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European Union, maritime security strategy, hard and soft conceptions European Union, maritime security strategy, KEY WORDS: likely to be a relatively weak maritime security regime, which suffers from a number of important important likely to be a relatively weak maritime security regime, which suffers from a number of limits. Zielonka 2006). By this account, the main objectives of EU maritime strategy are stability and objectives of EU maritime strategy are stability and Zielonka 2006). By this account, the main flows to be achieved using the classic instrumentsencouragement of globalised maritime trade of maritime security strategy is ‘soft maritime security’. While replete with great possibilities, the EU’s 2014, making distinctions between hard and soft conceptions of maritime security. The theoretical The theoretical soft conceptions of maritime security. 2014, making distinctions between hard and empire’ (Bull 1977: 254-255; Rennger 2006; approach employed invokes the ‘EU as neo-medieval This paper offers a critical interpretation of the EU’s recent Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) of Security Strategy (MSS) of recent Maritime the EU’s This paper offers a critical interpretation of Abstract Brendan Flynn Limits of Soft Security? The EU’s Maritime Security Strategy: Security Strategy: Maritime The EU’s on the a Neo-Medieval Perspective ISSN 1848-5782 1848-5782 ISSN UDC 656.6:347.79.061.1EU DOI 10.1515/cirr-2016-0001 CIRR XXII (75) 2016, 9-38 XXII (75) CIRR type of maritime security actor maritime security of type What can we explain the emergence of the EU’s of the the emergence can we explain how or Why Any definition of ‘maritime security’ ought surely to be wide enough to Maritime Security - Hard and Soft? is employed to draw out a number of limits that the EU faces as it attempts to become a significant maritime security actor. medieval (IR) approach, explaining how it can be applied to the MSS. In MSS. the applied to be can it explaining how approach, medieval (IR) a final extended discussion and conclusion, the neo-medieval approach of the EU as a security actor but also to how understanding the EU’s role EU’s the but also to how understanding of the EU as a security actor in maritime security fits poorly within the dominant international relations’ distinctive neo- paper presents the the Third, approaches. (IR) theoretical end of that spectrum. A second section moves from analysis end of that spectrum. A second of policy history recent the concerning puzzles series of evaluating a to documents character the to relate puzzles These security. in maritime EU’s role the of distinction between hard and soft maritime security is offered, together is offered, security maritime soft and hard between distinction with an analysis positions itself at the ‘soft’ of how the MSS text clearly medievalism. the a discussion on First, main sections. in three paper is structured The especially because what is in question is a ‘soft’ maritime security regime. maritime security is a ‘soft’ is in question especially because what neo- on literature the MSS are based on the to suggested limits These policy entrepreneurship (David 2015), especially from key elites in national, 2015), especially from (David policy entrepreneurship settings, and on the ‘ground’ (Arnold Council, and Commission institutional here, MSS is also explored EU’s the being limits to there issue of 2015). The references to the literature that draw on EU bureaucratic politics (Dijkstra draw on EU bureaucratic that to the literature references 2009; Hilsman et al. 2010) 1987; et al. 2015; and Trondal Vanhoonacker maritime security dimension? Those latter questions have already been already been have questions latter Those dimension? security maritime 2015;scholars (Germond Riddervold 2011, by other well addressed about, one could add to explain how the MSS came 2015). Moreover, subject of this paper is in fact, it is subject of this paper likely whether, to become a credible is: here question exact The one. is the EU? Not: Since the declaration of its Marine Security Strategy (MSS) in 2014, the EU 2014, the (MSS) in Strategy Security Marine its of declaration Since the The security. maritime in global player a be itself to proclaimed has loudly Maritime Security – Hard and Soft Varieties? and Soft – Hard Security Maritime

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 10 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 11 1 means of economic menace or reward. The latter, soft power, is the ability to have influence by co-opting others to international for one’s agenda on elements key some share to consequence, as a values and, one’s of some share order and security’ (Grey 2011: V). See also Lindley-French (2004). Gray clarifies the distinction as follows: ‘The former, hard power, is achieved through military threat or use, and by ‘softer’ end of the maritime security spectrum. 1 might be a good example of a hard maritime security threat, whereas threat, maritime security hard a example of be a good might framing mass irregular migrants as ‘climate change victims’ represents the or ‘securitised’ issues, to which elites seek responses from or electorates perhaps from NGOs and civic society navies, coastguards, and even (Ukraine) Mariupol assault on amphibious an Russia’s launching actors. lanes, fishing grounds, or seabed mineral wealth. By way of contrast, soft maritime security issues are likely ‘ideational’ to be socially constructed, security. For example, hard maritime security threats usually relate to more to usually relate threats security example, hard maritime For security. organised interests of states, alliances, or objective, real, material maritime sea access to or include littoral territory such Examples of actors. non-state There are also ontological distinctions between ‘hard and soft’ maritime and soft’ ‘hard distinctions between ontological also are There can be surprisingly ‘hard’. The EU has, for example, quite hard ‘economic’ ‘economic’ example, quite hard EU has, for can be surprisingly ‘hard’. The sanctions, wars, trade in engaging them, use to choose it should powers, and extra-territorial regulatory initiatives. fighting. Of course, there is a grey area between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’. Thus in ‘kinetic’ features Somalia have included some off anti-piracy operations powers soft some a maritime policing mission. Moreover, is otherwise what characteristic that force will not likely be employed, or if it is, such force will likely be employed, or characteristic that force not naval war unlike is quite It constrained. normatively and limited will be surely involves a focus on normative rather than military and on than surely involves force, normative rather a focus on co-operation and consent rather than conflict. Itchief activities at sea with the ‘constabulary’ old-fashioned language, could be called, in fighting and defence of sea lanes, maritime interests and marine spatial Soft maritime security is ‘everything else’, but it not just hegemony. The essence of hard maritime security is The essence of the willingness at to use force a political for from the sea, to achieve desired effects, whether sea, or It is about naval war an alliance (naval), such as NATO. nation state or Hard/Soft power distinction. Hard/Soft that can fall under the heading. However, a spectrum of marine security security of marine a spectrum However, heading. the under can fall that maritime ‘hard’ variants of ‘soft’ and between and activities challenges Gray’s (2011) Colin echoes This is emphasised here. 2010) (Rao security reflect Bueger’s (2015) matrix, which stresses the sheer diversity of topics

One can also 2 ‘based on the EU’s founding EU’s the ‘based on National Strategy for Maritime National Strategy

(Council 2014: 7). The fact that (Council 2014:fact 7). The

(NSMS) (HMG 2014). (NSMS) (HMG 2014). of this document has a great number While http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm 2 See: marine resources are protected’ (Council 2014: 3). The only hegemony only 2014: 3). The (Council protected’ are resources marine EU maritime, while protecting Moreover, is that of liberal norms. here sought but terrorists or against hostile states this is not mentioned; are borders international law and national law freedom of navigation are enforced, and environment the transport, infrastructure, citizens, and is guaranteed text states EU maritime actions are to be to are actions maritime EU states text and democracy’ and ‘Maritime security values of human rights, freedom maritime domain, in which global as a state of affairs of the is understood It is certainly not an exercise in naval strategy for brute hegemony. The hegemony. brute for strategy naval in exercise an not is certainly It extracting oil at sea may be in profound conflict with climatetypical ‘curate’s it is a rather In short, over. is entirely glossed concerns change egg’ of an EU document-by-committee. and coastal regions, as well as the conservation and sustainable well as the conservation use of as and coastal regions, risks’ security avoid future biodiversity to ‘the protection of economic interests, including the safeguarding of safeguarding the including interests, economic of protection ‘the environment the of protection alongside ‘the resources’ maritime energy areas maritime in climate change impact of the of management the and reflecting classic liberalsecurity rhetoric, and certainly does not offer any security maritime identify common to purports It choices. strategic clear include: example, they For widely pitched. are these but EU, the for interests As a document, the EU MSS can be described as somewhat rambling, the EU As a document, NSMS is to further British national interests. Moreover, it uses a coherent risks coherent a uses it Moreover, interests. national British further to is NSMS prioritised, be of risks to notably creates a hierarchy assessment, which near the top. with marine terrorism references to international law, upholding norms and keeping maritime norms and keeping maritime to international law, upholding references UK’s the of purpose the that statement clear it also has a very free, trade section devoted to ‘deterrence and collective defence’. ‘deterrence to devoted section contrast the EU MSS with the recent British Security organisations such as NATO. For example, the MSS text contrasts sharply text contrasts the MSS example, For such as NATO. organisations an entire has (2011), which maritime strategy on statement with NATO’s is not offered here. Nonetheless, as a document, it is obviously replete replete is obviously it document, as a Nonetheless, here. offered is not with language that fits the softer end of the maritime security spectrum. is much less There from might expect security talk we of the hard A systematic discourse analysis of the recent EU MSS or its action plan plan its action MSS or EU recent analysis discourse A systematic of the

