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Home , Eric Voegelin, George Santayana, Metaxy, Nearer the Gods, Pistis, Plato (exarch)

A CONSIDERATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHTS OF

ERIC VOEGELIN: THE LIFE OF , THE EQUIVALENT

SYMBOL OF THE DIVINE HUMAN ENCOUNTER

A dissertation by

Claire Rawnsley, B.A.Hons.

Submitted in fulfilment of PH.D in of , University of Queensland

July 1998

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who have in various ways I have been kind enough to read and give advice regarding this thesis. First, I would thank the various lecturers in the History

Department at University of Queensland who have assisted my work on this thesis from the beginning. There is Professor Crook, Dr. John Moses, my supervisors, and also Dr. Martin

Stuart-Fox who have all offered important criticism of my work.

I would also like to thank those people whom I contacted in the Voegelin , in particular, Dr. Geoffrey Price. He has generously offered many valuable suggestions and provided points that have had an important bearing of the thesis.

I would also like to thank Mr. Mike Dyson who introduced me to the complexity of the world of and and gave me critical points to consider in that area. There are many others who have helped with the typing and editing of the several drafts. First there is Mrs.

Irene Saunderson who typed the first draft of my thesis before I acquired some computer expertise. Then there is Ms. Robin Bennett who painstaking edited the draft and also Mrs.Mary

Kooyman who kindly offered many valuable suggestions with the presentation and final editing.

I would also like to thank Mrs.Rosemary van Opdenbosch who generously translated several articles from French and German. Her translations have been acknowledged at specific places in the text. I would also like to acknowledge the wonderful assistance given by the

Librarians at the Central library over the many years that I have used the library. Finally I am grateful to the many friends who have given support to continue this work under at times very arduous circumstances.

ABSTRACT

Voegelin was deeply concerned about a spiritual crisis of in the

Western world as well as the threat of totalitarianism growing in Europe. The realisation

led him to the question of which he considered as attempts to form a closed

society. He argued that should be as Plato and Aristotle envisaged a science

of human nature. The discovery by Plato and Aristotle that philosophy is an openness to

transcendence was a turning point in . However since the

Enlightenment, philosophy has eliminated the numinous from human experience and has

instead given emphasis to the rational intellect. As a consequence, experience is split

from knowledge in the human pysche.

Central to understanding this thesis is the notion of transcendence. Human reason

is capable of transcending the visible, experiential world. It can know investigate, explore ideas such as goodness, etc. This process is referred to here as noetic reasoning. If noetic knowledge is excluded from scholarly discussions we are then left with a philosophy that is unable adequately to describe the divine, human condition, society and history.

I have argued in this thesis that Voegelin’s thought concerning offers a fresh way of analysing and investigating how order is effected in society.

Noesis or noetic reason is that knowledge which includes all dimensions of human experience including the consciousness of the transcendent. Voegelin argues that an openness to transcendence will foster an open and pluralistic society. I have demonstrated that Voegelin’s thought concerning the life of reason offers a new way of

analysing and investigating how order is effected in . Hence, the first part of the

thesis examines noetic reason as a hermeneutic tool, closely related to this is , a symbol Voegelin declared indicates the type of order present in a society.

The first and second chapters consider Voegelin’s life, influences and the development of his thought. The third chapter explores the source of noetic reason in

Hellenist thought. Chapter 4 examines the transformation of noetic reason in

Christianity. Chapter 5 discusses the area of as a stratum of experience of human consciousness. Chapter 6 enlarges the study of noetic reason by examining its relation to homonoia, a symbol considered by Voegelin as the substance of society. In

Chapter 7 the loss of noetic reason in Western consciousness is examined, a loss that has created current repercussions in international relations. Chapters 8 and 9 investigate noetic reason in a non-western context. The chun tzu (sage) notion of is explored as an equivalent to Plato’s -king. Although the chun tzu is important in Chinese thought it never became a principle of order in China. The absence of this principle is evident in the unsettled nature of Chinese society in the 20th century.

To explore the problem of silencing the “creative minority”, I have examined the thought of Lu Hsun and his views on the fate of the individual in China. Finally, the thesis examines some possible lines of converging thought between Lu Hsun and

Voegelin and the extent to which each thinker was aware of the significance of noetic reason.

i chap TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Chapter

1. LIFE AND BACKGROUND OF , 1901-1985...... 1-25

1.1. Early Life 1.1.1. Study at the University of 1.1.2. life in Vienna 1.1.3. University Seminars 1.2. Formative Influences: (1881-1973), Karl Kraus (1874-1936), Stefan George (1868-1933) 1.3. The American Experience 1.3.1. Common-sense Philosophy 1.3.2. Santayana 1.4. Return to Europe; Work at the Law School in Vienna 1.5. Early Writings 1.6. The Political scene: Authoritarian State, 1.6.1. National 1.6.2. Escape to America 1.6.3. Louisiana State University 1.7. Return to Europe, Period 1.7.1. Teaching

2. VOEGELIN’S RECOVERY OF THE FULL STRUCTURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS ...... 66-83 2.1. Voegelin’s inquiry into political theory 2.1.1. Weber and the Social Sciences 2.1.2. History of Ideas (1939-1950) 2.1.3. Symbols 2.1.4. Order and History 2.2. Theory of Consciousness 2.2.1. Anamnesis (1966) 2.2.2. and the “In-Between” 2.3. Summary

3. THE LIFE OF REASON IN CLASSIC THOUGHT...... 84-120

3.1. Analysis of the order of the ; the Platonic vision 3.1.1. The Philosopher’s Knowledge 3.1.2. Knowledge and Virtue 3.1.3. Knowledge and Wonder (Thaumazein) 3.2. Plato’s Three Images 3.2.1. The Good and the Sun (The 507b-509c) 3.2.2. The Divided Line (The Republic 509e-511e) 3.2.3. Plato’s Parable of the Cave 3.3. The Psyche 3.3.1. Equivalent of the 3.3.2. “Un-reason”, Anoia 3.3.3. Deformed

ii

3.4. The Life of Reason in Aristotle (384-322 BC) 3.4.1. The Problem of the so-called “break” with Plato 3.4.2. Aristotle’s link maintained in the Bios Theoretikos 3.4.3. Aristotle’s Problem with the Transcendental 3.5. Summary

4. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LIFE OF REASON IN WESTERN HISTORY...121-149

4.1. Platonic Vision 4.1.1. Parable of the Cave 4.1.2. The Parable-Saving Tale 4.1.3. Parable, Question-Answer 4.1.4. Summary 4.2. The Israelite Experience, the Thornbush (Exodus 3:1-17) 4.2.1. Differentiated Experience of Consciousness 4.2.2. The Drawing (Helkein) or the “Force” 4.2.3. “I am”, The Name of 4.3. The Divine Esse (Being) and the Divine Bonum (Good) 4.4. The Christian Experience 4.4.1. Colossians (2:8-10) 4.4.2. The Life of Reason and the Theotes symbol 4.4.3. The Question of Christ 4.4.4. The Split in Reality 4.5. The Platonic Vision - more precise 4.6. The natural/supernatural problem 4.7. Separation-school 4.8. Summary

5. THE LIFE OF REASON (NOESIS) AND CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM...... 150-185

5.1. Voegelin’s Recognition of Mysticism 5.1.1. Mysticism Is Noesis Differentiated 5.1.2. Three Symbols 5.1.3. And Knowledge 5.1.4. The Hellenic of Noesis 5.2. Pseudo-Dionysius and the Name of God 5.3. St. Thomas, Analogia Entis 5.4. Christian mysticism 5.4.1. Analogia entis and via negativa 5.4.2. Contemplatio and theologia negativa 5.4.3. Conceptual knowing and mysticism 5.4.4. Conceptual Knowledge and St. Thomas of “Proportion” 5.4.5. “Additional Principle” 5.4.6. “Imperfect” Faith 5.4.7. Faith needs “Help” 5.4.8. Faith impossible without concepts 5.5. St. John of the Cross 5.5.1. The Journey of Faith 5.5.2. Faith the Proportionate Means 5.5.3. Darkness of Faith 5.5.4. Faith aligned with Charity 5.5.5. The boundaries of “union” 5.6. Summary

6. THE LIFE OF REASON AND HOMONOIA, A CREATIVE FORCE IN SOCIETY..186-227 iii

6.1. Homonoia, an ordering principle in society 6.2 Homonoia in classical literature 6.2.1. 6.2.2. Homonoia in Greek literature 6.3. Homonoia in Plato (427-347 BC) 6.4. Homonoia and Aristotle (384- 322 BC) 6.4.1. Homonoia a political concept 6.4.2. Homonoia parallel with Nous 6.5. Hellenistic Era 6.5.1. The kingship of Alexander the Great (336-323 BC) 6.6. Roman Empire 6.6.1. (106-43 BC) 6.7. Christianity: Transformation of Homonoia ( 14 AD) 6.7.1. Source of transforming influence 6.7.2. Personality of Christ 6.7.3. The vision of the disciple - evocative acts of Christianity 5.7.4. Epistle to the Hebrews 6.8. The early Church 6.8.1. Homonoia transformed by the Christian pneuma 6.8.2. Pauline compromises 6.8.3. Transformation of the Roman social order 6.8.4. Augustine (345-430 A.D.) 6.8.5. The City of God, civitatas dei and the City of earth 6.9. Summary

7. THE LIFE OF REASON AND THE LOSS OF COMMUNITY SUBSTANCE...... 228-274

7.1. Factors that contributed to the loss of reason 7.1.1. The Sacramental Church, a Buffer against 7.1.2. Second Factor: Nominalism 7.1.3. A Break between Philosophy and Theology 7.2. What the life of reason comprises: the loss 7.2.1. “Substance” Differentiated in the Christian experience 7.2.2. The hierarchy of Being 7.3. Loss of community substance 7.3.1. Voegelin’s analysis of (1530-96) and Vera religio 7.3.2. Loss of Noesis and order of society 7.3.3. Knowledge not divorced from conversio 7.3.4. Noesis Symbol: kept alive by Bergson (1859-1941) 7.3.5. Voegelin’s critique of Bergson 7.4. The speculative intellect 7.4.1. (1588-1679) 7.4.2. Human type-fusion of wills 7.4.3. Henry F. Giddings (1855-1931) 7.4.4. (1859-1952) 7.5. Summary

8. THE LIFE OF REASON IN A NON-WESTERN CONTEXT: CHINA...... 275-300

8.1. Chinese of the divine iv

8.1.1. Shang Ti, the common ancestor 8.1.2. T’ien 8.1.3. Tao 8.2. Cosmological emphasis 8.2.1. Divine Tao, Impersonal Force 8.2.2. The Eastern Problem of differentiation 8.3. Confucian Spiritual 8.3.1. Confucius’ Innovative sage notion 8.3.2. Voegelin’s Analysis of Confucius’ Chun tzu 8.3.3. China Presents an obscure Problem 8.3.4. Absence of the psyche as the site of transcendence

9. THE LIFE OF REASON AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ORDER IN CHINA: LU HSUN ...... 301-340 9.1. Twentieth century China: beginnings of the new order 9.1.1. The problem of Western learning 9.1.2. New political parties 9.2. Lu Hsun 9.2.1. Lu Hsun and Chinese culture 9.2.2. Lu Hsun and the fate of the individual 9.2.3. “Diary of a Madman”. 9.2.4. Lu Hsun’s of reality 9.2.5. Chinese society and the “iron room” 9.2.6. The difficulty of abandoning the old order 9.2.7. Lu Hsun and the CCP 9.3. Points of convergence between Lu Hsun and Voegelin 9.3.1. Lu Hsun: critique of society 9.3.2. Voegelin’s critique of society 9.3.3. The “spiritual disease” 9.3.4. Voegelin’s analysis of the “spiritual disease” 9.3.5. Lu Hsun’s “Great Wall” 9.3.6. Voegelin and the closed society 9.4. Lu Hsun’s Chinese world-view 9.4.1. Lu Hsun’s tentative breakthrough 9.5. China today - oppressive nature of society and order

CONCLUSION...... 341-350

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 351-374 1

INTRODUCTION

Over the last hundred years or so in the modern world there has been much

worthy discussion in the philosophical arena, but the outcomes do not all deserve to be

described as philosophy. Eric Voegelin (1901-1985) in his writings distinguished

between “opinions” and philosophy. In the course of his studies Voegelin became

increasingly aware of what he described as the phenomenon of modernity, and he desired

to analyse this particular twentieth century difficulty. The pressing question for him was

the problem of totalitarianism in modern Europe. He had written: “The principal problem

to which I refer is the fact that war against a totalitarian power, with the ruling group of

totalitarian sectarians firm in its faith and willing to sacrifice the people to the bitter end

for its domination, can only end with the horrors of physical destruction - that we know

from the Hitler case.”1 Taking account of this problem Voegelin saw the spiritual crisis

of the modern age as fundamentally a crisis of consciousness. The realisation led him to

analyse the question of ideologies which he saw as an attempt to construct a “second

reality”.2

The outcome of these modern ideological deformations, he argued, had led to a closed

society; that is, a society closed against “the ground of being”. Voegelin uses the term to

1Eric Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, edited by . (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University, 1989), p.117. Voegelin was referring to the American problem of the Vietnam war in the light of Europe’s two totalitarian wars. 2 The term second reality was drawn from Robert Musil’s book, Man Without Qualities, first published in German in 1930. 2

refer to that undefinable supreme reality as the origin or arche of all things. Voegelin

refers to the “divine ground”. He writes, “The ground is not a spatially distant thing but a

divine presence that becomes manifest in the experience of unrest and the desire to

know.”3 To counter this situation Voegelin realised he would have to investigate the

question of consciousness and formulate an alternative approach to what he termed those

“apodictically certain ”.4 Voegelin had studied neo-Kantianism and thinkers

such as Comte, Hegel and Marx. He was also familiar with the theories of such writers as

Heidegger, Husserl and Freud. These thinkers had constructed “systems” of

consciousness. Voegelin contended that reality cannot be created or contained in such

“systems” but must as it were be “discovered” through the opening of the soul of the

to the ground of order. Such was the path taken by the classic philosophers

Plato and Aristotle, and after them, the Christian writers (Augustine, Aquinas) and later

remnants found in the Scottish common-sense philosophers (Reid and Hamilton).

The aim of this thesis is to examine noetic reason or the life of reason as

illuminated by Eric Voegelin. He has argued that the life of reason is significantly

missing from modern Western thought. For most philosophers in the post-Enlightenment

era “reason”, as a study, is the investigation of the techniques, the processes of human

3Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press), Vol. 4, p. 184; “On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery” in Published Essays, 1966-1985, edited with an introduction by Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 354. “Divine ground” or “ground of being” is a notion that Voegelin uses to refer to the source of being. He sometime uses “God” but wished to consider other expressions of this reality. See his “Anxiety and Reason”, in Eric Voegelin, What is History? And Late Unpublished Writings, Vol. 28, p. 67 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990). See also Voegelin’s phrase “search of the Ground”, the aiton, arche or ultimate cause. Refer to Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik (R. Piper: Munich, 1966). The edition used here is translated by Gerhart Niemeyer Anamnesis (Indiana: Notre Dame University, 1978), Chapter 8, “The Consciousness of the Ground”. See also “Reason: the Classic Experience” in Published Essays, 1966-1986, Vol. 12, p. 271. 3 thought (it is “how” we think rather than “what” we think.) It is, for some, rationalisation in the sense of the simplification of complex expressions, or the classification of ideas that seem different but are largely similar. For others, “reason” is the science of logic, or

“reason” is a bridge to bring all empirical knowledge into some kind of synthesis. In such studies there is no acknowledgement of the importance of noesis (υοησιζ)5 as understood in current philosophy.

Many modern philosophers demand that knowledge must pass the test of either linguistic analysis or empirical proof. Against what he considered to be a narrow contemporary definition of reason, Eric Voegelin’s philosophical perspective constitutes a corrective. He found that the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy dealt far more comprehensively with “human affairs”. He stated: “...I would make no difference between and the philosophy of history, because as Aristotle already formulated it, what the philosopher has to deal with are human affairs. Philosophy is really a philanthropia [study of human affairs]”.6 Elsewhere he wrote: “The effort of the

Greeks to arrive at an understanding of their humanity has culminated in the Platonic-

Aristotelian creation of philosophy as the science of the nature of man”.7 Voegelin

4Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis (Indiana: Notre Dame University, 1978), p.10. Voegelin considered such an analysis of consciousness in itself as “a dead end”. He wrote, “Something had to be done. I had to get out of that ‘apodictic horizon’ as fast as possible.” 5 Noesis is the activity of the nous. Nous in Greek philosophy meaning “reason”, “”, is drawn from the nous of Anaxagoras and is understood as the cosmic reason that orders the universe and is linked to perception and creativity. Plato considers the nous as the most excellent part of humans. As the Nous rules the world so it controls moral action. Aristotle sees in the nous our characteristic energeia. Theoretical nous is the power of logical thought and practical nous sets goals for the will. The nous is immortal and comes to the body from outside. This applies only to the active, not the passive or potential nous. See Aristotle’s “nous” in Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, translator and editor, Geoffrey W. Bromley (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Herdmans, 1964-1976), pp. 636-637. 6 See Eric Voegelin, “Philosophies of History: An Interview with Eric Voegelin,” New Orleans Review 2 (1973), p.135; Also Eric Voegelin, “Les Perspectives d’avenir de la civilisation occidentale” in L’Histoire et ses interpretations. Entretiens autour de Arnold Toynbee, Raymond B. Aron, ed., (The Hague: Mouton, 1961), p. 136. Voegelin wrote that reason was “the essential character of western civilisation”. 7 Eric Voegelin, “On Classical Studies”, Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12 , p. 258. 4

declared that “the life of reason” has been displaced by the “climate of opinion” which

has taken hold of Western thinking as a result of the Enlightenment which has dominated philosophy for the last two hundred years or more.

Voegelin insisted that human beings, who seek to attain a full of life, or are searching for that fullness, must be “open” to the challenges of human curiosity, open to the challenge of the depths in reality that we humans can know only by analogy, and so open to divine reality. Plato based his philosophy on noetic reasoning, on the ability of human beings to go beyond themselves in contemplating being beyond the range of our physical experience. Was that an idealistic ambition? No: many philosophers whose works are still read put far narrower boundaries around their thoughts. They devised philosophies to support political movements, or to fit into contemporary movements.

Some examples are Comte, Hegel and Marx. Because such philosophies are dogmatic they do not survive the era in which they attain popularity. By contrast, Plato’s philosophy allowed his followers to be open to theophany or revelation. This conception of philosophy also leaves the student free to study the Judaeo-Christian conception of revelation with its accent on the pneuma, or spirit.

Having investigated the range of philosophical systems since the Greeks Voegelin not only found them of limited application but also irrelevant. It is a problem that many of us face: we tend to classify philosophies as too difficult, too irrelevant because of their

remoteness in time, place or tradition. Voegelin was able to search many pre-

Enlightenment philosophies, finding an accommodation with them, through his notion of

noetic reason, the ability to transcend visible reality. He was particularly impressed by

the works of St. Augustine. In the Civitate Dei he found the key contrast between “amor 5

dei” and “amor sui”. The contrast is between the human spirit confined to its own

interest (amor sui), and that which is able to contemplate transcendence (amor dei) at the

same time. These important ideas are examined in detail in the chapters which follow.

It is emphasised that reason in the noetic sense is significantly different from the

post- Enlightenment notion of rationalisation, empirical reasoning, logic and so on.

Noesis or noetic knowledge then is that knowledge which is man’s experience of

and awareness of all areas of reality which includes the spiritual. Knowledge

of this type is often present in a “creative minority” (Toynbee), due to its openness to the

full structure of reality.

It is argued here that the present discipline of limiting reason to rationalisation

alone has had serious repercussions in many areas of academic research. Such a

limitation, or reduction of reason, has meant that a whole body of knowledge is now

neglected. Knowledge understood as “numinous” or “the religious” or “the

transcendent” is completely dismissed as of no relevance or interest, whatever the subject

being discussed. Such a body of knowledge is absent from much academic debate. For

example, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995,8 there is no reference to

“the life of reason”. Instead, there are articles on: practical reason; practical reasoning;

theoretical reason. Such an application of reason understood in a Nominalist manner

presents a problem when applied to Chinese thought.9 As a result there is a one-sided

investigation of topics such as , history and philosophy. Investigations are carried

8Robert Audi, general ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 9The following studies use “reason” in a reductionist sense. See A. C. Graham, Unreason within Reason: Essays on the Outskirts of Rationality (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1992). See also Zhang Shi-Ying, “The Development of the Principle of Subjectivity in Western Philosophy and of the Theory of Man in 6 out using disciplines such as sociological or philosophical analysis which depend on this nominalistic conception of reason. When topics arise such as the nature of man, the intellect, or reason, there appears to be no other approach available, no language in which to assess the spiritual dimension of these questions. A problem is presented. As Voegelin argues, such studies omit a whole sector of human reality from their examination.10 The situation becomes more acute when such studies concerning man and society are of an intercultural nature. The tendency then is to resort to a relativistic approach, and to put all numinous knowledge in the same category, or to ignore the numinous element entirely.

Something of this nature occurs for instance, in the discussion on the nature of man11 in

Chinese thought. The result is that the numinous aspect of reason is totally eliminated from the discussion, and emphasis is given to what is termed the rational intellect. Some evidence of this approach appears in those trying to judge Confucius as a rationalistic and purely pragmatic thinker with no sense of the numinous. When this unfair, inadequate method of research is used, studies suffer under the scrutiny of a Western rationalistic view - something akin to censorship. The problem became apparent when some Chinese scholars took issue with it and set out in a Manifesto their own response.12

Chinese Philosophy,” in Tang yi-jie, Zhen, George F. McLean, eds., Man and Nature: The Chinese Tradition and the Future (New York: University Press of America, 1989), pp. 149-167. 10Eric Voegelin, “On Classical Studies”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, p. 258. Voegelin enumerates some principal points of disagreement between the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy and “the contemporary climate of opinion.” He states: Classic: Man is disturbed by the question of the ground; by nature he is a questioner (aporein) and seeker (zetein) for the whence, the where to, and the why of his existence; he will raise the question: Why is there something, why not nothing? Modern: Such questions are otiose (Comte); don’t ask them, be a socialist man (Marx); questions to which the science of world-immanent things can give no answer are senseless, they are Scheinprobleme (neopositivism). 11The use of “man” rather than “human” ‘“man/woman” etc. although not politically correct causes confusion in the present discussion. 12A group of Chinese philosophers wrote a Manifesto as a reproach against a reductionist view of Chinese thought. See Carson Chang, et al.,“A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture”, Chinese Culture, 3 (1960), pp. 1-71. 7

They objected to a Western (nominalistic) rationalistic analysis being applied to

Chinese thought. It is in this area that Voegelin’s philosophical approach is most useful

as his analysis of noetic reason shows that there is a common basis for discussion, and a

strategy as well for respecting philosophical differences.

It is not only in intercultural studies that the neglect of noetic reasoning has

impoverished research. Another example of nominalistic reasoning is found in the

treatment of mysticism. The subject is treated as “non-rationalistic”, and so of no interest

in studies based on a rationalistic approach to reason. Hence mysticism is treated by

Western experts as a psychological deviation of reason or in a relativistic manner that

does not account for the differentiation of the experience as it arises within the various

traditions.13 Again such an approach closes off a whole body of knowledge which

Voegelin on one occasion refers to as “pre-dogmatic knowledge”,14 i.e. knowledge that

has not yet been crystallised as dogma.

A closely related issue is found in the study of theology, where the tendency has been to rationalise the spiritual experience and so to split theology from philosophy. The distinction between noetic reason and nominalistic reason came to a head in the nominalism of William Ockam (c1285-1347). Voegelin observes that philosophy was split from theology, and once again the spiritual was separated from the intellectual, the

spiritual was removed from the academic community. He writes: “The nominalism of a

dogma that has separated from experience, and therefore can no longer be controlled by

13The differentiation of the experience of the mystics is referred to in Chapter 8. In this chapter an analysis is made between the Christian experience which is discussed in Chapter 4 and the notion of “oneness” as understood by the Taoists (see Chapter 8). 14Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p.192. Voegelin writes, “The classical noesis and mysticism are the two predogmatic realities of knowledge in which the logos of consciousness was differentiated in a paradigmatic way.” 8 recourse to experience, has become the publicly dominant form of the West because it was, beginning with the eighteenth century, adopted as the intellectual form of ideologizing”.15 The problem will be elaborated in this thesis, the aim of which is to argue for the recovery of noetic reason and the application of this as an analytical tool. It will be demonstrated that Voegelin’s philosophy provides a proper framework to investigate intercultural studies in many diverse areas, such as political theory or topics such as mysticism and theology. It is argued that Voegelin’s thought concerning the life of reason invites a new way of analysing and investigating how order is effected in societies of diverse cultures.

METHODOLOGY

The notion of “noetic reason” demands careful explanation. In a first sketch, we might refer to it as simply “being prepared to ask all necessary questions”. That preparedness to ask questions may then be studied in two contexts, the Platonic-

Aristotelian and the Judaeo-Christian. We then come to a key feature of Voegelin’s philosophical approach: the recovery of noesis also involves the recovery of experience of being. Voegelin attacks the spirit of modernity which averts attention from the divine ground by developing his own political theory of society within the experience of transcendence. He argues that an openness to transcendence will foster an open and pluralistic society. He approaches the problem of order in society from a classical perspective: at the centre of his understanding of order is the human tension of existence towards the divine. He points out that when the “climate of opinion” replaces “the life of

15Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 113. 9

reason”, reason becomes “pragmatic reason”.16 In one place, Voegelin defined “reason”

as the “maximum distinction between the domains of being.” He insisted on keeping the

distinction between immanence and transcendence. Thus he observes, “Can’t one say, in

the most objective way, that, as soon as one renounces this distinction between

immanence and transcendence, one is on the way to regression?”17 It is a narrowing of

the faculty of reason that makes reason useful to describe the sciences in the external world. It is this kind of reason that enables us to develop technology and to co-ordinate all the means and ends, causes and effects to produce a body of scientific knowledge useful for our modern world. But as Voegelin argues this is not to exhaust the human potential.

There is also noetic reason which includes not only all this activity (rational action in the sciences of man, society and history in the formation of the order of the psyche and society) but also embraces knowledge in the field of human consciousness of the tension of existence. The term “tension of existence” is one of Voegelin key notions.

It refers to humans’ seeking the ground and can be expressed by experiences of wonder, fear and awe: the consciousness of God, the ground of being, the , the fragility of human existence, of life and death. Such knowledge Voegelin regarded as grounding the

“essential character of Western civilization”.18

16Voegelin distinguishes between “pragmatic reason” and “noetic reason” in “Industrial Society in Search of Reason”, in , ed., World Technology and Human Destiny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963) , p. 43. 17Trans. from Eric Voegelin, “Les perspectives d’avenir de la civilisation occidentale”, in Raymond B. Aron, ed., L’Histoire et ses interpretations: Entretiens Autour de Arnold Toynbee, 1961, p. 138. (J’ai défini la “raison” comme distinction maximale entre les domaines de l’être. Ne peut-on pas dire, de la façon la plus objective, que, dès qu’on renonce à cette distinction entre immanence et transcendance, on est sur la voie de la régression?) [Translated by Rosemary van Opdenbosch]. 18 Eric Voegelin, “Les perspectives d’avenir de la civilization occidentale”, in Raymond B. Aron, ed., L’Histoire et ses interpretations: Entretiens Autour de Arnold Toynbee ( 1961), p.136. He writes: 10

In all noetic reasoning, however, the high point of human awareness, the distinctive realisation, is that of transcendence. It is this feature that marks off Western noetic knowledge from the earlier types of truth. These earlier understandings Voegelin designates as cosmological truth, a primordial grasp of truth which does not make a clear distinction between the , man and the world. For example, the Chinese would discuss the spirits inhabiting the world. Sometimes they called them gods and sometimes they were humans. In Western thought there is always a distinction between God and humans.19 Voegelin attributes this insight to Plato who identified the human psyche as the site of transcendence.20 (In his analysis of consciousness Voegelin considered the symbol of the “open soul” as describing/ representing/ indicating/ human consciousness in the full structure of reality, human consciousness as a true unit, a true feature of reality in our world.)

Si nous arrêtons à cette dernière interprétation, si nous retenons, comme caractère essentiel de la civilisation occidentale, le développement de la ‘raison’ et de la ‘science’, l’ambiguïté est loin d’être levée. Platon et Aristote ont enseigné, en effet, au monde occidental qu’on peut atteindre rationnellement à la saisie des essences. Mais de quelle ‘raison’ s’agit-il? On peut qualifer une action de ‘rationnelle’ lors-qu’elle implique une certaine adaption des moyens aux fins; on peut entendre ‘raison’ au sens ‘analytique’ d’Aristote; mais le mot ‘raison’ peut renvoyer aussi à l’idée d’une vue complète du royaume de l’Être. [ Trans. If we stop at this last interpretation, if we retain, as the essential character of Western civilisation, the development of ‘reason’ and ‘science’, the ambiguity is far from being removed. Plato and Aristotle have in fact taught the that one can by rational means succeed in grasping the essences. But what ‘reason’ is the issue here? One can call an action ‘reasonable’ in the ‘analytical’ sense of Aristotle; but the word ‘reason’ can also refer to the idea of a complete view of the kingdom of the Being.] [Translated by Rosemary van Opdenbosch] 19See Eric Voegelin, “Letter 38, 1951”, in Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper, Faith and : Correspondence between Strauss and Voegelin 1934-1964 (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 82. Voegelin writes, “The development of the soul (as Jaeger and Snell worked through very well in opposition to Rohde) appears to me to be the process in which man dedivinized himself and realised the humanity of his spiritual life. Only with this spiritual concentration will it be possible to experience oneself as being addressed by a world-transcendent God”. See also Voegelin, “Reason: the Classic Experience” in Published Essays 1966-1985, Vol. 12, p. 287. He writes “The unfolding of noetic consciousness in the psyche of the classic philosophers is not ‘idea,’ or a ‘tradition,’ but an event in the history of mankind”. 20 Eric Voegelin, New Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 77. See also Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, Published Essays 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 286. Voegelin discusses the ordering force of man’s psyche. 11

Underlining what was said above, that modern philosophy truncated and undervalued noetic reason, Voegelin found in Plato and Aristotle an illumination that true human reason is noetic reason. He insisted that the discovery of reason by the

Hellenic philosophers was a turning point in the history of consciousness of humans (in understanding human worth). The symbol Plato used for this was daimonis aner or spiritual man. That of Aristotle, was spoudaios or mature man.21 Against this background we see how Voegelin associates reason with “openness”. He writes:

Plato especially was very much aware that man, in his tension towards the ground of existence, was open toward a depth of divine reality beyond the stratum that had revealed itself as the Nous; as a philosopher he left consciousness open to the future of theophany, to the pneumatic revelations of the Judaeo-Christian type as well as to the later differentiations of mysticism and of tolerance in doctrinal matters.22

Our appreciation of the significance of noetic reason is assisted by examining another key notion that Voegelin attributed as a key to understanding order in society: the notion of homonoia.23 The word homonoia suggests “one mind” - noia, the idea of

“oneness” rests on the understanding that the knowledge of the Logos is common to all.24

Such a broad inclusive understanding was recognised by Alexander the Great and later

21Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, in Published Essays 1966-1985 , Vol. 12, 1990, pp. 265- 266. 22 Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 266. 23Voegelin considered that homonoia as “likemindedness” had a fundamental function of such categories for determining what the substance of society really is”. Refer to Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 30. Homonoia [Gk] was translated as concordia in Roman terms. Voegelin considered homonoia as one of the founding elements of . Refer to Eric Voegelin, “Speeches and Writing” Box 57.4 p. 84, “Unpublished Works”, kept in the , Stanford, . 24 What Aristotle calls ousia, although translated as “substance” according to Voegelin comprises much more in Aristotle’s thought. Voegelin states, “the one term ousia suffices him for all modes of being; his glance always passes through the ousia correctly to the “things” of primary experience...”. Anamnesis, p.160. In modern terms, substance is objectified as things in the world because they are composed of form and matter in space and time. The long term result has been that “reality” has been reduced to purely immanent external objects and the underlying reality is denied. The idea of a within of existence is dismissed as a subjectivist notion. Man is conceived of as an external object like any other and limited to 12

transformed by Christianity. The significance of homonoia as a category for determining

the type of order in society has not received much attention from Voegelin scholars or

even others except as a passing reference. The aim here is to examine this notion in a

historical context. Homonoia as a category of order cannot be fully appreciated unless it

is seen to be derived from noetic reason. The homonoia notion far outweighs in

importance those weaker notions of unity provided by the social sciences. Although

this total unity was never achieved in Western civilisation the notion has remained as a

fundamental principle and informing element in Western society, for example, in its

and also in ideas such as human and freedom and democracy. The source of these ideas can only be properly appreciated in relation to noetic reason.

With this problem in view, this thesis aims at the following : firstly, an exposition

of noetic reason as Voegelin has understood it; secondly, to show the validity of this

exposition of noetic reason as a philosophical and analytical tool. This thesis then

demonstrates how Voegelin’s philosophic approach is useful for opening the way to

investigate different notions in philosophy, theology, mysticism and intercultural studies,

specifically Chinese thought.

ORDER OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 examines Voegelin’s background and influences that led to his

diagnosis of the problem of modernity and recovery of political theory. This chapter is

concerned with the influences on the development of Voegelin’s thought. It considers

the way the life of reason has been badly damaged by positivism and empirical thought

in Western philosophy. A disturbing aspect of some intellectual movements is their

finite existence. Refer to Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History (Seattle: University of 13

failure to acknowledge the significance of the person. These theories have not been

confined to the speculations of ideologists but have been embraced by totalitarian leaders

such as Hitler, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung who acted out their ideas in the hope of

establishing a “new society” through grandiose schemes. In their designs the human

factor is discounted and replaced with visionary ideas to make a “new man” and a “new

world”. The twentieth century is characterised by such schemes on a massive scale and in

all cases the individual person is seen as of no significance, just the means to achieve

some futuristic program.

It was on this score that Voegelin argued that order in society cannot exist without

acknowledging the life of reason. He regarded reason as a creative force which can

realise order in society. He wrote: “The essential nucleus of a good society - without

which it is worthless no matter what accomplishments may be in other areas - is the life

of reason”.25

Chapter 2 reviews Voegelin’s recovery of the symbols “man,” “reality”, “reason”

and “history” and his challenge to Kantianism and neo-Kantianism. This chapter explains

his resistance to the Nominalist understanding of reason or rationalisation which reduced reason to intellectualising, speculation and empirical findings.

Chapter 3 seeks to put an identifiable face on what is meant by “the life of reason”. Here a more precise overview is given of the Classical philosophy of Plato and

Aristotle wherein the life of reason was first brought fully to reflective consciousness. In

this chapter the discovery of reason by the Hellenic philosophers is considered as a

turning point in the history of human consciousness. Voegelin called this “the Platonic

Washington, 1981), pp. 142-43. Webb discusses the question of “reality”. 14

vision”. Here “the life of reason” is considered in Plato and Aristotle in some detail by

focusing on Voegelin’s statement that “man participates in the process of reality.”26

These three aspects of “man”, “reality”, and “participation” form the basis on which an inquiry is built into “the life of reason” in Western history. Residual elements still permeate Western civilisation.

In chapter 4, the life of reason is examined as it is transformed by Christianity.

Here attention is drawn to the differentiation of experience as manifested in the Biblical account of the Thornbush event in the Book of Exodus and with the theotes symbol in the

Letter to the Colossians in the New Testament. It is argued that the Thornbush experience introduced a theology of Being in place of a theology of the Good (Plato).

Chapter 5 looks at the problem of mysticism, considered by Voegelin as an important stratum of human experience that illumines the life of reason. Mysticism is seen as a dimension of the life of reason that has been neglected by post-Enlightenment philosophy.

The chapter concentrates on Christianity and argues that, by exploring this aspect of the life of reason in more depth, it is possible to respond to Voegelin’s criticism of conceptual knowledge as dogma. To support this case two masters of theology, St. Thomas and St. John of the Cross, are examined. It is shown that in St. Thomas’ exposition of the life of reason, the theological virtues play a significant role, whereas, for St. John of the Cross, theologia negativa is a central feature.

Chapter 6 explores Voegelin’s findings on the question of the substance of society. It notes that he regarded homonoia, “likemindenness”, as a key element in

25 Eric Voegelin, “Industrial Society in Search of Reason”, in R. Aron, ed., World Technology and Human Destiny 1963, p. 42. 26Eric Voegelin, “Equivalencies and Experience and Symbolisation in History”, in Published Essays, 1966- 1985, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 120. 15

understanding order in society (the opposite is social disorder or a state of discord or

stasis). It shows that in his view, homonoia is the notion that has the potential to transcend groups or nations and “embrace all mankind”. Homonoia points to the

absence of particularity, and holds respect for the person as an individual. The

discussion then shows how Voegelin has traced homonoia back to Heraclitus’s symbol of

homologia, and to Aristotle’s advances in developing the symbol of philia.27 Then the

chapter examines Voegelin’s comparison of the Hellenic symbol philia with that of the

Israelite notion ruach, (spirit), which according to Voegelin did not exhibit the same

precise analysis of the importance of the individual as Aristotle’s meaning had attained.

After that, the chapter examines the radical newness of homonoia in the Christian

experience and shows how this symbol was transformed by the Christian pneuma [spirit]

potentially able to embrace all peoples. It points to Voegelin’s argument that the symbol

homonoia should be seen as a “gauge” to probe the substance of a community and refers

to the observation that the Roman empire could be perceived as a “population”

(Bevölterung) but not a “people” (Volk).28 The discussion shows how this weaker idea of

community is contrasted to that of the Christian concept of “community substance” with its potential for transcending particularities as a formative effect on Western civilisation.29

27 See Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, Order and History, Vol. 3 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 320-332. The shift in understanding came close in meaning to what Paul wrote concerning unity in his letters to the early Christians. See also Eric Voegelin, “The Growth of the Race Idea”, Review of Politics, 2 (1940), p. 289; 28Eric Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, 57.5. p. 100. Voegelin writes that Augustine considers, “the Ciceronian equation between res publica and res populi finds there never could have been a Roman res publica if we accept the equation because there never was a Roman people if we take the Ciceronian definition of the ‘people’ seriously”. 29Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction,1952, p. 77. Voegelin explains that the Platonic and Aristotelian complex was enlarged by Christianity. 16

Chapter 7 examines Nominalism as it arose in the 14th century. Voegelin considered that this movement caused a “split” in theology and philosophy. He argues that conceptual knowledge, once it is “split” from reality, suffers from a loss of which is essential to understanding the life of reason. The discussion points to the effects of

Nominalism which are present today and which result in the loss of the experience of homonoia in Western political thought. It examines how Voegelin diagnosed this problem as a “de-spiritualization” of the substance of society. The loss of homonoia that once characterised the former open society has now hardened because the prevailing trend in modern philosophies is to discount the notion of transcendence. The shift in philosophy that resulted in the modern period is captured by Voegelin’s observation that

God has been decapitated from “the hierarchy of being”.30 The chapter investigates the problem of “a sliding” down the scale of the hierarchy of being. The loss arose because the summum bonum no longer was recognised as the highest motive that governed one’s actions, instead summum malum or fear of death was emphasised as an ordering principle. Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan changed the meaning of order from summum bonum to summum malum.

The foregoing chapters expounded noetic reason within the framework of the anthropological and soteriological framework in the Western experience. The next part which includes Chapters 8 and 9 examines noetic reason or rather the tentative movement towards noetic reason that was present in Chinese thought. Chapter 8 in particular delineates some key notions of the divine and points to the cosmological emphasis in

Chinese thought. There is strong evidence to suggest that the Chinese were aware of the

30 Eric Voegelin, “Philosophies of History: An Interview with Eric Voegelin”, New Orleans Review, 2 17

spiritual from the earliest time in their history. The sense of the numinous in Chinese

thought is closely tied to the of the cosmos expressed in terms such as t’ien

(heaven), shang ti (high god) and Tao (the Way), etc.

For some commentators it is fashionable to suggest that Confucius was

dismissive of the spiritual dimension. However, there are strong indications that he

respected the traditions of the early sages which embraced the numinous. It is in this

sense that Voegelin regarded Confucius’s teachings to be a genuine “spiritual

outburst”.31 To support this view Confucius’s teachings are discussed by examining the

“sage notion”. It is observed that this notion has the potential to be one of the founding

principles of order in society. The discussion also considers Voegelin’s question why

such brilliant thought as Confucius’s insights into the chun tzu (sage notion) have never

deeply influenced the political order of Chinese society.32 The chapter argues that

Chinese thought has remained embedded in “the cosmological type of truth” right up to

this day and points to the historical circumstances that have suppressed such creativity.

In China the legacy of history was finally met with a challenge of new ideas from

the West. The task of chapter 9 is to look at China in the modern era. Here the loss of

order is examined by focusing on the acerbic works of Lu Hsun (1881-1925), one of

China’s greatest modern writers. The discussion considers his intuitive insights into the

individual and society. Lu Hsun’s works are useful for examining the problem of the

loss of order in Chinese society. For him, the importance of the individual is a key issue.

His vision was not limited to a humanistic view of man, but was comprehensive, in that

(1973), p.138. Voegelin refers to the death of God (Nietzsche). 31Eric Voegelin, “What is History?”, in What is History and Other Late Unpublished Writing, Vol. 28, 1990, p. 33. 32Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age: Order and History, Vol. 4 , 1974, p. 285 ff. 18 it saw the need to allow the freedom necessary for creativity in human society. Unless this spirit permeates human existence a society will be closed or, as he expressed it,

“surrounded by an iron room”. To draw out the importance of Lu Hsun’s thought in relation to noetic reason the discussion suggests a convergence of thought between him and Voegelin. Both thinkers are alike in their sensitivity to the importance of the underlying principles that relate to human existence and provide order in society.

A writer such as Lu Hsun may at first sight seem far removed from Voegelin’s thinking on noetic reason but on investigation it appears that Lu Hsun’s thought manifests aspects of an all-embracing view of human existence and society pointing to

“principles” that Voegelin had discovered in the Platonic-Aristotelian enterprise.

The discussion also draws attention to the fact that thinkers such as Lu Hsun, and before him, Confucius, cannot be adequately assessed by continuing to utilise a narrow, nominalistic view of reason. For as it is pointed out nominalistic reason is a split between theology and philosophy, i.e. the “name” has been separated from the experience that first engendered it. It is argued here that when this constricting (nominalistic) understanding of reason is applied to Chinese thought confusion arises for the deep realities of human existence cannot be properly examined. Hence nominalistic reason fails to account for the spiritual dimension that is present in Chinese thought.

Furthermore, even when the religious dimension is recognised by scholars there appears no philosophical framework with which to explore differences and similarities between

Chinese notions of the divine and Classic and Christian thought.

SOURCES 19

Voegelin’s corpus requires not only time but also a Copernican of

thought. He has written in German, French and English. It must also be recalled that

Voegelin died only in 1985.33 It is generally agreed that the core of Voegelin’s thought

is contained in his five volumes, Order and History. Volume One discusses the

emergence of Israel’s “existence in historical form” against the background of the rise of

the ancient cosmological civilisations of the Near East. The second book is concerned

with the pre-Socratic philosophers and of Hellas while the third, Plato and

Aristotle, is devoted to these two writers. The fourth volume, the Ecumenic Age, is a

reworking of Voegelin’s previous position in which he changed his approach from a

linear to a non-linear approach. This study took account of order in history expressed

through leaps of being or theophanies sometimes referred to as “the axis time”. The fifth

volume has been described by Voegelin as “the key to all his other works”34and gives

his vision of history as a human-divine encounter.

Other works should also be mentioned here. They are The New Science of Politics

(1952) and Anamnesis (first published in 1966 in German). The New Science of Politics

was originally given as the Walgreen lecture by Voegelin in Chicago in 1951. He

challenged the traditional approach to political science and offered a theoretical

methodology for the “retheorization of politics”. In Anamnesis there are several essays

which elaborate Voegelin’s theory of consciousness in a mature form.

33See Geoffrey L. Price, “Eric Voegelin: Classified Bibliography”, 1993, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 76 (1994), pp. 1-180. Also Bibliography of Works by and about Eric Voegelin, edited and published by the Eric Voegelin Institute of Louisiana State University, 1991, 1992. 34Eric Voegelin, In Search of Order, Order and History, Vol. 5, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press,1987). See the Foreword written by Lissy Voegelin. 20

Recently, the correspondence between and Voegelin has been published. 35 This work is important because it provides a criticism of the social sciences and their approach to analysing order in society. Voegelin’s Autobiographical

Reflections36summarises his intellectual development and his response to current philosophy.37

Since 1922, Voegelin has written over eighty articles, some of the most significant of which were written after he left Europe in 1939, and emigrated to America.

Some key essays illustrate a particular facet of Voegelin’s theory of consciousness. The most relevant here are, “On Debate and Existence”,38 “Equivalences of Experience and

Symbolization in History”39 and “The Gospel and Culture”.40 These essays offer an analysis of the problem of modernity, as well as Voegelin’s recovery of “philosophy”. In the essay “Wisdom and Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation”41, Voegelin examines the problem of gnosticism and its relation to political ideologies.

CRITICAL LITERATURE ON VOEGELIN

Voegelin’s philosophical approach aroused controversy in America and Europe, resulting in an abundance of critical comment. Two works introducing Voegelin’s

35 Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper, eds., Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin 1934-1964, 1993. 36 Eric Voegelin (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989). 37Another work which is also relevant to our thesis is Conversations with Eric Voegelin. This is a collection of informal talks wherein Voegelin ranges over a series of subjects, especially the idea of transcendence. See Eric Voegelin, in Eric O’Connor, ed., Conversations with Eric Voegelin (Montreal: Institute, 1980). 38Eric Voegelin, “On Debate and Existence”, Intercollegiate Review 3 (1967), pp. 143-52. (Now in Published Essays, Vol. 12, 1990.) 39In Luigi Pareyson et al., eds., Eternita e Storia: I valori permenenti nel divenire storico, Florence: Vallecchi Editore, 1970. pp. 215-34. (Now in Published Essays, Vol. 12.) 40 In Jesus and Man’s Hope, edited by Donald G. Miller and Dikran Hidden, pp. 59-101. Vol. 2. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary Press, 1971. (Now in Published Essays, Vol. 12.) 41Eric Voegelin, “Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation”, The Southerly Review, 17 (1981). ( Now in Published Essays, Vol. 12.) 21

thought are Ellis Sandoz’s: The Voegelinian Revolution 42 which is organised

chronologically and highlights the development of Voegelin’s thought and publications,

and Eugene Webb’s Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History.43 Webb discusses the

notion of participatio and the distinction between the Nominalist approach to language

and Voegelin’s position. He reviews Christian patristic thought, referring in particular to

St. of Nyssa. From patristic thought to the notion of

participatio is significant to theology.44 Webb has presented a good background of the

significance of participation and has drawn together Voegelin’s contribution to this. He

examines Voegelin’s theory of consciousness and interpretation of historical data.

There is also The Philosophy of Order, edited by Peter Opitz and Gregor Sebba,45 which consists of a series of essays by different authors and makes an important contribution to Voegelin’s theory of consciousness. Two other works which merit attention here are Eric Voegelin’s Thought: A Critical Appraisal46and Voegelin and the

Theologian: Ten Studies in Interpretation 47 These essays portray the particular

discipline of each author in relation to Voegelin’s thought in the area of religion.

David Walsh’s After , 1990, is important. Walsh writes that his book is

“the story of how modern human beings rediscovered their oneness with God at the limit

of their despair” however at the point of the “bitterest dregs” the possibility of life is

42Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981). 43 Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981). 44 See Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, p. 71. Webb explains that the word “being” is used so that one speaks of “participation in being” in two ways. In one sense it refers to the whole of reality, on all levels, as when Voegelin speaks of “the great stream of being”, in such a case the word “participate” means simply “to be part of.” The other use of the term refers not to any entities and not to the whole of reality but only to the supreme pole. 45 Peter J. Opitz, and Gregor Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order, Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981). 46Ellis Sandoz, (Durham: Durham University Press, 1982). 22

renewed.48 Walsh looks at the experiences of Dostoevsky, Camus, Solzhenitsyn and

Voegelin and how they surmounted the difficulties of the human condition that still face

the modern person today. He proposes that by examining the thought and literature of

these writers it is possible to see that philosophy and Christianity can be rediscovered.

Zdravko Planinc, in Plato’s Political Philosophy, Prudence in the Republic and the Laws49 argues against the conventional approach to Plato and Aristotle that separates

these two philosophers by regarding Plato as being of lesser importance than Aristotle

who is considered the beginning of modern philosophy. Planinc looks at the study of

Plato and Aristotle by Eric Voegelin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Leo Strauss and Stanley

Rosen and points out that these writers have challenged the standard position that there is

a “break” between Plato and Aristotle.

The number of articles and reviews dealing with Voegelin’s work is extensive and

increases each year. The most relevant articles in relation to this topic are Gregor Sebba,

“Order and Disorders of the Soul: Eric Voegelin’s Philosophy of History”,50 and “Eric

Voegelin: The In-Between of Human Life”.51

In Eric Voegelin’s Significance for the Modern Mind, edited by Ellis Sandoz,

there are two articles which touch on noetic reason. The first is by Paul G. Kuntz,

“Voegelin’s Experiences of Disorder Out of Order and Vision of Order Out of Disorder:

A Philosophic Mediation on His Theory of Order-Disorder”. This essay discusses

47John Kirby and William M. Thompson, eds., Voegelin and the Theologian: Ten Studies in Interpretation, Toronto Studies in Theology, Vol. 10 (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1983). 48David Walsh, After Ideology (Harper: San Francisco, 1990), p. 2. 49Zdravko Planinc, Plato’s Political Philosophy Prudence in the Republic and the Laws (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1991). 50Gregor Sebba, “Order and Disorders of the Soul: Eric Voegelin’s Philosophy of History,” Southern Review 3 (1967), pp. 282-310. 23

Voegelin’s “principle of maximisation” which as Kuntz observes was never further

developed after The New Science of Politics. Kuntz suggests that this “principle” could

well be developed as a principle of world philosophy.52 Another article considers the

development of Voegelin’s later thought. It is entitled “Voegelin: Philosopher of the

Divine Presence,” by Paul Caringella. The author deals with Voegelin’s definition of

mysticism as pre-dogmatic knowledge or as some thinkers have categorised this, the

divine-human encounter. Caringella elaborates on this interaction as a key point. He

deftly shows how Voegelin found Plato’s noetic quest of the “embodied soul in the

embodied cosmos in the ”.53 He points out that Voegelin’s vision extends to the

spiritual history of mankind, and is not confined just to the history of Christianity.

Voegelin’s vision helps to “restore, enrich and articulate Christianity’s original catholic

vision, its universal horizon”.54 The alternative to this enriching vision is a “sceptical

reflective distance and unlike the myths of Plato [it] has no ‘story’ to tell”. 55

To study Voegelin’s thought in more depth, one must turn to a slowly growing

number of studies. These range over several disciplines, viz. political theory, history, , literature, philosophy, religion and theology. The most significant for this discussion are: David Van Heemst, “Transcendence and politics: The Political Theories

of Herman Dooyeweerd and Eric Voegelin”,56 who argues that both thinkers have attempted to combat the groundless spirit of modernity by developing political theories

51 A. De Crespigny and K. Minogue, eds., Contemporary Political Philosophies (New York: Dodd, 1975), pp. 100-119. 52 Paul G. Kuntz, “Voegelin’s Experiences of Disorder Out of Order and Vision of Order Out of Disorder: A Philosophic Meditation on His Theory of Order-Disorder”, in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin’s Significance for the Modern Mind (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), p.171. 53Paul Caringella, “Voegelin: Philosopher of the Divine Presence”, in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin’s Significance for the Modern Mind, 1991 , p. 196. 54Ibid., p. 193. 24

which include the transcendent dimension, for only by being open to transcendence can an open and pluralistic society exist. There is also Kenneth Keulman’s work, “The

Balance of Consciousness: The Noetic Structure of the Psyche in the Theory of

Consciousness of Eric Voegelin”57 which looks at the complexity of consciousness and

knowledge and opposes the view that knowledge is a reflection of the mind.

John Ranieri’s thesis, “Vision and Order: Eric Voegelin on Society and Social

Change”,58 examines the question of social change and the problem of realising the truth

of order in society’s institutions and practices. Elsewhere Voegelin’s theory of

consciousness is considered from a theological position by Michael Morrissey in his

work “Consciousness and the Quest for Transcendent Order: Eric Voegelin’s Challenge

to Theology”.59 Morrissey’s interest was in the reconstruction of theology.

Furthermore, there is Robert Doran’s Theology and the of History,

1990.60 He has used Voegelin’s work in his discussion of community and refers to “three

dimensions that human societies in the long course of history have disengaged as

indicative of what makes for human flourishing, three aspects of the truth about the

human experience of the search for direction in the movement of life.”61 Doran draws on

Voegelin’s three dimensions (anthropological, cosmological and soteriological). He explains, that these dimensions are “discoveries of primordial partnership arrived at in the source of humanity’s living in tension of existence and the search for direction in the

55Ibid. 56Ph.D., 1993, University of Virginia. 57Ph.D. Dissertation, University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto, 1980. 58 Ph.D., Boston College, 1993, now published in book form. 59This has now been published as Consciousness and Transcendence: The Theology of Eric Voegelin, (Notre Dame: , 1994). 60Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 25

movement of life.”62 However, his main interest concerns Lonergan and Jung and

exploring the depth of the psyche.

The above works have stressed the significance of transcendence and its absence

from Western civilization. There has not as yet been any study devoted to the importance

of noetic reason itself and its relation to the notion of homonoia as the source of order in

society. Further, there has been little examination of noetic reason as a an analytical tool

to investigate Chinese foundational notions.63 Voegelin’s insights into the chun tzu

notion have provided a beginning for such an analysis.

At the same time it is important to acknowledge the particular social and

historical situation when Voegelin was working. In his writings he does not appear to

give emphasis to the more recent modern movements that have absorbed the energies of

environmentalists, feminists and multiculturalists. These movements are most significant,

but have come to prominence particularly in the years since Voegelin wrote. It is

important at this point, however, to note that the focus of this thesis is on Voegelin’s

contribution in delineating the importance of the life of reason and its loss in Western

society, and to suggest that a similar loss has also occurred in China.

61 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 1990, p. 213. 62Ibid. 63Seon-Hee Suh Kwon, Ph.D. Eric Voegelin and Lao Tzu: The Search for Order, 1991, Tech University. Seon-Hee Suh Kwon’s work is a cross-cultural study contrasting the political thought of Eric Voegelin with Lao Tzu. She observes that Voegelin concentrates mainly on Confucian interpretation of human existence and neglects the Taoist experience. In her thesis she looks at the problem of transcendence in relation to Lao Tzu’s thought and emphasises the importance of harmony with transcendence rather than as tension. Her thesis was brought only lately to my attention and I would argue 26

does not affect the heart of this thesis which is an exposition of noetic reason underscoring Voegelin’s principle of differentiation. 27

CHAPTER ONE

LIFE AND BACKGROUND OF ERIC VOEGELIN, 1901-1985

The examination of the life of reason is the focus of this thesis. The recovery of the

life of reason includes recovering what Voegelin calls the full structure of reality. His own

search for the recovery of the full structure of reality unfolds as the influences and events of

his life brought him to recognize the full dimension of human consciousness. Voegelin had a

contemplative and philosophical side to his character; he was to articulate his findings in

publications that do not fit into the conventional category of philosophy. If one looks at the

events that occurred during his life time one becomes aware of events that led to certain key

philosophical insights. Very early in his life Voegelin sensed that human consciousness

extends further than empirical evidence. Hence it is important to keep in mind the direction

of Voegelin's philosophical approach. One writer has observed, "there is no 'Voegelin

philosophy' as there was a Hobbesian, Kantian, Hegelian philosophy, all of these are closed

'systems' taking the place of living reality".1 As the study of Voegelin’s life, background and

influences unfolds it is possible to discern how the life of reason became an important symbol in his thought. The following chapter discusses the significant influences and events that shaped Voegelin's intellectual development and his awareness that human consciousness

extends further than rationalisation and empirical evidence.2

1.1. EARLY CHILDHOOD

1G. Niemeyer, "God and Man, World and Society: The Last Work of Eric Voegelin", The Review of Politics, 51 (1) (1989), p. 113. 28

Eric Voegelin was born in , Germany, on January 3rd, 1901. Between the ages of four and nine his family lived in Oberkassel and Koenigswinter, small towns on the

Rhine south of Bonn. There is little information about Voegelin's early childhood except some recollections he wrote in 1943, when he was developing his theory of consciousness after he had abandoned his project on the History of Political Ideas. These childhood incidents occurred between the ages of three and ten, and were selected by Voegelin on account of their content. He called these reflections “anamnetic experiments”.3 He connected these events to his awareness that humans are conscious of space, time, matter and history.

Several times he went with his family by boat on excursions up the Rhine. He remembered watching with fascination the boats and the ever-changing scenery. Not only the boats but their very names evoked thoughts of adventure, especially one boat named

Xanten. "The magic of Xanten has not evaporated. The word still evokes the blue-grey and gold ships descending the Rhine, into a dreamland that is neither temporal nor spatial."4 The appearance of Halley's comet brought home to him the fear of the unknown. He recalls a discussion in the family at the time, expressing fears about the comet being so close to the

2It is possible to give an account of Voegelin’s background and influences drawing on his own Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, and the details given by him in his Anamnesis when he was young. 3 Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978. Ellis Sandoz’s remarks concerning Voegelin’s biographical details are significant to note here. Sandoz explains he needed more details for his own work on his book The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction (Louisiana State University, 1981) so began conducting tape-recorded interviews with Voegelin on subjects of importance to this study. These topics ranged over many areas. In 1973 he conducted a series of interviews wherein Voegelin responded by dictating an oral narrative of his early life influences and research. Later Voegelin read and corrected the transcript. These interviews covered two weeks which included 2-3 hours each day. It was in this manner that Voegelin’s Autobiographical Reflections took shape; a work regarded as one of the most authentic summaries of his life. Voegelin’s Anamnesis includes anamnetic experiments conducted in 1943 but only published in 1966. Sandoz writes, “These fascinating sketches of recollections covered experiences from his boyhood that he found formative for his consciousness as a human being, beginning at fourteen months with his very first recollection and coming down to about age ten.” See Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, Introduction p. xi. 4Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p.45. 29 earth that it might pass through the comet's 'tail'. This aroused in Voegelin a fear of the end of the world and the realisation of matter.

Of this fear of the world's end, there remained a shudder in the face of matter. 'The starry heaven above me' fills my heart with admiration only as long as I see it as a firmament with glittering points; when I think of what these points are I am seized by a horror of the solitude in which globs of matter float around without meaning.5

Throughout his life Voegelin retained this sense of the fragility of human life lost in the vastness of the universe.

The abstract quality of mathematics was always of interest to him. This is illustrated at an early age when he recalled his awareness of the difference in size of conical surfaces whilst observing the family at dinner slicing a French roll. When it was cut the slices were not cylindrical but conical. Voegelin wondered how the smaller got to the larger, "when does the difference of size of the surfaces begin to increase so that in the end one still arrives at the larger surface?" Later, this problem was solved when he mastered Zeno's paradoxes and their solution.6

Voegelin's interest in history began when he was at the local school studying the history of Prussia. He was intrigued by the arrangement of the order. He remarks:

This arrangement occupied me quite a bit, and I remember having considered the possibility of reversing history. On the whole, however, I was satisfied, especially since a reversal would have encountered certain inner inhibitions. For history did not simply run backwards, but in retracing its steps its proportions changed in a way that seemed hardly reversible ... That seemed to be the right perspective: to look from the humanly comprehensible present into the depth of time and see the horizon closing with ever-larger figures that provided security.7

5Ibid., p.46. 6Ibid. 7Ibid., p. 47. 30

Voegelin has emphasised the importance of this insight in relation to his research

many years later. "Whatever capacity I have today to understand mythical images of history,

like that of the Greeks, must have developed on occasion of this reversed Prussian history."

Furthermore:

I have always taken it for granted that the present was to be measured, with , in human terms, that with increasing distance men grew to the size of a Solon and Lycurgus, that behind them there cavorted the heroes, and that the horizon was securely and dependably closed by the gods.8

These recollections were written by Voegelin for the purpose of developing his theory of consciousness.

In 1910 the family moved to Vienna because his father, an engineer, had taken a new job. Vienna was a city noted for its great intellectual activity. An atmosphere such as this

provided Voegelin with the opportunity to encounter a variety of stimulating ideas and

people later to be of significant influence in shaping his philosophical perspective. One of

the crucial interfaces between East and West, Vienna had formerly been the capital of the

Austro-Hungarian Empire, that once had a population of fifty million but was now reduced

to a city of only two million. Because of its geographical position, Vienna was the focus of

political events of world significance.9 Writing fifty years later Voegelin described the city:

Until the breakdown in 1918 the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a country equal in population to the United States. It was really an empire, embracing all sorts of nationalities - Czechs, Poles, Serbians, Hungarians, Croatians,

8Ibid., pp. 47-48. 9Some books consulted here regarding the politics and background to Vienna during this time are Franz Borkenau, Austria and After (London: Faber & Faber, 1938); Elizabeth Barker, Austria, 1918-1927 (London: Macmillan Press, 1973); Bruno Grimschitz, Vienna (Vienna: Wolfrim, 1951); Max Grunwald, Vienna (The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1936); C.A. Gulick, Austria from the Hapsburg to Hitler, 2 Volumes (Berkeley: University of California, 1948) A.Janik & S. Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973); Arthur J. May, Vienna in the Age of Franz Josef (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966). 31

Lithuanians, Germans, and so on. The whole personnel of the empire was a mixture of these various cultures.10

The Viennese were imbued with a cosmopolitan sense and considered themselves the centre of a multinational empire.

In 1910 Voegelin entered a modified classical high school (RealGymnasium). He has

described his studies in detail. "... I had eight years of Latin, six years of English, and as an

optional subject, two years in Italian. Besides, my parents took care that I had some

elementary tuition in French."11 The effect of the war years had touched the school and a

number of regular teachers had been drafted for military service. Other teachers were

supplied by personnel outside the regular teaching staff. One of these teachers, Voegelin

recalled, was an Englishman, formerly a journalist. This teacher impressed Voegelin

because of his broad knowledge, which even included the new theory of psychoanalysis of

Alfred Adler. For Voegelin one of the high points of his school education was the study of

Hamlet as interpreted by Alfred Adler's psychology of Geltung.12

Another teacher extended the students' knowledge of mathematics to the extent that

they were able to appreciate Einstein's theory of relativity. Voegelin notes:

We studied it [the theory of relativity] and at first we could not understand it, but then we discovered that our difficulty was caused by the simplicity of the theory. We understood it perfectly well but could not believe that something so simple could arouse such a furore as a difficult new theory. The mathematical apparatus, of course, was entirely at our disposition.13

In one particular lesson Voegelin can remember the mathematics teacher bringing to their

attention the fact that, "according to the new theory of atoms, when you take a saw and cut

10 Voegelin, "Autobiographical Statement at the Age of Eighty-Two", in Fred Lawrence, ed., The Beginning and the Beyond: Papers from the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences Supplementary Issue of Lonergan Workshop, Vol. 4 (Chicago, California: Scholars Press, 1984), p.111. 11 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 8. 12Ibid. 32

through a piece of wood you separate atomic structures." The separation of atomic structures

by a handsaw seemed to the teacher the greatest puzzle in the structure of physical reality.

