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TITLE PAGE

US MILITARY OPERATIONS, GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN , 2001-2010

BY

OKAFOR, IFEANYICHUKWU PG/MSC/09/50976

A PROJECT REPORT SUMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS).

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

JANUARY, 2011

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APPROVAL PAGE

THIS PROJECT REPORT HAS BEEN APPROVED ON BEHALF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA.

BY

------DR KEN IFESINACHI PROF. OBASI IGWE (PROJECT SUPERVISOR) (HEAD OF DEPARTMENT)

------PROF. E.O. EZEANI EXTERNAL EXAMINER DEAN OF FACULTY

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DEDICATION

THIS WORK IS DEDICATED TO THE ALMIGHTY GOD

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT To successfully complete this research work, I have inevitably incurred innumerable intellectual debt worthy of proper acknowledgement. First, I wish to register my unalloyed gratitude to God Almighty for His blessings and protection throughout the period of my academic sojourn in this great citadel of learning. Second, I wish to gratefully appreciate the intellectual inputs of both academic and non academic staff of Political Science Department especially my humane and brilliant supervisor – Dr. Ken Ifesinachi who patiently and dexterously guided me throughout this research work. I thank him. I also thank other lecturers like Dr. Aloysius-Michaels Okolie, Prof. Jonah Onouha, Prof. Obasi Igwe, Prof. Ikejiani Clark, Dr. I. Abada and others. Third, I wish to say a big thank you to my big brother and mentor Mr. Chilaka Francis who has consistently shown me that a sincere friend is better than uncaring brother. I thank you for assisting me in sourcing relevant materials for this project work. Also, worthy to mention are the services of my friends – Mr. Ejogo Ebele Michael, Mr. Kelechukwu Isaac, Mr. Ugochukwu Ugwu and others. Finally, I must also thank my parents, brothers and sisters – Chief and Mrs. Nwachukwu Okafor, Mr. Christopher M. Okafor, Mrs. Ijeoma Ukpai, Chinonso Okafor, Onyedikachi Okafor, Ginika Okafor, Chukwuebuka Okafor, Mr. F.C Nwachukwu, Mr. Friday Okafor and Mr. Chinedu Nwachukwu who have not only borne the burden of my academic pursuit, but have equally insisted that I must share in the joy of literacy. They have been wonderful indeed. Okafor, Ifeanyichukwu Political Science January, 2011.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Title page------i Approval Page------ii Dedication------iii Acknowledgement------iv Table of Contents------v Abstract------vi List of Acronyms and Abbreviations------vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Statement of Problem 1.3 Objectives of Study 1.4 Significance of Study 1.5 Literature Review 1.6 Theoretical Framework 1.7 Hypotheses 1.8 Method of Data Collection CHAPTER TWO: US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

2.1 US Military Plans before the 2001 Afghanistan Attacks 2.2 Legal Basis for War 2.3 Various Account of War in Afghanistan 2.4 International Reaction to the War CHAPTER THREE: US MILITARY STRATEGIES IN AFGHANISTAN AND INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

3.1 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom 3.2 Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building 3.3 , Al Qaeda, and Related Insurgent Groups vi

3.4 The NATO- Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Security in Afghanistan

CHAPTER FOUR: US MILITARY OPERATIONS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFGHANISTAN 4.1 Post-Taliban Nation Building 4.2 Political Transition in Afghanistan 4.3 Enhancing Local Governance

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 5.1 Summary 5.2 Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT America’s military invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 has attracted a lot of scholarly debate. Its military operations in Afghanistan till date have plagued the nation into a cesspit of insecurity and misgovernance. This study has been designed to critically evaluate US military operations, governance and security in Afghanistan. To achieve the aim of the study, we raised two research questions. First, did the US government’s military strategies de-escalate the menace of insecurity in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010? Second, has the US government’s military operations enhanced the stability of government in Afghanistan? The study anchored analysis on power theory, relied heavily on qualitative data did expost facto research design to analyze the study. After a critical review of available data and literature, the study revealed as fallows: first, that the US government’s military strategies have not reduced the menace of insecurity in Afghanistan second, US government’s military operations has not enhanced stability of governance in Afghanistan. The study is of the view that as long as America continues to have the erroneous believes that its relationship with Afghanistan is defined in terms of power, security and internal stability of governance will be a mirage in Afghanistan.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

OEF-Operation Enduring Freedom

ISAF-International Security Assistance Force

NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ANA-Afghan National Army

ANP-Afghan National Police

UNSC-United Nations Security Council 1

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION The US military Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched along with the British military in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US. The UK has since 2002, led its own military operation, , as part of the same war in Afghanistan. The character of the war evolved from a violent struggle by US led forces against Al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters, to a complex counter-insurgency effort by U.S- led forces against Afghans who claim to be trying to expel those U.S.- led forces. The war has killed tens of thousands of people, the majority of whom have been civilians (http://en.wikipedia.or/wiki/war in Afghanistan2001 , retrieved on 15/11/2010). The first phase of the war was the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001 when the United States Launched Operation Enduring Freedom, which they claimed had the goal of “removing the safe haven to Al-Qaeda and its use of the Afghan territory as a base of operations for anti-US, and terrorist activities”. In the first phase, US and coalition forced, working with the Afghan opposition forces of the , quickly ousted the Taliban regime. During the following Karzai administration, the character of the war shifted to an effort aimed at smothering an insurgency hostile to the US-backed Karzai government, in which the insurgents preferred not to directly confront the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 2 troops, but blended into the local population and mainly used Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Suicide Bombings. However, the US government claimed that the aim of their invasion was to find Osama Bin Laden and other high-ranking Al-Qaeda members to be put on trial, to destroy the organization of Al-Qaeda, and to remove the Taliban regime which supported and gave safe harbor to it. The Bush administration stated that as policy, it would not distinguish between terrorist organizations and nations or governments that harbored them. In other words, another ongoing operation is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was established by the UN Security Council at the end of December 2001 to secure and the surrounding areas. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed control of ISAF in 2003. By July 23, 2009, ISAF had around 64,500 troops from 42 countries with NATO members providing the core of the force. The NATO commitment is particularly important to the United States because it appears to give international legitimacy to the war. The United States has approximately 29,950 troops in ISAF. NATO Chief Promises to stand by Afghanistan (New York Times, 22 December, 2009). Moreover, the US and UK led the aerial bombing in support of ground forces supplied primarily by the Afghan Northern Alliance. In 2002, American, British and Canadian infantry were committed along with Special Forces from several allied nations, including Australia. Later, NATO troops were added, and the initial attack removed the Taliban from power, but Taliban forces have since regained strength. According to Rothstein (2006), 3

Afghanistan has experienced increased Taliban-led insurgent activity, record-high levels of illegal drug production with participation by Northern Alliance drug lords in the Karzai regime, and a corrupt government with limited control outside of Kabul. The Taliban can sustain itself indefinitely, according to a December 2009 briefing by the top U.S intelligence officer in Afghanistan. The Slide I PDF (2010) maintains that on December 1, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that he would escalate U.S. military involvement by deploying an additional 30,000 soldiers over a period of six months. He also proposed to begin troop withdrawals 16 months from the date. The following day, the former American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal cautioned that the timeline was flexible and is not an absolute, and the Defense Secretary Robert Gates when asked by a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, if it is possible that no soldiers would be withdrawn in July 2011, responded, “the President, as commander in chief always has the option to adjust his decisions”. Furthermore, Aziakou and Gerard (2010) believe that on January 26, 2010 at the International Conference on Afghanistan in London which brought together some 70 countries and organizations. Afghan President , told world leaders that he intended to reach out to the top echelons of the Taliban within a few weeks with a peace initiative. Karzai set the frame work for dialogue with Taliban leaders when he called on the group’s leaders to take part in a “loyal jirga or large assembly of elders to initiate peace talks. In the words of Hamid Shalizi and Abdul Malek (2010), opinion polls have shown decreased support 4 for the war of occupation since 2001. Polls in 2001 show that the majority of people in the U.S.A., the U.K., Australia, and several N.A.T.O. countries are opposed to their governments waging war in Afghanistan. According to Kenneth (2010), with Afghanistan divested after more than 20 years of warfare, the fall of the Taliban paved the way for the success of long-stalled United Nation effort to form a broad-based Afghan government and for a U.S.-led coalition to begin building legitimate governing institutions. Post- September 11, 2010 Afghanistan policy was predicated on the assumption that preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a terrorism safe haven required the building of strong governing institutions, functioning democracy, and economic development. This task has proved more difficult than anticipated because of the effects of the years of war, the low literacy rate of the population, the difficult terrain and geography, and the relative lack of trained government workers. The Obama Administration’s “strategic review” of Afghanistan policy, the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, narrowed official U.S. goals to preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the strategy in many ways, tries to enhance nation building by providing more civilian advisers and mentors to expand and reform the Afghan government, security forces and develop the economy. The military campaign in Afghanistan has taken on a fresh slant as coalition allies have moved towards counterinsurgency operations that emphasis population security, and have begun drawing up longer term plans to strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces with a view to 5 transitioning security control to the ANSF from the end of 2010 in order that coalition military forces can begin to withdraw from mid 2011. This study is therefore, designed to evaluate the US military operations, governance and security in Afghanistan.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States of America, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban when it refused to extradite Bin Lade judging that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S. forces to search for Al-Qaeda activists there. Thus, on October 7, 2001 the U.S. government launched military operations in Afghanistan. According to Steve (2004), teams from the CIA’s Special Activities Division (SAD) were the first U.S. forces to enter Afghanistan and begin combat operations. They were soon joined by U.S. Army Special Forces from the 5 th Special Forces Group. These forces worked with Afghan oppositions groups on the ground in particular the Northern Alliance. The U.K., Canada and Australia also deployed forces and several other countries provided basing, access and over flight permission. It should be noted that the main objective of the war was to eliminate Al-Qaeda and their Taliban host. Thus, with superior militarily power, the US led forces captured important Al-Qaeda strongholds like Mazar-I Sharif, Kabul, Kunduz, Qala-I-Janghi, , etc. 6

With the capturing of these cities and Subsequent fled of Kabul by the Taliban led government, the US with the support of the United Nations hosted the Bonn Conference in Germany. The result was the Bonn Agreement which created the Afghan Interim Authority that would serve as the “repository of Afghan sovereignty” and outlined a political process towards a new constitution and choosing a new Afghan government. Meanwhile, as noted by Gall (2006), the Taliban and al- Qaeda had not given up. Al-Qaeda forces regrouped at Shahi-Kot Mountains of Paktia province. The U.S led forces soon picked intelligence on this and quelled it with . Therefore, 2003 to 2005 saw a renewed Taliban insurgence. After managing to evade U.S. Forces throughout mid-2002, the remnants of the Taliban gradually began to regain their confidence and started to begin preparations to launch the insurgency that Mullah Omar had promised during the Taliban’s last days in power. The Taliban gradually reorganized and reconstituted their forces. As a result, coalition forces began preparing offensives to root out the rebel forces. In late August 2005, Afghan government forces backed by U.S. troops and heavy American aerial bombardment advanced upon Taliban positions within the mountain fortress. After a one-week battle, Taliban forces were routed with up to 124 fighters killed (Katzman, 2009). In 2006, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Forces known as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) started to replace the US troops of Operation Enduring Freedom. The NATO’s focus was to rebuild Southern Afghanistan. It formed 7 provincial Reconstruction Teams with the British leading in Helmand Province while Holland and Canada would lead similar deployments in Oruzgan Province, and Kandahar province respectively. Local Taliban figures voiced opposition to the incoming force and pledged to resist it. (http://www.csmonito.com/2008/0715/p07s05-wosc.html , retrieved on 15/11/2010). According to Robertson (2009), Southern Afghanistan faced in 2006 the deadliest spate of violence in the country since the ousting of the Taliban. Serious pockets of insurgents continued until Obama came to power. In order to tackle these insurgents from the Taliban and al- Qaeda, the Obama administration reviewed the strategy adopted by the previous administration. According to Katzman (2009), the Obama Administration conducted a “strategic review”, and favoured the deployment of more troops, increase in resources devoted to economic development, building Afghan governance primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan-security forces and trying to improve Pakistan efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. The strategy also backs Afghan efforts to negotiate with Taliban figures that are welling to enter the political process. The administration also decided that more innovative counterinsurgency tactics are needed. In May 2009, the top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan, General David Mckiernam was removed, and General Stanley McChrystal was named to succeed him. McChrystal has since been succeeded by Gen. David 8

Petraeus. The question becomes, has this new strategy by the Obama administration achieved the aim of winning the war? It is within this context that we pose the following research questions: (1) Did the U.S. government’s military strategies de-escalate the menace of insecurity in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010?

