is much more promising because The emergence of C4I, however, demands a military strategists decide how to array their capa- change in the tools used to support decisionmak- bilities on the battlefield and define some order ing on weapons systems and force structure. And of battle. Analysts program the computer model the issues go beyond weapons and force structure accordingly, and it is then run for a specified time to systems integration and process changes that or until a certain objective is achieved. Presented might yield force structure changes. with those results, strategists then make their Practitioners of operations research should in- next move, and so on. Although included, strate- stantly recognize that those who continue to use gists cannot truly exercise creativity because they force-on-force models are breaking a fundamental are restricted by the capabilities and assumptions rule: don’t make the problem fit the model. This of the models. unfortunately describes attempts by analysts to get Vigilant Warrior provides a situation in results through workarounds and tinkering with which one might ask a “man-in-the-loop” about current models. Armed with only force-on-force the value of improving ISR capabilities. Clearly models, they must ultimately reduce every ques- they saved the cost of revisiting Desert Storm. tion posed to fit a force-on-force analysis. Based on superior intelligence assets, we are able In relative terms the next century is here. to enforce a strategy in the Persian Gulf today But clearly current models cannot be retooled nor that relies on early warning, which has force implications. Perhaps an investment in technologies to integrate and present information more

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quickly rebuilt to address evolved is still widely recognized in the industrial the new issues that it will sector. This discipline incorporates a common pose. Military leaders must menu of techniques and mathematical models direct the analytical com- that have been developed over the years. But as munity to develop efforts operations research textbooks warn, these are which support reengineer- tools, not solutions to problems. One of the most ing warfare rather than au- fundamental errors that any operations research tomating it. They must en- analyst can commit is to apply the wrong model vision how strategy and to a problem. doctrine would change as a The essence of operations research is creativ- result of new capabilities ity and innovation—not employing models like and structure the force ac- cook book recipes. Its tools are useful in studying cordingly. a wide range of problems. But often there are no If strategy is informa- appropriate models for particular problems. That tion- or knowledge-based, is an opportunity for both the art and science of force enhancements might operations research to grow, to develop new mod- be measured in terms of how els. Determining the impact of the revolution in such capabilities are lever- information technology on warfare is one such aged. For example, restruc- opportunity. turing initiatives that eliminate layers of command and Failure to redirect the analytical community control, that simply filter in- toward reengineering warfare misses the chance formation with no value for military strategists and operations research ana- added, would be such an en- lysts to realize their potential. Yet the practice of hancement. These capabili- making incremental changes in strategy and mod- U.S. Air Force (MarleneU.S. Air Force Barry) ties enhancements might be eling may continue unnoticed. If strategists do not Deploying for Vigilant measured in terms of how consider the consequences of C4I beyond the Warrior. successfully they integrate or speed information safety of model-based wargames, tinkering with processing. old ideas will be reflected in reworking models that From a cognitive perspective, future develop- support them. Contractors will support expensive ments might focus on presenting commanders computer-based models by investing in graphic in- with the right information in an understandable terfaces and resolution improvements that give the and usable format. Psychologically, one might ask impression that the models themselves have been if the American people might be inclined to use modernized. But the opportunity will be lost to ex- unmanned autonomous vehicles and cruise mis- ercise the core competencies of both military pro- siles to lessen the chance of putting our forces in fessionals and operations research analysts. Mili- harm’s way. tary professionals will fail to apply their art in a new era while operations research analysts will fail Tools Are Not Solutions to fulfill the potential of their art and science envi- Operations research analysts cannot answer sioned a half century ago. JFQ every question. But they might gather groups of specialists from various fields to examine the fu- NOTES ture of warfare. This would include evaluating the 1 The Army is exploring how to adapt with a three- environment of the battlefield of tomorrow, how phase training and learning program task force ad- it will be changed by advances in information vanced warfighting experiment using a digitally technology, how the national strategy must equipped experimental force. The plan is briefly out- change, and how war can be revolutionized to lined in an Army pamphlet entitled Force XXI: America’s support that strategy. In addition to the usual line- Army of the 21st Century, pp. 23–29. up of experts in national and military strategy, 2 William A. Owens, open letter to the Military Oper- this group must include cultural, economic, and ations Research Society, December 1, 1994. intelligence specialists, computer experts, systems 3 William A. Owens, “The Emerging System of Sys- engineers, network analysts, and social scientists. tems,” Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 5 (May 1995), p. 37. This approach to problem solving is not new. Operations research traces its roots to World War II when diverse groups of scientists teamed up to solve complex problems. Many recognized the synergism in bringing diverse expertise and views to problem solving, so the practice spread. The success of the methodology and models that

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HH–3s.

Operation Kingpin—

DOD Success or Failure? By WILLIAM C. THOMAS

ne of the more controversial operations The raid on Son Tay demonstrated that service ri- during the Vietnam War did not in- valries could be effectively overcome to organize volve defoliants or bombing remote an appropriate force, sort out equipment interop- hamlets; rather it was an attempt to erability problems, conduct proper training, and Orescue 54 Americans held captive in the north. complete contingency planning to execute a mis- Operation Kingpin was the raid to retrieve prison- sion despite the inevitable friction of war. ers of war (POWs) from a camp located near Hanoi at a place called Son Tay. This effort is best The Mission remembered because the captives had been Most American POWs were held in Hanoi, moved prior to the raid and the camp was found whereas Son Tay was located 23 miles from the to be empty. But despite failing to accomplish the North Vietnamese capital. Using various intelli- objective, this mission offers some valuable gence sources, the United States discovered the lessons in jointness. site of the camp in May 1970 and identified Kingpin proved that a joint mission could be many of the captives.1 A plan then was developed well planned, trained, and executed—lessons for- to insert 56 members of Special Forces to perform gotten ten years later in Eagle Claw, the aborted a rescue. They would be delivered at night by Air mission to rescue American captives from Iran. Force helicopters, spend less than 30 minutes on the ground, and return with the POWs. The mission would involve the coordinated efforts of Air Captain William C. Thomas, USAF, is editor of Soldier-Scholar and Force and Army special operations units as well as assistant professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy where he teaches naval aviation forces who conducted a diversion- joint doctrine and warfare. ary attack over Hanoi.

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Intelligence assets monitored the camp dur- Building a Force ing the six months of planning and preparation. Concerns arose during planning for the raid Reconnaissance indicated it had been emptied over the size of the force as estimates of 350 per- but could not confirm this fact by other sources. sonnel were proposed. This was not unusual since Photos taken by SR–71s and Buffalo Hunter the services tend to exaggerate their role by in- drones indicated it was vacated sometime after creasing their contributions. In this case, how- June 6. POWs later reported that they were ever, planning was done primarily by operators 2 moved on July 14. The camp showed signs of rather than by the Joint Chiefs whose exclusion limited activity but there was no way of deter- reduced service parochialism. mining if the Americans had returned. Although A special operations team of Army and Air analysts prefer to have at least two independent Force personnel was formed over Marine Corps sources before relying on information, mission objections. Selection was not based on rank or ser- preparations proceeded. However, two days be- vice but rather on experience in Southeast Asia or fore the raid a source inside the North Viet- operational specialty. The Army and Air Force namese government indicated that the prisoners were chosen based on mission needs: the ability 3 had been moved to another camp. to move safely and strike quickly. Special Forces There remains speculation on why the POWs were best suited for the mission, which required a were moved. Some believe it was because of possi- small unit that could discriminately apply concen- ble flooding resulting from a CIA operation trated firepower. Air Force special operations pilots known as “Popeye” which had the most experience in low-level night inser- planners court disaster when seeded rain clouds to create tion and extraction missions. By combining tech- adverse weather in North they cater to the services by nical expertise with regional familiarity and not Vietnam. Another possibility insisting that every service be used the planners enlarging their roles is that the camp was under developed a force well suited to the objectives. repair or being expanded. The lesson is that force structure must be de- The raiders found lumber, termined by mission goals and the constraints in- cement, and tools. Whatever the reason, the com- herent in an operation. If that means using every mand staff decided to go ahead with the mission, service, then they should be used. If not, don’t. stating that it would be “unforgivable” to not go Planners court disaster when they cater to the ser- in after all the training and preparation only to vices by enlarging their roles and ultimately their find out later that the POWs had been there. budgets. When JCS planned Eagle Claw ten years Special Forces personnel would be transported later this lesson was forgotten. According to one via Air Force HH–53 and HH–3 helicopters from senior observer, “there was a general feeling that Udorn with MC–130 Combat Talon aircraft from it would be nice if everyone had a piece of the Tahkli serving as pathfinders (see map). Close air pie.”5 That general feeling can lead to putting the support would be provided by A–1 Skyraiders, con- wrong people into a job. sidered too slow by the conventional Air Force but perfect by air commandos. While the Navy staged Interoperability a diversionary attack over Hanoi to draw attention Today a major problem facing joint opera- from the camp (they had to drop flares since tions is interoperability. Too often services find bombing missions over the north were forbidden that their equipment is not compatible when at this time), helicopters would fly in and deposit they must work together. Each has its own acqui- the team at Son Tay. The prison assault team, led sition process even though the Office of the Sec- by Captain Dick Meadows, would crash land inside retary of Defense compiles a consolidated budget the prison aboard an HH–3. The small helicopter request. Despite the scrutiny provided by the would be abandoned rather than risk having it Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the ser- shot down while departing and falling on the vices typically buy equipment only with their troops below. As the assault team moved quickly own purposes in mind. This will change—but into the cells another group would create an es- slowly. Meanwhile the services must overcome cape route by blowing a hole through the prison this problem. Kingpin proved that it can be done. wall. A third team would defend the raiders from The most significant problems challenging enemy response. Once the POWs were rounded up mission planners involved the resources of only the helicopters would return from a nearby land- one service. Four types of aircraft were needed in ing zone, pick up the raiders and POWs, and redirect support of the ground force. An HH–3 turn to Thailand. The teams planned to be on the would carry one team while HH–53s took in the ground no more than 28 minutes (this estimate remaining Special Forces. Because the helicopters 4 was off by only 15 seconds). lacked navigation equipment to find Son Tay at night, two MC–130s would serve as pathfinders. Close air support would be provided by A–1s.