Voegelin observed that the teacher “had seen the problem of reduction and the autonomy of

the various strata in the reality of being".14 In Voegelin's last year at school the students'

knowledge of higher mathematics was extended. This in-depth study seemed to Voegelin to

account for his receptiveness when he later came to study science at the university.

Voegelin was dogged by financial problems for the first half of his life. In his

teenage years he recalls, "Since we were poor, I had to get some minimum pocket money by

way of tutoring other high school students who were the children of more affluent parents,

but did not match affluence with intelligence and industriousness. This kind of work

continued until I finished high school."15

When he was 17 years old, Voegelin saw the end of a political order that, to

Austrians of the early part of the century, had seemed virtually indestructible. This was the

collapse of the empire and the Hapsburg monarchy in 1919. The German-Austrians were

never able to accept the new reorganisation of Europe which resulted from the

Treaties.16

1.1.1. STUDY AT THE

13Ibid., pp. 8-9. 14Ibid.,p.9. 15Ibid., p. 85. 16Oscar Jazzi, Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago, Phoenix Books,1961). C.A. Macartney, The Social Revolution in Austria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926). 33

Voegelin entered the University of Vienna in 1919. This was an ancient institution

founded in 1365 by Archduke Rudolph IV, and modelled on the University of Paris. From

the end of the seventeenth century to 1914 it was the major university for both eastern and

south-eastern Europe. Between 1848 and 1918, German was the native tongue of less than

half the students. The teachers were organised according to faculties and the students

according to nationality.

The Faculty of Law in which Voegelin registered for a doctorate in 1919 had

recently founded a Department of Political Science. Voegelin's decision to take a course

leading to a doctorate in political science was induced partly by economic motives and partly

by personal interest.17 Because he was very poor, he took a doctorate in political science

because it could be finished in three years while that of law took four years. He was more interested in science than in law and in fact had thought of going into physics and mathematics but in the end for him "politics had the stronger pull". The choice of political science was also determined by the attraction of studying with famous teachers like Kelsen and Spann.18

The study of law at the University was arranged in such a way that three to

four semesters of the total eight were dedicated exclusively to the history of law, and the remaining four to five semesters left largely to political economy and public law. As

Ludwig von Mises, the famous economist, observed:

The school of law offered greater opportunities for the study of history than the school of liberal . The 'political' historians who taught at the latter were third- or fourth-rate men. The only significant historian produced by

17Voegelin’s Dissertation was “Wechselwirkung und Gezweiung.” (“Reciprocity and Pairing”) Ph.D. Dissertation, Vienna: Universitat zu Wien, 1922. Manuscript and typescript details from Eric Voegelin: Classified Bibliography Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester, 76, (1994), prepared by Dr. Geoffrey L. Price of the Department of and Theology, University of Manchester. 18 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 3. 34

Austria, Heinrich Friedjung, was denied access to an academic career. The emphasis in historical education at the University of Vienna was on palaeography.19

There was a five-hour series of lectures on Austrian history which was mandatory for all

first-semester students of law.

In order to support himself during his studies at University, Voegelin had "the good

luck of getting a job as a volunteer assistant in the Handelsvereinigung-Ost, an Austrian-

Ukrainian enterprise that had grown out of the occupation of the Ukraine by the Central

European powers during the World War 1."20 One of the students whom Voegelin had

tutored at high school and whose father was the secretary-general of the Chamber of

Commerce in Vienna had arranged for Voegelin to get the job. Although the pay was low it enabled him to continue his studies. Later, the possibility of another job occurred, a teaching position at Volkshochschule Wien-Volksheim, an adult education institute sponsored by the Socialist government. The students "were the intellectually more alert and industrious radicals, from the workers' environment." Voegelin observes:

I must stress the 'intellectually more alert,' because the less alert stratum of workers entering the political process was of course taken care of by the trade-union training courses. The Volkshochschule was something like a university for workers as well as lower middle-class people.21

In such an environment Voegelin learned to discuss and debate. Many of the students in his

classes were "rather radical Socialists, most of them probably outright Communists."22 He taught political science and the history of ideas. In the classroom they had many heated debates. Voegelin had a good relationship with these "young radicals" which continued during the 1930s. He recalls, "When the blow of the occupation fell, I was able to help some

19Ludwig von Mises, Notes and Recollections (South Holland, Illinois: Libertarian Press, 1977), p. 2. 20Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 85. 21Ibid., pp. 85-86. 35

of these radicals with letters of recommendation for their flight to safer areas, like

Sweden."23

1.1.2. INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN VIENNA

Voegelin continued his work at the trade school as well as teaching at the University

during the time he lived in Vienna, until he was removed by the National Socialists in

1938.24 His opportunities for debate in the life of the University were many and varied.

Here he met other like-minded people who left a lasting impression upon him. Recalling the

scene many years later he wrote:

In this Vienna, therefore, all the cultural and ethnic problems of imperial size were concentrated after 1918, as well as in the war years. There has been a certain distortion of the picture of Vienna in recent studies of Vienna's intellectual life concentrating on the so-called Vienna Circle - the circle of people, like Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick, with a positivistic orientation - which no doubt was extremely important. But there were half a dozen other such circles, about which nobody talks today. There was the historical society out of which came people like Otto Brunner, the medieval historian in Hamburg later; there was the history represented by Dvorak, who had just died, and by Strzigowski, who was still alive, and by their pupils ... there were a number of such circles. They represented considerable influence not only of German and Austrian but also of Western generally.25

The most well-known in the English speaking world was the Vienna Circle which included,

"among others, Moritz Schlick, Carnap, Neurath, Godel and Waismann with whom

Wittgenstein and Popper were more loosely associated".26 The group lasted until the 1930s

22Ibid., p. 86. 23Ibid., p. 87. 24Ibid., p. 86. 25Voegelin, "Autobiographical Statement at the Age of Eighty-Two", pp. 111-112. 26 Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, pp.52-53, see n.1. 36

and then broke up. Many of its members went to America and had an important influence on

American philosophy.27

Other circles have been described by the Viennese historian, Engel-Janosi.28 There

were circles such as those around Stefan George; the ongoing seminar of the economist

Ludwig von Mises; the Friedjung-Gesellschaft (primarily historical in emphasis) and the

Geistkreis (or Intellectual Circle) founded in 1921 by Herbert Furth and Freidrich Hayek.

Voegelin participated in both the Mises and Geistkreis seminars and was also involved to

some extent with the Österreichische Rundschau and Stefan George Circles.29

Through his participation in these meetings, Voegelin met people who were later to

be influential in one way or another. Among the many important personalities he came

across there were several who impressed him. Apart from Kelsen and Spann, there were the

professors of economic theory, Leopold von Wieser and Ludwig von Mises, famous for his

development of money theory. The works of Joseph A. Schumpeter were studied in a course

on theoretical physics begun by Ernst Mach and were represented at the time by

Moritz Schlick.30

Other important figures were Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alfons Dopsch, who attained

fame on the history of Carolingian economics. There was Otto Brunner, who later became

famous for his theories of medieval feudalism, and Max Dvorak and Josef Strzigowski.

27Refer to E. Wilder Spaulding, The Quiet Invaders, The Story of the Austrian Impact upon America (Vienna: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag Für Unterricht Wissenschaft Und Kunst, 1968); R. Schlesinger, Central European Democracy and its Background, (London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953). 28 Friedrich Engel-Janosi, ... aber ein Stolzer Bettler: Erinnerungen aus einer Verlorenen Generation (Graz: Styria, 1974), p. 111. 29Refer to Victor Kraft, The Vienna Circle, The Origin of Neo-Positivism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953); Richard Von Mises, Positivism, A Study in Human Understanding (New York, Dover Publications, 1951). Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siecle Vienna, Politics and Culture, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980). Carlo Antoni, From History to , The Transition in German Historical Thinking (London: Martin Press, 1962).

37

Voegelin had a course with the latter on the history of Renaissance art; and was particularly

interested in Strzigowski's study on Near Eastern art, and his two volumes on Armenia.31

The importance that was given to psychology and psychoanalysis at that time was significant; in fact, it had a "massive influence" according to Voegelin. He took courses under Hermann Swoboda, who he notes was also a friend of Freud. "The works of

Otto Weninger were also read by everyone at this time. The most important influence was

Freud ... I did not belong to the circle of Freud and never met him, but I knew quite a few younger men who had been trained by him."32

1.1.3. UNIVERSITY SEMINARS

Within the life of the University and in the seminars Voegelin made friends with

"students of his own age or two or three years elder who had been on military service". He himself had "escaped military service” on account of his youth.33There were three particular

seminars where he made lasting friendships. One was the seminar given by Spann, who

attracted students interested in and German nationalism. Later many of these

students became National Socialists or joined more radical parties. Voegelin attended

Spann's seminars over many years and attributed to them his first acquaintance with the

classical philosophers and with German Idealistic systems.34 The other two seminars of

significant value were those of Hans Kelsen and Ludwig von Mises. In the Mises seminar,

Voegelin formed a lasting friendship with Alfred Schütz, the sociologist. Later on Voegelin

30Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 1. 31 Ibid., p. 2. 32Ibid. 33Ibid., p. 4. 34Refer to “Eric Voegelin: Friend in Philosophical Adversity” in Helmut R. Wagner, Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983). Also see Worldly Phenomenology, The Continuing Influence of Alfred Schütz on North American Human Science, Lester 38

discussed with Schütz his Theory of Consciousness.35 Out of these three seminars a group of

younger men formed a group called the geist-kreis, or Intellectual Circle. Voegelin belonged

to this group, which met once a month with one of them choosing a topic and the others had

the task of tearing him to pieces.36

Voegelin's aspirations to be a political scientist during the 1920s were shaped during

a period of intense political and social turmoil. The country was attempting to establish a

government based on the principles of the Austrian Constitution formulated by Kelsen.37

There was also the problem of adjusting economically after a major war, with political tension between the two major political parties, the Christian Socialists and the Social

Democrats.

On the basis of his thesis, Voegelin received his doctorate38 in political science and

became a professor in the Faculty of Law. The title of his degree was Doctor rerum politicarum, awarded in 1922 by the Law Faculty of the University of Vienna. Over the next few years he worked in the Law School as Kelsen's assistant, "in the Law School my job was administrative law. I had to teach courses on the administrative code".39 At the same time he

continued his work teaching at the Trade Institute. In the midst of the flux of debate and

ideas Voegelin felt a need to get his bearings for, at that time, "the Marxist movements were

very strong, as well as the psychoanalytic movement and the Fascist movement".40

Embree ed. (Washington, DC: Centre for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1988). 35 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, pp. 70-71. 36Ibid., p. 5. 37Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California, 1970). Also refer to Mary MacDonald, The Republic of Austria, 1918-1934 ( London: Oxford University Press, 1946). She discusses the 1920 Constitution and Kelsen’s involvement. 38Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 26. 39 Eric Voegelin, “Autobiographical statement at eighty two,” in The Beginning and the Beyond, ed. by Fred Lawrence, 1984, p. 112. 40Ibid. 39

Voegelin was not satisfied with any of these groups; he looked elsewhere for a source of

guidance. He states, "at the time there were intelligent people around who did not belong to

any definite school or sect, but from whom you could learn something about reality -

spiritual, intellectual, and so on."41

1.2. FORMATIVE INFLUENCES: HANS KELSEN (1881-1973)

Voegelin was closely associated with Kelsen in the Law School over a period of

fifteen years. Voegelin was attracted to Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, a logical analysis of

the (German) legal system.42 He recalls:

I cannot say with precision why Hans Kelsen was for me a more strongly attractive teacher than . Spann's range was without doubt much larger, both philosophically and historically, than the range of Kelsen's work. What attracted me, so far as I recollect, was the precision of analytical work that is peculiar to a great lawyer. ... What I learnt from Kelsen, I should say, is the conscientious and responsible analysis of texts as it was practised in his own multivolume work and in the discussions in his seminar.43

Voegelin speaks glowingly of Kelsen and his Pure Theory of Law. "It was a splendid

achievement of a brilliant analyst, and it was so good it could hardly be improved upon.

What Kelsen did in this respect still stands as the core of any analytical theory of law."44

When Voegelin taught his own courses of in America he used Kelsen's pure theory of law as part of his teaching.

41Ibid. 42William Johnston, The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History, 1848-1938, (Berkeley:Berkeley University Press, 1972). Johnston writes that “Pure theory of law” assailed the foundation of which underlay the Austrian civil code complied between 1713 and 1811. Pure theory of law expunged from jurisprudence any social science except law. This self-enclosed system enshrined a dichotomy between legal fact and the latter being the rule that the former is presumed to embody”. 43Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 20. 44Ibid., p. 21. 40

However, Voegelin also had problems in accepting Kelsen's theory as it was. He

states, "My differences with Kelsen's theory began to evolve gradually."45 Although

Voegelin had learnt much from Kelsen, he could not accept his Pure Theory of Law

approach. He could accept the notions of Grundnorm and Normlogik with which Kelsen

defined the structural principles of the legal system. Nevertheless, he rejected (even while a

student) the claim of comprehensiveness that Kelsen's philosophical position assumed.

Voegelin would always insist that a comprehensive system of law must be shaped by a

philosophy of life. What Voegelin rejected was an ideological element which he detected in

Kelsen’s analysis of law which Kelsen had made on the basis of his neo-Kantian

methodology. Kelsen, like other neo-Kantian methodologists, had defined the field of his

“science of the theory of politics” (Staatslehre), according to the particular method used to

explore it. His method circumscribed the logic of the legal system and, as a result, had

reduced Staatslehre (the theory of the state or politics), to Rechtslehre (the theory of law) and excluded from it consideration of all materials outside the defined field.46 In consequence, Voegelin rejected not Kelsen’s analysis of the legal system, but rather his exclusion of the materials of political science from a Staatslehre conceived as Rechtslehre.

Voegelin discussed the exclusion of materials when he wrote an article in 1927 on

"Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law"47 and also in an earlier one on Reine Rechtslehre und

Staatslehre.48 In these articles he confronted Kelsen's position on "Pure Theory" with the

German Staatslehre of the nineteenth century. As a result of his engagement in Kelsen’s

45Ibid. 46Ibid. 47 Eric Voegelin, “Kelsen’s Pure theory of law”, Political Science Quarterly, 42 (1927), pp. 268-276. He wrote, "there never has been a difference of opinion with Kelsen regarding the fundamental validity of Pure Theory of Law”. 48 Eric Voegelin, in Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Rech 4 (1924), pp. 80-131. 41

work, Voegelin became more aware of the problems of Kantianism that held sway in the

philosophical life of Vienna.

Voegelin observed that Kelsen held the that with the introduction of

democratic structures, political solutions should automatically follow. This was a position

with which Voegelin had strongly disagreed. He analysed the material that was excluded

from Staatslehre, and wrote:

In 1924 I published my first essay of rather dubious scientific quality, entitled "Reine Rechtslehre und Staatslehre", in which I confronted the reine Rechtslehre with the materials dealt with by German Staatslehre of the early nineteenth century. Already at that time I conceived the task of the future political scientist to be that of reconstructing the full range of political science after its restriction to the core of the Normlogik.49

Voegelin realised that when political science diminished its points of reference (as it asked

fewer questions) least of all could it distinguish flaws in various political ideologies. The

"task of reconstruction" became the dominant force behind Voegelin's study, writings, his

choice of occupation and, finally, the location where he chose to live in America. Referring

to this goal in his book The New Science of Politics 50 he writes that his desire was to restore

the human sciences (social sciences) to the level of genuine theory. He declares:

Theory is not just any opining about human existence in society; it rather is an attempt at formulating the meaning of existence by explicating the content of a definite class of experiences. Its argument is not arbitrary but derives its validity from the aggregate of experiences to which it must permanently refer for empirical control.51

Political science had to be able to scrutinise all political theory to find its inadequacies and its potential.

KARL KRAUS (1874-1936)

49Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 22. 50Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952). 42

It was Kraus who sharpened Voegelin's awareness of the power of the media. This was chiefly supplied by the reading of Kraus's Die Fackel (The Torch) every month.52 "I became aware of the problems of the decay of the German language, which are similar to the problems today in the English language, due to the press, the media and the destruction of rational language.53

Through his reading of Kraus, Voegelin gained a critical understanding of current philosophical influences, and especially became aware of the press's role as a factor contributing to the general social disintegration in Germany and Austria. Kraus, himself, had decided to become an independent publisher and had founded Die Fackel in 1899. The effect of this publication in its first week was sensational when Kraus announced his uncompromising hostility to all that was corrupt in Austrian life.

Journalism was the target of Kraus's most corrosive prose which he attacked with a persistence that suggested that he considered such activity the central purpose of his life.

Ungar describes Kraus's relation to the press:

Kraus saw the press as the embodiment of intellectual venality, as a menace to peace already sorely imperilled, as the instrument of life's trivialization. His attacks, however, were not primarily directed at journalism's sinister

51Ibid., p. 64. 52 Kraus’ writings are compendious but to give an example of the pungent quality of his writings consider the following wherein he deplores the triumph of National Socialism. He writes: The notion that I could perceive this victory as my own is as pitiable as the spiritual being from which it descends and whose perforating cannot prevent me from rejecting it along with the presumptive helpers. I do so with a sense of greater responsibility and am capable of a perception which embraces both evils. For National Socialism has not annihilated the press; the press created National Socialism. Apparently only as a reaction, really as fulfilment. Beyond any question of what humbug they feed the masses - the journalist. Editorial writers who write with blood; babblers of the deed. Troglodytes to be sure, but they have only moved into the caves which the printed word had made of human fantasy; the fact that they do without ornament or are incapable of clumsily imitating ornament indicates a certain cultural headstart. The deed has extricated itself from the phrase, and if the phrase is now turned against it, this is without significance it is only grotesque. The phrase can do nothing more to Geist. (Quote taken from “After Karl Kraus” by T.W. Simmons, Salmagundi, Vol. 10-11 1969-70, p.172. 53Voegelin, “Autobiographical statement at eighty two” in The Beginning and the Beyond, ed. by Fred Lawrence, 1984, p. 112. 43

political influence, but rather at its perversion of culture and its corruption of language. ... It must be noted that the Viennese press of Kraus's time was an example of journalism in its ugliest form. ... The founder of Neue Freie Presse had openly declared that ideally no line printed in his paper should be without direct or indirect financial return to the publisher.54

The reading of Kraus's works gave Voegelin a critical perspective on National

Socialism in the 1930s. He observes that the second of Kraus's

great works dealing with the major catastrophes of the twentieth century was his Dritte Walpurgisnacht, treating the phenomenon of Hitler and National Socialism ...

I should say that a serious study of National Socialism is still impossible without recourse to the Dritte Walpurgisnacht and to the years of criticism in the Die Fackel, because here the intellectual morass that must be understood as the background against which a Hitler could rise to power becomes visible.

The phenomenon of Hitler is not exhausted by his person. His success must be understood in the context of an intellectually or morally ruined society in which personalities who otherwise would be grotesque, marginal figures can come to public power because they superbly represent the people who admire them.55

Voegelin applauded Kraus's work and his astute analysis of evil. He considered such parallel

phenomena present in modern society "though fortunately, not yet with the destructive

effects that led to the German catastrophe".56

STEFAN GEORGE (1868-1933)

Stefan George57 provided Voegelin with the necessary intellectual and moraliste

background. The work of these writers must be understood in the context of a society and

54 Frederick Ungar, ed., Karl Kraus, the Last Days (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1974), p. xiv. See Otto Kerry, Karl-Kraus-Bibliographie:mit e. Reg.d. Aphorismen, Gedichte, Glossen U. Satiren (Munchen: Kosel, 1970); Werner Kraft, Das Ja des Neinsagerss: Karl Kraus und Seine geistige Welt (Munchen: Richard Boorberg editor Text & Kritik, 1974). 55Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p.18. 56Ibid., p. 19. 57Stefan George was influenced by Mallarmé. Refer to M. Metzeger & E. Metzeger, Stefan George, 1868- 1933, (New York: Twayne Publ., 1972), p. 20; See also Jethro Bithell, Modern German Literature, 1880- 1950, (London: Metheun and Co.,1959), refer to chapter 7, “Stefan George”. 44

language that began disintegrating in the 1870s with the crumbling of the great Austro-

Hungarian empire. Regaining language became a deliberate effort on the part of the younger

generation. This concern with language was not a matter of semantics but was part of a

deliberate resistance against ideologies. In this situation, language is destroyed because

Voegelin observes "the ideological thinker has lost contact with reality and develops

symbols for expressing not reality but his state of alienation from it."58

The significance of symbols and their expression of reality was a subject pursued by

Voegelin in much of his later work. Here he acknowledges his debt to George and Kraus for

their ability "to penetrate this phoney language and restore reality through the restoration of

language".59Regaining language meant recovering the subject matter expressed by language.

This meant "getting out of what one would call today the false consciousness of the petty

bourgeois (including under this head Positivists and Marxists), whose literary representatives

dominated the scene."60

The battle against the ideologue was to preoccupy Voegelin all his life. His resolve was strengthened by his encounter with Stefan George, who was seen as the great German symbolist . George drew his inspiration from Mallarme and his circle. Symbolism was

not only a '', but proposed a specific attitude to life.

Metzger, describing George's symbolism, observes:

According to Mallarmé's poetic concepts, the world of phenomena exists in order to be transformed into the world of art, into . The poet, therefore, is the mediator who alone knows the secrets of the metamorphosis. He communicates his perceptions and responses to his being to inward and outward phenomena in terms of highly personal symbols, ... words

58 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, pp. 17-18. 59Ibid. 60Ibid., p. 17. 45

themselves are symbols which in the hands of the poet achieve a meaning beyond their commonly understood .61

George and his “circle” attempted to replace by Formkunst. As Bithell remarks,

George writes only for those who have the mental keenness to pierce the sense of him.

"Formvollendung means the mathematical precision of rhythm and stanza and symmetrical

construction with unity of idea of each volume of verse."62 George's study of languages and

his immersion in Romantic works gradually "alienated him from German literature which

was then in its heyday of naturalism."63

Association with the Stefan George circle was to broaden Voegelin's range of

comparative knowledge. He became acquainted with many adherents, friends and "pupils

who became scholars in their own right and determined the climate of the German

universities for the intellectually more alert younger generation."64 Voegelin absorbed the

works of such writers as Gundolf, Kommerell, Bertram, Stein and Kantorowicz. Another

group of writers who shaped Voegelin's intellectual development were Classical scholars

such as Heinrich Friedmann, Paul Friedlander and Kurt Hildebrandt. Their studies on Plato became fundamental for his own studies which he notes were continued in their spirit.65

Other German writers who contributed to Voegelin's thought were

Heimito von Doderer66 and Robert Musil.67 These writers gave Voegelin the concept,

"second reality" which he used when discussing his theory of consciousness. He writes:

61Metzger and Metzger, Stefan George, 1868-1933 , p. 2. 62Jethro Bithell, Modern German Literature (London: Methuen, 1959), p.122. 63Ibid., p. 124. 64 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections,1989, p. 16. 65Ibid., p. 17. 66Voegelin in his Anamnesis, 1978, cites Doderer, Die Merowinger (Munich: Biederstein, 1962), p. 353. Voegelin writes, “There are easygoing persons whom Doderer describes.” See Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p. 168. See also M.W. Swales, “The Narrator in Heimito von Doderer,” Modern Language Review, 61 (1966), p.87. He writes, “Doderer sees the world in its full complexity and finds room for the individual personality within this variety and complexity. It is this unmistakable moral intensity which 46

they were able to formulate certain problems such as the concept of 'second reality' developed by Doderer, in his Daemonen, which I have adopted. All of these people were always on the verge. You might say Doderer was perhaps, for a while, strongly inclined towards National Socialism, but he wrote his notes after he saw what it was; his analysis of National Socialism in the post-war novels is extremely acute, and results in the conception of the second realities which replaced the first realities.68

The term 'second reality' is understood by Voegelin as presenting a fictitious world considered as “real” but which in fact "eclipses genuine reality'.69

In Anamnesis, where Voegelin explains his theory of consciousness, he made reference to these authors as those who helped sharpen his awareness of reality at a deeper level. He states:

In a material sense our contemporary institutions, therefore, offer minimal opportunities of an access to the reality of knowledge. If, for instance, perhaps above all else makes his works so untypical of the modern novel generally. He is a moralist and the moral principles in which he so passionately are in a sense the mainspring of his literary production. He sees our age as one where a split has occurred between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ man between the individual and the social world in which he finds himself. Modern man tends to run away from the moral challenge which faces him in the confused complexity and arbitrariness of the ‘Alltag’, the first reality of life, and takes refuge in a rigid, self-enclosed world, an ideologized ‘second reality’ to which he feels he can lay down the law.” Criticising such a position Doderer sees the novelist’s task to draw man back to re-conquering social reality. 67Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities, English edition, translated from the German by E.Wilkins and E. Kaiser, consists of four volumes. [Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, the first volume was published in 1930, the second volume in 1932, the third volume unfinished.] The novel portrays a society on the brink of the abyss seen through the eyes of an individual called Ulrich, a ‘man of possibilities’. He can never discover why any given actuality ought to exist rather than some other. Yvonne Issit remarks (German Men of Letters, Vol. 3, 1964 p. 237), “Musil sought tirelessly to forge a link between the two realities of the human mind, which, as he experienced it, was divided against itself; the reality of the understanding, and a strange, ‘other’ reality of the scene. That is why he has so often been called a psychologist, because he was concerned with the vagaries of thought and feeling, locked apart without mutual means of communication.... Musil’s work represents his conscious experiment to subjugate the irony of human existence to the practical terms of an historical context. Voegelin derived his term “second reality” from Musil. See Voegelin’s essay, “The Eclipse of Reality” in Maurice Natanson ed., Phenomenology and Social Reality (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 185-194. Voegelin talks of ‘man’ contracting reality by his imagination. He writes, “The man who suffers from the disease of contraction, however, is not inclined to leave the prison of his selfhood, in order to remove the friction. He rather will put his imagination to further work and surround the imaginary self with an imaginary reality apt to confirm the self in its pretence of reality; he will create a Second Reality, as the phenomenon is called, in order to screen the First reality of common experience from his view” (p. 185). 68 Voegelin, “Autobiographical statement at eighty two”, in Lawrence, ed, The Beginning and the Beyond, 1984, p.113. 69 Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, p. 288. 47

one wishes to inform oneself about the great problems of thinking about order in Germany, one would do better to read the works of Robert Musil, Hermann Broch, , Heimito von Doderer, or the dramas of Frisch and Dürrenmatt, rather than the professional literature of politics.70

A significant influence for Voegelin were the historians, Toynbee71and Spengler.

Their breadth of comparative knowledge impressed Voegelin. He was familiar with

Spengler's Decline of the West but disagreed with his classification of civilisations.

Eduard Meyer and his great History of Antiquity72 were also important. Voegelin observed,

"If one looks at Toynbee's text, especially that concerning ancient civilisations, one will find

Meyer is the most frequently quoted authority."73The personality of Meyer had impressed

Voegelin. He commented, "It was my good luck when I was a student for a semester in

Berlin in 1922-3, to be able to take a course with Eduard Meyer in Greek History." Meyer's

"treatment of historical situations from the point of view of the person engaged in action" was a method Voegelin was to use later. Voegelin recalled:

I still remember his masterful characterisation of Themistocles on the eve of the Battle of Salamis, weighing the possibilities that could lead to victory. I like to believe that Meyer's technique of understanding a historical situation through the self-understanding of the persons involved has entered my work as a permanent factor.74

70Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p. 191. 71Refer to Arnold Joseph, A Study of History, in 10 volumes. Toynbee is considered to have a capacity for synthesising historical material and tracing unsuspected patterns. His basic “unit” is civilisation compared to Spengler’s “cultures”. Refer to P. Gardiner, Theories of History (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 200. See also Eric Voegelin, “Toynbee’s History as a search for truth”, in E.T. Gargan, ed., The Intent of Toynbee’s History (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1961), pp. 182-198. 72 Meyer had a strong background in Egyptology and his Geschichte des alten Aegyptens was published 1887. At that time he was one of the few individuals to control all available material from the Mediterranean to the Iranian Plateau. 73Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 14. 74Ibid., p. 15. 48

A similar range of "comparative vision" was offered by Alfred Weber,75the brother of

Max Weber. Voegelin had the opportunity to study in Heidelberg for a semester in 1929.

He attended Alfred Weber's course on the sociology of culture. Weber's breadth of vision impressed Voegelin. A scholar

if he wants to talk about social structures in their historical context, must have comparative knowledge and be at home in the genesis of Babylonian civilisation as in the genesis of Western civilisation in the time of the Merovingians and Carolingians.76

1.3. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

The major source of influence in Voegelin's intellectual development up to this time had been generally European and particularly German sources. This limitation was to be broadened with his American experience and introduction to English 'common-sense' philosophy. Voegelin's first-hand experience of the Anglo-Saxon tradition came during a short visit to England in 1922. "Through connections", Voegelin was able to get a scholarship for a summer school in Oxford. The official purpose of the fellowship was to learn English. While there he had the opportunity to attend the lectures of Gilbert Murray, the Australian classical scholar.77 Voegelin later recalled the impressions he received from

these lectures were "overwhelming". This was "my first introduction to the style of

75Alfred Weber, History of Philosophy, translated by Frank Tilly (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896). Weber was a sociologist and philosopher of history. He distinguished between the social, cultural and civilisational process. He had profound respect for Herder and with him deplored the Enlightenment’s dogmatic progressivism as a “dangerous sort of optimism”. The progressivist, evolutionary thesis stemmed in Weber’s opinion from confusing the culture process with the civilisation process, thus misconceiving the nature of culture, for culture does not flow in any definite lineal order of development but occurs sporadically, defying the causal determinism that operates in the realm of science and technology. 76Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 15. 77Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 27. See also Gilbert Murray, Essays and Addresses (London: George Allen, 1921). 49

distinguished English scholarship at its best."78This favourable impression of the Anglo-

Saxon tradition was to be a lasting influence.

In 1924 Voegelin had been awarded one of the first Laura Spellman Rockefeller

Memorial Fellowships for three years. His experience in America was to have lasting

repercussions on his philosophical direction. Voegelin considered his first two years in

America responsible for a great breakthrough in his intellectual development.79 His interests until then, although wide-ranging, were still "provincial". He felt that "the location of

Central Europe was not favourable to an understanding of the larger world beyond

Continental Europe".80

In America, Voegelin took a variety of courses at Columbia University from

Franklin Henry Giddings81the economist, and John Whitier McMahon. Voegelin admits that he was overwhelmed "by a new world of which hitherto I had hardly suspected the

existence."82 Voegelin read systematically through the history of English philosophy and its

expansion into American thought. He discovered English and common-sense

philosophy particularly through Dewey's recent book Human Nature and Conduct (1922),

based on the English common-sense tradition. Voegelin became familiar with the common-

sense philosophy of the Scottish philosophers, Thomas Reid and William Hamilton.

1.3.1. COMMON-SENSE PHILOSOPHY

78 Ibid., p. 27. 79Ibid., p. 28. 80Ibid. 81Voegelin discusses Henry F. Giddings (1855-1931) in Eric Voegelin, On the Form of the American Mind, Collected Works, Vol. 1, translated from the German by Ruth Hein, edited with an introduction by Jürgen Gebhardt and Barry Cooper (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana University Press, 1995). This work was first published in Tübingen in German in 1928. Giddings principal work is Principles of Sociology (New York, 1896) and it is considered one of the most important works in American sociology. [See Section 7.4.3. in Thesis]. 82 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p.28. 50

Voegelin's discovery of the common-sense philosophy was significant. He saw the

common-sense philosophy continuing in the line of Classical philosophy but "without the

technical apparatus of Aristotle". He was aware that Classical philosophy continued in the

guise of common-sense philosophy which, in turn, was to be significant in the "intellectual

climate and the cohesion of a society".83

Voegelin was now able to analyse the fundamental defect of the German political structure, that is, the absence of political institutions based on a common-sense tradition.

When he surveyed the contemporary German scene in 1969 (Voegelin’s Munich period) with its frenetic debate between positivists, neo-Marxists and neo-Hegelians, he wrote:

[I]t is the same scene that I observed when I was a student in the 1920s in the Weimar Republic; the intellectual level, however, had become abnormally mediocre. The great figures engaged pro and con in the analysis of philosophical problems in the 1920s - men like Max Scheler, Karl Jaspers, , Alfred Weber, Karl Mannheim - have disappeared from the scene and have not been replaced by men of comparable stature and competence.84

Alfred Whitehead at Harvard was another influence. Voegelin desired to explore in

greater detail the cultural and historical background of Whitehead's new book, The

Adventures of Ideas (1933). Voegelin in his second year became acquainted with

John Commons and his book Human Nature and Property. Commons argued that political

and economic problems should be the concern of both the state and national ,

with particular emphasis on the labour problem. In Wisconsin Voegelin gained knowledge

of the importance of the United States Supreme Court as a source of political culture in

America. This experience, he remarks, "became a strong factor in my later career".85 When

83Ibid., p.29. 84Ibid. 85Ibid., p.32. 51

he went to live permanently in America in 1938, his desire was to be able to teach American

government as a focus for understanding American culture.

1.3.2. SANTAYANA

Voegelin's reading of Santayana opened up a new horizon. He states:

To me, Santayana was a revelation concerning philosophy, comparable to the revelation I received at the same time through common-sense philosophy. Here was a man with a vast background of philosophical knowledge, sensitive to the problems of the spirit without accepting a dogma, and not interested at all in neo-Kantian methodology.86

He perceived Lucretian to be the motivating experience in Santayana's

thought.87 Later Voegelin found the same theme in his reading of the French poet,

Paul Valéry. This was an important insight as he notes:

Santayana and Valéry have remained for me the two great representatives of an almost mystical scepticism that in fact is not materialism at all. The emotional impact of this discovery was so strong and lasting that in the 1960s when I had the opportunity to travel in southern France, I went to see the Cimetière Marin in Cette where Valéry is buried overlooking the Mediterranean."88

Voegelin's deepening awareness of the common-sense tradition and his acquaintance with

different political systems made him more critical of neo-Kantian methodology that was so

important in the European circles he had just left. He realised that there was a place in which

the "great neo-Kantian methodological debates", considered so important in Europe, were of

no importance in America. In the "other world", America, elements of Christianity and

classical culture were still retained, which had shaped political thought and institutions.89In

debates of methodology in which Voegelin had earlier participated, the Classics and

86Ibid., p.31. 87See Voegelin’s reference to Santayana in Voegelin, On the Form of the American Mind, 1995, Chapter 2, “On ”. 88Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections,1989, p. 31. Refer to Paul Valéry, Poems, translated by David Paul in On Poets and Poetry, Bollingen Series, XLV (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). 52

Christianity were not only absent but were considered to be intellectually, morally and

spiritually irrelevant.90 His recognition of the plurality of human experience was now

enlarged beyond the ideas he found in , Spengler and Toynbee.91

1.4. RETURN TO EUROPE, WORK AT THE LAW SCHOOL IN VIENNA

Returning to Europe in 1930, Voegelin was no longer interested in the ongoing

debates of methodology. Even the newly published Sein und Zeit (1927) of Heidegger, then

the centre of attention failed to interest him. He recalls, "It [Sein und Zeit] just ran off [me],

because I had been immunised against this whole context of philosophising through my time

in America."92

On the completion of Voegelin's two years in America, the Rockefeller Foundation offered him the scholarship for another year. This time he chose to study in France. He wanted to research elements of French culture relevant to political science, and therefore chose to study at the Sorbonne where he could perfect his knowledge of French. In the course of his research he became aware of the French history of consciousness that began from the eighteenth century and continued into the present period.93The legal theory of

Duguit interested Voegelin and for the first time he encountered the French notion of

solidarité. The increasing presence of the Russian refugees in Paris had stimulated Voegelin

to study and read Russian. Before he left he was able to read Dostoevsky.

89 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, p. 29. 90Ibid., p. 32. 91Ibid., p. 33. 92Ibid. 53

Voegelin returned to Vienna after he had concluded his scholarship. He continued

his work in the Law School with Kelsen but the salary was poor. Meanwhile he had married

Lizzy Onken on July 30th, 1932, and therefore had to support both himself and his wife from

freelance teaching and writing.94 He also continued teaching at the Trading Institute.

Apart from teaching, all his energies were now concentrated on the publication of

writing that would lead to a professorship. The first book Voegelin completed was On the

Form of the American Mind, which came out in 1928.95 The various chapters corresponded

to the different areas of literature and history that Voegelin had studied in America. For

example, his chapter on "Time and Existence" reflected his studies of the English philosophy of consciousness with its comparison of German theory of consciousness represented by

Edmund Husserl. There was a chapter on George Santayana and another on

Jonathan Edwards. One section compared “Anglo-Saxon Analytical Theory of Law” with

the normlogik of Kelsen in the continental European theory of law. The book concluded with a study on the work and personality of John R. Commons for whom Voegelin had great admiration.96

1.5. EARLY WRITINGS

About 1929 Voegelin had begun writing a book on Staatslehre (political science).

He wanted to develop a system of Staatslehre and had completed some sections dealing with

the theory of law and the theory of power, but when he came to a third section he felt his

knowledge of political ideas was too limited so he gave up the project. Instead he began to

concentrate on deepening his knowledge of specific ideas of empirical studies for the

93Sandoz, The Voegelin Revolution, 1981, p. 40. 94Ibid., p.50. 95Voegelin, On the Form of The American Mind, 1995, Vol. 1 in The Collected Works translated from the German by Ruth Hein edited with an introduction by Jürgen Gebhardt and Barry Cooper. 54

purpose of analysing what he termed at this time "ideas",97 which resulted in his studies on

the race question. As he recalls, "The National Socialist movement obviously was in political

ascendancy; and though one could not foresee it would come to power, the debate about

race, the Jewish problem went on all the time."98 He completed a comprehensive study on

the race question, hoping he would be able to trace both the genesis of the political myth of

race and, at the same time, examine the mutation theory which he had acquired in Columbia

during his study of biology. Two small volumes were published in 1935, Race and State

(Rasse und Staat),99 and The Idea of Race in Intellectual History from Ray until Carus (Die

Rassenidee in der Geistes Geschichte von Ray bis Carus).100 The latter volume was quickly

withdrawn from circulation by the Nazis and most copies have been destroyed. Voegelin

considered this work as one of his better publications and felt it would have made a

contribution to the discussion of the theory of . One reviewer of the work

remarked:

Race and State maintains its stance of theoretical only with the greatest difficulty. Voegelin savages the leading German race biologist, he cannot bring himself to use the word 'National Socialism' even when he refers to it, yet he attempts to write his way around the censor without budging from the truth.101

While preparing this material Voegelin became convinced of the importance of reading the

Classical writers, Plato and Aristotle, in the original language, considering that reading only

96Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, p. 32. 97Ibid., p.38. 98Ibid. A recent work dealing with the question of anti-Semitism and totalitarianism is by Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany, A New History (New York: Continuum, 1995). See also Helen Fein, The Persisting Question, Sociological Perspectives and Social Contexts of Modern anti-Semitism (: Walter de Gruyter, 1987). 99Eric Voegelin, Rasse und Staat (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1933). Eric Voegelin, “Rasse und Staat” in Otto Klemm, ed., Psycologie des Gemeinschaftslebens (Jena: Fischer, 1935), pp. 91-104. 100Eric Voegelin, Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte von Ray bis Carus (Berlin: Junker & Duennhaupt, 1933). 101Gregor Sebba, "Prelude and Variations on the Theme of Eric Voegelin," Southern Review, 13 (1977), p. 652. 55

in translation was not sufficient. Voegelin considered the acquisition of this knowledge

fundamental to his later work.

That sounds trivial, but as I found out it is a truth not only neglected but hotly contested by a good number of persons who are employed by our colleges and who with the greatest of ease talk about Plato and Aristotle, or Thomas and Augustine, ... without reading a line of the authors on whom they pontificate.102

In 1929, Voegelin became a Privatdozent (unpaid lecturer) but, as he remarks, "I

received the title of Associate Professor in 1936, but neither of these dignities were

connected with any material support." Only with his duties first as assistant to Kelsen and

then to Merkl, did he receive:

... a modest income. I remember it started at one hundred schillings a month. At the time I left in 1938 it was two hundred and fifty schillings ... on which I had to pay taxes. Everything else necessary for living I had to gain through freelance writing, teaching, and so forth. One might say I have always been an independent entrepreneur.103

In 1938 the political situation in Vienna became very tense. Voegelin witnessed the

political structure of Central Europe starting to disintegrate as movements inspired by

various ideologies (National Socialism, and Socialism) took over. Although the

Austrian government made firm attempts to resist the advance of National Socialism, their efforts were opposed through the activities of the Social Democrats who strongly criticised the government for turning towards Mussolini as a protection against Hitler.

1.6. THE POLITICAL SCENE: AUTHORITARIAN STATE

Voegelin, like most of his friends, had supported the Social Democrats but while he

was in America (1926-1928) a deepening division between the two major parties had taken

place. The Christian Socialists were leaning towards Mussolini, seeing him as a willing

102Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 39. 56 protector against the greater evil of Hitler. Voegelin considered the Christian Socialists represented traditions of European culture more clearly than the Social Democrats. The

Christian Socialists also had greater awareness of the impending danger from Hitler.

Before Hitler became dictator in 1933, the Austrian government had adopted the name Autoritäre Staat. The conception of an Austrian corporate state was closely tied to the ideas of the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno 1931, and earlier encyclicals on social questions.104 In 1936 Voegelin published his next book under the title Die Autoritäre Staat

(The Authoritarian State) as an attempt "to penetrate the role of ideologies, left and right, in the contemporary situation and to understand that an authoritarian state that would keep radical ideologists in check was the best possible defence of democracy."105 In this book theoretical problems related to the concepts 'total' and 'authoritarian' were discussed. Since there was no literature dealing with these issues he hoped to develop the distinction between political symbols and theoretical concepts. He identified the totalitarian doctrine of the total subordination of the population to the collective entity of the State, Party or Race as a parallel to the Averroist idea of intellectus unus. The minds of humans are viewed as

‘sparks’ of the one supreme mind. Voegelin remarks:

the transfer of the conception of an intellectus unus to a world-immanent entity called nation or race, and its representatives was lethal to man's humanity. And I certainly was aware of the very serious split in the interpretation of Aristotle's psychology that took place in the Middle Ages

103Ibid., pp. 39- 40. 104Sandoz, The Voegelian Revolution, 1981, p. 64. See also Eduardo Soderini, Leo XIII, and France, translated by B.B.Carter (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1935). Frederic Spotts, The Churches and Politics in Germany (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1973). Alfred Daimant, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic, Democracy, Capitialism and the Social Order, 1918-1934 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960). Klaus Scholder, The Churches and The Third Reich, Vol.1, “Preliminary History and Times of Illusion, 1918-1934”, also Vol. 2 “Year of Disillusionment, 1934” (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977). 105Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 41. 57

between and Thomas, my preference being on the side of Thomas rather than the Averroizing thinkers.106

Hence he was able to conclude that the National Socialist and Fascist ideologies were on this point in astounding agreement.107 Voegelin had concluded that the adoption of the Averroist notion was the foundation of the totalitarian idea and these ideologies were, in fact, 'religious' doctrines which made the state into a spiritual power.

Voegelin's early religious influences are important in view of his ambivalent stance towards Christianity. He was raised in the Lutheran Church, his father being a Lutheran and his mother a Roman Catholic. Little information is given on how he was shaped by religious influences as a child but the traumatic events in Austria in the 1930s seemed to have left a permanent mark on his approach to the established churches. Webb has noted how, in conversation, Voegelin recalled his disappointment with both the Churches and their representatives "over their opportunistic attitude during the Nazi takeover".108 According to

Voegelin, all the clergy except one failed to raise any opposition to the Nazi outrages at that time. Even after the war, Voegelin's contacts with the clergy in Eastern and Western Europe seemed to him to confirm the same opportunistic attitude.109

1.6.1. NATIONAL SOCIALISM

Although Voegelin himself was of no political importance to the Nazis, his views of their policies were well-known through his many publications. He had remained in Vienna until 1938 because he felt that Austria would be protected by the Western .

When events proved otherwise he had to make his escape quickly.110 He had made

106Ibid, p. 52. 107Ibid., p. 41. 108Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, p. 224. 109Ibid. 110Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, pp. 43-44. 58 arrangements with a friend in Zurich for a currency exchange in order to have enough money to live on while he arranged his immigration visa to America. He recalled later the plan almost miscarried when the arrived at his home. The Gestapo wanted his passport but it was at the police station awaiting the visa. Eventually, with the help of friends, he was able to escape and Voegelin arrived safely in Zurich. He stayed there until he received a letter from confirming his position as a part-time tutor, a position which allowed him to have a non-quota immigration visa. After some delay the long awaited letter arrived and he was able to leave with his wife for America.111

Voegelin's attitude to politics and to National Socialism has often been misunderstood. In his Autobiographical Reflections he stated three for his special dislike of National Socialism:

... I first got acquainted with it in the 1920's; [this] can be reduced to very elementary reactions. There was in the first place the influence of Max Weber. One of the virtues he demanded of a scholar was "intellektuelle Rechtschaffenheit," which can be translated as intellectual honesty. I cannot see any reason why anybody should work in the social sciences, and generally in the sciences of man, unless he honestly wants to explore the structure of reality. Ideologies, whether Positive, or Marxist, or National Socialist, indulge in constructions that are intellectually not tenable. That raises the question of why people who otherwise are not quite stupid, and who have secondary virtues of being quite honest in their daily affairs, indulge in intellectual dishonesty as soon as they touch science. That ideology is a phenomenon of intellectual dishonesty is beyond doubt, because the various ideologies after all have been submitted to criticism, and anyone who is willing to read the literature knows that they are not tenable, and why. If one adheres to them nevertheless, the prima facie assumption must be that he is intellectually dishonest. The overt phenomenon of intellectual dishonesty then raises the question of why a man will indulge in it. That is a general problem in my later years, that required complicated research to ascertain the nature, causes, and persistence of alienation. More immediately, on the overt level that imposed itself, it caused my opposition to any ideologies - Marxist, Fascist, Nationalist Socialist, what you will - because they were incompatible with science in the rational sense of critical

111Ibid. 59

analysis. I again refer back to Max Weber as the great thinker who brought that problem to my attention; and I still maintain today that nobody who is an ideologist can be a competent social scientist.112

Voegelin gives another reason for his particular "hatred of National Socialism and other ideologies," he states:

[It] was quite a primitive one. I have an aversion to killing people for the of it. What the fun is, I did not quite understand at the time, but in the intervening years ample exploration of revolutionary consciousness has cast some light on the matter. The fun consists in gaining a pseudo-identity through asserting one's power, optimally by killing somebody - a pseudo- identity that serves as a substitute for the human self that has been lost.113

The third reason for Voegelin's hatred of ideologies is the destruction of language. "This occurs in both intellectual and vulgar jargon at any level."114 Voegelin dealt with this topic at length in many articles as well as in his book Political Religions115 in 1938.

1.6.2. ESCAPE TO AMERICA

Voegelin arrived in America in 1938. His first home was in Cambridge,

Massachusetts, where he was given a one-year appointment as tutor and instructor at

Harvard. The position lasted for only a year so he had to look for a job elsewhere. To do this he wrote more than forty letters to various universities. He gained an appointment at

Bennington College until the end of 1939.

In 1940 he obtained a position at the University of Alabama, but with a salary that was half that of Bennington. Voegelin regarded the position as an improvement because he was no longer among refugees and was able to do what he wanted, that is, teach American government. He stayed there for two and a half years. In the meantime, he had joined the

112Ibid., pp. 45-46. 113Ibid., p. 47. 114Ibid. 115Eric Voegelin, Die politischen Religionen (Vienna: Bermann-Fischer, 1938), trans. T.J. DiNapoli and E.S. Easterly III (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1986). 60

Southern Political Science Association and attended their meetings. At one such meeting he met Robert Harris, the chairman of the political science department at Louisiana State

University. Harris offered Voegelin a position at Louisiana State University and this he gladly accepted.

1.6.3. TEACHING AT LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

In 1942 Voegelin became an associate professor in the Department of Government at

Louisiana State University. Here he remained for sixteen years. His duties included a twelve-hour teaching load which often required four different preparations for classes. He also taught American and comparative government, diplomatic history, and the Law School's course in jurisprudence. For the latter course he wrote an essay of 100 pages entitled "The

Nature of Law" to use as a textbook.

Some time later he was chosen (because of his linguistic ability) to teach a course on

Chinese politics. He had learnt enough Chinese to read the classics in their original texts. In the process of developing this course (which he taught for ten years) he became particularly interested in the philosophy of Lao Tze and Confucius.

Over the next few years, Voegelin wrote many articles, which were published by leading journals. Voegelin was able to communicate to English readers something of a critique of but most of his efforts now went into compiling a "History of Political

Ideas."116 While Voegelin had been at Harvard he became acquainted with the editor of a textbook series for McGraw-Hill, who had encouraged him to do a concise introductory textbook on political theory. Voegelin worked on the project before and after his move from

Alabama first using George Sabine's standard work A History of Political Theory (1937), as

116Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, pp. 62-63. 61 a model. Soon Voegelin found his knowledge of the history of ideas was insufficient and therefore he would not be able to improve on Sabine's books, which he had considered deficient. At this stage he realised he could not write about medieval political theory without a better knowledge of Christianity and its origins; he needed to study its Judaic background.

In order to accomplish this he began to learn Hebrew.117 His research of Israelite origins changed his position that political thought had begun with the ancient Greeks.118 In time the size of the manuscript increased, bursting the bounds of a textbook project, and Voegelin was not able to deliver the manuscript in time to meet the publisher's deadline. But the conception of a history of Western political theory commencing with the Greeks and progressively following a unilinear pattern of developing ideas soon became inadequate.

Voegelin found the "origins" of history extended even further back with recent archaeological findings in the Near East. He observes:

The pattern of a unilinear development of political ideas, from a supposed constitutionalism of Plato and Aristotle, through a dubious constitutionalism of the Middle Ages, into the splendid constitutionalism of the modern period, broke down.119

In the face of these circumstances, Voegelin decided he would not go ahead and publish the "History of Political Ideas". This period in Voegelin's life marked a major crisis in his work and raises the question: why did Voegelin eventually abandon this huge project?

Earlier he had detected problems and noticed that these compounded as the manuscript grew.

His self-criticism became more exacting. Already he had compiled the "History of Political

Ideas" up to the nineteenth century when, as he comments, "the pattern of my work cracked

117Ibid. 118 Sandoz, The Voegelin Revolution, 1981, p. 72. 119 Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 63. 62

along other lines".120 Large chapters on Schelling, Bakunin, Marx and Nietzsche had been

finished already but when working on the chapter on Schelling, Voegelin noted:

[I]t dawned on me that the conception of a history of ideas was an ideological deformation of reality. There were no ideas unless there were first symbols of immediate experiences. Moreover, one could not handle under the title of 'ideas' an Egyptian coronation ritual, or the recitation of the enuma Elish or an occasion of Sumerian New Year festivals. I was not yet in a position really to understand where the concept of ideas had come from and what it meant.121

The period from 1945 to 1950 was a time of indecision as he attempted to solve this

question. Meanwhile he continued to publish articles and reviews covering various topics in

the history of political thought up to the mid-twentieth century. In 1946, Voegelin was

promoted to full professor of government at Louisiana State University. In 1952 he was

appointed the first Boyd Professor of Government, an endowed chair he held until his

departure for Munich.122

1.7. RETURN TO EUROPE, THE MUNICH PERIOD

In 1958, Voegelin accepted an appointment in Munich as professor and director of a new Institute of Political Science. He remained at the University of Munich until 1969. His decision to return to Munich provided him with an opportunity to organise a new program in

political science. He had some idea that perhaps a centre of political science carried on in the

spirit of American democracy would be a good thing in Germany.123 This appointment

brought increased financial benefits and the opportunity to associate with his old friends in a

congenial and intellectual environment.

120Ibid. 121Ibid. 122 Sandoz, The Voegelin Revolution, 1981, p.75. 123Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 91. 63

Voegelin's inaugural lecture at Munich University caused a furore because of his

uncompromising analysis of what he called the Marxian "swindle".124 A further sensation

occurred in 1964 when Voegelin's two-hour lecture course at Munich on "Hitler and the

Germans" was given to a packed house. Reflecting on this situation, Voegelin states:

It was extremely difficult to engage in a critical discussion of National Socialist ideas, as I found out when I gave my semester course on "Hitler and the Germans" in 1964, in Munich, because in National Socialist and related documents, we are still far below the level on which rational argument is possible than is in the case of Hegel or Marx. In order to deal with rhetoric of this type, one must develop a philosophy of language ...125

At this time Voegelin perceived a connection between ideologies as a form of political gnosticism. Some important research in the area of gnosticism had already been achieved by

Hans Jonas in 1930, ( 1937), on modern gnosticism,

Henri de Lubac in his Le Drame l'humanisme athée (1944) and in his The

Rebel,126L'Homme révolté, (1951). Voegelin’s Science, Politics and Gnosticism127 (1959)

contains his inaugural lecture at Munich. In this lecture he examined modern movements of

thought such as progressivism, positivism, Hegelianism and Marxism, as variants of

gnosticism. He analyses the "gnosticism" of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger, and

clarified the line that separates political gnosticism from a philosophy of politics. He notes

that the "gnostic nature of the movements mentioned had been recognised by William

James". James knew Hegel's speculation to be the culmination of modern gnosticism,

observing however that James's critical opposition had had little effect. Today, various

124 Sandoz, The Voegelin Revolution, 1981, p. 86. 125Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 50. 126 Sandoz, The Voegelin Revolution, 1981, p. 79. 127 Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1968), p.v. 64

intellectual movements of the gnostic type dominate the public scene in America, no less

than in Europe.128

The phenomenon of gnostism was discussed in The New Science of Politics, but at

that time the phrase "apocalypse of man" was used by Voegelin to characterise the modern

period.129He maintains that due to the influence of this phenomenon (gnosticism) the

epiphany of God is eclipsed in "the structure of Classic and Christian consciousness."

Consequently, where there is an "eclipse of reality" the symbolism of order breaks down.130

Gnosticism either in its ancient form or in its modern expression in the form of immanentism, is manifested in the various modern "isms".131

Voegelin was aware that gnostic elements were present in movements such as

"progressivism, positivism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, , and National

Socialism."132 These movements vary and are not always political. Some can be

“characterised as intellectual such as positivism, neo-positivism and variants of psychoanalysis."133 Hence Voegelin argued that differences between political mass

movements and intellectual elites (ideologues) are not as wide as it is conventionally

assumed; in fact, he doubts if there is any difference at all.134

128Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 119. 129Ibid., pp. 65-67. 130 Ibid., p. 67. 131 Refer to William Thompson, “Eric Voegelin: In Retrospect”, Religious Studies Review, 10 (1984), p. 33. Thompson notes that "some modern scholars take issue with Voegelin's anti-use of gnosticism.". Also see Gregor Sebba, "History, Modernity and Gnosticism", Peter. J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), pp.190-241. Sebba discusses Voegelin's early work on Gnosticism (1952) and argues that, although the new texts discovered near Nag Hammadi had not yet come to light. Voegelin's thesis concerning the relationship between a transformed gnosticism and modernity and history makes an important contribution to understanding this phenomenon. 132Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1968), p. 83. 133Ibid., p. 83. 134Ibid. 65

Voegelin's work in Munich involved carrying out the activities of the Institute, recruiting assistants, developing a first-rate library and a diversified program of instruction.

By the time he left in 1969 the Institute's library had the best single collection of works for studying “Contemporary Sciences of mankind” and society at the University. He gave special attention to those areas essential for an understanding of Western civilisation

(Classical and Christian); sources of modern history and political thought were given priority. The most recent scholarly developments in the prehistory of the ancient civilisations of the Near East, China and India as well as the field of archaeology also received attention. In addition to his work of writing and administrative duties, Voegelin regularly delivered two lectures at various universities on the Continent, England and the

United States. He participated in a at Dublin in 1963 and taught for a semester at Harvard in 1965. Many of these lectures later appeared as articles in various periodicals.

Upon reaching the retirement age of 70 at Munich, Voegelin availed himself of the opportunity offered by the Hoover Institute to return to the United States as the Henry

Salvatori Distinguished Scholar, a title he held until 1974. This position provided him with the leisure to continue his research. In this way he continued writing, lecturing and teaching at . During this period, he was Visiting Professor at the Universities of

Notre Dame, Harvard, Dallas, Texas and several others. These scholarly activities continued right up until his death in January 1985. 67

CHAPTER TWO

VOEGELIN’S RECOVERY OF THE FULL STRUCTURE OF HUMAN

CONSCIOUSNESS

2.1. VOEGELIN’S INQUIRY INTO POLITICAL THEORY

Voegelin sought to restore philosophy to the meaning that Plato had conferred on it, a way of life rather than an "accumulation of propositions".1 He maintained that the

symbolic forms engendered by the great Classical and Christian philosophers articulated an

ordered political existence. The practice of philosophy should extend to and energise human

society in all circumstances. It was his goal to challenge Western political theories,

particularly scientism, positivism, and all ideologies emerging from them such as

imperialism, nationalism and Marxism.

2.1.1. WEBER AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Weber’s work has had an enormous influence in shaping modern thought. His

impact on the social sciences gave importance to so-called "values" as concepts to explain

social order. However, if “values” have no frame of reference they are meaningless.

Voegelin argued that criteria are required to explain the "existential order” and responsible action in society. On this score social sciences fail to meet the challenge.

1 G. Niemeyer, "God and Man, World and Society: The Last Work of Eric Voegelin", Review of Politics, 51 (1) (1989), p.113.

68

Voegelin was not content to stay within the narrow confines set out by positivists

and those desiring to keep to the strict standards of Normlogik. He became acutely aware of

these restrictive boundaries and sought a way out. Max Weber's omission of a framework to

understand "values" had drawn his attention to a "gap" in certain areas of historical research;

Karl Kraus's critique of language had sharpened his awareness of the power of language.

The failure of Hans Kelsen to acknowledge the "full range of reality" and his determination

to remain in the narrow limits of Normlogik had convinced Voegelin that he should look in other directions for a “science of order”. Voegelin’s phrase "science of order" or "principle of order" is important to understanding the life of reason. What Voegelin means by these phrases is that the order of society depends upon the true order of man; the true order of man in turn depends upon the constitution of the soul; and the constitution of the soul, its order and disorder becomes apparent through the experiences symbolised in the course of the sensitive soul’s loving search for reality of the divine wisdom or philosophy in the Platonic sense.2 Voegelin was critical of Weber because he refused to look at a "science of order"

or "principle of order." He maintained that Weber’s approach lacked objectivity. "Authentic

principles of order" have been elaborated by the great thinkers of the past (Plato and

Aristotle and those of the Christian tradition).3 By ignoring these great thinkers Weber could

more easily deny that an ultimate universal order exists. He was able to dismiss certain

phenomena which stem from religious sources. Voegelin explains:

The reason for the omission seems to be obvious. One can hardly engage in a serious study of medieval Christianity without discovering among its ‘values’, the belief in a rational science of human and social order and especially of natural law. Moreover, this science was not simply a belief, but it was actually elaborated as a work of reason. Here, Weber would have run

2See Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution,1981, p. 103. 3Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 1952, p. 18.

69

into the fact of a science of order, just as he would if he had seriously occupied himself with Greek philosophy. Weber's readiness to introduce verities about order as historical facts stopped short of Greek and medieval .4

Failing to acknowledge the significance of Greek and Christian philosophy, Weber

was able to avoid providing a “science of order” based on the life of reason. Weber could

side-step the political philosophy of Plato, Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Voegelin wryly suggests a "conscientious scholar would first have to show that their claim to be a science was unfounded. And that claim is self-defeating". To embark on such a work the

“would be critic” would have to penetrate the meaning of metaphysics. In fact he would need to become a metaphysician himself. Voegelin concludes :

The attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with a good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge. The horizon of Weber's social science was immense; all the more does his caution in coming too close to its decisive centre reveal his positivistic limitations.5

Consequently, Voegelin regarded Weber's so-called "objectivity" of science as being ambiguous and not fitting the pattern of methodological debate. He observed that even though Weber had made studies in the sociology of religion these investigations did not induce him to “take a decisive step toward a science of order”.6 Weber’s approach to a

“value-free” science is an argumentum ad absurdum.7 It proves itself wrong. Voegelin

pointed out that an impossible situation arose with the positivists. They would not permit the Platonic vision, the admission of a science of essence of a true episteme.8 They are

satisfied only with empirical evidence so often inaccurately observed.

was a method which attempted to eradicate metaphysics and make empiricism a matter of

4Ibid., p. 20. 5Ibid. 6Ibid., p.19. 7Ibid., p.20.

70 logical necessity. It set out to show that any attempt to make a metaphysical statement is nonsense. It questioned not the limits of knowledge but the limits of meaningful linguistic expression.9

2.1.2. HISTORY OF IDEAS ( 1939-1950)

After Voegelin left Germany for America, he became involved in the project on "The

History of Ideas".10 While researching his project on the “History of Ideas” he became dissatisfied with the conventional periodisation, which assumed that philosophy began with the Greeks. Instead of continuing in that direction he turned to probing the history of symbols. He was helped at the time by recent historical discoveries brought to public attention by archaeologists.11 He contended that the task of the historian should be to restore

8Ibid., p.21 9See M. F. Griesbach, “Logical Positivism”, New Catholic Encyclopaedia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 965. 10Voegelin’s “History of Ideas”, will be published as Vols.19-26 in the series, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin as Studies in the History of Political Ideas. 11While working on his project, "The History of Ideas", Voegelin explains that he became "acquainted with the splendid achievements in the exploration of the ancient Near Eastern civilisation conducted by members of the University of Chicago Oriental Institute. The background thus, had expanded to the ancient Near Eastern empires, from which Israel had emerged...”. Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, p. 63. In Voegelin’s, “Autobiographical Statement at the Age of Eighty-Two”, in Lonergan Workshop 4, Supplement 1:The Beginning and the Beyond:Papers from Gadamer and Voegelin Workshops (1984), pp. 122-31.

The complexity of symbolism is examined. He explains: There is no single idea, one cannot write a history of the space idea, a history of the time idea, a history of the soul, a history of matter, a history of this or that, because all these ideas are parts; they are poles in the tension of complexes, and the tensions of complexes are the constants which always recur, from antiquity as far back as written records go and even farther back to the archaeological periods, right up to the twentieth century (p.119).

Voegelin was particularly interested in archaeology and made a special visit to inspect the cave engravings in France. Referring to a “time problem” in history. Voegelin writes: In 1966, there occurred the recalibration of radiocarbon dates. It was discovered that the radiocarbon content of the air is not at all times the same and that therefore many early dates, beginning with a certain millennium B.C., have to be moved farther back - sometimes by eight hundred or a thousand years. We now have, therefore, preceding the Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilisations, ... a whole set of other civilisations, neolithic civisilations - with enormous monuments to be dated in the third or fourth millennium B.C. and independent of Egyptian and Mesopotamian development. So that whole lovely pattern - ancient Near East, and then Greek antiquity and then the Middle Ages and then modernity - just doesn't work. A rich field of new civilisations has become visible and can now be dated with exactness (Conversations, p.119).