(2) Has the U.S. military operations enhanced the stability of governance in Afghanistan?

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY The central objective of this study is to critically evaluate US military operations and governance and security in Afghanistan. Specifically, the study is guided by the following objectives: (1) To determine whether the U.S. government’s military strategies have de-escalated the menace of insecurity in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010.

(2) To ascertain if the U.S. government’s military operations have enhanced the stability of governance in Afghanistan.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY This study is significant in two ways: Theoretical and practical. At the theoretical level, the study will add to existing literature and contribute significantly to the pool of knowledge on discourse about the American foray in Afghanistan. More 9 importantly, by unraveling the various strategies America has employed in the war in Afghanistan, the study will aid scholars in strategic studies in the act of war. At the practical level, policy makers will benefit greatly from this study since the study intends to implode the various obstacles America has uncounted in Afghanistan. By so doing, it leverages them on approaches to prosecute war. More fundamentally, the study will generally advance knowledge in the area of strategic studies. More importantly for those who are interested in American security studies.

1.5 LITERATURE RIEVIEW Political analysts, researchers and scholars have written several articles about the U.S. military operations and governance and security in Afghanistan. Some simply explored the effect of the war on the Afghans and Afghanistan sovereignty, while others highlighted the nature of the war and the pros and co ns inherent in the war. Some of these scholars are Gall, 2006; George, 2010; Kenneth, 2009; Baker, 2010; Susan, 2010 among others. Therefore, it is very obvious that scholars have written copiously on the American war in Afghanistan, but little or know effort has been made to interrogate whether U.S. strategies have helped to de-escalate the menace of al-Qaeda insurgents on U.S. soldiers, and/or to ascertain if the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan have ensured security and stability. George (2010), observed that from the beginning of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001, the focus was clear: eliminate al-Qaeda and their Taliban hosts. 10

According to Kilcullen (2009), it should be clear by now that the conflict being fought in Afghanistan is not a conventional war between two competing armies; it is an insurgency, and in an insurgency victory is not brought by defeating the enemy but by winning the hearts and minds of the people. In and of them, the Taliban present an insignificant military threat, and certainly not one the Western forces could have any difficulty eliminating quickly. The precise number of men the Taliban has under arms at any one time is uncertain, though current estimates put the number in the region of 30,000-40,000 in a country of approximately 28 million people. Facing them are some 140,000 ISAF and US soldiers and almost 120,000 soldiers from the Afghan National Army (ANA). He further maintained that this figure provides a Coalition Taliban force ration of more than 7:1 even before enormous disparities in weaponry, technology and training are taken into account. The idea that the Taliban could confront Coalition forces on the field of battle and prevail is clearly absurd, and indeed, whenever the Taliban do so they are in almost every case defecated. The heavy reliance of the Taliban on indirect combat methods, in particular the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), which now account for roughly two -thirds of coalition fatalities is a direct consequence of this disparity. Wintour (2010), is of the view that nine years since US and NATO forces entered Afghanistan, the Taliban has not been defeated and the war has not been won. Clearly then, the conflict in Afghanistan cannot be viewed as one which the elimination of insurgents by military means is either a possibility or a pre- 11 requisite for victory. What is required for victory in Afghanistan is not the elimination of insurgents, rather the elimination of the conditions that give right to- and sustain-insurgents in the first place. This means eliminating the conditions that cause the general population to lend their support to the insurgents, or at least to withhold it from the government. He stressed that the war in Afghanistan is a war for the Afghan people. Without their support, victory for the Afghan government and ISAF will be impossible. Equally, without the support –or at least the acquiescence of –the people, The Taliban has no hope of victory. In other words, Wintour further maintained that after more than three decades of near continuous bloody conflict that has left hundreds of thousands dead, and that has crippled the country economically, the Afghan people need to believe that the government can deliver in three crucial areas if they are ever to give its their support: First, and fundamentally, the Afghan people need to believe that the government can win. There are not many backers for a losing side. Second, the Afghan people need to believe that the government can put in place the necessary security framework to ensure that neither they nor their families will be at risk of retribution if they do support it. Even if the people believe that the government will ultimately prevail, this is small incentive to support its, if the likely consequence of doing so is punishment at the hands of the Taliban 12

Third, and finally, the Afghan people must believe that the government offers them and their children a better future, and adheres to the rule of law. However, he concluded that it has been the failure of both the Afghan government and its Coalition partners to convince the Afghan people that they can deliver in these three areas that lie behind their lack of progress in the conflict to date. According to The Daily Telegraph (2010), at a major international summit held in Kabul in July, both the Afghan government and its international partners expressed their intention to transfer responsibility for frontline security operations to Afghan forces by 2014. If by that date, Afghan forces are capable of taking such responsibility, and then withdrawal of international forces will be both a desirable and an appropriate next step. If, however, Afghan forces are not capable of assuming such responsibility by this time then it would be both wrong, and grossly irresponsible to press ahead with the withdrawal of international forces regardless. By setting such a rigid and arbitrary deadline for effective withdrawal of foreign forces, there is the very real danger of generating precisely the climate of fear and uncertainty amongst ordinary Afghans that will make a responsible withdrawal of foreign forces by 2014 impossible. Moreover, in a conflict such as this, perception is everything. It is long been the bitter lesson of counter insurgency warfare that where government seek quick victories and a swift withdrawal, they get neither. For better to commit properly and 13 for the long haul, the result of which may well be better progress and a quicker withdrawal than is anticipated. In the words of Robert (2010), it is a persistently methodical approach wearing the insurgent down. The government must not allow itself to be diverted either by counter moves on the parts of the insurgent or by the critics on its own side who will be seeking a quicker and simpler solution. There are no short cuts or gimmicks. Anthony (2009), observed that if there is any lesson to be learned from both the Bush Administration and President Obama’s initial failure as a wartime leader, it is that true leadership must be earned and constantly validated. He further buttressed his point by stating that in fairness, President Obama inherited nearly eight years of “spin” and inspirational intellectual vacuum from the Bush Administration. There was no meaningful strategy or even threat assessment for the war; not honest effort to create an effective civil military plan, or achieve more unity of effort from our allies in NATO/ISAF or UNAMA and the international aid effort. The Bush Administration’s national security team had shown no ability to manage one war, much less two. Progress, when it came in Iraq, came from outside advice and from an extraordinary country team on the group. Nevertheless, President Obama cannot be excused any repetition of the mistakes he made this spring. He let himself to be rushed into announcing what he said was a strategy, but was actually little more than a set of broad concepts. The months of effort within the US national security community that have followed have shown that the President spoke before there was 14 any meaningful reassessment of the threat. His strategy lacked plans to address how to deal with the corruption and lack of capacity in the Afghan government. It simply carried forward earlier plans to raise US troop levels to 68,000 men without an integrated civil-military plan to shape US manpower and spending. It did not describe how to create effective Afghan forces. It did not show how to deal with national divisions and caveats on NATO/ISAF and the PRTs. And, it made no meaningful effort to address the massive failures and corruption in the UNAMA-led international aid effort. The end result was that President Obama came all too close to repeating the mistakes of his predecessor, relying on “spin” and effort to “control the narrative”. Therefore, he argued that the strategic review of US strategy in Afghanistan was undertaken in acknowledgement of the prevailing political, economic and military challenges facing the region and the general political mood for a new direction to be adopted in order that progress could be made. As such, 2009 and 2010 have been regarded as defining years for Afghanistan, with a new pocus on strengthening governance and a fresh impetus to the military’s counter insurgency campaign. (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news , retrieved on 04/11/2010). In a report carried out by Susan (2010), to ascertain the level of casualty encountered by America since the institution of Operation Enduring Freedom, she noted that American casualty figure has risen and in American context OEF casualty goes 15 beyond Afghanistan to include, countries like Pakistan, Uzbe, Cuba, Turkey,etc.

US MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN Katzman (2009), noted that the Obama Administration conducted a “strategic review”, the results of which were announced on March 27,2009, in advance of an April 3-4, 2009 NATO summit. This review built upon assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, which produced decisions to plan a build-up of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. However, he goes on to state that in part, because of the many different causes of continued instability in Afghanistan, there reportedly were differences within the Obama Administration on a new strategy. Apparently leaning toward those in the Administration who do not believe that more combat troops will reverse U.S. difficulties, and on the new strategy, at least 21,000 troops were being added in 2009 and 30,000 in 2010. And the new strategy also emphasizes non-military steps such as increasing the resources devoted to economic development, building Afghan governance primarily at the Local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistan’s efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. The strategy also backs Afghan efforts to negotiate with Taliban figures that are willing to enter the political process. Congressional Research Service Report by Blanchard (2009), stated that the U.S. Administration strategy plans to expand the Afghan National Army to 134, 000 by 2011 essentially 16 a continuation of the Bush Administration expansion plan outline in September 2008. The Obama Administration strategy announcement of the 4,000 additional U.S. trainers is intended to help meet that goal. The funds for the expansion about $12 billion in that time frame are expected to come mainly from the United States, possibility defrayed by partner contributions by Japan, Germany, South Korea, or other donors. He further observed that the Obama Administration strategic review on Afghanistan did not specifically propose expanding the Afghan National Army (ANA) to about 250,000 which is what Afghan officials and some U.S. military leaders believe will be ultimately needed. However, the expansion to 134,000 is stated to be an interim step, thereby permitting a later decision for further expansion.

Grant (2010), argued that the U.S. operations in Afghanistan have not succeeded to date because, until recently, neither the correct strategy, nor the resources necessary to execute it, were in place. He goes on to stress that between 2001- 2005, the strategic focus of operations was on eliminating al- Qaeda and the Taliban, with far too little attention paid to eliminating the conditions that give rise to, and sustain such insurgents in the first place. Therefore, Grant concluded that the U.S. led surge that began at the start of 2010 is part of a renewed counterinsurgency strategy that differs fundamentally from the course of operations between 2001-2009 in that it is making the security and development of population –centers its primary focus, and is for 17 the first time being afforded the resources necessary to make success a possibility. Perception is everything in counter insurgency, and the setting of arbitrary and concrete withdrawal dates well convince the Afghan people that to support the government-side now will invite retribution at the hands of the Taliban after Coalitions forces withdraw.