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 12 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 13 risks are included on the same the on risks are included 3 (Council 2014: 8). The EU MSS is supposed to be to EU MSS is supposed The (Council 2014: 8).

(Council 2014: 10). There is also reference made to NATO, but(Council 2014: 10). There is also

A military acronym for threats, training or technology of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear type. technology of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological A military acronym for threats, training or in order to prevent and counter cross-border illegal activities’ cross-border (Council and counter prevent to in order 3 references to ‘full spectrum’ or ‘armed forces’, which suggests the forces’, ‘armed or to ‘full spectrum’ references of rest the However, name. EU’s force at sea in the possibility the use of of the MSS is a rhetorical tour de force of liberal, soft security approaches. will be an EU maritime security capability developed apart from NATO. from capability developed apart security maritime EU an will be a capability Nonetheless, to act autonomously is implied by textual framework of the partnership between the two organisations’ (2014: 10). framework of the partnership between there stating that say. It is not is clear in what it doesn’t In a way, this text management, EU and NATO engagement in the maritime domain shouldmanagement, EU and NATO engagement in accordance with the agreedremain complementary and coordinated, African Union or ASEAN, as well as multilateral civil cooperation platforms,African Union or ASEAN, as well as strengthento and interests its to safeguard ability its a direct impact on has security. In the context of crisisregional and international maritime development of partnerships with international organisations. The Union’sdevelopment of partnerships with UN, NATO, regional partners like thecapacity to cooperate with the domain’ ‘the EU should act autonomously andan ambiguous formula is used: attention should be given to thewith international partners. Special responsibilities. Their sustained presence needs to support freedom ofresponsibilities. Their sustained presence governance by deterring, preventingnavigation and contributes to good activities within the global maritimeand countering unlawful and illicit from the sea and provide global reach, flexibility and access that enable to the full spectrum of maritimethe EU and its Member States to contribute There are only oblique references to the deployment of ‘harder security’ references to the deployment There are only oblique following statements: MSS. Consider, for example, the assets in the EU role at sea and Armed Forces should play a strategic ‘Member States’ about managing all of these diverse issues and more. about managing (Council 2014: 7). Terrorism and CBRN and pillage research of archaeological page as ‘Illegal and unregulated objects’ archaeological following acts of external aggression including those related to maritime related to maritime those including aggression acts of external following disputes, threats to Member States’ sovereign rights or armed conflicts’ 2014: 7). Somewhat confusingly, the document shortly afterwards shifts to shifts afterwards shortly document the confusingly, 7). Somewhat 2014: ‘threats to attend EU must It states the hard security. closer to language sea at interests economic to and citizens European security of the to ‘ real institutional value (Whitman and Wolf 2012: 12). The much-truncated real institutional value (Whitman and Wolf 2012: much-truncated 12). The an EU ‘force catalogue’ for the Helsinki Headline Goals and naval forces Helsinki the catalogue’ for an EU ‘force surrounding controversy The exercise. paper that in strongly featured of to nothing came mostly the creation of an EU Rapid Reaction Force An enormous amount of speculation was generated by the creation of amount of speculation was generated An enormous intention was for an EU military capability, including naval assets, that was for intention also operate could if needed, but, NATO would be complementary to 2015: 119-120). outside NATO structures (Catalano operations could be acceptable and that they would collaborate to collaborate would they that acceptable and could be operations The crises’. capacity to manage international an ‘autonomous ensure things by shifting agendas towards terrorism and counter-insurgency and terrorism towards agendas by shifting things that at St. Malo in 1998 was a high-level we know there on land. Yet, military EU-led that British, and French the between least at understanding, emerge? This is we know the usual ‘Cold War’ excuse emerge? puzzling, because One might blame ‘9/11’ and how it derailed by then. was long gone security actor by then? Why did we have to wait until 2008 EU naval for a dedicated mission to to Operation Atalanta in 2008, so they are not even 10 years old. Why even 10 years old. not are they in 2008, so Atalanta Operation to should we then assume the EU will naval be deploying missions its name in EU will some 10 that the be an important maritime years from now, or even is relatively new must be emphasised. It also suggests that the EU as a the It also suggests that must be emphasised. is relatively new back naval missions date Explicitly, EU is unproven. maritime security actor That the EU’s entry into the marketplace of maritime security institutions of maritime security institutions into the marketplace That the EU’s entry date are presented as a series of ‘puzzles’ for academic research. as a series of ‘puzzles’ for academic date are presented The puzzle of timing naval war-fighting alliance, whereas NATO ostensibly is. Rather than repeat than Rather is. ostensibly NATO whereas alliance, war-fighting naval to trends security, in maritime involved became EU the how of story the EU says) the EU security (what on maritime history of EU efforts to a potted maritime soft observation is that core the Once again, done). has actually a not is actor an as EU The efforts. EU’s the dominates provision security In this focus moves away section, the (what the text of the MSS from the The EU as a ‘Soft’ EU as The Maritime Security Actor: Puzzles Five

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 14 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 15 , which 4 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede160315criticalmaritimeroutesprogr_/ sede160315criticalmaritimeroutesprogr_en.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/events/doc/2009_01_21_ piracy/maritime_routes.pdf See: 4 of maritime security, faces Janus-like dynamics of institutional competition focus for competition and simultaneously. The often and co-operation, Second, there is a puzzle concerning the fact that the EU, as a provider fact that the is a puzzle concerning there Second, approaches. The puzzle of institutional complexity such policies are truly effective. It is enough to note for our purposes here purposes for our to note It is enough such policies are truly effective. which is almost a cliché, of soft security that once again this is material, has been centre stage of efforts like EUCAP NESTOR. This approach blends NESTOR. like EUCAP efforts stage of centre has been and local promotion, democracy rights, development, a judicious mix of now to what extent can leave aside for institutional capacity building. We now the Gulf of Guinea). Alongside these measures, there is now the Gulf of Guinea). Alongside also the Approach’ to EU security, which obviously ‘Comprehensive normative small budget of €16m. Nonetheless, it has managed to develop specific problem is a piracy where routes trade main the of each for projects East Asia/Straits of Malacca and South (Somalia/Western Indian Ocean, However, such projects have only emerged since 2009. Labelled the since emerged have only projects such However, and launched at the height of the Critical Maritime Routes Programme Somalia, this initiative has had a relatively coast of the piracy crisis off maritime security. Central here are the EU CRIMSON projects maritime security. Central here Development and Co-operation. the DG for under access funding Alongside EUNAVFOR, which is lavished Alongside EUNAVFOR, with publicity and is a creature note should we bargaining, intergovernmental and Council the of way into its own Commission has steadily pushed European the how end of the spectrum remains still unproven after years of speculation. remains still unproven after end of the spectrum ‘kinetic’ from the outset all conspired to shelve the idea in preference to idea in preference all conspired to shelve the outset the ‘kinetic’ from intervening using NATO (HoL 2012: at p. 66). The lesson here is stark: the ‘harder’ allocate, naval capabilities even at the use, or EU’s readiness to the Libyan the Libyan crisis (2011), political but a lack of the among agreement have been a mission would such fact that and the states EU member never never been used in any significant way, even though there have been with naval deployed, including have been when they could occasions and amphibious elements. Using them was briefly considered during EU Battle-groups structures that eventually emerged in its wake have