71

the primal meaning of symbols. For behind these symbols were philosophical or spiritual

experiences which have given expression to the order of existence in human life. There is an

order to human life that has manifested itself historically. Voegelin understood this "order"

as an expression of essential truths, recorded by the great thinkers of the past. He saw his

task now was to study in the original language the works of these writers and to recover what

he terms the "structure of reality" or "the truth of existence”. He soon began to realise that

"ideas" could not provide an adequate explanation of the nature of "man, society and history"

and came to the conclusion that the only solution to this problem was to develop a theory of

consciousness.12 He had written in "Remembrance of Things Past"13 that it was clear

beyond a doubt that the centre of a philosophy of politics had to be a theory of

consciousness. Only a theory of this nature could analyse movements such as Communism,

Fascism and National Socialism.

To develop a theory of consciousness now became Voegelin's aim. There was no

lack of information in this area. In his formal training in philosophy he had come across a

"superabundance of theories of consciousness", as well as "methodologies of this science".

He considered previous theories of consciousness to be generally unsatisfactory. At that

time, a question he frequently raised was, “Why do important thinkers like Comte or Marx

refuse to apperceive what they apperceive quite well?"14 He continues:

... why do they expressly prohibit anybody to ask questions concerning sectors of reality they have excluded from their personal horizon? why do they want to imprison themselves in their restricted horizon and to dogmatize

12Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p. 3. 13Eric Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, Published Essays, 1966-1985, edited with an introduction by Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 304. 14Ibid., Also see Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, 1952, p.22. Voegelin writes, "Rather, we are confronted here with persons who know that, and why, their opinions cannot stand up under critical analysis and who therefore, make the prohibition of the examination of their premises part of their dogma. This position of a conscious, deliberate, and painstakingly elaborated obstruction of ratio constitutes the new phenomenon."

72

their prison reality as the universal truth? and why do they want to lock up all mankind in the prison of their making? ...15

"The prohibition of questions" was perceived by Voegelin as one of the "causes" of

the failure to provide a philosophy of a true order of man. He pointed out that the questions

these writers prohibited were those which referred to the full dimension of reality. At this

point Voegelin realised his training in philosophy had not provided him with adequate

answers to deal with these issues. With further examination he had begun to discern other

problems that were concerned in "ideologies’, one being that ideologies displayed the same

inherent restrictions as were manifested in political mass movements.16

Another difficulty to be confronted was the deliberate resistance to rational

discourse; in fact, Voegelin perceived an actual “contempt of reason”.17 He found it

impossible to use these ideologies or methodologies in an analysis of the thought of Homer,

Dante or Shakespeare. For these authors give "expression" to a “self-reflective, open consciousness" and, therefore, cannot be confined to the limited perspective of ideologies.18

Voegelin notes, "the extent of the horizon" is dependent on the analyst's willingness to be open to the full dimension of reality of his conscious existence. The responsibility to choose a restrictive or open horizon is in the hands of the individual.19

Voegelin now realised the seriousness of the problem and the effect these restrictive

ideologies had on consciousness. He had reached a turning point in his work, although, as

he observed, he was not the first thinker to be aware of this phenomenon. Locke, in his

15Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol.12, p. 304. 16Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections , p. 45. 17Voegelin, “Remembrance of things Past”, p.310. He states, "A true scholar has better things to do than to engage in futile debate with men who are guilty of the aspernatio rationis" [disdain; rejection of reason]. 18Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, p. 309.

73

essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690], also had criticised "these self-evident

opinions" koinai ennoiai20 of the Stoics and indicated the need to return to the experience

that had first produced the idea. Voegelin had reached the point where it was necessary to leave the koinai ennoiai (common concepts) of the Stoics and return to the "experience" of the consciousness of transcendence as found in Plato and Aristotle.

2.1.3. SYMBOLS

When Voegelin realised that the notion of a history of ideas was "an ideological

deformation", he turned his attention to the investigation of the origin of symbols. He

concluded there are no such thing as "ideas" and that a "history of ideas was untenable".

Instead he came to see that what should be examined is a history of "experiences".

"Experiences" for Voegelin referred to those experiences captured and expressed in myth, or in philosophical or theological concepts. He realised there was a need to study "symbols of immediate experiences". He states:

These experiences, however, one could explore only by exploring their articulation through symbols. The identification of the subject-matter and, with the subject matter, of the method to be used in its exploration led to the principle that lies at the basis of all my later work: the reality of experience is self-interpretative. The men who have had the experiences express them through symbols, and symbols are the key to understanding the experiences expressed ... . What is experienced and symbolised as reality, in an advancing process of differentiation, is the substance of history.21

19Ibid., Voegelin writes, "and the quality of the horizon will depend on the analyst's willingness to reach out into all the dimensions of the reality in which his conscious existence is an event; it will depend on his desire to know." 20Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections,1989, p. 63, "I was not yet in a position to understand where the concept of ideas had come from and what it meant"; Also see Voegelin, Conversations, p.106. Voegelin points out that Locke "criticises the koinai ennoiai of the Stoics: they and we have to go back to experience. That is the modern problem. Locke didn't get at the experiences, nor did Hegel although he was looking for them". 21Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, p. 80.

74

Voegelin considered ideas to be of secondary conceptual development. The original

expression of an experience is in the form of a "symbol", whereas "ideas" express a reality

not contained in the symbol. "Ideas" do not represent reality at all.

2.1.4. ORDER AND HISTORY (1956-57)

Voegelin now turned his attention "from ideas to the experiences of reality that

engendered a variety of symbols for their articulation."22 He gave up pursuing "ideas" as

objects of a history and established the experiences of reality - personal, social, historical,

cosmic - as the reality to be explored historically. Now he examined “symbols”, as the

pointer to the writer’s experience of reality. The title of his new project, Order and History,

refers to "an order that emerges in history from the experiences of reality and their

symbolisation".23

Voegelin gives an account of this project24 and relates how he resolved to begin with

the Mesopotamian and Egyptian empires and their cosmological symbolisation of the

personal and social order. He observed that against the background of the imperial order a

breakthrough occurred by the Israelite revelation. After some time, independent of this event,

there also "occurred the outburst of noetic thinking" in Greek philosophy. Volume 1 of

Order and History consists of an account of the near Eastern and Israelite experiences and

Volumes 2 and 3 describe the evolution of the Greek experiences, from the cosmological

origins to noetic differentiation. Voegelin explains that, according to his original plan, he

22Ibid., p. 79. 23Voegelin’s Order and History project was begun in 1965. It was to consist of six volumes. The work was presented as an "inquiry into the order of man, society and history", in which “the principal types of order, together with their symbols, will be studied". The material was to appear under the following titles: 1 Israel and Revelation (1956); 2 World and the Polis (1957); 3 Plato and Aristotle (1957); 4 Empire and Christianity; 5 The Protestant Centuries; 6 The Crisis in Western Civilisation. The format and titles of the last three volumes were changed and not published at all. Instead, Volume 6 became The Ecumenic Age (1972)

75

had intended to complete studies on Medievalism, Imperialism and and the

modern development, but he always came up against difficulties. "I always ran into the

problem that, in order to arrive at theoretical formulations, I had first to present the materials

on which the theoretical formulations were based as an analytical result."25

For this reason Voegelin decided instead to carry out studies on specific topics.

These subjects, he felt, would attain theoretical results more quickly than by filling volumes with discussion of the sources. Due to extensive developments taking place in historical explorations he felt that by the time he had finished one volume, his theoretical assumptions would have become obsolete. He explains that when he wrote his first volume of Order and

History, his horizon was limited to the Near Eastern empires. However, due to the expansion of archaeological knowledge in modern times he was now aware that the symbols which appear in the period of the history of the ancient Near East have themselves a history which stretches back to the Neolithic period or even to that of the Paleolithic, almost 20,000 years before the beginning of the Near Eastern empires.26

Other difficulties arose, one being the need for a "philosophy of language", and

another the question of a theory of consciousness. Problems such as these, Voegelin argued,

could not be solved by "pitting truth against falsehood", which was debated only on the level

of "ideas"; rather, truth needed to be situated in the experience of consciousness.27

2.2. THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

and Volume 5 was called In Search of Order (1990). Refer to Preface, p.x. of Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1. 24Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, pp. 80-84. 25Ibid., p. 81. 26Ibid., p. 82. 27Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, 1990, p.313. "For instance a philosophy of language did not become visible all at once."

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Voegelin had analysed what he saw as the problem of modernity, now he wanted to find a solution. During the 1940s, he had been studying Husserl's phenomenology and was investigating the problem of consciousness. He discussed this topic with Alfred Schütz.28

It was when Voegelin was reading a section of Husserl's Krisis der europäischen

Wissenschaften (1936) that he became aware of what he considered to be Husserl’s

“arrogance”. Husserl considered he had the “ultimate truth”, a posture which reminded

Voegelin of other “final” philosophies such as that of Hegel and Marx and also the

National Socialists. Husserl had exaggerated “the sense perception of objects in the external world.”29 Although he acknowledged “the sophistication of his analysis”,

Voegelin could not accept a position wherein “there was nothing to consciousness but consciousness of objects of the external world.”30 Voegelin recognised that the reductionist position Husserl was proposing with its restrictive vision was similar to that of the Enlightenment philosophers. Recognising that connection was a step forward for him in his search for the "truth of existence", he wrote:

28 Alfred Schütz was Voegelin's intellectual companion and critic who for forty years shared his philosophical concerns while pursuing his own different goal. See Voegelin’s letters to Schütz in P.J. Opitz, ed., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics (Stuttgart: Klett-Cota, 1981), pp. 431-465 which contain correspondence of Voegelin and Schütz, written about 1952. The Schütz-Voegelin contact, which began in Austria in the early 1920s, continued once they relocated to the United States. Their initial common interest was Husserlian phenomenology, an intense interest they shared between 1928 and the mid-1930s. The initial discussion, which ended in 1943, centred on Husserl’s Crisis. Yet their differences were not clarified fully until 1954 when the whole text of Husserl’s Crisis became available. Initially, Voegelin had argued that Husserl’s thought displayed historic tendencies. By the 1940s, Voegelin’s interest had shifted to the classical thought of Plato and Aristotle. In his 1943 correspondence with Schütz, Voegelin announced both the outline of his future work and his dissatisfaction with the methodology stemming from Descartes, Weber, and Husserl (see reference in Sandoz, The Voegelian Revolution, 1981, p. 167). “Voegelin used the term ‘theory’ in an historically-specific sense, one which had originally arisen between 600-300 BC. In Voegelin’s view, a science of ‘man’ and ‘society’ exists insofar as theory has developed which can explicate the experiences of the transcendence in language symbols.” Refer to L. Embree, Wordly, Phenomenology: The Continuing Influence of Alfred Schütz on North American Human Science, 1988, pp. 154-55. 29Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p.70. 30Ibid.

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I still remember the shock when I read this 'philosophy of history'. I was horrified because I could not help recognising the all-too-familiar type of phase constructions in which had indulged the Enlightenment philosophers and, after them, Comte, Hegel and Marx. It was one more of the symbolisms created by apocalyptic-gnostic thinkers, with the purpose of abolishing a 'past history' of mankind and letting its 'true history' begin with the respective author's own work. I had to recognise it as one of the violently restrictive visions of existence that, on the level of pragmatic action, surrounded me on all sides with its tale told by an idiot, in the form of Communism, National Socialism, Fascism and the Second World War. Something had to be done. I had to get out that ‘apodictic horizon’ as fast as possible.31

Voegelin's search for the "truth of existence" was now set firmly before him. He saw

his next task was to provide an alternative to Husserl's conception of an "ecologically constituted consciousness", i.e. an apocalyptic construction which has the purpose of abolishing history and thereby justifies the exclusion of a full historical dimension of reality

from the structure of one's own consciousness.32 What was crucial to this issue was not only

the fact of Husserl's exclusion of a period of "past history", but also the dismissal of the

transcendent dimension. Voegelin writes:

Reality, it is true, can move into the position of an object-of-thought intended by a subject-of-, but before this can happen there must be a reality in which human beings with a consciousness occur. Moreover, by virtue of their consciousness these human beings are quite conscious of being parts of a comprehensive reality and express their awareness by the symbols of birth and death, of a cosmic whole structured by realms of being, of a world of external objects and the presence of divine reality in the cosmos, of mortality and immortality, of creation into the cosmic order and of salvation from its disorder, of descent into the depth of the psyche and meditative ascent towards its beyond.33

Voegelin insists on the need to recognise the "comprehensiveness of reality" of the

human being's consciousness. Indications of this "reality" which impinge on the

consciousness are the "symbols" of birth and death, the universe, the question of mortality

31Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, 1990, pp. 310-311.

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and immortality and so on. These "symbols" are indications of a consciousness of one who

participates in the full dimension of "reality".

In the 1940s Voegelin’s understanding of what consciousness consists in was

extended by his reading of Classical, Patristic and Scholastic philosophy. He became

acutely aware that philosophy encompassed something more than just “perceptions of

objects in the external world.”34 Humans, Voegelin argued, are aware of more than mere sensory experience for they have the potential to experience notions such as infinity and timelessness. Such experiences, although “beyond” external phenomena, should be accepted as “real consciousness.”35 The recognition of reality beyond mere external

phenomena was embraced by all the great pre-Enlightenment philosophers. Voegelin

opposed the view that human experience can be reduced only to subjective experience

such as imagination, feeling and sensory perception of external objects. Human

consciousness includes a reality outside the recipient’s perception. Such consciousness is

a human’s “response to the movements of divine presence”.36

With the acceptance of reality in its full dimension Voegelin’s next move was to work towards restoring this full dimension of consciousness37 to philosophy. To do this

he saw a need for a “technical vocabulary” to express the full structure of consciousness.

But he did not have to create such a vocabulary. He found there were other philosophers

32Ibid. 33Ibid., pp. 311-312. 34Consciousness is not limited to a psychological meaning here. 35Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, Chap. 3. Voegelin discusses his anamnetic experiments. 36 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p.73. 37 Italics added.

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who “had gone through the same process” and had left symbols signifying a consciousness through their “analytical steps in the exploration of their experiences”.38

Voegelin makes it clear that consciousness as he understood it should be distinguished from that view of consciousness understood as “stream of consciousness”.

He regarded that view of consciousness as reductionist or excluding notions of transcendence.39 The consciousness he is referring to arises from the experience of “the

In-Between of the divine and the human.”40 He states that the “experience is the reality

of both divine and human presence, and only after it has happened can it be allocated

either to man’s consciousness or to the context of divinity under the name of

revelation.”41

2.2.1. ANAMNESIS (1966)

In the process of clarifying the problem of consciousness Voegelin turned to the task

of analysing his own consciousness in order to oppose his model to Husserl's. By calling up

his own experiences he could verify whether "consciousness" is limited only to the external

world as Husserl and the positivists claimed or whether an area of reality exists beyond the

external world. Therefore, he conducted a series of "experiments" related to his recollections

as a child. These experiences he called anamnesis or "recollections", as he explains:

The phenomena described were definitely phenomena of consciousness because they described my consciousness of various areas of reality as a child. And these experiences had very little to do with objects of sense perception.42

38Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 72. 39The term immanent in this sense excludes the transcendent dimension. 40Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 73. 41Ibid. 42Ibid., p. 71. See also Anamnesis, Voegelin’s Chapter 3 on his "Anamnetic Experiments", pp. 36-51.

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The "experiences" he described were "experiences" of consciousness in which he

was aware of a reality not limited by the external world. These "experiments" formed the

basis of his theory of consciousness. At this stage Voegelin acknowledged that he had not

yet discovered "those great precedents of existential analysis of antiquity" [Plato, Aristotle,

St. Thomas Aquinas and others] who "far surpassed in exactness and luminosity of

symbol isation, contemporary efforts".43 These great thinkers of the past gave expression to

the experience where the "symbol" had first been engendered. He explains:

These experiences of participation in various areas of reality constitute the horizon of existence in the world. The stress lies on experiences of reality in the plural, being open to all of them and keeping them in balance.44

"The balance" is maintained by imitating the attitude of the great philosophers who

presented an "openness of reality". The attitude of "openness to reality", Voegelin insists, is

the principal task of philosophy. Voegelin was at the same time quite determined not to be

drawn from one extreme to the other that is, from the "restrictive [neo-Kantian] position to

the other” [the neo-Platonist or neo-Thomist]. The problem to be addressed demanded a far

more radical solution,45 because the "resistance to the truth" was profound; it was a

resistance that had hardened into the great "rebellion" or "stasis".46

2.2.2. WILLIAM JAMES AND THE “IN-BETWEEN”

43Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, 1990, p. 306. 44Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections,1989, p. 72. Voegelin's approach to consciousness was derived from several influences. One influence was from the Stefan George circle, whose adherents had contributed to the restoration of German language; another was a renewed understanding of German classical literature; and a third was a new interest in Greek philosophy. 45Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, 1990, p. 306. 46See Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State Univrsity Press, 1957), p. 322; Also see Voegelin, Order and History, The World of the Polis, Vol. 2 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), p. 304. Voegelin uses the Greek stasis to refer to "rebellion", "revolution", "disorder", “Remembrance of things Past”, 1990, p. 307. "During the last fifty years, the conflict between open and restrictively deformed existence has hardened into the great stasis (in the Aristotelian sense) that we witness in our time."

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At this point in his investigation, Voegelin had come across an article that lent support to his theory of consciousness, William James's essay entitled "Does Consciousness

E.xist?" 47 Voegelin regarded this as one of the most important philosophical documents of the twentieth century.48 He stated:

... James put his finger on the reality of conscious participation inasmuch as what he [James] calls pure experience is the something that can be put into the context either of the subject's consciousness, or of objects in the external world. This fundamental insight of James identifies the something that lies between the subject and the object of participation as the experience.49

It is the important insight of the "In-Between" that is at the heart of Voegelin's theory of consciousness. By now Voegelin could no longer accept the "school construction", which taught that reality was restricted to a "subject of cognition" (in the Kantian or neo-Kantian sense).50 In contrast, Voegelin emphasised "the objectivity of the concrete consciousness of a concrete human being".51

Voegelin’s discovery of William James’s essay supported his realisation that "the human being's awareness of objects in the external world" and "the something" that lies

47 William James, "Does Consciousness Exist?", Chapter 6 in B. Wiltshire ed., The Essential Writings (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1971). [This essay was first collected in book form as Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York and London: Longmans Green and Co., 1912).] 48Eric Voegelin, On The Form of the American Mind, 1995, Vol. 1. Collected Works, trans English [First published in 1928 by J.C.B Mohr, Tübingen]. Refer to pp. 49-60, where Voegelin praises the simplicity and clarity of William James’s discussion of consciousness. 49Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 72; Also see Voegelin, On The Form of the American Mind, “Time and Existence” p. 50, where he considers that James’s handling of the problem is a further development of Hume’s thinking. Voegelin writes that James “answers the question of the relation between perception and object by stating that both - perception and object perceived - are made of the same substance and only subsequently were assigned to different areas.” “‘Pure experience’ is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories.” Voegelin cites from William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York, 1912), p. 93. 50Voegelin, “Remembrance of things Past”, 1990. p. 305. "And if that was true then the school construction of 'an intersubjective' ego as the subject of cognition did not apply to an analysis of consciousness; for the truth of my observation did not depend on the proper functioning of a 'subject of cognition' in the Kantian, or neo- Kantian, sense, when confronted with empirical materials, but on the 'objectivity’ of the concrete consciousness of a concrete human being when confronted with certain 'subjective' deformation." 51Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, 1990, p. 305.

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between the subject and object is "the experience".52 Voegelin had also found in Plato the

idea that the human being experiences reality that belongs "neither wholly to the subject nor

to the world of objects but is 'In-Between'"53 (Greek, metaxy), that is, between the external

world and the consciousness of the human being.54 Consciousness of this kind, Voegelin

comments, "does not just happen, nor is its horizon a given." Rather it is "a ceaseless action

of expanding, ordering, articulating and correcting itself; is an event in the reality of which

as a part it partakes."55 Such consciousness, Voegelin insists, is permanently open to the

invocation of reality and is sensitive in avoiding the attitude that reality can be reduced to a system.56 Hence Voegelin insists that "the experience is neither in the subject nor in the

world of objects but In-Between, and that means In-Between the poles of man and of the

reality that he experiences."57 Consciousness is the experience of participation, that is the

being in contact with reality outside oneself. The recognition of "participation" as the

"central problem" was expressed by Voegelin as the problem of "consubstantiality".58 If one

is not consubstantial and does not participate with the reality experienced, one could not

have experienced this.59 The experience of consciousness is a specifically human mode of

participation in reality. The experience is none other "than the concrete consciousness of the

52 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 72. 53Ibid., "In-Between" (metaxy), Plato's symbol representing the experience of human existence, "between the poles" or the extremes of the human and divine; imperfection and perfection; knowledge and ignorance. Voegelin uses this symbol as equivalent to the "participation of being". 54Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 72. 55Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, 1990, p. 305. 56Ibid. 57Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections,1989, pp.72-73. 58Ibid., pp. 72. See also Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, 1956, Vol. 1, p.84. Discussing "the Egyptian myth", Voegelin writes, [it] "contains an experience that welds the blocks into a living whole. That binding factor in the Egyptian cosmogonies is the experience of consubstantiality". Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, p. 279. Webb remarks that "consubstantiality" was a term Voegelin adopted from John A. Wilson, The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man, for the sensed underlying unity of reality, the common participation of all levels of being in the tension of existence toward transcendental perfection. 59Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections,1989, p. 72.

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analyst", because the quality of the "analyst" and consequently, the quality of the results,

will depend on what I have called the horizon of consciousness”.60 The implication is that

the analyst must choose whether to be "open" or reach out to all dimensions of reality.61

Voegelin's theory of consciousness is quite different from those stream of consciousness theories which explain consciousness as a " 'flow' of perceptions experienced at the vanishing point of the present moment".62 As he himself has stated, his understanding

of these problems of consciousness changed the direction of his work and he now turned to

investigate some of the “great analysts” in philosophy who had already carried out this

process.

2.3. SUMMARY

In this chapter I have examined the development of Voegelin’s thought and how he

came to the recognition that ideas and concepts were a deformation of knowledge. Voegelin

sought the recovery of symbols by going back to the original sources as far as possible. His

theory of consciousness has not only attacked reduction in the area of political theory but has

the potential to lift the level of philosophy. The loss of direction concerning the individual

and society can be traced to the loss of symbols. One “symbol” crucial to the development

of Western intellectual history is “the life of reason”. To gain a better understanding of the

60Voegelin, “Remembrance of Things Past”, 1990, p.305. 61Ibid. 62 A.A. Bueno, "Consciousness, Time and Transcendence", in P.J. Opitz, ed., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics (Stuttgart: Klett-Cota, 1981), pp. 95-96. Bueno discussed Voegelin's approach to consciousness and compared it to the stream of consciousness theories. "The stream conception of consciousness, the idea that consciousness is a 'flow' of perceptions experienced at the vanishing-point of the present moment, is false. There is no 'stream' of consciousness, except when a person's attention is directed to certain kinds of simple perception." Voegelin found support for this in the works of William James "who, after a careful introspective analysis, came to the conclusion that all he could find in the consciousness that manifests itself in the stream was 'the stream of breathing'". Bueno cites William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1978), p. 19.

84 significance of the symbol it is necessary to trace the path of the life of reason as it appeared at various stages in Western thought. The next chapter considers the origins of the life of reason “discovered” by Plato.63 (As will be shown Voegelin prefers to call the life of reason a symbol rather than an idea or concept.)

63Voegelin argues that the psyche is the site of transcendence, an idea discovered by Plato.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE LIFE OF REASON IN CLASSICAL THOUGHT

In the last chapter I explained that Voegelin developed a theory of consciousness to reverse what he saw as a despiritualising process in modern systems of thought. He insisted that human beings are aware of reality much more than modern philosophers have conceded. One of the difficulties of acknowledging the transcendent is the prevalence of rationalism, which measures reality according to empirical evidence.

Voegelin argued that there was a tendency to exclude the transcendent as part of the structure of reality. He argued that the great thinkers in Classical Greek and Christian thought had recognised the full structure of reality. It was in his examination of Hellenist thought that Voegelin recognised a comprehensive understanding of what he termed as

“the life of reason” sometimes also called noesis, as I will explain in the following discussion.1

1The phrase, “The Life of Reason” is also a title of a work written by George Santayana (1863-1952). His book was first published in 1905 and describes a philosophy of history using “the life of reason” to interpret the development of human history. However, Santayana’s understanding of the life of reason refers to an evolutionary development of reason consisting of five phases. According to Santayana, reason excludes the transcendent (which he regards as myth considered as the early conception of the divine). He argues that reason moves from the instinct to commonsense and finally to rationalization and “science”. Science is the ultimate end for humans and describes the logical conclusion of the life of reason. Santayana’s notion of the life of reason has nothing in common with the life of reason as Voegelin understands this notion. The life of reason considered by Voegelin is in line with the great thinkers, such 86

3.1. ANALYSIS OF THE ORDER OF THE SOUL; THE PLATONIC VISION.

Voegelin found in Plato what he called a comprehensive view of reality. Plato

discovered that man experiences reality not only in the world of objects but also as a

participant engaged in a movement toward immortality. An awareness of immortality is

central to the thought of Plato and Aristotle. Voegelin has his own expression for this

“the tension in existence”. In the following discussion the life of reason is examined in

the thought of Plato and Aristotle.

Voegelin considered Plato was the one who realised that man experiences reality

not in the world of objects but “In-Between”, metaxy. It is this Platonic view of reality or

the “Platonic Vision” that Voegelin considered is best expressed by the symbol of

metaxy. He states: “The Platonic Vision is so comprehensive, and its articulation so

thorough, that its reality not only is luminous to itself but illuminates the structure and

modality of visionary truth in general.”2

The term metaxy cited by Voegelin is found in Plato’s work in two places. One is in

Plato’s The Symposium and the other is The . In The Symposium (202a -203) there

is a passage where reports with Diotima, in which he asks:

Whereupon, my dear Diotima, I asked, are you trying to make me believe that Love is bad and ugly? Heaven forbid, she said. But do you really think that if a thing isn’t beautiful it’s therefore bound to be ugly? Why naturally. And that what isn’t learned must be ignorant? Have you never heard of something which comes between the two? And what’s that ? Don’t you know, she asked, that holding an opinion which is in fact correct, without being able to give a reason for it, is neither true knowledge - how can it be as - Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and others. The life of reason includes the transcendent, in the emphasis Voegelin has given to the works of Plato, Aristotle and others. 2Voegelin, “Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, edited with an introduction by Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 365. 87

knowledge without reason? - nor ignorance - for how can we call it ignorance when it happens to be true? So may we not say that a correct opinion comes midway between knowledge and ignorance? Yes, I admitted, that’s perfectly true. Very well, then, she went on, why must you insist that what isn’t beautiful is ugly, and that what isn’t good is bad? Now, coming back to Love, you’ve been forced to agree that he is neither good nor beautiful, but that’s no reason for thinking that he must be bad and ugly. The fact is that he’s between the two. 3 And yet, I said, it’s generally agreed that he’s a great god. It all depends, she said, on what you mean by ‘generally’. Do you mean simply people that don’t know anything about it, or do you include people that do? I meant everybody.4

In this enigmatic passage there is an important reference to the structure of reality

which is described as the In-Between. What Voegelin emphasises is that Plato by this

symbol suggests that humans are not immortals but are more than animal . They are as

it were “in - between” and live in the tension towards immortality. The spiritual man never

fully reaches this Divine nous but moves somewhere “In-Between knowledge and

ignorance”. On this subject Plato had written, “The whole realm of the spiritual (daimonion)

is halfway indeed between (metaxy) god and man” [Symposium 202a]. Voegelin explains,

“Thus, the In-Between, - the metaxy - is not an empty space between the poles of tension but

is the ‘realm of the spiritual’; it is the reality of ‘man’s converse with the gods’ [Symposium

202-203], the mutual participation [methexis, metalepsis] of human in divine, and divine in

human, reality. The metaxy symbolises the experience of the noetic quest as a transition of

the psyche from mortality to immortality.”5

3Bold is mine. 4Plato, Symposium, 202a-b. All references to Plato unless otherwise stated have come from Edith Hamilton, and Cairns Huntington, editors, The Collected of Plato: Including the Letters, Bollingen Series LXXI (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1961). 5Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 279. Plato’s use of metaxy does not include the article “the” which is frequently used by Voegelin and his commentators. This usage gives rise to the question whether Voegelin is hypostatising metaxy as a thing. However, as Voegelin always uses metaxy to symbolise the participation of man in the tension of existence, metaxy understood as the human-divine encounter is not a thing but a movement. 88

The symbols of this noetic quest are drawn from Ionian symbolism. Voegelin

writes:

Reality was experienced by Anaximander (fl.560 BC) as a cosmic process in which things emerge from, and disappear into the non-existence of the Apeiron. Things do not exist out of themselves, all at once and forever; they exist out the ground to which they return. Hence, to exist means to participate in two modes of reality: (1) In the Apeiron as the timeless arche of things and in the ordered succession of things as the manifestation of the Apeiron in time. This dual participation of things in reality has been expressed by Heraclitus (fl.500 BC) in the terse language of the mysteries:

Immortals mortals mortals immortals live the others’ death the others’ life die.(B 62).6

Voegelin’s second reference to metaxy in Plato is found in the Philebus. Here the

In-Between notion is expressed under two notions: one Apeiron, unbounded or infinite, and the other peras, limited. Plato in this passage alludes to “the One” and “the

unlimited” which Voegelin argues is what he has termed the In-Between. The passage

from Philebus is given. Plato writes:

The men of old, who were better than ourselves and dwelt nearer the gods, passed on this gift in the form of a saying. All things, so it ran, that are ever said to consist of a one and a many, and have in their nature a conjunction of limit and unlimitedness.This then being the ordering of things we ought, they said, whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single form and search for it, for we shall find it there contained; then, if we have laid hold of that, we must go on from one form to look for two, if the case admits of there being two, otherwise for three or some other number of forms. And we must do the same again with each of the ‘ones’ thus reached, until we come to see not merely that the one that we started with is a one and an unlimited many, but also just how many it is. But we are not to apply the character of unlimitedness to our plurality until we have discerned the total number of forms the thing in question has intermediate between its one and its unlimited number. It is only then, when we have done that, that we may let each one of all

6Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, p. 174. Refer to Fr. 66, “Immortals become mortals, mortals become immortals; they live in each other’s death and die in each other’s life”, in Phillip Wheelwright, Heraclitus (Westport, Conn.:Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 147. Wheelwright comments that the words “immortals” and “mortals” are traditional synonyms for gods and men respectively. 89

these intermediate forms pass away into the unlimited and cease bothering about them. There, then, that is how the gods, as I told you, have committed to us the task of inquiry, of learning, and of teaching one another, but your clever modern man, while making his one - or his many, as the case may be - more quickly or more slowly than is proper, when he has got his one proceeds to his unlimited number straightaway, allowing the intermediates to escape him, whereas it is the recognition of those intermediates that makes all the difference between a philosophical and a contentious discussion.7

Plato is suggesting here that reality is not limited to one or two forms but must be regarded as “many” and only then can one realise the “whole”. This whole is encompassed by the terms Apeiron (unlimited) and peras (limited). In other words reality cannot be reduced to one or two ideas but includes all this aperion. Under these symbols Plato has given another expression of reality. Plato is aware that this knowledge

(noesis) would not satisfy the wiseacres - who “make the ...indeterminate straitaway ..” that is, those who are content with immediate knowledge or that which can be easily deduced by the senses alone. Plato writes:

Protarchus: Plainly there can be no other source, Socrates. Socrates: No, for surely we cannot suppose, Protarchus, that those four kinds, limit, unlimited, combined, and cause, which is present in all things as a fourth kind - we cannot suppose that this last-named, while on the one hand it furnishes the elements that belong to our bodies with soul, maintains our physique and cures a body when it has come to harm, and provides all sorts of arrangements and remedial measures, in virtue of all which we recognise it as wisdom in all her diverse applications, has nevertheless failed in the case of the elements of the universe - although they are these same elements that pervade the whole heaven on a great scale, fair moreover and untainted - failed, I say, there to contrive that which is fairest and most precious. Protarchus: No, to suppose that would be utterly unreasonable. Socrates: Discarding that, then, we should do better to follow the other view and say, as we have said many times already, that there exist in the universe much ‘unlimited’ and abundance of ‘limit’, and a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and regulates the years, the seasons, and the months, and has every claim to the names of wisdom and reason. 8

7Plato, Philebus, [16 d-e -17a] Hamilton. 8Plato, Philebus, [30b-c] Hamilton. 90

Voegelin uses this passage from the Philebus to explain what he means by metaxy.

He writes, “The differentiation of Life and Death as the moving forces behind Reason and

the passions requires further refinements in the analysis of the metaxy”.9 The mystery of

being is expressed as “existence between (metaxy) the poles of the One (hen) and the

Unlimited (apeiron) (16d-e)”. “The One is the divine ground (aitia) that is present as the formative force in all things, to be identified with wisdom and mind (sophia kai nous)

(Philebus, 30b-c).”10 Voegelin writes, “The conflict between reason and the passions

receives its specific character from the participation of the psyche in the metaxy whose poles

are Apeiron and the Nous”. In the psyche of man, the tension of reality achieves the status of

consciousness.11 Hence the principles of limit (hen) and unlimited (Apeiron) in Plato’s

Theory of Forms refer to the underlying reality pertaining to the metaxy, In-Between.12

Voegelin emphasised that reality cannot be reduced to one thing but includes these various aspects such as “man” seeking immortality which is an aspect absent from modern examinations of reality. To eliminate transcendence is to dismiss the In-Between.

In his essay on “Reason: The Classic Experience”, Voegelin had written, “Man experiences himself as tending beyond this human imperfection toward the perfection of

9Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 281. 10Ibid. 11Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 282. 12See Eric Voegelin, Structures of Consciousness” (22 Nov.,1978), given at a Conference on “Hermeneutics and Structuralism: Merging Horizons” held at York University (Toronto, Canada), 21-24 November, 1978. A transcription of this lecture is found in the Voegelin--Research News, Volume II, No. 3 September 1996. A Response to Voegelin’s lecture was given by Zdravko Planinc, “The Uses of Plato in Voegelin’s Philosophy of Consciousness: Reflections Prompted by Voegelin’s Lecture, ‘Structures of Consciousness’. Planinc’s comments can be found in the same transcription of Voegelin--Research News Volume II, No. 3 September 1996. Planinc remarks on Voegelin’s method of interpreting Plato and his use of terms: epekeina and metaxy. He criticises Voegelin’s use of metaxy. Planinc refers to Voegelin’s approach to Plato in Plato’s Political Philosophy, Prudence in the Republic and the Laws (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1991). 91

the divine ground that moves him.”13 To unfold some of the riches of this statement three

aspects are considered. First there is the site of this movement in man which was termed

by the classic philosophers the human nous. Next, there is the human nous that seeks, zetesis the Divine Nous by being drawn (helkein) a movement which consists of two parts:

“seeking” and “being drawn”. Third, the goal of seeking and being moved which is the

“ground”. As Voegelin explains, “The spiritual man, the daimonios aner, as he is moved in his quest of the ground, moves somewhere between knowledge and ignorance (metaxy sophias kai amathias).”14 It is important to note that daimonios aner refers only to the

philosopher, the one who has attained true knowledge, episteme. (Episteme, knowledge

is opposed to doxa, opinions). Furthermore, the daimonios aner is one who understands

“truth” not to be a piece of information but an “event”, an experience of the soul in

which there is a struggle to articulate one’s own reality.15 Voegelin explains that Plato’s

experience is representative for all people. He writes, “Though the dialogue occurs in

one man’s soul, it is not ‘one man’s idea about reality,’ but an event in the Metaxy where

man has ‘converse’ with the divine ground of the process that is common to all men.”16

Voegelin refers to this knowledge as revelatory.

3.1.1. THE PHILOSOPHER’S KNOWLEDGE

Plato had argued that unless there are some wise rulers in society, such as the

“philosopher”, in no way can direction be given either in personal or public affairs. Some reference has already been made to the philosopher and the notion of episteme. Plato considered the philosopher to be one who has knowledge of the Forms whereas other men

13Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 279. 14Ibid. 15Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, p. 186. 16Ibid. 92

have belief or doxa so that their knowledge is limited to the physical world.17 The experience of the philosopher is difficult to convey to those who do not have a similar experience. Plato reflects: “They grasp at particular sights and sounds; of reality behind these they have no conception” (Republic 476c). Is not the dream state, whether the man is asleep or awake, just this - the mistaking of resemblance for identity?18 It is common

for men to mistake the image for the reality and this is what the ordinary man does when

he confuses particularly beautiful things which are so only so far as they participate in

beauty with Beauty itself.19

Plato’s theory of knowledge has generated much debate from various sides.

However, what is important is to point out that Voegelin has made Plato’s notion of knowledge, episteme, central to understanding the life of reason.

3.1.2. KNOWLEDGE AND VIRTUE

Plato’s theory of knowledge accounts for an experience of human consciousness that draws on a source of knowledge that does not rest solely on sense perception, rationalisation or intellectual speculation. What has to be borne in mind is that for Plato, knowledge cannot be separated from “virtue”. The relation between knowledge and virtue is suggested in Socrates’ teachings which stated that virtue is knowledge. One does not really know virtue unless he has a vision of human goodness to serve as a guide.

17 Plato, The Republic 476c, Hamilton, 1961. 18Ibid. 19Ibid. 93

Plato tried to determine exactly what sort of reality this goodness was. In the

the close connection between knowledge (episteme) and virtue is explained:

Socrates: Evils, Theodorus, can never be done away with, for the good must always have its contrary; nor have they any place in the divine world, but they must needs haunt this region of our mortal nature. That is why we should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other, and that means becoming like the divine so far as we can, and that again is to become righteous with the help of wisdom. But it is no such easy matter to convince men that the reasons for avoiding wickedness and seeking after goodness are not those which the world gives. The right motive is not that one should seem innocent and good - that is no better, to my thinking, than an old wives’ tale - but let us state the truth in this way. In the divine there is no shadow of unrighteousness, only the perfection of righteousness, and nothing is more like the divine than any one of us who becomes as righteous as possible. It is here that a man shows his true spirit and power or lack of spirit and nothingness. For to know this is wisdom and excellence of the genuine sort; not to know it is to be manifestly blind and base. All other forms of seeming power and intelligence in the rulers of society are as mean and vulgar as the mechanic’s skill in handicraft. If a man’s words and deeds are unrighteous and profane, he had best not persuade himself that he is a great man because he sticks at nothing, glorying in his shame as such men do when they fancy that others say of them, They are no fools, no useless burdens to the earth, but men of the right sort to weather the storms of public life.20

Here Plato points to the ultimate goal which is to aim to “be like the divine in so far as we can”. To imitate the “divine” demands the virtue of “righteousness”. The text sets out the means to reach this goal. The point about this knowledge is that the whole

man is involved. The knowledge referred to is different from that understood as a “piece”

of knowledge.21 The relation of knowledge with virtue has also been examined by the

great Christian writers on , such as St. Thomas and St. John of the Cross, who

will be discussed later.

3.1.3. KNOWLEDGE AND WONDER [THAUMAZEIN]

20Plato, Theaetetus, 176 a-d. Hamilton, 1961. 21Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, p. 186. 94

Another aspect of knowledge is the association of knowledge with wonder,

thaumazein [θαυμαζειν]. Voegelin comments, “This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin, and he was a good genealogist who made the daughter of ” (Theaetetus, 155d).22 There is also Achilles who

expressed “the Ionian thaumazein, before the spectacle of the cosmos which Aristotle

still recognised as the origin of philosophical inquiry.”23 The characteristic of wonder

distinguishes Plato’s philosophy from knowledge that is reduced to a system.

There has been a tendency to relegate the insights of the Classical writers to the

category of “natural reason”. Natural reason is opposed to Christian revelation or

supernatural knowledge. However Voegelin contends that Plato’s experience should also

be regarded as a “discovery” or a theophany. He argues, “Now the man who goes

through that illuminative, revelatory process knows that it has happened, and that he now

has a different type of consciousness and understanding of reality from people who have

not gone through that process.” Further, “You therefore find in the Symposium of Plato a

new classification of man, socially and historically. The man who preceded that

discovery of illumination remains under the title of the Homeric language for man, the

‘mortals’, the thnetoi. The man who goes through the [experience] and [is] conscious of

it, he calls the daimonios aner, the ‘spiritual man’, he lives in that consciousness and is

aware of it”.24 The two types of man are expressed in the Theaetetus:

22 See Voegelin, Order and History, The World of the Polis, Vol. 2, p. 166. 23Refer to Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p.307. Also see Voegelin, Order and History, The World of the Polis, Vol. 2, p. 166. 24From Eric Voegelin, “Structures in Consciousness”, 22 Nov. 1978. This was a lecture given at a conference on “Hermeneutics and Structuralism: Merging Horizons”, held at York University (Toronto, Canada), 21-24 November, 1978. Quote taken from a transcription of that lecture by Zdravko Planinc cited in Voegelin Research News, Vol. 2, No 3, October 1996 . 95

Such are the two characters, Theodorus. The one is nursed in freedom and leisure, the philosopher, as you call him. He may be excused if he looks foolish or useless when faced with some menial task, if he cannot tie up bedclothes into a neat bundle or flavour a dish with spices and a speech with flattery. The other is smart in the dispatch of all such services, but has not learned to wear his cloak like a gentleman, or caught the accent of discourse that will rightly celebrate the true life of of gods and men.25

So far the discussion has examined Plato’s knowledge as episteme. However, for Plato

the consciousness of reality does not stop at the Forms. Voegelin states:

In the Republic it is the desire for truth that drives man on his way through the various forms of knowledge, from the less to the more perfect ones, until he sees transcendent reality which in its turn constitutes the objects of noesis, as well as the faculty of nous or episteme. There are various forms of knowledge because there are two realms of objects given to human understanding, the realm of becoming (genesis) and the realm of essence (ousia). Each of the realms, furthermore, has two subdivisions of objects. In the realm of becoming things are either shadows and reflections, or objects of sense perception; in the realm of essence they are mathematical objects or ideas proper. To the altogether four classes of objects correspond the four faculties of knowledge: eikasia, pistis, dianoia, and noesis or episteme (509d-511e). The transcendental constitution of the soul can be achieved when a man passes through the forms of knowledge, when he ascends from the realm of shadows (and the corresponding eikasia) to the realm of ideas (and the corresponding episteme) and ultimately to the vision of the Agathon itself.26

3.2. PLATO’S THREE IMAGES

In order to examine the “Platonic Vision” three well-known images, the Sun, the

Divided Line and the Cave, are presented.

3.2.1 THE GOOD AND THE SUN (The Republic 507b-509c)

The image of the sun was used by Plato to describe the Good (Agathon)

[αγαθον], which is beyond the Forms. “As the good is in the intelligible region to reason

25 Plato, Theaetetus: 176e. Hamilton, 1961. 26Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, pp. 113-114. 96 and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.”27 The order of the soul is associated with the Agathon. Voegelin asks:

What is the idea of the Agathon? The briefest answer to the question will best bring out the decisive point: Concerning the content of the Agathon nothing can be said at all. That is the fundamental insight of Platonic . The transcendence of the Agathon makes immanent propositions concerning its contents impossible.28

He explains:

The vision of the Agathon does not render a material rule of conduct, but forms the soul through an experience of transcendence. The nature of this experience and the place of the Agathon in it is described by Socrates indirectly through the function of the ‘offspring’ of the good, the sun, in relation to vision (506e ff). Things are visible to the eye when the light of the sun enters the relation as a third factor. The eye is the most sunlike of all instruments and receives its power of sight from the sun as it were through an influx. Moreover, the sun which lends to the eye the power of sight can by virtue of this power itself be seen (508a-b). These are the propositions concerning the sun which serve as the analogon (508c) to make intelligible the role of the Agathon in the noetic realm (noetos topos). The Agathon is neither intellect (nous) nor its object (nooumenon) (508c), but that what ‘gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowledge to the knower.’ The Idea of the Agathon is the cause of knowledge [episteme] and of truth [] as far as known (508e).29

Voegelin continues, “The analogical elucidation of the Agathon by means of what is most like it (eikon) is then carried one step further. The sun not only provides visibility, but generation, growth, and nurture to the visibles, though it is not itself generation

(genesis). And likewise the Agathon not only makes objects knowable, but provides them with their existence and essence, though it is itself beyond (epekeina) essence in dignity and power. The epekeina is Plato’s term for ‘beyond’ or ‘transcendent’. The excellence

27Plato, Republic 508 b-c.Hamilton, 1961. 28Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 112. 29Ibid., pp. 112-113. 97

created by the Agathon in the soul is not identical with any of the four virtues in the

model (518d); Plato’s preferred term for its designation is (518e)”.30

There appears to be a close relation between the nous and the Good, for the nous

depends on the Good for light, which illumines the Forms. The nous is sustained by the

Good, which gives birth and growth, and the Good is superior to that which it sustains.

The world is made intelligible by the Good. Plato considers the Forms as creative causes

of natural objects and human actions as well as the illumination of the life of reason.

3.2.2. THE DIVIDED LINE (The Republic 509e-511e)

In the second image, the Divided Line, Plato illustrates the various orders of

reality, the interrelation of the Forms and their ultimate dependence on the Good. There

is some debate on how the Divided Line should be interpreted. One problem is the

interpretation of Plato’s three images (Sun, Cave and Divided Line). The standard view

suggests that the Divided Line is the key to understanding the other two images.

However Planinc supports Voegelin’s view that the interpretation of the Sun, the Cave

and Divided Line be kept as each depicting the whole rather than taking up one image as

a so-called “key” to interpret the other two.

I will first consider briefly Planinc’s support of this view against the standard approach of modern commentators. Planinc criticises those who attempt to unravel

Plato’s “cloudy symbolism”.31He remarks :

Although Raven is aware that the discussion of the longer way should be seen as ‘an organic and indivisible whole’, he divides it into several sections, each of which he reconstructs as an independently meaningful part of a theory being presented allegorically by Plato. He refers to each of these sections according to a

30Ibid., p. 113. 31Zdravko Planinc, Plato’s Political Philosophy: Prudence in the Republic and the Laws, (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1991), p. 32 98

central image: the Sun (507a9c), the Divided Line (509-11e), and the Cave (514a- 17a). Raven does not explain why the ongoing discussion between Socrates and is best understood in this manner. The esoteric character of this sort of analysis is evident in its immediate consequence. The dialogic relation of Socrates and Glaucon is what makes everything said in the account of the longer way ‘an organic and indivisible whole’. When an analysis of the text does not recognise that it is a dialogue, the organic unity is lost and some esoteric interpretative criterion must be found in order to restore it. This is usually done by selecting one of the subsections as the most important. 32

Planinc concludes, “Raven stands with a majority of scholars in claiming that the divided

line is the source of the organic unity of everything said in the discussion. The line is

Plato’s allegorical presentation of his . The Sun and the Cave are simply

two analogies or allegories for the line.” Furthermore, “Raven even claims that any attempt to find ‘any wider significance whatever’ in the sun and the cave allegories is ‘to destroy the whole analogy’”.33

Voegelin agrees, and argues that the Divided Line distinguishes the two orders of reality already considered under the Sun image. The key issue concerns the two types of knowledge, episteme and doxa (belief). Plato is fully aware that these ultimate truths exceed his powers, as when he writes in The Republic (506c-e):

But then, said I, do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know? By no means, he said, as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines. Nay, said I, have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge are ugly things? The best of them are blind. Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way? They do not differ at all, he said. Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous and fair?

32Ibid., pp.32-33. 33Ibid., p.33. 99

Nay, in heaven’s sake Socrates, said Glaucon, do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal. For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of , sobriety, and other virtues. It will right well content me, my dear fellow, I said, but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing stock. Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself, for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today. But of what seems the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop.34

Hence the Divided Line image illustrates the presence of a reality that is different

from knowledge explained by that resting on sense perception. Both forms of knowledge

are real yet the reality that the philosopher experiences is not present to the ordinary

man it does not mean to say it is not there.

The Cave Parable found in The Republic (514a-518c) is the most illuminating.

Here the philosopher’s knowledge is compared with light and darkness.

3.2.3. PLATO’S PARABLE OF THE CAVE

Briefly, the story begins with human beings living in an underground den which opens towards the light. They have been there, chained, since childhood and can only look ahead and are prevented by a chain from moving their heads. Behind them is a blazing fire and a path with a low wall. Along this path many people pass carrying all kinds of goods.

Plato likens those in the Cave to prisoners who are unable to move and who see only their own shadows and the objects carried behind them. If the "prisoners" could articulate their experience they would therefore conclude that the shadows they see are the only reality before them. On the other hand, if one of the prisoners was released, and were to see the sunlight on the side of the cave he at first would be unable to see reality because the "glare

34Plato, The Republic, 506c-e. Hamilton. 100 would overcome him and at the same time he would be unable to see the realities of his former state". And if someone said what he saw before was an illusion, but now when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision - what would he answer?

To be able even to name the objects would be difficult and the shadows he saw formerly would appear more real. And the brighter the light the more difficult it will be to see. Will he not have pain in his eyes, turn away and take refuge in the objects which he can see? He will think these objects to be clearer than the other things being shown to him. And if he is forced back to look into the sun is he not likely to be pained and irritated? To be able to see anything afterwards his eyes will be dazzled and he will not be able to see anything at all of what we call realities. Eventually his sight would be accustomed to objects and soon he would be able to see the sun and its reflection, and understand that it is the cause of all things in the world. The shadows he saw before now seem false. Returning to the cave after coming in from the sun he has difficulty seeing the shadows again. The others there see the shadows more easily than he as his sight is still weak. Those remaining below would consider it worthless to go up because one who has done this is now unable to see the shadows. And if someone came to help one of the prisoners leave the cave they would

"catch the offender and put him to death ..."35

Plato explains the meaning of the Parable. The prison house [cave] is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and the journey upwards is the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world. He notes that

in the world of knowledge, the idea of good appears last of all, and is only seen with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal source of all things,

35Plato, Republic, 517a . 101

beautiful and right ... the parent of light and of lord of light of this visible world and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellect;36 and upon this power one should fix one's eye and act rationally in public or private life.37

It is important to observe that the Good is the immediate source of noetic reason.

Plato tells us “not to wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to

descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they

desire to dwell.”38

The Cave illustrates the difference between the darkness of belief (doxa) and the

light of knowledge. Some effort is required, for what was previously regarded as light is

now conceived as shadows and darkness, and it is difficult to grasp. The philosopher

must make a radical break with his previous knowledge in order to grasp the Good. The

movement is upward rather than downward on the Divided Line. The upward movement

indicates a greater consciousness of reality.

The three images are Plato’s testament to reality. Voegelin notes that the Good

symbolised by the Sun is “beyond” the other orders of reality. The image of the Divided

Line points to a teleological, hierarchical view of knowledge. The Parable of the cave

suggests the philosopher’s goal to be “real” but difficult to attain. Voegelin draws

attention to a key word here, pathos is an experience accompanying the philosopher’s

knowledge which is both illuminative and dark.39 The experience of pathos is a

36Bold mine. 37Plato, Republic, 517 c. 38 The discussion of the “cave” is paraphrased from The Dialogues of Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), pp. 388-389. 39Refer to Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 29. Voegelin writes, “Pathos is what men have in common, however variable it may be in its aspects and intensities. Pathos designates a passive experience not an action; it is what happens to man, what he suffers, what befalls him fatefully and what touches him in his existential core - as for instance the experiences of ” (481cd). 102

characteristic which writers such as Pseudo-Dionsyius and St. John of the Cross allude

to in their writings in regard to the religious experience.

This discussion of Plato’s experience of knowledge has been elaborated at length

because there are schools of thought that dismiss Plato as an Idealist or as an ancient

philosopher who has no relevance today. Voegelin saw his thought quite differently and

regarded the Platonic vision as one of the articulations par excellence of human

participation in the structure of reality. It was Voegelin’s aim to restore the Platonic

vision as an important contribution to the various realms of knowledge.

3.3. NOUS

In Plato’s philosophy the nous [νους] of man and the activity of the nous, noesis

refer to the highest part of the soul. It is the nous that grasps or knows the Good. The

nous was already in Greek thought long before Plato.40 Anaxagoras (500-428 BC) was

considered the first to refer to the Nous meaning Mind, Intelligence, understood as a

“moving cause” which was later termed Cosmic Intelligence.41 Voegelin refers to

Anaxagoras as the first to suggest that:

... the Nous was alive not only in living things but in nature at large, that order in reality (kosmos, taxis) was caused by the in-being (eneinai) of the Nous in everything. The noetic theophany, thus, revealed the intelligible structure in reality as divine. The Nous that had been experienced as the ordering force in the psyche let himself be seen as the divine ground of all being. The process of

40 A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (London: Methuen & Co, 1957), pp.12-13, writes: ’s way of thinking is that he is the first Greek philosopher who reasons... . The logic of Parmenides, however primitive it may seem, is the starting-point from which Platonic , Aristotelian logic and the whole Western tradition of philosophical reasoning have developed. His basic proposition is “That which is is, and it is impossible for it not to be.” This is the “Way of Truth.” Absolute non-existence is absolutely unthinkable, and thought cannot follow the Way of Not-Being. ... For Parmenides “is” has only one sense, the most absolute. “That which is” means the whole of actually existing reality and nothing else. All those distinctions between the different meanings of “is” which seem to us the merest common sense were worked out by Plato in solving the problem which Parmenides set later philosophers, and by Aristotle after him. 41 Ibid., p. 20. 103

reality can become luminous for its structure in noetic consciousness because both the cosmos and the psyche of man are informed (eneinai) by the same divine Nous (Metaphysics 984b8-23).42

Voegelin refers to the Nous as “The divinely creative substance in the ” ...

“hence the building of the cosmos in the likeness of the god becomes a work of the

Nous.”43 He explains that the Greek word Nous is best retained, as any rendering by a

modern term (such as intelligence, reason, Geist, spirit) would fragment the compact

meaning of Nous.44

The Nous has been considered as a principle of the cosmos; now we come to

examine the nous of “man” or the Platonic soul. This is considered to be “the intellectual

moral personality, the most important part of man; and for Plato it is not only the most

important, but is by far more real than the body, an exact reversal of earlier Greek

beliefs.” Heraclitus’s contribution to the notion of the immortal soul of man is considered

by Voegelin a “magnificent achievement”.45Heraclitus’s notion of the soul breaks with

the archaic inseparable connection of immortality with divinity.46 Voegelin argues that

the soul was understood as immortal and not a daimon [spirit].

3.3.1. THE PSYCHE EQUIVALENT OF THE NOUS

The nous of man can also be referred to as the psyche of man.47 Voegelin writes,

“The psyche is the most divine part in man, and the insight into the superiority of its rank over goods of the body and material goods is the first condition for the conduct in

42Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, p. 232. 43Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, pp. 200-201. 44Ibid., p. 201, n. 11. 45Ibid., p. 224, 46Voegelin, Order and History, The World of the Polis, Vol. 2, p. 224. See note 7, where Voegelin points out that his interpretation is guided principally by Olaf Gigon, Werner Jaeger and Bruno Snell. He states that these three thinkers have put the understanding of Heraclitus on a new basis. 104

which man ‘likens’ himself to God. Man must establish the true order of temperance and

justice in his soul; he must then apply these principles to the order of his personal life, to

the domestic order of the community, and to the relations both with strangers in the polis

and with foreign poleis.”48

Once again there is an important difference between Voegelin’s interpretation of

Plato and the position taken by standard commentators. He declares that man’s nous is consubstantial with the divine Nous as a “unit” whereas the conventional view49 considers the nous merely as an intellectualising process. Voegelin writes, “This unit to which I have succinctly referred as man’s tension in the ground of existence... .”50 and,

“there is both a human and a divine Nous signifying poles of tension.”51The symbols

express the tension: “there is a noesis and a noeton to signify the poles of the cognitive act

intending the ground; and there is generally the verb noein to signify the phases of the

movement that leads from the questioning unrest to the knowledge of the ground as the

Nous.”52

3.3.2. ‘UN-REASON’, ANOIA

Not only is the life of reason an integral part of Plato’s vocabulary but there is

also a term that points to the loss of the life of reason, i.e. anoia, which refers to the

disorder of the soul. Commenting on this term Voegelin writes:

... Plato expresses the experience of oblivion by the symbol anoia, conventionally translated ‘folly’ which lets the accent fall on the resister’s disorder of existence rather than on the acts of imaginative oblivion caused by it. The resister guilty of

47Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 254. 48Ibid. 49For example Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (Boston, Mass.:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). 50Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 273. 51Ibid., p. 272. 52Ibid. 105

anoia is a man who does not remember his role as a partner in the community of being, who has managed to make himself unconscious of his consciousness of questing participation in the divine Beyond, in the Nous, and who as a consequence can transform his assertive participation into self-assertion. The man who resists his formation through the divine Nous deforms himself; he becomes a fool.53

Voegelin explains that “the symbol anoia, however, has not survived in philosophical

discourse; even worse, because of its compactness, it has become practically

untranslatable into a modern language. If Nous be translated as reason, its negation would

have to become un-reason, if the association of the symbolism nous-anoia is to be preserved.”54 He notes, “Such usage, however, would be linguistically infelicitous

because the symbol “reason” has undergone since the time of Plato, substantial changes

of meaning through the movements of Enlightenment and Christian theologians.”55

So far the discussion has considered three aspects: the nous, the structure of reality or Plato’s Good, and the problem of consubstantiality as Voegelin understood it. Alluding to these Voegelin writes, “man (1) participates (2) in the process of reality (3)”.56 Each aspect is integral to understanding the life of reason. Noetic reason has had a chequered path in Western history. Since the Enlightenment the life of reason has gradually been faded from the philosopher’s vocabulary.

3.3.3. METAXY DEFORMED

The dismissal of noetic reason leads to what Voegelin calls an imbalance in consciousness. It is now necessary to examine what arises when noetic reason no longer informs the philosopher’s vision. Voegelin considered it is the philosopher’s task to

53Voegelin, Order and History, In Search of Order, Vol.5, p. 43. 54Ibid. 55Ibid. 106

preserve this metaleptic reality (the balance between Apeiron and peras). However he

observed there are always those who even in Plato’s time wished to change the structure of

existence by going beyond the Apeiron (unlimited) and hen (limited). He writes:

This area of metaleptic reality is the proper domain of human thought - its inquiries, learning, and teaching [skopein, manthanein, didaskein]. To move within the metaxy, exploring it in all directions and orientating himself in the perspective granted to man by his position in reality, is the proper task of the philosopher. To denote this movement of thought or discussion [logos] within the metaxy, Plato uses the term dialectics [ 17a].57

Voegelin continues, “Since, however, man’s consciousness is also conscious of participating

in the poles of metaleptic tension [i.e., in the Apeiron and Nous], and the desire to know is

apt to reach beyond the limits of participatory knowledge,” there is the tendency for some

“to let the In-Between reality [ta mesa] escape [ekpheugein] them in their libidinous rush

toward cognitive mastery over the hen or the apeiron.”58 Plato termed this type (typos) of speculative thought as eristics [17a].59 Voegelin observes that unlike modern day messiahs,

“Plato was aware of the reflective distance between his existence as an event of participatory

consciousness, and the event through the symbols he developed in his work; and he has

expressed his awareness more than once by rejecting the misunderstanding of his spoken or

written word as a ‘truth’ to be possessed as informative doctrine. The truth of the symbols is

not informative; it is evocative.”60For symbols, as Voegelin insisted, do not refer to

structures in the external world but to the essential movement of the metaxy. From this

source, various symbols have mysteriously emerged. Voegelin writes, “To understand the

truth in the integrality of its structure, as Plato does, is an essential component in the balance

56Voegelin, “Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in History”, Published Essays, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 120. 57Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 283. 58Ibid. 59Ibid. 107

of consciousness that we call ‘wisdom’”.61 For, “If man exists in the metaxy, in the tension

‘between god and man,’ any construction of man as a world-immanent entity will destroy

the meaning of existence, because it deprives man of his specific humanity.”62 For this

reason Voegelin insisted, “The poles of the tension must not be hypostasized into objects

independent of the tension in which they are experienced as its poles.”63He considers

these fallacious misconstructions as “attacks on the life of Reason, an aspernatio rationis

in the Stoic sense.” Voegelin regarded these attacks as “psychopathological

phenomena.”64What is happening is a refusal to accept the structure of existence and instead change this or create their own reality and thus deform the Platonic vision.65

Voegelin condemned such a distortion of the Platonic vision and described the distortion as a "satanic vision".66 The distortion occurs when there is a revolt against reality

characterised as an attempt to define reality. Many manifestations of malformations of reality occur as for example by those sectarian groups who show contempt for the order of reality by lives of extreme asceticism or licentiousness. At the core of this revolt lies a refusal to participate in the process of reality demanded by the conditions of its mysterious structure.67 Voegelin explained that there are some groups who by their distortion of

60Voegelin, “Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme”, Published Essays, 1990, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 344. 61Ibid.

62Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 280. 63Ibid. 64Ibid. 65Voegelin points out that there are diverse ways in which an attack on the life of reason can arise. He writes that “misconstructions can assume the form of elementary logical mistakes such as the previously rejected transformation of the summarising symbol say, zoon noun echon into a word definition.” Or there can be more elaborate misconstructions, as, for example, to emphasise man’s bodily [material] existence to the detriment of the tension towards existence. Then there is the possibility of the symbols being “psychologised” “into projections of an immanent psyche.” (Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 280.) 66Voegelin, ‘Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme’, Published Essays, Vol. 12, 1990, p.338. 67Ibid 108 reality attempt to leap out of metaxy into the Beyond which is imagined as the true, some place from which man has fallen. For example, there is the “experience” of the gnostic which is symbolised then as a “thing”. The symbols of alienation are recognisable as hypostases of the poles of existential tension.68The problem with these false views of reality is that symbols are divorced from their true meaning. Voegelin explains:

The ‘world’ we discern in the perspective of our existence to partake of both time and the timeless is dissociated, under the pressure of the mood, into ‘this world’ of existence in time and the ‘other world’ of the timeless; and as we ‘exist’ in neither the one nor the other of these worlds but in the tension between time and the timeless, the dissociation of the ‘world’ transforms us into ‘strangers’ to either one of the hypostatized worlds.69 The reality of man’s existence can never be fully defined. Instead the spiritual man’s quest for the divine ground moves somewhere between knowledge and ignorance [metaxy sophias kai amathias].70 To fail to recognise this structure of reality results in an imbalance of understanding of reality. The life of reason, Voegelin insists, lies within the participatory process in "man's converse with the gods, the mutual participation (methexis, metalepsis) of human and divine, and divine in human, reality.”71The next section explores noetic reason in

68Eric Voegelin, “Immortality: Experience and Symbol”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, edited with an introduction by Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 84. 69Ibid.; See also Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, pp. 283-84. Voegelin writes: Phenomena in the metaxy, of an economic or psychological nature, are rashly fused in an act of libidinous transgression with the apeirontic depth in such symbols as the Marxian Being which determines Consciousness, or the Freudian symbol of the Libido with the declared purpose of mobilising the authority of the Acheronta against the authority of the Reason. Voegelin continues, Hegel in particular is a thinker who has perverted the metaxy into what for Plato was “eristics”; this has been inverted by Hegel into “dialectics”. See “Reason”, p. 285. The metaxy has been transmuted into immanence. This “imperial style” of Hegel “is in general characteristic for the modern egophanic revolt against Reason in its ideological varieties and subvarieties.” Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 285. What also can occur is that this “existential disorder” can reach the grotesque when the social scene is filled with “little emperors who each claim to be possessor of the one and only truth; and it obviously becomes lethal when some take it upon themselves to engage in mass murder of everyone who dares to disagree.” (p. 285). 70Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 279, [translated “between knowledge and ignorance”]. 71Ibid. 109

Aristotle’s thought. I have followed the same procedure i.e. taking up the three aspects of

“man’s participation in reality”.