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Son Tay. Bridge CHINA Pond Pond Trenches

Automatic weapon position Bamboo gate NORTH VIETNAM SONG CON

Trees 40' high “Beer “Opium Clothes house” den” Headquarters line 40' BURMA 40' 40' 40' 40' Son Tay 20' Gardens Gardens Hanoi Assualt Group20' “Cat Concertina house” Steps wire on 6 steps 20' wall Air Fish pond Refuel Area

Automatic Trenches Well N weapon Command Group position Support Group

LAOS Source: Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

Udorn GULF Nakhon OF Phanom Quang Tri TONKIN

Da Nang

Takhli THAILAND

Bangkok

CAMBODIA

MH–53. SOUTH VIETNAM

Saigon

SOUTH CHINA SEA DOD Source: Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

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them. By flying in the slipstream of larger aircraft the HH–3 could gain the ten knots needed to keep up. A–1s would fly large S-turns along the flight path to keep from getting too far ahead. This plan allowed all the aircraft to arrive at Son Tay together. Despite the fact that the aircraft came from one service the lesson applies to joint operations. Mission requirements will dictate that certain forces be used. They may not be able to immediately integrate. Their equipment may be incom- patible or their skills may not be complementary. Instead of making the choice between accepting a bad situation or canceling a mission, planners must find the means to remedy such problems. The answer may be obvious or require innovation, but again this lesson was forgotten in Eagle Claw when an array of forces from all services was employed. They did not have the right ra- dios. Rather than ensuring that the widely dispersed personnel could communicate in a secure Aerial view of Son Tay, fashion, the leadership accepted a bad situation North Vietnam, 1970. and hoped for the best. It was this lack of communication that contributed to mission failure. Model of prison used as training aid. Proper Training The mission validated the fact that joint training must be accomplished before an operation. It is difficult to train as a single service and then to fight jointly; forces need to train as they fight. Once a plan is developed, if the services train by themselves the required synergy will not be there. Fortunately this was not a problem in Kingpin. The raiding team trained at Eglin Air Force Base using a full-scale mockup of the Son Tay camp built from reconnaissance photos. They

U.S. Air Forceran dry-fire exercises during U.S. Air Force the day, then at night, followed by daytime live-fire exercises and finally three full rehearsals at night. Helicopter crews practiced with MC–130s and trained at the The problem was speed because the HH–3 mockup camp. Over 150 practice sessions were was the slowest aircraft. That made it difficult for run. Troops thus got used to being a team and MC–130s; when flying just over their stall speed better understood the needs and capabilities of they were still ten knots faster than the HH–3. other services. Since MC–130s were navigating for the heli- Joint training is critical because each service copters, it would not be ac- has needs that can only be met by a supporting if the services train by them- ceptable for the slowest air- service. When the Air Force provides close air craft to lag behind. A–1s were support or insertion and extraction for Army selves the required synergy even faster and would be over units, pilots have to know how the Army fights to will not be there the target area long before support the troops on the ground. On the other the raiders arrived thereby in- hand, if Army planners are depending on Air creasing their exposure. A Force support they must understand Air Force ca- way had to be found to keep the aircraft together. pabilities. Fortunately, the special operators in- Although some might have proclaimed the volved in Kingpin had worked with the other ser- obstacle unsolvable and the mission impossible, vices, and the planning staff included both Army Kingpin planners recognized that most problems and Air Force representatives. can be overcome through innovation and creative thinking. MC–130s would fly just above their stall speed with the HH–3 “drafting” behind

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Eagle Claw planners forgot this critical les- turned out, the mission was called off when three son ten years later. The senior leadership as well of eight helicopters were lost because of naviga- as ad hoc units formed for the mission had lim- tional or mechanical difficulties. The loss of three ited joint experience. In six months of prepara- helicopters was one of the abort thresholds. tions not one rehearsal integrated all task force The fact that unexpected situations occur components. Knowing the capabilities of other highlights the need for effective joint operations. services leads to planning that allows various ele- Using two or more services makes the whole ments to support and complement each other. greater than the sum of its parts. While there may Moreover, such an awareness coupled with inte- be some redundancy in such operations, this may grated training also enables operators to develop free up resources from one service, allowing them responses to unexpected contingencies. The bet- to be applied elsewhere and thus enhance econ- ter the preparation, the better the ability to react omy of force and the ability to respond to prob- if things don’t go according to plan. lems which arise.

Preparing for Contingencies Operation Kingpin is a model of joint plan- First planned for late October, Kingpin was ning and operations. Its force structure reflected postponed for a month by the national security the politico-military objectives of the mission adviser to the President, Henry Kissinger. The un- rather than interservice rivalry. Instead of ignor- expected delay proved essential for the raiders. ing equipment incompatibilities, planners found With no other taskings and not wanting the team ways around them. The services conducted realis- to lose its edge, planners began asking “what if?” tic training that allowed them to resolve prob- It was during this period that they planned and lems before rather than during the operation. Fi- trained for a range of contingencies. nally, the raiders were ready for unanticipated The planners anticipated various possibili- issues that arise in all missions. Was the operation ties. What if a helicopter was lost? What if North successful? If one is asking if it met its objectives Vietnamese reinforcements arrived? What if the the answer is no. Despite intelligence, planning, prisoners were unable to walk or were too scared and training not one POW was rescued. But if to leave their cells? While it is impossible in such one is inquiring whether this was a joint mission situations to think of everything, operators will at that reflects realistic planning, appropriate force least be in the frame of mind to find a solution structure, quality training, and effective use of when something goes wrong. This turned out to ground and air assets, the answer must be an em- be critical once Kingpin was executed. phatic yes. JFQ The helicopter carrying Colonel Arthur D. (“Bull”) Simons, the ground forces commander, ac- NOTES cidentally landed at another facility 400 yards 1 Operational aspects are discussed in Benjamin F. away. Realizing he and his 21-man team would be Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper and Row, out of action until picked up, he radioed the mes- 1976), p. 56. sage “option green” which alerted Meadows, who 2 Interview with Col Henry P. Fowler, Jr., USAF (Ret.), was inside the camp, that he was now in com- one of the Son Tay captives, January 29, 1996. Interview mand. Simons and his team were lifted out after a with MAJ Richard J. Meadows, USA (Ret.), May 5, 1995. brief fire fight, but once on the ground at the right The assault force was led by Meadows, who searched place he resumed command. The transfer was each cell looking for prisoners. seamless and the mission was never disrupted de- 3 Speculation continues over whether human intelli- spite briefly losing its commander and nearly half gence verified that the prisoners were gone, and senior members of the joint task group refused to either con- the ground forces. If the raiders had not consid- firm or deny it. Schemmer recounts an exchange which ered unanticipated problems this incident could involved the Chairman, ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN; have spelled disaster for the entire team. the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, LTG By contrast Eagle Claw demonstrated what Donald V. Bennett, USA; and the special assistant for occurs when potential problems are not tackled counterinsurgency and special activities on the Joint early on. Rather than devising methods for work- Staff, BG Donald D. Blackburn, USA. According to ing around obstacles, the planning staff expected Schemmer they discussed the recent intelligence and to abort the mission if things went wrong. The recommended that the mission continue. Other sources use of go/no-go abort points was mandated in the also believe that actual verification was received. 4 original operational requirements.6 Such a fatalis- The summary of the plan is consolidated from Ben- jamin Kraljev, “The Son Tay Raid,” Airlift Operations Re- tic approach leads operators to focus on halting a view (January 1981), pp. 27–31, and Schemmer, The Raid. mission rather than resolving problems. As it 5 John E. Valliere, “Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change,” Parameters, vol. 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 78. 6 Robert L. Earl, “A Matter of Principle,” Proceedings, vol. 109, no. 2 (February 1983), p. 30.

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CH–46 moving cargo from USS John Paul Jones.

In Search of U.S. Navy (Rodger Dellinger) W. Focused Logistics By JOHN J. CUSICK and DONALD C. PIPP

esigned as an operational template to raised various points: that maneuver, strike, pro- guide the Armed Forces, Joint Vision tection, and logistics are hardly new operational 2010 has four major tenets: dominant concepts and that technology is stressed over the maneuver, precision engagement, full human element. But our objectives remain funda- Ddimensional protection, and focused logistics. A mentally the same. What will change is how they judicious application of technological innovation will be achieved. and information superiority is billed as the criti- Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen fight cal enablers of this process. Any initiative of this and win wars, not technology. All the technolog- breadth is bound to be controversial. Critics have ical sophistication in the world is of little value without high quality and trained people. How- ever, technology enables the warfighter to ac- Lieutenant General John J. Cusick, USA, is director for logistics (J-4), and complish the mission with increased precision, Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Pipp, USAF, serves in the Readiness and lethality, and at a human, political, and eco- Requirements Division (J-4), Joint Staff. nomic cost we can afford. Technology goes a