. naval blockade to naval blockade . de facto de coalitions of the willing, and there are and there willing, the of coalitions ad hoc , although what exactly it might realistically what exactly do by , although 6 To be clear here, such a capability is To be clear here, not an EU standing 5 There is no necessary reason why one organization above organization one why necessary reason is no There 7 http://www.euromarfor.org/ http://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/a-la-une/spontex-13-activation-de-la-force-navale-franco-allemande See: recognised terms for this are the more Multilateralism or ‘differentiated integration’ 6 7 (Perlmutter 1998: 207), which combined a combined 1998: 207), which (Perlmutter 5 See: Mandates, but these were not EU-led naval interventions. For example, For naval interventions. EU-led not were these but Mandates, the Italian Navy led a coalition of the willing in Operation Alba of 1997 Yet, that rise is recent. It is important not to forget that before Operation that before to forget not It is important that rise is recent. Yet, UN European missions under several ad hoc were Atalanta there institution in the event of an emerging maritime security crisis, even if we crisis, even security maritime emerging an of event the in institution can acknowledge its rise in this area. maritime contingency. Why one would turn to the EU, among other among EU, to the would turn Why one maritime contingency. question that an ongoing possible institutional actors, is therefore obvious most the from is far EU The will ask. decision-makers diplomats and The reality of European maritime security is then a confusing institutional institutional a confusing maritime security is then reality of European The complexity. any to respond same time) cannot indeed several at the (or another diplomatic relations. 1998: 239). There is even a bilateral Franco-German Naval force, which 1998: Naval force, 239). There is even a bilateral Franco-German remains partially active to keep warm Franco-German itself is puzzling, except as a mechanism Portuguese, Italian, Greek, and importantly, also Turkish naval forces. It sits, It naval forces. Turkish also importantly, and Italian, Greek, Portuguese, (Marquina and EU naval structures NATO both doll-like, within Matryoshka Operation Atalanta and offering what it terms a ‘non-standing but pre- and offering what it terms a Operation Atalanta force’. structured Spanish, French, combines which Med’, ‘Club a reality, in but naval group, the WEU and its merger into the EU (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting 2011) within having some organisational identity the EMF lives on However, This distinctive evolutionary can be considered an naval organization the mid 1990s, WEU were locked in an when the EU and the fossil from eventual dissolution of dance that ended with the institutional courtship notably EUROMARFOR (EMF). EUROMARFOR (EMF). notably forces. The EU must also co-operate and/or compete with unilateral with unilateral compete and/or also co-operate EU must The forces. actions at sea, with national naval matters, for organizations European multilateral alternative various co-operation is not just towards NATO or even UN-brokered naval naval is task UN-brokered or even NATO just towards not co-operation

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 16 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 17 https://idfspokesperson.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/list-of-attempts-by- and https://www.idfblog.com/hezbollah/2013/11/04/4-years-ago-idf-stopped-hezbollahs- 8 9 merger into the EU, one assumes that such a mission today would today a mission such assumes that one EU, the into merger http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11584 largest-ever-weapons-shipment-iran/ terrorist-organizations-to-smuggle-weapons-via-the-sea/ For Israeli perspectives, see: For 9 to be that the EU cannot assume it will always be the predominant nor 8 See: What can we say about this institutional complexity? One lesson appears What can we say about this institutional complexity? One lesson much less successful. It is smuggling possible that Hezbollah has continued also are routes land many although 2006, after route sea the via weapons available. can be judged a success. However, the objective of stopping Hezbollah’s stopping of objective the a success. However, judged be can been via ships has apparently heavy weapons (rockets) of smuggling the outcomes of such soft maritime security operations are not immune to immune are not soft maritime security operations of such the outcomes was to give diplomatic cover of that operation If the purpose controversy. it then Lebanon, Southern of its occupation from withdraw Israel to for The salience of nation state navies doing the operational heavy lifting salience of nation The obvious, rather should be structures, with ubiquitous ad hoc along here, than any well-developed and distinctive EU naval capability. Moreover, notably that of Brazil. naval withdrawal and help the Lebanese government before UNIFIL before Lebanese government naval withdrawal and help the 2008: naval peacekeepers arrived (Marta 3). Today, that mission remains navies, non-EU many of leadership participation and the with but ongoing UN-mandated and German-led naval force arrived, the Italian Navy naval force and German-led UN-mandated to cover Israeli Maritime Task Force’ unilaterally provided an ‘Interim However, this Combined Task Force 448 did not involve an EU dimension, EU an involve did not 448 Task Force Combined this However, being instead a partial Maritime Force activation of the European there the again, before Once mandate. UNIFIL the support to (EUROMARFOR) Lebanon in 2006, led by the German Navy. This mission was hastily Lebanon. Southern Israeli withdrawal from of an in the context together put be either given to the EU or potentially to NATO. be either given to coast of the off naval peacekeeping example of the Also instructive is in the Persian Gulf, which again was a non-EU operation. Given the WEU’s the Given operation. was a non-EU which again Persian Gulf, in the facto de especially at sea, where the Italian Navy became mired in controversy controversy mired in Navy became Italian the especially where at sea, the life. In loss of large-scale to boat led a migrant with a collision after operation a minesweeping responsibility for took the WEU also late 1980s, push back refugees, augmented by land forces. Its success was mixed, mixed, was success Its land forces. by augmented refugees, back push So 10 coalitions of the willing. It is easy willing. the of coalitions ad hoc maritime security actor at sea. In fact, operational operational In fact, at sea. actor security maritime European NATO also got drawn into the Yugoslavia crisis with Operation Maritime Monitor in July to November 1992, which 1992, which November July to in Monitor Maritime Operation Yugoslavia crisis with the into drawn also got NATO became operation Maritime Guard until 1993, and then it transferred to WEU ‘ownership’ as Operation Sharp Guard became operation Maritime Guard until 1993,to WEU ‘ownership’ as Operation Sharp and then it transferred in what was a merger at sea of two different naval operational strands.

10 By way of contrast with these limited violent incidents, some national navies, national some incidents, violent limited these with contrast of way By intensive quite in involved recently been have French, or British the as such luckless national contingent and chain-of-command ‘responsibility’? luckless national contingent and chain-of-command ‘responsibility’? for the operations was given to ‘EU forces’ rather than specific national to (say, children killed) horribly wrong had gone If things contingents. some diplomats or EU – attributed been responsibility have would whom scale incidents. Interestingly, the exact composition and nationality of the scale incidents. Interestingly, confidential kept been have 2012 May of raid beach the in used elements responsibility Thus, same nationality). the of hostages to harm prevent (to elements on beached pirate skiffs. There have been other encounters have been other beached pirate skiffs. There on elements small- have been these of most but used, has been force at sea where military missions on land, where, for example, the EU now seems in Mali to in seems now EU the example, for where, land, on military missions al. 2015). It et by proxy’ (Skeppström be engaged in ‘counter-insurgency dramatic raid was launched by EUNAVFOR that in 2012 is true at least one Third, there is has engaged in only very a puzzle over why the EU to date less by EU limited use of force at sea, certainly has been encountered than The puzzle of lethal force the puzzle here is: what does the EU uniquely offer for maritime security maritime for uniquely offer EU does the what is: here puzzle the don’t? that other institutions, like NATO, compete or complement the EU to deliver naval constabulary security at naval constabulary security or complement the EU to deliver compete the during effectively very so did They spectrum. the of end ‘softer’ the naval early stages of the blockade during the Yugoslavia civil war. mention private security actors, such as ship guards, consultants, and ship- such as ship guards, consultants, private security actors, mention could easily naval forces NATO that be noted it should Moreover, owners. parallel efforts by NATO’s operation Ocean Shield and the US-led Task US-led Task and the Ocean Shield operation by NATO’s parallel efforts navies (Malaysia, capable Asian of host a and 151. Russia, China Force to not there, roles have all played important Singapore) Korea, South actions by national navies and national navies actions by with shared be has to Atalanta operation success of the that forget to choices for policy-makers are much more complex than a simplistic a simplistic than complex binary more much are policy-makers for choices institutional A variety of a NATO mission. either an EU or for preference unilateral old-fashioned, least, not is available templates in emergencies, distinctively distinctively