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN As Katzman (2009) puts it, upon and since taking office, the Obama Administration has faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan president Hamid Karzai, and the infiltration of Taliban and other militants from safe haven in Pakistan. According to Congressional Research Service Report by Vincent and Belkin (2009), the major criticism of the Afghan National police is wide spread corruption, to the point where many Afghans are more afraid of the police than they are of the Taliban. Therefore, there have been few quick fixed for the chronic shortage of equipment in the Afghan National Police. Most police officers are under-equipped, lacking ammunition and vehicles. In some cases, equipment requisitioned by their commanders is being sold and the funds pocketed these activities as well as absenteeism, led to the failure of a 2006 “auxiliary police”. 18

Moreover, they maintained that the capable Afghan National security forces (i.e. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National police) are the means by which the United States and NATO might wind eventually down their involvement in Afghanistan. Walker (2010), labeled the Afghan National police force “the biggest obstacle to progress” and that the local force was the reason for the insurgency in the Nad-e-Ali district of Helmand. Baker (2007), stated that the failure of the Afghan government and its international partners to capitalize on the goodwill of the Afghan people in the early years and to make genuine progress on the redevelopment front was unquestionably a major factor behind the revival of the . With the lights never on, the water still dirty and the jobs still elusive, Afghans began to question whether the new world order was quite so desirable after all. This was particularly the case given reports of widespread corruption within the new government. Parekh and Vikram (2002), observed that the lack of commitment to Afghanistan also manifested in the failure to properly develop good governance in the country. President Karzai has been criticized for rejecting, or at least not taking seriously the fledgling institutions of government the UN and others were trying to build. Karzai’s first cabinet contained numerous warlords and powerful regional personalities, many of whom have been guilty of heinous human rights violations. The sentiments of many delegates at the Loya Jirga where the new cabinet was announced in June 2002, was summarized by one female activist: This is worse than our worst expectations, the 19 warlords have been promoted and the professionals kicked out. Who calls this democracy? Nevertheless, they further their analysis by stressing that karzai had the implicit support of the U.S., who were happy to put warlords on their payroll as a cheap way to keep the peace in the regions and to provide information about al-Qaeda. Rather than nation-building, creation of legitimate state institutions and rebuilding of the country’s shattered infrastructure, the U.S. pursued a strategy which though changing the personnel governing Afghanistan, failed to improve the structures, security and stability in Afghanistan. They concluded that the evitable consequence of all this neglect was disillusionment amongst ordinary Afghans and the progressive erosion of the legitimacy of the state. This was to be ruthlessly capitalized upon by the Taliban which offered itself up as the defender of ordinary Afghans against the capricious machinations of Karzai, the Warlords and their foreign backers. According to Mojumdar (2008), the Afghan National police provide support to the Afghan army. Police officers in Afghanistan are largely illiterate, and approximately 17 percent of them test positive for illegal drugs, and widely accused of demanding bribes. The plan to transfer security responsibility to Afghan forces is the centerpiece of U.S. president Barack Obama’s revised Afghanistan strategy. At present, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) has severely limited fighting capacity. Even the best Afghan units lack training, discipline and adequate reinforcements. Afghan Security is plagued by inefficiency and 20 endemic corruption. (http://en.eikipedia.org/wiki.war- in- Afghanistan-2001% E2% 80% 93 present, retrieved on 25/11/2010). Gilles (2010), maintained that the United States has supported all manner of militia in Afghanistan, creating fragmentation and a dangerous degree of competition in the security sphere. This is a formula for an even weaker government in Kabul. In a number of cases, the U.S. is dealing directly with armed groups that are beyond the control of the central government, including the group that was reportedly responsible for the killing of the Kandahar police chief in 2009. According to Kenneth (2009), in particular, two approaches perpetuate familiar problems. Thus, the first is the game of numbers. Mr Obama plans to recycle old proposals about the size of the ANP, by pledging to work towards meeting the target of 82, 000 police officers, but this figure was agreed long ago. Present staffing is already near that and the small increases in human and financial capital currently proposed and unlikely to be decisive in ANP reform… The second problem is the continuous use of the ANP as a paramilitary force, a crucial factor in explaining their poor performance at actual policing duties, which are supposed to be their real responsibilities. Sending ANP units into harms way achieves very little, whereas providing security to the public and reducing criminality are the most effective tools for winning hearts and minds of the people. This is especially important with regard to how the Afghan people respond to the ANP as a public service. 21

That article went on to conclude that although extra manpower will significantly aid progress in terms of training and mentoring new recruits, Obama’s strategy is still doomed to fail. It falls short of the real target which is the creation of a framework for real change. Increasing the number of police will not tackle the widespread problem of ANP corruption, as this tends to emanate from the centre. Reform efforts must take a more comprehensive approach by combating corruption from top to bottom. An effective strategy must also initiate judicial reform because the police and the judiciary are inextricably liked to one another and cannot be treated separately. It is obvious that scholars have written copiously on the American war in Afghanistan but little or know effort has been made to interrogate whether US military strategies have de- escalate the menace of internal and international security. More fundamentally, the literature on American war in Afghanistan did not capture the purported stability in governance that America claims to have enthroned in Afghanistan. It is these gaps in literature that this study seeks to fill.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK In this study, we will anchor our analysis on power theory or what scholars call political realism or real politik . The realist scholars derive their intellectual inspiration from the works of classical realist such as Thomas Hobbes, Nicollo Machiavelli whose works emphasize the dark side of man. Thus power theory centers on the belief that man is selfish and aggressive in nature. Hans J. Morgenthau, a leading figure in political realism 22 elaborated on this view, when he noted that political realism believes that politics, like society is governed by objective law that have roots in human nature. Like Hobbes, Morgenthau noted that the inherent nature of man to dominate is not only an exclusive preserve of man but also inherent among states (Morgenthau, 1948). Therefore, for most realists, international politics like all politics is the struggle for power. As one of the leading figures of realist, K.W. Thompson (1960) noted: the realist approach accepts for the guide and premise of its thought the permanence and ubiquity of the struggle for power. Schwarzanberger (1964) in a similar vein asserts that: power politics has been a constant feature of international relations throughout the ages. Thus, the central organizing concept for the realist is power supplemented by the concept of national interest . The central thesis for the realist is that states acting through statesmen, who personify them, think and act in terms of interest defined as power. Power for them is very necessary in international relations. The only weapon that will guarantee security for them in international relations is national power. Thus, power for the realist should be the most sought after good in international politics. The national interest of states should be defined in terms of power because might is always right. To that extent, the realist according to Asogwa (1999) assigns little or no role to moral principle; law etc in the guide to the conducts of states in international relations. 23

This theory is not only relevant but also captures the American foray in Afghanistan. Since the war began in 2001, the US government has adopted different war strategies to win the war in Afghanistan or at least to reduce the lost of US soldiers but this has not abated the spate at which US soldiers die and the war remains unwinnable. On the other hand, the U.S. military operations tend to undermine the stability of governance in Afghanistan. Yet, the U.S. because it feels that its power position is preponderant over Afghanistan and with the notion that Afghanistan can easily be run through continues to wage war in Afghanistan. The American idea that its relationship with Afghanistan is defined in terms of power is the main reason that has sustained the war.

1.7 HYPOTHESIS The study will be guided by the following hypotheses: 1. That the U.S. government’s military Strategies in Afghanistan tend to de-escalate the menace of insecurity in Afghanistan.

2. The U.S. government’s military operations in Afghanistan tend to undermine the stability of governance in Afghanistan.

1.8 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION There are two broad methods of generating data for social science research. These are observation method and self-report. While the former entails either observing actions or events as 24 they occur (direct observation) or observing the traces or records of actions or events as well as the reports put down or recorded through direct observation (indirect observation), the latter largely borders on the use of interview and/or questionnaire to elicit information internal in the respondents. For the purpose of generating data to test our hypotheses in this study, we shall use the observation method of documentary sources. By document, we mean any written material (whether hand-written, typed, or printed) that was already in existence, which was produced for some other purpose than the benefit of the investigator (Nwana cited in Obasi, 1999). Hence, documentary method is used in this study to mean a method of gleaning, extracting, examining, analyzing and interpreting information as well as reading meaning into these pieces of information so as to be able to draw inference from the available evidence in order to reach a conclusion (Obasi, 1999). What the foregoing implies is that documentary method makes the recourse to the secondary sources of data inevitable. By secondary sources of data, we mean data gathered or authored by another person, usually data from the available data, archives, either in form of document or survey results and books (Ikeagwu, 1998). To this end, this study will be based on documentary analysis of secondary sources of data. These sources of data include institutional and official documents from Nigerian Ministry of external affairs, Chinese embassy, National Office of Statistics, etc. Apart from institutional and official documents, this inquiry will extensively source materials in the internet and other 25 secondary sources of data as textbooks, journals, magazines, articles and other written works dealing on the subject matter of this inquiry. To be sure, secondary data sources imply information originally collected for the purpose other than the present one (Asika, 2000). The advantage of secondary data is that it saves time and money through purpose and random selection of recorded materials in order to investigate the problem and test the hypothesis. There is also the possibility of using the work of others to broaden the base from which scientific generalizations can be made. The use of documents will be complimented by the technique of non-participant observation as the researcher has been a keen follower of the American war in Afghanistan. Research Design This study will adopt the ex-post facto analysis as our research design. The ex-post facto also called (Casual Comparative Research) is an alternative to the classical experimental method for establishing casual relationship between events and circumstances. It is an experiment in which the researcher rather than creating the treatment, examines the effect of a naturally occurring treatment after it has occurred. It is a study that attempts to discover the pre-existing casual conditions between groups. (www.petech.ac.za/robert/resmeth.htm ). So, in effect this is a method that finds out the cause of certain occurrence and non occurrences by observing effects and by noting the factors present in the instances where a given effect occurs and where it is absent. Unlike the experimental research; in the ex-post facto 26 research, the assignment of subjects to groups is impossible because the groups already exist; also in ex-post facto, there is no treatment applied because the independent variable is either an attribute or else treated as an attribute. Sukhia and Metrotra (1966:215) observed that ‘this method is based on Mill’s Canon of Agreement and Disagreement which states that causes of a given observed effect may be ascertained by noting elements which are invariably present when the result is present and which is invariably absent when the result is absent’.

Kerlinger (1964:360) thus defines ex-post facto research as: That research in which the independent variable or variables have already occurred and in which the researcher starts with the observation of a dependent variable or variables. He then studies the independent variables in retrospect for their possible relations to, and effect on the dependent variable or variables.

Ary, Jacobs and Razavieh (1972:264) posits that the basic purpose of ex-post facto research is to discover or establish causal or functional relationship among variables. The procedures involved in conducting an ex-post facto research were set forth by Isaac and Michael (1971:23) and they include: 1. Define the problem 27

2. Survey the literature 3. State the hypotheses 4. List the assumption upon which the hypotheses and procedure will be based. 5. Design the approach A. Select appropriate subject and source materials B. Select or construct techniques for collecting data C. Establishing categories for classifying data that is ambiguous, appropriate for the purpose of the study and capable of bringing out significant likeness or relationship 6. Validate the data gathering technique 7. Describe, analyze and interpret the findings in a clear precise term. Sukhia and Metrotra (1966:215) listed three important aspect of the causal-comparative method in regard to its treatment of data. 1. Gathering the data on factors invariably present in cases where the given result occurs and discarding of those elements which are not universally present. 2. Gathering of data on factors invariably present in cases where the given effects does not occur and, 3. Comparing the two sets of data or in effect subtracting one from the other to get at the causes responsible for the occurrence or otherwise of the effect. The analytical method involved in testing the hypothetical inductions in this study is based on the concomitant variation of independent variables (X) i.e., the U.S. government’s military 28 strategies in Afghanistan and U.S. government’s military operations in Afghanistan and the dependent variables (Y) i.e., the menace of insecurity and the undermining of stability of governance in Afghanistan. This demonstrates that (X) is the factor that determines (Y).