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■ FOCUSED LOGISTICS

long way toward improving the quality of life of unit to unit. GCSS will provide logisticians much- warfighters by accomplishing tasks more effec- needed visibility of critical resources in factories tively and efficiently, thus allowing them to and wholesale locations, in transit to and from the “work smarter not harder.” Focused logistics, a theater, and in storage at units both in and out of full partner in JV 2010, takes a basic issue and theater. Multiple requisitioning of an item in the seeks the best way to provide combat support to hope that at least one will arrive when needed will the warfighter. The most often quoted reasons become a thing of the past. The logistics footprint for developing focused logistics are downsizing, of the future will strike a more precise balance: just changing threat environment, technology, and in time and just in case = just enough. political and fiscal realities. Attracting little at- New developments in automated information tention is the fact that logisticians in all services technology will provide automated tracking of as- are dissatisfied with the level of support provided sets worldwide. Incorporating requirements for to warfighters. They know they can be more ef- this technology in the acquisition process could fective and efficient. They have the opportunity offer global visibility of assets throughout their life and high caliber people to make a genuinely evo- cycle. These efforts are noble indeed but are of lit- lutionary change in how they do business. tle consequence unless conscious efforts are made Air Force lean logistics and Army velocity to monitor progress through to completion. management programs are literal springboards for The Logistics Directorate (J-4), Joint Staff, is quantum improvements in logistics. By accelerat- developing a focused logistics action plan to iden- ing movement of assets through transportation tify initiatives to improve support for the and repair cycles, support has been improved at warfighter. Focused logistics takes its cue from two less cost and confidence is building that the sys- processes: the joint warfighting capabilities assess- tem will work when ment (JWCA) and the joint monthly readiness re- the logistics footprint of the future required. Advance- view (JMRR). CINCs and the services articulate is- ments in strategic sues that they feel have adverse impacts on their will strike a more precise balance lift—sea and air— capabilities through these processes. While the will go a long way programs require intensive management, they toward providing deployability, a vital element of have already proven their worth as a vehicle for our military strategy. Senior leadership has suc- channeling and resolving joint issues. They have cessfully argued for the acquisition of C–17 air- resulted in considerable cost savings, improved craft and roll-on/roll-off ships. The air mobility support to CINCs, contributed to our goal of express and integrated use of commercial carriers being the premier deployer in the world, and by the Air Force are illustrations of innovations made significant contributions to joint logistics that provide unprecedented strategic force projec- operations. While JWCA/JMRR is a key element of tion capability. While we have not yet finalized the process it is by no means the only one. the elements of joint reception, staging, onward Strategic direction found in the National movement, and integration or of theater distribu- Military Strategy, Joint Strategy Review, JV 2010, tion or joint logistics command and control, Quadrennial Defense Review, and other planning there is unanimous agreement on the necessity of guidance form a baseline for developing the fo- more clearly defining roles and responsibilities in cused logistics plan. Meanwhile service vision the area of force projection. Thus near-term reso- statements and strategic logistics plans of the lution is probable. CINCs, services, and Office of the Secretary of Supporting the entire network from the Defense were reviewed for common themes and source of supply to point of need will be the global innovative concepts with the intent of drawing combat support system (GCSS). It is intended to do on the many talents of strategic planners across for logisticians what the global command and con- the services. Other sources included the excep- trol system does for operators. GCSS will facilitate tional work done by the Defense Science Board, access to critical resource data anytime and any- think tanks, and Joint Warfighting Center. The where in the world without specific hardware. De- target date for publishing the plan is this sum- velopments in joint total asset visibility and in- mer after extensive coordination with CINCs and transit visibility will culminate in quantum leaps the services. in the effectiveness and efficiency of logistics sup- Evolving concepts influence various dimen- port to warfighters by providing critical resource sions of the operating environment, and focused information throughout strategic, operational, and logistics is no exception. It has major implica- tactical levels of any military operation. tions for doctrine, organization, training, mater- Each service has a way of ensuring logistics ial, leadership, and personnel. Not surprisingly, connectivity and resupply to deployed forces. Problems often arise where these methods not only vary among the services but sometimes from

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Cusick and Pipp U.S. Air Force (John U.S. Air Force E. Lasky) Pushing cargo onto C–17 Globemaster III at Rhein-Main. GCSS forms a common thread through these commands and the services in either developing areas. The quality of life benefits derived from fo- or reviewing various strategic logistics plans. cused logistics are boundless: computer based The focused logistics plan will be a living training, reliable modeling and simulations, state document and as such will be subject to change. of the art decision tools, medical readiness, asset Its utility will not be judged by how many pages visibility, smart card technology, and estimates of or graphs are produced, but by validated progress the extent to which industry can provide logistics in identified programs. Focused logistics is not support. Logistics organizations will be stream- the latest fad to be encountered in the introduc- lined as the logistics footprint is adjusted and tion of some new regime. It is a dynamic plan of more progress is made in areas such as logistics action as well as a state of mind that we must sus- command and control and theater distribution. tain throughout the joint logistics community for Logistics doctrine is being reviewed and modified combat support to the warfighter. JFQ to keep pace with rapid developments and to provide overarching guidance regarding traditional as well as developing capabilities. The focused logistics plan will be a concise publication of joint logistics issues of highest concern to CINCs and the services as identified in the JWCA process. It will provide logisticians with a concise overview of the principal issues and projects under development on behalf of the joint logistics community. In addition, it will furnish metrics for programs identified to the extent possible. The plan will be a think piece for unified

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USS George Washington and USNS Yukon.

A sound logistic plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistic support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful. —Admiral Raymond A. Spruance1

U.S. Navy (Jim Vidrine) Review Criteria for the

Logistic hen logistics cannot support an operation all else becomes irrelevant.2 But despite the critical role of logistics, joint doctrine does not prWovide commanders with review criteria to evalu- Plan ate the logistic plan. Joint doctrine, however, does give combatant commanders a hierarchy of con- By KEVIN R. WHEELOCK siderations for the operation plan. The principles of war offer broad guidance for the concept development phase. Operation checklists identify lesser but not insignificant issues that require attention during the execution phase. Between these two extremes, doctrine contributes two sets of mid- level standards: operational considerations and operation plan review criteria. Operational considerations address ends, ways, means, and risks.3 For Commander (Select) Kevin R. Wheelock, USN, is director of Commodity instance, commanders should determine if mili- Business Unit-V at the Defense Industrial Supply Center in Philadelphia. tary conditions produced in operational theaters

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Wheelock

that achieves strategic objectives dictated by Military Operations Value Model higher authorities. The plan designed with such a Phase Operations Logistics vision places tremendous demands on the logistic system. Tension arises when logisticians compare an operation plan against the capabilities of the logistic system and decide that the plan may not Concept Principles Principles be supportable. As Joint Pub 4-0 explains, at that Development of War of Logistics point planners and logisticians have reached an operations-logistics gap. To integrate operational intentions with logistic capabilities commanders must bridge it and either lobby for more re- Operational sources or pare down the plan. Resolution is im- Logistic Plan Planning Considerations perative. It is a basic tenet of joint doctrine that Review Criteria Process an operation plan cannot “break” the logistic Operation Plan (Proposed) Review Criteria concept without sacrificing the operation itself. Logistics is inherently a constraint. Henry Eccles once defined it as “military economics” wherein all resources are finite. Elsewhere he re- marked, “At the strategic level economic forces Execution Operation Logistic limit our ability to create combat forces; opera- Phase Checklists Checklists tional logistic factors limit our ability to employ our combat forces.”5 Combatant commanders should thus use logistic plan review criteria to determine the limits of the logistic system and where an operations-logistics gap may exist. Second, the review criteria allow information to be managed by exception. Once aware that lo- can achieve the strategic goal (ends) and if the se- gisticians are resource-constrained and that re- quence of actions is likely to create the conditions view criteria seek to identify the limits of avail- (ways). Using the operation plan review criteria able resources, commanders should not expect commanders evaluate plans for their adequacy, logisticians to ignore resource constraints. Instead feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with logisticians will provide exceptions that do not joint doctrine.4 Commanders must be wary of a meet criteria. Candid answers reduce the informa- proposed plan that does not satisfy both operation for commanders to matters that demand tional considerations and the review criteria. their attention. Combatant commanders do not possess Third, these criteria fill the void previously comparable mid-level criteria for the logistic plan. identified between the principles of logistics and The library of joint publications provides princi- the logistic checklists. Finally, they have universal ples of logistics and logis- application. Their interpretation depends upon commanders should not expect tic checklists. Between the particular circumstances surrounding an oper- the principles and check- ation and service perspectives of both combatant logisticians to ignore resource lists one would expect re- commanders and their subordinate logisticians. constraints view criteria for the logistic plan, a short list with Responsiveness probing questions to de- The first criterion is that the plan must be re- termine how well logistics will support a military sponsive to force needs. Joint Pub 4-0 advises that operation. But no such criteria exist. Comman- responsiveness means having the right support at ders will have more confidence in an operation if the right place at the right time. Despite its limi- they can evaluate the logistic plan against a sepa- tations, a logistic system that answers the needs rate set of criteria rooted in principles of logistics. of combat forces will allow them to reach their full potential. To be responsive logisticians must Review Criteria anticipate a range of requirements. Commanders The proposed review criteria have four dis- may need logistic mobility to support advancing tinct characteristics. First, they define the limits forces, flexibility to sustain expanding forces, or of the logistic system and available resources. In simply heroics to reconstitute exhausted forces. delineating the system they defuse the inherent In response logisticians may apply three concepts tension between planners and logisticians. Plan- of operational art: the arrangement of operations, ners must be encouraged to adopt an uncon- logistic discipline, and synchronization. strained vision and develop an operation plan

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■ THE LOGISTIC PLAN

C–5 delivering supplies during Southern Watch. DOD (FrankDOD Rizzo)

How well a logistic system responds to the spectrum. During the development of a response demands of the arrangement of operations will to the first criterion, logisticians may find that determine the success of phasing, the branches support is impossible if planned sequential opera- and sequels, and ultimately the timing, tempo, tions (logistically supportable) become concur- and momentum of an operation. Since the out- rent (and perhaps insupportable). come of any phase is uncertain, each has branches and/or sequels of its own. To be respon- The Logistic Snowball sive logisticians must marshal logistic support ac- Responsiveness is a hostage to logistic disci- cordingly for each phase and all possible pline. Since transport, supplies, and logistic per- branches and sequels. Anticipating such sonnel will always be limited, they must be dis- prospects, they may ascertain that the logistic sys- tributed to best meet the requirements of combat tem cannot accommodate the unique demands forces and the arrangement of operations. Logis- for a particular branch or sequel. Time and dis- tic discipline promotes economy, efficiency, and tance factors or availability of critical items may effectiveness. But its absence can ultimately cre- limit support. ate a logistic snowball, “a huge accumulation of The calculus of logistic support is further slush [that] obscures the hard core of essential complicated by the uncertainty arising when one combat support.”6 If combat or logistic resources phase transitions to the next. How quickly can are not allocated appropriately, additional re- the system respond? For instance, phases may be sources must be expended to reallocate them to sequential or concurrent. If in the fog of war phases planned as sequential become concurrent, logistic needs will multiply across the support