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 18 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 19 New 14 Moreover, 11 , sending a frigate. Ukraine also Ukraine , sending a frigate. 12 , and Serbia has sent vessel-protection , and Serbia has sent vessel-protection 13 http://eunavfor.eu/operation-atalanta-ship-esps-meteoro-meets-colombian-warship-arc-7-de-agosto-at-sea/ http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12072.doc.htm, especially at points 8 and 10 http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12072.doc.htm, especially at points 8 and http://www.eu-norway.org/news1/frigate/#.VfssGkVDpJM http://eunavfor.eu/norway-and-switzerland-to-contribute-to-op-atalanta/ See: See: See: See: 13 14 11 12 (after previously doing time with the US-led Combined Maritime Forces US-led Combined (after previously doing time with the out of Bahrain). Moreover, the British and other EU states, including even troops as part of Operation Atalanta. More recently, the Columbian Navy the Columbian recently, Atalanta. More as part of Operation troops duty off Somalia with Operation Atalanta. a stint on up for turned Zealand briefly assigned her Orion patrol aircraft to EUNAVFOR in 2014 ‘Ocean Shield’. For obvious reasons, that ship is now back home, facing home, back ship is now that reasons, obvious ‘Ocean Shield’. For than Somali pirates. Switzerland sent troops grave threats much more food shipments to coordinate in EUNAVFOR missions as early as 2009 missions in EUNAVFOR sent a frigate in 2014, a stint with NATO’s operation after it previously did delivery of EU maritime security. Plucky little Iceland has made an amazing an has made little Iceland Plucky security. maritime EU delivery of FRONTEX-organised ongoing the to health, fiscal and size its for contribution, rescue missions for migrants off Libya has participated in 2015. Norway Fourth, there is a puzzle over the ‘EUness’ of EU maritime security, which is there Fourth, players in the states are quite important non-EU Some obvious. entirely not The puzzle of the of EU maritime “EUness” security after Brexit expressly prohibited. The effect was to force this EU mission into being a being mission into EU this force was to effect The expressly prohibited. was originally planned. much ‘softer’ intervention than what was finally reached, after much Russian and Chinese delay, this mandate mandate this delay, Chinese and Russian much after reached, finally was constabulary-type actions. to the use of force carefully limited waters (12 nautical miles) were within Libyan territorial EU naval operations support for such a use of force, both at the UN level but also from the EU’s EU’s the level but also from UN at the both such a use of force, support for In October 2015, member states. 2240 when a UN mandate in Resolution become more ‘kinetic’, up to and including military actions to destroy to and including military actions more ‘kinetic’, up to become people-trafficking boats, possibly via amphibious or naval special forces political Operation Sophia never received actual reality is that raids. The recent EU Operation Sophia (2015, ongoing) was initially in its concept of initially in its concept was (2015, ongoing) Sophia Operation EU recent stages progressively would in mission that as a naval drafted operations 2011. They have been sinking ‘enemy vessels’, conducting amphibious amphibious conducting vessels’, ‘enemy sinking been have They 2011. 2013). landings (Wollert raids and done forces have maritime security EU do they seem likely The most so any time soon. to do nor like this, nothing naval naval (2003) War Gulf in the second warfare of Libya or the intervention followers at a late stage rather than pacesetters from the outset (Tardy followers at a late stage rather than pacesetters from practice, because states who use this expedient agree to participate to agree this expedient use states who because practice, that conditions and terms operational on but mission security EU an in operational become They influence. to ability limited very only have they senior British officers, who have heretofore played a very visible and positive and visible very a played heretofore have who officers, British senior in have been not uncontroversial FPAs as Tardy explains, Moreover, role. centre outside London will no longer be used as an EU command centre, be used as an EU command longer will no outside London centre as it is today (although its NATO significance will remain). Brexit seems to also imply EU missions future will also lose the leadership and experience of However, Brexit would seem to imply that the Northwood command Agreement (FPA) (Tardy 2014). (FPA) (Tardy One must reiterate how valuable Agreement and participation in Operation Atalanta has been: the state ubiquitous non-EU have all played a significant role. navies of Norway and even Columbia sea operational outcomes of Brexit may be less obvious. It is worth noting that a Britain outside the EU could easily deploy its vessels and staff any future EU maritime missions, a Framework Participation relying on on that NATO also engages in similar like the EU, often soft security operations actual at- the Operation Atalanta, example of the in parallel following a joint NATO-EU template, although it is possible that the Brexit vote might vote Brexit the that possible is it although template, NATO-EU joint a push the Royal Navy’s political a ‘NATO-only’ preference, masters towards (see below). However, considering somewhat like the position of Denmark British naval co-operation with the EU may be pragmatically framed within framed pragmatically be may EU the with co-operation naval British unquestionable implications following this event for EU maritime security, maritime EU for event this following implications unquestionable in EU participate Navy will never Royal the that mean not it probably does missions. maritime security is very important, following the shock of the Brexit 2016 referendum and the UK’s apparently in imminent exit from June the EU. While there are Somalia have worked very well with each other (Gebhard and Smith 2014), (Gebhard and other very well with each Somalia have worked the between differences the are exactly what question: the begs which co-operation for NATO-EU 2014). This precedent two entities? (Riddervold There is no exclusivity here and no effort to build a cohesive, specifically and pragmatic promiscuity rules institutional at sea. Instead, EU identity off and EU forces NATO sway. It seems (quite rightly) holds co-operation Task Forces 150, 151, and NATO’s Ocean Shield. Ocean and NATO’s 151, Forces 150, Task the French, have not just deployed their navies to EUNAVFOR but also to also to but to EUNAVFOR navies their just deployed not have French, the