Method of Data Analysis The Method of Data analysis is contained in the logical data framework (LDF) presented below:

S/N0 Hypothesis Variables Main Indicators Data Method of Method of Sources Data Data Collection Analysis 1. The US (X) 1. Operation Library Observation Theoretical government’s US Herrick texts. of primary framework military government’s 2. Change in War Journals and of power strategies in military Commanders Books secondary theory, Ex Afghanistan strategies 3. Operation Magazines sources of post facto tend to de- Anaconda and recorded design, escalate the 4. Deployment of Newspapers human statistical menace of more troops Speeches. documents tables, insecurity. Policy such as text concepts Papers books, and journals, discoveries reports, Websites of international bodies, etc (Y) 1. Taliban attacks Library Observation Theoretical Menace of on supply lines texts. of primary framework insecurity through Journals and of power Pakistan Books secondary theory, Ex 29

2. Civilian Magazines sources of post facto rejection of US and recorded design, military Newspapers human statistical presence Speeches. documents tables, 3. Suicide Policy such as text concepts bombing Papers books, and journals, discoveries reports, Websites of international bodies, etc 2. The U.S. (X) 1. The Library Observation Theoretical government’s U.S. International texts. of primary framework military government’s Security Journals and of power operations in military Assistance Books secondary theory, Ex Afghanistan operations in Force (ISAF) Magazines sources of post facto tend to Afghanistan 2. Operation and recorded design, undermine Khanjar Newspapers human statistical the stability 3. Operation Speeches. documents tables, of Pather’s Claw Policy such as text concepts governance Papers books, and in journals, discoveries Afghanistan reports, Websites of international bodies, etc (Y) 1. Elections Library Observation Theoretical The during combat texts. of primary framework undermining 2. US Journals and of power of stability of Organisation of Books secondary theory, Ex governance elections for Magazines sources of post facto in Afghan people and recorded design, Afghanistan 3. Taliban’s Newspapers human statistical 30

rejection of Speeches. documents tables, Hamid Karzai’s Policy such as text concepts government Papers books, and and journals, discoveries negotiations reports, with Taliban to Websites of include them in international government bodies, etc

CHAPTER TWO U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN 2.1 US Military Plans before the 2001 Afghanistan Attacks Elliot (2002), Clarke, chair of the counter Terrorism Security Group under the Clinton administration, and later an official in 31 the Bush administration, allegedly presented a plan to incoming Bush administration in January 2001 that involved covert support for the Northern Alliance, air strikes, and the introduction of U.S. Special Operations Forces into Afghanistan. More fundamentally, one day before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration agreed on a plan to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by force if it refused to hand over Osama bin Laden. The plan involved using escalating methods of applying pressure over a three year period. At that September 10 meeting of the Bush administration’s top national security officials, it was agreed that the Taliban would be presented with a final ultimatum to hand over Osama bin Laden. If the Taliban refused, covert military aid would be channeled by the U.S. to anti-Taliban groups. If both options failed, “the officials agreed that the United States would seek to overthrow the Taliban regime through more direct action (Julian, 2004). In the words of Arney (2002), Naiz Naik, former Foreign Secretary of the government of Pakistan, alleged that at a meeting in Berlin in mid-July 2001 senior U.S. officials warned him that unless bin Laden was handed over quickly, the U.S. would take military action to kill or capture bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullar Omar sometime in the middle of October 2001, the wider objective of the planned operation, according to Naik, was to topple the Taliban regime and to install a more moderate government. He also claimed that he was told the operation would be launched from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and that U.S. military advisors were already in place. 32

Bob (2002), argued that prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little from Clinton Administration policy, applying economic and political pressure while retaining dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from militarily assisting the Northern Alliance. The September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, Administration officials leaned toward such a step and that some officials wanted to assist anti-Taliban pashtun forces. Other covert options were under consideration as well. In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to end its support for the Taliban. However, in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001, the United States Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York closed, although the Taliban representative continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Administration officials received a Taliban envoy to discuss bilateral issues.

2.2 Legal Basis for War Cohn (2002), stated that the United Nations Charter, which has been ratified by the United States and to which other members of the invasion coalition are signatories, provides that all U.N. member states must settle their international disputes by peaceful means, and no member nation can use military force except in self-defense. The United States Constitution states that international treaties, such as the United Nation Charter, that are ratified by the U.S. are part of the supreme law of the land in the U.S. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) did not 33 authorize the U.S. led military campaign in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). Therefore, defenders of the legitimacy of the U.S-led invasion argued that UN Security Council authorization was not required since the invasion was an act of collective self-defense provided for under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and therefore was not a war of aggression. Critics maintain that the bombing and invasion of Afghanistan were not legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter because the 9/11 attacks were not “armed attacks” by another state but rather were perpetrated by groups of individuals or non-state actors. Furthermore, even if a state had perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, no imminent threat of an armed attack on the U.S. existed after September 11, and the U.S. would not have waited three weeks before commencing the bombing campaign against Afghanistan if there had been such a threat: the necessity for self-defense must be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation” (http://austlii.org/au/journals/melbJIL/2003/3.htm1 , retrieved on 19/11/2010). Moreover, the Bush administration for its part did not seek a declaration of war by U.S. Senate, and labeled Taliban troops as supporters of terrorists rather than soldiers, denying them the protections of the Geneva Convention and due process of law. This position has been successfully challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court and questioned even by military lawyers responsible for prosecuting affected prisoners. On December 20, 2001, more than two months after the U.S-led attack 34 commenced, the UNSC authorized the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to take all measures necessary to fulfill its mandate of assisting the Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining security. The command of the ISAF passed to NATO on August 11, 2003 (http://www.issi.org.pk/Journal/2007file/no1/commenr/IC.htm , retrieved on 01/12/2010).

2.3 Various Account of War in Afghanistan In the words of George (2010), given the shock and anger that pervaded after the atrocities of 11 th September, the scale of the 9/11 attacks necessitated a military response against those that harboured the perpetrators and ensured that the U.S public would be united behind it. As a result, confronted with a surprise attack requiring an immediate response, policy as well as military strategy was informed by existing paradigms as perhaps best exemplified in the first Gulf War, above all that military campaigns should be conducted against clearly defined objectives; a preference for warfare reliant on air superiority; maximum mobility on the ground; and a strong basic predilection against getting involved in civil matters that vastly increase the political complexities inherent in the military action. Seen through this lens, a relatively straight forward focus on eliminating al-Qaeda and their Taliban hosts by means of a campaign of air strikes and limited land warfare appears a reasonable response to the September 11 attacks. Unfortunately, though understandable this response was also unsustainable and far from leading to the elimination of al-Qeada and the Taliban as intended, this 35 approach would end up actually making Terrorist Movements stronger (David, 2001). The routine of the Taliban and the seizure of Kabul that quickly followed the commencement of aerial and ground operations on 7 October were predictable enough. In surreal collaboration, the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, many mounted on horse back and armed with little more than Sabres and Kalashnikovs, now found itself supported by the most advanced military superpower on earth. Within barely a

month, on 9 November, 2001, the northern city of Mazar-e-sharif had fallen to the Alliance, and just four days later Kabul itself was seized as the panic-stricken Taliban fled the city. Therefore, with the Taliban gone and the country all but theirs, minds in Washington did not turn to reconstruction, maintaining instead as the overriding focus the elimination of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which had fled South and east to the border region with Pakistan (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/10/mil-011007- usia01.htm , retrieved on 13/11/2010). In December 2001, the US-led coalition began a massive offensive in the region in the east, believing this to be where Osama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda were in hiding. Whether bin-Laden was ever in Tora Bora, or whether he was already in Pakistan, the coalition failed to capture him, though severally hundred Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives were captured or killed. On the back of Tora Bora, in March 2002, came Operation Anaconda, conducted in the Shahikot Valley and Arma mountains, in the Zormat region, in the southwest of the 36 country. As with Tora Bora, Operation Anaconda resulted in the elimination of several hundred al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives by Coalition and Afghan forces (http:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_2001%E2%80% 93present, retrieved on 28/11/2010). In the words of Berntsen and Ralph (2005), after the refusal of the Taliban regime to cease harbouring al Qaeda, on October 7, 2001 the U.S. government launched military operations in Afghanistan. Teams from the CIA’s Special Activities Division (SAD) were the first U.S. Army Special Forces from the 5 th Special Forces Group and other units from USSOCOM. These forces worked with Afghan opposition groups on the ground, in particular the Northern Alliance. The United Kingdom, Canada and Australia also deployed forces and several other countries provided basing, access and over flight permission. On October 7, 2001, air strikes were reported in the capital, Kabul (where electricity supplies were several), at the airport, at Kanada (home of the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Mullah Omar), and in the city of Jalabad. CNN released exclusive footage of Kabul being bombed to all the America broadcasters at approximately 5:08 p.m. October 7, 2001. At 17:00 UTC, President Bush confirmed the strikes on national television and prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair also addressed the UK. Bush stated that Talilban military sites and terrorist training grounds would be targeted. In addition, food, medicine, and supplies would be dropped to “the starving and suffering men, women and children of Afghanistan. 37

A pre-recorded videotape of Osama bin Laden had been released before the attacks in which he condemned any attacks against Afghanistan. Al Jazeera, the Arabic satellite news channel, reported that these tapes were received shortly before the attack. Air Campaigns Bombers operating at high altitudes well out of range of anti-aircraft fire bombed the Afghan training camps and Taliban air defenses. U.S. aircraft, including Apache helicopter gun ships from the 101 st Combat Aviation Brigade, operated with impunity throughout the campaign with no losses due to Taliban air defenses. The strikes initially focused on the area in and around the cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Within a few days, most Taliban training sites were severely damaged and the Taliban’s air defenses were destroyed. The campaign then focused on command, control, and communication targets which weakened the ability of the Taliban forces to communicate. However, the line facing the Afghan Northern Alliance held, and no tangible battlefield successes had yet occurred on that front. Two weeks into the campaign, the Northern Alliance demanded the air campaign focus more on the front lines. Meanwhile, thousands of Pashtun tribal men from Pakistan poured into the county, reinforcing the Taliban against the U.S. led forces. The next stage of the campaign began with carrier based F/A-18 Hornet Fighter-bombers hitting Taliban vehicle in pinpoint strikes, while other U.S. planes began cluster bombing Taliban defenses. For the first time in years, Northern Alliance 38 commanders finally began to see the substantive results that they had long hoped for on the front lines. At the beginning of November, the Taliban front lines were bombed with daisy cutter bombs, and by AC-130 gun ships. The Taliban fighters had no previous experience with American firepower, and often even stood on top of bare ridgelines where Special Forces could easily spot them and call in close air support. By November 2, Taliban frontal positions were divested, and a Northern Alliance march on Kabul seemed possible for the first time. Foreign fighters from al-Qaeda took over security in the Afghan cities, demonstrating the instability of the Taliban regime. Meanwhile, the Northern Alliance and their Central Intelligence Agency/Special Forces advisors planned the next stage of their offensive. Northern Alliance troops would seize Mazari Sharif, thereby cutting off Taliban supply lines and enabling the flow of equipment from the countries to the North, followed by an attack on Kubul itself. Areas most Targeted During the early months of the war the U.S. military had a limited presence on the ground. The plan was that Special Forces, and intelligence officers with a military background, would serve as liaisons with Afghan militias opposed to the Taliban, would advance after the cohesiveness of the Taliban forces was disrupted by American air power. The Tora Bora Mountains lie roughly east of Afghanistan’s capital Kakbul, which is itself close to the border with Pakistan. American intelligence analysts believed that the Taliban and al- 39