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combat forces in need. Expediting material conduct forcible entries into immature theaters. Light sumes time and other resources to pinpoint and forces with limited supplies are inserted initially move a handful of critical supplies. A logistic sys- and their success often depends upon prompt ar- tem that is not disciplined and must consume ad- rival of properly balanced combat and support ditional resources to overcome the logistic snow- forces. If operations security is critical, combatant ball cannot respond as well to the operational commanders may delay follow-on logistic prepa- needs of a commander. rations to conceal operational intentions. Logisticians must be sensitive to synchro- In an immature theater logistic intelligence nization and its associated demands for respon- is required to determine the extent of in-country sive logistic support. Synchronization suggests resources. Absent host nation support logisticians there is a decisive time and place where combat must develop an infrastructure to support the forces will produce maximum relative combat forces. They must be flexible and balance a myr- power against enemy iad of issues, including survivability of the logis- forces. Unfortunately, this tic system, needs of expanding forces, and avoid- logisticians will encounter poses a dilemma. Achiev- ance of bottlenecks.10 Viewing a logistics system great difficulties in supporting ing maximum relative as a critical vulnerability, an enemy may attack it forcible entries combat power in a syn- and its sustainment capabilities. Operations and chronized maneuver, com- logistics must be closely coordinated to ensure bat forces will simultane- survivability of such systems. ously generate the greatest logistical demands for According to Eccles, “Logistics is the creation sustainment. At the peak of battle resource avail- and sustained support of combat forces and ability will be at a premium. Resources needed to weapons. Its objective is maximum sustained schedule, arrange, transport, and distribute sup- combat effectiveness.”11 Logistics may even dic- plies may not be readily available or could be ob- tate the options available to commanders when structed by the proximity of combat. Thus syn- forcibly entering an immature theater. The fol- chronization may bring combat forces to their lowing is a description of planning for Operation culmination point before the logistic system can Overlord: resupply them. A system that does not resupply Logistics was greatly responsible for the preference of before the culminating point is unresponsive. American military chiefs for a cross-Channel attack General Walter Bedell Smith, USA, described for the main effort as opposed to a Mediterranean or the difficulty of coordinating logistics with the other approach on the Continent....Logistics domi- movement of combat forces. “It is no great matter nated the definition of objectives, the choice of land- to change tactical plans in a hurry and to send ing sites, the size of the assault force, and plans for troops off in new directions. But adjusting supply building up the initial forces and pushing inland.12 plans to the altered tactical scheme is far more difficult.” 7 This challenge does not diminish the Sustainment of forces ashore was critical be- need for logistic support to be responsive to the cause “the men who planned Operation Overlord demands generated by the arrangement of opera- were well aware that the success of an eventual tions and synchronization. Combat forces that do Allied invasion of Europe would depend above all not receive the right support at the right place at on their ability to feed in troops and equipment 13 the right time may be placed in grave danger. at a higher rate than the enemy.” Regardless of Thus, as Joint Pub 4-0 describes, responsiveness is the theater (mature or immature), type of opera- the most important of the seven principles of lo- tion (forcible or permissive entry), or type of war- gistics and the centerpiece of the first logistic fare (attrition or maneuver, conventional or spe- plan review criterion. cial operations), sustainability and sustainment are the crux of successful military operations and Sustainment of the second review criterion. The second criterion is that the plan should Logistic Culminating Points sustain the force. The concepts of sustainability and sustainment appear throughout joint doc- The third criterion is determining the logistic trine. Sustainment is pivotal to operational logis- culminating points. Joint Pub 3-0 indicates that lo- tics,8 and sustainment planning is one of the five gistics fixes the operational reach of combat pillars of joint operation planning.9 In addition, forces—the distance over which military power it is a principle of logistics that can be measured can be concentrated and employed decisively. It in terms of “availability” or “days of support.” can extend operational reach by forward basing, Operational art provides a myriad of issues transport, effective lines of communication, to consider regarding the sustainment of combat and throughput of supplies. It also dictates the forces. For instance, logisticians will encounter great difficulties in supporting troops that con-

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■ THE LOGISTIC PLAN

Synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination....At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve strategic objectives before reaching their culminating point. If the commanders cannot do so, they should rethink their concept of operations. More than one logistic culminating point may exist. A short supply of ammunition, fuel, or some commodity may create its own. Logisticians must identify such points to combatant commanders. Otherwise, past any culminating point logistics starts to command the commanders.

Operational Risks The next criterion is identifying the risks in executing the plan. Combat operations require prudent risk management. Combatant commanders must weigh the risk associated with movement or positioning of forces against expected benefits and may elect to either reduce that risk

“a real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader’s plan”

or accept it to achieve some objective. Logistic culminating points are the ultimate risk and are accorded their own logistic plan review criterion. But the logistic plan has other risks. The tempo of Landing ships in operations may cause forces to expand faster than Italy, 1944. what the logistic system can support, bottlenecks in supply distribution, or loss of asset visibility in U.S. Army theater. Moreover, the system is vulnerable to direct and indirect attacks on friendly lines of communication, operational fires directed at friendly characteristics of operational reach, including the logistic infrastructure, political decisions that af- size of combat forces, depth of attack, and speed of fect access to host nation support, loss of logistic advance. With operational reach combat forces command and control systems, and the effects of can achieve positional advantage relative to the information warfare. enemy center of gravity. “The ability to maneu- In addition to operational risks, the logistic ver,” according to Joint Pub 3-0, “must be a trait plan may not adhere to the remaining principles not only of combat forces but also of the logistic of logistics. It may not be flexible, simple, eco- resources that support them.” nomical, or survivable, and there may be linger- Operational reach has a finite range beyond ing doubts about whether it is attainable. This cri- which a logistic system cannot support forces. At terion should identify the risks for commanders that point where the offensive becomes logistically who must assess them and plan accordingly. As overextended forces encounter the logistic culmi- Sir Archibald Wavell observed, “A real knowledge nating point. Beyond it, offensive combat power of supply and movement factors must be the no longer sufficiently exceeds that of the defenders basis of every leader’s plan; only then can he to continue the thrust and consequently freedom know how and when to take risks with those fac- of action is inhibited. Joint Pub 3-0 provides operators, and battles are won only by taking risks.” tional logisticians with a prescription to prevent the arrival of the culminating point:

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Meeting the Unexpected to unplanned contingencies. Using these criteria The fifth criterion is that there must be to identify limits and risks, the greatest contribu- ample resources to react to unplanned contingencies. tion made by logisticians is helping commanders Logisticians can never have sufficient resources to to see the most viable course, isolate its logistic respond to every conceivable contingency. But risks, and bridge the operations-logistics gap. careful analysis should reveal which requirements Armed with logistic plan review criteria, combat- are likely and which can and cannot be satisfied. ant commanders can quickly identify the critical This analysis may persuade commanders to fol- logistic issues and determine if the logistic plan low a less risky course. Logisticians who can affect supports the operation plan. A sound operation operational decisions have mastery over logistics. plan must have adequate logistic support. As Ad- Equally important, they avoid a course that can miral Spruance reminded us, if combat forces do create a logistic bottleneck and enslave logisti- not receive adequate logistic support operations cians, commanders, and forces to logistics. will suffer and may ultimately fail. JFQ For example, suppose a commander intends to execute action “A” to initiate battle. It has a NOTES highly desired strategic endstate but may gener- 1 Naval Doctrine Publication 4, Naval Logistics ate substantial casualties. The logistician antici- (1995), p. 33. pates that they would inundate in-theater med- 2 Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint ical units and that the additional medical assets Operations (1995), p. II–1. required to be flown in would overwhelm the 3 See Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations transport and distribution system. He envisions (1995), p. II-3. 4 that this logistic bottleneck will develop into a Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations formidable problem. The airlift system from the (1995), pp. I-13 through I-14. 5 Henry E. Eccles, Logistic Research Notes (Washing- strategic to tactical theaters would have to adapt ton: The George Washington University Logistics Re- to a new and more urgent priority of transporting search Project, 1961), p. 3. medical resources. Airlift assets would have to be 6 Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy rescheduled, unloaded, reloaded, flown into the- (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), ater, and compete with other missions for mater- pp. 83–85. ial-handling equipment, cargo-handling person- 7 Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Six Great Deci- nel, warehousing, and distribution. Dedicating sions (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, such assets to a more robust medical infrastruc- 1956), p. 82. 8 ture leaves fewer to sustain combat forces. In ad- Operational logistics “encompasses those support dition, the lead time for other critical nonmedical activities required to sustain campaigns and major operations,” according to FM 100-5, Operations, p. 12-3. supplies increases. 9 The pillars are mobilization, deployment, employ- Logisticians must inform commanders of the ment, sustainment, and redeployment planning. See sufficiency of in-theater resources to react to an Joint Pub 5-0, p. I-3. unplanned contingency, the risk of creating a lo- 10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Capstone and gistic bottleneck as friendly forces react to this Keystone Primer (1995), p. 60. contingency, and the second and third order ef- 11 Eccles, Logistic Research Notes, p. 22. fects on the sustainment of combat forces. 12 James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775–1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, The logistic plan review criteria provide an 1966), p. 523. 13 agenda for both commanders and logisticians to Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University discuss the merits and hazards of the logistic Press, 1977), p. 206. plan. They define the limits of the logistic system to support an operation beyond which commanders incur additional and possibly unacceptable risks. The criteria are not intended to make logisticians arbiters between the feasible and the infea- sible. Nor are logisticians expected to respond recklessly or boast of capabilities the system cannot deliver. On the other hand, logisticians must be able to convincingly discuss the ability or inability of a logistic system to respond to and sustain combat forces. Fortitude is needed to identify both the culminating points and risks associated with military options. In addition, they must candidly explain to what degree a logistic system can react

Spring 1997 / JFQ 133 2615JtWd 8/6/96 1:34 PM Page 134

■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General George Scratchley Brown (1918–1978) Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA orn in Montclair, New Jersey; graduated from Military Academy (1941); flying school, Pine Bluff and Kelly Field (1941–42); B–24 pilot, 344th and 329th Bombardment Squadrons (1941–42); 93d Bombard- ment Group, Libya (1943–44); 2d Bombardment Division, England (1944–45); Army Air Force Train- ing Command (1945–46); Air Defense BCommand/Continental Air Command (1945–50); commander, 62d Troop Carrier Group (1950–51); commander, 56th Fighter Interceptor Wing and 4708th Defense Wing (1951–52); assistant director and director of operations, Fifth Air Force, Korea (1952–53); commander, 3525th Pilot Training Wing (1953–56); student, National War College (1956–57); executive assistant to chief of staff of the Air Force (1957–59); military assistant to Deputy Secretary and Secretary of De- fense (1959–63); commander, Eastern Transport Air Force (1963–64); commander, Joint Task Force II (1964–66); assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1966–68); commander, Seventh Air Force, and deputy commander for air operations, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1968–70); commander, Air Force Systems Com- mand (1970–73); chief of staff of the Air Force (1973–74); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1974–78); died in Washington.