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 20 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 21 security operations labelled ‘EU’, we should ask if they are really such, orsecurity operations labelled ‘EU’, we should ask if they are really alongside Italian and EU naval forces, following UNCLOS norms for rescuealongside Italian and EU naval forces, following UNCLOS norms for chainat sea, and remains formally outside the EU’s operational control and maritimesee we when that us remind should details Such command. of diplomatic and legal agreement with the Italian Navy rather than gettingdiplomatic and legal agreement with the Italian Navy rather than operatesvessel Irish the that is result The bureaucracy. EU/Frontex mired in because domestic Irish law requires such for participation. However, Irelandparticipation. However, for such requires law Irish because domestic deployed patrol vessels in 2015 and again in 2016 to the Mediterranean bilateralsimpler a preferred authorities Irish the However, crisis. refugee be simply due to budgetary restrictions, however, the failure to secure abe simply due to budgetary restrictions, set-back,serious a also was 2015 October until mission the for mandate UN Ireland has deployed land forces on many EU missions, it has only sent navalIreland has deployed land forces officers as observers to Northwood in relation to Operation Atalanta. One maymissions anti-piracy to deployed been have ships Irish no why reason The case of Ireland towards EU maritime security is less well known. WhileThe case of Ireland towards EU maritime evolving EU maritime security role is evolving EU maritime security role likely for now, it seems to evolve, but be to maritime capabilities Turkey’s will continue that assume safe to or a NATO orientation. framed within either a unilateral bid for membership of the EU, yet EU membership suddenly returned on suddenly returned membership EU yet EU, the of membership bid for on the the agenda in 2015 to engage with Turkey as part of the EU’s desire an towards orientation Turkey’s Thus, Syrian civil war. crisis and the refugee EU types of missions and several EU states. The at sea involving Turkey serious slide a let to been has governments Turkish recent of orientation exclusively through NATO structures. The same type of ‘NATO first’ logic in formal participation their should note one although applies to Turkey, and non- the EMF, which leaves the possibility non-NATO open for future known. Because of their Maastricht Treaty-era opt outs from EU security missions anti-piracy ability for pushes its impressive policies, Denmark In fact, a future British reluctance to participate in EU maritime security is well Denmark case of The peculiar. or unique from forays will be far important important to any EU mission success, precisely because role. marginal in their missions or more be part of future unlikely to the British are will revolve around the increasing importance of not just the French Navy French the just not of importance increasing the around will revolve the of participation central) but especially always been (which has the simply who now become and Italians, Spanish, Dutch, German, more 2014: 4). Without the Royal Navy, any distinctively EU maritime operations operations EU maritime any distinctively Navy, Royal the 4). Without 2014: as well, where EU capabilities are more ‘marine constabulary’ EU capabilities‘marine constabulary’ nature as well, where are more in is visible a scenario problem here if we imagine than anything else. The skewed towards the softer end of the spectrum, which realists disdain spectrum, the end of softer skewed towards the and would not predict. This obviously applies to the maritime domain and hard security measures? has been capabilities employment security and EU reality of actual The security capability as insurance against NATO deadlock, then why have then deadlock, against NATO capability security as insurance capabilities soft between of giving it a full spectrum of stopped short they unhappy with interventions that offend her geopolitical interests, such as such interests, geopolitical her offend that interventions unhappy with puzzle the However, Syria). or Libya, today, and Balkans the of parts various here is, if the French and British foremost have invested in a distinctive EU meetings today are likely to be Germany (still squeamish on the use of the be Germany (still squeamish on meetings today are likely to as seen in Libya force, 2011) her neo-Ottomanist mode, or Turkey (in ‘close to NATO but if need be, also capable of operating outside NATO’. ‘close to NATO but if need be, also really In fairness the countries inside to the Americans, ‘awkward’ NATO and Syria. French and British frustration with the US during the Yugoslavia being ‘St. Malo logic’ of the term might wars also played a part in what we win) or as eventually happened in the case of Albania, a complete state Albania, a complete case of in the as eventually happened win) or collapse migration at sea, a crisis in 1997 leading to mass, uncontrolled that prefigures the current humanitarian disaster associated with Libya NATO but informally co-operative with NATO naval structures, has a long NATO naval structures, but informally co-operative with NATO spill focused on operations for as a contingency It was foreseen pedigree. overs from the Algerian conflict in the 1990s (fearing the Islamists might against America dominance (Kluth and Pilegaard 2011; Riddervold 2014; 2011; Riddervold Pilegaard and (Kluth dominance against America Rynning 2011). a ‘back-up’ The logic of naval formally distinct from force, European powers to engage in missions and face threats without relying without threats in missions and face engage powers to European understand it all One could as hegemony. US and, therefore, on NATO block European western balancing’ within the some type of ‘internal would, doubtless, find little difficulty explaining the EU’s foray into maritime into foray EU’s the explaining difficulty little find doubtless, would, capabilities allow to insurance of development security as basically the The puzzle of theoreticalThe puzzle interpretation and hues stripes different Realists of ugly heads. their rear IR theories Fifth, not operating within a formal NATO or other such structure? other such NATO or a formal within not operating are they expedient coalitions of the willing of (mostly) European states, just states, European (mostly) of of the willing coalitions expedient are they

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 22 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 23 who do not share European interpretations. as the primary objective of it’s own maritime security strategy, the EU sets law is actually international of regime itself if the obvious snares for rather powers manipulation by great to given or contested and complex quite By making such an emphasis on upholding the rule of international law disconnect. This signifies, from more material, EU maritime interests and cases, notably the utility in extreme of force to uphold international norms the controversial ‘right to protect’ doctrine. the rather typical medley of liberal security conceptions and translated and conceptions liberal security medley of typical rather the the is here puzzle the However, naval settings. and marine to them In contrast, the liberal school of IR theorists would not be surprised that the liberal In contrast, ‘normative them, For maritime security. developed ‘hard’ has not EU the has thus taken 2014 MSS of sea. The to Europe’ has simply power gone or else risk irrelevance in the marketplace for institutional security regimes. or else risk irrelevance in the marketplace of scale. The last time the French and British tried something like this on their own was at Suez in 1956. Perhaps, realists might predict that ‘insurance’ capabilities such ‘harder’ time EU maritime security will evolve over hard security assets. The EU Battle groups would seem hardly up to such a limited provide only would this). EUNAVFOR debate might a task (one be an aggressive amphibious template for what would have to operation appear gloriously irrelevant, as it is basically ‘laundry list’ of ‘soft appear gloriously irrelevant, as it a worthy security’ challenges and capabilities scenario that would demand in a In the event that EU naval forces have to be rushed into some kind of EU naval forces have to be rushed In the event that would EU maritime security strategy action, the more-demanding 181). Turkey was also initially very lukewarm about NATO’s 2011 military 2011 NATO’s about lukewarm was also initially very 181). Turkey intervention in Libya. NATO operation problematic or delayed, as has happened in the past in the delayed, as has happened operation problematic or NATO objections delayed the and Turkish Greek Macedonia, where concerning mission a NATO peace-keeping an EU one (Phillips to transition from 2004: refused to participate in the NATO mission but did not block it. Turkey, it. block did not but mission NATO the in participate to refused a make future, may, in the that interests has distinctive within NATO, intervene in Europe’s neighbourhood because of a NATO unwillingness unwillingness NATO a of because neighbourhood Europe’s in intervene 2011, crisis of Libyan the during that should recall act. We slowness to or was administration the Obama to initially reluctant Germany use force. where EU powers (France, Italy, UK, Spain, etc.) felt it necessary to urgently urgently to felt it necessary etc.) Spain, Italy, UK, (France, EU powers where Had it not 15 , questionable and thus in conflict with the EU’s stated a priori http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12072.doc.htm See: 15 (Doyle 1986; Schimmelfennig 2001). of the literature on liberal normative IR approaches, which stresses the be widely applied expand and imperialistic the approach to ambitions of (NATO or a coalition of the willing) would turn up to fight with or without UN without or with fight to up turn would willing) the of coalition a or (NATO this means the EU maritime security mandates if need be. In some ways, in much assertion the to in contrast a corner, itself into has painted regime could be found), would be simply left to other actors. The EU, as a liberal EU, as a actors. The be simply other would left to could be found), elements rougher as stand down, would then security regime, normative Another interpretation is that unilateral military interventions in such unilateral military interventions is that interpretation Another lawful alternative (say, because no truly needed if they were scenarios, so extensive that they would make any unilateral European action at seaat action European unilateral any make would they that extensive so the logic of ‘normative power’ Europe. seem an obvious contradiction with what it wants regarding EU maritime security. Admittedly, the documentwhat it wants regarding EU maritime oncontingent be will operations security marine EU that state not does to international law and regimes areUN mandates, but the references and central to that problem is also a fundamental evasiveness over theand central to that problem is also been explained, the MSS text does notuse of force in the EU’s MSS. As has make very clear how, when, and where the EU will actually fight to get Such scenarios reveal the EU has material and territorial interests in marineSuch scenarios reveal the EU has security that may conflict with the rule-of-law norms that the EU preaches, would be, rule of international law. adherence to the been forthcoming, the EU would have had to contemplate a unilateral contemplate to have had would EU the forthcoming, been mandate. The legality of such use of force without a UN intervention justify arming rebel groups and, eventually, regime change. In the end, change. groups and, eventually, regime justify arming rebel that actually limited grudgingly approved but in a way a mandate was Sophia to outside Libya the EU’s Operation territorial waters. from unease about the way the original UN mandate to intervene in Libya in Libya mandate to intervene the original UN about the way from unease to powers/NATO, western by the interpreted was permissively in 2011 maritime mission (Operation Sophia) off the coast of Libya (Resolution (Resolution of Libya coast off the Sophia) (Operation mission maritime especially of Chinese and because emerge 2240) time to took a very long this originates that is well known It Council. Security in the Russian opposition To cite an example already mentioned, the UN authorization for an EU an for authorization UN the mentioned, already example an cite To