3.4. THE LIFE OF REASON IN ARISTOTLE ( 384-322 BC)

Aristotle expressed as metalepsis the divine-human encounter which Plato treated as metaxy. It is necessary at this point to refer to what scholars term as Aristotle’s

“break” with the Platonic view of reality. Voegelin argues that this so called break did not in fact exist. He supports his claim by pointing to the common source of noetic reason as it was understood by Aristotle. “Going back to Anaximander’s B1, as Plato did in the

Philebus, Aristotle gave his rendering, both paraphrastic and argumentative, of the truth that had constituted the field of noetic consciousness.”72 Voegelin cites Aristotle:

Everything either is the beginning (arche) itself or is from the beginning. Of the Unlimited (apeiron), however, there is no beginning, or else it would have a Limit (peras). As far as it is a beginning, furthermore, it is ungenerated and imperishable, for whatever is generated of necessity must come to an end; there must be an end to everything perishing. Therefore, as we say, it has no beginning (arche) but is itself the beginning of all things, embracing and governing things as those thinkers declare who accept no other causes (aitias) besides the Apeiron, such as mind (nous) or love (philia). And this (Apeiron) is the Divine (to theion), for it is immortal and imperishable, as Anaximander and most of the natural philosophers (physiologoi) maintain [ Physics, III, 4 (203b7ff]. 73

The passage points to Aristotle’s understanding of man’s participation in the

Nous as a “dialogue” which had begun with Anaximander.74 Aristotle continues the tradition of Plato in that the nous is regarded as an action of immortalising. Voegelin elaborates:

the revelation of the Nous as incarnate in both the psyche and the world is, for the classic philosophers, inseparably connected with the question of mortality and

72Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, p. 188. 73Ibid. 74Ibid., pp. 188-89. 110

immortality. For the openness of man’s existence towards the ground is dependent on the something in man that can respond to a theophany and engage in the quest of the ground. This something in man, as it is discovered on the occasion of the response, Plato has symbolised as the daimon (Timaeus, 90a), Aristotle as the theion (NE 1177b 28ff). This divinest part (theiotaton) in the psyche is the human nous that can participate in the divine Nous; and the nature and culture of the theiotaton through its engaging in the quest of the ground, in a theoria theou, is the action of immortalising (athanatizein).75

These texts which refer to the divine establish securely Aristotle’s strong link with that of

Plato and the other classic philosophers.

3.4.1. THE PROBLEM OF THE SO CALLED “BREAK” WITH PLATO

Voegelin also emphasises the point that Aristotle retained strong philosophical

links with Plato because when Aristotle entered the philosophic way of life certain

philosophical notions had already been established, such as notions of the immortality of

the soul, etc. Voegelin comments, “Aristotle, following Plato, penetrated into the region

of the nous in the religious sense. He arrived at the idea of a ‘true self’ of man and at the

idea of homonoia, that is, of the parallel formation of the souls of man through nous, as

the bond of society.”76 Aristotle did not abandon Plato’s mythic interpretation of man

and embark on empirical immanent direction as is implied by some commentators but

retained the religious sense of man’s nous. Even in his later work this noetic, religious

sense still remains.

Some indication of this strong link is evident in his intense interest in the bios

theoretikos (theoretical life). For Aristotle was by now “fascinated by the grandeur of the new life of the spirit and intellect; and his work, ranging over the realms of being, brings them into the grip of his imperatorial mind. For such a man the accents of the crisis will

75Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, p. 237. 111

no longer lie on the misery of Athens; they will lie on the new life that begins with Plato.

An epoch is marked but it has the character of a new climax of the intellect, of the

nous.”77

Both Plato and Aristotle regarded philosophy as a seeking, zetesis. Aristotle

observed, “All men by nature desire to know.” Voegelin comments, “The sentence is the crystal symbol that opens the great reflective study of consciousness, the act of remembering its range from sense perception to its participation in the divine Nous. It

opens the quest for the truth of reality (tes arches theoria) as the quest for the arche tes

kineseos (or Plato’s arche tes geneseos), for the beginning of genesis as a formative

movement.”78At the same time Voegelin is acutely aware that if this sentence “were torn out of its noetic context, it could be ridiculed as an empirically false statement; for quite a few men obviously do not desire to know but are engaged in the construction of Second

Realities and obsessed by their defensive obtuseness, refuse to apperceive reality.” 79

Voegelin is critical of those modern commentators80 who consider a break arose

between the thought of Plato and Aristotle. In their interpretation of Aristotle they

emphasise the importance of his categorisation of things and hence regard his

philosophy as a “system.” Commentators who take this approach reduce Aristotle’s

philosophy to a process of intellectualisation or rationalisation and ignore its

76Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 364. 77Ibid., p. 289. 78Voegelin, Order and History, In Search of Order, Vol. 5, p. 47. 79Ibid. 80Some examples are, A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (London: Methuen & Co., 1957). Armstrong does not mention any spiritual dimension of the soul; he only remarks that the divisions of the soul in three parts can be seen to break up the personality but this is held together by Eros. W.K.C.Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Aristotle An Encounter, Vol 6 (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 286ff; 308ff; 315ff. 112 comprehensive approach to consciousness.81 It was Voegelin’s contention that

Aristotle’s philosophy is not a system; he retained the recognition of divine-human encounter, which for Plato was metaxy, and in Aristotle is termed metaleptis. Voegelin writes, “The divine-human encounter, carefully analysed by Plato as the immaterial In-

Between of divine and human reality, and by Aristotle as the metaleptic reality, becomes for the Stoics under the name of tension the property of a material object called the psyche. The materialisation of the psyche and its tension is then extended to divine reality and the cosmos at large”.82

3.4.2. ARISTOTLE’S LINK MAINTAINED IN THE BIOS THEORETIKOS

Aristotle’s link with Plato is seen in his definition of the bios theoretikos which is a notion closely connected with eudaimonia (happiness). “A man is considered happy when he is engaged in a life of action according to the highest (teleios) virtues (N.E.,

1101a15). There are degrees of eudaimomia according to the ranks of virtues realised in human activity. The highest happiness (teleia eudaimonia) will be reached through an

81See Terence Irwin, A History of Western Philosophy: Classical Thought (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Irwin refers to Aristotle’s philosophy as a “sharp break” from Plato’s philosophy, p. 118. Irwin classifies Aristotle, Hegel and others as “systems” (see p. 113). A.H. Armstrong, The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1967, pp. 42-43. Armstrong explains the role of the intelligence in Aristotle’s philosophy. He comments, “It is somewhat surprising that after having denied the transcendence of ideas and the substantial character of the soul, introducing instead the concept of soul as immanent for a living body (entelechy), Aristotle in his psychology introduces intelligence in terms clearly indicative of its transcendental nature with regard to the soul and therefore to man. It is equally surprising that after having established the mortality of the soul, Aristotle proceeds to assert the immortality of the intelligence. Unfortunately his description of the nature and activity of intelligence is brief to the point of obscurity. He expects us to apply to it his ubiquitous terms of potentiality and actuality and thus distinguish intelligence which becomes everything from another which acts or activates everything (we shall refer to them as passive and active intelligence)”. Also see Armstrong p. 43, “As already indicated some aspects of Aristotle’s noetic are, as far as psychology is concerned, difficult to reconcile with other of its aspects. The same is true of Aristotle’s (or metaphysics)”. Also, “In other words, in all its aspects Aristotle’s noetic stands out against the rest of his philosophy and so poses a prima facie problem whether the two can be reconciled. Just for this reason - no matter whether and how he can solve the problem - it must attract the attention of every reader of Aristotle. And many a Platonist will be attracted to Aristotle’s noetic precisely because of its Platonist flavour”. 82Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, p. 39. 113

active life according to the dianoetic virtues; the fullest eudaimonia will be a form of

contemplative activity (theoretke energieia) (1178b7f).83Aristotle’s philosophical

anthropology draws on the Platonic notion of eudaimonia. Voegelin explains, “The

happiness of theoretic activity is highest because contemplation is the highest function in

man; and it is the highest function because it is the function of the highest part in the soul

of man, that is, of the intellect (nous).”84By recognising the importance of contemplative

activity Aristotle recognised the transcendent dimension.

Furthermore, the acknowledgement of transcendence is evident in Aristotle’s

expression of the activity of the nous. Voegelin elaborates:

The action of the nous (1) extends to the best of knowable things, in particular to things divine; (2) it is an activity that can be maintained more continuously than any other human activity; (3) it is accompanied by a specific pleasure of marvellous purity and permanence; in contrast with activities of the practical life, it (4) is least dependent on external instruments and on the help of other men, possessing to the highest degree the quality of self-sufficiency (autarkeia); (5) the theoretic life has no purpose beyond itself, and its activity is loved for its own sake, while in all other activities we work for some gain from our action; and (6) the theoretic life is a life of leisure (schole), and the scholastic, leisured life is the purpose for which we undergo the work of our practical life. In view of these qualities especially of self-sufficiency, leisure, and relative freedom from physical fatigue, the theoretic life is to be considered the highest, because it is the most divine (117a17-1177b 26).85

The Aristotelian nous encompasses more than an understanding of the world of

immanent objects. What is suggested here is that for Aristotle the nous is active in that area “where man transcends his mere humanity into the divine ground.”86 “In the bios

theoretikos”, Voegelin writes, “we have the intellectualised counterpart to the Platonic

vision of the Agathon which, in beholding the Idea, transforms the soul and lets it partake

83Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 305. 84Ibid. 85Ibid., pp. 305-306. 114

of the order of the Idea.”87Hence, the life of reason, noesis is preserved by Aristotle as

man’s awareness of the full structure of reality.

Another close link in Aristotle’s work with Plato is in his discussion on the “best polis.”88 Voegelin dismisses those who translate the term as “ideal polis” for the original

sense is lost. A more accurate rendering is to recognise that the “best polis” is derived

from the Platonic standards which recognise the bios theoretikos. Such knowledge can

assume the form of “criteria” or “standards” the Aristotleian horoi. The “standards” are

derived from the Platonic; and this link is never broken.89 It is in this sense that the

“best” should be understood. Voegelin stresses that “polis is ‘best’ in which the

happiness of the bios theoretikos can be realised”.90

Voegelin did not accept, as some commentators have done, the argument that

Aristotle’s thought underwent a so-called major evolution.91 Rather, he perceived the

difference between Plato and Aristotle as a modification of the Platonic problems.92

Where exactly does this difference arise? For on the one hand, there is the Platonic and idealism and on the other, there is the Aristotelian immanentism and realism.93 Aristotle certainly rejected Plato’s Forms, however the rejection of Forms is

complex. Voegelin explains:

At one stroke we are rid of the realm of paradigmatic ideas, of speculations on the possibility that ideas are numbers of one kind or another, of methexis, of embodiment, of the creation of the world, of the demiurge, and so forth. And as far as the history of philosophy on the doxographic level is concerned, we now have a

86Ibid., p. 306. 87Ibid. 88Ibid., p. 289. 89Ibid., p. 282. 90Ibid. 91Ibid. 92Ibid. 93Ibid., p. 274. 115

clear opposition between Platonic transcendentalism and idealism on the one side, and Aristotelian immanentism and realism on the other side. Plato and Aristotle have developed two entirely different metaphysical systems.94

However, to come to this conclusion is false95 since Voegelin contends that neither Plato nor

Aristotle developed systems. They were far too engrossed in the discovery of new

problems.96Rather the new developments should be viewed more as a “shift” of emphasis.

Voegelin suggests:

What happened on the level of philosophising must rather be described as a shift of attention, accompanied by a far-reaching differentiation of problems. Plato and Aristotle were in agreement on the presence of form in empirical reality. By withdrawing attention from the origin of realised form in a realm of separate forms, the formal structure of reality itself came into clearer view. A vast field of new problems opened, such as the problems of substance and accidence, of essence as the object of definition, of act and potentiality, of matter and entelechy, as well as of the logical problems that were collected in the Organon. When Aristotle’s attention was turned in this direction, when his inquiry concerned immanent form and the immense ramifications of its problems, the Platonic assumption of transcendental form indeed appeared as an unnecessary, and perhaps unverifiable, duplication of that immanent form that was given with such certainty in the immediate experience of the soul.97

Although Aristotle rejected Plato’s ideas, Voegelin insists this should not be regarded as a break, but rather as a thinning out.98 Voegelin cautions, “Nevertheless, we

must be aware that Aristotle’s criticism of the Idea is not a criticism of Plato’s thought

itself.” For, “Plato had not ‘duplicated’ immanent form; he had discovered transcendental

form as a separate substance when his experimental attention had been turned in a direction

94Ibid. 95Commentators such as Guthrie, Armstrong and Ross understand “reason” in a Nominalist sense and therefore in their writings there is little or no reference to the transcendent dimension. 96 Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 274. 97Ibid.,pp. 274-275. 98Ibid., p. 276. Voegelin writes, “And, finally, the mystical via negativa by which the soul ascends to the vision of the Idea in the Symposium is thinned out to the rise toward the dianoetic virtues and the bios theoretikos.” 116

opposite to the Aristotelian.”99 He continues, “Aristotle’s exploration of the field of

immanent form is in itself not an argument against transcendental form”.100 He asks, “Hence

the question arises: What has become of the problems that had been seen by Plato when the

eye of his soul was turned towards the Agathon? Has Aristotle abandoned them?”101

Voegelin explains, “The answer cannot be simple. The Platonic realm of changeless, eternal being was not a wanton assumption; it was experienced as a reality in the erotic fascination of the soul by the Agathon as well as in its cathartic effects.” For, “The realm of ideas was one of the symbols which expressed the philosopher’s experience of transcendence” and accordingly, “Aristotle was not only aware of this origin but was able to participate in these experiences.”102

Indications of Aristotle’s recognition of transcendence arise in one of his “finest

formulations of the problem of faith”.103 Voegelin cites a fragment of Aristotle’s work, On

Prayer, on the subject of the mystery-religions states:

Those who are being initiated are not required to grasp anything with the understanding [mathein], but to have a certain inner experience [or passion, pathein], and so to be put into a particular frame of mind, presuming that they are capable of this frame of mind in the first place. 104 Hence

The cognitio Dei through faith is not a cognitive act in which an object is given, but a cognitive, spiritual passion of the soul. In the passion of faith the ground of being is experienced, and that means the ground of all being, including immanent form. Hence, it is legitimate to symbolise the ground of being through immaterial forms, like the Platonic Idea. Being can be experienced either in its world-immanent articulation or through the pathein of the soul in openness towards its ground; and for expressing the relation between transcendental and immanent being we have no other

99Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 275. 100Ibid. 101Ibid. 102Ibid. 103Ibid. 104Ibid. Voegelin cites Jaeger, Aristotle, 160, Frg. 15. 117

means than the analogical use of terms derived from our experiences of immanent being.105

The key point regarding consubstantiality was something which Aristotle had to explore.

Voegelin explains, “If in his interpretation of being, a philosopher wants to account

for the whole structure of being - that is, for immanent as well as transcendental being - he

has not much choice. In one form or another he must do what Aristotle accuses Plato of

doing, that is, he must ‘duplicate’ being.” However, Voegelin considers “the Aristotelian

criticism of the Idea is pointless as far as the question of duplication is concerned.” But, “It is

not pointless, however, where it attacks the speculative use which Plato made of

transcendental being in his interpretation of immanent being.”106Although, “The relation

between transcendental and immanent being, as we just indicated, can be symbolised only

analogically.” Voegelin argues that “neither Plato nor Aristotle quite penetrated this problem

of metaphysical speculation; and an approximately satisfactory formula was only found in

the Thomistic analogia entis.”107 What Aristotle did achieve was to avoid hypostatizing

“transcendental being into a datum as if it were given in world-immanent experience”.108

Aristotle “rightly criticised this part of Platonic speculation; and in eliminating this confusion he penetrated to the clearness of his own ontology.” 109

3.4.3. ARISTOTLE’S PROBLEM WITH THE TRANSCENDENTAL

Voegelin acknowledged Aristotle’s thought as a “magnificent achievement” which

had the effect of eliminating the problem of the transcendental. But he concludes, “For this

magnificent achievement, however, he paid the great price of eliminating the problem of

105Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 275 [cf pathein with saving tale]. 106Ibid., p. 276. 107Ibid. 108Ibid. 118 transcendental form along with its speculative misuse.”110 Although the (Platonic) Ideas were rejected by Aristotle the “experience” of the “order of being” was retained.

However, the overall effect of Aristotle’s analysis “can be described as an intellectual thinning out” of the experience of transcendence.111 The thinning out procedure of Aristotle’s analysis is contrasted with “the fullness of experience which Plato expressed in the richness of his myth...”. In Aristotle the experience of transcendence is now reduced to a conception of God as the prime mover, as the noesis noeseos, the “thinking on thinking”.112It is possible to place here the first beginnings where cognitive action takes precedence over the experience. “The Eros toward the Agathon correspondingly is reduced to agapesis, the delight in cognitive action for its own sake.”113 “Moreover, no longer is the

109Ibid. 110Ibid. 111Ibid. 112Ibid., Voegelin cites Metaphysics 1 980, Metaphysics XII,9,1074b. 113Ibid., Voegelin, “Reason”, pp. 284-285. Voegelin explains that Hegel “deformed” an important passage in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Voegelin writes: There is a passage in Aristotle’s Metaphysics which can be misunderstood if one wants to misunderstand it at all costs, because it is pervaded by the exuberant joy of touching divine immortality for a moment when touching (or apprehending, thigganein) the divine Nous in cognitive participation. Hegel attaches this passage (Metaphysics, 1072b18-31) as an appendix to his Encylopaedie, indicating by this strategic placement its central importance for him. The critical sentence in the passage is the following: ‘Thought (nous) thinks itself through participation (metalepsis) in the object of thought (noeton); for it becomes the object of thought through being touched (thigganon) and thought (noon), so that thought (nous) and that which is thought (noeton) are the same’ (Metaphysics 1072b-20ff.). When read in the Aristotelian context, the sentence articulates the dynamics of sameness and difference of the knower and the known in the act of noetic participation, the joy of momentary sameness with the divine notwithstanding. When reading the context of the Encyclopaedie, the sentence expresses the beginnings of a philosophic enterprise that has been brought to its successful conclusion by Hegel. For in the Hegelian conception, philosophy begins as the ‘love of wisdom’ in the classic sense and moves from this imperfect state toward its consummation as ‘real knowledge’ (wirkliches Wissen) in the system. From this classic participation in the divine Nous it advances, through the dialectical progress of the Geist in history, to identification with the Nous in self-reflective consciousness. The tension toward the ground of existence, considered by Hegel to be the state of diremption (Zerrissenheit) or alienation (Entfremdung), is meant to be superseded by a state of conciliation (Versöhnung) when the ground has become incarnate in existence through the construction of the system. The metaxy has been transmuted into immanence. This speculative magic (Zauberworte, Zauberkraft) by which the thinker brings the divine ground into his possession is what Plato has called ‘eristics’; Hegel, on the contrary, called it ‘dialectics’. Thus, the meaning of the terms has been inverted. 119

soul as a whole immortal, but only that part of it which Aristotle calls active intellect: the

passive intellect, including the memory, perishes. [De Anima 111,5]. And, finally the

mystical via negativa by which the soul ascends to the vision of the Idea in The Symposium

is thinned out to the rise toward the dianoetic virtues and the bios theoretikos, contemplative

life.”114

3.5. SUMMARY

The life of reason in Plato and Aristotle is seen both as a movement of the psyche

towards the ground, and the experience of the psyche as being moved by the ground.115

Noetic reason draws meaning from the Logos or the transcendent Nous and is a constituent of humanity regardless of time and place.116The life of reason was recognised

by both Plato and Aristotle, though Plato was more concerned with the Forms, whereas

Aristotle was interested in the complexity of the soul’s parts. His contribution illuminated

the order of existence through his characterisation of man as zoon noetikon, as the animale

rationale, for man is regarded as a rational animal and the nature of man is reason.117

Aristotle was concerned with man’s “synthetic nature”, and in man’s “noetic psyche with its three dimensions of order” participating “in hierarchy of being including the Nous

down to matter.”118He emphasised peri ta anthropina, the study of things pertaining to

man’s humanity. However, it was Plato who introduced the symbol of the Beyond

114Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 276; See also Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, p. 232. Voegelin refers to Met. 984b8-23 regarding the divine Nous in all things; Aristotle’s bio theoretikos is referred to in Nic 1177a17ff. Aristotle refers to contemplation as the highest human happiness. 115 See Voegelin, Anamnesis,1978, Chapter 10, “The Tensions in the Reality of Knowledge”, p. 183; Voegelin has dealt with this topic extensively, particularly in his essay “Reason: The Classic Experience”, pp. 265-291. 116Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 265. He writes that “reason linked to language symbolises a historical event”. 117Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, 1990, p. 268. 118Ibid. 120

[epekeina] “into philosophical language as the criterion of the creative divine ground

(Republic 508-509)”.119 Furthermore Plato positively “identifies the One (to hen) that is present as the ground in all things as sophia kai nous (Philebus 30c-e)”.120

Yet both Plato and Aristotle recognise the transcendental dimension. In the case

of Plato, the philosopher’s quest lay in the Forms, whereas Aristotle dispensed with

Plato’s Forms121 and pursued the philosopher’s quest from a different dimension [NE

1097a]. Although a different emphasis is given by each philosopher, both have provided

language symbols which express their experience of the structure of reality and hence

have laid foundational principles with which to understand the life of reason.

In the next chapter I will discuss the radical transformation that occurs in the life

of reason. The Platonic vision will be referred to again in relation to the Christian

experience. Christian writers have given expression to the full structure of reality under a

variety of different images and notions referring to the same experience. So far noetic

reason has been illuminated in the Plato-Aristotle experience or as Voegelin categorises

this the anthropological human type where the psyche was the site of transcendence.122

119 Ibid., p. 272. 120Ibid. 121Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1096a 11-16. 122Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 1952, p. 76ff. Voegelin distinguishes between “three types of truth”. The two concerned here are the second type which “appears in the political culture of Athens and specifically in ”. Voegelin terms this anthropological truth. He notes that the “term covers the whole range of problems connected with the psyche as the sensorium of transcendence”. The third type he terms soteriological which appears with Christianity. (The first is the cosmological type and is referred to in Chapters 8 and 9 of this thesis.) 122

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LIFE OF REASON IN WESTERN HISTORY

Throughout the long course of his life Voegelin often referred to Platonic vision as the most perfect analysis of metaxy. He said, however, when he came to treat the

Christian experience that he always confronted difficulties due to its most radical expression of transcendence. Voegelin examined the Christian experience and offered a fresh approach in the treatment of revelation. At the time when Voegelin was writing,

Christian theologians held the view that “revelation” should refer specifically to the

Judeo-Christian experience whereas other numinous experiences should be considered as

“natural” knowledge. Hence Classical Greek thought is often classified by Christian theologians as “natural” knowledge, as opposed to Christian “supernatural” knowledge.

Voegelin disagreed with that position and argued coherently that Plato’s experience as presented in the Cave parable should also be regarded as “revelatory.” Voegelin considered that Plato’s experience was as authentic as that revelation given to Moses but he did acknowledge that in the case of Moses (or the Judeo-Christian experience) that the intensity of the degree of transcendence manifested there was greater. It was Voegelin’s contention that confusion arises if the Platonic vision is relegated to so-called “natural” knowledge. Theophanies are then separated into categories of “natural” and

“supernatural” which causes a split in philosophy. Each experience is then categorised as either “natural” or “supernatural”. 123

To address the complexity of the interpretation of experiences of transcendence as

manifested between Platonic and Judaeo-Christian experiences is the task of this chapter

and the following. By clarifying what the differentiation consists of in these two

experiences consists it is then possible to recover a more complete understanding of the

life of reason.

4.1 PLATONIC VISION

I have pointed out that Voegelin considered that the Platonic vision not only

illuminates but can illuminate truth in general. He attacked those who only analyse the

philosopher’s (Plato’s) “ideas” without accounting for the experiences that first motivated

them. These experiences he regarded as the “philosopher’s theophanies.” He referred to the

Platonic vision as a revelatory experience. In recognising the Platonic vision as “revelation”

Voegelin raised serious questions that “must not be dodged”. He contends that “the God who

appeared to the philosophers” (Plato and Aristotle, Parmenides and so on) was the "same

God who revealed himself to Moses as the, 'I am who (or: what) I am', as the God who is what He is in the concrete theophany to which man responds."1 He writes, God lets himself

be seen, "whether in a burning thornbush or in a Promethean fire, he is what he reveals

himself to be in the event."2 By these words Voegelin is suggesting that the illumination of

the truth of existence as manifested in Plato’s Parable of the Cave has as its source the “same

God who revealed himself to Moses”. At this point some discussion of the Cave experience

of Plato is recalled.

4.1.1. PARABLE OF THE CAVE

1Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 229. 124

In the Parable of the Cave, the focus is on the prisoner who at first could only see

shadows in the gloom; not until he turned around (periagoge) was he able to see the sun.

With his new-found knowledge he went back to his unaccepting fellow-men.

Voegelin suggests that this parable illumines the structure of reality and man’s participation in it. Human’s participation in the structure of reality should be seen as an

“intelligible whole”, comprising “question and answer”, that is “seeking” and “being

drawn”. Secondly, the recognition of man as a individual comes to play in the use of the

term "man's self” (autos). Man must be willing to be “drawn”, a movement understood as

the struggle of “the sacred pull of reason (logos) and (logismos).”3 Thirdly, the

parable as it is unfolded by Socrates-Plato has a soteriological character and is perceived as

the “tale that saves”.

Voegelin observed that the experience expressed in the Cave parable is not just a

piece of information available to everyone. He explains:

The tale has to be found by the man who is suffering the death of reality and, in the cave of his death, is moved to turn around [periagoge] toward the divine light. The turning-around from death to life, then, must not remain a mute event in the soul of the man who was touched by grace, or it will be lost. It must become Word [logos] in the story of the periagoge, in the Parable of the Cave, and what was seen by the life-giving light must become Word [logos] in the myth of immortality, judgement, and choice.4

2Ibid. 3Eric Voegelin, “The Gospel and Culture”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12 (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 186. Refer also to Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, 1947, p. 105. According to Armstrong Aristotle, like Plato, had no clear and distinct conception of the will. He states, “In his doctrine of deliberate choice, however, he comes very near to it. Deliberate choice is for him as we have seen the essential element in moral activity. He distinguishes it clearly from mere appetite, which has nothing rational or moral about it, and from rational wish, which can be directed to impossibilities; we can wish for the impossible, but we cannot choose it. Choice, he says, must be of things within our own power, and it must follow on a process of deliberate thought. It is an act in which desire and reason are combined, ‘desireful reasoning or reasoning desire’, ‘desire based on deliberation’. This comes very near to later conceptions of an act of will.” 125

Voegelin asks why is the prisoner in the cave in the first place? He reflects:

In Plato's experience, the suffering overshadows the action in the search so strongly that it becomes difficult to translate the pathos in his tauta ta pathe en hemin (Laws 644e), ‘all these pathe in us.’ Does this pathos express only the experience of the pull (helkein) that gives direction to the search, or does it want to acknowledge the movement as so strongly tinged by suffering that the terms experience and passion approach synonymity?5

Socrates is the one who by his life illustrates the mystery of this structure of reality in the

Parable of the cave. He represents the spiritual man (daimonios aner). In his attempt to

share with his fellow-men "the light of God", he suffers instead a kind of death:

If we accept this suffering of being dragged up as a realistic description of the movement, the parable evokes the passion of Socrates who tells it: his being dragged up to the light by the God; his suffering the death for the light when he returns to let his fellow men have their share in it; and his rising from the dead to live as the teller of the saving tale.6

In this context, Voegelin makes reference to “Er the Pamphylian, the man of all tribes,” who came back from death and told his fellow-men of the judgement he had witnessed in the underworld.7 He writes: “Moreover, behind the tale stands the authority of the representative

death suffered by Socrates for its truth.”8 As Plato writes, “It is not, let me tell you, said I, the tale that was told to Alcinous that I shall unfold, but the tale of a warrior bold... .”9 He concludes:

And so Glaucon, the tale was saved, as the saying is, and was not lost. And it will save us if we believe it, and we shall safely cross the River of , and keep our

4Voegelin, “Wisdom and Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12 1990, p. 335. Voegelin refers to the Logos here, using the Christian expression of the “Word”. 5 Voegelin, “The Gospel and Culture”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, p. 185. Voegelin points out that pathos is an event, a passion or an experience that is undergone and should not be confused with the idea of “pitiableness”. 6Ibid., pp. 184-185. In this passage Voegelin sees the periagoge in the light of the Christian sense as involving pain in turning away from that which is familiar to the unfamiliar. 7Ibid., p. 180 8Ibid. 9 Plato, The Republic 614 b, in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters, Bollingen Series LXXI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 126

soul unspotted from the world. But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever, that we may be dear to ourselves and to the gods during our sojourn here and when we receive our reward, as the victor of the games is about to gather theirs.10

4.1.2. THE PARABLE-SAVING TALE

These reflections on the Parable-Saving Tale illuminate what Voegelin terms the structure of reality. For Plato and those who have followed him man’s participation in this reality could only be spoken of in these terms. The full recognition of this dimension of reality in the Parable-Saving Tale can be lost or passed into oblivion as for example when opinion-makers become the dominant force influencing the consciousness of a society.

When this occurs the understanding of the mystery of man’s in-between existence is lost.

When transcendence is dismissed what Voegelin calls a “second reality” is substituted. In cautionary tones, Voegelin writes: “What is crucial for society is the preservation of the

Saving Tale itself. The structure of reality is in danger of being forgotten or even worse, deformed. What is at stake here is the preservation of ‘the “Tale” that saves,’ and this

...must itself be saved from the death from which it emerges, if it is to become the living Word with the magic power of salvation (Republic 621c). Yet, even when the truth experienced is saved from loss by becoming the tale that saves, the truth now living in the Word is still surrounded by the forces of death. The man who returns from the light to the cave will speak the Word to those who cannot hear what they hear; he will be mocked, persecuted, and like Socrates be put to death.11

Society has great difficulty in accepting the “virtues” that the Saving Tale demands. The

brightness of the light is often too great to bear and the bearers of the light, like the prophets

of old, are rejected by society. A reductionist approach instead becomes the “real” for

10Plato, The Republic, 621c. 127

society, and “the double symbol of life and death”, that is, the tension of existence is

regarded as a unimportant. Voegelin sceptically comments:

When the living are dead, the dead who are living have no audience. So it was in the time of Socrates; so it was in the time of Christ; and so it is today. The constant discord between the saving Word saved from death and its nonacceptance by man in society and history can be experienced so intensely that the reality of the discord rather than reality of the saving Word will be sensed to be the truth of the ‘message’ ...12

However,

The magic of the saving Word is as dependent on man's openness to the order of love as is the magic of the disordering word on his inclination to resist and hate truth.13

The temptation to construct a reality of one's own is always present to individuals and

society i.e. the temptation is to transfigure reality into a state of perfection or a utopia.

Voegelin writes:

Neither the discord nor its origin in the mysterium iniquitatis escaped Plato. The saving Word, as it speaks to man, does not transfigure his worldly existence into a state of perfection. On the contrary, by revealing the direction of the movement toward the Beyond, the tale reveals the In-Between state of existence, the metaxy; it reveals existence as neither transfigured nor untransfigured but as engaged in a transfiguring movement from imperfection to perfection. Reality is experienced as moving beyond its own structure, and on man is put the burden of his freedom to participate in the movement or to resist it.14 4.1.3. PARABLE, QUESTION-ANSWER

Lastly, Voegelin sees the Parable of the Cave as expressing mystery. The search of

the philosopher raises questions and answers. The mystery of the Parable of the Cave

deepens, "For the surer we are of knowing the true answer to the question of life and death,

11 Voegelin, “Wisdom and Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 335. 12Ibid. 13Ibid. 14Ibid., p. 336. 128

the more puzzling it becomes that there should be a question at all.”15 In the movement of

metaxy the following questions are raised:

Why is the prisoner fettered in the Cave in the first place? Why must the force that binds him be overcome by a counter-force that turns him around? Why must the man who ascended to the light return to the cave to suffer death at the hands of those who did not leave it? Why does not everybody leave, so that the Cave as an establishment of existence would be abandoned?16

The Parable raises questions regarding human existence. These questions concerning the why of existence are never answered completely because the mystery of life is greater than the answer.

4.1.4. SUMMARY

In what way is all this relevant to understanding the life of reason? The Parable of the Cave is regarded by Voegelin as a “breakthrough” from the state of consciousness where man and the gods can “merge” as in Homer. Plato has illumined man’s existence in the structure of reality more precisely. Voegelin points to the particular experience of the one who is leaving the shadows. He explains this as a “moment”. Plato has “discovered” the psyche as the site of transcendence. To understand the degree of differentiation involved in revelatory experience it is now necessary to consider the Thornbush experience.

4.2 THE ISRAELITE EXPERIENCE, THE THORNBUSH (EXODUS 3:1-17)

When we come to examine the Israelite experience as manifested in the Thornbush the intensity of transcendence is illumined in a way far beyond anything found in Plato.

What is particularly evident is the precise differentiation that arises between immanence and

15 Voegelin, “The Gospel and Culture”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990), p. 185. 16Ibid. 129

transcendence which appears in human consciousness. Voegelin regarded the new

experience of transcendence as an important achievement of mankind.17 Before discussing

this differentiation it is necessary to look at the Thornbush event itself:

Moses was looking after the flock of Jethro, his father-in-law, priest of Midian. He led his flock to the far side of the wilderness and came to Horeb [Sinai], the mountain of God. There the angel of Yahweh appeared to him in the shape of a flame of fire, coming from the middle of a bush. Moses looked; there was the bush blazing but it was not being burnt up. ‘I must go and look at this strange sight,’ Moses said 'and see why the bush is not burnt'. Now Yahweh saw him go forward to look, and God called to him from the middle of the bush: 'Moses, Moses!' he said. ‘Here I am' he answered. 'Come no nearer' he said. 'Take off your shoes, for the place on which you stand is holy ground. I am the God of your father,' he said, 'the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob.' At this Moses covered his face, afraid to look at God.18

When God tells Moses he has been chosen to lead the people out of Egypt, Moses responds

by asking God his Name:

Then Moses said to God, 'I am to go, then, to the sons of Israel and say to them, "The God of your fathers has sent me to you." But if they ask me what his name is, what am I to tell them?' And God said to Moses, 'I Am who I Am. This' he added 'is what you must say to the sons of Israel: "I Am has sent me to you.”’ And God also said to Moses, 'You are to say to the sons of Israel: "Yahweh, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you." This is my name for all time; by this name shall I be invoked for all generations to come. 'Go and gather the elders of Israel together and tell them, "Yahweh, the God of your fathers, has appeared to me - the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob; and he has said to me: I have visited you and seen all that the Egyptians are

17 Voegelin regarded certain events in history as “spiritual outbursts”. These occurred in the “axial time” (Jaspers). This means that the experience of the transcendent does not occur through a gradual evolution of consciousness but through what is termed a “leap of being’. These spiritual outbursts appeared in the great traditional religions in various degrees and manners and “break” away form the cosmological mode or what Voegelin terms “the compact experience of reality”. In the compact experience of consciousness the structure of reality comprising “god, man, world and society” is seen as a whole (to ). Refer to Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, p. 1. These early societies are exemplified in the empires where the ruler represented the people, and prosperity and decline were all seen to be influenced by the dispensation of the gods. To move from this primary experience of the universe to a differentiated experience as in the case of the Hellenes and here the Israelites, demanded a change in the “order’ of society which Voegelin argues could only come through “noetic advances which let the more compact symbols appear inadequate in the light of the differentiated experiences of reality and their symbolisation.” 18 The Jerusalem Bible, Alexander Jones, ed. (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1971), Exodus 3:1-6. 130

doing to you. And I have resolved to bring you up out of Egypt where you are oppressed, into the land of the Canaanites, ... to a land where milk and honey flow."'19

4.2.1. DIFFERENTIATED EXPERIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The Thornbush event was God's revelation to the Israelites. A covenant was formed

with the people at Sinai. The God who appeared to Moses was not an unknown God, but as

he told Moses, "the God of your fathers". Voegelin interprets the theophanic event as "an

irruption of the spirit" which transfigures "the pragmatic event into a drama of the soul and

the acts of the drama, into symbols of divine liberation."20 The Exodus symbolised the

liberation of Israel from Sheol (death) in Egypt to a life in a new historical form. The

experience of the Thornbush event served to heighten the awareness of the distance that

separates human consciousness of immanent existence from that of the transcendent divinity.

Voegelin considered the Thornbush experience as a "leap in being" that constitutes

existence in historical form. The experience is real, for it is "an ontologically real event in

history".21 It should not be seen as a subjective experience. Voegelin insisted that the event is experienced in the consciousness of a concrete human being, i.e. the recipient of the revelation is a particular individual who in this case was Moses on Mt. Sinai, who is representative of all humanity. In the course of history, the revelation has been incorporated into the consciousness of the community. The God who was revealed to Moses is revealed to the Hebrews and eventually to all “peoples”.

Let us note the differences between the Parable of the Cave and the Thornbush experience. The main difference between the two is that the notion of the transcendent is

19 Ibid., Exodus, 3:1-17. 20 Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956), p.113. 21 Ibid., p. 130. 131 differentiated. In the Parable of the Cave the accent is on the human psyche as the site of the transcendent whereas in the Israelite experience, the divine transcendence almost overwhelms the “hearer who was Moses”. ("In the compact vision of Parmenides, the accent falls on the Oneness of the realissimum from which all reality originates.") Voegelin considers that the Thornbush episode “more subtly distinguishes between the mystery of the divine abyss and the What as which the God lets himself be concretely known in the theophanic event".22For example, the flame in the Thornbush seen by Moses is understood not as God himself, but as the "messenger of Yahweh", who from the flame "sounds a voice proclaiming itself as the 'God of the Fathers'."23 The Thornbush event is a revelatory experience that suggests a greater intensity of divine transcendence. This experience provides an understanding of the relationship that exists between God and man in a more differentiated form.24

The overwhelming experience of transcendence was not evident in the Parable of the

Cave. In the Thornbush event there is the “heightened awareness of the distance separating the immanent and transcendent.” Voegelin insisted that this difference should not be regarded as a gradual development of thought but as a "leap in being". The Thornbush event should be perceived as a "real ontological event in a concrete human being who was Moses” for "the knowledge of God has now become the knowledge of Moses". He was able to

“hear” the voice of God who appointed him the servant of Yahweh.25It is the encounter between the divine and human in a personal way that differentiates it clearly from the

Parable of the cave. There the divine is experienced as a force that draws and pulls.

22Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4 , 1974, p. 229. 23Ibid. 24Ibid. 25 Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, p. 407. 132

4.2.2. THE DRAWING ( HELKEIN) OR THE “FORCE”

In comparing the experience of Moses in the Thornbush event with that of the

Prisoner of the Cave, Voegelin suggested some parallel features. One is in the "force" that impels the participant to "hear" as in the case of Moses, or to "turn around" in reference to the Prisoner in the Cave. On the human side, there are hesitations, doubts and a struggle, which suggest the movement of "pulling" and “drawing”. These "forces" or movements appear in both events and belong to the same type of theophanic event.

Another parallel feature is the question of free will. Voegelin asks to what extent is the recipient overwhelmed by the “force” of the revelatory event? For example, in the case of Moses “the command could only be rejected by one who could never ‘hear’ it" and he comments that "the man who can hear cannot reject." Voegelin’s reference to this paradox is important for he is inquiring into the nature of participation. He points out that in the case of Moses, he “has ontologically entered the will of God as the will of God has entered

him."26 The particular “relationship” is significant because in this meeting between man

and God “a decisive differentiation” takes place. Voegelin explains this difference by

referring to the problem of “grace”:

The situation becomes dynamic when one of these people is ‘forced’ to turn around and is then dragged up to the cave entrance where he can see the sun. Question: who ‘forces’ this man to undergo the conversion, the periagoge? Here you have the problem of grace, on the Platonic level of transposition in parables or myths. It is this ‘forcing’ that in essence is differentiated in Christian ‘revelation’ or grace as the experienced intrusion of transcendence into human life which can break in from outside so overwhelmingly that it may call human freedom in question, as it did with Paul or Augustine. This is new. 27

26Ibid. 27Peter J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), “Eric Voegelin to Alfred Schütz, Letters, [On Christianity January 1 1953], p. 450. 133

The “newness” of grace defines the experience of Moses:

When Moses can hear the voice appoint him the servant of Yahweh, he has grown spiritually into the servant of Yahweh. ... When the consciousness of the divine will has reached the clarity of revelation, the historical action has begun.28

4.2.3. “I AM”, THE NAME OF GOD

Voegelin points out that the misgivings of Moses are overcome when "the god of the fathers reveals his true nature through the self-interpretation of his name, ‘Yahweh’". In keeping with his principle that the language of an experience is engendered in the experience itself, Voegelin states "The interpretation is part of the action that has begun in Moses with the revelation, and it determines the literary form of the scene”. He notes that “the supreme revelation of God's nature is framed by 'I will be (ehyeh) with you' of Exodus 3:12 and 4:12.”

“The focus on the meaning of God is then revealed as 'I am who I am' [ehyeh asher ehyeh]."29 When the people respond, their bondage to Egypt is broken. As Voegelin

comments, "To the sceptical sons of Israel, Moses will have to say: 'Ehyeh has sent me to

you.'"30 When the Hebrews break with Egypt then “a people” is formed. The event

requires the participation of the people who by their response to the revelation of God's

presence can leave their bondage to Egypt. "The mutual presence of God and Moses in the

Thornbush dialogue will then have expanded into the mutual presence of God and his

people, through the Berith (the covenant), in history."31

To clarify the significance of this episode and its importance in Western tradition,

Voegelin inquires:

28 Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, p. 407. 29Ibid., p. 407. See n. 17 p.407. Voegelin refers to his source as Buber’s Moses, Chapter, “Der brennende Dornbusch,” pp. 56-81. 30Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, p. 407. 31Ibid. 134

whether a work so distinctly prophetic in form contains a historical substance that can be assumed to go back to an unbroken tradition to the time of Moses. And in particular, we must ask whether the of the divine name as I AM WHO I AM can have had Moses as its author.32

Historians consider it unreasonable "that a member of a nomad people in the thirteenth

century BC should have coined a formula of 'being'.” However, such criticisms are

"illuminating", because those who support this view assume "that nothing extraordinary can

happen in history; no unique personality, even if God so wills it, can break the so called

'stage of development.' "33 No account is taken of the fact that, "revelation creates history as

the inner form of human existence in the present under God" and therefore, inevitably

whenever this occurs there must be a "break" with the "stage of development [theory]" at

any time in history. The failure to acknowledge the revelation in the history of the Hebrews

has important implications. The revelation (the God-Moses encounter) should be seen as a

"break", or "leap in being" in consciousness. The confusion in the exegesis of the Name is, in

fact an explication of the experience of the divine presence, with an etymology of the name

"Yahweh", i.e. Voegelin emphasises the significance of the revelation, should be on the

experience rather than the etymological expression of the word Yahweh.34

Voegelin argued that historians’ reluctance to include a metaphysical dimension in the debate creates a dilemma. On the one side, there is an awareness that the exegesis of the passage cannot be accepted as a philosophical proposition concerning the nature of God, because it is thought that no philosophical propositions occurred in the history of Israel.35

On the other hand, Christian tradition includes this aspect. Voegelin cites the words of John

Damascene:

32Ibid., p. 408. 33Ibid., p. 409. 34Ibid., pp. 409-410. 135

The foremost of all names applied to God is, ‘HE WHO IS’. For, as it comprehends in itself, it includes ‘being’ itself as an infinite and indeterminate ocean of substance.36

Voegelin remarks "we cannot deny that the Christian interpretation is well-founded on the

text".37 To support his argument, Voegelin refers to a distinction made by Etienne Gilson

who states, "One cannot of course maintain that the text of Exodus bestowed a metaphysical

definition of God on mankind. Still, if there is no metaphysics in Exodus, there is a

metaphysics of Exodus."38 If we apply Gilson's distinction to a concrete case, i.e., the

experience of Moses, we see that this distinction supports the "principle of evolution from

compactness to differentiation". Although "the Exodus passage is not a metaphysical

proposition, it contains in its compactness the meaning differentiated by the Christian

philosophers."39

If the Thornbush episode is accepted as an "experience" expressing "compact" symbolism, not only will the philosophical interpretation appear well-founded, but the work

of analysis given by Christian thinkers in general can be accepted as an important aid for

understanding the symbol, the Name of God. St. Thomas Aquinas's exegesis of the text strengthens this view. Voegelin writes:

We shall use for this purpose the summary of the problem given by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologiae.40 Thomas considers HE WHO IS the most proper name of God for three reasons:

a) because it signifies God according to his essence, that is, as being itself;

35Ibid., p. 410. 36 Ibid., p. 410. n. 21. Voegelin cites Johannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa I, 9 (Migne [ed.], P G, XCIV, p. 836). 37Ibid. 38Ibid., p. 410. n.22. Voegelin cites Etienne Gilson, L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale (2d ed., Paris, 1948), 50, n.i. 39Ibid. 40Ibid., p. 410. n.23; Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I q. 13, 11. 136

b) because it is universal and does not more closely determine the divine essence which is inaccessible to human intellect in this life; and,

c) because it signifies being in the present which is appropriate to God, whose being has no past or future.41

Therefore, when the issue of the "philosophical proposition" is placed in the context of the

Thomist analysis the ehyeh no longer appears as an incomprehensible, philosophical outburst but rather as an attempt to articulate a compact experience of divine presence, expressing the omnipresence of a substantially hidden God.42Voegelin writes:

The 'I will be with you', we may say, does not reveal the substance of God but the frontier of his presence with man; and precisely when the frontier of divine presence has become luminous through revelation, man will become sensitive to the abyss extending beyond into the incommunicable substance of the Tetragrammaton [YHWH].43

The event was the high point of the Israelite religious experience “as a matter of fact.”

Voegelin declares:

the revelation of the thornbush episode, once the divine presence had become an historical experience of the people through the Berith (Covenant), had no noteworthy sequel in the history of Israelite symbols and certainly no philosophical consequences.44

Still it must be recognised that the presence of the transcendent element opens up the possibility for an imbalance of consciousness to occur. In this case, "the unrevealed depth, however, that was implied in the revelation, has caused the name of God to become the unpronounceable Tetragrammaton (YHWH)." On the problem of transcendence, Voegelin concludes, "Philosophy can touch no more than the being of the substance whose order flows through the world."45

41Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, pp. 410-411. 42Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, p. 411. 43Ibid. 44Ibid. 45Ibid. 137

4.3. THE DIVINE ESSE AND THE DIVINE BONUM (GOOD).

Not only the intensity of transcendence is differentiated but there occurs the differentiation of substance. In the Thornbush event the primary emphasis is on the divine esse (being), whereas in the Platonic vision the primary emphasis is on the divine bonum

(good). These important philosophical differences distinguish the two experiences. In the

Christian experience emphasis is given to the essence of God. Voegelin observes that this has been justly called the “philosophy of Exodus.”46 For now "the great issue of

'philosophical proposition' (divine good of Plato) has given way to the insight that a

metaphysics of being can be differentiated from the text of Exodus 3:14." More importantly,

St. Thomas's summary of the problem "has led us back to the full meaning of the Thornbush

episode as the revelation to Moses of the divine presence with him and his people."47

However, these key questions are often obscured by secondary problems, “one

being the statement of the issues,” which is not always clear, and the other is a bias in favour

of a progressive ideology. The statement of the problem, Voegelin argues, must be clarified

first. "We must realise that we are dealing with a revelation, presumably received by Moses,

and nothing but that revelation; and second, that with regard to the contents of the revelation

we have no source but the episode analysed."48 The most important issue here is the

Christian speculation about the nature of God which is "a formidable issue" that is "injected

46Ibid., p. 409. 47Ibid., pp. 411- 412. 48Ibid., p. 408. Voegelin dismisses as irrelevant, "the etymological debate concerning the name of Yahweh, with its variegated conjectures, some more plausible than others but none conclusive"... it "must be excluded as irrelevant to our problem." It does not appear that the narrative itself contains any meaning that can be attached to the name of Yahweh or have influenced the contents of the revelation. "On the contrary, it presents the name as one whose meaning is unknown...". 138

into the controversy" for "since the time of the Patres, the divine self-interpretation (Ego

sum, qui sum) has been the basis of Christian speculation on the nature of God".49

The Thornbush episode is a drama of the "first rank".50 Voegelin observes, “Here,

for the first time, appears the theme of ‘my people (ammi)’, firmly framing the promise of

freedom in Ex. 3:8. As the seneh (burning bush) points forward to Sinai, so the ammi (my

people) points forward to the Berith [symbol of the historical period] through which the

Hebrew clans, who as yet are ignorant of the fate in store for them, will be transformed into

'my people'.”51 In this setting Moses is the one who “meets” God. “By a prophet, Yahweh

brought Israel up from Egypt. The order of Egypt has its origin in Moses; and the order of

the soul of Moses has its origin in the ‘leap in being’, that is, in his response to a divine

revelation”. "For the knowledge of God has now become the knowledge of Moses who, in

the course of his life, has grown where he can hear the divine voice articulate its

command."52

The Thornbush event illuminates two important symbols - the notion of transcendent

“being” and the notion of “my people”. There is also the introduction of grace. This element

appears to “force” the soul of Moses to carry out the will of God. Voegelin observes that

grace in this context is perceived as an intrusion of the transcendent into human life.

Voegelin notes that the introduction of grace has an important “philosophical-technical

consequence” because, as he says today, “no-one would think of developing a theory of

mystic experiences in the form of a Platonic myth.”53 It is vital to recognise the

49Ibid., pp. 408-409. 50Ibid., p.405. 51 Ibid.,p. 406. 52Ibid., p. 407. 53Opitz and Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics , “Eric Voegelin to Alfred Schutz, Letters” [On Christianity January 1 1953] p. 450. 139

introduction of “grace” as new. Failure to acknowledge advance allows a regression to

occur if the philosopher bases his theory only on the experience such as the Parable of the

Cave. Here the substance was the Good but in the Thornbush event the substance has been

differentiated in the experience of Being.54 Voegelin has defined philosophy as “the

interpretation of experiences of transcendence”. This is a remarkable description of

philosophy. Voegelin held that it was the philosopher’s task to recognise the degrees of differentiation of transcendence. He argues that as long as the philosopher “is operating rationally, he does not have the right to base his interpretation on more compact types of

experience while ignoring differentiation.”55 Voegelin criticised those who relativised

experiences as all the same and fail to recognise the principle of differentiation. It was on

the basis of this principle that Voegelin based his own philosophical understanding.

Because of the importance of the principle of differentiation the next section focuses further

on the Christian experience. Noetic reason in the Christian experience has been radically

transformed. To draw out the significance of what this transformation involves I have

considered two aspects: Voegelin’s discussion of the theotes symbol (the presence of God’s

reality) in Paul’s Epistle to the Colossians and what he calls the Question of Christ.

4.4. THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

Voegelin recognised that in the Christian experience there is something new. He

wrote, "Something about Jesus must have impressed his contemporaries as an existence in

the metaxy of such intensity that his bodily presence, the somatikos of the passage, appeared

to be fully permeated by the divine presence".56 To envisage in more depth what this

54Ibid. 55Ibid. 56Voegelin, “The Gospel and Culture”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, p. 193. See also J. McCarroll, "Man in History: A Symposium on the Work of Eric Voegelin", Philosophical Studies 28 (1981), p. 38. 140 radical newness comprises Colossians (2:8-10) is examined. The passage of Colossians

(2:8-10) expresses "with admirable precision" the divine irruption of the presence of

Jesus.57The text is as follows:

Voegelin has shown a preference for the symbol theotes, the divine reality which St. Paul says was in Christ; this he seems to say, is a superior generic way of referring to God. McCarroll points out that Colossians, 1:19 speaks of the “fullness of God” - and Colossians 2:9 “of the whole fullness of the ” (p. 38). Other references to this subject by Voegelin are in Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, p. 9 and in Voegelin, “Wisdom and Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, p. 368. 57Voegelin, “Wisdom and Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, p.368. 141

4.4.1. COLOSSIANS (2:8-10)

Make sure that no one traps you and deprives you of your freedom by some second-hand, empty, rational philosophy based on the principles of this world instead of on Christ.

In his body lives the fullness (pleroma) of divinity, and in him you too find your own fulfilment, in the one who is the head of every Sovereignty and Power.58

In him you have been circumcised, with a circumcision not performed by human hand, but by the complete stripping of your body of flesh. This is circumcision according to Christ.59

By following the Greek text, Voegelin perceives the Christian transformation as “this irruption” and cites “the author of Colossians in the words: ‘For in him the whole fullness of divine reality (theotes) dwells bodily’” (Col. 2.9). Voegelin explains “In its whole fullness

(pan to pleroma), divine reality is present only in Christ who, by virtue of this fullness, ‘is the image (eikon) of the unseen God, the firstborn of all creation’” (Col. 1:15)60 Voegelin

observes:

All other men have no more than their ordinary share of this fullness (pepleromenoi) through accepting the truth of its full presence in the Christ who, by his iconic existence, is ‘the head of all rule (arche) and authority (exousia)’(2:10).61 Voegelin argues that the passage is "precious" because the author of Colossians has

successfully conveyed the meaning of the structure of reality without “recourse to older,

more compact symbols, such as the Son of God” which are inadequate terms to symbolise

58 The Jerusalem Bible (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1971) comments on the expression “fullness of the divinity”; the word pleroma here is defined as the “divinity” that is actually “filling” Christ now in his body: in other words, the risen Christ, through his incarnation and resurrection, unites the divine and the created. Other commentaries such as The New Bible Commentary, (1970) suggest that "The Pleroma dwells directly in Him. The word deity (theotes) occurs only here in the New Testament and denotes the divine essence; The Interpreter's Bible emphasises “bodily”, noting that although Lightfoot suggests “incarnate”; "... it is not so understood by the ancient fathers, and it is probably better to interpret it as meaning 'genuinely' (i.e., not figuratively; so Cyril), or as 'in a body' ... " (p.193). 59Colossians, 2: 8-10, The Jerusalem Bible. 60Voegelin, “The Gospel and Culture”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, pp.192-193. 61Ibid., p. 193. 142

this newly differentiated experience. In fact, the passage is regarded as unique because it

must have required "a conscious effort" on the part of the author to employ the term theotes.

In preference to other translations, such as "Godhead, divinity, or deity", which imply a

, Voegelin argues that the term theotes, "divine reality" expresses more aptly

the intention of the author which was to denote “a nonpersonal reality”. The term allows for

varying degrees of participation in its fullness but at the same time acknowledges the God

Beyond the In-Between of existence.62 The choice (of the author of the Colossians in using theotes rather than theiotes) points to a recognition of the distinction between the two terms.

In this way the author has "distinguished the invisible God, experienced as real beyond the metaxy of existence, from the theotes, the divine reality which enters the metaxy in the movement of existence." 63

4.4.2. THE LIFE OF REASON AND THE THEOTES SYMBOL

The theotes symbol is considered first. Voegelin points out that if we accept that

"the revelation of ‘the unknown god’ through to Christ is in conscious continuity with the millennial process of revelation", then a basis is found to recognise other theophanic experiences as equivalents to the Christian experience of theotes. Voegelin writes “the gospel itself is an event in the drama of revelation.” The divine-human drama should be seen as a unit. The presence of the Unknown God is revealed and humans respond to the divine and also to one another.64 In this historical drama of revelation, the Unknown God of Plato and Moses becomes “known” through his presence in Christ.

62Ibid., Voegelin makes a subtle distinction between Paul's symbol theiotes (divinity) and theotes (fullness of divine reality). He sees the author of Colossians using theotes as an attempt to overcome imperfections in Paul's symbol theiotes. 63Ibid., pp. 193-194. 64Ibid., p. 201. 143

Voegelin refers to the Platonic vision, “Plato has to ask the question ‘Who is this

God?’ - who is ‘the god’ who draws from the Beyond of a cosmos that is full of gods, ‘the

god’ who emerges from a tradition of divine presence but is not one of the traditional

gods."65 Yet "the Christian visionaries do not have to ask this question because they know who their god is: he is the God of the fathers, the God of Moses, of Israel and her Kings, the

God of the Prophets. They rather have to ask the question ‘Who is this Son of God?’ - who

is this Messiah, this Christ, this vessel of divinely immortal presence, this living Word of the

truth?”66

4.4.3. THE QUESTION OF CHRIST

The “Question” requires precision. Voegelin contemplates the person of “Christ”

and asks:

But who is this person of Christ really? - the central question of the visions, including the visions attributed to Jesus himself as, for instance, in Matthew, 3:16-17. He is neither a man, moving in the struggle of the metaxy toward immortality, nor the divine reality beyond the metaxy. The visions see in the Christ the historical event of the God's pleromatic presence in a man, revealing the suffering presence of the God in every man as the transfiguring force that will let mortal reality rise with the God to his immortality. The pleromatic metaxy seen in the Christ reveals mortal suffering as participation in divine suffering.67

Voegelin observes that some commentators could be shocked by the language of “pleromatic

metaxy.” However, the symbol conveys as exactly as possible the conception of the Christ in

the Definition of Chalcedon, A.D. 451. “The Definition refers to two natures, the divine and

human, in the one person of Christ. The two natures are not annulled by their union but

preserved in their characteristics as they come together in forming one person (prosopon)

65Voegelin, “Wisdom and Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, p. 366. 66Ibid. 67Ibid., p. 369. 144

and subsistence (hypostasis) of the Christ.”68 At the same time Voegelin notes that “the

philosophical language of the fifth century appears to be ‘less subtle’ than the experiential

language of either Plato or the New Testament”. For, “the Definition tries to render the

visionary truth of the Christ’s existence in a metaxy that is distinguished from the noetic metaxy by the pleromatic presence of divine reality.”69 However, the aim of the Definition of

Chalcedon was to emphasise this distinction between the two natures. Voegelin argued that

as a result of this act of dogmatising, the way was left open for a split to arise between the

poles Apeiron and peras. Plato had avoided the problem by employing the term metaxy.

Voegelin examined the episode of Jesus on the way to Caesarea Philippi (Matt.

16:13-20) and suggests this event is “a key to the understanding of the existential context

into which the logion (Matt.11:27) must be placed”.70 The particular incident he referred to

is when Christ asked his disciples: “Who do people say the Son of man is?” Voegelin

explains that the recognition of the divine Sonship is explained as ‘something’

not revealed through information tendered by Jesus, but through a man's response to the full presence in Jesus of the same Unknown God by whose presence he is inchoatively moved in his own existence. The Unknown God enters the drama of Peter's recognition as the third person.71

The incident is important, for when Peter attempts to dissuade Jesus from the course which

would lead to his death, he is rebuked. He is seen by Jesus as an obstacle (skandalon)

(Matthew 16:21-23) and Peter is told that “the way you think is not the way of God but of

men." Voegelin concludes, the one who fails to acknowledge the full structure of existence

"has contracted his existence into a world-immanent self and refuses to live in the openness

68Ibid., p. 370. 69Ibid. 70Voegelin, “The Gospel and Culture”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, p. 202. 71Ibid. 145

of the metaxy."72 The metaxy, the divine presence, must not be reduced to propositional

forms. Voegelin states that “the strength of the gospel is its concentration on the one point

that is all-important: that the truth of reality has its centre not in the cosmos at large, not in nature or society or imperial rulership, but in the presence of the Unknown God in a man's existence to his death and life.”73 The problem, however, is that the symbolisation of this

presence of the Unknown God in man’s existence has been open to many interpretations that have split the experience from the symbol.

4.4.4. THE SPLIT IN REALITY

Voegelin contended that the metaxy (the divine-human encounter) had been badly

obscured in Western history by Christian theologians. They assigned Plato’s experiences as

the work of “natural reason” whereas Voegelin insisted that Plato was conscious of this

revelatory component in the truth in his logos, as also were the prophets of Israel and the

authors of the New Testament writings. Unfortunately this split that has occurred put serious

difficulties in the way of understanding of the life of reason. One is the problem of dogmatising Christian truths.

72Ibid., p. 206. 73Ibid., p. 210. 146

4.5. THE PLATONIC VISION - MORE PRECISE

On account of the split that occurred in the articulation of the Christian experience

Voegelin considered the Platonic analysis as a more precise analysis of metaxy because it

embraces the plurality of “pulls” (the divine-human encounter). The movement of metaxy

(i.e. zetein) seeking and drawing (helkein) should not be seen as two different movements between the divine and human poles.74 Within the tension of human existence towards the

Beyond man emerges as “the questioner,” and “God as mover”. Thus God attracts and

draws man to himself.75

When the metaxy is expressed in the Christian experience, an element of complexity

is present. Voegelin sums up this problem in the following passage:

The movement that engendered the saving tale of divine incarnation, death, and resurrection as the answer to the question of life and death is considerably more complex than classic philosophy; it is richer by the missionary fervour of its spiritual universalism, poorer by its neglect of noetic control; broader by its appeal to the inarticulate humanity of the common man; more restricted by its bias against the articulate wisdom of the wise; more imposing through its imperial tone of divine authority; more imbalanced through its apocalyptic ferocity, which leads to conflicts with the conditions of man's existence in society; more compact through its generous absorption of earlier strata of mythical imagination, especially through the reception of Israelite historiogenesis and the exuberance of -working; more differentiated through the intensely articulate experience of loving- divine action in the illumination of existence with truth.76

In this passage Voegelin highlights the differences between the Platonic vision and the

Christian experience. These differences were perceived by Voegelin as an advance in human

consciousness. At the same time the very complexity of the differences allows for an

74Ibid., pp. 183-184. 75Ibid. 76 Ibid., p. 189. 147

opening up of consciousness to be deformed. (Some varieties of deformation will be

examined later.)77

The Platonic symbol of metaxy appears to Voegelin to be more exact than the

symbols “man” and “God” used by Christian theologians. These symbols, Voegelin

observed, “are loaded with various doctrinal content".78 Yet the notions “man” and “God”

were originally derived from the Socrates-Platonic-Aristotelian insights in classic

philosophy.

4.6. THE NATURAL/SUPERNATURAL PROBLEM

Voegelin has found a new way of examining the natural/supernatural issue. His

presentation of metaxy has highlighted the polarisation that occurs when terms such as

“philosophy”/“religion”, “metaphysics”/“theology”, “reason”/“revelation”; “natural”/

“supernaturalism” and “rationalism”/“irrationalism” are used.79 He refers to these pairs as

“topical dichotomies” and emphasises the need to establish what each of these pairs has in

common. He argues there is need to focus first on "the noetic core" of each “topical

dichotomy” to make it easier to analyse differences. 80

Voegelin explained what he meant by the “noetic core”. These characteristics are present for both classic philosophy and the Christian experience. He states :

There is the same field of pull and counterpull, the same sense of gaining life through following the pull of the golden cord, the same consciousness of existence in an In-Between of human-divine participation, and the same experience of divine reality as the centre of action in the movement from question to answer. Moreover, there is the same consciousness of newly differentiated insights into the meaning of existence; and in both cases this consciousness constitutes a new field of human types in history which Plato describes as, first, the spiritual man (daimonios aner) in whom the movement occurs; second, the man of the earlier, more compact types of

77Thesis: Chapter 7, “The Life of Reason and the Loss of Community Substance”. 78Ibid. 79Ibid. 80Ibid. 148

existence, the mortal (thnetos) in the Homeric sense; and third, the man who reacts negatively to the appeal of the movement, the dullard or foolish man (amathes).81

However, the greatest “differentiation” between the Platonic vision and the Judaeo- Christian

experience lies in “the experience of an extraordinary divine irruption in Jesus."82 The

Christian experience expresses the most radical transformation. Although the Platonic

experience and the Judaeo-Christian experience both indicate "the dynamics of the divine

presence", Voegelin makes it clear that a greater possibility for types of deformation in

human constructions of the experience of the “Christ-event” occur due to the intensity of the

experience.