The American military has no separate life of its own. It is not an end in itself, but simply a means to the end of protecting and preserving our national security. In

the final analysis, it is the American people who determine our national goals Art Collection U.S. Air Force and objectives, including the defense and security of our Nation. The Armed Forces Portrait by are the instruments of the people. They are constituted and supported by the elected Maxine McCaffrey. representatives of the people, and serve to achieve national goals.

—Armed Forces Day address by George S. Brown, delivered in Phoenix, Arizona (May 15, 1975)

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THE JOINT WORLD ■

A nonresident program information The NSOOC staff is also available Doctrine guide with enrollment details is available for “outreach training” through con- by calling (401) 841–6528/DSN 948–6528 densed presentations on NATO specifi- JOINT DOCTRINE or via e-mail at [email protected]. cally tailored to customer needs which JFQ can be provided to U.S. Government WORKING PARTY agencies and military organizations in- The 19th meeting of the joint doc- cluding the Reserve components. trine working party (JDWP) was hosted For details on upcoming course by the Joint Warfighting Center at Fort NATO COURSE dates and registration contact: National Monroe on April 1–2. Attended by repre- Officers about to embark on their Defense University, ATTN: NDU–NSS– sentatives of unified commands, services, first NATO staff assignment or who deal NSOOC, 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62), Joint Staff, and doctrine development with European security affairs are encour- Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. centers, the meeting was briefed on joint aged to enroll in the NATO Staff Officer 23019–5055; telephone: (202) 685–3828/ doctrine proposals and approved the fol- Orientation Course (NSOOC) offered by DSN 325–3828; Fax: (202) 685–3829/ lowing decisions: the Institute for National Strategic Studies DSN 325–3829; e-mail: [email protected]. JFQ ■ cancel Joint Pub 3-09.2, Joint Tactics, at the National Defense University. Estab- Techniques, and Procedures [JTTP] for Ground lished in 1987 under CJCS Instruction Radar Beacon Operations 1210.01, the course is an intense two- ■ cancel Joint Pub 1-01.2, Joint Electronic week program of instruction which is History Library Users Guide conducted seven times per year. It is ■ conduct an early revision of Joint mandatory for all O-4s through O-6s JOINT HISTORY Pub 4-01.5, JTTP for Water Terminal Operations, being assigned to NATO headquarters and to include the single port manager concept ON-LINE agencies in Europe and North America. ■ consider expanding the concept of operational maneuver during the revision of This course is also useful for both Several titles issued by the Joint His- Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations military officers and civilians who serve tory Office are now available on the Joint ■ include the concept of consequence on the staffs of commands and agencies Doctrine Web Site at http://www.dtic. management in Joint Pub 3-07.6, JTTP for responsible for NATO/European affairs, mil/doctrine. Click on the Joint Elec- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and Joint including the Joint Staff, Office of the tronic Library for the following publica- Pub 3-07.7, JTTP for Domestic Support Secretary of Defense, and Department of tions: The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs Operations State. Military attachés assigned to U.S. of Staff, The Development of the Base Force, ■ develop a JTTP publication for legal missions and students en route to staff The History of the Unified Command Plan, support to military operations and war colleges in Europe can also bene- and . ■ include post-hostilities guidance in Operation Just Cause JFQ Joint Pubs 3-0, 3-07.3, 3-57, 5-0, 5-00.1, and fit from the program. 5-00.2. In other areas, JDWP agreed that the joint doctrine electronic information system should be recommended to the Chairman as a means of reorganizing the For your reference shelf... joint doctrine hierarchy. A series of enhancements to the joint doctrine development system were approved to include A new edition of Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff posting changes on the World Wide Web, Officer’s Guide 1997, is now available. This illustrated 450-page volume using the Joint Doctrine Web Site to staff provides a comprehensive summary of details on joint planning and draft pubs, and making combatant com- execution that cannot be found elsewhere. It presents mands part of the process of coordinat- an overview of the players, processes, and procedures ing final versions of joint pubs. The next JDWP meeting will held used in the joint arena as well as a wide range of on October 28–29, 1997. JFQ reference material of interest to joint staffs as well as officers in the field and fleet. AFSC Pub 1 can be found on the Internet Education (at www.afsc.edu) and also can be accessed through NONRESIDENT PME the Joint Electronic Library. Copies are for sale from the Superintendent of Documents at $38.00 each The College of Continuing Educa- by writing to: U.S. Government Printing Office, tion (CCE) of the Naval War College will conduct its nonresident seminar program Washington, D.C. 20402, or phoning (202) 512–1800 at 17 locations during 1996–97. CCE [GPO stock no. 008–020–01422–2]. In addition, it seminar students who complete core may be purchased from the Defense Automated Printing courses in strategy and policy, national Service (DAPS) for $14.00 by contacting Don Mruk in San Diego, California, security decisionmaking, and joint mar- at (619) 556–7187/ DSN 526–7187 or Everett Morton in Norfolk, Virginia, at itime operations receive an diploma and credit for phase 1 of the program for (757) 444–7724 / DSN 464–7724 (extension 19). JFQ joint education (PJE).

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■ THE JOINT WORLD

CJCS Essay Competition

The 16th annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strat- egy Essay Competition was conducted on May 22–23 at the National Defense University. This event challenges students 1997at intermediate and senior colleges to write on some aspect of international security, defense policy, or military affairs, with special emphasis on joint topics.

FIRST PLACE ESSAY Commander Jeffrey Kline, USN (National War College) “Joint Vision 2010 and Accelerated Cumulative Warfare: The Masters of War Evaluate a Future Strategy”

DISTINGUISHED ESSAYS Lieutenant Colonel Sean J. Byrne, USA Captain Christopher P. McNamara, USN (Army War College) (National War College) “Defense of Sovereignty: Domestic Operations, “Breathing New Life into Dead Reckoning: Legal Precedents, and Institutional Confusion” A Proposal for the Next National Security Strategy”

Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Fox, Jr., USA Lieutenant Colonel David M. Riester, USAF (Army War College) (Marine Corps War College) “Military Medical Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa: “Spacelift: Search for a National Vision” The DOD ‘Point of the Spear’ for Engagement and Enlargement” Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell S. Ross, USA (Army War College) Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Kaufmann, USA “National Information Systems: The Achilles (Industrial College of the Armed Forces) Heel of National Security” “Fractured Synthesis: The Military’s Encounter with Postmodernism” Lieutenant Colonel Randal G. Tart, USA (Army War College) Lieutenant Colonel Martha J.M. Kelley, USAF “Civil-Military Relations and General Maxwell Taylor: (Air War College) Getting it Right and Getting it Wrong!” “Into the 21st Century: Solving the Air Force’s Problems of Gender Differences and Leadership” Colonel Cliff Tooley, USA (Army War College) “The Machine Nexus: Institutional Bias Against a Capabilities-Based Force”

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to implement them. The late Conserva- has enhanced and modernized air trans- JOINTNESS IN tive government introduced “front line port and tanker fleets. New amphibious first” that sought to maintain operational ships, plans for larger replacement carri- DEFENCE OF THE strengths as high as a falling defense bud- ers and aircraft, and the purchase of get allows, but at the expense of much Tomahawk missiles all demonstrate the REALM support and training infrastructure. The new focus of defense planning. A Review Essay by drive for operational efficiency was given NATO, however, remains the central added impetus by the Defence Costs focus of Britain’s security. Changes as a JEREMY R. STOCKER Study that has, among other measures, result of the end of the Cold War have introduced commercial practices, de- profoundly affected contributions to the volved budgeting, and agency status to Alliance. The commander and over 60 Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, many support activities within the de- percent of the headquarters personnel of British Defence Doctrine fense establishment. The defense budget the new Allied Rapid Reaction Corps are London: Ministry of Defence, has fallen steadily in recent years, repre- British. Altogether, some 55,000 troops January 1997. 178 pp. [ISBN 0–85516–150–7] senting about 2.8 percent of GDP today, are assigned to this corps, principally down from nearly double that figure a l Armoured Division based in Germany decade ago. Military personnel have been and 3 Division (mechanized) in the ritain remains America’s strongest and reduced from nearly 300,000 to United Kingdom. Danish, Dutch, and Bclosest ally today. Increasing U.S. in- 214,000—half in the Army, the rest di- Italian units also come under those divi- terest in the Asia-Pacific region and vided among the Royal Navy, Marines, sions when assigned. Britain also con- greater, if often reluctant, British involve- tributes 24 Airmobile Brigade to Multina- ment in Europe have not altered that tional Division (Central). strategic reality. Although no one can pretend that it is a relationship of equals, Force Structure cooperation on intelligence, nuclear, and These changes have led to the devel- maritime issues is close. Many post-Cold opment of a regular force structure worth War problems facing the U.S. military are noting (see the accompanying figure). echoed in Britain, though with a some- The reserve force of 60,000 personnel what different geographic and cultural provide the Army with a further 70 regi- emphasis as well as a wide disparity of ments and battalions, and relatively few scale. Downsizing and jointness domi- individuals supplement the regular Royal nate British defense policy much as they Navy and Royal Air Force, many of them do that of the United States. specialists. Recent legislation updated the In Britain, adjustment to the loss of status of the reserves and gave the ser- empire and world power status brought vices greater flexibility in the call up of about a defense policy closely focused on selected reservists in peacetime. Reserve the security of Western Europe through personnel have recently been deployed NATO and the so-called “special relation- operationally, notably in the former Yu- ship” with the United States. For the lat- goslavia and the Falklands. ter half of the Cold War, Conservative By comparison, the division of tasks and Labor governments rested defense and assets among the British services is policy on four pillars: defense of the somewhat different from the U.S. mili- United Kingdom, a contribution to the tary. Maritime patrol aircraft and support defense of Western Europe (especially helicopters are, for purely historical rea-

Germany), the security of the eastern At- Ministry of Defence sons, flown by the Royal Air Force. In an lantic, and a separate nuclear deterrent era of increasing jointness this ought to based on the Polaris system. Residual be progressively less important, although out-of-area commitments (such as Hong and Air Force. Peacetime force commit- it does impose a joint problem where Kong and the Falklands) and wider inter- ments to the NATO Central Front in Ger- (conceptually at least) none need exist. ests were covered by forces earmarked many have been significantly scaled The disruption from any change of own- primarily for NATO. Defense spending as down and will eventually include with- ership of such assets probably outweighs a proportion of GDP, though much lower drawal of all fixed-wing aircraft to the likely gains. Britain does not have a coast than in the United States, remained con- United Kingdom. guard, and management and control of sistently higher than in nearly any other British defense policy now has a offshore assets and responsibilities is a European NATO nation. much more explicit world-wide emphasis good deal less tidy than in the United than at any time during the last thirty States. Most patrol vessels (what the U.S. Post-Cold War years. Power projection and expedi- Coast Guard calls cutters) are operated by Events since 1989 have brought a tionary warfare are back in vogue, having the Royal Navy, search and rescue heli- significant shift in British defense and se- been taboo terms for many years. Force copters by the Royal Air Force, and other curity policies and in the forces intended reductions have not hit the marines or assets by various government depart- airborne forces, and the Royal Navy’s ments, civilian contractors, and even a modest carrier force has not been af- charitable organization (the Royal Na- Lieutenant Commander Jeremy R. Stocker, fected by the cuts in the frigate/destroyer tional Lifeboat Institution). All (not just Royal Naval Reserve, is a postgraduate and submarine fleets. The Royal Air Force student at the University of Hull.