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 24 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 25 medievalism of political by suggesting that while a de-centring authority world’ will also be post- this ‘new note, of central phenomenon is the Rennger (2006) adds another dimension of the invocation of neo- cohesive federal Westphalian state, principally because of the absence the principally cohesive federal Westphalian state, because of existing nation partly builds on result is a polity that The demos. common of states but also goes well beyond this and in ways that are confusing. their demise, remain coherent and highly capable Instead, the actors. their demise, remain coherent is that the EU is unlikely to become itself a central claim, as Zielonka puts it, efforts without the French, Germans, and the British nation states, but it Moreover, bargaining and interests alone. their to reducible is surely not of rumours despite and institutions, maritime interests national strong the claim that nation states do not continue to matter, when they clearly when they to matter, continue the claim that nation states do not EU naval do. Not much would happen regarding or maritime security EU today. He did not in fact think states had yet lost their sovereignty to EU today. He did not is This us. was really upon order neo-medieval genuine a that extent the involve to have not neo-medieval perspective does a because important, It is important to point out that Bull only sketched out the neo-medieval is how it is used to explain the complexity of the which idea as metaphor, was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and awas sovereign in the sense of being (Bull 1977: 254). given segment of the Christian population...’ be replaced not by a world government but by a modern and secular by a world government but by be replaced not political organisation that existed inequivalent of the kind of universal Ages. In that system no ruler or stateWestern Christendom in the Middle to some comments made by Hedley Bull in his ‘Anarchical Society’ (1977), (1977), Society’ ‘Anarchical his in Bull Hedley by made comments some to wherehe imagined in the future: and disappear might states ‘sovereign of being something like a Westphalian state actor, or on the way to being like a Westphalian of being something state actor, writings associated with the clearly is today most work This body of such. of Jan Zielonka (2006), however, its antecedence is usually traced back bold claim that the EU might best be understood as a ‘neo-medieval best be understood EU might the bold claim that standard the to EU the hold views, which academic to Empire’ in contrast ‘neo-medieval’ perspective as an alternative IR tradition that can make can that tradition IR alternative as an perspective ‘neo-medieval’ the especially of security, maritime into foray EU’s puzzling the of sense this is the to Central encompass. to now, for seems mostly, style it ‘softer’ How then are we to make sense of these puzzles? This paper offers the paper offers the puzzles? This sense of these are we to make How then A Neo-Medieval Perspective on the and the EU Perspective A Neo-Medieval EUMSS policies and hold to EU norms are much wider than the list of member for example, raising issues of Scottish and, perhaps, Catalan independence. actually participate in EU that countries those before, As we have seen states there will join the EU, or when they will do so: 10 years or 20 years fromstates there will join the EU, or when they will do so: 10 years or 20 years now? Equally, Brexit puts the stability of the EU’s western borders in question, automatic. Croatia was left waiting for 10 years in a limbo-like pre-accessionautomatic. Croatia was left waiting a full member. The entire Westernstatus before being permitted to become Balkans is a question mark as to what extent all, or just some, of the various what polity is ‘out’ of the wider spheres of influence of the EU isvague and signed, but progress and entry is far fromshifts. Accession agreements are in the case of Hungary), but these are being challenged, contested, andin the case of Hungary), but these movements) and above (by the EU itself,negotiated from below (by people polity is ‘in’ andMoreover, what in Hungary). played out see being as we Some EU states keep pretty ‘hard’, rigidly policed borders (as we are seeingare we (as borders policed rigidly ‘hard’, pretty keep states EU Some has become today. For example, the borders of the EU are somewhat has become today. For were in medieval unclear, just like many borders times, although not exactly in the same way. the EU has become a new Holy Roman Empire, or that it actually is a actually it that or Empire, Holy Roman a new become has EU the are Instead, the point is there pathologies. medieval political replay of EU polity the the medieval system and the analogies between functional attempt to extract implications EU’s maritime security policy. from it for the literal claim that is no There some misconceptions. we can dispose of First, borders’ or ‘victims to be saved at all costs’. borders’ or ‘victims we a little before neo-medieval perspective clarifying the is worth It issues (piracy) may enjoy broad disdain, but other topics may be more topics may be more other disdain, but broad enjoy issues (piracy) may to ‘threat as a seen be should people boat whether example, divisive, for values. The implications of this are not immediately obvious for the EU’s EU’s the for immediately obvious implications of this are not values. The and ‘wrongs the on agreement it means that but security strategy, marine address may be elusive. Certain policy is supposed to rights’ of what that may be a broad consensus on a mix of democracy, markets, and rule of markets, a mix of democracy, on a broad consensus may be way of shared much else by be not may EU polity, there the law within absence of shared ethical meta-narratives (Rennger 2006: 64-66). Foreign Foreign 64-66). 2006: (Rennger meta-narratives ethical shared of absence pitching them, for out cut work post-modern will have their policy-makers justifications and legitimacy to sucha diverse ‘audience’. So while there modern and, therefore, replete with ethical and normative conflict in the conflict and normative ethical with replete therefore, and, modern

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 26 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 27 the Mediterranean are liable to shift and be contested. The EU will, like The are liable the Mediterranean to shift and be contested. and extent are, as we have seen, somewhat unclear. I think an important I think unclear. somewhat have seen, as we are, and extent trajectory EU is that its future the neo-medieval description of the part of is not settled. Membership is fluid. The Union’s borders to the east and in as the EU is conversely always a settled project. Collapse and breakup project. settled always a is conversely EU as the EU’s boundaries the thing, one For 2014). (Zielonka possible outcomes are 2001). polity such to infer that a neo-medieval However, it would be very wrong regulated market capitalism, together with liberal regulated market capitalism, democracy, the rule of together provide a secular equivalent (Friedrichs human rights for law, and respect strong forces that imposed some cohesiveness. The ‘unity of Christendom’, ‘unity of Christendom’, that imposed some cohesiveness. The forces strong (Keen style it, was one normative force as historian Maurice Keen used to of some form wide consensus on that 1991). Today it has been suggested medieval literature is careful not to suggest that a neo-medieval polity medieval literature is careful not of coercion incapable of patterns or internally disordered, is chaotic, all, had after medieval realm, polities. The ‘subjects’ and constituent on Bull clearly implied that the decline of states would produce a neo- wider the was reconstituted, order new a before chaos of amount certain Another confusion concerns whether the neo-medieval analogy implies the neo-medieval analogy whether confusion concerns Another stable. While would be order an such extent what to or chaos, anarchy, Such opacity about the limes of the EU’s empire constitutes a reality that Such opacity about the limes of justifies the sobriquet ‘neo-medieval’. membership. However, that pathway was until recently stalled, and only in pathway was until recently that membership. However, 2015 the EU is was or is it resuscitated. Whether committed to anything not vague. remains Moldova and Ukraine the for status association, than more about EU borders in a way that echoes medieval practices of suzerainty. medieval practices of echoes in a way that EU borders about Turkey was 10 track for considered to be on a progressive years ago ubiquitous as to be a ‘norm’. ubiquitous as to Moreover, according to Zielonka, there is likely to be considerable flux as a ‘stealth’ member state. Small but politically significant contributions is so ‘fuzziness’ type of This states. non-member other made by were she is the FRONTEX missions today, although she is not at all an EU member member EU an all at not is she although today, missions FRONTEX the is she soon. Yet her one anytime to become looks most unlikely state and is participation is that Norway in EU affairs so extensive described routinely states. In EUNAVFOR, Norway was a significant and valuable presence, as presence, valuable and significant a was Norway EUNAVFOR, In states. , which command wide support (2011: 289). Piracy at sea at (2011:289). Piracy support wide command which , 16 Best defined as: “Valence issues in their simplest sense are those for which there is really only one side – for example peace, prosperity, ...everyone is on the same side” (Maddox and Lilie 1984: 135).