Qaeda had dug in behind fortified networks of well-supplied caves and underground bunkers. The area was subjected to a heavy continuous bombardment by B-52 bombers. The U.S. forces and the Northern Alliance also began to diverge in their objectives. While the U.S. was continuing the search for Osama bin Laden, the Northern Alliance was pressuring for more support in their efforts to finish off the Taliban and control the country. The Battle of Mazar-I Sharif The battle for Mazari Sharif was considered important, not only because it is the home of the Shrine of Hazrat Ali or “Blue Mosque”, a sacred Muslim site, but also because it is the location of a significant transportation hub with two main airports and a major supply route leading into Uzbekistan. It would also enable humanitarian aid to alleviate Afghanistan’s looming food crisis, which had threatened more than six million people with starvation. Many of those in most urgent need lived in rural areas to the south and west of Mazar-i-Sharif. On November 9, 2001, Northern Alliance forces, under the command of generals and Ustad Atta Mohammed Noor, swept across the Pul-i-Imam Bukhri bridge, meeting some resistance, and seized the city‘s main military base and airport. U.S. Special Operation Forces (namely ODA 595, CIA Paramilitary Officers and Air Force Combat Control Teams) on Horseback and using Close Air Support platforms took part in the push into the city of Mazari Sharif in Balkh Province by Northern Alliance. After a bloody 90-minute battle, Taliban Force, who had held the city since 1998, withdrew from the city, 40 triggering jubilant celebrations among the townspeople whose ethnic and political affinities are with the Northern Alliance. The Taliban had spent three years fighting the Northern Alliance for Mazar-i-Sharif, precisely because its capture would confirm them as masters of all Afghanistan. The fall of the city was a “body blow to the Taliban and ultimately proved to be a major shock”, since the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and originally believed that the city would remain in Taliban hands well into the following year, and any potential battle would be “a very slow advance”. Following rumors that Mullah was headed to recapture the city with as many as 8,000 Taliban fighters, a thousand American 10 th Mountain Soldiers were airlifted into the city, which provided the first solid foothold from which Kabul and Kandahar could be reached. While provided the first solid football from which Kabul and Kandahar could be reached. While prior military flights had to be launched from Uzbekistan or Aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea, now the Americans held their own airport in the country which allowed them to fly more frequent sorties for re-supply missions and humanitarian aid. These missions allowed massive shipments of humanities aid to be immediately shipped to hundreds of thousands of Afghans facing starvation on the northern plain. It was revealed that the airfield had been booby trapped by the Taliban as they left, with explosives planted around the property, as well as being badly damaged by their own Air Interdiction missions in order to prevent it being used by the enemy. The destroyed runways on the airfield were patched by 41 the U.S. Air Force Red Horse personnel and local Afghans hired to fill bomb craters with asphalt and tar by hand, and the first cargo plane was able to land ten days after the battle. The airbase wasn’t declared operational until December 11. The American-backed forces now controlling the city began immediately broadcasting from Radio Mazar-i-Sharif, the former Taliban Voice of channel on 1584 Khz, including an address from former President Burhanuddin Rabbani. Music was also broadcast over Kabul radio for the first time in five years, and the songs were introduced by a female announcer-another major breakthrough for a city where women had been banned from education, work, and many other civil Liberties since 1996. The fall of Kabul On the night of November 12, Taliban forces fled from the city of Kabul, leaving under the cover of darkness. By the time Northern Alliance forces arrived in the afternoon of November 13, only bomb craters, burned foliage, and the burnt-out shells of Taliban gun emplacements and positions were there to greet them. A group of about twenty hard-line Arab fighters hiding in the city’s park were the only remaining defenders. This Taliban group was killed in a 15-minutes gun battle, being heavily outnumbered and having had little more than a telescope to shield them. After these forces were neutralized Kabul was in the hands of the U.S./NATO forces and the Northern Alliance. The fall of Kabul marked the beginning of a collapse of Taliban positions across the map. Within 24 hours, all the Afghan provinces along the Iranian border, including the key city of Heart, had fallen. Local Pashtun commanders and warlords 42 had taken over throughout northeastern Afghanistan, including the key city of Jalabad. Taliban holdouts in the north, mainly Pakistani Volunteers, fell back to the northern city of Kunduz to make a stand. By November 16, the Taliban’s last stronghold in northern Afghanistan was besieged by the Northern Alliance. Nearly 10,000 Taliban fighters, led by foreign fighters, refused to surrender and continued to put up resistance. By the, the Taliban had been forced back to their heartland in southeastern Afghanistan around Kandahar. By November 13, al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, with the possible inclusion of Osama bin Laden, had regrouped and were concentrating their forces in the Tora Bora cave complex, on the Pakistan border 50 kilometers (30 mi) southwest of Jalabad, to prepare for a stand against the Northern Alliance and U.S/NATO forces. Nearly 2,000 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters fortified themselves in positions within bunkers and caves, and by November 16, U.S. bombers began bombing the mountain fortress. Around the same time, CIA and Special Forces operatives were already at work in the area, enlisting and paying local warlords to join the fight and planning an attack on the Tora Bora complex. The fall of Kunduz Just as the bombardment at Tora was stepped up, the that began on November 16 was continuing. Finally, after nine days of heavy fighting and American aerial bombardment, Taliban fighters surrendered to Northern Alliance forces on November 25-November 26. Shortly before the surrender, Pakistani aircraft arrived ostensibly to evacuate a few 43 hundred intelligence and military personnel who had been in Afghanistan before U.S. invasion to aid the Taliban’s ongoing fight against the Northern Alliance. However, during this airlift, it is alleged that up to five thousand people were evacuated from the region, including Taliban and al-Qaeda troops allied to the Pakistanis in Afghanistan, see Airlift of Evil. The Battle of Qeada-I-Jangi On November 25, the day that Taliban fighters holding out in Kunduz surrendered and were being herded into the Qala-1- Sharif, a few Taliban attacked some Northern Alliance guards, taking their weapons and opening fire. This incident soon triggered a widespread revolt by 300 prisoners, who soon seized the southern half of the complex, once a medieval fortress, including an armory stocked with small arms and crew-served weapons. One American CIA paramilitary operative who had been interrogating prisoners, Johnny Micheal Spann, was killed, marking the first American combat death in the war. The revolt was finally put down after seven days of heavy fighting between an SBS unit along with some US Army Special Forces and Northern Alliance, AC-130 gun ships and other aircraft took part providing strafing fire on several occasions, as well as bombing air strikes. A total of 86 of the Taliban prisoners survived, and around 50 Northern Alliance soldiers were killed. The squashing of the revolt marked the end of the combat in northern Afghanistan, where local Northern Alliance warlords were now firmly in control. Consolidation: the taking of Kandahar 44

By the end of November, Kandahar, the Taliban’s birthplace, was its last remaining stronghold, and was coming under increasing pressure. Nearly 3,000 tribal fighters, led by Hamid Karzia, a loyalist of the former Afghan king, and , the governor of Kandahar before the Taliban seized power, pressured Taliban forces from the east and cut off the northern Taliban supply lines to Kandahar. The threat of the Northern Alliance loomed in the north and northeast. Meanwhile, the first significant numbers of U.S. combat troop had arrived. Nearly 1,000 Marines, ferried in by GH-53E Super Station helicopters and C-130s, set up a Forward Operating Base known as Camp Rhino in the desert south of

Kandahar on November 25. This was the coalition’s first strategic foothold in Afghanistan, and was the stepping stone to establishing other operating bases. The first significant combat involving U.S. ground forces occurred a day after Rhino was captured when 15 armored vehicles approached the base and were attacked by helicopter gun ships, destroying many of them. Meanwhile, the air strikes continued to pound Taliban positions inside the city, where Mullah Omar was holed up. Omar, the Taliban leader, remained defiant although his movement only controlled 4 out of the 30 Afghan provinces by the end of November and called on his forces to fight to the death. On December 6, the U.S. government rejected any amnesty for Omar or any Taliban leaders. Shortly thereafter on December 7, Omar slipped out of the city of Kandahar with a group of his hardcore loyalists and moved northwest into the mountains of 45

Urzgan province, reneging on the Taliban’s promise to surrender their fighters and their weapons. He was last reported seen driving off with a group of his fighters on a convoy of motorcycles. Other members of the Taliban leadership fled into Pakistan through of remote passes of Paktia and paktika provinces. Nevertheless, Kandahar, the last Taliban-controlled city, had fallen, and majority of the Taliban fighters had disbanded. The border town of spin Boldak was surrendered on the same day, making the end of Taliban control in Afghanistan. The Afghan tribal forces under Gul Agha seize the city of Kandahar while Marines took control of the airport outside and established a U.S. Base. 2.4 International Reaction to the War When the invasion began in October 2001, polls indicated that about 88% of Americans and about 65% of Britons backed military action in Afghanistan. Table 2.1 Show Support for War in America and Britain in 2001 Country Year Percentage of those Percentage of those in support of war not in support of war America 2001 88% 12% Britain 2001 65% 35%

A large-scale 37-nation poll of world opinion carried out by Gallup International in late September 2001 found that large majorities in most countries favored a legal response, in the form of extradition and trial, over a military response to 9/11: Only in three countries out of the 37 surveyed-the United States, Israel, 46 and India-did majorities favor military action in Afghanistan. In the other 34 countries surveyed, the poll found many clear majorities that were in favor of extradition/trial instead of military action: in the United Kingdom (75%), France (67%), Switzerland (87%), Czech Republic (64%), Lithuania (83%), Panama (80%), Mexico (94%), and other countries. Table 2.2: Show countries that supported legal response over military response in Afghanistan after September 11 attacks.