4.7. SEPARATION-SCHOOL THEOLOGY

The problem of deformations of human constructions Voegelin attributed to the

dogmatisation in Scholastic theology which is a development that came after the Christian

experience. Voegelin considered that early Christianity had been dogmatised and in the

effort to produce clear definitions had produced a “split” in the early Christian experience.

He observed that Christian theology kept its “inseparable unit” until the time of ."83

It was after that the dogmatising of the Christian experience occurred. Voegelin considers that "this unfortunate separation" of the Christian experience has been one of the major sources for the modern spiritual crisis. He notes there have been many attempts to cope with the effect of the split in theology and philosophy. In modern times, for example, there have been "a variety of crisis and existential , as well as the awareness of the loss of

81Ibid., p. 192. 82Ibid. 83Ibid., p. 199. 149 experimental reality through doctrinisation and so on". According to Voegelin all these existential theologies have failed to cope with the problem.84

The doctrinal developments put in place by the Church as a protective measure, have instead, Voegelin contends, hypostatised the Christian experience. The result is that now

“the unknown God”, theotes, has been overshadowed by dogma.85 Consequently, there has been a separation (split) of the theotes experience that once engendered the symbolisation of divine reality:

At a time when the reality of the gospel threatens to fall apart into the constructions of an historical Jesus and a doctrinal Christ, one cannot stress strongly enough the need to understand the status of a gospel as a symbolism engendered in the metaxy of existence by a disciple's response to the drama of the Son of God.86

So pervasive has been the “split” concerning the reality of the Unknown God or theotes that the knowledge of the metaxy has likewise suffered. The problem of dogmatising first appeared with the Chalcedonian Definition but it has continued over many centuries.

Many other definitions have also had the result of dogmatising the Christian experience.

4.8. SUMMARY

In this chapter I have compared Plato’s expression of the life of reason to the divine- human encounter in the Judaeo-Christian experience. In the Thornbush episode the theology of Being was introduced, a theology of Being differentiated from the Good of Plato. It is here that this radical difference occurs which distinguishes the Platonic Good from the

Christian experience. The analysis of the Platonic and Christian experiences has provided foundational principles by which to explore the life of reason. Yet as Voegelin pointed out a

84Ibid. 85Ibid., p. 200 86Ibid., p. 201. 150 split has occurred in the metaxy which resulted in the separation of theology from reality, i.e. "the Unknown God whose theotes was present in the existence of Jesus has been eclipsed by the revealed God of Christian doctrine."87 In order to demonstrate the serious repercussions this split has had on the life of reason the next chapter considers the stratum of the Christian experience as illumined by the great teachers of the spiritual life. The aim is to show that although dogmatisation has occurred in the Christian experience at the same time the stratum of experience or mysticism has kept alive noetic reason.

87Ibid., p. 199. 151

CHAPTER FIVE

THE LIFE OF REASON (NOESIS) AND CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM

5.1. VOEGELIN’S RECOGNITION OF MYSTICISM

In his recovery of symbols Voegelin came to understand more clearly the role of mysticism in Western Christian experience. The word mysticism is open to a variety of

meanings. In Voegelin’s thought mysticism refers to the illumination of human

consciousness in the process of divine-human co-operation. Voegelin called this

movement a “stratum of experience”.1 He considered that there were certain individuals

in the course of history who had had such experiences. Plato, Aristotle and Moses are a

few persons whose experiences Voegelin recognised as representative for humanity.

From the movement of the divine in human consciousness important symbols have been

engendered. For example, Plato’s discovery of the psyche as the site of the divine presence

is one such experience.2 The major Hellenic thinkers, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato and

Aristotle were perceived by Voegelin as "mystic-philosophers" because of their noetic experiences.3

However, over time symbols engendered by the divine presence in these individuals

can lose their pristine meaning. Voegelin explains:

Symbols at large move into the position of a secondary realisation of insight; beyond this secondary insight there arises an understanding of man's tension toward the divine ground that cannot be adequately expressed by any symbolisation of truth in this world. This further articulation of a stratum of

1Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p.112. 2Ibid. 3 Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, pp. 181-182. Webb explains the conflict between "existential truth" and propositions. 152

experience beyond the symbolisation of noetic and pneumatic divine presence is what, after Pseudo-Dionysius, came to be called mysticism.4

Voegelin observes that Plato had acknowledged the "stratum of experience"

centuries before Pseudo-Dionysius. He had "clear knowledge of the relation to a divine

reality that lies beyond the revelation expressed by his symbols of a Demiurge, or of the

Nous as the third god following Kronos and in history".5

5.1.1. MYSTICISM IS NOESIS DIFFERENTIATED

I have already discussed the differentiation of the Platonic and the Christian experience in the previous chapter. In his book Anamnesis, Voegelin referred to Classical

noesis and Christian mysticism as two predogmatic forms of real knowledge. The logos of

consciousness becomes optimally differentiated, i.e. "in the mode of knowing there is the

process of differentiation." The Hellenic thinkers’ understanding of the logos of

consciousness or "reason" (the life of reason) was later differentiated by the Christian

theologians into "faith, truth (pistis) and love". He writes:

I am thinking particularly about the experience of faith, love and hope, which already Heraclitus recognised and distinguished as sources of knowledge. It is thus in order to speak not only of a cognitio rationis but also of cognitiones fidei, amoris, et spei.6

With the entrance of Christianity into the Western experience, consciousness of the divine

appeared in a radical new way. The divine presence was now symbolised by “the Christian

symbol of Incarnation."7 Such a radical new experience of transcendence meant that

4Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, p. 112. 5Ibid. p.113. 6Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, Chapter 10, “The Tensions in the Reality of Knowledge”, p.184. 7 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p.112. 153 philosophy must now be interpreted differently.8 Voegelin understood “philosophy” in its original sense as "an experiential mystical ascent to a luminous participation in existential truth".9

5.1.2. THREE SYMBOLS

Voegelin explains what he means by the differentiation of reason. For the Hellenes the life of reason was cognitio rationis whereas for the Christians it was transformed into cognitiones fidei, amoris, et spei, three symbols which had been recognised by Heraclitus.

In Plato, the notions eros (desire, love, longing), (justice, order) and (wonder) were accepted. These symbols suggest an openness of the soul to the divine. The attitude of openness leads the soul to "the rightness of action" and attainment of the "balance" of techne metretike, i.e. the art of measure.10 The measure achieved is that balance of consciousness which, Voegelin points out, is "a rare event indeed". He states:

The ‘balance of consciousness’ achieved by the classic philosophers who could face the Mystery is a rare event indeed, carefully to be preserved as a strand in Western civilisation where it has to contend with the unbalanced

8Peter J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), “Eric Voegelin to Alfred Schütz, [On Christianity, January 1, 1953]”. Refer to Letters to Schültz, p. 450. It is important to note what Voegelin means by the principle of "differentiation." He states: Philosophising seems to me to be in essence the interpretation of experiences of transcendence; these experiences have, as an historical fact, existed independently of Christianity, and there is no question that today, too, it is equally possible to philosophise without Christianity. But this basic and unequivocal answer must be qualified on one essential point. There are degrees in the differentiation of experiences. I would take it as a principle of philosophising that the philosopher must include in his interpretation the maximally differentiated experiences and that, so long as he is operating rationally, he therefore does not have the right to base his interpretation on the more compact types of experience while ignoring differentiation, no matter for what reason.

9Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, p. 181. 10Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p.184; See R. Knox, Enthusiasm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), p. 580. He writes, "Let us note that traditional Christianity is a balance of doctrines, and not merely of doctrines but of emphases. You must not exaggerate in either direction or the balance is disturbed." 154

strand of the ‘stop-history’ movement that has also remained constant into our present.11

The balance of consciousness and its relationship with faith is always at risk in the

tension of existence. In his essay, “Ersatz Religion”12 Voegelin examined faith under

two aspects. The first is an ontological aspect which asserts that faith is the substance of

things hoped for. The substance of these things subsists in nothing but the very faith, and not

in its theological symbol. The second understanding is that faith is the proof of things

unseen. Voegelin remarks "Again, proof lies in nothing but faith itself. This thread of faith,

on which hangs all certainty regarding divine, transcendent being, is indeed very thin." There

is nothing tangible here. “The substance and proof of the unseen are ascertained through nothing but faith which man must obtain by the strength of his soul...".13 Voegelin compares

faith expressed in Pauline Christianity with Heraclitus whom he cites, "If you do not hope,

you will not find the unhoped for, since it is hard to be found and the way is all but

impassable." "Nature loves to hide", and "through lack of faith (apistie) the divine escapes

being known". Love, hope, and faith are the orientating forces in the soul; the invisible

attunement is hard to find unless it is hoped for; and the divine escapes being known unless

we have faith. From a psychological perspective Voegelin asks, why is uncertainty

disturbing? He responds:

One does not have to look far afield for an answer. Uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity. The feeling of security in a ‘world full of gods’ is lost with the gods themselves; when the world is de-divinized, communication with the world-transcendent God is reduced to the tenuous

11 Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4 (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), p. 329. The term “stop-history” in Voegelin's expression to refer to those systems of history created by writers such as Hegel. 12Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism , 1968. “Ersatz Religion” is the second essay. 13Voegelin, “Ersatz Religion” in Science, Politics and Gnosticism, 1968, p. 108. Voegelin continues “...in this psychological study we disregard the problem of grace.” 155

bond of faith, in the sense of Heb. 11:1, as the substance of things hoped for and the proof of things unseen.14

5.1.3. FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

Faith is a special way of knowing the divine. It is an expression of human

consciousness of the divine: "Ontologically, the substance of things hoped for is nowhere to

be found but in faith itself; and, epistemologically there is no proof for the things unseen but again this is very faith."15 The bond of faith is tenuous, and can easily snap. Unlike the

certainty that empirical evidence gives, faith on the other hand demands an "openness

towards God, the waiting, the periods of aridity and dullness, guilt and despondency,

contrition and repentance, forsakenness and hope against hope, the silent stirrings of love

and grace trembling on the verge of a certainty which if gained is loss... ."16 In this passage

Voegelin provides a "psychological analysis of faith" and the language he employs is close

to that of the mystics, particularly Pseudo-Dionysius and St. John of the Cross, writers well-

known for their insights into mystical theology.

5.1.4. THE HELLENIC INFLUENCE OF NOESIS

The “language of faith” has its source in Hellenic influences which provided a

"lengthy preparation for the irruption of the transcendental reality of Christianity". Other writers besides Voegelin acknowledge the Hellenic influence. For example, Endre von

Ivanka observed:

The phenomenon which characterises the whole of the first millennium of Christian theological thought .... is the use of as the form for [its] philosophical

14Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction, 1952, p.122. 15Ibid. 16Ibid. 156

expression and the framework of the world-picture in terms of which the proclamation of revealed truths was made - in other words Christian Platonism.17

Louth points out that Christian Platonism has meant many things, but in the early Church this experience was met "primarily on the level of mysticism". For, by the second century,

Platonism “was characterised by its predominantly religious and theocentric view...”.18

Louth notes that Platonism was known as and was seen as “theological and other-worldly.” Middle Platonism was concerned with the soul’s search for immediacy with God.19 Louth cites Père A.J. Festugiere as “one of the great living authorities on

Hellenistic religion”, who could say: “When the Fathers ‘think’ their mysticism, they

platonize. There is nothing original in the edifice.”20

The difference between Christian mysticism and Platonism, Louth explains, is that in the former there is the soul's continual seeking after God. There is no final vision, for the soul's experience in darkness is not - cannot be - theoria, knowledge for there is no possibility of sight in this darkness. God's presence cannot be seen or comprehended, but only felt and accepted. The denial of the ultimacy of theoria is what sets off the writings of

Gregory [Nazianzen] most sharply from Origen and Evagrius. “The Platonic doctrine of contemplation is left behind; it is beyond theoria, in the darkness of unknowing, that the soul

penetrates more and more deeply into the knowledge and presence of God through love.”21

5.2. PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AND THE NAME OF GOD

17Cited in Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, from Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), Introduction, p.xiii, see n. 4, which refers to Endre von Ivanka, Plato Christianus (Einsiedeln,1964), p.19. 18Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys, p. xiii, see n.5, R.E.Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (reprint, Amsterdam, 1971) 19Ibid. 20Ibid., n.7 (Contemplation de Vie Contemplative selon Platon, Paris, 3rd. edn., 1967,(p. 5). 21Ibid., see Chapter 5, “Nicene Orthodoxy”, p. 97. 157

Christian mysticism in its early development was strongly influenced by the thought

of Pseudo-Dionysius.22 He is regarded as one of the most significant authorities on mystical

theology and has been referred to in Voegelin's writings.23 Pseudo-Dionysius is important

because Voegelin had observed a reference to his work Theologia Mystica by Jean Bodin.

Bodin had used the noesis symbol. Voegelin was able to trace the notion back to Plato. In

Voegelin's view, Bodin’s reference to noesis was significant because it stood alone within

the modern period of Western intellectual history.24

The attempt to give expression to the Ineffable in language, has its own problems, as

Voegelin recognised:

One cannot escape the difficulty of communicating the insight into the balance of tolerance, precisely because one of the areas to be balanced is that of silence. Thus there is no language other than the existential tension toward the ground that could express the depth of the ground. Pseudo- Dionysius tried to find a way out by putting the preposition hyper before the philosophical and revelatory symbols of the ground; thus he arrives at such compound words as hypertheos, hypersophos, hyperagathos, hyperkalos, hyperousios, hyperagnostos, hyperarchios, and so on.25

Voegelin comments that no matter how far the series is extended "one still does not gain

more than the insights we experience in the tension to the ground".26 He notes that it is

possible "to speak of the ineffable only by characterising it as going beyond the symbolic

22Pseudo-Dionysius, also known as Dionysius the Areopagite is a name assumed by the author of four Greek treatises on liturgical and mystical theology that appeared at the beginning of the 6th century. The four treatises are, The Divine Names, Mystical Theology, The Celestial Hierarchy and The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. 23See Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, pp.194-195. Voegelin refers to Bodin’s insight into the essence of tolerance, considering this as a balance between silence and the expression of a reality of knowledge. Bodin employed some thoughts from the Theologia Mystica of Pseudo-Dionysius when he discussed noesis. Refer also to Voegelin, "Wisdom and Magic in the Extreme", in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 361; See also Voegelin, “Response to Professor Altizer’s, “A New History”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12. Voegelin writes, “The tension between theologia mystica and theologia dogmatica goes as far back as the patres. It dominates the work of Origen; and its dynamics is the living force in such noteworthy successors as Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, Scotus Erigena, , and the mystics of the fourteenth century. It is definitely an intra-Christian tension.”( p. 294). 24 The importance of Bodin’s work on the noesis symbol is taken up in Chapter 7. 158

language of participation".27 On this account Voegelin considered that Thomas Aquinas’s thought on analogia entis was a great advance.

5.3. ST. THOMAS, ANALOGIA ENTIS

Voegelin regards "the achievement of analogia entis" of Thomas Aquinas as a key to understanding the problem of God. Thomas Aquinas refers to Pseudo-Dionysius's De divinis nominbus and acknowledges the formulation of the symbol, of God, as HE WHO IS.

He states:

The name HE WHO IS is most proper for God because it goes beyond the particular forms of mundane life. Beyond that name, there is the name GOD, because it signifies the divine character of the ground; and beyond that there is the name Tetragrammaton, since it expressed the incommunicability of the divine substance (ST I, XIII, II.)28

St. Thomas has given three points in this formulation: first, knowledge, noetic exegesis,

cannot extend further than the symbol of the ground of being; the second is the

comprehensive pneumatic reality of knowledge to which belongs the experience of being

personally addressed by God; and, third, the area of incomprehensibility we touch by

symbolic terms of noetic and pneumatic experiences. It is here that symbols such as the

“Ineffable” and “Silence” are given expression.29

The last point, that of “silence” in the face of incomprehensibility, is of particular

interest here. The new symbol appeared in Pseudo-Dionysius' work Theologica Mystica

(c. 500). Theologica Mystica was a valuable contribution to understanding what is called

25Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, pp.197-198. See n.12, p.198. 26Ibid., p.198. 27Ibid. 28Ibid. 29Ibid. 159

affirmative and negative theology.30 Pseudo-Dionysius helped to illuminate "the

differentiated Ineffable".

5.4. CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM

The subject of Christian mysticism is elaborated here because of its radical

difference from all other expressions of mysticism. Mysticism is understood here as a form

of knowing (faith) that goes beyond ratio. Medieval theologians acknowledged two valid forms of knowledge. One took the form of discursive reason, ratio; the other form was intellectual, intellectus.31 Referring to the second form, Johnston remarks:

Dionysius speaks much of the transcendence of God, stressing the fact that by reasoning we know little about Him; but he never denies the power of discursive reason to come to the knowledge of God, merely emphasising the superiority of mystical knowledge.32

Speculative knowledge of God is obtained through theology and philosophy, whereas

mystical knowledge gives a knowledge of God that is intuitive and ineffable. Hence it is

called "mystical" or "hidden".

5.4.1. ANALOGIA ENTIS AND VIA NEGATIVA

The terms analogia entis and via negativa are complementary expressions used in

connection with knowing God by reason (ratio), one being affirmative and the other

negative. The affirmative mode, analogia entis, is the acknowledgement of God as the

source of all that is good. Johnston remarks:

30Ibid., p.199. 31F.C. Happold, Mysticism, A Study and An Anthology (London: Penguin, 1970), pp. 27-28: The word 'intellectus' is not easy to define exactly. It carries something of the meaning of intuition or creative insight or imagination in the sense Blake used the word. Intellectus was considered a higher faculty of the mind than ratio; one capable of bringing men to a more profound knowledge than could be gained through discursive reason.

160

We can affirm of God all the good that can be affirmed of His creation, saying that He is holy, wise, benevolent, that He is light and life. All these things come from God, so we can affirm that the source possesses their perfections in a higher way.33

The analogia entis or “analogy of being” is used in Scholastic philosophy. The notion assumes grades of excellence to provide a means of arguing from one case to another on differing levels of being, and finally, to perfect being. The method has been described as one

"of predication" whereby concepts derived from a familiar object are made applicable to a relatively unknown object in virtue of some similar objects (called analogues). Thus, it is by

"analogy" that it is possible for the human intellect to speak of the “justice” of God.

However, God's Justice is not totally dissimilar from justice as met with in human experience, though it is certainly not identical with it.34

I pointed out in Chapter 3 that Voegelin criticised the Scholastic method for its

dogmatic emphasis and consequent loss of the consciousness of mystery. However, he distinguishes the writings of Aquinas from Scholasticism. Voegelin regards the analogia entis as the "centrepiece of Thomistic theology"35 and considers that Aquinas has

demonstrated by this notion that “theological are not judgements in the sense of

statements about the content of the world.”36 For example, “the proposition ‘God is

almighty’ combines a transcendent subject (one of which we have no innerworldly

experience, only an experience of faith), with an ‘idealised’ infinite, innerworldly predicate.

32William Johnston, The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing (Wheathamstead, Hertfordshire: Anthony Clarke, 1967), Foreword by Thomas Merton, edited by Edward Malatesa, p. 32. 33Ibid., pp. 32-33. 34"Mysticism", Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 1958, p.48. See also Summa Theologiae, ed. T.C. O 'Brien, 1974, Vol. 13, "Glossary", p.216: analogy, analogia is an agreement or correspondence in certain respects between things that are absolutely speaking diverse. A term is analogical if it is used in two or more senses that have some mutual reference or interdependence. 35Opitz and Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics, 1981, “Eric Voegelin to Alfred Schütz [On Christianity, January 1, 1953]”, p. 455. 36Ibid. 161

The proposition is, therefore, meaningless if both the subject and the predicate are taken

literally; it makes sense only if the predicate is added analogically to the extrapolated

subject of the experience of faith.”37

Voegelin points out that the failure to understand the significance of the analogia

entis occurs because since the time of the Enlightenment a metaphysical approach has been

out of favour. Modern philosophy generally has taken the position that theological

statements - unlike statements concerning sense perception - are meaningless because they

cannot be verified. Strongly disagreeing with such a reductionist and purely rational

approach, Voegelin maintains that the issue raised by Aquinas is in fact “the very starting

point of Christian theology".38 On this basis Christian philosophy can explore the via negativa, which implies that God is unlike any created thing.

5.4.2. CONTEMPLATIO AND THEOLOGIA NEGATIVA

Other terms necessary to the discussion are contemplatio and theologia negativa.

The term “contemplatio” is understood to have been in use longer than “mysticism”.39

Johnston points out that contemplatio was used by Aquinas to cover "not only experiences of the Christian mystics but also those of the Greeks."40 There is a basic similarity in all great

intuitive experiences irrespective of whether or not the subject was a Christian.41 The contemplative life itself did not receive a strict formulation in religious writings before the

37Ibid., pp. 455-456. Voegelin is arguing that God can only be known analogically and will always remain a mystery; even the word “God” is a concept that is an analogical term. 38 Ibid., pp. 455-456. 39 Johnston, The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing, 1967, p. 13. 40Ibid. 41Ibid. 162

thirteenth century.42 In making a distinction between the "active" and "contemplative"

modes of life, Aquinas has formulated an important theological statement.

But contemplation regards the simple act of gazing (intuitio) on the truth; hence Richard says again, ‘contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling (contuitus) upon the object of its ; meditation is the survey (intuitio) of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth; and cogitation is the mind's glance which is prone to wander’.43

Contemplatio was considered as a “more ‘common’ and precise” term by medieval

theologians, and was in fact "used to designate a rare and advanced form of spiritual

experience, not found among the ordinary religious folk."44

Theologia negativa or mystical theology is considered as a higher way of knowing

God. Theologians described this form of knowing as "dark knowledge". Pseudo-Dionysius

is the most famous exponent of this mode of knowing.45 Johnston cites Pseudo-Dionysius:

But there is yet a higher way of knowing God. ‘Besides the knowledge of God obtained by processes of philosophical and theological speculation, there is that most divine knowledge of God which takes place through ignorance.’ In this knowledge the intellect is illuminated by ‘the unsearchable depth of wisdom.’46

Mystical theology or "theologia negativa" is an apophatic mode of knowing. It is

contrasted with the cataphatic form, which employs concepts as means through which

knowledge is conveyed (media quo). In the apophatic form concepts are discarded.

Knowledge in this form "is aided more by the positive content of those concepts than it is

impeded by their limitation".47 Theologia negativa constitutes a genus of knowledge, a

42Ibid. 43St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (London: Burns and Oates, 1947), p. 610, (ST. II, Q 180 A.3). 44Happold, Mysticism, a Study and an Anthology, 1970, p. 27. 45See Dionysius, The Areopagite on the Divine Name and the Mysticial Theology, C.E. Rolt, ed., (London: S.P.C.K.,1920) 46Johnston, The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing, p .33. 47Charles Journet, The Dark Knowledge (London: Sheed and Ward , 1948), p. 71. 163 wisdom of the highest order to be distinguished from ordinary theology, being a theology of a different kind of mystical experience.48

Cataphatic and apophatic are two ways of knowing, based on faith using concepts.

Moreover "faith" in the apophatic mode, is impelled to go beyond the imperfect fragmentary way in which concepts express this knowledge.49 Then the conceptual mode is no longer used as a formal means of knowledge but is actually transcended by faith. The two ways of knowing are given a theological description by Aquinas who stated that one mode

(cataphatic) is "the law of faith that loves" and the other (apophatic) is a "law of love that believes".50

Christian theologians emphasise the existential aspect of knowing because the mode of knowing by faith is seen as an “engagement” or encounter with the divine presence. In the apophatic mode (mysticism) the process of knowing changes and faith that once employed concepts in one way, now in the darkness seem to "transcend them".51Journet describes the apophatic form of knowing as an experience where the "dark knowledge" of faith transcends concepts. Faith is impelled not, indeed,

to go beyond the mystery of reality they express, but beyond the imperfect and fragmentary way in which they express it, and to culminate in an assent conditioned, to be sure, by the presence of concepts but one which ceases to employ concepts as a formal means of knowledge, because faith is in itself transconceptual, without mode, obscure, rich in all that has been antecedently specified by concepts.52

48Ibid., p. 110, no. 47. 49Quotation taken from Journet, The Dark Knowledge of God, 1948, p. 110. Journet cites , Distinguish to Unite, or The Degrees of Knowledge, Translated by Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), pp. 292, p. 294. 50 Reference from Journet, The Dark Knowledge, 1948, p. 70. [ST. I, 1.6, ad. 3.] 51Ibid., p. 70. 52Ibid., p. 77. 164

Knowledge experienced under the apophatic form is theologia negativa in which conceptual knowledge (cataphatic) is discarded. However, it must be recognised that in

Christian mysticism knowledge under the apophatic mode "far from superseding the former type (cataphatic) rests upon it, that it may rise higher, like mists from the sea."53 Journet explains there is a consensus of thought concerning the “dark knowledge” which in mystical theology is attained by "ignorance" rather than by light.54 Maritain explains that the apophatic “knowledge” is "negative, not because it simply denies what the other [cataphatic] affirms, but because it attains more than by affirmation and negation, i.e. more than by communicable enunciations, because it experiences by the mode of ignorance the reality which the other affirms and can never affirm sufficingly.55The apophatic form of knowing

leaves behind the conceptual mode of the analogia entis and enters the uncharted seas of the

secret wisdom of God. The "secret wisdom" or "mystical theology", as it is commonly

called, surpasses “all distinct notions, and every sign which can be expressed, to cling in the

experience of love to that very reality which is the first object of faith."56

The explanation of the significance of the “dark” knowledge and its relation to

Christian mysticism is relevant when one is analysing the role of concepts in the apophatic

mode of knowing. Voegelin on many occasions argued that aletheia (truth) is reduced to

doxa (opinions) when those symbols that once expressed the divine presence have in the

53Ibid., pp. 72. 54Ibid., p.73. Journet writes: "Rather than a knowledge that is nescient, this is a nescience that knows, a nescience that crowns all: [Pseudo-Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii) ] 'what new light! But what ignorance! I see nothing and yet I see all!’” 55Refer to Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, Translated by Bernard Wall (London: Geoffrey Bles; The Centenary Press, 1937), p. 294. 56 Journet, The Dark Knowledge, 1948, p.102, n.15. Journet refers to Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 1937, p. 16. 165

course of time been separated from their first luminous meaning. The symbols are reduced to dogma or doctrine. The life of reason needs to be protected from such reductionism.

Voegelin insists that a serious indication of reductionism arises when contentious topics about so-called "correct theologies" or a dogmatisation of theology becomes an issue.

Doctrinaire positions are reinforced and the balance of the Ineffable is lost. Knowledge

(noesis) then assumes a form of "unbalanced and rigid dogmatism". The dogmatic position is finally enforced and a position is assumed as the prototype of “the truth”. As a result within the field of research, the theologian carries out a doctrinaire campaign while ideologists generate "the well-known phenomena of ideological classics and the ensuing literature of commentaries and apologetics... ".57

Voegelin’s analysis of dogmatisation and reductionism of symbols has served to

illumine the life of reason. At the same time it is necessary to restore some balance into

Voegelin’s dismissal of concepts and his stress on the primal meaning of symbols.

Christian theologians of the spiritual life have demonstrated very precisely the role of

conceptual thought in the mature soul’s spiritual and mystical development. The next section

examines some theological elucidations of the mystics’ form of knowing and the delicate

balance kept between conceptual knowledge and the mystics’ apophatic knowing.

5.4.3. CONCEPTUAL KNOWING AND MYSTICISM

Jacques Maritain, a Christian theologian, has written about the role of concepts in

Christian mysticism. He explains that concepts "have not been obliterated; that would be

contrary to the very nature of our intelligence, which has need of them in order to be

57Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p.199. 166

actualised."58 Using the language of philosophy, he argues that if "the mystical experience

passes through them [sic.concepts] it does so as through a formal means of knowledge

which regulates and measures our knowledge",59 but it passes through them as conditions

required by the subjects; and that is why they may be confused. It is the "connaturality of

charity by which the soul is moved by the ".60 The term "connaturality of

charity" is a philosophical explanation of the process of knowing that passes or transcends concepts in the darkness of faith.

John of St. Thomas61 (1589-1644) also wrote on the subject of mysticism and

discusses the way of knowing. He states:

Although love cannot, in what concerns the subject upon which it bears experience attain to anything other than what is proposed to it by knowledge, nevertheless love can attain the object in a way better than any accessible to the intellect.62

The intellect infused by the light of faith is raised beyond the limitation of concepts. Thus

what begins with faith by means of concepts, is then deepened by love. Journet paraphrases

St. Thomas Aquinas and writes:

It is the law of knowledge ... to be achieved in accordance with the mode of being of the knower, and in this sense knowledge is a process whereby things are transferred intentionally to the mind of the knower.63

58 Cited from Journet, The Dark Knowledge,1948, n.16. p.102. Refers to Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 1937, p. 326. 59Ibid. 60Ibid. 61Refer to F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, (New York: Image Books, Doubleday, 1993), Vol. 3, p. 345. An eminent Dominican theologian and philosopher John of St. Thomas was a commentator on St Thomas. His most well-known work was the The Gifts of the Holy Ghost from which tthe quotation is taken. 62Quotation taken from Journet, The Dark Knowledge, 1948, p. 73. Journet cites De donis spiritus sancti, a 4, n.13 and 14, Vive's ed., Vol. VI, p.638. (See Journet 1948, n. 7, p.99). Journet gives a "penetrating note" from Raissa Maritain's translation (Paris, 1930, p.142) as follows: It remains always true that love tends only to the known. For obscure knowledge, like that of faith, is aware of its own obscurity, that is, it is aware that it is transcended by its object, and thus it manifests the latter in some way. And it is because this knowledge is conscious of its own obscurity, that it can be the basis of a love which is beyond it. 63Journet, The Dark Knowledge, 1948, p. 76. Journet refers to ST. 1-1, 19, 3, ad 6. 167

Elsewhere St. Thomas distinguishes "meditation" which "would seem to be the process of reason, from certain principles that lead to the contemplation (consideration) of some truth".

In fact, "every operation of the intellect may be called a consideration."64As already noted,

"contemplation" is seen as "the simple act of gazing (intuitio) on the truth”.65

Maritain supports the idea that concepts are present under the influence of "the secret wisdom which purifies the soul". He writes that faith:

While remaining wholly under the control of theology, totally depending on it for its conditions and its foundations on human soil, for the multitudinous notions and conceptual signs by which divine Truth is manifest to our intelligence; without any abandonment of revealed dogmas (on the contrary!), knowing better than by concepts the very things which the conceptual formulas of dogma communicate to our human intellects, how can it not surpass all distinct notions, every sign which can be expressed, to cling in the experience of love to that very reality which is the first object of faith?66

Theologians stress the importance of faith and the role of conceptual knowledge in the soul that reaches a very high degree of union with God through love.67 Maritain comments, "Here we are at the antipodes of ."68 Journet remarks that for those who

64Ibid. Journet cites ST. II -II, 180, 3. Of The Contemplative Life, (“Whether There Are Various Actions Pertaining to the Contemplative Life?”) Apart from Journet’s paraphrasing of St. Thomas the edition referred to here is St. Thomas’s Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Revised by Daniel J. Sullivan, Vols. 1 and 2 (Chicago and London: Wm. Benton, Publ., 1952). 65 ST. II -II, 180, 3, Of The Contemplative Life, (“Whether There Are Various Actions Pertaining to the Contemplative Life?”) 66Cited from Journet, The Dark Knowledge, 1948, p. 102, no. 15. Refer to Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 15-16. 67See Journet, The Dark Knowledge, 1948, pp. 102-103, n.16. Journet points to the significant role of symbols in the rapture of St. Paul. He refers to Aquinas who interprets the event as a vision of the divine essence, and "not mediated by any concept, did however implant in the Apostle's mind concepts whose content he would later be able to elaborate" (De Ver, XIII 3, ad. 4). 68Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, pp.15-16. Maritain means here that faith understood in this way is far removed from the doctrine of Plotinus (born c. A.D. 203) who regarded God as being so transcendent as to be beyond all thought. The “One” of Plotinus is not the same as the One of Parmenides, a monistic principle. Plotinus had set the One beyond being. Plotinus also regards the world as a necessary emanation, not something created from nothing. Refer to Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol.1, (London: Image Books, Doubleday, 1993), pp. 464-65. 168 have experienced this mystical theology, i.e. the mystics, "all this doesn't raise even a shadow of a problem".69 They are noted for their "unshakeable affirmative and cataphatic theology."70

5.4.4. CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND ST. THOMAS’ NOTION OF

“PROPORTION”

A further elaboration of the significance of concepts in mystical knowing is given by

Thomas Aquinas. He refers to the life of reason as a process of faith conditioned by love.

Faith and love are seen in his thought in relation to the two powers of the soul, i.e. the intellect and the will.71 The term "proportion" is significant for it explains that the "law of knowledge is achieved in accordance with the mode of being of the knower, and in this sense, knowledge is a process whereby things are transferred intentionally to the mind of the knower".72 The "nature of the knower" must always be taken into account, no matter to what heights of knowledge the soul is raised. As St. Thomas points out, the vision of the

Divine essence cannot be attained in this present life: "Dionysius says in a letter to the

Monk Caius, 'if anyone seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God himself, but something belonging to God.'"73 Thus, it is "not at all by altering their nature" that the

69See Journet, Dark Knowledge, 1948, p. 104, n.18. He writes: We, however, follow a middle path, holding that mystical theology is indeed a knowledge but not itself a conceptual knowledge. Mystical theology is the act of the gift of wisdom which charity produces in the believer's intellect, that theological faith may there assume all its own proper dimensions; it is the flower of knowledge upon the bough of love. 70Ibid., pp. 74-75. Journet writes, “Upon the path faith opens by means of concepts. Upon this route and upon no other. For the mystic all this doesn’t even raise a shadow of a problem.” 71 Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 405. St. Thomas takes the Aristotelian division of the powers of the soul into the intellect and will, whereas St. John of the Cross sees three faculties of the soul, intellect, will and memory which is understood as an Augustinian approach. Maritain remarks that St. John of the Cross "makes constant use of the Augustinian division of the higher faculties into understanding, memory and will". 72The quotation was taken from Journet, The Dark Knowledge, 1948, p. 76. 73 Journet, The Dark Knowledge, p. 102, n.14. ST. I-II, 28, 3. Of The Effects Of Love (Art.3 “Whether Is An Effect Of Love?”) Referring to ecstasy where the soul appears to leave herself/himself because the soul "is placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason." Journet cites (p. 102,n.4) ST. II-II, 180, 5. Of the 169

participation is experienced but "in conferring upon things known, the mode of being of the

knower."74 Aquinas has shown that conceptual knowledge is tied up with the human mode

of knowing.

Furthermore he (Aquinas) adds, “In the present state of life human contemplation is

impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see the intelligible species

in the phantasms as the Philosopher [Aristotle] states. Yet the knowledge of our intellect

does not rest in phantasms themselves, but contemplates in them the purity of the intelligible

truth, and this not only in natural knowledge but also in that which we obtain by revelation.”75 The supernatural mode of knowing begins with concepts and is later "driven to

transcend them." Charles Journet writes:

Faith, which at the outset necessarily employs concepts, is thus later driven to transcend them; following the path which concepts have opened to it, faith is impelled not, indeed, to go beyond the mystery of reality they express, but beyond the imperfect and fragmentary way in which they express it, and to culminate in an assent conditioned, to be sure, by the presence of concepts, but one which ceases to employ concepts as a formal means of knowledge, because faith is in itself transconceptual, without mode, obscure, rich in all that has been antecedently specified by concepts.76

In discussing the mode of knowing as elaborated by St. Thomas the principle of "proportion"

needs to be explained. There are two ways in which a person's action may be perfected.

Contemplative Life (Art. 5 “Whether the Present State of Life the Contemplative Life Can Reach to the Vision of the Divine Essence?”) 74Ibid., p.101, n.11. 75 ST. II-II, 180, 5. Of the Contemplative Life (Art. 5 “Whether the Present State of Life the Contemplative Life Can Reach to the Vision of the Divine Essence?”) St. Thomas refers to Aristotle’s [De Anima] Soul, III 7 (431 A 16).(The Summa Theologica, revised by Daniel J. Sullivan 1941, ed.) 76 Journet, The Dark Knowledge, 1948, p. 77, and p.102, n.16. Also Journet refers to Maritain who writes: What then has become of concepts? They have not been obliterated; that would be contrary to the very nature of our intelligence, which has need of them in order to be. They are still there. But all distinct concepts have grown silent, ... And confused concepts which intervene, and which remain wholly unperceived, only play a purely material part. I would say indeed that if mystical experience passes through them, it is not by way of the formal means of knowledge which regulates and measures our knowing, it is without being measured by them, as conditions which are required on the part of the subject, and that is why they may be so confused, so indistinct, as little discernible as one will: the 170

"One is proportionate to human nature", and the other "is a happiness surpassing man's

nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of

the Godhead, about which it is written that by Christ we are made partakers of the Divine

nature."77

Because supernatural knowledge surpasses the proportion of man, "the natural

principles which enable him to act out according to his capacity are not sufficient to attain

this end.” For this reason St. Thomas writes:

Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, by means of which he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end by means of his natural principles, although not without the Divine assistance.78

5.4.5. “ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES”

In the language of Aquinas these "additional principles" are called "theological

virtues".79 He insists that as God is the object of these principles, they (the theological

virtues) are infused in us by God alone and these virtues are "not made known except by

Divine revelation contained in Holy Writ".80 The text indicates that, to attain God, the mode of knowing required "surpasses the proportion of human nature." To overcome this difficulty Aquinas refers to the theological virtues infused in the soul by God. Knowledge or the readiness to accept this mode of knowing is given in “revelation”. Aquinas emphasises the need of "supernatural help" - in the form of "additional principles". As Voegelin suggests, the differentiation of the Christian experience from the classical Greek

philosophers has complicated the life of reason.

formal means and the law of mystical knowledge come from elsewhere." (Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 326.) 77ST. I-I I, 62, 1, (Art. 1 “Whether there are theological virtues.”) (Aquinas refers to II Peter, 1.4.) 78Ibid. 79 Ibid., Thomas refers to Wm. of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, Pt. III, tr. 2, Chap. 2 (fol. 130 ra). 171

The “complication” is even more profound when Aquinas explains the need for

theological virtues to aid “reason”. In the Christian experience the term "participation"

cannot be comprehended without reference to the "theological virtues". The particular mode

of knowing discussed above depends on "these virtues" which "belong to man in respect of

the Nature of which he is made a partaker."81The virtues are described as "Divine" because through them "God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself".82 St. Thomas observes

that, of themselves, the reason and will together are an insufficient medium although

“naturally directed to God, according as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in

proportion to nature." For "the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently

directed to Him, insofar as He is the object of supernatural happiness."83 To reach the end

which is God, therefore, the reason and will require the theological virtue of faith. Although

faith is a theological virtue, it is "greater" than the light of reason, yet "reason", St. Thomas

says:

is possessed by man in a more perfect manner than the latter, because man has the former in his full possession while he possesses the latter [sic. theological virtues] imperfectly since we love and know God imperfectly.84

5.4.6. “IMPERFECT” FAITH

The process of knowing God by the theological virtue of faith is "imperfect", for the

soul "cannot of itself work unless moved by another".85 Aquinas explains this situation. He uses two examples. The first is: "Thus, the sun which possesses light perfectly can shine by

80Ibid. 81 I Pet. I. 4. 82ST. I-II, 62, 1 Of the Theological Virtues (Art. 1 “Whether there are theological virtues.”) 83Ibid. 84 ST. I-II, 68, 2. Of the Gifts (Art.2 “Whether the Gifts are necessary to man for salvation”.) 85Ibid. 172

itself; but the moon which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light."86

The other example given by Aquinas is that of a physician "who knows the medical art perfectly and can work by himself; his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from him."87 Aquinas indicates by these

metaphors the need for "help in the shape of special promptings from God".88 The source of

this "help", Aquinas explains, is "out of God's superabundant goodness".89

5.4.7. FAITH NEEDS “HELP”

We come now to the heart of the special “complication” of the differentiation of

reason in the Christian experience. Voegelin had distinguished the Christian experience from

the Hellenic experience by what he calls the pneumatic experience. The pneumatic

experience was absent in the Platonic vision although a transcendent element was present. In

the Christian experience the transcendent is experienced as pneumatic or the effect of the

Spirit. The differentiation between the Hellenic and Christian experiences is illuminated by

Aquinas.

Aquinas insists that the action of reason is not sufficient unless it receives "in

addition, the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost [Spirit]." He states, "Therefore, in

order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost

[Spirit]."90 It is important to recognise, Aquinas insists, that the natural light of reason and

even the theological virtues need "help" "in the shape of special promptings from God".

However, in order to receive special "help" from God, certain conditions are required in the

86Ibid. 87Ibid. 88Ibid. 89Ibid. 90Ibid. 173

soul. A preparation of grace is necessary for the soul to receive the wisdom or the spirit of

God. Aquinas maintains that:

The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated above (AA.2,3), enables us to judge rightly of Divine things, or of other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of charity... . Hence the wisdom of which we are speaking presupposes charity. 91

Thus, the context in which Aquinas situates faith is perfected by the Spirit of God

which requires the soul to be free of what Thomas calls serious or "mortal sin". He writes,

"it follows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be together with mortal sin."92

The wisdom referred to here "denotes a certain rectitude of judgement in the contemplation and consultation of Divine things."93 The reception of wisdom demands that only those who

possess charity and grace are prepared for the reception of Divine wisdom. Reference is made to wisdom (Wisdom, 7.28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom",

and of fear [awe]94 (Ecclus. 1.28:) "He that is without fear [awe] cannot be justified."

"Wisdo m" is not understood as something exotic and afar off. Thomas says that the seven

gifts are necessary for salvation.95

Aquinas’ discussion concerning the relation between the theological virtues and

reason has raised several important points. First, the Divine essence cannot be attained in

this life. This being so, the question is asked, how does human consciousness reach such a

91 ST. II-II, 45, 4. Of the Gift of Wisdom (Art. “Whether Wisdom Can be Without Grace and With Mortal Sin?”) 92Ibid. 93ST. II-II, 45, 5. Of the Gift of Wisdom, ( Art. “Whether Wisdom Is in All Who Have Grace?”), Wisdom is the effect of charity. "I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speaking,... denotes a certain rectitude of judgement in the contemplation and consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these men obtain various degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things.” 94 Fear of God is considered as the beginning of wisdom. “Fear” is understood more as awe of God. 95ST. I-II, 68,3. Of the Gifts, (Art.2 “Whether the Gifts are necessary to man for salvation”.) 174

seemingly unattainable goal? Acknowledgement of the distance between God (Uncreated)

and man (creature) is the basis of the loving knowledge expressed by St. Thomas. What is

made clear is that the law of knowledge is in accordance with the mode of being of the

knower. The boundaries between "the knower" and the Divine essence must be respected.

5.4.8. FAITH IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT CONCEPTS

Aquinas also emphasises that consciousness is "impossible without phantasms".

Concepts are necessary for the intellect in the supernatural mode of knowing which "begins

with concepts” and later is "driven to transcend them." He makes a clear distinction between

"natural" knowledge and "supernatural" knowledge. Supernatural knowledge is explained as

"that which we obtain by revelation", understood as that which "surpasses man's nature."

Such knowledge can be attained by the "power of God alone." That activity is explained as

"a kind of participation of the Godhead." How is this participation to be achieved? What is required are "additional principles", or what has been referred to as "theological virtues."96

"Theological virtues" are themselves a mode of knowing that is given in revealed truth. The goal is Divine Ground, even if this higher mode of knowing is still imperfect. Therefore, the theological virtue of “faith” must "in addition, receive the ‘prompting’ of the Holy Spirit.”97

The theological explanation of the soul’s participation in the life of God presented by St.

96ST. I-II Q.62, 3. Of the Theological Virtues (Art. 3 “Whether Faith, Hope, Charity Are Fitting put as Theological Virtues.”) 97ST. I-II Q 68, 2. Of the Gifts, (Art.2 “Whether the Gifts are necessary to man for salvation”.) Aquinas writes: “But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason moves him according as it is in a manner and imperfectly informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. 8. 14, 17: ‘Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God’ ... because, that is, none can receive the 175

Thoma s Aquinas explains the Christian differentiation of the life of reason experienced by

the mature soul.

The language used by St. Thomas Aquinas to describe the Christian soul’s

participation in God appears very different from Voegelin's analysis of the metaxy.

However, there is a common core, for both Plato and Aquinas refer to knowledge as

episteme - not doxa, opinions. Both Voegelin and Aquinas take account of the spiritual

man, daimonios aner, or the whole person or the notion of what Voegelin calls the “concrete

man”. These thinkers argue that the life of reason cannot be reduced to rationalisation or

intellectualisation. Aquinas has demonstrated the necessity that the soul be without "serious

sin" in order to be open to divine wisdom. Similarly Voegelin emphasised the open soul (e.g. the Prisoner in the Cave) as one who has had the experience of a “turning around”, periagoge, an equivalent to the Christian idea of metanoia, change of heart. Finally, both

scholars recognise the full structure of reality which is symbolised by Voegelin as the “In-

Between”. In Aquinas’ theology the full structure of reality comprises the “knower”, the

Divine Ground and the relationship based on the notion of "principles”.

To pursue the discussion of the life of reason further and its differentiation in the

Christian experience I have considered some insights of St. John of the Cross. St. John of the

Cross analysed the role of conceptual knowledge in Christian mysticism. His explanation

draws on the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and applies his theological principles to

mystica l theology.

5.5. ST. JOHN OF THE CROSS

inheritance of that land of the Blessed except he be moved and led to it by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.” 176

Although the language St. John of the Cross used in his commentaries and poems

appears to be very different from the theological works of St. Thomas, the substance of his

writings concerning the soul's search for the Divine is governed by an epistemological

framew ork that draws on a similar theological source.98 Collings observes that St. John

shows a readiness to accept the scholastic definition of faith as a “rather uncongenial

formulation as a basis for his own teachings”. Collings observes that he

proceeds to make use of this doctrine for his own purpose, as a rationale for the experience of contemplation, by elaborating on the transcendent nature of faith and the natural understanding being 'overwhelmed' in thick darkness by this excessive light, yet the principle is still firmly fixed: the dark night of contemplation is but one dimension of that ‘believing truths revealed by God’ which is common to all Christian faith, even the most elementary.99

5.5.1. THE JOURNEY OF FAITH

There appears to be a deep agreement between St. John of the Cross and St. Thomas concerning the end and meaning of human life. However, St. John of the Cross's description

of the means the soul must take to effect union with God is different. As Journet explains,

the great achievement of St. John of the Cross was to address the question of faith and its

importance for the soul in its divine journey. St. John writes, "this loving obscure

knowledge, which is faith, serves, in a manner, in this life as a means of the divine union, as

the light of glory hereafter serves for the beatific vision".100 St. Thomas had set out “faith”

as a “principle” whereas St. John takes up this “principle” and demonstrates its potentiality

for the divine-human encounter.

5.5.2. FAITH THE PROPORTIONATE MEANS

98 Ross Collings, John of the Cross (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1990), p.105. Collings discusses John of the Cross's particular treatment of the theological virtue of faith. 99Ibid. 177

Throughout his works, St. John of the Cross is at pains to emphasise that faith is the

proportionate or proximate means for union with God. The "faith" he refers to is the

theological virtue which has already been described by St. Thomas. The soil in which faith grows is that of the "mature soul", daimonios aner, i.e., the person set towards the higher

good who is ready to abandon not only the goods of the world but even spiritual delights.

The attitude of openness needs to kept in mind when the following texts are considered. St.

John's description of faith refers to the mode of knowing which takes place in the theologia negativa of the contemplative life (bios theoretikos). He writes:

Faith, the theologians say, is a certain and obscure habit of the soul. It is an obscure habit because it brings us to believe divinely revealed truths which transcend every natural light and exceed all human understanding.101

Faith is at the centre of St. John of the Cross's theology. Collings remarks that faith for St.

John is the "principle" that St. Thomas calls “faith” but in the context in which he places this

faith the emphasis is different. However, the faith invoked by John is a faith "activated" in

contem plative prayer. Faith in this context becomes "the very substance of prayer and the

spiritual life as the soul 'leans upon' nothing but them, 'leaving behind' its earlier images and

concepts."102

"Faith" described by John has been compared to a "dark night" "because a brighter light will eclipse and suppress a dimmer one". The action is compared to the "sun":

100Journet, The Dark Knowledge, 1948, p.97. See note 66, St. John of the Cross, The Ascent of Mount Carmel, Bk. II, Chapter 24. 101 St. John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel, II, 3, 1, in St. John of the Cross, The Collected Works of St John of the Cross, translated by Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez (Washington,D.C.: ICS Publications, Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1973) ; See ST. I-II, 62, 1, Of the Theological Virtues (Art. 1, “Whether There Are Any Theological Virtues?”). The “Faith” referred to here is, as St. Thomas had stated, a "theological principle" or "theological virtue". Because God is the object of these principles these theological virtues "are infused in us by God alone and these virtues are not made known except by Divine revelation contained in Holy Writ." This faith is not to be confused with “natural” faith in someone or something. Faith here is theological because the goal is God. 178

The sun so obscures all other lights that they do not seem to be lights at all when it is shining, and instead of affording vision to the eyes it overwhelms, blinds and deprives them of vision, since its light is excessive and unproportioned to the visual faculty.103

In a similar fashion, "faith in its abundance suppresses and overwhelms that of the intellect".104 John of the Cross distinguishes two modes of knowing. First, the intellect's

"own power" which comprehends, referred to as "only natural knowledge". He points to the

potential the soul has to be "raised to a supernatural act whenever our Lord wishes".105

Here, John of the Cross maintains that the means must be proportionate to the end. The

"means" must "manifest a certain accord with and likeness to the end", sufficient in such a way "for the attainment of the desired goal".106 St. John has taken up the theological virtue

of faith to reveal how the substance of faith in darkness is the site for the divine presence in

the soul. In his works St. John elaborates on the transcendent nature of faith and how the

natural understanding is overwhelmed in darkness by excessive light. 107

5.5.3. DARKNESS OF FAITH

The description of sun and light and the pain of the brightness are symbols which

appear to be similar to Plato’s description of the experience of the Prisoner of the Cave. All

of these characteristics point to a reality that is obviously different from empirical reality but

all the same a reality present to the spiritual man, Plato’s philosopher. The experience is

102Collings, John of the Cross, 1990, p.105. Ross Collings, Passivity in St. John on the Cross, Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford University, 1979, pp. 231-232. 103Collings refers to St. John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel, II, 3, 1. 104St. John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel, II 3, 1, 1973. 105Ibid. 106Ibid., II 8, 2. 107Collings points out that it is important to be cautious in the way we apply the principle that Thomas and John view “the same thing” from “different viewpoints” (p. 6), especially as both theologians use the same terminology. He notes that "Thomas and John are writing in what we might call different realms of discourse and that the terms of one writer are not simply transferred to the context of the other" (p.8). See Collings, Passivity in St. John of the Cross, 1978. 179

“mystic ism” or what Voegelin refers to as the stratum of experience of human consciousness

of the divine.108

In St. John of the Cross’s works vivid examples are found to explain what is

happening. Two metaphors he uses are a "road" that leads to the city, and the "enkindled log". He writes:

If fire is to be united with a log of wood, it is necessary for heat, the means, to prepare the log first with a certain likeness and proportion to the fire. This is done by communicating to the wood a particular amount of heat. Now if anyone wanted to prepare the log by an inadequate means, such as air, water, or earth, there would be no possibility of union between the log and the fire, just as it would be impossible to reach the city without taking the proper road that connects with it.109

Keeping to the "philosophical axiom" of “proportion” John of the Cross concludes that "if

the intellect then is to reach union with God in this life, insofar as it is possible, it must take

that means which bears a proximate likeness to God and unites with him.”110

The importance of "the proximate means of union with God" is reiterated by John of

the Cross throughout his writings. He constantly demonstrates that "our natural way of knowing" can only grasp an object through forms and phantasms (images) of things perceiv ed through the senses. It is a "natural" way of knowing, unlike that of the

"supernatural way":

... the intellect according to the possibilities of its ordinary power is neither capable nor prepared, while in the prison of the body, for the reception of the

108Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, pp. 112-113. 109 St. John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel II 8, 2. 110 Ibid. John writes: “Let it be recalled, then, that according to a philosophical axiom all means must be proportionate to their end. That is, they must manifest a certain accord with and likeness to the end - of such a degree th at they would be sufficient for the attainment of the desired goal.” The word “proximate” describes the closest manner in which the soul can attain to “seeing” God by the dark night of faith, i.e. faith becomes the means. The “faith” St. John refers to is that same supernatural principle of St. Thomas and it is regarded in Christian theology as one of the three great theological virtues. In St. John of the Cross’s teaching this “proximate” means that faith is the path that the prayerful soul must follow to encounter God. 180

clear knowledge of God. Such knowledge does not belong to this state, since death is a necessary condition for possessing it.111

5.5.4. FAITH ALIGNED WITH CHARITY

In considering St. John of the Cross’s description of the mode of knowing one can see that he is applying the principle of faith in a specific way to those individuals who have

reached a certain maturity on their spiritual journey. What is important in his exposition on

the theological virtue of faith is the close alignment with the other theological “principle”,

which is the theological virtue of charity. Both St. John and St. Thomas insist they are

referring to “supernatural virtues”, that is powers “infused” by God in the soul. As Maritain

explains, commenting on the words of John of the Cross on this matter, "we do not know

God by His essence" but "by His effects". He insists that even "pure knowledge" is unable

to unite the soul with God but "love on the contrary can".112 Thomas Aquinas speaks in

similar terms in answer to the question "whether knowledge is a cause of love?"113 He answers that "a thing is loved more than it is known, since it can be loved perfectly even without being perfectly known."114

The distinction between "knowledge" and love in this context is best explained by

Thomas Aquinas, who states that "it does not follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known through another

111 St. John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carme,l II 8, 4. 112 Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 322, n.3 (John of the Cross-Cant, Stanza, 32, 19.) Maritain writes, “So God is still known by his effects (necessarily so in so much as he is not seen in his essence), but these effects are no longer the things or objects already known to the soul by which it rises in the ananoetic manner of human knowledge... .” 113ST. I-II, 77, 2. Of The Cause Of Sin On The Part Of The Sensitive Appetite (Art. “Whether the Reason Can Be Overcome by a Passion Against its Knowledge?”) 114Ibid. 181

thing".115He observes that although knowledge cannot unite us immediately to God, "love

on the contrary, can." "God, who in this world cannot be known by Himself, can be loved

by Himself" "immediately".116 In other words, the gulf between divine-human is “bridged

by love” which begins where knowledge ends [St. Thomas]. Maritain explains why St. John

of the Cross takes exception to "the idea that pure knowledge or pure understanding could be the means proportionate to union with God". In his thought, "contemplation is not its own

end but remains a means the most excellent of means and already united to the end.” The

union of love with God is a loving knowledge; a loving attentiveness to God.117

5.5.5. THE BOUNDARIES OF “UNION”

In the writings of St. John, considerable importance is given to recognising the

“distance” between the "creator" and the "creature" or between that which is Uncreated and

that which is created. His unique exposition of the dark night of faith is important in this

respect. On the one hand, he emphasises the "nothingness of creatures" in the face of the

absoluteness of God; however, the soul is not left to its own resources in the face of such a

chasm between the realisation of its creatureliness and the transcendent. The union is

attained by faith as a means to encounter God.118 His radical approach to the via negativa

and the “dark night” of faith have a purpose. He writes "Faith, manifestly, is a dark night

115ST. II-II, 27, 2, Of The Principal Act Of Charity Which is Love (Art. 2 “Whether Love Considered As an Act of Charity Is the Same As Goodwill?”) 116Ibid. 117 Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 1937, pp. 326-37. Maritain writes that “This is the theological root of the doctrine of St John of the Cross.” (In theology what John means by union of love of God is referred to as the created participation of grace through the Christian’s membership in the Church by Baptism.) 118St. John of the Cross's work deals with the process of the soul, leaving aside everything that does not unite it with God. 182

for man , but in this very way it gives him light. The more darkness it brings upon him, the

more light it sheds. For by blinding it illuminates him... ."119

As he explains, the reason for the obscurity is the nature of God, i.e. the distance

between the creature and God.120 Some reference was made to St. Thomas's approach for

the importance of the soul to be prepared by “grace”. In the writings of St. John the

importance of the preparation by “grace” is given more intensity. Throughout his works he

explores the subtle psychological movements of the “soul”, understood as the “centre of a

person”. Participation, as St. John explains, can be attained only through a spiritual

transformation so that God can enter into substantial communion with his creature.

Balthasar observes that this "contact between substance and substance" is not only in the

"natural ontological sphere of the universal analogia entis (which to some degree can also be realised by mystics outside the Christian tradition), but also - and John quite explicitly distinguishes the two - in the supernatural sphere...".121 It is important to stress that mysticism as understood here in no way tends towards the pantheistic solution,122 although

the language might seem to suggest this. Within the framework of St. John of the Cross's

mystical theology as Balthaser insists “we are a long way here from seeing man's relation to

God as either one of opposition or immersion.”123 In St. John’s theology “ it is never a case

119 St. John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel, II 3, 4. 120See St. John of the Cross, The Dark Night, in Collected Works, 1973, where John of the Cross expounds the passive purifications of the soul’s journey to God through what he calls the dark night of faith. 121 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “St. John of the Cross”, The Glory of the Lord, in Vol. 3, Studies in Theological Styles: Lay Styles (Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1986), p. 140. 122 Urs von Balthasar, ‘St. John of the Cross’, The Glory of the Lord, in Vol. 3, Studies in Theological Styles: Lay Styles, p. 141. See St. John of the Cross, Ascent, II, 5, 3. St. John writes: To understand the nature of this union, one should first know that God sustains every soul and dwells in it substantially, even though it may be that of the greatest sinner in the world. This union between God and creatures always exists. By it he conserves their being so that if the union would end they would immediately be annihilated and cease to exist. 123 Urs von Balthasar, “St. John of the Cross”, The Glory of the Lord (1986), p. 143. 183

of the creature being engulfed by God; it is rather the incorporation of the creature in the

whole of his being, with all his powers,... into the depths of grace".124

As Balthasar remarks, the theological principle, in the theology of John of the Cross faith, has received special attention. St. John identifies “faith” with contemplation:

For faith is depicted as nonvision and noncomprehension, whereas contemplation means vision. Where the two are identified, then the act of 'mystical theology', with all its nonvision, dispossession, privation and night, must nevertheless involve vision: vision in the mode of nonvision, vision of someone present in the mode of absence or as through a veil or a quest, which is so absolute, tends so much towards the Absolute itself, that it cannot do other than ultimately find, 'hunt down', the Absolute; then again, the vision is love, which is set so much on the ultimate that it discovers the ultimate being itself as the mystery of love.125

Balthasar comments that “the dizzy heights” concerning the soul’s union with God are specific to heroic souls.126 He explains that “pure faith” is defined by John in two senses: in a negative sense, with “the elimination of every figura, every finite form, that faith, as faith in God and for God alone, transcends in its formal object.”127In the positive sense when the

“night of faith” is identified with the night of contemplation, it represents an existential

relationship with God - a state in which one is affected by God - albeit formless, whether

positive or negative.”128In both ways St. John is dependent on the great spiritual tradition -

Evagrius, Macarius, Denys [Pseudo-Dionysius], Gregory, Bonaventure and others. The

radicalness of St. John is that he has illuminated Christian tradition with his own experience

of “union” with God.129 For him, discursive knowledge is left behind and the “experience”

of the night of faith takes over.

5.6. SUMMARY

124 Ibid., p. 144. 125 Ibid., pp. 144 -145. 126 Ibid.,p. 159. 127Ibid. 128Ibid. 184

In the Christian experience the key principle is faith, as elaborated by St. John of the

Cross and also by St. Thomas. In the writings of St. John the mode of participation is the union in which the "creature" or the knower meets the "creator" or Divine Ground. It is the theological virtue of “faith” that is closely associated with another theological virtue, "love".

These two virtues of faith and love are "activated" in contemplative prayer. Prayer which is loving contemplation of God affects the soul's union with God. Union of this kind, even in

the highest contemplation, is still limited by the "nothingness of the creature" and the

"absoluteness of God", and the chasm is bridged by this special faith encounter with God.

The examination of the life of reason considered in the Christian experience has

given prominence to the illumination of knowing by the “principles” of faith, hope and

charity.130 The major differentiation of the life of reason in the Christian experience is

detected in the gulf between the creature and God. The abyss between two such different

entities is bridged by the “additional principle of faith” (St. Thomas and St. John) or loving

knowledge. The divine-human encounter is attained only by the free gift of God and the creature’s readiness to respond to that gift. In the encounter between the soul and God, the divine is characterised as a meeting of the Divine as “Person” whereas in the Parable of the

Cave the divine presence was experienced as a “force” drawing the person towards the light of the sun. These are key radical differences between the Platonic vision and Christian experience.

The purpose of this discussion was to draw attention to the role of mysticism in

Western thought and the preservation of the life of reason. Christian thinkers have elaborated on the divine-human encounter and have provided a body of knowledge that has sustained

129Ibid., p.160. 185

the life of reason against the onslaughts of dogmatism and reductionism. St. Thomas and St.

John in their theological expositions have shown that conceptual knowledge is essential to

the Christian experience.

The life of reason has so far been considered in Hellenic and Judaeo-Christian

experience. In the next chapter the life of reason is considered in relation to homonoia,

meaning “same mind” or more comprehensively “unity”. Voegelin recognised that homonoia is a symbol that indicates the type of order present in society.

130St. Thomas calls this special help in knowing “additional principles”. 187

CHAPTER SIX

THE LIFE OF REASON AND HOMONOIA, A CREATIVE FORCE IN WESTERN

SOCIETY.

In the previous chapters I have elaborated the key features of the life of reason in the

Hellenic and Christian experiences. The anthropological type of truth experienced by Plato

was the discovery of the psyche as the site of transcendence. Aristotle by his description of

the human nous drawing its meaning from the Logos contributed to understanding noesis.

From that noetic origin he developed the idea of political friendship as a basis for order in society. The Greek philosophers’ perception of order provided foundational principles which served as the basis of order in Western society for the next 2400 years.

When Judaeo-Christianity was received into Western consciousness the noesis principle as previously experienced by the Hellenists was radically transformed. In Judaeo-

Christianity the experience of the divine-human encounter was more intense. An indication of the differentiation was manifested in the Thornbush experience of Moses when God revealed his Name to Moses. A further intensity of transcendence appeared in the divine- human encounter of the Incarnation. In the present chapter I will be studying the noesis symbol in relation to another symbol, homonoia. So far the order of the soul (divine-human encounter) has been discussed, now it is time to look at the ordering principle of society.