16 is obviously such a valence topic. Who could not be against it? What other be against it? What not could Who is obviously such a valence topic. maritime security problem could draw in the Chinese, Asian, European, Somalia? Seen off together work all to Russian navies, and even US, the difficult to articulate and execute a unified common policy unless over issues valence can utilize two essays by Jan Zielonka (2011, 2013), considers where he observes that he system. First, international in the EU as an actor the the polycentric nature of EU decision-making means that the EU finds it To extract possible implications from the neo-medieval perspective, we neo-medieval perspective, implicationsthe possible from extract To Perspective for EU Maritime Security Perspective Conclusion: Implications from the Neo-Medieval Implications from Conclusion: seemingly minimal. included aggressive scenarios that envisage amphibious landings to included aggressive scenarios here strategy EU’s maritime security The a Russian occupation. counter its relevance to such hard security threats is is ominously silent. Moreover, confidence building’. NATO has also staged elaborate BALTOPS exercises exercises BALTOPS elaborate staged also has NATO building’. confidence in 2015 and 2016, to reassure the very nervous Baltic States. These have regulation of aircraft emissions deployed naval and air trading. Russia has regulation NATO Cold war ways, a move that traditional in rather assets menacingly rather than the EU has seen fit to respond to through a policy of ‘military using a mix of hard and soft power. China has threatened to ground EU ground to China has threatened power. hard and soft using a mix of EU attempted extra-territorial the when Airbus orders aircraft and cancel It should also be clear, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, that the clear, after the annexation It should also be imperial powers, by other contested will be externally EU the expansion of impulses will to and fro, and we should expect such dynamics to play out to such dynamics expect and we should and fro, will to impulses security policy. as EU maritime domains, such in discrete There will also be countervailing will interests and voices, forces, internal be countervailing also There to a smaller the EU project, less and return to reign in ambition who seek imperial, more territorially cohesive, less complex, costly, and risky. Both all empires, display ambitions to expand its extent, influence, andpower.

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 28 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 29 NATO’s focus on intensive war-fighting roles at sea. I have previously In this respect, one could be optimistic that the EU might offer a niche of niche a offer might EU the optimistic that be could one this respect, In at force of forms more-nuanced less-lethal and in capabilities engage to can do, but it may sap sea. This is something that NATO and undermine as realists suppose. Instead, what is of more interest is how the EU MSS EU the is how interest more is of what as realists suppose. Instead, seems ‘doomed’ to skirt the ‘grey zone’ of intermediate levels of force. Related to this, what we would not expect is that the EU will lurch is that the expect we would not this, what Related to towards developing hard naval power to balance its soft normative side, why Operation Sophia has evolved tentatively, despite some ambitious why Operation Sophia has evolved much more robust. staff planning that imagined something should predict caution rather than boldness from the EU maritime security should predict caution rather than regime. This partly explains wait till why we had to in 2008 EUNAVFOR for and a distinctively EU-branded maritime operation, of debut major the at sea with some care. It has to, because it has to husband what limited at sea with some care. It has to, maritime capabilities be fatal for the stability it has. Any mistakes could of we suggests This insight regime. and still-unproven security is a new what However, these features should logically However, these features should make the EU a discriminating deploy force to how and where, when, choose to want would that actor over the evolving EU row over the extent, severity, and possible relaxation ofover the evolving EU row over the ongoing Ukraine crisis.sanctions against Putin’s role in the the EU likely to back down when faced with a serious military challenge.the EU likely to back down when much as see We instead. power economic EU’s the use to is reflex the Instead peace-keeping and constabulary-like missions have been undertaken, such constabulary-like missions have peace-keeping and cards’, at best, being the result is an EU polity with ‘ace as EUNAVFOR. The access. This makesinstruments of trade deals and market hard economic feedback de-legitimising the EU. Zielonka’s core insight here is that the EU’sthe that is here insight core Zielonka’s EU. the de-legitimising feedback an impressive plethora of is essentially limited, even if ‘hard’ military power no military means but rather that using such is (a) not the preferred option, but rather that using such is (a) no military means and brittle, it has to be the EU’s military power is shallow and (b) because generates importantotherwise it will very likely fail, which used selectively, Second, the EU is mostly a civilian power, which does not mean she has which does not a civilian power, the EU is mostly Second, if the issue was one not given to consensus (say, to consensus not given one issue was if the intervention a second into Libya) then the EU would find itmuch harder to agree to deploy and mission. maritime security a more-controversial execute this way, EUNAVFOR’s success is not so remarkable, and we can suggest suggest we can and so remarkable, is not success EUNAVFOR’s this way, EU states will want to pull their vessels from EUNAVFOR and an anti-piracy and an EUNAVFOR vessels from pull their to states will want EU risk being seen as irrelevant. We can see this geopolitical tension playing risk being seen as irrelevant. We can see this geopolitical tension out already. As ships and assets are pooled to help FRONTEX deal with does this mean the humanitarian disaster unfolding in the Mediterranean, thousands of people during 2015 (Patalano 2015: 17). That magnitude of involved or step up and become either EU’s MSS to a problem requires the it will devote its attentions and capabilities. Consider that the Italian the and capabilities. that Consider it will devote its attentions were countries, other by ships from augmented Coastguard, Navy and periods, 24-hour around 9,000 people a week and, in some rescuing human security emergency, then clearly the EU’s maritime security policy human security emergency, where about choices geopolitical obvious but hard some make to has It is all very well to help local navies keep the straits of Malacca free from Malacca free straits of the help local navies keep to well is all very It prosper. East Asia can and South China with trade Europe’s that piracy, so faces an unprecedented Mediterranean However, if at the same time the looking rather than externally focused (2013: 12). looking rather than externally focused in the CRIMSON projects and in the MSS text will in the CRIMSON projects and in be in tension with the stabilisation for the EU’s near need to provide proximate marine forces inward as a proclivity to be more waters. Zielonka describes this tension The Balkan countries are obvious examples here, but also some eventually Libya. One implication states, such as Tunisia and perhaps of Africa is this, for any EU maritime strategy, emphasis that the global on operations very dynamic and fluid situation. There are many states on the periphery as Zielonka styles them – ‘protectorates’. or EU, that are associates of the Third, regarding borders and centre-periphery relations, the EU, unlike EU, the relations, centre-periphery and borders regarding Third, a China, Russia), is faced with possible ‘imperial powers’ (America, other 2013). Who better to face down post-modern threats at sea than a post- a sea than at threats post-modern down face to better Who 2013). as the EU? modern polity such judicious use of coastguard-type forces rather than navies. These employ navies. These than rather forces coastguard-type judicious use of the sea with nationalist style, share less-lethal tactics and, in post-modern activists, ‘rent-a-mob’ fishermen and various other non-state actors (Liss the need for intermediate-level maritime forces, noting how in the South in the how noting forces, maritime intermediate-level need for the Pacific increasingtensions between China and Japan are played out by labour, whereby the EU deliberately should develop its soft maritime maritime its soft develop should EU deliberately the whereby labour, the or to NATO defence roles naval capabilities security and leave proper on has written example, Alex Calvo (2014), level (Flynn 2015). national for argued that NATO and the EU should consider a functional division division a functional consider EU should and the NATO that argued of