Country Percentage support for Percentage support for Legal Response Military action USA 4% 96% Israel 1% 99% India 30% 70% Britain 65% 35% France 67% 33% Switzerland 87% 13% Czech Republic 64% 36% Lithuania 83% 17% Panama 80% 20% Mexico 94% 6%

An Ipsos-Reid poll conducted between November and December 2001 showed that majorities in Canada (66%), France (60%), Germany (60%), Italy (58%), and the U.K. (65%) approved of U.S. air strikes while majorities in Argentina (77%). China (52%), South Korea (50%), Spain (52%), and Turkey (70%) opposed them. Development of Public Opinion. In a December, 2009 Pew Research Center poll, only 32 percent of Americans favored increasing U.S. troops in 47

Afghanistan, while 40 percent favoured decreasing them. Almost half of Americans, 49 percent, believed that the U.S should “mind its own business” internationally and let other countries get along the best they can. That figure was an increase from 30 percent who said that in December 2002. In a November, 2009 Gallup poll, a record 66% of Americans said things were going badly for the U.S. in Afghanistan, up from 61% in early September. 36% said U.S. involvement was a mistake, unchanged from views over the summer. Opinion was more closely divided over whether or not further involvement was worth it. Between 42%-47% favored at least some troop increase to satisfy military’s request, 39%-44% wanted to begin reducing troops, and 7-9% wanted no changes in troop levels. Just 29% of Democrats favor any troop increase while 57% want to begin reducing troops. 36% of Americans approved of Obama’s handling of Afghanistan, including 19% of Republicans, 31% of independents, and 54% of Democrats. In a 47-nation June 2007 survey of global public opinion, the Pew Global Attitudes projects found considerable opposition to the war. Out of the 47 countries surveyed, 4 had a majority that favored keeping foreign troops: the U.S.(50%),Israel (59%),Ghana (50%), and Kenya (60%). In 41 of the 47 countries, pluralities want U.S. and NATO member countries say troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible (http://en.wikipedia.or/wiki/war- in-Affghanistan-(2001%80%93present, retrieved on 15/11/2010 ). A 24-nation Pew Global Attitudes survey in June 2008 similarly found that majorities or pluralities in 21 of 24 countries 48 want the U.S. and NATO to remove their troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible. Only in three out of the 24 countries the United States (50%), Australia (60%), and Britain (48%)-did public opinion lean more toward keeping troops there until the situation has stabilized. Since that June 2008 global survey, however, public opinion in Australia and Britain has also diverged from that in the U.S., and a majority of Australians and Britons now want their troops to be home from Afghanistan. A September 2008 poll found that 56% of Australians oppose the continuation of their country’s military involvement in Afghanistan, while 42% support it. A November 2008 poll found that 68% of Britons want their troops withdrawn within the next 12 months. In the United States, a September 2008 Pew survey found that 61% of Americans wanted U.S. troops to stay until the situation has stabilized, while 33% wanted them removed as soon as possible.

Afghan Opinions Recent polls of Afghans have found strong opposition to the Taliban and significant, albeit diminished support of the America military presence. Also, the idea of permanent U.S. military bases vexes many people in Afghanistan, which has a long history of resisting foreign invaders. According to a May 2009 BBC poll, 69% of Afghans surveyed thought it was at least mostly good that the U.S. military came in to remove the Taliban-a decrease from 87% of Afghans surveyed in 2005. 24% thought it was mostly or very bad-up from 9% in 2005. The poll indicated that 63% of Afghans 49 were at least somewhat supportive of a U.S. military presence in the country-down from 78% in 2005. Just 18% supported increasing the U.S. military’s presence, while 44% favoured reducing it. 90% of Afghans surveyed opposed the presence of Taliban fighters, including 70% who were strongly opposed. By an 82%-4% margin, people said they preferred the current government to Taliban rule. In a June 2009 Gallup survey, about half of Afghan respondents felt that additional U.S. forces would help stabilize the security situation in the southern provinces. But opinions varied widely across Afghanistan at the time; residents in the troubled South were mostly mixed or uncertain, while those in the West largely disagreed that more U.S. troops would help the situation. In December, 2009, many Afghan tribal heads and local leaders from the Pashtun south and east, the heartland of the Taliban insurgency called for U.S. troop withdrawals.” I don’t think we will be able to solve our problems with military force,” said Muhammad Qasim, a tribal elder from the southern province of Kandahar.” We can solve them by providing jobs and development and by using local leaders to negotiate with the Taliban. “If new troops come and stationed in civilian areas, when they draw Taliban attacks civilians will end up being killed,” said Gulbadshah Majidi, a lawmaker and close association of Mr. Karzai. “This will only increase the distance between Afghans and their government”. In late January, 2010, Afghan protesters took to the streets for three straight days and blocked traffic on a highway that links 50

Kabul and Kandahar. The Afghans were demonstrating in response to the deaths of four men in a NATO-Afghan raid in the village of Ghazni. Ghazni residents insisted that the dead were civilians. Protests, Demonstrations and Rallies. The war has repeatedly been the subject of large protests around the world starting with the large-scale demonstrations in the days leading up to the official launch of U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom under George W. Bush in October 2001 and every year since many protesters consider the bombing and invasion of Afghanistan to be unjustified aggression. The deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians caused directly and indirectly by the U.S. and NATO bombing campaigns is also a major underlying focus of the protests. New Organizations have arisen to oppose the war; for example, in January 2009, Brave New Foundation Launched Rethink Afghanistan, a national campaign for non-violent solution in Afghanistan built around a documentary film by director and political activist, Robber Greenwald.

CHAPTER THREE U.S. MILITARY STRATEGIES IN AFGHANISTAN AND INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

3.1 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom

Ten years ago, the global began in Afghanistan as a military response to the September 11 attacks. After the 51 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban when it refused to extradite Bin Laden, judging that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S. forces to search for Al-Qaeda activities there. According to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, the Security Council “expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the September 11 attacks. However, this is widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks, but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the Resolution specifically reference chapter VII of the U.N.Charter, which allows for responses to threats to international peace and security (Drogin 2002). In order to legitimize the vague U.N. Resolution 1368, in congress, Senate Joint Resolution 23 passed 98-0 in the senate and with no objections in the House demanding that: All necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons that determined, planned, authorized, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons. (http://en.wikipedia.or/wiki/war-in-Affghanistan- (2001%80%93present, retrieved on 15/11/2010 ).

Moreover, given the shock and anger that pervaded after the atrocities of 11 th September, the focus was in many ways understandable. The scale of 9/11 attacks necessitated a military response against those that harboured the perpetrators and ensured that the U.S. public would be united behind it. A relatively straight forward focus on eliminating al-Qaeda and their Taliban 52 hosts by means of a campaign of air strikes and limited land warfare appears a reasonable response to the September 11 attacks. Announcing the Commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom (DEF) on 7 October 2001, President Bush began with the following statement: On my orders, the United States military has began strikes against al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime. At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we shall also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/nes/2001/1 0/mil-011007-usia01.htm , retrieved on 5/12/2010) .

In the words of Kenneth (2009), major combat in Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S air strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces, facilitated by the cooperation between small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S Special Operations Forces and the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S ground units (about 1, 300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Quandahar at the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its Afghan opponents. 53

Some critics believe that U.S dependence on local Afghan militia forces in the war strengthened them for the post-war period, settling back post war democracy building efforts. He further maintained that Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost of Mazar-e-sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces loyal to Dostam. Other, mainly Tajik, Northern Alliance forces-the commanders of which had initially promised U.S officials they would not enter Kabul, entered the capital on November 12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to pro-U.S. Pashtun leaders, such as Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Quandanhar and Mullah Umar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administed by Pashtun leaders such as the Noorzai clan. In 2001, U.S. Special Operations Forces and CIA officers reportedly narrowed Osama Bin Laden’s location to the Tora Bora mountains in Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the khyber pass), but the Afghan militia fighters who were the bulk of the fighting force did not prevent his escape. Claire (2010), noted that the command and control in Afghanistan is complicated by the fact that, in addition to the deployment of the ISAF force, America and other forces have continued to operate in dependently in the country under Operation Enduring Freedom. Given the focus of OEF in the southern and eastern provinces of the country, the NATO operational plan for expansion into the south in 2006 subsequently set out arrangements for greater command 54 integration between the ISAF and OEF operations. According to a NATO statement: ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the ongoing US- led military operation in Afghanistan, will continue to have separate mandates and missions. ISAF will continue to focus on its stabilization and security mission whilst OEF will continue to carry out its counter-terrorism mission. Clear command arrangements will coordinate, and where necessary de conflict efforts within the two missions as agreed under the auspices of the operational plan (www.un.org/news/dh/latest/afghan/brahimisc-briefing.htm , retrieved on 5/12/2010).

3.2 Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building Crossette (2001), believes that one major question among experts is what is the U.S definition of “winning the war” in Afghanistan. While that might be debated, the top security priority of the United States articulated since 2001 has been to prevent the Taliban and its allies from challenging the Afghan government as that government builds capacity to defend itself and as economic growth and development takes hold. The Obama Administration review, the results of which were announced March 27, 2009, narrowed the formal U.S. mission goals to preventing Al-Qaeda from re-establishing a base in Afghanistan, although the policy tools announced including the military strategy, and continue expansion of the nation-building mission. According to Vincent and Belkin (2009), the Obama Administration strategy review emphasizes Expanding the Afghanistan National Security Forces and helping it take the lead 55 in securing Afghanistan, rather than placing it in a back seat to U.S. led combat, a clear contrast with the 2007 “troop surge” in Iraq. U.S. forces (“Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan, CSTC-A), headed by Maj. Gen. Richard Formica, along with partner countries and contractors and training the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Nevertheless, Jane’s Defense Weekly (2009), succinctly noted that the Afghan army and police are the U.S and NATO’s ticket out of Afghanistan, everyone agrees that security like governance needs an Afghan face. Congressional Research service Report by. Vincent and Belkum (2009), noted that U.S and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible national police force is at least as important to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the Afghan National Army (ANA). Katzman (2009), observed that the Afghan National Army has been build from scratch since 2002.It is not a direct continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That National Army disintegrated during the 1992-1996 Mujahedin Civil War and the 1996-2001 Taliban periods. However, some Afghan military officers who served prior to the Taliban regime did re-join the new military after the fall of the Taliban. The U.S. and allied officers say that ANA, about 90,000 trained and assigned with the total to exceed 90,000 before the end of 2011 is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and national symbol. It now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and it deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts 56 for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. According to the Department of Defense, the ANA has taken the lead in 30 significant combat and clearing operations to date, and has demonstrated “increasing competence, effectiveness, and professionalism.” Many experts believe that comprehensive justice sector reform is vital to Afghan focus on building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court construction; many of these programs are conducted in partnership with Italy which is technically the lead coalition country on Judicial reform. The United States has trained over 750 judges, lawyers and prosecutors and built at least 40 judicial facilities. USAID also trains court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General and the Supreme Court, Congressional Research service Report by Blanchard (2009). The United States and its partners have, to date, generally refrained from interfering in traditional mechanisms such as village “jirgas or Shuras” convened to dispense justice. Doing so would likely raise questions among Afghans that the United States is trying to influence traditional Afghan culture and impose Western values on Afghanistan. The traditional mechanisms are still more widely used in Afghan villages, particularly in pashtun areas, than the secular judicial mechanisms, in part because of the ease of access of these mechanisms. 3.3 Taliban Al-Qaeda and Related Insurgent Groups The Taliban of Afghanistan is increasingly linked politically to Pakistan Taliban Militants such as Beitullah Mehsud and 57 others. The Parkistan Taliban is primarily seeking to challenge the government of Pakistan, but they facilitate the transiting into Afghanistan and support the Afghan Taliban goals of recapturing Afghanistan. Some Pakistan militants are increasingly focused on interrupting U.S supply line’s into Afghanistan that run through Pakistan. However, security is being challenged by a confluence of related armed groups, not only the ousted Taliban still centered on Mullah Umar. Mullah Umar and many of his top advisers from their time in power remain at large in Pakistan and around the city of Quetta (Crossette, 200). In other words, the U.S commanders say that with increased freedom of action in Pakistan, Al. Qaeda militants are increasingly facilitating terrorist activities through financing and recruiting militant incursions in Afghanistan. However, only very small numbers of Al-Qaeda members including Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens are being captured or killed in battles in Afghanistan. The two most notable Al-Qaeda leaders at large that believed in Pakistan are Osama bin Laden himself and his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. There have been no recent public indications that U.S. or allied forces have learned or are close to learning bin Laden’s Location (Gall et al, 2006). Nevertheless, Hik matyar’s fighters, once instrumental in the U.S. supported war against the Soviet Union, are operating in Kunar, Nuristan and Nan garhar0 provinces, east of Kabul. They have been described by the U.S government as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” and under the authority of Executive 58

Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S sanctions. On the other hand another militant faction is led by Jalaludin Haqqani and his eldest son, Siraj (or Sirajjudin). Jalaludin Haqqani, who served as Minister of Tribal Affairs in the Taliban regime of 1996-2001, is believed to be closer to Al Qaeda than to the ousted Taliban leadership in part because one of his wives is, purported Arab. The group is active around Kihost Province. According to Stenersen and Anne (2010), every insurgency and particularly an Islamist insurgency needs a cause, and the Taliban is no different. The Taliban’s basic cause is the expulsion of all foreign forces from Afghanistan and the over throw of the current government as a precursor to the establishment of an , governed by the Taliban according to its austere and highly doctrinaire interpretation of Sharia Law . Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s Spiritual leader has warned that in its unwavering struggle to fulfill these objectives, the Jihad will go on, even for a thousand years. The insurgency in Afghanistan needs to be divided along its strategic and operational lines, which are also nothing like as coherent as many might believe. Though the Taliban is undoubtedly the dominant insurgency fighting in Afghanistan, it is not the only one. Indeed, within the Taliban itself there are important divisions. Operationally speaking, there are five insurgencies operating in Afghanistan at present. First, there are three regional Taliban commands: the northern command, eastern command and southern command. In addition there are two separate fronts: the Hezb-e-Islamic group (HIG) Operating in north-eastern Afghanistan and commanded by Gulbuddin 59

Hekmetyar, and the , operating out of North in Pakistan and commanded by Jalaluddin Haqqani. These commands do not combine to form a unified whole, like the different regiments of an army, but are often divided, and have even been known to fight one another, just as they fight the government and NATO (http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/haqqani- network , retrieved on 15/11/2010). However, the group least closely aligned to the Taliban leadership is Hekmetyar’s Hezb-e-Islami Faction. Hekmetyar has never publicly sworn allegiance to the Taliban’s spiritual leader Mullah Omar, and the group has insisted in the past that no cooperation has taken place between it’s and the Taliban at the leadership level. According to Carlotta (2006), in November and December 2008, there were multiple incidents of major theft, robbery and arson attacks against NATO supply convoys in Pakistan. Transport companies south of Kabul have also been reported to pay protection money to the Taliban. Baker (2007), noted that the failure of the Afghan government and its international partners to capitalize on the goodwill of the Afghan people in the early years and to make genuine progress on the redevelopment front was unquestionably a major factor behind the revival of the Taliban insurgency.

3.4 The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Security in Afghanistan

60

Kenneth (2009), stated that ISAF was created by the Born Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution), initially limited to Kabul. In October 2003, after Germany agreed to contribute 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz, ISAF contributors endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval which came on October 14, 2003 in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510. While in August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF. However, the ISAF mission was most recently renewed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1833 (October 13, 2009). It reiterated the previous year’s renewal resolution (1776) support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility for northern and western Afghanistan. The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. The assumption of NATO/ISAF commands of peacekeeping in fourteen provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus all of Afghanistan), was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover, the United States put about half the U.S. Troops operating in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF. Although most donor nations are suffering from waning public support for the Afghanistan mission, there have been additional U.S., NATO and other troops sent to Afghanistan in 2008 and 2009. According to Katzman (2009), the Obama Administration has faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, 61 including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the infiltration of Taliban and other militants from safe haven in Pakistan. Congressional Research service Report by Vincent and Belkin (2009), the major criticism of the Afghan National Police is wide spread corruption, to the point where many Afghans are more afraid of the police than they are of the Taliban. Therefore, there have been few quick fixed for the chronic shortage of equipment in the Afghan National Police. Most police officers are under equipped, lacking ammunition and vehicles. In some cases, equipment requisitioned by their commanders is being sold and the funds pocketed. These activities as well as absenteeism, led to the failure of a 2006 “auxiliary police”. Therefore, they stated that the capable Afghan National Security Forces (i.e. the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police) are the means by which the United States and NATO might wind eventually down their involvement in Afghanistan. The plan to transfer security responsibility to Afghan forces is the centerpiece of U.S. President Barack Obama’s revised Afghanistan strategy. Current U.S. policy calls for boosting the Afghan National Army to 134, 000 soldiers by October, 2010. The army currently numbers about 95,000 troops. This increase in Afghan troops would allow the U.S. to begin withdrawing American forces in July, 2011, as now planned. The transfer of security responsibilities cannot happen unless the Afghan 62 government and the coalition can recruit train and retain soldiers. At present, the Afghan National Army has severely limited fighting capacity. Even the best afghan units lack training, discipline and adequate enforcements. Afghan Security is plagued by inefficiency and endemic corruption. (http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/war-in-Afghanistan- (2001%E2%80%93present , retrieved on 15/11/2010). Gilles (2010), is of the view that the United States has supported all manner of militia in Afghanistan, creating fragmentation and a dangerous degree of competition in the security sphere.

CHAPTER FOUR U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFGHANISTAN

4.1 Post Taliban Nation Building The fall of the Taliban paved the way for the success of a long stalled U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government and for a U.S. led coalition to begin building legitimate governing institutions. Post-September 11, 2001 Afghanistan policy was 63 predicated on the assumption that preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a terrorist safe haven required the building of strong governing institutions, functioning democracy and economic development. This task has proved more difficult than anticipated because of the effects of the years of war, the low literacy rate of the population, the difficult terrain and geography, and the relative lack of trained government workers (http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberghtm , retrieved on 05/12/2010). Furthermore, the Obama Administration’s “strategic review” of Afghanistan policy, the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, narrowed official U.S. goals to preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the strategy in many ways, tries to enhance nation building by providing more civilian advisers and mentors to expand and reform the Afghan government, security forces and develop the economy. Gibson (2009), stressed that it is necessary to appreciate that the socio-political climate in Afghanistan makes a transition to democratic accountability extremely difficult, and understanding the logic that governs Karzai’s actions in this regard is important. Karzai’s dilemma as president in Kabul is that Afghanistan has never had a strong and viable central government. Instead, governance and power projection has taken place almost exclusively at the regional level. Therefore, this is a real problem for the implementation of a genuinely democratic system based on the principle of one-man-one-vote. For people who have never experienced centrally directed government, and 64 indeed whose only experience of external intervention in their area has been pernicious, persuading them to sacrifice the collective security that can be obtained by operating through regional power brokers, however, imperfect, is extremely problematic. One-man-one-vote is only appealing to people if they can be certain that their interests are better served by representing themselves than by working as a collective. Though president Karzai recognizes that this system does not serve the people well at all, since these power brokers are always liable to abuse their positions of power, he nonetheless continues to use it to his advantage. In the words of McGirk (2009), the biggest problem with governments that operate outside the law is that they are unpredictable. Those who seek to start a business cannot be certain that they will not have their assets seized; those who register dissent cannot be certain that they will not be mistreated or even killed; and nobody can be certain of a fair trial in the courts. Inevitably, this creates a situation where the people cannot trust the government to represent their interests, with the result being that they cease to support it altogether. A dictatorship in a stable country can operate outside the law and survive for a time, though history has proved that dictatorships will always fail in the long-run. However, in a country such as Afghanistan, where instability is rife and there is a very clear alternative to the government, the government cannot afford to forfeit the legitimacy and support it garners from operating within the law. It is a damning and extremely concerning indictment of the Afghan government’s performance in this regard that one of 65 the common answers given by the Taliban is: “they may be brutal, but at least they are fair”. Nevertheless, it has been frequently asserted that the reconstruction component of the strategy in Afghanistan is vital for winning the people, but this is made immeasurably more difficult if the government does not act within the law. For one thing, funds intended for development projects do not reach their destination and basic services fail to be delivered as finance is diverted into the pockets of corrupt officials. Indeed, corruption is one of the most debilitating malaises that can afflict a country. It serves to stifle development and prevents ordinary people from improving their lives. According to Transparency International, Afghanistan is now the most corrupt country on earth after Somalia, a state that has had no functioning government at all since 1991. During General McChrystal tenure, he describes corruption as the greatest single threat facing Afghanistan: It is greater, in my view, probably than the insurgency, although the insurgency is more immediate, more obvious---Corruption is more corrosive. That is the problem with governments that act outside of the law, they are unproductive and inefficient (http://www.mod.uk/Defenceinternet/DefenceNews , retrieved on 25/11/2010). The scale of the challenge confronting Afghanistan is immense, and nobody, including the Afghans expects it to be dealt with over night. What they do want to see, however, is that the country is at least traveling in the right direction, albeit slower at times than they might like. The role of the international community in helping Afghanistan deal with these problems is 66 extremely important. Driven by three decades of near continues conflict, desperately poor, and with no history of stable and accountable governance, Afghanistan cannot be expected to deal with these problems on its own. The international community cannot solve the problems within Afghanistan; that has to be done by the Afghans. However, what it can do is to provide the help, the pressure and the support for the Afghan government and others to deal with the problem so that when this support is ultimately withdrawn, the frame work has been put in place such that Afghans can continue to make progress on their own. In other worlds, the majority of police officers not only received no training, but in many cases, virtually no pay. What actually happened was that recruits were given a gun, put on a check point and left to fend for themselves. The result, inevitably, was rampant corruption as police demanded bribes from everyone they could extort from just to earn a basic living (The Times of India, 06/04/2010). According to Parekh (2002), the biggest criticism that has been leveled at Hamid Karzai is that he has tended to see good governance as the projection of powerful tribal personalities rather than the building of institutions. From its inception in 2002, Karzai’s government has contained numerous warlords and other regional power players whose commitment to honest citizen- service is dubious at best. Gibson (2009), argued that last presidential election in Afghanistan suffer from significant irregularities, including high levels of voter intimidation ballot- stuffing and a general lack of transparency that ensured Hamid Karzai’s re-election. Moreover, failure to respect the will of the 67 people in an election will frequently have the added consequence of convincing them to look to sources of authority other than the government to represent their interests, which in Afghanistan could mean the Taliban. 4.2 Political Transition in Afghanistan According to Katzman (2009), in the formation of the first post- Taliban transition government, the United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the soviet occupation. During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga . However, U.N. mediated cease-fires between warring factions always broke down. Non-U.N. initiatives made little progress, particularly the “Six plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United State, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmensitan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Other failed efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United State) formed in 2000; an Organization Islamic Conference(OIC) contact group; and Afghan exile efforts, including discussion groups launched by Hamid Kaxai’s clan and Zahir Shah (Rome process).

Bonn Agreement Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 was adopted on November 14 2001, calling for a “central” 68 role for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King but not the Taliban to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.” It was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement reportedly forged with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because of Iran’s support for the Northern Alliance faction: • Formed the interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai. • Authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul, and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) gave formal Security Council authorization for the international peacekeeping force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF). • Referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter narcotics, crime, and terrorism. • Applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted. 10

Permanent Constitution 69

A June 2002 emergency loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it was attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women) from Afghanistan’s 364 districts. Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission drafted the permanent constitution, and unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “ constitution loya jirga (CLJ)” during December13, 2003- January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Mojadeddi (mentioned above), ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes. The Northern Alliance faction failed in its effort to set up a prime minister-ship, but they did achieve a fallback objective of checking presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president. The constitution made former King Zahir Shah honorary “Father of the Nation”, a title that is not heritable. Zahir Shah died on July 23, 2007. The constitution also set out timetables for presidential, provincial and district elections (by June 2004) and stipulated that, if possible, they should be held simultaneously(http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/Constitution Afghanistan.pdf.).