188

6.1. HOMONOIA, AN ORDERING PRINCIPLE IN SOCIETY

Homonoia, “the same mind”, is connected with the nous. Aristotle recognised the actualisation of the nous as the search for order of the soul.1 The actualisation of the nous in society is homonoia [likemindedness], the symbol of political friendship. Homonoia, according to Voegelin, is a key principle that determines “what the substance of society really is”.2 He insists that the presence or absence of homonoia in a society determines whether a particular society is “open” or “closed”. Homonoia is likened to a “gauge” or criterion which measures “the movement of ideas".3 Furthermore, Voegelin regards homonoia,4 as one of the "founding elements of democracy".5

Despite the scattered references in Voegelin's writings to homonoia his insights are significant and comprise a key to his thought on “order of society” and “order of history”.6

Voegelin explains that he became mindful of the “problem of homonoia” only gradually.

Not until he learnt Greek and was able to read the texts in their original language did he became “aware of the fundamental function” of homonoia. In his investigation of

“community” Voegelin found that the “transformation” of community substance had not

1Voegelin, Order and History: Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, p. 321. 2Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 30. He writes, “That was the first time I became aware of the problem of homonoia, about which I knew extremely little at the time, because my knowledge of Classic philosophy was still quite insufficient and my knowledge of Christian problems practically non- existent. Only later, when I had learned Greek and was able to read the texts in the original, did I become aware of the fundamental function of such categories for determining what the substance of society really is.” 3 Eric Voegelin, Speeches and Writings, Unpublished Notes, Box 57.4 Chapter Three, S 5. “Homonoia-The Empire People”, p.83. See Eric Voegelin, “Speeches and Writing”, Box 57. 4, p. 84, “Unpublished Works”, kept in the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California. 4See the article on homonoia by Ernst Dassmann et al., Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum: Sachworterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der antiken Welt.(Stuttgart: Anton Hierseman, 1992), 122/123 Homilie [Forts.] - Honorar. Voegelin considered “homonoia as the basic community concept of the Hellenistic and later of the Roman world (concordia),and through the of St. Paul the idea became one of the founding elements of democracy". 5 Eric Voegelin, Speeches and Writings, Unpublished Notes, Box 57. 4, Chapter Three, S 5. “Homonoia-The Empire People”, p. 84. 189 received “adequate treatment" from scholars. The reluctance he felt was due to the fact that

"there exists no generally accepted term to signify it."7

Homonoia literally, means “same mind” and draws its meaning from noesis. The nous of the philosopher participates in the Divine Nous.8 I have referred to Hellenic ideas of man’s nous participating in the xynon, common knowledge of the logos. Homonoia translated from Greek in Roman writings is concordia. Later, the idea of “one mind” was taken up by St. Paul and by other Christian thinkers and transformed into the “unity” of Christians with Christ and each other.

To translate homonoia precisely into English is difficult. In the negative it means “to live without quarrelling”. The opposite of homonoia is stasis or discord.9 Homonoia can also sometimes refer to the union between groups of people belonging to different mentalities and outlooks. As an abstract term in the oecumene, the inhabited world, homonoia emerges as an idea denoting equality and brotherhood. Unanimity was recognised as a positive good in the polis.

6Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 30. 7Voegelin, “The Growth of the Race Idea”, Reveiw of Politics, Vol. 2 , 1940, p. 302. 8Refer to J. de Romilly, 1972, p. 200, “Vocabulaire et Propagande ou Les Premiers Emplois du Mot ομονοια”, [“Vocabulary and Propaganda or the First uses of homonoia”, trans.] Melanges de Linguistique et de Philologie Grecques offerts a Pierre Chantraine (Paris, Klincksieck, 1972). See n. 8, p. 200, where she notes that “the word homonoia, with its little intellectualist element implied by the relationship with nous, was well able to express such values.” [Trans. Rosemary Opdenbosch] Romilly cites Thucydide, VIII, 92, 6; , Helleniques, II, 3, 15. 9W.W. Tarn, Alexander the Great: Vol. 2, Sources and Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), Appendix 25, "Brotherhood and Unity", p. 400. He refers to Alexander concerning a single idea that has three facets ... the third is homonoia. Tarn writes: “It means ‘a being of one mind together’; it was to become the symbol of the world's longing for something better than everlasting wars”. 190

6.2 HOMONOIA IN CLASSICAL LITERATURE

The idea "that all men qua men are equal" is a notion drawn from the experience

(xynon) of the cosmos that "men are men and gods are gods”. Voegelin insists that the

premise is based on the claim that noetic experiences are binding on all.10 It is the universality of noetic experiences that endows them with community-creating substance.

Voegelin refutes the idea that such experiences can be relegated to the “biophysical”.

“Universal mankind” is not a society existing in the world, but a symbol which indicates human consciousness participating in earthly existence, in the mystery of a reality that moves toward its transfiguration. “Universal mankind” is an eschatological index.11 The noetic experiences of the Greek philosophers have a theophanic character. The psyche is constituted as the sensorium of reality. In the philosophy of Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle

"noetic science" is present not as the result of argument (doxa, opinion) but through

participation in the ground of being.

The origins of homonoia can be traced back to the pre-Socratic period when

Heraclitus was writing, about 500 BC. Hellenic perception of the order of community was

mythic, which meant a conception of community that blended the “cosmos, gods and men into the ultimate ground."

6.2.1. HERACLITUS

Voegelin cites fragments of Heraclitus's writing (B1) that refer to the Logos:

This Logos here, though it is eternal, men are unable to understand before they hear it as well as when they hear it first. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this Logos, they are like untried [sic. inexperienced] men when they try words and deeds such as I set forth, explaining each thing according to its nature and showing what the real state of the case is. But as

10Voegelin. Anamnesis, 1978, “What is Right by Nature”, p. 57. 11Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4 , 1974, p. 305. 191

to these other men, it escapes their notice what they do when awake, as it escapes their memory what they do when asleep (B1).12

The Logos is also understood as “law” or “order” of the cosmos. Voegelin writes,

"Agreement with his logos will produce homologia, a conception of community that prefigures the homonoia of Aristotle, of Alexander, and St. Paul”.13 Heraclitus perceives the duty of all “to follow the common [xynon]”. The term “common”, xynon found in Heraclitus refers to a primal understanding of unity when people are in agreement with the Logos.14 He makes the complaint: “But though the Logos is common, xynon, the many live as if they have a wisdom of their own [idian phronesin]”.15 Voegelin comments, “The Logos is what men have in common, and when they are in agreement with regard to the Logos (homologia) then they are truly in community.”16 Heraclitus is sceptical about the ability of the sleepers to wake up; he nevertheless invites them to participate in his Logos. He exhorts them to

12Voegelin, Order and History, The World of the Polis, Vol. 2, 1957, p. 230. Voegelin takes this quote from G.S. Kirk and J.E. Ravin, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 188. Heraclitus's understanding of the Logos is examined and these writers argue that “the terms ‘formula', 'proportionate arrangement' and so on are misleading abstracts as translations of this technical sense of Logos [λογοσ] was probably conceived by Heraclitus as an actual constituent of things, and in many respects it is co- extensive with the primary cosmic constituent, fire". See also E. G. Weltin, Athens and Jerusalem: An Interpretative Essay on Christianity and Culture (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1967). Weltin explains that the Logos notion is seen as moving closer to . He writes, “In Heraclitus, at the end of the sixth century, however, one might find a clearer and more influential exponent of a single deity, since his Logos can be conceived of, at least metaphorically, as a supernatural pantheistic force moving the universe from within, a view attractive to later Stoics” (p.74). 13Voegelin, Order and History, The World of the Polis, Vol. 2 , 1957, p. 231. 14Ibid., Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought, Trans. by T.G. Rosenmeyer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p.145. Snell traces the pre-Socratic distinction between the divine and human but “eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men if they have barbarian souls”. [ Heraclitus fg. 107]. All experience, necessary as it is, remains without value unless it leads to an intensive understanding of the logos, the basis of which speech is only the superstructure, and whose objective existence is implied in every word that hits the mark. The term “common” is significant here in its use as an overall designation for the notion of the 'community creating force of the Logos.” Thus the notion of “common” becomes successively identified with the order of the cosmos, the divine law and even the idea of the “rule of war” which determines the coming into being and the passing away of all things. 15Voegelin, Order and History, The World of the Polis, Vol. 2, 1957, p. 232. 16 Ibid. 192 agree with him (homologeein), not hearing him but the Logos. Agreement with the Logos will produce, homologos (agreeing).17

Voegelin comments on the pair of words “common/private” linked with those of

“wake/sleep”. He cites Heraclitus,

Those who are awake have a world [kosmos] one and common, but those who are asleep each turn aside into their private worlds.18

Those who are “asleep” do not constitute a “community” but create their own world without a xynon (common) bond. They are likened to those who are “asleep”. These considerations show that foundational principles of order were already being developed by

Heraclitus.

6.2.2. HOMONOIA IN GREEK LITERATURE

In Greek thought the homonoia symbol had many applications. For example

Isocrates emphasises reconciliation of people rather than suppression. Homonoia was used in connection with Alexander’s attempt to blend the Greeks and the Persians. Homonoia was promoted in defence of eleutheria (freedom). Evidence suggests that homonoia although once an abstract ideal moved towards the idea of a personified divinity. In fact, there is some indication that Homonoia was worshipped at the Eleutheria festival.19 West points out

17 Ibid., p. 231,[frg 50 kr, 196] 18 Ibid., p. 232, Heraclitus, B 89. 19 Ibid., p. 324. Also see Wm. C. West, “Homonoia and the New Decree from Plataea”, in Greek Roman Byzantine Studies, Vol. 18 (1977), pp. 307-319, pp. 314 -315. West writes: In reconstructing the transition of Homonoia of the Hellenes from abstract ideal to divinity, Etienne and Pierart cite general propaganda of the middle of the fourth century, showing that the abstraction had been linked by Isocrates with war against Persia and that the creation of a Plataean legend is reflected in the fabrication of documents such as the Covenant of Plataea and the Oath of Plataea. They believe that the Eleutheria festival was founded after 338, but prefer to think that the divinization of Homonoia came later. Worship of Homonoia at this festival is not attested in our sources for it, which are late but may preserve a genuine tradition of the fourth century. Homonoia is thought to be divine when invoked in Alexis' Hypobolimaios (fr. 244 kock), which is roughly contemporary with the treaty of alliance between Athens, Sparta and Ptolemy II against Antigonus Gonatas moved by Chermonides (IG II-2 687). 193 that the terms “likemindedness” and “freedom” represent political aspirations, were easily conceptualised and were promoted in public oratory.20 Archaeological evidence of homonoia has also been found.21

In Stoic literature, homonoia was accepted as "a unity, a harmony, by the decree of the Divine Power; for the universe was the expression of Himself, and He Himself was

Homonoia".22 Tarn elaborates:

Stoics had several names for the unity - Homonoia, harmony, sympathy; but whichever term they used, the World-State, which was coterminous with the universe, was in harmony together and had been so from the start. The harmony, the Homonoia was there. ‘It is Thou,’ says Cleanthes in his great hymn to the Divine Power, ‘It is thou that hast made this harmony.’ 23

Zeno (336-264) has been attributed with the notion that homonoia (harmony), was patterned on the universe24and from this idea an analogy is made between the king's function in the state and the operation of God in the universe. It was assumed that a state would fall apart without the bond of fellowship (philia) which was understood as a

20 West, “Homonoia and the New Decree from Plataea”, in Greek Roman Byzantine Studies, Vol. 18 (1977), p. 309. 21 Ibid., p. 316; West writes "The fact that we now have evidence of a dual cult of these divinities at Plataea, a site associated with the Persian wars of the fifth century, attested at a far earlier period than previously known, strengthens this view considerably." See p. 316, note 11, West writes, “The decree specifies that it be set up by the common altar of the divinities, and a structure which could be interpreted as this altar was uncovered in 1971 near the find-spot of the decree, in an area later used for Christian graves of the fourth and fifth centuries (Spyropoulos, loc.cit. [supra n.1] ).” “Three bases of dedications by οι Βοιωτοι to Zeus (JG VII 1672-74) had been found in the nineteenth century in the nearby ruins of the Byzantine churches...by A.N. Skias, an excavator of the site.” 22W.W. Tarn, Alexander the Great, Vol. 2, Sources and Studies, "Brotherhood and Unity", Appendix 25, 1950, p. 423. 23Ibid., See Tarn’s reference in n. 3.S.V.F.II,fr. 1076 (Chrysippus). 24John Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World (London: Methuen, 1958), p. 125. Ferguson writes that Alexander's version of unity was "transmuted philosophically into Stoic universalism." "To the Stoics homonoia already existed. It is to be seen in the universe, said Zeno, and later the example of the heavenly bodies was used in demonstration of the fact.” See p. 125, n. 4, D.Chr.XL 35 ff. 194 partnership reflecting the homonoia (harmony) of the universe. For this reason it was the function of the king to promote unity.25

6.3. HOMONOIA IN PLATO (427-347 BC)

References to homonoia26 can be found in Plato’s works. He writes that “wisdom consists in the harmony of thought.”27 For example, “Homonoia”, says Socrates, addressing Hippias in the pages of Xenophon, “is generally agreed to be the greatest blessing a state can have. Cabinets and leading citizens regularly tell the people to achieve unity of purpose. Everywhere in Greece there exists a law that the people must swear to pursue the same ends in common purpose; everywhere they take this oath.”28

Such reflections are typical of the period. Ferguson observes that homonoia in that passage is extended only within the state. It goes no wider.29

Other examples of homonoia in Plato are provided by Betz: “Like the strings of a musical instrument, the wise man attunes the rational and sensual powers of the soul according to the degree of intelligence and brings feelings and desires into unison with the laws of the Logos. In this way the inner complete goodwill, the harmonious accord

25Ibid., p. 127. 26Refer to O. Betz, “Homonoia”, in Theologisches Wortenbuch zum Neuen Testament, Gerhard Kittel, ed. (Stuttgart: W Kolhhammer, 1932-1979), Vol. 9, 1971. p. 298. According to Plato, wisdom consists in the harmony of thought (p. 299). Betz refers to Leg III 689 d, Res P III 401 d. Tim 47d. 27 Ibid., Betz notes that homonoia is in Plato and chiefly means “harmonious blending of tones” as in music. He refers to Plat Crat 405 c.d. cp Tim 67c; Symp. 187 b. Leg. VII 812 d. Homonoia is also used to refer to the congruity of two tones. See Resp. VII 531 a.c. and also Xen. Mem. IV 4, 16. 28See John Ferguson, Moral Values, 1958, Chapter 7, “Homonoia”. 29Ibid., p. 119. Ferguson cites “Socrates addressing Hippias in the pages of Xenophon”: ... I don’t believe the purpose of this is merely to ensure that they vote for the same dramatic companies, approve the same musicians, exalt the same writers, and have the same tastes: it is to ensure that they obey the law. It is where the people uphold the law that a state achieves strength and prosperity. But without homonoia no state and indeed no family could be in a healthy condition [Xen. Mem.IV 4, 16]. Ferguson observes that Plato considers philia and homonoia as the two qualities demanded of a citizen [Alc.126 E] and the true [Polit.311c]. In all instances the concord referred to is internal concord (p. 119). 195

of man with himself is produced.”30 Also, “The beauty of the soul, formed through

reason, should find its harmonious matching in a beautiful bodily shape, so that an ideal

form of man is produced.”31 On this subject Betz remarks that “Greek philosophy reveals

an homonoia as harmonious order which constitutes the being of the cosmos and ensures

its continued existence. The harmony of the world rests on the togetherness and co-

operation of the opposing ....dimension.”32

Plato’s idea of community was circumscribed. Voegelin explains that the polis in

Athens was constructed out of families and tribes and no direct membership was possible

except through birth or adoption. The idea of personal membership in a community of spirit,

irrespective of family ties, was still in its infancy; it had just begun to express itself in the

fourth century, in the form of philosophical schools.33 Social unity at this early stage of city

life in Athens depended on natural ties. Even though Plato confronted the idea of community

he failed to provide an adequate solution. Voegelin suggests that this “question is especially

intriguing because Plato, one should think, had at his disposition the means of overcoming

disruption through family relations in his idea of a spiritual community united by the

Agathon.”34 Still, Plato did take account of “a Paideia which inculcates the same spirit in

the citizenry; but then he projects, in addition, a concrete somatic substance as the basis for

the spiritual community.” Voegelin insists that Plato’s particular idea of community was not

30Betz, “Homonoia”, Theologisches Wortenbuch zum Neuen Testament, 1971, p. 299. Betz refers to Plat Leg III 689d, c.f. 696 c; Resp VIII 554e. 31Ibid., Betz refers to Resp III 402d; IX 59d; Gorg 479 b. 32Ibid., Betz refers to Pseudo-Aristotle Mund 5p 396a33- 397 b, 8 c.f. Plato Sym 187 a. 33Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, p. 118. 34Ibid., p. 119. 196

“a passing idea in The Republic; for the same concern about proper mating as the condition

of spiritual balance reappears in the later Statesman.” 35

Voegelin’s main difficulty with the Platonic idea of community was the inclusion of

a somatic basis. The true order of the spirit could not be realised in community unless

supported by eugenic selection of “right bodies”. The difficulty reveals the degree to which

the Platonic notion of a spiritually formed personality was still embedded in the notion of a

compact myth of nature. In spite of recognising the separation of body and psyche, in

practice the two were still perceived as inseparable. Hence, for Plato to overcome the

disruptive exclusiveness of the family bond the solution was to be found in extending the

notion of family to the scale of the polis. Voegelin explains that “The polis is man written in

larger letters in more than one sense.”36 The Platonic difficulty involved the separation of

body and psyche. The problem of unity was not solved until the Christian experience

introduced the notion of the “mystical body”.37 The formation of a “mystical body” bound with a common spiritual substance present within the members was historically to become the solution.38

6.4. HOMONOIA AND ARISTOTLE (384- 322 BC)

In Aristotle, the notion of homonoia appears in several texts.39 In fact as Romilly remarks,40 “the entire development of De Mundo is dominated by an analysis of the cosmic

35Ibid. 36Ibid. 37Ibid., Voegelin notes, "The formation of a mystical body through a common spiritual substance living in all members has in fact, become historically the solution." 38 Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, 1957, p. 119. This topic is discussed in the next section. 39 Betz, “Homonoia”, Theologisches Wortenbuch zum Neuen Testament, 1971, p. 298. He notes that Aristotle considers homonoia as the harmonious blending of many tones. Refer to Post II 2, p. 90a 18f; Probl 19, 38, p. 921 a 2f. Aristotle distinguishes the harmonious blending of different voices from simple unison. Pol II 5 p. 1263 b 35, homonoia is understood here as the harmonious agreement of foods. 197

virtues of the homonoia.” It is “a theme dear to the author” for “the word [homonoia] is

part of the author’s vocabulary and of his thinking: it belonged to him, and not to Heraclitus;

and the resume is quite naturally coloured by this new language.”41Examples appear in De

Mundo where Aristotle wrote:

Yet some have wondered how it is that the Universe, if it be composed of contrary principles - namely, dry and moist, hot and cold - has not long ago perished and been destroyed. It is just as though one should wonder how a city continues to exist, being, as it is, composed of the opposite classes - rich and poor, young and old, weak and strong, good and bad. They fail to notice that this has always been the most striking characteristic of civic concord, that it evolves unity out of plurality, and similarity out of dissimilarity, admitting every kind of nature and chance. It may be that nature has a liking for contrarieties and evolves harmony out of them and not out of similarities. The arts, too, apparently imitate nature in this respect. They are of , which by mingling in the picture the elements of white and black, yellow and red, achieves representations which correspond to the original object. Music, too, mingling together notes, high and low, short and prolonged, attains to a single harmony amid different voices while writing, mingling vowels and consonants, composes them all in its art. The saying of Heraclitus the obscure was to the same effect: ‘Grasping wholes and not wholes, that which agrees and that which differs, that which produces harmony and that which produces discord; from all one and from one all .42

Elsewhere, Aristotle stated:

What is a harmony? An arithmetical ratio between high and low. Why does the high harmonise with the low? Because an arithmetical ratio holds between the high and the low. Can the high and the low harmonise? - Is there an arithmetical ratio between them? Assuming that there is, what then is the ratio?43

6.4.1 HOMONOIA, A POLITICAL CONCEPT

40J. de Romilly, “Vocabulaire et Propagande ou les Premiers Emplois Du Mot ομονοια,” [“Vocabulary and Propaganda or First uses of homonoia”] in Melanges de Linguistique et de Philologie Grecgues offerts a Pierre Chantraine, Paris: Klincksieck, 1972, pp. 199-29. 41Ibid., p. 202, notes, “un theme cher a l’auteur” [trans. a theme dear to the author]. The passage is preceded by a reference to πολιτιχηζ ομονοιαζ ( De Mundo 396 b, 4) and followed by other references to homonoia in general (De Mundo (397 a, 4). 42 Aristotle, De Mundo 396 b1-20. (Bold is mine). 198

For Aristotle homonoia most importantly was a political concept.44 His specific contribution was understanding homonoia in relation to philia, “political friendship”,45 or

“agreement” between citizens. Such political friendship is not an agreement of opinion such as might occur among strangers, or an agreement on a scientific proposition but rather an

“agreement’ between citizens”46concerning their interest on policies and their execution.

Ferguson remarks, “The definition of homonoia in positive terms we owe to Aristotle,”: he

“treats it under the general heading of friendship,47 and in giving it a clear positive content he differentiates it from homodoxia, or agreement of opinion.”48 Homonoia is seen as the social and political expression of friendship, and it is actively and closely tied to morality.

Ferguson observes that “there is unlikely to be any real unity of purpose except between men who are trying to do what is right. There may be honour among thieves, but it is very limited and soon breaks up. Consequently unity of purpose must be linked with morality.”49

6.4.2. HOMONOIA PARALLEL WITH NOUS

43Aristotle, Posterior Analeptics, Bk. II, 90a 44Ferguson, Morals in the Ancient World, 1958, p. 123. Ferguson writes, “Homonoia is a social and political expression of friendship, and it is active.” 45Voegelin elaborates on this theme in his Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, p. 321. He refers to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1163b 23; See also Eric Havelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (New Haven: Yale University, 1957), pp. 290-291. Havelock cites Aristotle’s Ethics Bk. 8 and 9 as a treatise on personal friendship. Havelock writes: He [Aristotle] owes here, as always, a good deal to Plato’s inspiration. His own premisses require him to present friendship teleologically as achieved completely only in relationships between two completely good and virtuous men, who bear a strong resemblance to Aristotle himself. However, the Greek term philia could apply to other relationships besides personal ones. Aristotle narrows it down, so to speak, as he becomes progressively involved in his thesis of the fellowship of good men, but here and there he feels compelled to notice fellowship in its more diluted forms, as it inheres in various kinds of social, legal and political partnerships. Consensus, a classic term, is included in his over-all review. Now, he specifically admits that the term is political. But he goes on to try and accommodate it to his own present perspective by arguing that it could also apply to a personal relationship.” 46 Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, p. 321. 47See Ferguson, Morals in the Ancient World, 1958, p. 123, n. 2. He refers to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1155 a 24; IX 1167 a 23 ff. 48Ibid. 49Ibid. 199

When Voegelin examined Aristotle’s use of homonoia he found that homonoia was

parallel with nous. The political sense of “friendship” is based on the ordering of nous in

one's soul, which in turn is the source of order in human relations. A perfect community will be achieved only between those who recognise the order of nous in common. Voegelin

insists that this is the raison d'etre of the polis. A polis is constituted by being an association of diversified human types. For a group of “like” people does not constitute a polis but is merely a family or tribe. That type of unification could be destructive whereas a more embracing type of unity is demanded for groups with diverse cultures.

Aristotle’s understanding of “order” is a higher type than that based on natural ties.

Voegelin elaborates:

At this juncture of his description Aristotle touches on the ultimate source of order between men. The specifically human order of society is the order created through the participation of man in the divine nous; just order in society will be realised to the degree in which the potentiality of noetic order becomes actualised in the souls of men who live in society. Justice is ultimately founded in nous and philia.50

If harmonious conditions are present then agreement prevails. Agreement is understood as

homonoia and pertains to friendship based on likeness in the actualisation of the nous.

Commenting on the Aristotelian “achievement” Voegelin states that Aristotle had reached

“the border of transcendence” and had “taken the language of philosophical anthropology”

to the area of religious symbolisation.51 At the same time, his understanding was limited

“there remained in Aristotle the fundamental hesitiation which distinguished the Hellenic

from the Christian idea of man”, for he insisted that friendship (philia) between God and

50Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, p. 321. Voegelin cites Nicomachean Ethics, 1167 b3-4 [politike philia, political friendship] 51Ibid., pp. 363-64. Voegelin comments, “we are advancing, in the Platonic sense, from the symbolisations of the people’s myth to the differentiated experiences of the philosophers and to their symbolisations. This 200 man was impossible. The result was that the nature of man was understood in an immanent sense as the form of an organic being. The notion of immortalisation was present, but for him human nature found its fulfilment immanently.52 Aristotle penetrated into the region of the nous in the religious sense.53

Voegelin insists that for homonoia, “likemindedness”, to prevail as the substance of any group, society or polis such agreement must rest on the premise that all men are equal

[as men]. Aristotle’s recognition of this type of order was an advance. Voegelin remarks that Aristotle’s actual terminology was adopted by St. Paul and a new meaning was given to homonoia. It was through Paul’s usage that homonoia as a term was transformed ultimately to become a central feature in the Christian community.54 Hellenic thought had touched on the Christian understanding of philia, “friendship”, for in the Christian experience,

“friendship” was amicitia between God and man. The Aristotelian position did not allow for a formation of the human soul through grace [forma supernaturalis].55 Notwithstanding,

Aristotle's notion of political friendship did suggest the beginning of political "ideals".

6.5. THE HELLENISTIC ERA

advance is part of the historical process in which the older symbolic order of the myth disintegrates in the souls ... and a new order of the soul in openness to transcendental reality is restored on a more differentiated level.” 52Ibid., p. 364. 53Ibid. 54Ibid. See also Aristotle who refers to "reason" as "our natural ruler guide". Aristotle states: But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine then in comparison with man the life of the intellect must be divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us being ‘men to think of men’, and being ‘mortal of mortal things’ but must so far as we can make ourselves immortal and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it is small in bulk much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b, 26 ff. The Complete Works of Aristotle: Revised Oxford translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Vol. 2, Bollingen Series LXXI.2 (Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 1861. 55 Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, 3, p. 364. Voegelin explains, "Transcendence does not transform the soul in such a manner that it will find fulfilment in transfiguration through grace in death." 201

In the thought of Alexander the Great homonoia was employed to cement the broad

domains of empire. Homonoia was extended to encompass diverse groups.56 He sought to

unite the “barbarians” of the East and the Greeks of the West. The imperial dream of

Alexander was an “attempt to blend Persians and Hellenes in harmony, the homonoia, of

his empire.57 Voegelin writes, "the king realises through action what the philosopher only

dreams and talks about".58 There is a significant section (I,6;329a-d) where praises

the “much admired Politeia of Zeno”. He argues that men should form one polity and

people with a common life and an order common to all. Voegelin writes, “What Zeno only

dreamt, Plutarch continues, Alexander put into effect; for to Zeno’s reason (logos) he supplied his deed (ergon). Alexander did not follow the advice of Aristotle to treat the

Hellenes as their hegemon, the barbarians as their master, but was convinced that ‘he was sent by the gods (theoten) to be the general harmoniser (harmostes) and reconciler

(diallaktes) of the All.’”59 For ultimately it was Alexander’s plan “to gain for all men

harmony (homonoia) and peace () and community (koinonia) among one another

(Plutarch 1,9 33 oe)”.60 Voegelin emphasises the point that Alexander should speak of

himself as the reconciler and harmoniser of the world in this manner. He observes that

Alexander’s conception of an empire in this form became accepted as common knowledge.

Voegelin analyses the Banquet of Opis.61 After the mutiny at Opis which had ended

with a reconciliation between the king and his Macedonian veterans, Alexander offered

sacrifices and arranged a feast. Sitting next to him at the banquet were the Macedonian

56Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumene, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 155. Voegelin refers to Plutarch’s text (c.a. 46-120) Fortune and Virtue of Alexander. 57 Voegelin, Order and History, The World of the Polis, Vol. 2, 1957, p. 324. 58 Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p.155. 59Ibid. 60 Ibid., pp. 155-56. Voegelin cites Plutarch, 1,9:33oe. 202 companions, next to them the Persians, and then the delegates from the other tribes according to their precedence in reputation and excellence. Alexander and his comrades drank from the same bowl and poured the libations, the Greek seers and Persian magicians opening the ceremony. The ritual reached its climax when Alexander rose to say the important prayer.62 Voegelin observes, “According to the reading accepted by most scholars, Alexander ‘prayed for the other good things and for Homonoia, and partnership in rule (koinonia tes arches) between Macedonians and Persians.’”63

6.5.1. THE KINGSHIP OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT (336-323 BC)

Some historians have conceded that the king prayed for nothing other than harmonious relations with the joint Macedonian-Persian government of the empire.

Voegelin, however, supports Tarn who holds that such an interpretation is incompatible with the situation of the Banquet, at which representatives of the various peoples of the realm were present numbered up to nine thousand.64 Alexander believed himself to be divinely sent to exercise a ministry of reconciliation throughout the world. Alexander’s mission meant in practice a broadening of homonoia until its scope was universal. Hence homonoia must have been requested for the vast and mixed population under Alexander’s

61 Ibid., p. 156. 62 Ibid., pp. 156-157. Voegelin notes, “The text of the prayer quite possibly is not complete, though its tradition goes back to Ptolemy; moreover its grammar bears more than one translation.” Voegelin refers to note 31, p. 444 in W.W. Tarn, Alexander the Great, II: Sources and Studies (Cambridge: 1948). Literature on the subject of the prayer is in Tarn, Alexander the Great, II: Sources and Studies, 1948, pp. 434-49; See also Ernest Barker, From Alexander to Constantine (Oxford: 1956), who has translated the prayer: He writes, “Alexander prayed for blessings, and especially for the blessing of human concord (Homonoia) and of fellowship in the realm (koionoia tes arches) between the Macedonia and Greeks ”( p. 6). 63 Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 156-157. Alexander's conception of the empire related by Arrian in his Anabasis of Alexander, VII, 7, 8-9, 73, was the Banquet of Opis. 64 Ibid. In note 31, Voegelin refers to W.W. Tarn, Alexander the Great, II: Sources and Studies (Cambridge, 1948), p. 444, where references are given on the literature on the prayer. Tarn's interpretation, once criticised, has now been substantiated by recent discoveries of an altar at Plataea; Tarn favours the approach that Alexander saw himself as having "a mission from God to bring general harmony and to be reconciler of the world." His intuition was symbolised by the famous libation at the banquet with a vast number of peoples from many nations. 203

rule. The request is suggested by the passages in Plutarch’s writings which probably render

the tenor of the prayer. Voegelin suggests that the text does not render Alexander’s prayer

“literally” but “the probable meaning is reconstructed”. It is necessary to assume that the king prayed

... not for fellowship between Macedonians and Persians, but for the blessings of the gods for Macedonians and Persians. Among these blessings the prayer then singled out the homonoia kai koinonia tes arches. If we make this assumption, we create a context of meaning that is intelligible both intellectually and pragmatically. For the formula of the specific blessing transfers the categories of homonoia (being of one nous, likemindedness) and koinonia, which Aristotle had developed for the polis, to Alexander's creation, i.e. to the empire that embraced not only the Macedonians and Persians, but also Greeks, Egyptians, Phrygians, Phoenicians, Arameans, Babylonians, Arabs, Indians, and so forth. That such a vast agglomeration of culturally variegated peoples was in dire need of a community of the spirit (nous) to become the people of an empire will hardly be doubted.65

The Hellenic understanding of homonoia (Plato and Aristotle) was concerned with unity

between citizens, i.e. “fraternal sentiment between members of a symbolic group."66

However, Alexander’s prayer expanded homonoia to an ever larger group until finally it was understood as "the sentiment which has to create unity between Greeks and Barbarians in his world empire."67 Voegelin’s expression to “create unity” is significant because “unity” of

this kind is not to be reduced to merely a psychological feeling but is an ontological unity

arising from human participation with the divine Nous or Logos.

It is in this larger perspective that homonoia is understood and employed by

Alexander the Great. Homonoia is able to embrace the “barbarians” and weld together two very different peoples. Notwithstanding, when Alexander died, his empire died with him

(323 BC). Nevertheless, in that short time, a large part of the civilised world had undergone a momentous and permanent change. Any further development of national unity

65Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 157-158. 204

or a united world-order in the sense of transcending national differences was delayed for

the next hundred and fifty years until became the dominant power in the

Mediterranean world.68

A radical shift of understanding of the notion of unity had taken place with

Alexander the Great’s political designs. Previously a multiplicity of separate self-governing

cities was determined as the best constitution of politics. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of

separate self-governing cities gave way to the idea of a single cosmopolis. Alexander the

Great’s plans included belief in an equality between all men. These two fundamental

principles inaugurated a new epoch and surpassed the old understanding of a polis.69

6.6. THE ROMAN EMPIRE

The rulers of the Roman empire drew their inspiration of unity from the Hellenists.

Barker observes that the foundational principles on which the Empire rested made it more than a structure based on the principles which had germinated in the [Middle] East:70

66Voegelin, "The Growth of the Race Idea", Review of Politics, 2, 3 (1940), p. 289. 67Ibid. 68T.R.Glover, The Ancient World (Penguin: 1948), p. 222. 69Ernest Barker, “The Conception of Empire”, in The Legacy of Rome, Cyril Bailey, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), p. 45. 70Ibid., p. 45. 205

... men had learned to believe in a single universal society, and in the government of that society by a king who was ‘as a god among men’, and indeed was a very god; and it was there, in the feeling of loyalty for the person of such a monarch, and even of ‘adoration’ of his divinity, that a corresponding social will had found its expression. If imperium was a Latin word, the idea of an empire and the idea of an emperor were not of Latin origin. We must recognise in the Roman Empire the result of the fusion of Roman political development and Roman institutional structure with Hellenistic ideas.71

Barker adds, “While it was the Greek genius which, in its latter days, rose to conceptions of

the unity of humanity, it was the Roman genius which translated those conceptions, in

themselves insubstantial and unbodied, into an organised system of life.”72

6.6.1. CICERO (106-43 BC)

Further evidence of the Greek influence on the order can be found in Cicero’s De Re

Publica, begun in 54 BC, in which forms of government are elaborated. According to

Cicero there were three forms of government, namely kingly, aristocratic and democratic.

Any one of these forms which abides by the principle of social equity can be endured.73 As

Rand comments,

This binding principle is the concordant respect for law in the interests of a common unity. The motive is not a feeling of weakness, but an innate desire for a unified life. For no man liveth for himself alone. Man is not naturally individualistic, or in Cicero’s more picturesque epithet, ‘lone-wandering’, (solivagus). Concordia is the key word in this analysis of human society.74

In Cicero’s De Re Publica Scipio takes the view that a “classless society” is not true to the facts of existence or fair to those who have an inborn capacity to rise. The best

71Ibid., pp. 45-6. 72Ibid., p. 46. Barker writes, Rome had independently built an empire on which “the Greeks afterwards looked, and as they looked exclaimed, ‘[τουτ εκεινο] : this is the unity of humanity of which we have been thinking all along’”. 73Cicero refers to , the tutor of Scipio and Panaetius, who considered Plato as the Prince of philosophers. 206

form of government consists in a combination of all three forms of government.75

Elsewhere, Cicero bewails the present state of the Res Publica and asks his fellowmen to head off any attack; “even if on every side we all put our backs into it to shore up the crumbling fabric of the Res Publica, our united strength will scarce suffice to keep its edifice intact.” He continues:

There was a time long ago when this state of ours was so strong and so secure that neither senatorial incompetence nor the wicked actions of individuals could disturb it. But that is no longer so. The treasury is empty, the tax collectors going bankrupt; respect for authority is non-existent; national unity is dissolved, the law courts have gone to ruin, the right to vote is the close preserve of a chosen few.76

Cicero writes that haruspices (prophecies) should be heeded and “surely the very voice of

heaven is bound to move us one and all. Do not credit the old wives’ tales you see on stage,

nor believe that some god actually comes down from heaven to associate with men, to spend

a while on earth, and walk and talk with them”.77

Rand explains that De Re Publica does more than set forth Scipio’s and Cicero’s

theories about good government. It is generally conceded that while the Romans excelled in

organisation and government they lacked certain spiritual aspirations. The Romans saw life

in terms of action and necessity. They would never have attained to any high degree of

consciousness without the contribution of the Greek mind.78 Moore writes, “It is true and fortunate for posterity that he [the Roman] was inspired by Greek idealism to much of his

74See Edward R. Rand, The Eternal Building of Eternal Rome (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943) p. 21 refers to De Re Publ. 1 39, 21. [ Cicero XVI De Re Publ. DE LEGIBUS, The Loeb Classical Library] 75Ibid., pp. 21-22. Rand refers to Cicero, De Re Publ. I 52. 76Cicero, Res Publica: Roman Politics and Society According to Cicero, trans.W.K. Lacey and B. W. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 201. 77Cicero, Res Publica: Roman Politics and Society according to Cicero, trans.W.K. Lacey and B. W. Wilson, 1970, pp. 201-202. 78R.W. Moore, The Roman Commonwealth (London: Hodder & Stoughton, English University Press, 1942), p. 31. In a word, the Romans lacked humanitas in the deeper sense of consciousness of “man”, nous participating in the divine Nous. 207

greatest work, but in himself he remained the realist of the Western world.”79 Rand supports

this view noting that “in its essence the of the Romans is true to the standards that

they took over from the Greeks.”80

Cicero employed the term, concordia (the Roman translation of homonoia), as a

symbol of unity. Cicero needed the term to express his perception of the Roman

Commonwealth.81 Concordia [ομονοια] was understood strictly in a political context. As

Mazzolani explains:

In the political thought of the ancient world there is no systematic legal basis for coexistence between nations. The rights and duties of citizens, both towards each other and towards the State, were exactly and strictly regulated; but relationships between one people and another interested neither the theoretician nor the legislator. The outer world was only significant if it threatened invasion or promised plunder. 82

In the Greek polis order was based on spontaneous obedience of individuals and internalisation of their code of conduct, whereas in Republican Rome the emphasis was on morality and civil law.

The break-up of Alexander’s empire had left a need for some common bond to be present to ensure peace among so many different peoples. Mazzolani writes that Roman thinkers began to formulate ideas of a universal empire. The problem of racial assimilation assumed importance.83 A clash of ideas ensued, with tensions between racial and social

equality and between those who wished to retain the old exclusive policy. Nevertheless, the

79Ibid. 80 Rand, The Eternal Building of Eternal Rome, 1943, p. 27; Also see Rand’s reference to Werner Jaeger Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. from the second German edition 1939, in n. 96 . 81 Ibid., p. 21. Rand refers to Cicero, De Re Publ. I 42; Regarding the use of homonoia see Helene Petre Caritas: Étude sur le Vocabulaire Latin de la Charite Christienne, 1948, Louvain 22 (Leiden). She notes that concordia appeared in Cicero De Rep. fat., 1, 2 (Ax, p 130) : “maxime nos quidem exquirentes ea consilia quae ad pacem et ad concordiam ciuium pertinent”; De Rep., Ii, 14, 27 (Ziegler, p. 57): “cum unde quadraginta annos summa in pace concordiaque regnavisset” . 82Lidia Storoni Mazzolani, The Idea of the City in Roman Thought: From Walled City to Spiritual Commonwealth, trans. from Italian by S. O’Donnell (London: Hollis and Carter, 1970), p. 16. 208

practice of assimilation had been initiated and became the theoretical inspiration of the

Roman system. Newcomers could be accepted into Roman society with limited rights. They recognised the privilege of their new title Civis . Roman citizenship was much prized.84 However, the presence of assimilation policies resulted in a certain social levelling.

The growth of Republican Rome was due mainly to the ability of its rulers to “unite

and incorporate those whom she conquered into herself.”85 Mazzolani remarks:

In the early stage of their imperial designs the Romans absorbed a body of theory which had no relevance to their own current stage of development, because it came from a country already far advanced on the road of collapse. The Greeks had explored the problem of good and evil in every way of which the human mind is capable. Faced with the basic question of how men ought to live together, they had worked out various solutions, some systematic, others Utopian. Although the Romans absorbed these principles they could not make immediate use of them.86

The Stoic natural law also contributed to order in Republican Rome. Zeno, a Stoic

writer, had declared, “All men are citizens of the world and should obey the precepts of a law which is both divine and human because it rules over gods and men alike and coincides with the voice of nature and the prompting of reason.”87

Nevertheless, these aspirations of unity were not attained by the Romans even

though “concordia Augustus” was an essential theme of imperial propaganda. Theoretically

from 212 A.D. every free provincial could be a Roman citizen. Ferguson considers that

concordia was applied to the citizens in a paternalistic manner. “It originated in the policy of the sovereign rather than in the will of the people. It is a social grace rather than a moral

83 Ibid.,p. 21. 84Ibid., p. 37. 85Ibid., p. 43. 86Ibid.,p. 51. 87Ibid., p. 53. 209 value. Its association lay with philanthropia rather than philia.”88 If homonoia were to become an ordering principle it could only do so if it influenced the hearts and minds of people rather than being imposed from above. Yet a type of order did arise in Western consciouness that had the potential to influence the whole person. This new ordering principle was found in the Christian experience which gave homonoia89 a radical new meaning.

6.7. CHRISTIANITY: TRANSFORMATION OF HOMONOIA ( 14 AD)

Voegelin considered there were two important cycles that influenced Western civilisation. The first was the Hellenic influence which has already been examined; the second was the Christian experience. In his treatment of “Political Ideas” in his Unpublished

Notes: "The Rise of Christianity",90 Voegelin perceives that Christianity was one of the main driving forces in the first century. Formerly the Roman Empire had derived its strength from the energy of Republican Rome until it was slowly transformed by Eastern [Christian] forces. From “an early date", there existed "a consciousness" that Christianity and the

Roman Empire were "two-epoch-making phenomena" each independent of the other.91

88 Ferguson, Morals in the Ancient World, 1958, pp. 131-132 89Helene Petre,“‘Pax’ et ‘Concordia’” in Caritas: Étude sur le Vocabulaire Latin de la Charite Christienne, Vol. 22 (Leiden), 1948. Chapter 12, [pp. 294-319] She points out that although the word homonoia does not figure in the New Testament and is rare in the Greek version of the Old Testament its frequent use very quickly spread among the Christians. This is evident by the ancient documents: the First Epistle of Clement of Rome where homonoia appears fourteen times, five of which co-ordinate it with ειρηνη, also in the Epistles of Ignatius of Antioch (eight examples) and in Hermas’ Pastoral where homonoia is associated with the αγαπη, be it in the enumeration of good works, or in that of the Virgins representing the Christian virtues ( p.316). 90Eric Voegelin, “PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME: Chapter I, The Rise of Christianity” in "Speeches and Writings", Unpublished Manuscripts, Hoover Institution Library Archives, Stanford University, Eric Voegelin Papers, Box No. 57. 5. Folder ID .5. 91Voegelin, “PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME: Chapter I, The Rise of Christianity” in "Speeches and Writings”, Eric Voegelin Papers, Box No. 57. 5. Folder ID .5, p. 1. To show the existence of this consciousness Voegelin gives the following passage from the Christian apologist, Melito of Sardes, who addressed the emperor, Marcus Aurelius, in these terms: Our philosophy first grew up among the barbarians, but its full flower came among your nation in the great reign of your ancestor Augustus, and became omen of good to your empire, for from that time the power of the Romans became great and splendid. You are now his happy successor, and shall be so 210

Against this background there evolved "the creation of a new community substance" which was to form the basis of the Roman Empire and later Europe.92 In the first century the

Roman Empire had been at its height. External conditions had paved the way for the new religion (Christianity) to flourish and it was eventually to supplant the Roman order.

Tension would exist between Rome and the Christian community because of its

"universalistic claim."93

6.7.1. SOURCE OF THE TRANSFORMING INFLUENCE

Voegelin substantiates his claim that a radical transformation arose by carefully examining the Christian experience. He considers the constitution of the new community94 and “the personality of Jesus, his life and work”95 He bases his discussion on The Gospel according to St. Mark which he observes contains not historical reports but a class of literature which is generally called hagiographic.96 From a historical perspective certain difficulties arise. The first is the treatment of the Gospel sources. These are “historical reports” belonging to a class of literature which Voegelin terms hagiographic though he recognises that it might be more useful to rank the Gospel as a genus in itself.97 In order to

along with your son, if you protect the philosophy which grew up with the empire and began with Augustus. (Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. IV. XXVI.7. Trans. by Kirsopp Lake, Loeb Classics. Lib., 1926). 92Ibid., p. 3. Voegelin writes, “The main function of Christianity, as far as its rise belongs in the history of political evocations, was the creation of a new community substance which would be grafted, with varying degrees of success, on the population basis [on the basic population ] first of the Roman Empire, and later on the tribes of the Great Migration.” 93Ibid. 94Ibid.,p. 4. 95Ibid., p. 6. 96Ibid. 97Ibid., p. 4 ff. Voegelin wrote this manuscript about 1950 and was dependent on works which were available at that time. In this text he refers to C. Guignebert, Jesus (Paris: 1933) (L'Evolution de l'Humanité, Vol. 29), p. 692. Guignebert dismisses any belief that Jesus was accepted as Messiah before his death. He attributes the idea of Christ’s Messiahship to the intense faith held by Peter and the Apostles. Voegelin questions Guignebert's argument, though acknowledging his analysis is "impeccable in itself" and the difficulty of it being opposed. He writes, "I have reported, therefore, dutifully, the result of the analysis as the latest stage of science, but I have to draw the conclusion that the methods of critical exegesis of the Gospels are not the methods by which we can approach the personality of Jesus." 211 work through the difficulty of categorising the Gospel literature Voegelin begins by assuming that the "Gospel of the Markian type reflects the personality of Jesus, his life and his work ... .”98 Even if exegetical problems are taken into account, "the most important question" Voegelin argues is “the self-consciousness of Jesus as the Messiah".99The question of Jesus as the Messiah demands treatment according to the same principles as that of the

Gospel text.100 Recognising the presence of immense difficulties, Voegelin draws attention to the following characteristics concerning the “self-awareness of Christ”.

6.7.2. THE PERSONALITY OF CHRIST

The first characteristic concerns the personality of Christ. In the Gospel of Mark

Jesus is portrayed as possessing mana [power].101 Voegelin refers to Mark's Gospel 5, 25-

35, where Jesus heals the woman with a haemorrhage.102 What is crucial here is not "the historicity of the incident" but "the conception of the healing process."103 Jesus is possessed of mana which he can communicate to other people and can start other processes in them, usually healing processes.104 Voegelin remarks that the “healing mana is not used by Jesus

98Ibid., p. 6. Voegelin writes: We may agree that every single miracle-report is untrustworthy and still understand the report as a whole as substantially reflecting the healing work of the Saviour; we may agree that the parables and dialogue-scenes have little chance of reporting correctly the pronouncements of Jesus and still be sure that He expressed himself in parables in general and that the parables as reported reflect essential features of his teaching ... we may doubt the report on the temptation and still assume the existence of the problem of temptation in his life. 99Ibid., p. 7. 100Ibid. He writes, "I cannot see much sense in treating the Gospel text as if it were a stenographic report of the events and sayings and to draw from the obvious contradictions concerning the point the conclusion that only one version can be the correct one" (p.7). 101Ibid., p. 9. For mana Voegelin gives the Greek term dynamis and notes it is translated in English as "virtue" or "power". 102Ibid., pp. 8-9, Mark 5, 25-35. The woman touched the cloak of Jesus and He felt "that virtue had gone out of him." 103Ibid., p. 9. 104Ibid., p.10. "The mana of Jesus and the faith of the believer are corresponding personality elements which can communicate with each other and thus constitute a kind of community substance." 212

at will; its effectiveness is confined to persons who have faith (Greek pistis) in Him."105

Voegelin insists that "the casuistic details are important".106 When Jesus met a person who

had faith he or she was healed. Voegelin points out that the “metanoia, the turning, the healing, the state of faith, had to spring from the soul-forces of the individual.”107 It also appears that Jesus never attempted to heal or convert persons who did not respond to his call.108 What is important is not the intellectual acceptance but an adherence to Christ that

includes love, loyalty and devotion.109 An absence of faith, pistis, restricts the power of

Jesus in Mark 6: 1-6. “The mana has to be met by faith in order to be effective.”110

Voegelin concludes from his analysis of Jesus that this is the "closest we can come through our sources to the constitution of the Christian community as a divine and at the same time historically active substance."111 Voegelin remarks that in the mana concept the “spiritual”

element is not always clearly distinguished from the “physiological” as in the Pauline interpretation of “community”.112

The early Christian notion of “communism” had emphasised the eschatological dimension. After all, why work for a world that will end tomorrow? Ultimately mainstream

Christianity did not succumb to this type of radical Christianity. Notwithstanding, the radical eschatological element in Christianity needs to be taken into account when trying to analyse the problem of “disorder” [stasis] that appears later in Western society. There is nothing

105Ibid., p. 9. 106Ibid. 107Ibid., The process can be compared to periagoge, turning around , (Prisoner in the Cave). Also meta - noia, meta- “change”, noia “of mind” (nous). 108Ibid., p. 9. 109Ibid., In note 8, Voegelin compares faith and bhakti and refers to B.H. Streeter, The Rise of Christianity (C.A.H. Vol. XI, Ch. 7), 1936. Streeter states that faith “does not mean intellectual acceptance of a creed or proposition, but loyalty, love and devotion, something like what in Indian religion is known as bhakti.” 110Ibid. 111Ibid., p. 10. 112Ibid.,p. 11. 213

parallel to this particular phenomenon of gnosticism in Hellenic antiquity.113 The Messianic

consciousness of Jesus “could become stronger at times",114 and at other times less

intense. Even the disciples were confused at times when Jesus revealed his mission.115

Besides, the death of Jesus and the visions of the Resurrection increased the transcendent tension.

6.7.3. THE DISCIPLES’ VISION - EVOCATIVE ACTS OF CHRISTIANITY

Whatever one’s opinion it should be recognised that Christianity has made a significant contribution in shaping community substance. The visions which the disciples experienced after the death of Jesus should be understood as fundamentally evocative acts of the Christian community. Historians of political ideas consider that such experiences belong to the "field of religion" and therefore have nothing to do with "politics". Refusing to concede to that position, Voegelin declares:

The belief is so pitiful that it is not worth any further argument. The Christian community has been, for the better part of two thousand years, the most important political force of the Western world, and the evocation acts which created it are the basis of all later political evocations which occurred in Western history - as far as it is Christian. To omit the visions of the disciples, would be equivalent to an omission of the Declaration of Independence from a history of American political ideas. 116

The Christian experience of community did take root in Western society. The earlier

emphasis on the “eschatological” and a looking towards the imminence of the Last Day was

relinquished. Instead recognition that the Messiah had appeared, his realm had been

established, and a new aeon had begun was affirmed. Paul and the Christian community

accepted that the second appearance of Christ to judge the world would take place much

113Ibid., p 17. 114Ibid., p. 21. 115Ibid., p. 22. 116Ibid., p. 23. 214

later.117 These beliefs were embraced by the small Christian community.118 When Paul was

writing, the eschatological significance of the Last Day had become more remote and the

community adjusted to the exigencies of living in this world.119

6.7.4. THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS

A further characteristic of the Christian experience is expressed in The Epistle to the

Hebrews,1. 11. Voegelin declares that Hebrews,1. 11. is one of “the most intellectual and systematic statements of the new community idea” and, an “outline of the future Christian theory”.120 Although the language is "ecstatic”, a fairly clear set of ideas becomes apparent.121 The Epistle to the Hebrews states that “faith is the substance of things hoped

for, the evidence of things not seen.”122 Voegelin explains that “faith is not a subjective

attitude of the individual, a belief, but the community substance itself, created by the

appearance of Jesus, “author and finisher of our faith.”123 Faith is “not an intellectual process

but the transformation of the whole personality, the process by which man is integrated into

the community substance.”124

A counterpart to the Christian idea of community substance is found in the Ideas

and Forms of Plato. In reference to this Voegelin writes that

the beholding of the pattern in heaven is the mystical process by which the divine substance overflows into the beholder and transforms his soul so that it becomes part

117Ibid., p. 26. 118Ibid., The “eschatological” sentiments remained and have appeared throughout Western history in the form of various “movements”. In his use of “eschatological” and “apocalyptic”, Voegelin follows the terminology of Alois Dempf, Sacrum Imperium, (1929). 119Ibid., p. 25. 120Ibid., pp. 28-29. 121Ibid., p. 27. 122Ibid., pp. 28-29. The Epistle to the Hebrews, 11,1; The Greek word is translated as “substance”; some versions translate as “assurance”. See The Jerusalem Bible, the word is translated as “reality” cf. the Gk., hypostasis=order, reality. 123 The Epistle to the Hebrews, 12, 1. 124Voegelin, “PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME: Chapter I, The Rise of Christianity”, Unpublished Notes, Box 57. 5, p. 28. 215

of the earthly incarnation of the city that is laid up in heaven. The ‘beholding’ on the part of the philosopher and the spread of his realm through Eros are the Hellenic counterparts to the Christian myth of Jesus as the Son of God and the spreading of his realm through Faith. The Christian evocation of the realm has the essentially same structure as the evocation of the Platonic realm.125

The underlying order of reality is the same although differentiated in the Christian

experience. A readiness on the part of each person is needed in hearing and obeying the word just as the philosopher sought “knowledge” through virtue.126 Only when this

acceptance takes place can the revelation be effective in the constitution of the new

community.

The Christian community substance is pictured as a “field” in which “power”

circulates; faith is a process through which a person becomes "a unit in this field, permeable

for the circulating power substance."127 What is important is that between the Christ and the

faithful the new “community” is not just any community entering the scene of history, but is

a community that is marked as beginning a new epoch.128 The sense of “epochal

consciousness” is fully developed; and the appearance of Christ becomes the dividing line of

world history.129 The writer of Epistle to the Hebrews envisages this aeon of Christ as the

ultimate fulfilment of history. The preceding period is seen as a preparation (for Christ) in

125 Ibid., p. 29. 126This is important when Confucius’s teaching is discussed later in thesis, Chapter 8. 127Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, 57.5, PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME, Chapter 1, “The Rise of Christianity”, The Epistle to the Hebrews, p. 29. A comparison is made with the Platonic concept of "the pattern in heaven", seen as the divine substance overflows into the beholder and transforms his soul so that it becomes part of the earthly incarnation of the city that is lit up in heaven. The "beholding" on the part of the philosopher and the spread of his realm through Eros are the Hellenic counterparts to the Christian myth of Jesus as the Son of God and the spreading of his realm through faith. 128Ibid. 129Ibid. 216 accordance with the plan of God. The transition of the spiritual meaning from the metathesis to the fuller conception of translatio imperii130 is important.

6.8. THE EARLY CHURCH

When discussing the mana concept the body/soul differentiation was not made clear. The separation in body/spirit notion becomes clearer when ones examines the self- interpretation of the early Church. There are two models of the Church. One model is expressed as the “Body of Christ.” This “construction” of the Church can be found in

Scripture and is attributed to St. Paul. Paul wrote, “For as the body is one and hath many members and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is

Christ.” Those who have been received into the membership of the community, the ecclesia, participate in the ‘mind’ [pneuma] of Christ.131 The problem with this model is that the ideas soma, body, and pneuma, spirit, were not clearly differentiated. Failure to differentiate in this model opens the way for a merging of body and spirit. For example, in this model Christ “merges” with the believers as members of the one community whereas in the second model there is a clear separation of Christ who is the Head and the members who are his “Body”.

130Ibid., p. 31. Voegelin refers to Matt. 21:43 in which Jesus announces his Kingdom. Voegelin explains that “The old order gives way to the new: ‘He taketh away the first, that he may establish the second’ (Matt.10, 9). With the change of the priesthood of Moses into that of Christ, the old law changes into the new. The concept of change (GK. metathesis) refers in the context of Hebrews to the epochal change of the order of life, the taxis, brought about by the ‘renovation’ of the personality through faith in Christ. The meaning of metathesis was in later times enlarged to comprise the massive power structure of the community when the term was no longer applied to the incipient realm of the Christian community but to the Christianised Roman Empire. In the Latin version of the metathesis, the translation is the Christian culmination of the tendencies towards an epochal construction of world-history, the beginnings of which we noticed in Daniel and Polybius” (p. 30). 131 Voegelin, "The Growth of the Race Idea", Review of Politics, 2, 3 (1940), p. 290. Voegelin points out that the interpretation of this “construction” depends on the acceptance of Christology. One difficulty with this model is a propensity it has “of collapsing the personality of Christ into the multitude of humans who compose the church.” 217

In the second construction, the differentiation of the “body” [soma] symbol is

drawn. Christ who is the Head of his Body the Church, and the community who are

members of that Body are clearly distinguished (Col. 1,18.). The pneuma of Christ is

able, because of his fullness [pleroma] to live in an indefinite number of persons at the

same time. Hence, it is Christ living in the members of the community who constitutes

the spiritual bond between them.132Voegelin points to the idea of universalism. The

Church has the potential to include all peoples for membership extends to in actu, actual

membership and in potentia. In potentia means all people are members of the mystical

body and Christ is therefore Head not only of the faithful (in actu ) but of all people. He

is “the Saviour of all people especially of those that believe (Timothy, 4:10)”.133 In the second model there is also diversification of the pneuma [mind, spirit] of Christ into various charisms which differentiate the status and task of the members of the body. The second construction is the model that triumphed in Western history.134

The “body” (soma) symbol of the Church,135 has no equivalent in the language of

Biblical Hebrew. Paul’s use of the “body” in the majority of cases has been

“conditioned by Hebrew understanding of man.”136 Paul did not regard the body as a

“prison house” but as an integral part of the whole person who was not redeemed apart

from the body. Best explains, “It can be seen that neither the Greek conception of the

132Ibid. 133Ibid. 134Ibid. 135 E. Best, One Body in Christ (London: SPCK, 1953), p. 215. In Appendix C: “Σ>ΜΑ and the Σ>ΜΑ- ΜΕΛΗ Metaphor”, Best discusses the use of σϖμα [body]. He points out that it has no proper equivalent in Biblical Hebrew and that “In classical Greek σϖμα ‘body’ has a wide range of meanings. He also notes that in “Greek the meaning is concerned rather with the ‘form’ of things than with the material that composes things; its distinctive meaning is therefore ‘form’. Another strand in Greek thought concerning the meaning of ‘body’ is that which contrasts body with ψυχη. The word appears most clearly as the meaning in Hellenistic Gnosticism where the body is the prison-house of the soul and where salvation comes through release from the body” (p. 215). 218 body as form, nor the gnostic dualism between body and soul is normative for Paul; while in a few places he adopts these ideas.”137 The “body” idea is used by Paul in reference to “organisation of the community, the hierarchical nature of the group.” The

“body” element of the church includes ministry, sacraments, Scripture and other “visible” aspects of the Church.138 The Church is distinguished by the “body” element from being some minor sect.

6.8.1. HOMONOIA TRANSFORMED BY THE CHRISTIAN PNEUMA

Voegelin emphasises that Paul drew on the same unity that Alexander had once used to express his vision of empire. However, in Paul the use of homonoia is radically transformed. The homo-noia (same mind) is not just the divine Nous or Logos which had been recognised by the Greeks but is the mind, pneuma, of Christ. Because of his pleroma the “mind”, pneuma, of Christ is all-embracing and includes the whole world.

Homonoia is transformed into an all-encompassing notion of “community”. Voegelin states, “The foundation of community is the bond between the members through the participation of every person in the pneuma of Christ (in actu and in potentia).” The unifying force at work is the “transcendental personality of Christ”.139 Hence the

136Ibid. 137Ibid., p. 221. In the New Testament, apart from Paul, the metaphor cannot be traced. Best notes that the metaphor is found in , De Spec. Legg.III.; 23 (131, M. 2. 321), see note 1, p. 222. Best writes: The metaphor, nevertheless, was fairly widely used outside Biblical sources in the ancient world; there are two main streams of thought which employ it, though perhaps to some extent they influenced one another. Through Gnosticism it can be traced back to Iranian and Indian sources, while it became a commonplace with the later Stoics though known to other Greek and Latin writers. ... We can trace its beginnings in Zeno, for whom God was the ‘fiery mind’ the nous of the cosmos, which could be described as an ‘animal alive and conscious, endowed with mind and reason’. Cleanthes sometimes gave the name of ‘God’ to the cosmos itself. Likewise Chrysippus can call the cosmos ‘God’ or ‘a God’, and speak of it as ‘a living being, rational with soul-life and mind’. Best’s view that “the state, or empire, is a body of which the king or emperor is head” is found in Seneca (p. 223). 138Ibid. 139 Voegelin, "The Growth of the Race Idea", Review of Politics, 2, 3 (1940), p. 290. 219

newness of the Christian community substance is described as the pneuma hagiosynes

(spirit of holiness) of Christ.140 The new community is comprised of those who

participate in the amicitia (friendship) between God and man.141 Paul believed a new bond of unity was present which could unite all peoples on earth when he wrote, there is

“neither Greek nor Jew ...barbarian, Scythian, bond or free.” The unity of all people depended on “the pneuma of Christ” and drew from “his pleroma to live in an indefinite number of human persons at the same time.” Christ living in the members of the community constitutes the spiritual bond between them.142 Voegelin elaborates:

In his philosophical anthropology Aristotle, following Plato, penetrated into the region of the nous in the religious sense. He arrived at the idea of a ‘true self’ of man and at the idea of homonoia, that is, of the parallel formation of the souls of man through nous, as the bond of society. Actually, Aristotle penetrated so far into this region that his very terminology could be used by St. Paul in making homonoia the central concept in the theory of a Christian community. Nevertheless, there remained in Aristotle the fundamental hesitation which distinguished the Hellenic from the Christian idea of man, that is, the hesitation to recognise the formation of the human soul through grace: there was missing the experience of faith, the fides caritate formata in the Thomistic sense. In the case of Aristotle, the most poignant symptom of this hesitation is his insistence that friendship (philia) between God and man is impossible. Equality is for him an essential element of friendship; philia between unequals is difficult, if not impossible... .143

In the Aristotelian understanding the soul was not transformed by grace.