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 30 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 31 blockade and turning back blockade and turning de facto Canary Islands in the Atlantic). The Italian solution in Operation Alba (1997) Italian solution in Operation Canary Islands in the Atlantic). The is no longer available. Mounting a is not legally refugees permissible anymore. In 2012, the ECHR in its Hirsi of that is arguably happening now regarding the boat people tragedy, the regarding now that is arguably happening of as the as far (including Mediterranean wider the in has unfolded which Finally, because so much emphasis has been placed on soft instruments soft placed on emphasis has been much Finally, because so its ensure be careful to EU will have to the and normative power, test huge claim. A likes to as it as impressive are credentials normative USA, have considerable say in how the EU evolves by their own actions. USA, have considerable say in how such as Germany, refuse to simply get involved? We cannot know for know simply involved? We cannot to get such as Germany, refuse is that the EU as quasi-empire here sure, however, Zielonka’s observation the notably powers, great other the Moreover, divide. is relatively easy to even a major naval confrontation in the Pacific with China? Post-Brexit Britain would seem an obvious candidate here. Would other EU states, and likely have a great focus on the harder ‘naval defence’ aspects. ‘naval defence’ harder the on focus and likely have a great plausible states would be divided. it is also as that European However, global leadership, including to follow American Would some states choose might conspire to push European states towards looking increasingly to might conspire to push European capabilities. themselves for security and defence This would in theory ambitious, more stronger, policy much make an EU maritime security military hegemony was attractive. It is not impossible American attractive. It is not that future was military hegemony presidential administrations, or events in the Pacific concerning China, a pragmatic relationship, especially a pragmatic relationship, quickly over anti-piracy. Yet how we forget that during the Bush presidencies (2000-2008), the desire for some American distinct security capabilities Europeans to have apart from making (Zielonka 2013: 12). Thus, we should expect quite a bit of regime a bit of quite expect should we Thus, 2013: 12). (Zielonka making far has been and the EU’s MSS, which so say NATO competition between, Zielonka also points to the fundamental weakness of the EU as neo- to the fundamental weakness Zielonka also points powers (America, Russia, and great medieval from other polity to pressures decision- EU’s diversity and polycentric can easily exploit the China) that borders of the EU imperium. of the EU imperium. borders happens happens when the mandate for EUNAVFOR is reconsidered in late 2016, EU naval capabilities have to logic will be a growing there arguably but maritime contested and fuzzy the given especially home, to closer pitched mission that seems to have run its course? It will be interesting to see what see what to interesting will be It its course? run have to seems that mission

Médecins Sans Frontières Sans Médecins We might also speculate here that We might also 18 (Application no. 27765/09), Judgment delivered 23 February 2012. . The ex-military personnel are notably from the Maltese armed forces. Vessels include the Vessels include forces. armed Maltese the from notably are personnel ex-military The . found heavily against the Italian state for intercepting and returning returning and intercepting for state Italian the against heavily found http://www.moas.eu/ Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy Hirsi Jamaa and Others 17 Phoenix, which has been operational off the coast off Libya since May 2, 2015, replete with a leased drone. This vessel This with a leased drone. Libya since May 2, 2015, replete coast off the off operational which has been Phoenix, third a is there and people, 700 of capacity rescue a has which Argos, Bourbon the boat, second a by joined been has vessel, Dignity 1. See: See: 17 18 ambiguous, confusing, and contingent in its stability should in its direction, and contingent and ambiguous, confusing, we not expect the same from the EU’s maritime security policy? reality to the EU’s MSS and serves as a useful corrective for what has been what for EU’s MSS and serves as a useful corrective the reality to operation successful mission: very one just from much so infer to rush a widely viewed as as a polity remains EU the Given that Atalanta. In conclusion, the neo-Medieval framework helps bring a large dose of dose a large helps bring framework neo-Medieval the conclusion, In change the definition of artificial Islands. Europe might be America’s formal absence from the in such fraught negotiations, given quite alone UNCLOS framework. They may seek, for example, to reduce the scope for ‘innocent passage passage ‘innocent scope for the reduce to example, for may seek, They seas or like territorial more something make EEZs into warships’ or of dominated by Europeans alone. It is very possible Chinese, dominated by Europeans alone. that growing Brazilian, and Indian voices within UNCLOS epistemic communities might sea. the for basic legal framework that of key features seek to change Overall, the normative environment the EU faces is Overall, arguably more the normative environment in style, and certainly not one that will complex than ever, post-modern be operations, and the neo-medieval approach would expect it to grow in in grow it to would expect neo-medieval approach the and operations, 2015; White and Macleod 2008). the maritime domain as well (Gould ‘business’. This is less navies and security contractors a question of private likely at sea, but more imagery, less-controversial providers of drones, the for land is already evident trend types of support. This logistics, and other to private commercial marine security actors more than the nation the than more actors security commercial marine private to of out done be to keen not are Coastguards Navies and whose states, Aid Station), a charitable organisation that features several highly that features several highly charitable organisation Aid Station), a experienced ex-military personnel. resorting comfortable more be polity, could as a neo-medieval EU, the is the presence of private NGO actors at sea: at actors NGO private of presence is the Offshore (Migrant MOAS with together ships three less than have no (MSF) boat people to Libya in 2009 (at least one of these subsequently died in died subsequently these of one (at least in 2009 Libya to people boat and Coastguards to left not are seas the Moreover, camps). Gaddafi-era situation current the novelty of One disaster. this unfolding in navies alone ruling

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 36 Vol.XVIII,XXII No. (75) 66 - 2016- 2012 37 , 35 (1): 1-18. The European Union as a Global as a Global Union European The , 16, 281-301. London: John Wiley & Sons. London: John Wiley . London: Routledge. pp.128-149. . London: The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Journal of European Integration Journal of European . Oxfordshire: Routledge. pp 3-19. pp Routledge. . Oxfordshire: Is the EU Doomed? Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European European Enlarged the of Nature The Empire: as Europe has been a lecturer within the School of Political of School within the a lecturer has been . OUP, Oxford. or Medieval Chaos? or Medieval Chaos? Union Affairs Review European Foreign M., Wagnsson, C., eds. C., M., Wagnsson, from the Campaign Learned Whitman, R. G. and Wolff, S., eds. Wolff, S., G. and R. Whitman, Manager Conflict been the Irish Fishers’ Knowledge Project (2008-2013). his research is focused on marine renewables and EU marine EU and renewables marine on is focused his research major research project has security debates. His most recent University of Essex and PhD degrees, the latter for his Masters policy”. environmental EU of Evolution the and “Subsidiarity on: politics while policy and marine and European teaches He Brendan Flynn Science & Sociology, NUIG, since 1998. He has studied at the Zielonka, J., 2014. Zielonka, J., 2014. Zielonka, J., 2013. The International System in Europe: Westphalian Anarchy Westphalian in Europe: System International 2013. The J., Zielonka, Zielonka, J., 2011. The EU as an International Actor: Unique or Ordinary? or Unique Actor: International as an EU 2011. The J., Zielonka, Zielonka, J., 2006. J., Zielonka, Wollert, C., 2013. Naval Assets: not just a tool for war. In Engelbrekt,K., Mohlin, for war. In Engelbrekt,K., not just a tool 2013. Naval Assets: Wollert, C.,