First Post-Taliban Elections According to Rajiv et al (2009), security conditions precluded holding of all major elections simultaneously. The first election for president was held on October 9, 2004, slightly missing a June deadline. Turnout was about 80%.On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote) over his 70 seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for the 364 district councils, each of which will likely have contentious boundaries because they will inevitably separate tribes and clans, have not been held to date. For the parliamentary election, voting was conducted for individual’s running in each province, not as party slates. (There are now 90 registered political parties in Afghanistan, but parties remain unpopular because of their Linkages to outside countries during the anti-Soviet War).When parliament first convened on December 18, 2005, the Northern Alliance bloc achieved selection of one of its own who was Karzai’s main competitor in the presidential election-Yunus Qanooni, for speaker of the all-elected 249 seat lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the people). In April 2007, Qanooni and Northern Alliance Political Leader Rabbani organized this opposition bloc, along with ex-Communists and some royal family members, into a party called the “United Front” (UF) that wants increased parliamentary powers and directly elected provincial governors.

The 102-set upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders), selected by the elected provincial councils and Karzai, consists mainly of older, well-known figures, as well as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution). The Leader of that body is Sibghatullah Mojadeddi,s a pro-Karzai former mujahedin party leader and elder statesman. With his bloc 71 of 17 non-female slots, Karzai appointed many of his allies, but also some of his perceived political adversaries, to the upper house.

2009 and 2010 Elections and Candidates The next major political milestone in Afghanistan is the 2009 presidential and provincial elections. On February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009 as the election date-a change from a date mandated by one section of the Constitution (Article16) as taking place by April 21, 2009, in order to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term expires on May 22, 2009. The IEC decision on the latter date cited another article of the Constitution (Article 33) mandating universal accessibility to the voting and saying that the April 21 date was precluded by difficulties in registering voter, printing ballots, training staff, making the public aware of the elections, and the dependence on international donations to fund the elections, in addition to the security questions. This decision caused the UF bloc to say it would not recognize Karzai’s presidency after May 22. As expected, the IEC reaffirmed on March 4, 2009 that the election must be held on August 20, 2009. The official decision did not stop the UF from insisting that Karzai step down on May 22 in favour of a caretaker government, which presumably would be headed by Upper House speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi. Karzai argued that the Constitution does not provide for any transfer of power other than in case of election or death of a President. The Afghan Supreme Court backed that decision on March 28, 2009. The Obama 72

Administration publicly backed both the IEC and the Supreme Court rulings, even though, according to U.S. officials, that backing could be interpreted as a U.S. endorsement of Karzai. Obama Administration Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrook says “the United States favors no candidate and Ambassador Tim Carney is coordinating U.S. support for the elections process and to ensure U.S. neutrality from U.S. Embassy Kabul”. Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public has been high. Registration (updating of 2005 voter rolls) began in October 2008 and was completed as of the beginning of March 2009, with over 15.6 million Afghans updating their registry. However, there were also reports that some voters registering on behalf of women who do not, by custom, show up at registration sites. In some cases, according to observers, Taliban militants decided not to prevent registration, possibly for fear of angering Afghans who want to vote. The elections are expected to cost about $200 million; on March 31, 2009. At a U.N.-led conference in the Netherlands, the United States committed $40 million of that amount, which is part of a planned $175 million U.S. funding for elections in FY2009. Governance Issues The Obama Administration review emphasizes providing additional U.S. and international resources to improve Afghan governance. Since its formation in late 2001, Karzai’s government has grown in capabilities and size, although more slowly than 73 expected, particularly outside Kabul. At the same time, it has narrowed ethnically, progressively dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, who have traditionally governed Afghanistan. Among the key security bodies, only the Intelligence Directorate continues to be headed by a non-Pashtun (Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik). Adhering to a tacit consensus, the other security ministries (Defense, Interior) tend to have Pashtun leadership but with non-Pashtuns in key deputy or subordinate positions. One prominent example is the defense ministry, in which the chief of staff is a Tajik (Bismillah Khan), who reports to a Pashtun Defense Minister (Abdul Rahim Wardak). The parliament has emerged, unexpectedly to some, as a relatively vibrant body that creates accountability and has asserted itself politically. Some criticize it for the large presence of mujagedin leaders- figures who gained prominence from their anti-Soviet War effort. In 2007, the parliament compelled Karzai to oust several major conservatives from the Supreme Court in favor of those with more experience in modern jurisprudence. In mid-2007, parliament enacted a law granting amnesty to former Mujahedin commanders-an attempt to put past schisms to rest in building a new Afghanistan. The law was rewritten to give victims the ability to bring accusations of past abuses; its status is unclear because Karzai did not veto it but he did not sign it either. In May 2007, the UF bloc engineered a vote of no confidence against Foreign Minister Rangeen Spanta for failing to prevent Iran from expelling 50,000 Afghan refugees. Karzai opposed Spanta’s dismissal on the grounds that refugee affairs are not his 74 ministry’s prime jurisdiction. Therefore, the Afghan Supreme Court has sided with Karzai and Santa remains in position. On the other hand, on some less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature appear to be working well. Since the end of 2007, parliament has passed several laws, including a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a convention on tobacco control. The Wolesi Jirga also has confirmed Karzai nominees in several cabinet shifts, as well as for the one remaining justice to fill out the Supreme Court. In April 2009, parliament enacted a personal status law for Shiites that caused an outcry in the international community (Chandrese and Karan, 2009).

4.3 Enhancing Local Governance Kenneth (2009), noted that since the beginning of 2008, there has been a major U.S.-Afghan push to build up local governance, reflecting a shift from the 2001-2007 approach of building only the central government. The approach represents an attempt to rebuild some of the tribal and other local structures, such as “Jirgas” and “Shuras”-traditional local councils that were destroyed in the course of constant warfare over several decades. The leader in this initiative has been the “Independent Directorate of Local Governance” (IDLD=G), formed in August, 2007 and headed by Jelani Popal (a member of Karzai’s Popolza clan). The IDLG reports to Karzai’s office, and its establishment was intended to institute a systematic process for selecting capable provincial and district governors by taking the 75 screening function away from the Interior Ministry. The IDLG is also selecting police chiefs and other local office holders, and in many cases has already begun removing allegedly corrupt local officials. Part of its mission is to empower localities to decide on development projects by forming local “Development Councils” that decide on local development projects and are key to the perceived success of the “National Solidarity Program”. There are 30,000 such elected positions nationwide. In 2008, with the support of the Bush Administration, the IDLG launched the government’s “Social Outreach Program”, intended to draw closer connections between tribes and localities to the central government. The program includes small payments (about $200 per month) to tribal leaders and other participants, in part to persuade them to inform on Taliban insurgent movements. Since its formation, the United States has provided over $100 million to the IDLG for its strategic work plan and its operations and outreach (as of early 2009). Of that, about $8.5 million in FY2009 funds is assisting the Social Outreach Program and related “Governor’s Performance Fund” The Social Outreach Program’s security dimensions primarily the “Afghan Public Protection Force”. Among the notable success of the IDLG leadership on gubernatorial appointments is the March, 2008 replacement of the ineffective Helmand governor (Asadullah Wafa) with Gulab Mangal. Mangal is considered a competent administrator, but he is from Laghman province, not Helmand, somewhat to the consternation of Helmand residents. U.N. Office of Drugs and 76

Crime (UNODC) and other officials say Mangal is taking effective action against poppy cultivation in the province. Some observers speculate, however, that Karzai still wants to replace Mangal with a close Karzai ally, the former governor, Sher Muhammad Akunzadeh (governor until 2005, now a Karzai appointee in the upper house of Parliament), who purportedly committed numerous human rights abuses in the course of fighting the Taliban in the province and apparently remains powerful informally there. Karzai maintains Akunzadeh, when he was governor, was highly effective in keeping the Taliban at bay in the province by fielding local tribal forces against the insurgents. The UNODC also credits the strong leadership of Ghul Agha Shirzai, Nanagarhar’s governor, Atta Mohammad of Balkh, and Monshi Abdul Majid, governor of Badakkihshan, for eliminating or reducing poppy cultivation in their provinces. The governor of Qandahar was changed (to former General Rahmatullah Rufi, replacing ) after the August 7, 2008, Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison (Sarposa) that led to the freeing of several hundred Taliban fighters incarcerated there. However, reflecting continued political infighting over how best to stabilize Qandahar, Raufi was replaced in December, 2008 by Afghan-Canadian academic Tooryalai Wesa. Other governors said to be successful in helping stabilize and develop their provinces include former Khost governor Arsala Jamal, and governor Hajji , son of the slain “Jalabad Shura leader Hajji Abd al-Qadir. Expanding and Reforming Central Government /Corruption 77

With a permanent national government fully assembled, U.S. policy has been to expand governance throughout the country, and this policy will receive increased U.S. Financial and advisory resources under the new Obama Administration strategy. The Karzai government is widely estimated by U.S. officials of control about 30% of the country, while the Taliban controls 10%, and tribes local groups control the remainder. In part because building the central government has gone slowly, there was a U.S. shift during 2008 away from reliance only on strengthening central governments toward promoting local governance. Some argue that doing so is more compatible with Afghan traditions, because Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy and resisted strong governance from Kabul.

CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary and Conclusion In this study, we examined US military operations, governance and security in Afghanistan. This inquiring was necessitated by the endless war the U.S. has mired itself in Afghanistan in the past nine years. The study is based on the following research questions: 78

1. Did the U.S. government’s military strategies de-escalate the menace of insecurity in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010?

2. Has the U.S. government’s military operations enhanced the stability of governance in Afghanistan?

For a proper analysis of the subject matter under investigation, the study adopted the power theory. This theory is not only relevant but also captures the American foray in Afghanistan. Since the war began in 2001, the US government has adopted different war strategies to win the war in Afghanistan or at least to reduce the lost of US soldiers but this has not abated the spate at which US soldiers die and the war remains unwinnable. On the other hand, the U.S. government’s military operations have not ensured security and stability in Afghanistan. Yet, the U.S. because it feels that its power position is preponderant over Afghanistan and with the notion that Afghanistan can easily be run through, continues to wage war in Afghanistan. The United States idea that its relationship with Afghanistan is defined in terms of power is the main reason that has sustained the war. Following from the research question, we hypothesized as follows: 1. That the U.S. government’s military strategies in Afghanistan tend to de-escalate the menace of insecurity in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010.

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2. That the U.S. government’s military operations in Afghanistan tend to undermine the stability of governance in Afghanistan.

We subjected the hypotheses to a test in our chapter three and four to ascertain the validity of the claim. We found that each U.S. government’s military strategies in Afghanistan have escalated the menace of insecurity in Afghanistan. The study further revealed that the U.S. government’s military operations in Afghanistan tend to undermine the stability of governance in Afghanistan. The U.S. government’s military strategies and operations in Afghanistan have only compounded the problem of security and stability in Afghanistan. In concluding this study therefore, we state on the basis of empirical evidence, we uphold the hypotheses that U.S. government’s military strategies in Afghanistan tend to de- escalate the menace of insecurity in Afghanistan, and that the U.S. government’s military operations in Afghanistan tend to undermine the stability of governance in Afghanistan. We further state that as long as U.S. government continues to have the erroneous idea that its relationship with Afghanistan is defined in terms of power, the issue of security and stability will continue to be a mirage. We therefore, recommend that the U.S. government should as a matter of respect for Afghan sovereignty withdrawal its forces from Afghanistan.

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