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British Armed Forces Doctrine is “that which is taught.” It “is defense, military aid to the civil authori- informative, whereas policy is essentially Army ties, noncombatant evacuations, human- prescriptive.” What is more it results itarian aid, arms control monitoring, and 41 infantry battalions from hard-won experience. Doctrine “is public and ceremonial duties. To mount 11 armored and armored reconnaissance enduring” but “not unchanging.” It un- this range of tasks, different categories of regiments (900 tanks) derlies everything we do, from formulat- forces are used. Permanently committed 16 artillery regiments (530 guns plus MLRS) ing policy and plans to executing tasks. It forces are dedicated to their tasks on a 10 engineer regiments is, if you like, the philosophy of British day-to-day basis, such as nuclear deter- 5 army air corps regiments (280 helicopters) defense. The publication attempts to rence. National contingency forces are 12 signals regiments bring together strategic and operational tasked to meet challenges to national in- 1 special air service (SAS) regiment concepts common to all aspects using terests or to international peace and sta- 1 NATO corps headquarters military force, introducing previously un- bility. Finally, there are forces for general 2 divisional headquarters familiar terms and ideas to each service. war, a “regeneration and reconstitution” 20 brigade headquarters British Defence Doctrine inevitably has capability “within the warning time something of the feel of a basic text. That Royal Navy and Royal Marines likely to be available.” This must be of points to the roles of such a book: part of particular concern since “front line first” 4 ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) an officer’s essential military education, a with Trident D5 emphasizes the maintenance of forces in means to influence public, political, and being at the expense of support infra- 12 nuclear attack submarines (SSN) academic opinion, and a medium for ex- structure, which is precisely what is 3 V/STOL light aircraft carriers (CVSG) ercising influence abroad. needed to “regenerate.” 10 amphibious and sealift ships The second chapter of this joint British policy features three defense (LPH/LPD/LSL/roll-on, roll-off) publication examines the nature of war roles in lieu of the four pillars of the late 35 escorts (DDG/FFG) and armed conflict and reminds us that Cold War era: 18 mine countermeasures vessels (MCMV), warfare is the essence of the profession of ■ role one—ensure the protection and increasing to 25 arms, but also that it is necessarily both a security of the United Kingdom and depen- 19 fleet air arm squadrons (170 aircraft: Sea political act and a limited one. What we dent territories even when there is no major Harriers and helicopters) do is for political reasons and must be external threat 1 marine commando brigade limited by political requirements, frustrat- ■ role two—insure against a major exter- 5 special boat squadrons (SBS) plus afloat ing though that can be for the military nal threat to the United Kingdom and our allies ■ role three—contribute to promoting support, survey, and patrol vessels mind. Moving to a description of strategy, the wider security interests of the United King- Royal Air Force JWP 0-01 discusses ends, ways, and dom through the maintenance of interna- 18 attack and reconnaissance squadrons means. These are essentially what is to be tional peace and stability. (Tornado/Jaguar/Harrier) done, how it is to be done, and what in- Each of these roles is broken into struments are to be employed. The politi- 7 air defense squadrons (Tornado) specific military tasks such as MT 1.7, the cal character of strategy is again stressed, 4 maritime patrol squadrons (Nimrod) provision of military aid to the civil com- particularly where international consen- 2 airborne early warning squadrons munity; MT 2.4, air immediate reaction sus and legality are essential. There are (E3D Sentry) forces; and MT 3.7, the provision of a also short definitions of information war- 9 transport and tanker squadrons military contribution to operations fare (IW) and command and control war- (Tristar/Hercules/VC10) under international auspices. fare (C2W), but it is not altogether clear 13 helicopter squadrons (Chinook/Sea King/ The seven mission types on which just what the difference is. Large portions Puma/Wessex) plus training, support, and British forces may be employed in imple- of the respective definitions could be ex- surface to air missile (Rapier) units menting these defense roles and tasks as changed with no appreciable change in outlined in the latest annual Statement on meaning. Although both subjects are very the Defence Estimates include: much part of warfare in the 1990s, no ■ military aid to the civil authorities in one in Britain seems to have firmly estab- the United Kingdom (such as Northern Ireland) 2 some, as in the United States) afloat sup- lished what IW is that C W is not already. ■ internal and external security of de- port ships and some amphibious ships, There is a short section on the politico- pendent territories or overseas possessions are civilian-manned, although hydro- legal implications of targeting policy (such as the Falklands) graphic survey work is undertaken by the which, it is interesting to note, is to be re- ■ contributions to new NATO and West- Royal Navy itself. tained on “the strategic level.” ern European Union (WEU) missions (such as A chapter on security and defense Bosnia) Doctrine ponders the relationship between ■ other military assistance and limited operations to support British interests and in- One growth area in British defense these levels of activity. Security is con- ternational order and humanitarian principles cerned with territorial integrity and pur- is doctrine. Traditionally a concept asso- (such as Angola) ciated mainly with the Army, all three suit of legitimate interests at home and ■ a serious conflict (but not an attack on services have recently produced new or abroad whereas “defence policy supports NATO) which could adversely affect European updated doctrine publications, followed security policy.” It determines strategy security, British interests elsewhere, or interna- now by the appearance of Joint Warfare and force planning and both protects tional security (such as the Gulf War) Publication (JWP) 0-01, British Defence and promotes security interests. ■ a limited regional conflict involving a Doctrine. The introduction to JWP 0-01 JWP 0-01 moves on to cover mili- NATO ally who calls for assistance under arti- explains the nature of doctrine and its tary capabilities by discussing the types cle 5 of the Washington Treaty ■ general war—a large scale attack place in the conduct of our business. of operations that the services may be re- against NATO. quired to perform. They include combat, deterrence, support to diplomacy, home

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northwestern suburbs of London, which Gurkhas making house stands alongside the existing national call at Camp Lejeune, and NATO maritime headquarters. PJHQ CJTF ‘96. will predict, plan, and conduct joint (and contributions to combined joint) operations, using forces provided by the individual services. Moreover, PJHQ is responsible for developing joint warfare doctrine, procedures, operational standards, training, and exercises. To an extent, it may be seen as a single British equivalent of several unified commands under the U.S. system. The principal tool of PJHQ is the newly-formed Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF) that will fulfil a range of missions, mounted nationally or as a contribution to NATO, WEU, coalition, or U.N. operations. While no units are permanently assigned to JRDF, its core is 3 Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines and 5 Airborne Brigade from the Army, which incidentally were the prin-

U.S. Marine Corps (C.D. Clark) cipal land force elements in the Falklands campaign of 1982. Other assets will be drawn from the national contingency Still under development, apparently 1960s in favor of a single Ministry of De- forces of all three services as required with some difficulty, is JWP 0-10, United fence (the DOD level in American (such as a carrier task group or an ar- Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Combined terms). The purple Central Staff has been mored division). Royal Navy amphibious Operations, which will cover operational progressively strengthened at the ex- lift (of broadly brigade-size capability) as opposed to strategic doctrine. On the pense of service staffs, and the services and the Royal Air Force’s air transport tactical level, Britain has a good deal of lost their ministers in the early 1980s fleet (mainly C–130s) are integral to the joint doctrine and abundant procedures. (who were equivalent to pre-1947 cabi- JRDF concept. Both PJHQ and JRDF were In air defense, for example, the Royal net-level Secretaries of War and Navy in exercised last year during Purple Star in Navy and Royal Air Force have worked the United States), though the three ser- North Carolina. closely together for many years, to some vice chiefs and their modest staffs have This year also sees the demise of the extent as a result of the demise of parts been retained to address service-unique individual service staff colleges, with the of naval air defenses when large conven- matters. The Chief of the Defence Staff formation of the Joint Services Com- tional strike carriers were phased out in (a post equal to the Chairman, Joint mand and Staff College. Initially in tem- the 1960s and 1970s. Royal Navy antiair Chiefs of Staff), is now principal military porary accommodation on the site of the warfare destroyers and Sea Harrier- advisor to the government. old Royal Air Force Staff College at Brack- equipped light carriers are fully inte- Britain does not have a system nell to the west of London, it will even- grated into the United Kingdom Air De- equivalent to the unified command plan tually have a permanent home at fense Region using NATO coordinated in the United States because of its more Shrivenham in western England. air-sea procedures developed and proven modest force structure and regional com- in Britain. mitments. In peacetime, each service has Technological Horizon Joint rules of engagement have re- three commands to deal broadly with The RMA debate in America is being placed the separate service rules of a few operations, materiel, and personnel. Con- followed with considerable interest on years ago. Aircraft procurement, mainte- trol of operational forces, however, is al- the other side of the Atlantic. In general nance, and training are increasingly most totally joint. Prior to last year joint two themes dominate British and Euro- coordinated among the services, with operations were run by whichever service pean views on RMA. The first is a some- Royal Air Force fast jets (Harrier GR7s) headquarters was most appropriate. Re- what skeptical view on the true impact operating today from a carrier (HMS Illus- covery of the Falkland Islands, known as and importance of new technologies in trious) in the Far East, alongside Royal Operation Corporate, was controlled from fundamentally altering the nature of war. Navy Sea Harrier F/A2s. Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, while European strategic and military cultures Britain’s contribution to Desert Shield/ tend to be less technologically-focused Joint Developments Desert Storm (alias Operation Granby) and consequently give less weight to the The services have become increas- was conducted from Royal Air Force significance of technology. On the other ingly coordinated and in some ways in- Strike Command Headquarters at High hand, there is increasing concern that if tegrated over the last thirty years or so, a Wycombe. Such ad hoc arrangements Britain is to continue to operate in the process that has accelerated in recent were ended in April 1996 with the major league but cannot afford to de- years for much the same reasons as in establishment of Permanent Joint Head- velop or acquire new systems, it must at the United States. Separate government quarters (PJHQ) at Northwood in the least do enough to maintain compatibil- ministries (War Office, Admiralty, and ity and connectivity with the U.S. mili- Air Ministry) were abolished in the tary. Britain is probably better placed to