However, in the Christian experience the soul finds “fulfilment in transfiguration through

grace in death.”144 Voegelin explains:

In the Christian idea of community the bond between the members is created -when we single out the pneumatic construction for the moment - through the participation of every person in the pneuma of Christ. The unifying force is the transcendental

140Ibid. 141 Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, p. 364. 142Voegelin, "The Growth of the Race Idea", Review of Politics, 2, 3 (1940), p. 290. 143Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, p. 364. Voegelin refers to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 1158b 35ff). 144Ibid. 220

divine personality of Christ, and the community might be called ‘open’ because it is not a closed mundane entity but an aggregate of persons finding its common centre in a substance beyond the field of earthly experience.145

The new community substance has influenced “order” in Western civilisation. It is essential that the Christian experience be acknowledged. For, if “the pneuma of Christ and of its function as the substance of the Christian community,” is omitted, what remains of Christianity is “only Stoic ethical legal theory, a few remarks concerning the recognition of temporal authority and the hierarchy of functions. The substance has disappeared”.146 Voegelin observes that “Christian Patristic literature is strongly influenced by Stoic theories.” He states that “one may flatly say that Stoic positions have been simply taken over.”147 He adds “the Stoic ideas of the Golden Age and the civilisation order were closely parallel to the Christian ideas of mankind before and after the Fall.” Voegelin writes:

Christian thinkers could without difficulty build the Stoic theory into the Christian system. To conclude from this relation, however, that early Christianity has not contributed much to the theory of politics and law, and that history would have taken, as far as political theory is concerned, the same course without Christianity, is a gigantic misunderstanding, for Christianity had precisely what Stoicism had not: a new evocative idea, the idea of the Kingdom of God under the royal priesthood of Christ. Stoicism had arrived at a dead end, the community idea of Christianity was the force that determined the future.148

145 Voegelin, "The Growth of the Race Idea", Review of Politics, 2, 3 (1940), p. 303. 146Eric Voegelin, “Political Theory and the Pattern of General History”, in E. S. Griffith, Research in Political Science (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University, 1948), p. 199. Voegelin had difficulty finding a conceptual apparatus for the treatment of Christianity. 147Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, Box 57.5, PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME, Chapter 3, “The Emperor”, S3: The Christian Theory of Law, b. The Reception of the Stoic Theory, p. 75. 148Ibid. 221

The reception of the “Stoic ethical and legal doctrine did assist Christianity to fix its relations to the ‘world’ in which it spread.”149 The Christian experience changed Western

civilisation’s view of the “world”.

6.8.2. PAULINE COMPROMISES

Reference has already been made to the desire of some groups in the Church to

“separate” from society and to live like a sect. However, these groups did not prevail

and the Church did take its place in society. The initial cleavage between Christianity and the “world” was fully superseded by the compromise of the sacramental Church. The

Church embraced the world rather than leaving it. Hence the “world” in its material and human substructure acquired a status of legitimacy in the existence of the Christian.150

Voegelin declares that the decision the Church made to embrace the world rather

than flee from it and become a sect was a “master stroke of ecclesiastical statesmanship”.

He attributes the direction the Church took to the work of St. Paul who had identified

three community forces at work, i.e. the Pagan, the Hebrew, and the Christian. Paul

related these three forces to the three laws, Stoic natural law, Hebrew external law, and

Christian law of the heart. Voegelin comments, “The transference of these forces into

progressively higher levels of spirituality made the historical situation for his

contemporaries meaningful and intelligible.”151 The presence of the sacramental Church

was secured through the alignment of these “three community forces.” The Church was

149Ibid., p.76. 150 Eric Voegelin, “Siger de Brabant”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4, (1944), pp. 507- 525, p. 507. 151 Eric Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, ed. John H. Hallowell, (Durham, Nth. Carolina: Duke University Press, 1975), p. 22. 222

able to maintain the “balance” between the secular and the spiritual order.152 In fact, so

effective was the Pauline compromise that, “the Church was, one might say, the cement

that reintroduced rationality through this necessary balance between secular and spiritual

order.”153The Church became “historically effective through the Pauline

compromises.”154

The Christian experience penetrated the “order of the world - not only order of the state but the very being of the world, a world that will not end next week... .”155 With the

idea of the eschatological expectation of the Second coming of Christ left behind, the

historical notion of corpus Christi mysticum became more important. Voegelin states,

“These [Pauline]compromises were not an arbitrary addition; they were definitely

implied as a possible evolution in the appearance of the teachings of Christ.”156 Voegelin

considers that “in its theology and philosophy Christianity has attained very significant

achievements which should not be neglected.”157 The Hellenist and Roman order of

society was absorbed by the Christian experience.

6.8.3. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ROMAN SOCIAL ORDER

Great impetus was given to the Church as a civilising force with the conversion of

Constantine in 306-337 A. D. He allowed the Church freedom of worship and provided

great material benefits for the Church. As Macmullen observes, “Overnight it seemed, he

(Constantine) created a Christianity whose bishops and clergy had their social horizons

152Eric Voegelin, “Configurations in History”, in The Concept of Order, pp 23-42, Paul Kuntz, ed., (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), p. 111. 153Ibid., p. 111. 154Voegelin, “Eric Voegelin to Alfred Schütz”, 1 [On Christianity] , in , P.J. Opitz & Gregor Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics, p. 453. 155Ibid. 156Ibid. 157Ibid. 223

blown wide open by finding the open-handed Constanine in their midst.”158 In the

process of alignment with the empire the Church was no longer a small alien sect

accessible to only a few. Ultimately the Church assumed responsibility for society as a

whole. However, some scholars take the view that the Church was “hijacked” by

Constantine who imposed his imperial ideology on Christianity.159

6. 8.4. AUGUSTINE (345-430 A.D.)

The Christian understanding of order was advanced by the insights of St. Augustine.

Voegelin considers St. Augustine’s famous work De Civitate Dei, “the City of God”, as a

bridge between Roman thought and the Christian experience.160 In De Civitate Dei,

Augustine reflects on the “world” that appears to be passing and the new order evolving.161

When examining Cicero’s work on the State Augustine imparts his famous demonstration that the Romans never had a res publica at all, not a real res populi, if Cicero’s definition holds.162 Cicero had written:

Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people.163But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The first cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man.164For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort [is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men.] ...

158 Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100-400), (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 49. 159 See W.H.C. Frend, The Rise of Christianity (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984), pp. 569 ff. 160Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, 57.5, p. 84. 161Augustine, De Civitate Dei. See Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, 57.5, p. 100. Voegelin notes that Augustine takes Cicero as a starting point. 162Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, 57.5, pp. 100-101. Voegelin cites Augustine XIX, 23. 163Cicero, De Re Publica (Loeb Classical edition), p. 64, note 1; res publica (public thing or property) is the same as res populi (thing or property of a people). 164 Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Cicero, De Re Publica (Loeb Classical edition), p. 64. See n.2. Compare Aristotle, Politics I, 1253 a: “Man is by nature a political animal.” 224

In a short time a scattered and wandering multitude had become a body of citizens by mutual agreement...165

Cicero’s view of a “people” was merely an “assemblage of a multitude associated by a

common feeling of utility”.166He writes, “ Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum

quas diligit concordi communione sociatus.”167 Augustine is aware that such a notion of

unity depends merely on feeling. He asks: How can there be any justice without a God to

whom justice is referred? Augustine put forward a different understanding of what the unity

of “people” consists in his contrast of the two Commonwealths, the earthly faulty pagan city

and the radiant City of God.168

In his description of the “City of God” Augustine has sometimes been called

inconsistent or vague but Voegelin argues he is neither. In fact his thought is complex.169

Voegelin points to the theories of Tyconius which developed in the Donatist sect. The question arose which was the “true church”. There were some in the Church who held that there was an invisible spiritual church of the perfect Christians which according to the

Tyconian theory was “the true Church”? That group argued that the pagans and the separated or false brethren belonged to the “city of the devil.”170 The main church, however,

admitted the fallen brethren who stood outside the “true Church”. Voegelin comments :

165Cicero, De Re Publica, Loeb Classical, p. 65, I XXV. 166 Cicero, De Re Publica, Loeb Classical, p. 24. 167Ibid. Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, Box 57.5, “PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME, Chapter 1. “The Rise of Christianity”. Voegelin notes that at the time of the appearance of Jesus, “A world empire had come into existence as a power organisation, but to the vast organisational range did not correspond a spiritually coherent people; to be exact: the Roman empire did have a population only, it did not have a people.” (p. 3). 168Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, Box 57.5, p.100. 169Ibid., Chapter 5. “St. Augustine”, p. 93, n. 1. Voegelin points out he is following Alois Dempf, Sacrum Imperium, 1929, Part II, Chapter 3. 170 Ibid.,p. 94. (See n. 63, Voegelin’s reference for the Theory of Tyconius is by Traugott Hahn, Tyconius- Studien, Ein Beitrag zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte des vierten Jahrhunderts. (Leipzig: 1900) and Dempf, op. cit., p. 120 ff.) 225

The theory of Tyconius contained a profound truth insofar as it stressed, in contrast with Paul, much stronger the spiritual character of the true Christian community, but it violated in its rigoristic construction the rule of Christian love which would allow the Church to be a corpus mixtum, a mystical body composed of healthy and less healthy members.171

6.8.5. THE CITY OF GOD, CIVITATAS DEI AND THE CITY OF EARTH

Augustine did not follow either Tyconius’s ideas or the idea of an invisible Church

within the visible. He opposed sectarian narrowness and held to the idea of the sacramental

church. However, he did “distinguish between the body of the elect, throughout the history

of the world, and the earthly city, the civitas terrena, composed of lost souls.”172 Augustine

considered that neither “the city of God” nor “the city of earth” is identified with any of the

earthly institutions. “The Church remains the sacramental unit, embodying the elect along

with the wicked; and the Empire remains the Empire.” At the same time there is “a specific relation between the Church and the Civitate Dei, city of God. The Church is not the Civitate

Dei (city of God) itself, but it is its militant representative on earth in history”.173 Voegelin

suggests that “by means of the construction Augustine preserved the world-function of the

Church, saving it from the fate of becoming a sect.”174

In Civitas Dei, the transcendental community membership is selected individually by God. The most concise formula of the qualifications of membership in either the earthly or the heavenly city is given in Civitas Dei, XIV, 28:

Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self [amor sui], even to the contempt of God: the heavenly by the love of God, [amor Dei] even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is

171Ibid. 172Ibid., p. 95. 173Ibid.,Voegelin writes, “The Church is the kingdom of Christ qualis nunc est, though not all members of the historical Church, qualis nunc est, will be members of the final Church, qualis nunc erit, when the tares are weeded out”. See n. 1, p. 95. Voegelin cites Civitas Dei, XX, 9. 174Ibid., pp. 95-96, Sec. b. The Augustinian civitas Dei and civitas terrena. 226

God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God, ‘Thou art my glory, and the lifter up of mine head.’ [Ps.3.3.] In the one, the princes and the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling [libido]; in the other, the princes [praepositi] and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying [subditi] while the former take thought for all.175

Augustine’s vision of the “city of God” embodies foundational principles that have

become ordering principles of Western civilisation. In Order and History: The Ecumenic

Age Voegelin elaborates on certain aspects he had not developed in his Unpublished Notes.

In The Ecumenic Age he argues that the “Stoic deformation in Philosophy, and especially its

Ciceronian form, has remained a constant in history, because it is the only elaborate doctrine

of law produced by the ecumenical-imperial society”.176 Elsewhere he remarks that not until

Augustine wrote his Civitas Dei was a symbol found to express the idea of the two cities.177

The notion of the City of God was integrated into the pragmatic and spiritual order of

Western Christian civilisation, at least for a time.178

6.9. SUMMARY

I have explored homonoia in Western civilisation in the Hellenic experience as

envisaged by Plato and Aristotle’s notion of homonoia which has not yet been considered as

an universal idea but restricted to the polis alone. A further understanding appeared when

homonoia was taken up by Alexander the Great in his great unifying vision of blending the

175St. Augustine, The Confessions, The City of God, On Christian Doctrine, trans. by Marcus Dods, (Chicago: Wm Benton, Publisher, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), p. 397. [I have used Marcus Dods’ translation since Voegelin’s use is not so clear.] See Voegelin, PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME, Box 57.5, pp. 96-97, [Sec. b. The Augustinian civitas Dei and civitas terrena.] See note 1. p. 97. Voegelin points out that he has been unable to find any reference to this parallel of symbols of the “two types of men” but considers the idea significant and should be further investigated. He comments that “The description is couched in terms of spiritual characteristics, but it is not to be understood as an essay on characterology” (p.97). 176Voegelin, Order and History: The Ecumenic Age, 1974, Vol. 4, p. 47. 177Ibid. p. 146. 178Ibid. 227

Persians and Hellenes into one harmonious empire that would transcend national differences.

In the Roman Empire homonoia was never more than an ideal.

Homonoia in the Christian experience was changed. From small beginnings a new

community developed. Although at first there was an attempt by a sectarian group to

emphasise eschatological radicalness the main church gradually took shape through the

Pauline compromises. The sacramental Church determined the kind of order in Western

society. Voegelin remarks:

... mankind as a whole could be organised in the new community. The recognition of the existing social structure, furthermore, had made the community compatible with any society into which Christianity would spread, influencing social relations only through the slowly transforming force of brotherly love.179

As it was the duty of a Christian to respect lawful authority the Church was able to be

integrated with government authority.180

Nevertheless, the dream of "the creation of a new people" was never fully realised,

except imperfectly in the Middle Ages - "the dream of Dante: one God, one Emperor, one

Christian People."181 Voegelin suggests that perfect vision of order was not realised because ethnic and national differences prevailed over the Christian understanding of community substance. Although various peoples were conquered by Alexander and the rulers of Rome, they were still strong enough to reassert their ethnic differences and split "the unity of the

Kingdom of God".182

179Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME, Box 5.57, Chapter 2, “Christianity and the Nations”, p. 38. 180Ibid. 181Ibid. 182Ibid., p. 39. Voegelin continues his analysis of the development of political philosophy by tracing its course to the division of the Eastern and Western Churches. 228

No remarkable change took place in the substance of order in Western society until about the mid-seventeenth century with the Enlightenment period. At that time a seriously, critical change occurred in Western consciousness and subsequently in the type of order. The

Christian experience was dismissed from the public consciousness and a new form of order was set in place. In Post-Enlightenment thought the life of reason passed into oblivion. The significance of the transcendent dimension was no longer acknowledged in the order of the soul and the order of society. 229

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE LIFE OF REASON AND THE LOSS OF COMMUNITY SUBSTANCE

I have considered the importance of the life of reason in the two cycles, the

Hellenist and Christian experiences. Voegelin insists that reality cannot be created,

systemised or dogmatised. The loss of the life of reason occurred in the post

Enlightenment era. The transcendent structure of reality was dismissed in philosophy and

the order of the soul and the order of society were reduced to intramundane reality.

Voegelin analyses the loss of reason as a process of reductionism which effects a closure

of the essential substances. Hence, political ideas no longer draw on foundational

principles such as homonoia but are created from various opinion makers. Philosophy is

transmuted into philodoxy.

In the new order, man and society are understood in sociological or

psychological terms that depend on intramundane theories. Political theories dismiss the

life of reason and offer world-views that pretend to secure order in society. However, the

disastrous effect is , not order. Voegelin explains that the dismissal of noetic reason

from public consciousness and the fading out of the symbol homonoia1 is a loss of spiritual

substance. He describes the loss as a “thinning out” or a “falling down the hierarchy of

being”. There is a fading away in Western consciousness of the full structure of reality as expressed in the Platonic vision and the Christian experience.

1Eric Voegelin, "The Growth of the Race Idea", Review of Politics, 2 (1940), pp. 289 ff. 230

The loss of the life of reason is explored under the following headings: factors that contributed to the loss of reason; what the loss of reason comprises; Voegelin’s analysis of noesis and the rise of dogmatomachy in Jean Bodin and ; the fading of homonoia and the dominance of the speculative intellect in Western consciousness.

7. 1. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOSS OF REASON

Voegelin regarded gnosticism2 as one of the more serious causes of the loss of the life of reason. He observed that “there is nothing in Hellenic antiquity that can be compared to these peculiar phenomena” for previously the spirit [pneuma] was not present.3 In fact, so distinctive is this phenomenon that Voegelin suggests that after the appearance of

Christianity, Western civilisation should be termed a “pneumatic civilisation” in contrast to non-pneumatic civilisations such as that of Hellenes.

Gnosticism is manifested by certain characteristics,4 one being the tendency to escape from the tension of existence, the In-Between. The escape from the tension of existence is manifested in two ways:

2 “Gnosticism" is a type of thinking that claims absolute cognitive mastery of reality. Relying as it does on a claim to , gnosticism considers its knowledge not subject to criticism. As a religious or quasi-religious movement, gnosticism may take transcendentalising (as in the case of the Gnostic movement of late antiquity) or immantentising forms (as in the case of Marxism). Refer to Webb, Eric Voegelin Philosopher of History 1981, p. 282. 3 See Voegelin, “Immortality: Experience and Symbol”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, pp. 54 -55. Also see Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, 57.5, PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME, Chapter 1, “The Rise of Christianity”; “Eschatological Hardness of the Believers - The Saints”, p. 17. 4 Voegelin, Unpublished Notes, 57.5, PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME, Chapter 1, “The Rise of Christianity” ; “Eschatological Hardness of the Believers - The Saints”, p.18. Voegelin explains this as an “eschatological hatred” which threatens those civilisational structures that are not based on eschatological expectation but on a compromise with the world. ... “The later type of aggressive eschatological sentiment becomes increasingly important since the Reformation; it reaches its climax in the secularised derivatives of Christian eschatology, in the modern mass-movements of Communism and National Socialism. In the aggressive type of eschatological movements, we can distinguish furthermore most clearly the transfer of the eschatological hardness from the Saviour, in whom it is an essential part of His mission, to the believers themselves. Political leaders and their followers assume the Saviour function and, borne by a sentiment of divine inflation, concentrate the fury of their eschatological hatred against the evil opponent. Eschatological hatred is, since the Reformation, an essential feature in Western political mass movements.” 231

One is to escape from the world into the Beyond - as was the case with the ancient Gnostic movement - and the other is to draw the Beyond in some manner into the world. The latter can be attempted in various ways. One may claim cognitive and pragmatic mastery of mundane existence (in the case of magic and alchemy) or of divine reality (in the case of theurgy). Or one may claim to have special knowledge of a about to dawn in which oneself and one’s followers will play a leading role.5

Gnosticism regards the “world” as transitory and even “evil”.6 The emphasis is on

“God” as so absolutely “Beyond” that he has nothing to do with creation. Accordingly,

“the Gnostic imbalance of consciousness, thus, causes a split to run through divine reality, separating the daimonic powers of the world from the pneumatic divinity

Beyond.”7 Hence gnosticism is seen as a short cut to immortality. It will be recalled that

Voegelin argues that man’s existence in reality is an In-Between existence and to

“escape” from this tension is to create one’s own reality.

7.1.1. THE SACRAMENTAL CHURCH, A BUFFER AGAINST GNOSTICISM

5 Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, p. 201. Webb has summarised what Voegelin said at the Conference, “Gnosticism and Modernity”, University of Vanderbilt. Webb notes that while Voegelin’s use of the term “gnosticism” is based on the understanding of the term in the ancient world, it is also broader both in conception and in coverage. Later Voegelin used terms such as apocalypticism, alchemy, magic, and theurgy, scientism and others. 6Gnosticism covers a broad area. Ancient gnosticism is found in the texts of Nag Hammadi. These texts have been published in James M. Robinson, ed., trs. The in English, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977). Ancient Gnosticism tended to denigrate this life in favour of some escape or secret knowledge. What is of interest here is that form of gnosticism which draws on the power of such knowledge for the transformation of the world. An example is and those who looked for a Third Kingdom of the Spirit in which all Christians would be inspired by the Holy Spirit to the extent that institutional authorities, either secular or churchly, would no longer be required. Gnosticism can be seen either to reject this world or to transform it. See Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, p.198, n.6, also p. 199, no. 7. See also Voegelin, “Philosophies of History: An Interview with Eric Voegelin,” New Orleans Review (1975), p. 136. Voegelin notes that Gnosticism is one factor in a very complex set of factors to which it also belongs ... not the only trend. One has to include apocalyptic strands, the neo-platonic restoration at the end of the fifteenth century, and the hermetic component which resulted in the conscious operation of sorcery and in Hegel’s determinology. Whatever form gnosticism takes it is characterised as an attempt to escape from the tension of existence of the In-Between. 7Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 234. 232

Many variants of gnosticism have dotted the path of Western history. One type is a form of Christianity which regards the “sacramental church” as “unessential.”8 The appearance of eschatological Christianity is generally seen in groups splintering as sects from the main Church. In its early history the Christian Church confronted the phenomenon and met the challenge.9 The direction it took was a

“compromise”10solution. The Church embraced the “world” rather than fleeing from it, as it viewed the world as something to be Christianised. The result was that the community substance of Western civilisation was transformed. In fact “the very being of the world”11 was transformed. The decision to confront the world rather than flee from it, according to Voegelin, was a decisive moment for the Church and Western civilisation. If the Church (“essential Christianity”) had not taken this path it would never have become a substantial influence in history; and Christianity would have remained an obscure sect.12

8Voegelin, “Eric Voegelin to Alfred Schütz,” [On Christianity], in Optiz, and Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics, 1981, pp. 452-453. 9Ibid.,p. 459. 10Ibid.,p.453. Voegelin states that “Christianity became historically effective through the Pauline compromises... .” Also see Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 234. Also in “Eric Voegelin to Alfred Schütz” II [On Gnosticism], in Optiz, and Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics, 1981, p. 459. Voegelin writes: ... the Christian eschaton is not a hypostasis (of what should it be a hypostasis, in the sense of positing a speculative end state as real?). On the contrary, the Christian eschaton means: understanding the final goal of an experience of faith and perfection as non-real in immanent sense and assigning the reality status of this experience to a supramundane perfection which is believable as such (and which, if it is believable at all, must be believed) precisely because it is not an object of innerworldly experience. 11 “Eric Voegelin to Alfred Schütz,” [On Christianity], in Optiz, and Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics, 1981, p. 453. 12 Ibid., Voegelin states: If there were no more to Christianity than this radical eschatological expectation, it would never have become a power in history; the Christian communities would have remained obscure sects which could always be wiped out in the event that their foolishness seriously threatened the order of the state. But precisely because this evaluation is correct, I consider it fantastic to see the essence of Christianity in this destructive component, while dismissing as unessential the Church’s factual evolution into a historical power. 233

By embracing the world rather than fleeing from it the Church became a buffer against the various types of gnosticism that raged against society in Western civilisation.

Voegelin surmises that if these gnostic forces had been unrestrained Western society would be very different today. Nevertheless, gnostic forces continue to appear in some form. The phenomenon of gnosticism escalated during the Reformation period,13 which was a turning point for the Church’s position in Western society. The Church failed to meet the challenges of reformers at that time.

In his study From Enlightenment to Revolution14 Voegelin describes the loss of community substance as occurring in three phases. In the first phase (1300 to 1500) he considers that the Church could have prevented some of the tension with the growing secular civilisation if it had reduced its economic and financial power. The “spiritual substance” of the Church would not have been endangered.15 It was on the issue of property that political tension between the Church and the state had arisen. In failing to respond adequately to the crisis the Church as a “spiritual institution” was “relegated to the private sphere, while the autonomous political institutions achieved the monopoly of

13 The problem of this “destructive component” has been elaborated by Voegelin in a Letter to Leo Strauss “Letter 34 to Leo Strauss” in Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964, Translated and edited by Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1993), pp. 73-74. Voegelin writes: I would see in orthodox already the start of immanentisation. Calvin flirts with the problem in the Institutes, where his concern for the certitudo salutis through the unequivocal ‘call’ is quite clearly a Gnostic attempt to gain certitude through salvation, which is a bit more certain than orthodox cognitio fidei. Luther vacillates, but his hatred of the fides caritate formata, his wild efforts to take love out of faith, and to make deliberate knowledge into its substance, seems to me to lead in the same direction. One would perhaps have to say that there was enough Catholic substance in ‘orthodox’ Protestantism to arrest further development, the inner logic of which forces itself through in liberal Protestantism. 14Eric Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, (Durham, Nth. Carolina:Duke University, 1981). 15Voegelin, “Siger de Brabant”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (1944), p. 508. 234

publicity.”16The relegation of the Church to the private sphere heralded the separation

of the sacred and secular in Western civilisation.

The next period, from 1500 to 1700, gave rise to the advance of science and the

scientific credo which challenged Church teachings. More relevant here is the third

phase which Voegelin considers the most serious. The period extends from 1700 to the present17 when Christian symbolism was attacked.18 New historical and critical evidence

challenged the Church’s teaching on the texts of Scripture and how these should be

interpreted.19 Voegelin elaborates:

The symbolic language in which the truth of Christianity is expressed stems from Hebrew and Hellenistic sources. The mythical language was, at the time of its original employment, the precise instrument for expressing the irruption of transcendental reality, its incarnation and its operation in man. In the age of Christ and the centuries of early Christianity, this language was not a ‘myth’ but the exact terminology for the designation of religious phenomena. It has become a ‘myth’ as a consequence of the penetration of our world by a rationalism which destroys the transcendental meanings of symbols taken from the world of the senses. In the course of this ‘de-divinisation’ (Entgötterung) of the world, sensual symbols have lost their transparency for transcendental reality; they have become opaque and are no longer revelatory of the immersion of the finite world in the transcendent.20

The challenge led to a “spiritualisation” of the Christian experience. Thus, the

de-divinisation of the “world” was set in place and Christianity became historicised. The

symbolisation of the Church belonged to an era that was alien. Christian symbolism

16 Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, 1981, p. 20. 17 Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution. This work was published in 1981 but Voegelin wrote and examined these problems in the 1940s and early 1950s. His references to the issues confronting the Church were relevant then but many of those issues have received attention from the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. 18 Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, 1981, p. 21. Voegelin explains, “The Christian credo ut intelligam, which presupposes the substance of faith, is reversed into an intelligo ut credam. The is the object of an hypothesis with a high degree of probability. There has disappeared, furthermore, the basis of Christian theology, the analogia entis, and with it the possibility of speculation on the attributes of God” (p. 26). Voegelin criticises who dismisses the notion of the Christian soul. 19 Ibid., p. 20. 235

came to be seen in a literal manner and acquired a certain “disenchanted opaqueness”

when challenged by logic, biology, history, etc. The age of rationalism prevailed.

Voegelin comments:

For modern man who has grown up outside Christian traditions and institutions, it is extremely difficult to regain the original meaning of ancient symbolisms, be they Hellenic or Christian, but he can gain an understanding of the problem when he observes the symbolisms of modern spiritual perversions which are quite as far beyond the sphere of rational critique as are the ancient symbolisms.21

Things came to a head in the 17th century when a philosophy of “self-assertion of the

speculative intellect”22prevailed. The result has left “deep scars in the spiritual and

intellectual structure of the West”.23 Consequently, the Church not only lost its

“leadership in civilisation,”24 but also its “leadership of the spirit”. Although there was a belated effort by the Church to “compromise” in the Pauline sense this time it came too late. As Voegelin remarks:

The futile opposition to the civilisation process engenders an increasing opposition among its bearers against the claim of the church to be an institution that preserves authoritatively the Western spiritual tradition. Hence the inadequacy and belatedness of the civilisational compromise becomes of growing importance as a cause of de-Christianisation and non-Christian respiritualisation.25

20Ibid., p. 21. 21Ibid.,Voegelin explains what he means by “modern spiritual perversions”. He writes, “ Anybody who has ever tried to explain to a convinced Marxist that the idea of a communist stateless society is a derivative eschatology and that Marxism is not a ‘scientific’ socialism, or has tried to explain to a fanatic of world organisation that terms like world peace, peace-loving nations, aggressors, etc., are not concepts of empirical politics, but symbols of an intramundane eschatology, can gauge by the reaction he encounters how senseless it must have appeared to an early Christian if somebody had argued against the Incarnation with biological reasons” (p. 22). 22Voegelin, “Siger de Brabant”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1944), pp. 507-508. 23Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, p. 20. 24Ibid., Voegelin writes, “the problem that the Church is losing its leadership, not only the leadership of the civilizational process itself, but the leadership of the spirit.” 25Ibid. 236

The Church’s alienation in a society where rationalism prevailed resulted in the separation of the Christian substance from its source, the “holiness of Christ”. Although this is a gradual process, the decisive point occurred when “the spirit of holiness”

(pneuma hagiosynes ) was replaced by reason (rationalisation) as the basis of order in society. Forthwith, an “imbalance” in consciousness resulted and there was a fading out of the notion of the mystical body of Christ, the source of community substance.26

A spiritual vacuum was left providing an opening “for a respiritualisation of the public sphere from other sources, in the forms of nationalism, humanitarianism, economism both liberal and socialist, biologism, and psychologism.”27 Voegelin contends that this “growth of a plurality of counter-spirits and counter-churches to the traditional spiritual institutions is the most fateful consequence of the failure of the

Church to find a compromise with the new pluralistic world of politics.”28

7.1.2. SECOND FACTOR: NOMINALISM

Another influence that contributed to the loss of reason was Nominalism,29 the via moderna inspired by William Ockham. Ockham considered that there could be no valid

26 Voegelin, “The Growth of the Race Idea,” Review of Politics, 2 (1940), p. 293. 27Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, p. 20. 28Ibid. 29Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, p. 113. Voegelin writes, “The nominalism of a dogma that has separated from experience, and therefore can no longer be controlled by recourse to experience, has become the publicity dominant form of the West because it was beginning with the eighteenth century adopted as the intellectual form of ideologizing”. Refer also to “Nominalism” by Heinz Robert Schlette in Karl Rahner, ed., Sacramentum Mundi, 1975, p.232: The term “Nominalism" refers to a controversy that began in the eleventh and twelfth centuries over the ontological validity of the concept as such. This was a revival of a debate by Porphyrius, in his introduction to Aristotle on the Categories - a work known in the Middle Ages through the translation of . Are genus and species "real" or are they only present in the intellect? Are they distinct from the sensible or are they in the sensible? It is easy to recognise here a crystallisation of the whole philosophy of Plato and Aristotle in its confrontation with the various forms of scepticism. Though in the discussion prior to Roscelin de Compiegne and in Roscelin himself and above all in Peter Abelard the linguistic and logical problems were in the foreground, it is clear that an ontological or metaphysical question, which represented a fundamental critique of the philosophical and theological tradition, was a basically dangerous and shocking one. 237

inference of God beyond what was provided by empirical experience. He wished to remove

faith (pistis) from reason and "did not stop until he had reduced their union (faith and

reason) to absurdity".30 The “real” was the “individual thing” to which there is something

corresponding. His ideas at the time were revolutionary. Universals were seen as a purely

psychological explanation and should be regarded only as a function of the mind. The effect

in the long term was to nullify the achievements of the scholasticism of the thirteenth

century. The influence of Nominalism meant that the rational understanding of faith

provided by Bonaventure and Aquinas and their contemporaries was no longer accepted.31

Instead the new philosophy separated reason from faith. Ockham's theoretical innovation was the beginning of a new era. Gilson explains this as follows:

Faith was intact, but to follow Ockham was to give up any hope of achieving in this life a positive philosophical understanding of its intelligible meaning.32

The doctrine of Ockham was a turning point in the history of philosophy and

theology. His doctrine paved the way for positivism and the empirical approach of the

moderns.33 Gilson suggests that disastrous implications followed as a result of this split in

theology and philosophy. He writes, "In philosophy itself, this apprentice sorcerer [William

Ockham] has not at all created but unleashed and encouraged forces which he himself could

not possibly control after setting them free."34

30Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought (London: Penguin Books, 1958), pp. 280-281. 31Etienne Gilson, Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p.499. [The debate over the effects of "Nominalism" is ongoing and cannot be dealt with here.] 32Ibid. 33Ibid. 34Ibid., See also Gordon Leff, The Dissolution of the Medieval Outlook (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p.12. Leff writes that the immediate effect of Nominalism: was to introduce an asymmetry between the conceptual and the real and to recast the notion of reality in its light. Universal knowledge was not denied; but in Ockham's view it could only be reached through knowledge of individuals and it was ultimately about individuals. It was that which reversed the accepted order. 238

It will be recalled that noetic reason arises from the philosopher’s experience of the

process of reality so that the philosopher is understood here as the “lover of wisdom”, and

like Socrates he works against the problems of the age.35The “reason” that Ockham had

proposed was a reductionist view of human existence.36There is a sharp distinction between

what has been described as noetic reason and what is proposed as the "nominalist 'definition'

of reason".37Limits were set to human understanding by the nominalists. By the eighteenth

century, nominalistic reason was firmly established and "adopted as the intellectual form of

ideologising."38

Philosophy now demanded a reasoning (rationalisation) that required empirical

evidence. The determining factor in the interpretation of all reality rested on this new form of

knowing. Copleston makes the point that the Nominalists by their theory of universals and

their empiricist analysis of causal relations changed the understanding of the substance-

accident metaphysics. He explains :

If, then on the one hand only analytical propositions, in the sense of propositions reducible to the principle of contradiction, are absolutely certain, while on the other hand statements about causal relations are empirical or inductive generalisations which enjoy at best only a very high degree of probability, it follows that the traditional metaphysical arguments, resting on the employment of the principle of causality and on the substance-accident metaphysic, cannot be absolutely certain. In the case of statements about God’s existence, for example, the nominalists maintained that they owed their certainty not to any philosophical arguments which could be adduced in their favour but to the fact that they were truths of faith, taught

35Voegelin, “Immortality: Experience and Symbol”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, pp. 64 - 65. 36Voegelin, “On Hegel - A Study in Sorcery”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, p. 221. Voegelin writes, that Hegel exploited this version of reason to the full. Voegelin used the term "sorcerer" in his criticism of Hegel who construed the human being as a "blind particle". In this nihilistic perspective, “Man has become a nothing; he has no reality of his own; he is a blind particle in the process of the world which has the monopoly of real reality and real meaning" ... and yet, to Hegel something important has been gained: “the nothing that has raised itself to a something has become, if not a man, at least a sorcerer who can evoke, if not the reality of history at least its shape." 37Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience", in Published Essays,1966-1985, Vol.12, p. 265. 38 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, p. 113. 239

by Christian theology. This position naturally tended to introduce a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology.39

Nominalism also set aside the possibility of being able to prove that the “preambles of faith” that is that certain truths are logically presupposed by the act of faith. The Nominalists regarded the “preambles of faith” as not strictly provable. A taboo was placed on metaphysics. The former link between philosophy and theology was finally severed as a result of the strong influence of nominalism.40

7.1.3. A BREAK BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Serious repercussions followed this break between philosophy and theology, one was the advance of a propositional form of theology. Noesis or mysticism was now excluded from human consciousness. Voegelin designates the propositional form of theology as “dogmatomachy”, a form of knowledge clearly articulated, defined and separated from the original thinker's experience and symbolisation. Dogmatomachy is contrasted to “predogmatic” knowledge or ratio which is the source of understanding or luminosity of consciousness.41

7.2. WHAT THE LIFE OF REASON COMPRISES: THE LOSS

39Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, Vol. 3 (New York: Image Books, Doubleday, 1993), [1953], p. 126. Copleston points out that the Nominalists on the one hand demanded that the truth of a statement is not absolutely certain unless the opposite cannot be stated without contradiction...they argued that the inference from phenomena to substance was an inference from effect to cause. If only statements about causal relations are empirical or inductive generalisations which enjoy at the best only a very high degree of probability, it follows that the traditional metaphysical arguments, resting on the employment of the principle of causality and on the substance-accident metaphysic, cannot be absolutely certain. ...a thinker like Aquinas had been convinced that it is possible to prove the ‘preambles of faith’ such as the statement that a God exists who can make a revelation.... he recognised as strictly provable certain truths which are logically presupposed by the act of faith... . (pp. 125- 126). 40Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p. 192. 41Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, p. 113. 240

To grasp the full effect of the loss of the life of reason in Western consciousness it is necessary to understand what Voegelin refers to as “the closing of community substance”.

The phrase appears in his article “Growth of the Race Idea”42when he was investigating the

“racial factor” in Nazi Germany. He writes that the situation in which the racial factor develops is brought about by a process that has some afinity with secularisation and particularlisation. He points out that this process “has not received as yet any adequate treatment” also there is “no generally accepted term to signify it”.43Voegelin terms this process as a “‘closing’ of the essential substances, such as organism, person, and society.”44At this point some discussion of Voegelin’s meaning of “substance” is useful.

“Substance” in Voegelin’s thinking has a different meaning from what is commonly accepted.

The term “substance” in English has a wide range of meanings depending upon the context, philosophical, theological or other - wherein the word is used.45Voegelin uses

“substance” in the same way as Aristotle, who stated, “... that which underlies a thing

42Voegelin, “The Growth of the Race Idea”, Review of Politics, 2 (1940), pp. 283-317. 43Ibid., p. 302. 44Ibid., p. 303. 45 “Substance” has a long and complex history and in fact there are some philosophers who deny the philosophical meaning of the word. The word “substance” in English is a transliteration of substantia from Latin. In early Greek philosophy there was the search for something basic or fundamental in the cosmos, something that would explain stability within the context of change. To express this unchanging reality Parmenides affirmed that the unchanging was real and to express this he used various forms of the verb “to be” (ειναι). Plato in his attempt to solve the problem of stability versus change confined the stable and the unchanging to the world of his Ideas as ousia from the feminine participle of ειναι. To allow for the more dynamic character of substance Aristotle expanded the meaning of ousia and applied it to things in the sensible changing world. He applied ousia to essence; to the universal; to genus and to the subject [Latin subjectum]. Concerning this Aristotle says, “...for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its ousia” (Meta. 1029a3). Refer to “Substance” entry by R. E. Mc Call, New Catholic Encyclopaedia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 766-770. In modern thought two types of usage are discernible. In the empirical tradition the notion of substance is a thing. In the second type of usage the meaning of substance has been influenced by the impact of the physical sciences. Substance is viewed as a thing and its property tends to dissolve. Substance in this view becomes a substratum in which properties and qualities inhere. See Dictionary of Philosophy “Substance”, pp. 320-322. 241

primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its ousia” [substance] (Meta.1029a3). (This

use of “substance” should not to be confused with “substance” found in traditional

metaphysics which refers to substance as an independent existing entity.)46 Voegelin explains that when Aristotle was writing, the one word ousia sufficed “for all modes of being.” He states “the question that has always been asked and is still being asked today, the ever puzzling question, ‘What is being?’ amounts to this: ‘What is the primary being of

(ousia)?’” (Meta.1028 b3-5). Voegelin elaborates:

It does not make sense to translate ousia in this sentence with ‘substance,’ as it is conventionally done, for one would thereby only get involved, anachronistically, in the problems of later dogmatic metaphysics. The meaning of this ousia is the undoubted, unquestionable, and convincing reality of ‘things’ in the primary experience. If one is looking, in Aristotle’s language, for an explanatory synonym for ousia, the closest would be aletheia in its double meaning of reality and truth. For Aristotle, everything that is convincingly real falls under the title ousia. Form and matter are ousia and also the thing that is composed of form and matter. Beyond that the soul, or at least its noetic part, is ousia, inasmuch as it is the form (eidos) of man. Furthermore the constitution is such a real form (eidos) of the polis - a mishap the consequences of which still plague us today as the doctrine of state forms in political science. Finally, the divine nous, the Prime Mover, has the status of ousia.47

When ousia was understood compactly as in the cosmic experience there was no difficulty in understanding “substance” as underlying reality. But when the cosmic experience of reality was differentiated into the “world” and “ground” then ousia became

disassociated from its underlying reality and what was once referred to as ousia is now

objectivised. A “split” in reality came about and ousia was reduced to a subject of

dogmatics and given expression in such ideas as the “soul” and its existence with God,

proofs of finity and infinity and so on. The dissociation of substance from its early meaning

gave rise to the split in philosophy that has led to the Enlightenment and Positivism.

46Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 1981, p. 288 242

Voegelin argues that as a result of the split in philosophy “the residual mode of world- immanent existence alone still carries the title” whereas “the reality of reality, about the truth of which man historically is concerned, is simply denied.”48 Such a way of thinking is

viewed by Voegelin as “grotesque”.49Knowledge that rests on a mode of existence which is

actually highly speculative - that of existence as known purely from without - has become

widely accepted as the standard of reality, while that mode of existence which man actually

experiences in consciousness is treated as unreal.50 Voegelin had provided an analysis of the repercussions this separation has had on philosophy.

7.2.1. “SUBSTANCE” DIFFERENTIATED IN THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

When discussing “the substance of order” Voegelin considers both “classic and

Christian conceptions of society,” for “men are members of society in so far as they participate either in the nous in the classical sense, or in the Logos in the Christian sense.”51In the Christian experience, there is a differentiation of community substance.

This was new. The source of this newness is found in the pneuma hagiosynes (spirit of

holiness of Christ)52 and is specific to Christianity. The radical new substance was referred

to earlier when he was discussing The Epistle to the Hebrews, ”Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.”53 To dismiss the substance of faith is to

47Voegelin stated the basic problem concerning substance in his 1943 essay, “The Consciousness of the Ground” in Anamnesis,1978, pp. 160-161. 48Voegelin, “The Consciousness of the Ground”, in Anamnesis, 1978, pp. 161. 49Ibid. 50Ibid., pp. 163 - 164. 51 Voegelin, “Necessary Moral Bases”, p. 64. Voegelin refers to the elimination of homonoia in Western society and points specifically to Hobbes’ Leviathan. He eliminated the divine summum bonum from his political theories. 52Voegelin, “The Growth of the Race Idea,” Review of Politics, 2 (1940), p. 303. Refer to pneuma hagiosynes (p. 293). 53See thesis, Section 5.7.4. “substance” in The Epistle of the Hebrews, 11:1. 243

reduce Christianity to mere Stoic ethics, legal theory, temporal authority and a hierarchy of

functions because then “the substance has disappeared”.54

The loss of community substance is also referred to as a downward movement or as a

process of “sliding down” the essential substances. Examples of the downward movement

appear in the Enlightenment where Voegelin refers to “the rapid descent from reason”55 and that “...once the transcendental anchorage is surrendered the descent from rational to the animal nature seems inevitable.”56 In another place he points to the “sliding down of the substance of order over the ranks of ontological hierarchy”.57There is a reference to

Christianity as “thinned out to a code of social ethics” and the loss of rationality as “an

ontological reduction that occurs with regard to the accepted source of order in man and

society. What becomes clear from these references is that this “sliding down” the

hierarchical scale is associated with a downward movement or a loss of Christian substance,

expressed by Voegelin as a thinning out or as a “spiritualisation” of substance.

The “loss” of Christian substance results in a modification of community

substance. The order that once found its source in noetic reason has now moved down to

the level of organic substances (on the hierarchy of being). The situation arises when

morality is dissociated from language. For “morality is inseparable from rationality of

discourse - rationality understood in the substantive sense of truthfulness. If the language

employed in communication is irrational, the morality of the communication itself will be

54Voegelin, “Political Theory,” in Research in Political Science, pp. 190-201, ed. Ernest S. Griffith (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), p. 199. 55Voegelin, From Enlightenment To Revolution, 1981, p. 13. 56Ibid. 57Voegelin, “Necessary Moral Bases For Communication in a Democracy Speech, 75th Anniversary Conference, Marquette University”, in Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1956), p. 66. 244 impaired in the measure of its irrationality.” Then a downward movement occurs, resulting in an ontological reduction in the way man and society are regarded. Voegelin explains:

By this movement is meant the transformation of our conception of society by moving the substance of order from Logos, through the levels of the ontological hierarchy, down to organic substances and drives.58

Full comprehension of what the “moving down” process implies requires some examin ation of the idea of “the hierarchy of being”.59

7.2.2. THE HIERARCHY OF BEING

The idea of the structure of the world within the framework of the hierarchy of being was generally unquestioned until the late eighteenth century. The notion of “hierarchy of being”60 was central to the medieval philosophers. Etienne Gilson in his work, Being and

Some Philosophers61 analyses the etymological components of “being,” and explains that

“being is the first principle of human knowledge, it is a fortiori the first principle of metaphysics.”62 He states that “if being is the first principle of human knowledge, it must

58Ibid., p. 64. Voegelin expresses similar considerations in “The Growth of the Race Idea,” Review of Politics, 2 (1940), p. 293. 59Paul Grimley Kuntz, "Voegelin's Experiences of Disorder out of Order and Vision of Order Out of Disorder: A Philosophic Meditation on His Theory of Order-Disorder", in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Significance for the Modern Mind (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1991). See pp. 135-144. 60 See Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (1936), pp. 52-59. The phrase is also called the “principle of plenitude” or “great chain of being” and, as Lovejoy observes, it "covers a wide range of influences, from premises identical with Plato's theorem of 'fullness' i.e. the realisation of conceptual possibility in actuality. Aristotle also took up the idea which was later used as a system of classification by naturalists and philosophers. His criterion of rank was the degree of development of organisms. A further extension of the idea is found in his De Anima which presents another version of hierarchical arrangement in all organisms”. 61Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 2. Gilson writes that one can “sum up the nature and unity of philosophical experience in the two following propositions: first, that since being is the first principle of human knowledge, it is a fortiori the first principle of metaphysics; next, that all the past failures of metaphysics should be blamed, not on metaphysics itself, but rather on repeated mistakes made by metaphysicians concerning the first principle of human knowledge, which is being.” Gilson uses these conclusions as his starting point for his discussion, although he admits they are paradoxical. 62Gilson refers to another book he wrote, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Scribner, 1937), pp. 313, 316. 245

be the very first object to be grasped by the human mind.”63It will be recalled that the

term ousia derives from the verb “to be”. It is here that the complexity of the problem

resides.

Gilson observes that “the word ‘being’ is a noun, as such it signifies either a being

(that is, the substance, nature, and essence of anything existent), or being itself, a property

common to all that which can rightly be said to be.” Gilson notes that in “a second

acceptation, the same word is the present participle of the verb, ‘to be’. As a verb, it no

longer signifies something that is, nor even existence in general, but rather the very act

whereby any given reality actually is, or exists.64 He points out that “being” means the

thing “being” what it is. Then he states,

Let us call this act a ‘to be’, in contradistinction to what is commonly called ‘a being’. It appears at once that, at least to the mind, the relation of ‘to be’ to ‘being’ is not a reciprocal one. ‘Being’ is conceivable, ‘to be’ is not. We cannot possibly conceive an ‘is’ except as belonging to something that is, or exists. But the reverse is not true. Being is quite conceivable apart from actual existence; so much so that the very first and the most universal of all the distinctions in the realm of being is that which divides into two classes, that of the real and that of the possible.65

Such a view of “being” and, consequently of the “world” is now no longer held. Gilson reflects on the current state of philosophy and writes, “For indeed, if ‘being’ is the first

principle of human knowledge, it must be the very first object to be grasped by the human

mind.” He asks, if this is so, “how are we to account for the fact, that so many philosophers

have been unable to grasp it?”66 Modern philosophy appears to have difficulty in coming to

terms with this key notion. Gilson states:

63Bold added. 64 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 2. 65Ibid. 66Ibid., Gilson states: 246

The only way for us to avoid this depressing conclusion is to suppose that the fault does not necessarily lie with the nature of the human mind, and that being itself might be partly responsible for the difficulty. There may be something in its very nature which invites philosophers to behave as though the fear of being were the beginning of wisdom. What else could account for the curious eagerness of metaphysicians to ascribe the primacy and the universality of being to practically any one of its parts rather than to accept being as the first principle of their philosophy? 67

Gilson’s argument is useful here for two reasons. One is his attempt to explain the various facets of “being” and the other is his emphasis that being is “the first principle of philosophy.” Voegelin’s approach to “community” needs to be understood on that basis. He criticises those who deform reality by rejecting the significance of “being”. Without understanding the philosophical implications of “being” it is not possible to grasp what

Voegelin means by the process of “the closure of essential substances”.

“Hierarchy” is an idea found in Aristotle and taken up by Pseudo-Dionysius68 suggesting “grades” or “levels”. The notion of “hierarchy” is used, (often without definition), as part of the common order of ideas.69 Paul Kuntz refers to Thomas Aquinas’s definition of

“hierarchy” commenting that “no one pauses to admire the logical beauty of this

achievement” as found in Summa Theologica:

Hierarchia est ordo, id est relatio, inter diversos gradus: Non autem ut dicat unum gradum.

Nor is this all. That which comes first in the order of knowledge must of necessity accompany all our representations; now, if it does, how can being both be constantly present to the most common mind, yet prove so elusive that so many very great philosophers have failed to see it? If the ultimate lesson of philosophical experience is that the human mind is blind to the very light in which it is supposed to see both itself and all the rest, what it [‘philosophy’] teaches us is worse than a paradox, it is an absurdity. 67Ibid. 68 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 572. Copleston refers to Pseudo-Dionysius’ Celestial Hierarchy (De Coelesti Hierarchia) and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia). 69 Kuntz, “A Formal Preface and an Informal Conclusion to The Great Chain of Being: The Necessity and Universality of Hierarchical Thought”, in Marion Leathers Kuntz & Paul Grimley Kuntz, eds., Jacob’s 247

(Hierarchy is order, that is relation between different levels, Not however so as to speak of

a single level.)70 Kuntz considers St. Thomas “very modern” in his stress “on order as a

‘relation’, and his recognition of the obvious asymmetry of such an ordering relation as above-below or before-after”.71 In the 19th and 20th centuries, a shift occurred and serial

order came to be defined in the logic of Whitehead and Russell as a relation that is

asymmetrical, transitive and connected.72 But, as Kuntz notes, for “hierarchy” to have meaning there must be at least three levels as asymmetry is defined in only two terms.73

Principles of hierarchical order are reflected in many ways in the structure of the cosmos and in our societies. Hierarchy is seen as a peculiar metaphysical pattern associated with

Western thought (Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus) and has for some thinkers been completely supplanted by evolutionary thought.74

There is a certain universality about the notion of hierarchy. Kuntz points out that in

other cultures such as the Jewish and Moslem philosophies this notion is important and

extends to non-Western thought. He writes:

If these seem to be also Neo-Platonic in origin and similarly provincial and remote from us, then it becomes necessary to examine philosophies of all the world. Quite independent of Jacob’s Ladder and Homer’s Golden Chain we find in Hinduism a rich heritage of the stages by which Atman can ascend to union with Brahma. This is a central theme in the Upanishads, and Hindu systems are rare that do not tell us of the degrees of perfection, even if they emerge as Buddhism, by denying Atman and Brahma.75

Ladder and the Tree of Life: Concepts of Hierarchy and the Great Chain of Being, New Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1987[revised ed.], p. 3. 70 Ibid., Kuntz refers to Editio Altera Romana, (Rome: Leonine Ed., n.d.,), Vol. VI, p. 191. The specific question is 108, Article 2, in the midst of a discussion of angels Thomas extends this examination to the order of “courts, warriors, labourers” et sic de aliis. 71Ibid., p. 4. 72Paul G. Kuntz, “Order” in The New Catholic Encyclopaedia (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), Vol. 10, pp. 720-723. 73 Kuntz, “A Formal Preface and an Informal Conclusion to The Great Chain of Being: The Necessity and Universality of Hierarchical Thought”, 1987, p. 6. 74 Ibid., p. 8. 75Ibid. 248

Chinese thought is also considered: although

...quite reticent about higher beings and the soul’s ascent, is nevertheless always subjecting [it], even the emperor, to the . And striving to be a sage along with a deep sense of the proper ceremony to be observed in relation to those on a higher level, is as powerful a motive in as in any tradition.76

“Hierarchy” can also be found in the sciences, for as Feibleman observed, we study entities with distinct processes and emergent qualities, and between these levels are found cleavages. For example, there is a lower level, the physical atom, out of which emerges the chemical atom, the biological organism, the psychological mind, and the anthropological society. He states, “The integrative levels are stepwise phenomena, structures existing one above the other logically...”77

Voegelin refers to the “hierarchy of being” in “Reason; the Classic Experience”,

where he explores the unfolding of noetic consciousness. He points to the “practically

forgotten experiential context on which the meaning of reason depends...”78 and lists in

diagrammatic form the various levels of “hierarchy of being” from Divine Nous to Apeiron,

Depth.79 In the Aristotelian framework humans participate in all levels.80 Voegelin

associates “order” with “the hierarchy of being”, explaining that man’s existence

participates in three dimensions of “order”: being a person with the nous, in society and

76Ibid.,p. 9. 77Ibid., p. 10. The quotation is cited by Kuntz. He refers to James K. Feibleman, “The Integrative Levels in Nature”, in Focus on Information and Communication, Barbara Kyle, ed., (London: ASUB, 1965), p. 28. Kuntz notes that Feibleman is one of the many philosophers and scientists who are now contributing to the theory of hierarchy. 78 Voegelin, “Reason: the Classic Experience”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, 1990, p. 289. 79 Ibid., pp. 287-290. Voegelin presents a diagram illustrating the levels of the “hierarchy of being” from the Divine Nous to the Apeiron - Depth. He notes that "Man participates in all of them; his nature is an epitome of the hierarchy of being." (See diagram, Table 1 in Appendix of thesis). In Voegelin, Order and History: Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 334-335. Voegelin presents a more complete picture of the “hierarchy of being” . 249

history. No part of the grid should be absent or hypostasised into an autonomous entity,

neglecting the context.81

Failure to keep the formation and foundation of order leads to reality being

obscured.82 Voegelin criticises a reductionist approach when he refers to the philosophy of

Nietzsche which "decapitated" God and he argues that unless the full “hierarchy of being”

is acknowledged there is a degeneration of religion from true to false.83

7.3. LOSS OF COMMUNITY SUBSTANCE

The “hierarchy of being” sets out the philosophical framework which explains the

loss of the life of reason. What was once the common centre of community substance - the

Divine Nous and the pneuma of Christ - is now closed from public consciousness. Voegelin

explains the loss:

In the Christian idea of the community the bond between the members is created - when we single out the pneumatic construction for the movement - through the participation of every person in the pneuma of Christ. The unifying force is the transcendental divine personality of Christ, and the community might be called ‘open’ because it is not a closed mundane entity but an aggregate of persons finding its common centre in a substance beyond the field of earthly experience. By ‘closing’ of a substance I mean the process in the course of which the transcendental point of union is abolished and the community substance as an intra-mundane entity becomes self-centred. The formerly open group with spiritual threads running from every single member beyond the earthly reality into another ontological realm closes by the transfer of the centre from the beyond into the very community itself. This process is practically completed when the unit of a group is believed to lie in a group mind, in a national spirit, in the character of a class as an agent of history, or when society is interpreted by analogy to a self-centred organism.84

80Voegelin, “Reason: the Classic Experience”, Published Essays, 1966-1985, 1990, p. 290. 81 Ibid., See diagram, Table 1 in Appendix of thesis. 82Voegelin considers all reductionist fallacies are to be excluded for they are false. 83Voegelin, “Nietzsche, “The Crisis and the War”, The Journal of Politics, 6 (1944). See also Kuntz, "Voegelin's Experiences of Disorder out of Order and Vision of Order Out of Disorder: A Philosophic Meditation on His Theory of Order-Disorder", 1987, p. 135. 84Voegelin, "The Growth of the Race Idea", The Review of Politics, 2 (1940), p.303. 250

Hence, the open society is open to the influence of the pneuma of Christ whereas

the closed society breaks off spiritual links and transfers the focus into the community itself.

The transfer of the focus into the community itself is a loss. Centring on the community alone is described as a move from amor Dei (love of God) to amor sui (love of self) as stated in St. Augustines’s The Two Cities. When the transcendental ties are severed, the preparation for a closed society ensues.85

Voegelin explains that when the transcendent element is abolished [“the hierarchy of

being”, God decapitated] the unifying principle moves inward [intramundane] and becomes

self-centred. The new unifying principle becomes a mundane entity, imprisoned within its

own psychological consciousness. It no longer has the unifying source of community

substance. Such a society is closed because it has abolished the transcendent point of union.

The essential substances are closed and as a result the focus of society is turned inward.

The loss of the life of reason is shown to be a closure of substance. The process of

closure is basically “a sliding down” “the hierarchy of being”. Consequently, of the

closure of essential substances, the transcendent point of union in the consciousness of

Western society is lost. Voegelin’s research has brought to light two thinkers whose

spiritual horizons could embrace noesis. First there was Jean Bodin, who in the midst of

the war of dogmas gave emphasis to the notion vera religio (true religion). The other was

Henri Bergson, who grasped the significance of the open soul notion. 86

7.3.1. VOEGELIN’S ANALYSIS OF JEAN BODIN (1530-96) AND VERA RELIGIO

85Ibid., p. 304. 86Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 114; Voegelin remarks: "In the twentieth century, when the dogmatomachy is no longer that of theological but ideological sects, a similar understanding of the problem has been reached by Henri Bergson in his Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, (1932). I doubt that Bergson has the same stature as a mystic as Bodin, but these two French spiritualists are for me the 251

To understand the importance of the noesis symbol in Jean Bodin’s thought it is

necessary to consider the historical context in which he was writing. In France, within a

divisive society eight religious wars occurred within a period of fifty years. At this time the

new world, the Americas had been discovered. The truths of Christianity were challenged.

New questions arose regarding the old order when it was confronted with the new. One

formidable question was, which version of Christianity was authentic, and which religion

was true?87Some sense of the turmoil of the times is reflected in Jean Bodin’s Colloquium88 where he considers on the one hand the series of conflicting wars raging in France and on the other hand, the diversity of experience of the new world. He wrote: “omnes ab omnibus refelluntur - all are refuted by all"(V,256/196).89 In one dialogue a participant naively asks,

“Who can doubt that the Christian religion is the true religion or rather the only one?” The answer is brutal and short: “Almost all the world.” (IV,163/125)90Christianity was at the

cross-roads.

Bodin had examined the religious struggle that raged between the various theologies

and recognised the importance of noetic reason. His perception of the importance of the

noesis symbol helps to explain what Voegelin regards as the problem of dogmatomachy.

Over the last five centuries Voegelin found there was a tendency to interpret Christianity as

representative figures for the understanding of order in times of spiritual disorder". See also Voegelin, Anamnesis, p. 195, his reference to Bodin. 87J.S. Preus, Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory, Bodin to Freud (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 3. 88Preus, Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory, Bodin to Freud, 1987, p. 3. He cites Joannis Bodini, Colloquium Heptalomeres de rerum sublimium arcanis abditis (in its English translation, Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the ), written by 1593 but not published until 1857. Refer to Jean Bodin, The Colloquium [ New trans. by Marion Kuntz, Princeton, 1985.] 89What Bodin is implying is that there is no meeting point. Each is refuting the other and their arguments are not based on substance but opinions (doxa). 90 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 113. 252

a system of doctrines which he terms “dogmatomachy”.91Dogmatomachy or doctrinisation, he argues, leads to an eclipse of the mystical side of Christianity. He states:

My careful study of the work of Bodin in the early thirties gave me my first full understanding of the function of mysticism in a time of social disorder. I still remember Bodin's Lettre à Jan Bautru as one of the most important documents to affect my own thought.92

And in Anamnesis, Voegelin offers more information:

In this letter Bodin speaks of the confusion of the soul as it is exposed to the pressure of contending religions. He admonishes his friend not to be carried away by the opinions about them (variae de religionibus sententiae) but always to remain conscious of ‘true religion being nothing else than the turning (conversio) of a purified spirit to the true God.’93

Bodin was able to distinguish between doxa, opinions and, episteme, philosopher’s

knowledge. Vera religio, true religion, is the recurring symbol found in Bodin's writings and

this is something to which Voegelin attached particular importance in understanding the

structure of reality. The symbol vera religio is associated with another symbol which is

conversio; in order to acknowledge the full structure of reality (i.e. the transcendent

dimension) there is a need for openness and "true religion", i.e. a turning to God with a

purified mind (Religio vera ipsa, id est purgatae mentis in Deum recta conversio) [Bodin].94

Voegelin was able to trace the symbol conversio right back to Plato’s episteme. The conversio symbol appeared in the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius:

The term conversio has represented, since Eriugena, the epistrophe of Pseudo-Dionysius; it is widely used in the literature of the Renaissance, for

91Ibid. 92Ibid., pp. 113-114. 93Voegelin, Anamnesis,1978, p. 195. In note 6 Voegelin cites Jean Bodin, Lettre à Jean Bautru de Matras, in Colomiès’, Gallia Orientalis,1665, p. 76ff.; reproduced in Roger Chauvire, Jean Bodin, Auteur de la république (Paris, 1914), p. 522ff. About the letter, cf. Pierre Mesnard, La Pensée réligieuse de Bodin, Revue du Seizième Siècle, Vol. 16 (1929). 94Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p. 195. 253

instance, in the Oratio Joannis Trithemii de vera conversione mentis ad deum (1500).95

Voegelin observed the influence of Plato's noesis :

The fascination of the Renaissance thinkers by the mysticism of Pseudo- Dionysius seems to have stemmed from the latter's proximity to Plato's noesis, with its emphasis on eros in the tension toward the ground. Pico della Mirandola, in his Heptaplus, which title probably suggested Bodin's Heptaplomeres, investigates the conversio of the angels and in this context speaks of ‘the movement of the conversio’ as a motus amoris.96

The form of knowing (noesis) appears in the following passage:

Marsilo Ficino, in his commentary to the Theologia Mystica of Pseudo- Dionysius, speaks of the fruitio Dei and emphasises that it is less a movement of self to God but rather a being moved by him. To this almost Aristotelian understanding of the movement he adds, in the imagery of the Symposium, the remark that fruitio is not like being emptied but rather like being filled. Finally, it is not a movement of the intellect to the bonum but rather a being - carried in by love: non est per intellectum versari circa bonum, sed amore transferri. [It is not by the intellect that one moves towards the good but one is carried by love.]97

Voegelin considered the Renaissance thinkers were more perceptive than the

Nominalists. They saw the limitation of dogmatism and recognised "mysticism as a method".

The transcendent dimension of consciousness was acknowledged as a movement towards the divine ground:

Pico della Mirandola and Ficino seem to have resorted to mysticism as a method by which they could find and lift into the light of consciousness the existential tension toward the ground, behind the theologico-metaphysical dogmatism.98

Voegelin's discovery of Bodin's notion vera religio helped him to restore the significance of

the noesis symbol. He explains:

95Ibid. 96Ibid., In note 8 Voegelin cites Pico della Mirandola, Heptaplus, III, 2 and 5. Opera (Basle, 1601). 97 Voegelin, Anamnesis, pp.195-196. In note 9 Voegelin cites Marsilio Ficino, Dionysii Areopagitae, de Mystica Theologia, ad Timotheum Liber, Opera (Basle, 1576), Vol. II, p. 1019 f. 98Ibid. 254

Two generations later, it became Bodin's method to understand the time dimension of consciousness and the structure of history. The Letter to Jean Bautru contrasts the solitude of the conversio to the sociality of the historical religions.99

The symbols noesis, vera religio, conversio had a long history. They point to a form of

knowing that has now been lost to philosophy and theology. At the time experience is “split”

from reality, noetic reason is reduced to rationalism. Hans Urs von Balthasar points to this

when he states that faith which is "disengaged from the real context of a person's life" is

substituted by a theology that "takes over functions which in the pre- and non-Christian

world belonged to philosophy." Hence, Balthasar insists, “there cannot be two ultimate truths

about the world and man".100

7.3.2. LOSS OF NOESIS AND ORDER IN SOCIETY

Voegelin’s analysis of the loss of noesis is crucial for understanding order in society.