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do this than many other U.S. allies which tics of the combatants to set the stage for have even more modest defense re- JOINT TRAINING the looming action. It recounts both suc- sources and force structures. cesses and failures impartially through the On the related issue of defense co- FOR MOOTW eyes of the author who indulges in no operation, Britain continues to be torn self-praise and offers no excuses. between being the junior partner in A Book Review by By its very nature training cannot transatlantic projects such as the joint SHAWN C. WHETSTONE fully replicate the experience of life-and- strike fighter, and having a stronger but death situations under live fire. However, still minority role in European projects units often become totally immersed in such as transport/tanker aircraft and the The Battle for Hunger Hill: this exercise with the fear of failure pro- British-French-Italian Project Horizon for The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry viding some of the same edge. So too, the antiair warfare ships. While there are in- Regiment at the Joint narrative often sweeps the reader along creasing political imperatives to joining Readiness Training Center and assumes the intensity of combat his- European defense projects, the military by Daniel P. Bolger tory. Reality is not forgotten as the com- and financial advantages of working with Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1997. promises necessary in a training environ- the United States remain considerable. 363 pp. $24.95 ment are dealt with at appropriate times. Needless to say, Britain remains deeply [ISBN 0–89141–453–3] The title of the book is derived from suspicious of any European defense and the unit’s first rotation. While actively security identity (ESDI) if it threatens to ctions placed under the nebulous seeking supply points one company dis- undermine NATO primacy. Arubric of military operations other covered a large camp tentatively identi- It would be wrong to pretend that than war (MOOTW) make up a rapidly fied as the main guerrilla supply base. But the British defense establishment is all growing share of missions conducted by the cache was actually an elaborate decoy one might wish. Resource constraints in the Armed Forces. U.S. intervention to lure his unwary troops. Mortar fire recent years have been severe, and while forces often find themselves in situations began raining on the site. The guerrillas the new Labor government has criticized that intermix political and military ob- decimated the surprised company and se- aspects of the last administration’s de- jectives, combatants and civilians. How verely hampered battalion efforts to re- fense policy, including an overstretch of do soldiers prepare for these exigencies? cover their comrades. The location, forces, it seems unwilling to do much The Battle for Hunger Hill provides an in- named Hunger Hill by the unit, repre- about it. There will not be additional sight into the demands of MOOTW and sented a situation that its soldiers did not money for defense, and a further budget their effects on the men and women who want to repeat. It became a rallying cry squeeze is quite possible. Labor promised must conduct them. Drawing on the ex- for changes that were implemented as a a comprehensive defense and security re- perience of leading an air assault infantry result of lessons learned. In this and other view in its first six months, but broad battalion through two rotations at the battles during the rotation one senses the support for the major tenets of the last Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), frustration of a conventional force fight- government’s approach has been ex- Lieutenant Colonel Daniel P. Bolger, USA ing an elusive unconventional enemy. pressed. These include maintenance of (currently an operations officer with the Foremost among the lessons was a the nuclear deterrent, active involvement 101st Airborne Division) derives lessons realization that often gets lost amidst in U.N. and other peace operations, and on the nature of leadership and tactics other concerns and activities: the pri- an intervention/expeditionary warfare required under such conditions. mary tasks for infantry are to control capability. Located at Fort Polk, Louisiana, ground or kill the enemy. The latter be- The British military has faced much JRTC is peopled with villagers, hunters, came the unit’s guiding principle and de- change and turmoil in recent years, and farmers, reporters, relief workers, and fault mission. consolidation is needed and promised. guerrillas who create a scene increasingly Leaders implementing lessons from Some overdue rationalization of the de- familiar to the U.S. military. This is the such an experience often do not have the fense establishment has certainly taken fictitious island of Aragon which is com- opportunity to observe the fruits of their place, but there are concerns about some prised of three countries: pro-American labors. Current personnel rotation poli- aspects of sustainability and regeneration Cortina, neutral Victoria, and Marxist At- cies and training center schedules rarely capability. Interservice cooperation is lantica. Conventional Atlantican govern- allow commanders to take their units greater and more effective than at any ment forces and guerrillas of the Cortin- through two rotations. However, Bolger time in the past, although interservice ri- ian Liberation Front provide the opposing and the 1/327 Infantry had that chance. valries can still be strong and active com- forces. American intervention involves all Approximately nine months after their petition for scarce resources has certainly services including close air support by the first rotation, the unit went back to JRTC not gone away. Greater emphasis on joint- Air Force and naval gunfire which is tar- to test new ideas and exact revenge on ness has not come at the expense of com- geted by Marine liaison teams. the Cortinian Liberation Front. bined operations, and Britain’s interaction It is into this setting that Bolger leads The second rotation featured differ- with its NATO allies is undiminished. members of 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry ent scenarios and missions. But the guer- JWP 0-01 elucidates the warfighting Regiment in September 1994. The unit rillas remained and were ready to tangle doctrine of the “other” half of the Anglo- fights as an element of 3d Brigade, 101st with U.S. forces. From the start the bat- American special relationship against a Airborne Division. The book opens by re- talion showed it had learned its lessons. background of change in the defense es- viewing the history, organization, and tac- Almost every organizational and tactical tablishments of both countries. As joint change improved their combat effective- doctrine, this new publication should ness. The reader detects confidence and strike a familiar cord within the U.S. Armed Forces. JFQ Shawn C. Whetstone is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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a sense of accomplishment in turning third wave, they concluded, was also in the table on the guerrillas. More impor- RIDING THE the process of transforming war. tantly, the second rotation both An obsession with lessons learned, strengthens and gives credence to the TOFFLER WAVE especially from the Vietnam experience, book’s observations. also influenced the military in the early A Book Review by The author’s knowledge of military 1980s. Demoralization stemming from history offers unique insights which M.E. AHRARI that war played a part in forward think- merge theory and praxis. He reviews the ing among our best military minds. Thus role of doctrine, personnel policies, the the appearance of The Third Wave in decisionmaking process, command and Creating a New Civilization: The 1980 served to assure many senior offi- control, staff work, and fratricide. He Politics of the Third Wave cers that they were on the right track does not claim to have solved the dilem- by Alvin and Heidi Toffler about a technological revolution that mas that face commanders in MOOTW. Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1995. would make the world a global village Rather, his experiences demonstrate that 112 pp. $14.95 (not just metaphorically as was the case [ISBN 1–57036–224–6] neat school book solutions do not always prior to the 1980s). fit messy real world situations. While The second reason for reviewing the that appears obvious, the day-to-day de- hen one thinks of futurists who body of work by the Tofflers is that Creat- mands of commanding a unit often ob- Whave depicted new vistas and writing a New Civilization summarizes their scure that simple lesson. ten lively accounts of social and techno- earlier books and advances a number of The United States prefers utilizing logical progress, the Tofflers—Alvin and arguments initiated there. Still, those firepower in dangerous situations rather Heidi—immediately come to mind. who have not read the other books may than placing its soldiers, sailors, marines, Their influence on the military is a trib- not be totally unfamiliar with the argu- and airmen directly in harm’s way. ute not only to iconoclasm but to the ments in Creating a New Civilization, JTFs can strike fear into the hearts of a resolve of today’s professionals in keep- which though a short read at 112 pages is would-be opponent. When it was able, ing abreast of technological revolutions rich in content. 1/327 Infantry employed available air in other sectors. The theme of accelerated change support and naval gunfire to devastating Just as the Nation as a whole cannot found in Future Shock was developed in effect. But MOOTW will often involve afford to take its eye off technological The Third Wave. The term third wave, ac- enemies who are not as vulnerable to competition, the military comprehends cording to the authors, “is not just a mat- high tech. Such operations require troops the peril of becoming first among equals, ter of technology and economics. It in- who can handle complex problems, much less second. The emphasis in pro- volves morality, culture, and ideas as well defuse violence, and fight unconven- fessional military education is a persua- as institutions and political structure. It tional forces while minimizing collateral sive indication of this thinking. Paul implies, in short, a true transformation damage as well as casualties. Resulting Kennedy’s advise appears to have been in human affairs.” The third wave is expectations and pressures can be taken to heart by both business and mili- about the information revolution. Today, tremendous. The Armed Forces must tary elites: we do not wish to confront a dictatorships and remaining Stalinist have experience to execute missions to decline in the economic realm lest it re- states—Cuba, North Korea, and to a the standards demanded by their leaders duces our capacity to remain a super- lesser extent the People’s Republic of and the public. Just as the National power. The Tofflers began admonishing China and Vietnam—are under tremen- Training Center proved its worth in the us along those lines years ago when they dous pressure from within. The choices Persian Gulf War, JRTC is demonstrating suggested a blueprint for avoiding “fu- are stark: either change or be swept aside. its value in interventions by the Armed ture shocks”—the disorientation caused The information revolution is no less Forces in places like Panama, Somalia, by super change that the post-World War challenging to democracies. Ruling elites and Haiti. The training is realistic and al- II period visited on the industrial sector. can no longer govern on the basis of a lows for mistakes to be made in acquiring Before examining Creating a New “father knows best” approach, especially the skills to execute increasingly complex Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave, since arguments over social problems are missions. In relating his insights on gain- it is helpful to review the earlier work by becoming numerous and convoluted. A ing expertise in this regard, Bolger has the Tofflers for two reasons. First, almost public glutted with information is in- written a book that both entertains and all their writing—notably The Third creasingly impatient with its leaders. educates. For those who haven’t been Wave, Future Shock, and War and Anti- War and Anti-War advanced an idio- there or can’t go, The Battle for Hunger War—has been studied by our military syncratic proposition: “The way we make Hill provides a taste of what it is like. JFQ leaders. One of the major arguments in war reflects the way we make wealth— The Third Wave that impressed them was and the way we make anti-war must re- the idea that each wave of change brings flect the way we make war.” In Creating a with it a new kind of civilization. “Today New Civilization, the Tofflers developed a we are in the process of inventing a third “coherent approach” and a “new frame- wave civilization with its own economy, work for change.” The explosion of infor- its own family form, media, and poli- mation is among other considerations welcomesJFQ your letters tics.” The military in the 1980s applied revolutionizing markets and the nature and comments Tofflers’ thesis to their profession. The of employment worldwide. While one Fax your correspondence to may get nostalgic over the victory of cap- italism and think glibly about the “end (202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219 M.E. Ahrari is associate dean of the Joint of history,” we must be concerned with or via e-mail to [email protected] and Combined Warfighting School at the the potentially deleterious effects of Armed Forces Staff College.

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growing competition among nations. Al- their forefathers of the second wave. Will ■ Does it massify society (an apparent ready we have been witnessing an in- this be a change for the better? Some de- reference to mass production and assembly crease in the formation of trading blocks. velopments are not promising. The rise lines, mass education, masses, and mass Where will this trend lead? of ethno-nationalism in Europe, Asia, media, all symbolizing the second wave)? ■ The Tofflers touch on this issue in and Africa; religious extremism in the Does it promote vertical organizations (second wave) or virtual organizations (third discussing the move from a “bisected” to Middle East, South Asia, and Africa; wave structures that parcel out services and a “trisected” world. In the latter, the first weakened governments in some Third stay slim)? wave sector supplies agriculture and min- World countries (states belonging to the ■ Does it empower the home? Demassi- eral resources. Cheap labor and mass pro- first or second wave) suggesting to some fication will enable many people to work at duced goods come from the second wave the end of the nation-state—these are ex- home using computers, facsimiles, and other sector, while dominance by the third amples of what we will witness with the third wave technologies. wave sector is “based on the new ways in revolutionary changes of the third wave. In their conclusion the authors offer which it creates and exploits knowl- The remainder of the analysis is fo- some principles of third wave govern- edge.” They unequivocally state that the cused on U.S. political battles of the ment. The first wave was characterized “globally competitive race will be won by 1990s. They label opponents of the by “minority power” and the second op- the countries that complete their third North America Free Trade Agreement— erated on the basis of majority rule since wave transformation with the least paragons such as consumer advocate it “almost always meant a fairer break for amount of domestic dislocation and un- Ralph Nader and columnist and peren- the poor.” In countries undergoing the rest.” This prognosis does not bode well nial political candidate Pat Buchanan—as third wave revolution, the poor are no for the rest of the world. second wave figures while Vice President longer in the majority, according to Tof- The authors also predict that “his- Al Gore has “one toe wet in the third flers. “In a good many countries, they— toric change from a bisected to a trisected wave.” The bureaucracy and civil service like everyone else—have become a mi- world could well trigger the deepest are derided as second wave entities that nority.” Consequently, majority rule is power struggles on the planet as each are “largely unreformed, unreengineered, not only inadequate as a legitime princi- country positions itself in the emerging unreinvented.” The last phrase refers to ple in societies moving into the third three-tiered power structure.” So how efforts by Mr. Gore to “reinvent” (read: wave; it is no longer necessarily human- should we manage the race among sec- fix or make efficient) government. izing or democratic. On this point per- ond wave countries to join the ranks of The 1996 election had its share of haps they are so focused on the future the third wave? Is there any way of ame- “wave-related” rhetoric like Clinton’s they ignore current realities. Recent re- liorating the effects of the competition? harping on designs to build a bridge to ports indicate that the level of poverty in The authors do not say. My hunch is that the next century, portraying his candi- the United States has increased. Thus it is they would opt for social Darwinism. dacy as part of the third wave. At the hard to imagine that the poor will be- An engaging problem raised in the same time, in a not-too-veiled reference come a minority any time soon. The book is “conflict between the second and to his opponent, Clinton questioned the record of other industrialized countries the third wave groupings” in the United “age of his ideas,” implying that the Dole cannot be that much better. The Tofflers States. Who will “shape the new civiliza- campaign was characterized by “second also recommend the modernization of tion rapidly rising to replace it?” The way wave ideas.” the entire American system “so as to this conflict will be resolved in America Second wave elites are struggling “to strengthen the role of the diverse minori- is significant. However, it is equally im- retain or reinstate an unsustainable past ties....” portant to apply this question to domes- because they gained wealth and power Their second proposal is “semi-di- tic scraps between different generations from applying second wave principles, rect democracy,” a mix of direct and in- of leaders in European and Asian nations. and the shift to a new way of life chal- direct democracy. Thirdly, to break the Erstwhile members of the former Warsaw lenges that wealth and power.” More- decision logjam they propose dividing Pact are likely to experience similar con- over, both political parties “reflect and reallocating decisions by “sharing flicts in a decade or two as they rebuild second wave.” But the brunt of criticism them more widely and switching the site institutions on the pattern of the West- is borne by the Democrats whose core of decisionmaking as the problems them- ern democracies. But the countries of the constituencies—labor unions, the civil selves require.” Interestingly, the Republi- Balkan region, most of the Common- service, etc.—make it unable to follow can “Contract with America” considered wealth of Independent States (CIS), the its most forward-thinking leaders. such suggestions. By devolving Federal Caucasus region, Middle East, Africa, and According to the Tofflers, third wave power to state governments and empha- South America will have to wait several constituencies encompass “industries sizing the role of the private sector in decades to answer this important ques- based on mind work rather than muscle many issues, the Republican majority in tion. It is safe to speculate that although work,” which includes data-enriched ser- the 104th Congress activated the “semi- a new generation of leaders in many vices such as finance, software, commu- direct democracy” and attempted to countries has grown up in the second nications, entertainment, medicine, and avoid decision logjam. However, whether wave, its thinking might be colored by education. The authors believe these sec- these attempts will bring about qualita- an exposure to the third wave era in the tors will agree on “liberation from all the tive changes or accelerate America’s age of electronic communications. This old second wave rules, regulations, taxes, progress as a third wave society has yet to generation is bound to respond quite dif- and laws laid in place to serve the smoke- be seen. ferently to social changes than did its im- stack barons and bureaucrats of the The “super struggle” between efforts mediate predecessor. past.” Third wave activist citizens, politi- to preserve second wave societies and ef- In the 1990s and beyond both rulers cians, and policymakers will assess pro- forts to create third wave ones is unlikely and ruled will probably behave unlike posals for change based on the following: ■ Does it resemble a factory (symbol of the second wave)?

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OFF THE SHELF ■

to end soon. As the Tofflers see it, “cre- first wave and into the third with only a misinformed way by casting it as an ob- ation of new political structures for a brief transition in the second. Little at- stacle to modernization. Because a transi- third wave civilization will not come in a tention is paid to the regional security tion from the first to the third wave era single climactic upheaval but as a conse- implications of such a conversion. promises to modernize societies, one can quence of a thousand innovations and At least some interest is being apply this negative argument and take collisions at many levels in many places shown in countries that are scrambling the position that Islam would oppose over a period of decades.” The fact that to pull themselves out of the second and such changes. In reality all Muslim coun- the thrust of Creating a New Civilization into the third wave. We have witnessed tries in the 1990s are coming to grips deals with political, social, and techno- shock waves created by such endeavors with how to modernize without Western- logical change suggests that the United in Russia, where the government is strug- izing. Put differently, these societies are States will remain in the vanguard of the gling to maintain its influence after un- caught between adopting the technologi- third wave. If indeed technological inno- dergoing a radical shift from control of cal but not the cultural aspects of the sec- vations substantially determine the fu- an empire to confronting the multi- ond and third waves. ture of this civilization, then America faceted challenges of the information The ultimate influence of the Tof- will be in the forefront. But the Tofflers age. Other CIS states are bound to un- flers’ work on the profession of arms and argue that the third wave involves more dergo cataclysmic changes in their efforts of the third wave on the future of war than technology and economics. “It in- to emulate the industrial democracies of cannot be known. But one has only to volves morality, culture, and ideas as well the third wave, especially the United note the petulant title of the preface as institutions and political structure.” States, Japan, and Germany. The impact to this slim volume (“A Citizen’s Guide But this definition compels us to search of such changes on European security to the Twenty-First Century”) and its for this civilization around the world. will be considerable. author (Newt Gingrich) to appreciate One reason for the increased num- In the Middle East, the transition that its potential audience is legion. JFQ ber of conflicts in the post-Cold War from the first or second to the third wave world is the level of strife involving first is complicated by Islam. Some analysts or second wave states. Weakened nations treat the role of Islam in a superficial and in Africa underscore the inability of some societies to pull themselves out of the

Joint Force Quarterly READERSHIP SURVEY

questionnaire was enclosed in issue 13 (Autumn 1996) to solicit relevant information from JFQ readers. Results of that survey are abstracted below. (For purposes of comparison, data collected A from the only previous survey which was conducted in 1994 is displayed in parentheses.) Of all respondents, 84 (83) percent were members of the Armed Forces. The service affiliation of active and Reserve component respondents was Army, 31 (30) percent; Navy, 28 (32) percent; Marine Corps, 10 (7) percent; Air Force, 28 (30) percent; and Coast Guard, 1 (1) percent. Majors and lieutenant commanders comprised 24 (29) percent of military readers; lieutenant colonels and commanders, 32 (32) percent; and colonels and captains, 17 (19) percent; general and flag officers, 7 (8) percent; and all other officers and enlisted personnel, 20 (12) percent. Among all readers, 44 (49) percent usually read most articles and another 48 (41) percent read some. Other than feature articles the most stimulating contributions (ranked in order of their popularity) were The Joint World (professional notes), Out of Joint or commentary, book reviews, and letters to the editor. In terms of overall relevance, balance, and accuracy, 36 (31) percent rated JFQ as excellent and 59 (65) percent as either very good or good. Responding to how faithfully the journal achieves its stated purpose—to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces— 30 (28) percent found that it was right on target and another 66 (66) percent indicated that it met the purpose either very closely or closely. Asked to identify the exclusive form in which they would prefer to receive JFQ in the future, 81 percent of all readers opted for print, 10 percent for cumulative issues on CD–ROM, and 9 percent for on line.

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