Once noetic knowledge has been lost, it is very difficult to recover because of the conflict

between those who hold different forms of knowing. The conflict becomes serious to the

point of deadliness. Voegelin declares:

Men do not all have the same spiritual rank. There are select ones - selecti vitae puriores homines - to whom revelations occur, and there is the great mass of mortals who would grope in eternal darkness if God did not from time to time stir up the ‘highest virtues’ in some particular persons so that they can point out the right road to their fellow-beings. The fate of the select ones, both in historia sacra and the historia pagana, is pathetic. They are slandered, exiled, killed, and punished as subverters.101

The reflection is reminiscent of the fate of Socrates as presented by Plato in his discussion of

the Parable of the Cave. Not only do the "prophets" meet resistance from society, but the

"message" itself can be subject to distortion. Voegelin states:

99Ibid. 255

Even when their message becomes socially effective, it soon is distorted by superstition, when the historical-human form of revelation is taken for its essence, and fanatical literalists obscure its function, i.e. the purification of the spirit and the turning of the soul to God.102

The prophetic element of mysticism invariably places the bearers at odds with the general mass of those who do not possess this perception. Voegelin explains:

Mankind is understood as a society in the mode of existence in history, and history as divided into periods and regions of civilisation, in each of which there occurs the inevitable drama of the spirit: the appearance of the prophet - the transformation of vera religio of the solitary soul into the historical religion of the people - finally a return from the historical religion to the solitude of the prophetic soul.103

Voegelin comments on the "prophetic soul" notion:

In Bodin's later work this image of history is subject to several changes and supplementations but remains constant in its fundamental features. It is closely related to the image of history of Bergson: the opening of the soul, the rigidification on the new level, and the renewed opening, in his Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932).104

That type of openness is ready to recognise a "pluralism" in symbols that gives expression to noesis. Voegelin comments:

Bodin is no utopian. Neither the different levels of spiritual rank of various men nor the pluralism of the historical religions will disappear from history. In his later years, his insight into the problem seems to have penetrated deeper, as he sees pluralism no longer as a consequence of the differentiations of spiritual rank but as a necessary result of the sociality of symbolic expressions. The symbols are described as means that are essentially inadequate to express fully the reality of knowing participation.105

7.3.3. KNOWLEDGE NOT DIVORCED FROM CONVERSIO

100 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, A Theological , Vol. I (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1982), p.143. (See also pp.131-144). 101Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, pp. 195-196. 102Ibid., p.196. 103Ibid. 104Ibid. 105 Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, pp. 196-197. 256

However, the symbol must remain only a symbol and not be hypostatised, that is,

crystallised into dogma. "Behind the knowledge, which enters into the symbol, there is

always the ineffability of the knowledge about the inexhaustibility of the ground."106 To overcome the problem of dogmatism and to maintain the balance there is a need to keep the symbol, conversio:

While the conversio remains the way to escape the dogmatomachy of the literalists, it does not remove the tension between the symbol and the ineffability. As soon as the knowledge of participation is communicated, it enters into the realm of symbolism, and enters only as far as it can enter into symbolic expressions. The parekbasis into literalist dogma, therefore, can be avoided only by maintaining the balance between symbols and the knowledge back of it.107

In his important work, the Colloquium Heptaplomeres of 1593, Bodin kept alive noesis.

Concerning this dialogue Voegelin remarks, "The participants in the great religious

conversation take leave from each other with embraces and assurances of friendship". He

quotes Bodin, “Never again did they dispute about religions”, Voegelin continues, “but each

one remained active within his own."108Although, "Symbolism is no more than the last word

of each historical religion; the reality of faith through conversio lies beyond the symbols".109

Bodin's valuable insight into the essence of tolerance drew on the Theologica Mystica of

Pseudo-Dionysius. He recognised a balance between silence and the reality of knowledge taking symbolic form. On this account Voegelin regards Bodin’s awareness of dogmatism as unique. He explains:

Further fruitions of the same source are few and far between in modern centuries. One cannot escape the difficulty of communicating the insight into the balance of tolerance, precisely because one of the areas to be balanced is

106Ibid., p.197. 107Ibid. 108Ibid., In note 10 Voegelin cites Jean Bodin, Colloquium Heptaplomeres de Rerum sublimium arcanis abditis, ed. L. Noack (1857), in fine. 109Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p. 197. 257

that of silence. Thus, there is no language other than the existential tension toward the ground that could express the depth of the ground.110

Bodin’s recognition of the symbol vera religio, further illustrates an awareness that the substance of religion must be distinguished from dogmatic assertions that generate wars of religion. In the dialogues where Toralba speaks of original religion:

If we measure the best kind of religion by its antiquity, we must seek its origin from the parent of the whole human race (totius humani generis parente origo est petenda). For he must have been supplied with the best habits, the best training, the best knowledge, and finally, the best spiritual virtues (animi virtutibus) by God.111

He continues:

It is consistent with his [God's] nature that he should endow his beloved sons with such unusual virtues and especially with true religion so that they would adore the eternal God and worship him (His tamen multis et praeclaris virtutibus filios sibi charissimos imbuisse consetaneum est atque inprimis vera religione, ut scil. Deum aeternum eique sacra facerent ... ) [IV, 182- 8/140].112

In this passage Bodin considers that the most ancient religion is planted (insita) in the human

mind by "the eternal God". The same idea is present when Plato and Aristotle insisted that

noetic reason must be “discovered”.113

7.3.4. NOESIS SYMBOL : KEPT ALIVE IN BERGSON (1859-1941)

Henri Bergson114 is the other key thinker who Voegelin considers appreciated the

mystical dimension or the substance of the soul. He was the first to use the term “the open

soul”. In his Autobiographical Reflections Voegelin refers to “...the image of history of

110Ibid. 111 Quotation of Bodin cited by Preus in J.S. Preus, Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory, Bodin to Freud (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 11. 112Ibid. 113Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 101. Voegelin writes, “ ... became the basis for the discovery of the existential order by Plato and Aristotle.” 114Ibid., p. 114. Voegelin writes that both Bodin and Bergson are two French spiritualists” who for him are “the representative figures for the understanding of order in times of spiritual disorder.” 258

Bergson: the opening of the soul, the rigidification on the new level, and the renewed

opening, in his Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932).”115Already in 1928, Voegelin

had shown that he was aware of Bergson’s (and William James’) contributions to “the modern Philosophical movement.”116Bergson’s work was “a great landmark” in

philosophy in the midst of times of spiritual disorder.117

Bergson recognised that the notion of “openness” must be distinguished from

quantitative or expansiveness understood as a “broadening out” in society, for example from

family to nation and then to the whole of humanity.118 “Openness” in Bergson’s thought

refers instead to an understanding of openness that draws its character from “religion and

philosophy.”119 He states:

...it is only through God, in God, that religion bids man love mankind: and likewise it is through reason alone, that Reason in whose communion we are all partakers, that philosophers make us look at humanity in order to show us the pre-eminent dignity of the human being, the right of all to command respect. Neither in the one case nor the other do we come to humanity by degrees, through the stages of the family and the nation. We must, in a single bound, be carried far beyond it, and, without having made it our goal, reach it by outstripping it.120

“Natural” feelings alone do not constitue an open society. What is required to obtain

openness is to look to a higher source - one which allows humans to transcend their own

narrow limits of natural instincts. The “higher source” for Bergson is “religion and

115Voegelin, Anamnesis, 1978, p. 196. 116Voegelin, “Immortality: Experience and Symbol” in Published Essays 1966-1985, 1990), p. 56. Refer to Eric Voegelin, On the Form of the American Mind, Vol. 1, 1995. 117Voegelin, “Immortality: Experience and Symbol”, in Published Essays 1966-1985, p. 56. 118 Henri Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1932), trans. as Two Sources of Morality and Religion, by R. A. Andra and C. Brereton (New York: Holt, 1935), p. 24. cited by Dante Germino, “Preliminary Reflections on the Open Society: Bergson, Popper, Voegelin” [pp. 1-25] edited by Dante Germino and Klaus von Beyme in The Open Society in Theory and Practice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 2. 119Ibid. 259 morality.” He observes, “‘Exceptional men’ are the heroes, and virtuosi of the spirit are the carriers in time of the vision of the open society and the open morality”. He continues:

Before the saints of Christianity, mankind had known the sages of Greece, the prophets of Israel, the Arahants of Buddhism, and others besides. It is to them that men have always turned for that complete morality which we had best call absolute morality. 121

Humanity is not left in the abstract for Bergson. For him the individual is important and holds the key to “openness”. It is the psyche of the individual wherein the spiritual centre is found and where the spiritual energy is drawn to lift humanity to new heights. He remarks,

“These exceptional persons are pioneers in morality” who introduce us by their example to

“unsuspected tones of feeling,” rather like a great composer who “draws us after him” into some new symphony.122These “exceptional persons” recognise the transcendent.123

Commenting on Bergson’s understanding of human consciousness, Frederick

Copleston remarks:

This open and dynamic morality (‘open’ in the sense of being universal) is, for Bergson, of suprarational origin. The morality of obligation is, as we have seen, of infra-intellectual origin, being the analogue at the human level of the constant and never failing pressure of instinct in infra-human societies. The open morality however originates in a contact between the great moral idealists and prophets and the creative source of life itself. It is, in effect, the result of a mystical union with

120Germino cites Henri Bergson’s Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1932), p.25. Two Sources of Morality and Religion, translated by R.A. Audra and C. Brereton (New York: Holt, 1935). 121Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion, p. 26. 122Ibid., p. 32. Cited by Germino, “Preliminary Reflections on the Open Society: Bergson, Popper, Voegelin” in Dante Germino, The Open Society in Theory and Practice, 1974, p. 4. 123 Dante Germino, “Preliminary Reflections on the Open Society: Bergson, Popper, Voegelin” in Dante Germino, The Open Society in Theory and Practice, 1974, p. 4. Germino explains, “In the open soul concept a new morality is reflected, a morality unlike that of the closed soul, and is not derived from nature, but is ‘acquired’ by a new passion ... the soul. In allowing itself to be seized by this new passion the open soul breaks with the nature which ‘enclosed it both within itself and within the city’”. 260

God, which expresses itself in universal love. ‘It is the mystical souls which have drawn and continue to draw civilised societies in their wake.’124

Copleston refers to Bergson’s two types of religion, which in turn correspond to two types

of morality, “static” and “dynamic”. “Dynamic religion” for Bergson in essence is found in mysticism. Mysticism as previously explained is a form of knowing that recognises the full structure of reality and is often found by that “creative minority” (Toynbee). Bergson explains what the “creativity” is:

...a contact, and consequently a partial coincidence, with the creative effort of which life is the manifestation. The effort is of God, if it is not God himself. The great mystic is an individual who transcends the limits assigned to the species by its material nature and who thus continues and prolongs the divine action. Such is our definition.125

Bergson perceives the “mystic” as one who “transcends” his “material nature” and as

having a decisive influence on others in society.126 Hence it is in this sense that he

understands an open society which possesses a qualitative movement of openness rather than

a quantative one, whereas a closed society is one that is closed off from transcendence.

Bergson elaborates:

Never shall we pass from the closed society to the open society, from the city to humanity, by any mere broadening out. The two things are not the same essence. The open society is the society which is deemed in principle to embrace all humanity. A dream dreamt, now and again, by chosen souls, it embodies on every

124 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol, IX, “Maine de Biran to Sartre” (New York & London: Doubleday, An Image Book, 1985) “Henri Bergson”, p. 207. Copleston cites Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 68. 125 Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 188, cited by Copleston in A History of Philosophy, Vol. IX, “Maine de Biran to Satre” (1985), p. 210. 126 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. IX, “Maine de Biran to Sartre”, Vol. IX, p. 210. Copleston explains how Bergson regards mysticism, “He therefore regards a mysticism which concentrates simply on turning away from this world to the divine centre or which results in an intellectual grasp of the unity of all things, coloured by sympathy or compassion but not by dynamic activity, as incomplete. And he finds a mysticism of this sort represented especially, though not exclusively, in the East, whereas ‘complete mysticism is in effect that of the great Christian mystics’ [Refer to Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 194]”. 261

occasion something of itself in creations, each of which, through a more or less far- reaching transformation of man, conquers difficulties hitherto unconquerable.127

7.3.5. VOEGELIN’S CRITIQUE OF BERGSON

However although Bergson gave great importance to the recognition of the transcendent as a important element in creating an open society Voegelin did have some misgivings. He regarded Bergson’s insights as significant principally because of his acknowledment of the transcendent in philosophy. At the same time, he argued that “the full implications of his own discovery, viz. the eschatological character of the open society symbol” failed to be drawn by Bergson128 For Bergson, “the qualitative distinction between

universality and ecumenicity, and the open society thus becomes a project to be achieved in

the future rather than an ever-present spiritual reality.”129He did not sufficiently

account for the notion of “universality”.130 “Deliverance” from present evils was something

to be gained in the future when evil and psychological forces had been banished.131 Germino

reports that Voegelin was critical of Bergson and regarded the tenor of the closing of The

Two Sources of Religion “as a regrettable capitulation to progressivist fervour.”132 In taking

this direction Bergson fell short of accounting for the tension of existence. Voegelin

127Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion, 1935, p. 256, cited in Germino & von Beyme, The Open Society and Practice (1974), p. 5. In “Henri Bergson:Activist Mysticism and the Open Society” in Political Science Reviewer, 9 (1979-80), p. 26, Germino discusses Bergson’s very complex question, “Can mysticism succeed in transforming humanity? Bergson offers two very different methods “mechanical” and “mysticism itself”. 128Refer to Dante Germino, Political Philosophy and the Open Society (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), Chapter IX “Henri Bergson’s Two Sources of Morality and Religion”, p. 168. 129Ibid. 130Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 305. Voegelin writes, “Universal mankind is not a society existing in the world, but a symbol which indicates man’s consciousness of participation in his earthly existence, in the mystery of reality that moves towards its transfiguration.” 131 Germino, Political Philosophy and the Open Society, pp. 168-169. 132 Germino, “Preliminary Reflections on the Open Society: Bergson, Popper, Voegelin” in Germino, The Open Society in Theory and Practice, 1974, p. 21. 262 contends that a perfect society can never reach perfection because this is an ever present goal forever beyond the reach of humanity. 263

7.3.6 POPPER (1902-1994)

A very different interpretation of an open society is given by in his

book, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1962).133 Popper explains his usage of the term, by

comparing “open” and “closed” societies. Primitive tribal society is closed in the sense of

being a charmed circle of unchanging taboos and customs which are felt to be as inevitable

as the rising sun. Such a society is characterized by a “magical” attitude, as opposed to that

of a so-called open society, which Popper defined as one based on a “scientific approach”.

Whereas, in a closed society the members “imagine” that “rules” current in their tribe, which

forbid or demand certain modes of conduct, are fixed and inviolable as natural laws,134 an

“open” society is characterized by rationality, and opposed to blind beliefs in dogma. Thus

Popper’s “open society” is one that rejects dogmas, judges things only on the basis of evidence, and is always ready to think again when experience falsifies earlier conclusions.135

Order in such a society depends on "faith in reason, freedom and the brotherhood of all men."136 His exposition of “open” and “closed” societies thus fails to address the problem of

human nature in the Classic and Christian sense.

Voegelin adamantly rejects “the open society” notion of Popper and in the strongest

terms disputes the opinion that his book is one of the social science masterpieces of our

times. In a “Letter to Leo Strauss” Voegelin outlines what he considers as the most serious

problems regarding Popper and his idea of “an open society”. He states:

133Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 2 volumes.

134Ibid., 1, p.57. 135Maurice Cornforth, The Open Philosophy and the Open Society: A Reply to Dr Karl Popper's Refutations of Marxism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), pp. 6-7.

136Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1962, p. 201. 264

1. The expressions "closed [society]" and "open society" are taken from Bergson's Deux Sources without explaining the difficulties that induced Bergson to create these concepts, Popper takes the terms because they sound good to him; [he] comments in passing that in Bergson they had a "religious" meaning, but that he will use the concept of open society closer to Graham Wallas's "great society" or to that of Walter Lippman ... There also arises the relevant problem: if Bergson’s theory of open society is philosophically and historically tenable... then Popper’s idea of the open society is ideological rubbish. For this reason alone, he should have discussed the problem with all possible care.

2. The impertinent disregard for the achievements in his particular problem area, which makes itself evident with respect to Bergson, runs through the whole work. When one reads the deliberations on Plato or Hegel, one has the impression that Popper is quite unfamiliar with the literature on the subject - even though he occasionally cites an author. In some cases, as for example Hegel, I would believe that he has never seen a work like Rosenzweig's Hegel and State [Hegel und der Staat (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1920)]. In other cases, ... he cites works without appearing to have perceived their contents ...

3. Popper is philosophically so uncultured, so fully a primitive ideological brawler, that he is not able even approximately to reproduce correctly the contents of one page of Plato. Reading is of no use to him; he is too lacking in knowledge to understand what the author says. Through this emerge terrible things, as when he translates Hegel’s “Germanic world” as “German world” and draws conclusions from this mistranslation regarding Hegel’s German nationalist propaganda 4. Popper engages in no textual analysis from which can be seen the author's intention; instead, he carries the modern ideological clichés directly to the text, assuming that the text will deliver results in the sense of clichés. ...for example , Plato experienced an evolution - from an early “humanitarian” period still recognizable in the , to something else (reactionary or authoritarian) in the Republic.137

Voegelin thus contends that Popper's enunciation of “open” and “closed” societies is idealistic and immature and fails to explain how “unity” in society would be achieved other than that all agreeing to live in so-called “brotherhood”, an aim difficult of fulfillment in the most perfect of communities. Voegelin concludes that what is basically omitted in Popper's

137See Eric Voegelin, Letter 30, April, 18, 1950 to Leo Strauss, in Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964, Trans. and ed. by Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p.67. 265 discussion of an 'open' society is the question of human nature.138 Society is composed of humans and as Voegelin has insisted, humans live in the tension of existence between human and divine poles. When recognition of this dimension of reality is omitted, reality itself is deformed and so also what is human.

Above all, Voegelin insisted that Popper’s idea of an “open” society was an anomaly of the twentieth century. Numerous constructions of history have appeared from the late nineteenth century to the present proclaiming so-called “standpoints” based on what were called ‘values’. Indeed numerous are the ‘standpoints’ created that the idea of the

“open” society had to be invented to deal with them.139

7.4. THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT

Bodin and Bergson were regarded by Voegelin as two isolated thinkers who recognised the significance of the noesis symbol as an ordering principle. With the loss of the life of reason in Western society rationalisation and the “speculative intellect” became the driving forces of society. When the transcendent is dismissed from consciousness “man” in this new consciousness is reduced to an “organism.” Voegelin saw that the reduction of man to an “organism” was an opening for the “group mind” to take hold on a society. In its extreme form the idea of “the group mind’ is manifested in movements such as the Nazi idea, or in the “national spirit” in Fascism, or the idea of “class as an agent” as in Marxism. Another variant of reductionism is secularism as then society

138See Eric Voegelin, Letter 30, April, 18, 1950 to Leo Strauss, in Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964, Trans. and ed. by Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p.67.

139See Voegelin, Published Essays, 1966-1985, He writes “Not the least grotesque feature of a grotesque age is the speed at which ‘standpoints’ roll off the production line of consciousness. In fact, the public 266 turns into itself as a self-centred organism.140These various manifestations of reductionism are an indication of the gradual process of closure of the essential substances. In fact there comes a time when “the bonds linking the community with the transcendent divine centre are severed”, then the closing process reaches its full circle.141The loss of the life of reason is aptly illustrated in Voegelin’s analysis of the following thinkers. By considering the language of these thinkers it is possible to demonstrate the movement towards a gradual closure of consciousness of the full structure of reality.

7.4.1. THOMAS HOBBES (1588-1679)

Thomas Hobbes proposed a new type of order in society. He was a forceful advocate of unrestrained state power. In his well-known work, Leviathan (1651), he argued for a political order based on absolutism, influenced by a pessimistic view of human nature.

Voegelin maintains that in order to solve the problem of political conflict in society, Hobbes contended that "there was no public truth except the law of peace and concord in a society; any opinion or doctrine conducive to discord was thereby proved untrue."142

scene has been so crowded with them that, in the twentieth century, the open Society- Popper’s not Bergson’s -had to be invented, in order to prevent public collisions between private opinions.” 140 Voegelin, “The Growth of the Race Idea,” Review of Politics, 2 (1940), p. 303. 141Ibid. 142Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction, 1952), p. 153. See n.11 where Voegelin refers to Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946). Concerning Hobbes, Voegelin states: The Hobbesian theory of representation cuts straight to the core of predicament. On the one hand, there is a political society that wants to maintain its established order in historical existence; on the other hand, there are private individuals within the society who want to change the public order, if necessary by force, in the name of a new truth. Voegelin cites Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, ed. with intro. by Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946), Chap. xviii, pp. 116- 117, where Hobbes writes: For a doctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against the law of nature ... . Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new truth, that can be, does never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the war. For those men that are so remissly governed, that they dare take up arms to defend, or introduce an opinion, are still in war; ... they live, as it were, in the precincts of battle continually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath sovereign power, to be judge, or 267

Critically reviewing Hobbes's theory of representation, Voegelin observed that a civil theology had been devised that ignored the tension of existence. In order to achieve

“concord”, Hobbes had in fact inverted reality.143 Voegelin explains that “Human nature would have to find fulfilment in existence itself, a purpose of man beyond existence would have to be demanded.”144Hobbes attempted to establish Christianity as an English civil theology, and in doing so “denied the existence of the tension between the truth of the soul and the truth of society; the content of Scripture, in his opinion, coincided in substance with the truth of Hobbes."145

The Hobbesian paradigm took on gnostic characteristics. The tension of existence was ignored and a new idea of man was created.146 Voegelin comments, “He improved on the man of God’s creation by creating a man without such experiences”.147Hobbes’ attempt to devise a new order in society was criticised as deformed. The new order was a

“destruction of truth of the soul” and disregarded “the problem of existence”. In Hobbes’ view, “The generic nature of man must be studied in terms of human passions”. However, as

Voegelin insists this is a fundamental counterposition to Classical and Christian moral philosophy. The seriousness of the philosophical shift can be observed when Hobbes insisted

constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace; thereby to prevent discord and civil war. 143Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction, p.156. Voegelin writes, “When he treats Christianity under the aspect of its substantial identity with the dictate of reason and derives its authority from governmental sanction, he shows himself as oddly insensitive to its meaning as a truth of the soul as were the Patres to the meaning of the Roman gods as a truth of society.” 144 Ibid., p. 179. 145 Ibid., pp. 159-160. 146 Ibid., p. 179. Voegelin notes, “Human nature would have to find fulfilment in existence itself; a purpose of man beyond existence would have to be denied.” 147 Ibid., p.161. Further on, Voegelin explains the axioms that govern existence. He writes, "What comes into being will have an end, and the mystery of this stream of being is impenetrable." These two axioms, Voegelin repeats, "govern existence." When these two axioms are ignored a "gnostic speculation on the eidos of history,” generates an attitude which not only ignores these principles but which “perverts them into their opposite." Reality is thus turned into dream. There is then the assumption of “a society that will come into being but have 268

“that there is no summum bonum, ‘as is spoken of in the books of the old moral

philosophers.’"148 Voegelin contends to ignore summum bonum is to distort reality for then

there

disappears the source of order from human life; and not only from the life of individual man but also from life in society; for, as you will remember the order of the life in community depends on homonoia, in the Aristotelian and Christian sense, that is, in the participation in the common nous.149

Hobbes therefore was faced with the problem of constructing a new order for

society; he insisted that the discord of the passions was "the normal order of the soul” a

counter-position to the classic and Christian moral philosophies instead of human action

directed to the summum bonum.150As a result he was left with the predicament of

constructing an order from isolated individuals not bound by any common purpose

motivated only by their individual passions.151

Likewise “happiness” in Hobbesian terms was a long way from the eudaimonia of

Aristotle. Hobbes’ conception of society no longer rests on homonoia (community or

likemindedness); instead order is conceived of as when a multitude of men is not a community but a group driven by power in competition with each other.152Order in society

is now reduced to a “restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in death.”153

no end, and the mystery of the stream [of being] is solved through the speculative knowledge of its goal." (p. 167). 148Ibid., p. 180. See n. 6. Voegelin cites Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946 ), ch. xi, p. 63, "For there is no such finis ultimus, utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest good, as is spoken in the books of the old moral philosophers." 149Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction, 1952, p. 180. 150Ibid. 151Ibid. 152Ibid., p.181;Voegelin cites Leviathan, 1946, Chapter viii, p.47. See also Thomas A. Spragens, The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes (London: Croom Helm, 1973). 153Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction, 1952, p. 181. In n. 9, Voegelin cites Hobbes, Leviathan, 1946, Chapter xi, p. 64. “So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.” 269

The new order in the Hobbesian paradigm is maintained by fear of death.154 To attain some semblance of concord out of mutual fear there arises the need to submit to a government by contract.155 The contract is agreed upon by all parties who willingly “confer

all their power and strength upon one man, or assembly of men, that they may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will.”156As a result of such a contract “they

cease to be self-governing persons and merge their power drives into a new person, the

commonwealth, and the carrier of this new person, its representative, is the

sovereign.”157Order in such a society no longer rested on the life of reason in the Platonic-

Aristotelian and Christian sense. Community substance no longer implied the participation

of the members with the Logos or as in the Christian experience like-mindedness through the

Spirit.

154 Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction , 1952, p.182, see n. 16. 155Ibid., 156Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 17, p. 112, cited by Voegelin in The New Science of Politics, An Introduction, p. 182. 157Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction, 1952, pp. 182-183. Voegelin explains the difference between “person” that is one whose actions are considered his own; when he represents himself he is then a “natural” person; but when he represents another he is called an “artificial” person. With this new definition Hobbes could separate the visible realm of representative words and deeds from the unseen realm of processes in the soul, with the consequence that visible words and actions, arise from the interaction of individual human souls. Voegelin cites Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XVII, p.112. 270

7.4.2. HUMAN TYPE -FUSION OF WILLS

The most significant shift in the Hobbesian perspective was that for him humans ceased to exist as single individuals and were instead merged into “one person represented by the sovereign."158 Order in society forthwith demanded a "fusion of wills."159 The life of reason and its relation to the homonoia symbol has now been effectively eliminated. Human nature is perceived to:

...be nothing but passionate existence, devoid of ordering resources of the soul, the horror of annihilation will, indeed, be the overriding passion that compels submission to order... . If the souls cannot participate in the Logos, then the sovereign who strikes terror into the souls will be ‘the essence of the commonwealth’.160

Voegelin's analysis of Hobbes’s political theory clearly illuminated the crucial shift that has occurred in Western consciouness regarding the significance of the person. The human type of Hobbes is no longer “man” in the tension of existence towards the summum bonum but rather is considered as an “organism” motivated only by human drives. Such a pessimistic view of human nature illustrates the falling down through the hierarchical scale of being. Order once illuminated by the life of reason is now eliminated. Voegelin observes that Hobbes simplified the structure of politics by throwing out anthropological and soteriological truth. He comments:

This is an understandable desire in a man who wants his peace; things to be sure would be much simpler without philosophy and Christianity. But how can one dispose of them without abolishing the experiences of transcendence which belong to the nature of man? Hobbes was able to solve this problem too; he improved on the man of God’s creation by creating a man without such experiences.161

158Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction, 1952, p. 183. 159Ibid., Voegelin cites Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XVII, p. 112. 160Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction, p. 184, see n. 21. Voegelin cites Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. XVII, p. 112. 161Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction, p. 161. 271

In Giddings and Dewey Voegelin observed two theorists who illustrated by their

terminology the loss of the life of reason. These thinkers dismissed the transcendent from the

order of the soul and society, hence a reductionism in regard to human nature was

manifested.

7.4.3. HENRY F. GIDDINGS (1855-1931)

Henry Franklin Giddings in his examination of human nature162drew on sources

such as Comte’s Positive Polity. From Comte he derived the idea of a fundamental social

science. Giddings repudiated theological and metaphysical thinking about society and instead upheld the idea that “sociology must always be an empirical science, worthy of our scientific age.”163 His view of the social system was essentially an adaptation of and

elaboration of Spencer’s system.164He followed the idea that the main purpose of sociology is to furnish scientific guidance for civic reform and social betterment. His conception of

“consciousness of kind” was a substitute for homonoia. It was derived mainly from Adam

Smith’s notion of reflective sympathy.

In Giddings’s thought order in society is based on the idea of “association”. He explains this idea by distinguishing human society “from all swarms, herds, and packs of

animals” which he characterises as “gregariousness”.165These phenomena he contends are

162Clarence H. Northcott, “The Sociological Theories of Franklin Henry Giddings: Consciousness of Kind, Pluralistic Behaviour, and Statistical Method”, in Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., An Introduction to the History of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 744 -765; Northcott writes that Giddings was one of the ablest sociologists that the United States ever produced and that he is known for his penetrating mentality and capacity for theoretical formulation and analysis. See n. 1, p. 763. Some of his works are Principles of Sociology, 1896; Elements of Sociology, 1898; Democracy and Empire, 1900; Inductive Sociology, 1901. 163 Northcott, “The Sociological Theories of Franklin Henry Giddings: Consciousness of Kind, Pluralistic Behaviour, and Statistical Method”, 1948, p. 744. 164Herbert Spencer (1800-1903) advocated a system which was to be based on the law of evolution or as he expressed it the law of progress. 165Northcott, “The Sociological Theories of Franklin Henry Giddings: Consciousness of Kind, Pluralistic Behaviour, and Statistical Method”, 1948, p. 744. 272

products of a collective or pluralistic mode of the “struggle for existence.”166On this basis

Giddings proposed a theory of “consciousness of kind.”167He explains that his theory is

based on man’s reaction to his fellow men. Because these reactions tend to be “alike”

Giddings argues a perception of “likeness” arises due to the response of men to the same

external stimuli. Hence a “consciousness of kind” is compounded of organic sympathy and

resemblance described as an interactive process. Natural selection works on this principle

and produces collective behaviour; in this manner it comes about that “the consciousness of

kind” converts gregariousness into association, and the herd or pack into society.168

Voegelin’s attention to Giddings’ theories occurred when he visited America in 1926

and later published his research of American democratic ideals in his book, On the Form of

the American Mind.169He closely examined Giddings’s The Principles of Sociology,

pointing out that he took the “original and elementary subjective fact” of society to be “the

consciousness of kind.”170He observed that in Giddings’ terminology, consciousness “is intended to designate the experience of pure group membership, without reflection on the rational sense”. Voegelin elaborates:

Viewed objectively, progress means an increase in commerce among people, a multiplication of relations, an improvement in the standard of living, population growth, and development toward rational conduct. Subjectively it is the ‘expansion of the consciousness of kind.’ Growth in empathy and the development of reason are

166 Ibid., p. 745. 167 See Leonard D. Savitz, who writes that in his major work Principles of Sociology (1896) Giddings defines society in terms of logical categories and systems predicated upon his concept of “consciousness of kind”, a term derived from . This view considers a communal sense of likemindedness is produced through persons who respond to stimulation and act upon others through suggestion. From there “consciousness of kind” moves from gregariousness to a discriminating association, governed by norms and customs. Society is therefore perceived as those who are united by "consciousness of kind"; the interaction of individual minds gives rise to culture. Refer to Leonard D. Savitz, “Giddings”, Encyclopaedia p. 737. 168 Northcott, “The Sociological Theories of Franklin Henry Giddings: Consciousness of kind, Pluralistic Behaviour, and Statistical Method”, 1948, pp. 746-7. 169First published in German in 1928. 170See Eric Voegelin, On the Form of the American Mind, (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1995) Vol. 1, pp. 218-219. Voegelin refers to Giddings, The Principles of Sociology (New York, 1896), p. 17. 273

merely secondary phenomena. The important and causative sequence lies in the development of consciousness of kind.171

In Giddings’s case his “preferred terminology” demonstrates the “sliding down the

[hierarchical] scale”. Giddings attempted "to transform the homonoia, in the sense of a

‘community of the spirit,’” into what Voegelin regarded as “innocuous”; something “like a community of kind in the biological sense."172Reducing the notion of community to biology

Giddings was able to avoid any connection with Classic and Christian traditions; his

conception of the order of society avoided all contact with the Classical and Christian

substance.

7.4.4. JOHN DEWEY(1859-1952)

John Dewey was a thinker who in his empirical naturalism displayed the same

tendencies as his contemporary, Giddings.173 Human consciousness as Dewey understood this is a highly developed process that related to the idea of stimuli and response on the purely biological level. He regarded society as a collection of interacting "primary groups"

wherein individuals are motivated by their self-interest. Many groups, he argued, have

consequences for persons other than those who participate in them [primary groups]. Hence

arises a distinct though secondary form of associative life, including the State.174 According

171Ibid., p. 217. Voegelin is citing from H. F. Giddings, The Principle of Sociology [New York, 1896]. 172Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p.30. 173 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Bentham To Russell, Vol. 8 (New York : Image Press, 1985), p. 354. 174See Perspectives in : Readings in Sources of Social Philosophic Thought, compiled by Robert N. Beck (New York: Holy, Rinehart & Winston, 1967). The emphasis is not on how individuals or singular beings come to be connected in just those ways which give human communities traits different from those which mark assemblies of electrons, unions of trees in forests, swarms of insects. When we consider the difference we at once come upon the fact that the consequences of conjoint action take on a new value when they are observed. 274

to Dewey humans do not have a spiritual centre but receive their consciousness merely as

being links in a chain of generations.175

In his work On the Form of the American Mind of 1928, Voegelin expressed his estimate of Dewey. He wrote:

Dewey shared Giddings’ optimistic view and advocated the same theory in every essential point. He replaced ‘consciousness of kind’ with ‘likemindedness’ and ascribes to it the obligating power behind all specifics of social action. Like Giddings, he uses awkward psychological terminology for his description. He states that in order to live communally, people should have common goals, beliefs, knowledge, and finally - summarily - mutual ‘understanding.’ For ‘understanding’ Dewey has no other concept ready than the rationalistic one of consciousness of community.176

Order in Dewey’s view comprised the common goals of expansion and progress in the

higher levels of communisation. His criterion for the good society consisted in the variety

and number of different associations among individuals.177

Consciousness in the thought of Giddings and Dewey was no longer enriched by a

spiritual centre. Community substance as once expressed in the Classical and Christian

experience has been “thinned out” or, to use Voegelin’s other expression consists in a

“sliding down the scale” of the hierarchy of being. It has been shown that Giddings’s

terminology of “consciousness of kind,” was drawn from a biological analogy, and Dewey’s

notion of “community” implied an amorphous “link” between so called primary and

175 Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, 1990, p. 30. [A remnant of the former emphasis of homonoia surfaced in Dewey's use of the term “like-mindedness”. Voegelin considers this term is found "in the King James version of the Bible and is used to translate homonoia.”] 176Voegelin, On the Form of the American Mind, 1995, pp. 218-219. See Voegelin’s note 23 where he refers to “the presumable religious root of this theory, Rom. 12:16 and 15:5-7”. The Jerusalem Bible, Romans 12:16 “Treat everyone with equal kindness, never be condescending but make real friends with the poor.” Romans, 15: 5-7. “And may he who helps us whom we refuse to give up, help you all to be tolerant with each other, following the example of Christ Jesus. So that united in mind and voice you may give glory to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Other versions are “...give you the same mind among one another according to Christ” “be of one accord with one another ..” Greek, one accord. Also see Voegelin, On the Form of the American Mind, 1995, pp. 218-219, n. 24. Voegelin refers to John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York, 1916), p. 5. 275 secondary groups. Each new version of order is a poor replica of the once rich notion of

“community” based on homonoia, one mind as understood in the Classical and Christian sense.

7.5 SOME POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND SCHOLARS INFLUENCED BY

VOEGELIN

Voegelin’s influence in political science during his own lifetime and later has been perceptively discussed by Kenneth W. Thompson.178 He examines Voegelin’s resistance to positivism which was shared by other notable scholars such as Friedrich A. von Hayek, Hans J. Morgenthau, , and Erich Hula.179

More particularly Voegelin’s influence is evident in work by the Japanese political scientist, Terajima Toshiho180and the German political scientist, Albrecht Kiel,

(in his Gottesstaat und Pax Americana: zur politischen Theologie von und

Eric Voegelin.)181An array of scholars has been brought together in a study by Eugene

Webb, Philosophers of Consciousness: Polanyi, Lonergan, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard,

Kierkegaard.182 Finally, Geoffrey Price183has provided an up to-date topical bibliography

177 Ibid., p. 219. 178“Voegelin and Politics”, in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin’s Significance for the Modern Mind, 1991, Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge and London. 179A more recent contribution on the same topic has been made by Barry Cooper in his book Eric Voegelin and the Foundations of Modern Political Science, Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1998. 180“Eric Voegelin no seiji tetsugaka”. [Political Philosophy of Eric Voeglein]. Part 1 Journal of Law, Politicsand Sociology] 61, no. 10 (October 1988a): 81-114. 181Cuxhaven, Dartford: Junghans, 1998. 182Seattle, Washington University Press, 1988. 183Geoffrey Price, “Recent International Scholarship on Voegelin and Voegelinian Themes : A Brief Topical Bibliography” in International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Eric Voegelin ed., Stephen A. McKnight and Geofrey Price University of Missouri Press: Columbia, 1997, pp. 189-214. 276 covering the disciplines of political science, history, philosophy and religion. That provides a list of scholars with whom Voegelin had important correspondence.184

7.6. SUMMARY

Order in Western consciousness as proposed by these and many other modern thinkers has moved down the hierarchical scale to the level of organic substances and drives.185The downward movement on the hierarchical order clearly indicates the loss of the former order which was conscious of the Logos, or the pneuma of Christ as the source of the transcendent.

The homonoia symbol has been replaced by ideas such as “sense of community” or “rational collective goals” and “community of kind”. These ideas demand a pragmatic, rationalistic view of order for a society. The dismissal of transcendence means that any so- called “brotherhood” is merely a cover to hide varieties of nationalism shaped by ideas such as ethnicity, colour or creed or even gender. It is Voegelin’s contention that order in society without the recognition of the transcendent principle is a fallacy. He insists that a community cannot be formed without recognition of the tension of existence186 and hence community substance is tied to the highest Good [summum bonum].187Community

184Some of the scholars he corresponded with include: Thomas Altizer, , Raymond Aron, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Robin Collingwood, S.G.F. Brandon, Hermann Broch, Cleanth Brooks, , Norman Cohn, Alois Dempf, Carl J. Friedrich, Nahum N. Glatzer, Friedrich A. von Hayek, Werner Jaeger, , Bertrand de Jouvenel, Hans Kung, Karl Lowith, Ludwig von Mises, Michael Oakeshott, Wolfhart Panneberg, ,Michael Polanyi, Gilles Quispel. Refer to pp.198-199; Voegelin’s correspondence is held in the Hoover Institute at Standford and will soon be published. 185Voegelin, “Necessary Moral Bases for Communication in a Democracy”, in Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society (1956), p. 64. 186Eric Voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin., Eric O’Conner, ed., Thomas More Institute Papers. Transcripts of four lectures and discussions in Montreal, in 1965, 1967, 1970 and 1976 (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1980), p. 109. 187See Voegelin, “La Societé industrielle à la recherche de la raison,” in Colloques de Rheinfelden, pp. 44- 64, eds., Raymond Aron, and George Kennan (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1960). Translated as “Industrial Society in Search of Reason”, in Aron, ed., World Technology and Human Destiny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 38-39. Voegelin discusses the features of a good society. He notes that there are various models. 277

substance rests on “order” as understood by Plato and Aristotle as homonoia,188for then the

human nous is linked to the Logos or in the Christian experience, the pneuma of Christ.

Voegelin states, “The essential nucleus of a good society - without which it is worthless

no matter what its accomplishments may be in other areas - is the life of reason.”189When a society no longer draws on these spiritual principles it is closed to the creativity of its members.190

In Western civilisation, Voegelin perceives that a residue of Classical and

Christian substance still persists which enables these societies to remain open. However, there are societies where the creative minority has been subjected to such repression that it seems as those in society were “asleep” (Heraclitus). When a society is restricted for a long time such a society (in Toynbee’s words) is an “arrested” civilisation.191 In the next

chapters I will explore Chinese consciousness of the order of the soul and society first, in

the Confucian age, and then in twentieth century China.

188Voegelin, “Immortality: Experience and Symbol”, Published Essays 1966-85, 1990, p. 61. Voegelin discusses the destruction of “community among men through the destruction of the spirit”. 189Voegelin, “Industrial Society in Search of Reason”, in R. Aron, ed., World Technology and Human Destiny, 1963, p. 42. 190Voegelin emphasises that the “model of the good society is not an a priori datum. Its construction is extremely elastic and must vary with our empirical knowledge of human nature and society. One sure thing is that the social effectiveness of the life of reason, which is constantly developing, must be included.” Voegelin, “Industrial Society in Search of Reason”, in Aron, ed., World Technology and Human Destiny, 1963, p. 38. 191Ibid., pp. 38-40. Toynbee’s phrase is “arrested” civilisation . 278

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE LIFE OF REASON IN A NON-WESTERN CONTEXT: CHINA

In the last section the focus was on the loss of the life of reason in Western consciousness. Now the discussion takes a different turn and considers the life of reason in a non-Western situation: China. To discuss the life of reason in a non-Western experience is a major challenge. First, it is generally conceded that the Chinese experience arose independently of the West which means there are no common symbols.

Secondly, the analyst can be accused of imposing cultural values from one culture to another. Voegelin made a major contribution to the problem of analysing the Chinese experience by choosing the “philosopher’s experience” which has engendered symbols and in this way he avoided the problem of using sociological or culture-bound values.

The immediate task is to investigate the degree and type of differentiation exhibited by the Chinese experience of the divine. Voegelin used such terms as,

“immanence” and “transcendence”, “leap in being”, “incomplete break” and lastly,

“substance” to indicate the types of differentiation. The discussion focuses on Chinese perceptions of the divine and the human types in the Chinese experience. On this basis, it is then possible to examine the ordering principle in Chinese society.

8.1. CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DIVINE

One of the most problematic areas to study are symbols that have been engendered as expressions of the divine. How did the early Chinese conceive the divine?

I have considered the following notions: Shang Ti [high god or ancestor], T’ien [heaven], 279 and the Tao [Way]. A brief reflection on each of these notions accounts for the type of differentiation displayed.

8.1.1. SHANG TI , THE COMMON ANCESTOR

Shang Ti in the Shu Ching and the Book of Odes refers to a being who is literally the “Supreme Emperor” and seems to have been considered by the early Chinese as the highest and supreme authority. He presided over an elaborate hierarchy of spirits who were secondary to him and paid him an allegiance. Shang Ti belonged to the religious beliefs of a large part of the population of China and had probably existed from the earliest time in Chinese history.1 The official religion regarded certain as objects of state worship. Ti or Shang Ti was still retained by the Ch’ing government, and was given

“first rank” with "The Empress Earth, the Imperial Ancestors and the Guardian Spirits of the

Land and the Harvests [she chi]."2

8.1.2. T’IEN

One of the earliest references to T’ien, “heaven”, is in the Shu Ching V,1(1),3 :

“Heaven and Earth are Father and Mother of all beings” The ruler is referred to as the

“Father and Mother of the nation.”3 Schindler observes a close relation between sky,

1Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 2, “History of Scientific Thought” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp. 580-581. See also Joseph Shih, “The Notions of God in the Ancient Chinese Religion”, Numen: International Review for the History of Religions (Leiden: Brill), 16 (1969), p.100. 2See Laurence Thompson, Chinese Religion: An Introduction (Belmont, Cal: Dickenson Pub. Co., 1969), p. 69, see n. 2. 3Bruno Schindler, “The Development of the Chinese Conceptions of Supreme Beings”, in Hirth Anniversary Volume, Major, Journal devoted to the Study of Languages, Arts and Civilisation of the Far East and Central Asia, Introductory Volume, edited by Bruno Schindler (London: Probsthain, 1923), p. 299. Schindler notes that if the Sovereign is called “Father and Mother of the nation”, this is no contradiction but is simply one of the numerous linguistic parallelisms brought about by mental association, and customary with the Chinese at all times. He also remarks that the title Ti means supreme Master, Ruler, Emperor (p. 336). When discussing the origins of Shang Ti, Schindler observes that Shang Ti is not only an ancestor-deity in the ordinary sense but seems to be of a totemistic character. Furthermore, he observes that there is evidence to suggest that the old sacrifices of the ancestor cult have been mingled with the cult of the universe (p. 355). 280

T’ien and sun in some old forms of Chinese writing - “Heaven understood with the sun

as a solar god.” In ancient literature t’ien, heaven, appears to be entirely

anthropomorphic. Heaven is referred to as “quick of hearing and sharp of sight like the

people.”4As the documents were revised the anthropomorphic conception of heaven gradually waned. Reference to “summer sky” and “autumnal sky” indicates that the

divinity of Heaven was apparently taken to be the personification of the sun.5 The

association of T’ien with the sky has been remarked on by Eliade, who observes that for

the Chinese the sky “regulates the order of the cosmos, and dwells as supreme sovereign

at the summit of the nine regions of heaven.” Also, “The sky is a dynastic providence, an

all-seeing and law-giving power. It is the god of vows. Men swear by the brightness of

day and of dawn; they call to witness the blue vault, the blue sky, the sky on high that

shines and shines.”6 T’ien is closely connected to natural phenomena such as sky and

from this source belief in an all-seeing giver was conceived. The God-on-High, as Joseph

Shih has suggested, can sometimes be “confused with a moon-god and was consequently

taken for a Higher ancestor.”7 However Shang Ti could also be considered as a deity of

Earth.

8.1.3. TAO

4 Schindler, “The Development of the Chinese Conceptions of Supreme Beings”, in Hirth Anniversary Volume, 1923, p. 301. Schindler cites many examples from the Shu Ching to support the anthropomorphic idea of Shang Ti. 5Ibid., Schindler also notes that t’ien is considered a Chou term. 6 , Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans. Rosemary Sheed (London & New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958), p. 63, see n.1. Eliade refers to M. Granet, La Religion des Chinois (Paris, 1922), p. 57. 7 Shih, “The Notions of God in the Ancient Chinese Religion”, p. 112. 281

Tao is more fluid than Shang Ti and T’ien in the sense of being a process or force

in the cosmos.8 The self-generating process of the cosmos as a harmony of cosmic forces

has been encapsulated by Chang Tsai in his treatise “Great Harmony (Ch. 1). He writes:

The Great Harmony is called the Way (Tao, Moral Law). It embraces the nature which underlies all counter processes of floating and sinking, rising and falling, and motion and rest. It is the origin of the process of fusion and intermingling, of overcoming and being overcome, and of expansion and contraction. At the commencement, these processes are incipient, subtle, obscure, easy and simple, but at the end they are extensive, great, strong and firm. It is ch’ien (Heaven) that begins with the knowledge of Change, and k’un (Earth) that models after simplicity. That which is dispersed, differentiated, and capable of assuming form becomes material force (ch’i), and that which is pure, penetrating, and not capable of assuming form becomes spirit. Unless the whole universe is in the process of fusion and intermingling like fleeting forces moving in all directions, it may not be called Great Harmony.9

The passage exemplifies the understanding of Tao as the cosmic force behind all that

exists. The early Confucians recognised the importance of Tao as the force that not only

governs the cosmos but also as the Way or path to guide the lives of humans.

8.2. COSMOLOGICAL EMPHASIS

The Chinese experience of a sense of harmony with the divine is strengthened by a strong cosmological experience. The Chinese conception of the world in this manner has had a pervasive influence throughout the entire society and has found expression in the cultural history of China. Voegelin makes out a case for the failure of the Chinese experience to break from the cosmological mode by pointing out that in China

8See Kristofer Schipper, The Taoist Body, translated by Karen C. Duval (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993). See Chapter 3, “Divinity”. Also refer to Michael La Fargue, Tao and Method: A Reasoned Approach to the Tao Te Ching (New York: State University Press, 1994). La Fargue takes what he calls “a non-foundational position” to examining the Tao. See also Zhang Longxi, The Tao and the Logos: Literary Hermeneutics, East and West (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1992). 9 Wing-tsit Chan, translated and compiled, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 1963), pp. 500-501. 282

“ of the Homeric type” never appeared. He notes that the Chinese at an early

date regarded “the divine force ordering the ritual ecumene” as an impersonal force,

“expressed by the symbol t’ien”.10The order as envisaged by the sages, was validated on

a “deceptively traditionalist claim, on the ethos of a past unencumbered by polytheism.”

The result was the absence of tension in Chinese thought which in other traditions led to

debates about which god was more important. Due to the absence of tension Voegelin

contends that in the Chinese experience there failed to occur as far as we know any act of

transcendence.11

Some scholars attribute the cause of China’s failure to reach modernity in the area

of philosophy and science in spite of high attainment to a strong cosmological accent.12

There is much literature on this aspect of the topic.13Needham appeared to recognise the

same problem when he insisted that Chinese thought failed to separate the “social man”

from Nature. He noted that although Chinese philosophers gave great significance to the

study of man and to the doctrine of a co-operative society in which men’s interests

complemented each other without conflict, at the same time they neglected to develop principles to confront superstition. If they had done so the way could have been opened up to investigate scientific principles. Needham also perceptively observed that there

10Voegelin, “What is History”, in Eric Voegelin, What is History and other Late Unpublished Writings, Edited with an introduction by Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul Caringella, Vol. 28 (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 28. 11Ibid. 12Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 286. Voegelin criticises Weber’s explanation of the difference between Western and Chinese culture. Weber attributes this difference to a lack of rationalism which is supposed to explain the ascendancy of Confucian bureaucracy. Voegelin considers this argument needs more explanation. He states that “the problems of Chinese order are not caused by the absence of differentiations but precisely by their presence... . It is the rather subdued, muted mode of differentiation that causes the difficulties of analysis” (pp. 286-287). 13 See Hu Shih, “The Scientific Spirit and Method in Chinese Philosophy”, in Charles A. Moore, ed., The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 283

was a failure to distinguish between ethics and politics. Furthermore China did not

develop a rational science.14 He argues that supernatural or religious perceptions were

unquestioned. If the Chinese thinkers had been more “rationalistic” that approach could

have aided the evolution of a scientific view of the world. Needham placed the blame on

the Confucian view of man and human society. The Chinese scholars were satisfied with

what they had and did not look for an alternative approach. For them the Way of

antiquity and the sages whom Confucius idealised was sufficient.

Voegelin observed the difficulty of finding in non-Western cultures a common

substance or topoi (notions). Some common substance is necessary to carry out a debate.

He remarks “a dialogue or conversation must always have as its substance a background

of common experience of something, and a common language.”15 In the Western

experience the common basis was the Hellenic and Christian experience of

transcendence. When non-Western experiences such as the Hindu, Buddhist, or

Confucianist experiences are examined there appears to be no common topoi or

experience between them. Each tradition has a very difference substance.16

Voegelin’s use of substance has been discussed in the context of Hellenic and

Christian thought. Substance is understood as the underlying reality (ousia).When

Voegelin examined the Chinese experience he categorised it as a “compact” experience

1967), pp. 104-131. See also Discovering China: European Interpretations in the Enlightenment, Julia Ching and Willard G. Oxtoby, eds., (Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press, 1992). 14 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, “History of Scientific Thought”, Vol. 2, 1956, p.14. Needham writes concerning the absence of tension in Confucianism and considers its “intense concentration of interest upon human social life to the exclusion of non-human phenomena negates all investigation of Things, as opposed to Affairs. Hence, rationalism proved less favourable than mysticism to the progress of science”. A criticism has been made of Needham’s position by A.C. Graham, Unreason within Reason, in his essay, “China, Europe and the Origins of Modern Science: Needham’s The Grand Titration” (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publ.,1992). 15Voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin, ed. Eric O’Connor, 1980, p. 70. 16Ibid. 284

meaning that the Chinese view of “heaven” (Tao, T’ien) is portrayed as the “operation of

impersonal cosmic forces.” Tien, heaven, preserves its “majesty of undisturbed order,

while society is engaged in its struggle for attunement [to the cosmos]”17

The same idea of merging between men and spirits in the Chinese experience is

supported by Fung Yu-lan. He observes that although the concept of Heaven (tien) and

God (ti) gives an appearance of a monotheistic belief, the old ideas of polytheism were

still present.18 As it was, the multitude of spirits which pervaded the Chinese universe were considered “anthropomorphic beings”.19 The actions of these spirits were looked

upon as quite indistinguishable from those of human beings. Fung Yu-lan refers to the

idea by pointing out that, “people and spirits were confusedly mingled” and “people and spirits held the same position”, further “the spirits followed the customs of the people”.

Hence the actions of these spirits were looked upon as being indistinguishable from those of human beings.20

Both Needham and Fung Yu-lan emphasise the absence of the principle of

differentiation as found in Hellenic and Christian thought. They acknowledge the merging of divine, human and natural phenomena is a basis for concern.

8.2.1. DIVINE TAO, IMPERSONAL FORCE

17Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, p. 39. 18Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, The Period of the Philosophers, Translated by Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), Vol. I, pp. 22-24. It is important to note that Voegelin considers polytheism in the Homeric sense as one significant god competing with another whereas Fung Yu-lan descibes polytheism as many gods present but it is not an issue whether one is more important than another. The idea of one god being more important was not significant until T’ien became ritualised by the emperors. 19Ibid., p. 24. 20Ibid. 285

What is being emphasised here is that in the Chinese experience the divine is never identified except as an impersonal force that pervades the cosmos whereas in the

Western experience the divine is understood as “being”.21Gilson explained that “being” is

“the first principle of human knowledge”22and “if being is the first principle of human knowledge, it must be the very first object to be grasped by the human mind.” It is useful to recall Gilson’s observation that “the word ‘being’ is a noun, as such it signifies either a being (that is, the substance, nature, and essence of anything existent), or being itself, a property common to all that which can rightly be said to be.” In “a second acceptation, the same word is the present participle of the verb, ‘to be’. As a verb, it no longer signifies something that is, nor even existence in general, but rather the very act whereby any given reality actually is, or exists”.23 Thus Gilson sums up “being” as the thing “being” what it is and states, “Let us call this act a ‘to be’, in contradistinction to what is commonly called ‘a being’. It appears at once that, at least to the mind, the relation of ‘to be’ to ‘being’ is not a reciprocal one. ‘Being’ is conceivable, ‘to be’ is not. We cannot possibly conceive an ‘is’ except as belonging to something that is, or exists.”24

21Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 295. He writes: I should like to stress that there is something amoebic about the manner in which a Chinese universe of meanings changes shape, contracts, and expands. From empirical observations we move to essences, from institutions to principles, from principles to manners of operation, from the te of a dynasty to the te of culture and the jen of ecumenic rule, from the jen back to methods of federal execution, and finally, we arrive at a philosophy of history which pictures the course of a civilisation as the exhaustion of its substance, not so very different on principle from ’s corso. The differentiated meanings, though present, never become articulate with any precision; and the symbols created for their expression never achieve the status of analytical concepts. As a consequence, at every turn the symbolisation may slide back from a theoretical level apparently reached to expressions of extreme compactness and, then, advance to theoretical insights. 22 Etienne Gilson refers to his work, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Scribner, 1937), p. 313 and p. 316. 23 Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 2. 24Ibid., p.2. 286

Gilson’s elaboration of “being” highlights the difference between the Chinese experience of the divine and the Western; in the Chinese experience the Tao is never considered a Being. (The Tao is sometimes described as non-being.) The expression non- being reinforces the failure to account for the precise differentiation of being, i.e. the divine and other beings. There is no philosophical framework present in Chinese thought such as the hierarchy of being to differentiate what the divine Being is. In the Judeo-Christian experience, the divine is understood as transcendent Being and it has an identity and a Name.

The “Moses experience” discovered that the transcendent being was the being of God, “I am who I am” and that the Israelites were the “people of God”. Hence the particular emphasis given to the relation between the transcendent being and those beings who were “His people”.25

The accent on differentiation of being that is human-divine has important reverberations on Western consciousness in determining the human type and the order of society. Voegelin explains the “types of truth”:

25See thesis, Section 4. 2.1. 287

The first of these types is the truth represented by the early empires; it shall be designated as ‘cosmological truth.’ The second type of truth appears in the political culture of Athens and specifically in tragedy; it shall be called ‘anthropological truth’ - with the understanding that the term covers the whole range of problems connected with the psyche as the sensorium of transcendence. The third type of truth that appears with Christianity shall be called ‘soteriological truth.’26

The first type, designated as “cosmological truth” is represented in the Chinese

experience of the divine.27The compact experience is aptly illustrated by the way the

Chinese or Eastern “saint” conceives the divine as compared with the Christian “saint”.28

8.2.2. THE EASTERN PROBLEM OF DIFFERENTIATION

The “saint” in the Eastern experience transcends the ordinary distinctions of things and loses his or her “self” in the Tao. The fluidity of the Eastern experience is

manifested as the “saint” merges into the nameless Tao. The experience is one of losing

oneself in the Tao as understood by Chung Tzu. Fung Yu-lan suggests, “because he has

transcended the ordinary distinctions of things, he also transcends the distinction between

the self and the world, the ‘me’ and the ‘non-me’”. Fung Yu-lan elaborates:

Therefore he has no self. He is one with the Tao. The Tao does nothing and yet there is nothing that is not done. The Tao does nothing, and therefore has no achievements. The sage is one with the Tao and therefore also has no achievements. He may rule the whole world, but his rule consists of just leaving mankind alone, and letting everyone exercise his own natural ability fully and freely. The Tao is nameless and so the sage who is one with the Tao is also nameless.29

26Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 1952, pp. 76-77. 27The Chinese experience is complex as will be shown when I discuss the Confucian chun tzu. 28The notion of “saint” refers here to “the mature soul” of St. John of the Cross or Plato’s philosopher’s nous. 29Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, Derk Bodde, ed. (New York: Macmillan Publ., 1948), p. 110. 288

In this passage the union between the divine and the human is expressed as the

self merging in the Tao. Some observations by Sebba are useful here.30He observes that

the consciousness of the “saint” in Eastern experience is a kind of consciousness that

goes beyond differentiation. (A “transconsciousness”, as Mircea Eliade calls it). Sebba analysed the Eastern consciousness as a way of knowing that stops the movement through the hierarchy of being in order to force ones state of consciousness to the point where all experience of differentiation vanishes.31 In this manner the “saint” achieves oneness with the Tao. Hence, consciousness in the Eastern experience is perceived as a state beyond the cosmos and beyond history.32 Whereas in the Western experience, the

“saint” stays within the movement of the hierarchy of being because in the Christian experience the “saint” experiences the divine union through faith and love.33

When discussing the Christian way of knowing it was shown that in the divine-

human encounter the mature soul never merges with the divine being.34 Christian

theologians carefully preserve the creature/Creator distinction when exploring the mature

soul’s spiritual encounter with the divine. The framework of the hierarchy of being is

carefully maintained. Hence the “saint” in the Christian experience does not “leap out” of

the framework of the hierarchy of being but acknowledges the order as an ever present

structure of reality pertaining to human existence. In the Western experience holds no

place for immersion for the “saint”, although the language of some mystical writers may

invite such an impression. The union with the divine in the Christian experience is

30Gregor Sebba, "Prelude and Variations on the Theme of Eric Voegelin", Southern Review, 13 (1977), p. 672. 31Ibid., Sebba refers to Voegelin’s comment that “Europocentrism preserves all strata of reality in their own right and grasps the hierarchy of being in its full articulation”. 32Ibid. 33Ibid. 34See all of thesis Section 5.5. 289

accomplished through grace, an aspect Voegelin remarked on in a letter to Alfred

Schütz.35

Some scholars question whether Voegelin in his Order and History: In Search of

Order, may have moved from his earlier position on differentiation as expressed in the

New Science of Politics to a new position suggested by the terms, “It-reality” and “thing-

reality”. Do these terms replace the three “human types” category?36 The subject is too large to elaborate on here except to point out that if this was so, then Voegelin would have refuted all he had previously written on the order of the soul and order of society.

Secondly, Voegelin himself could be accused of reductionism, which was something he persistently challenged. Although he may have shifted his position several times yet his works hold together with remarkable consistency. Furthermore in Order and History, In

Search of Order, he remarked that the work was the key to all he had written.37 Hence his

use of the term “It-reality”/”thing-reality” does not contradict his notion of maximisation

and differentiation as expressed in earlier works.

Throughout this thesis I have sought to demonstrate that Voegelin clearly

maintained: a) the radical difference between the Hellenic and the Christian experience;

b) the difference between the Platonic (mystical) experience and the Christian experience

of mysticism; and c) the differentiation between the cosmological, anthropological and

soteriological human types. I argue that by maintaining these crucial philosophical

distinctions one is enabled to grasp what Voegelin implies when he uses the terms

35Voegelin, “Letter to Schütz”, in Opitz, and Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics, 1981, p. 455. 36See Fred Dallmeyer, “In Search of Order - Eric Voegelin,” Journal of Politics, 51 (1989), pp. 411- 430. 37See Forword in Eric Voegelin, Order and History, In Search of Order, Vol 5, 1987. 290

transcendence, immanence, leap in being and substance.38 “Transcendence” in this context means an experience that involves the differentiation of consciousness between the soul and the divine in the Hellenist sense, the Platonic discovery that the psyche is the

site of transcendence. In the Christian sense of transcendence God is understood as “I am

who I am” in partnership with “his people”. The Hellenic Judeo-Christian experience is a

human-divine unit, not a oneness. “The leap in being” means a movement up the

hierarchical scale of being - not a leap away;39 whereas “immanence” is understood as a

divine force literally “dwelling in”, and adhering within the cosmos, as in Hegel’s Giest.

Immanence opens the way for and reductionism, and has been opposed by

those thinkers for whom the Judeo-Christian experience is central to their philosophic

framework.

These differences recognised in the Western and Eastern experiences of the divine

have important implications for understanding the life of reason. The analysis suggests

that reason (noesis) as characterised by the Hellenic and Judeo-Christian experience has

never been part of the Chinese experience. The failure to differentiate the human

experience from the divine has serious implications in the interpretation of order in the

political, social, economic and international arenas. We find that an impersonal source of

order is still a defining code in China even to the present. This situation allows Chinese

thought to meld easily with communism. Voegelin states:

38See Voegelin, “Letter to Schütz”, in Opitz, and Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics, 1981, p. 450. 39 “Metastatic ” was a term introduced by Voegelin in his Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, p. 452. Subsequently the term refers to all unrealistically expected transformations of man, society, the structure of existence, and so on. The fundamental form of such utopian expectation is that escape from the tension of existence will be possible through movement out of “metaxy" (In-Between) toward identity or union with one of its poles (extremes). Refer to Webb, Eric Voegelin, The Philosopher of History, 1981, p. 284. 291

To this day, the faith in an impersonal source of order has remained a determinant in the resistance of cultivated Chinese to religions with personal gods because of their inferior rationality, while the same faith seems to have affinities, if not with the ethos of communism, at least with its impersonal law of dialectics.40

8.3. CONFUCIAN SPIRITUAL CREATIVITY

Nevertheless, the matter does not rest there since the Chinese experience is complex. Although the divine is perceived to be closely linked to the cosmos at the same time a remarkable advance towards the anthropological human type is found when we examine the notion of “man” in the Chinese experience. Confucius offered a brilliant new understanding of “man” in the sage notion (chun tzu). In China spiritual creativity appeared markedly in thinkers such as Confucius and Lao Tzu. What is generally agreed is that the spiritual outburst had no connection with Judaic or Hellenist thought even though a similar creative outburst appeared there at the same time. Voegelin understands these spiritual outbursts as “carriers of the spiritual order”41and prefers to call this period

40Voegelin, What is History and other Late Unpublished Writings, Edited with an introduction by Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul Caringella, Vol. 28, “What is History?”, p. 28. 41There are several important sources where Voegelin examines the Chinese situation. These are Order and History, The Ecumenic Age (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), Chapter 6. “The Chinese Ecumene”.The following are the sources: The Shih-chi in the French translation of Edourd Chavannes: Se- Tien, Les Memoires Historiques (5 Vols. Paris, 1895-1905); and the English translation by Burton Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China (2 Vols.: New York, 1961). Also Burton Watson’s Ssu-ma Ch’ien, Grand Historian of China (New York, 1958); Henri Maspero, La Chine Antique (1927; new ed., Paris, 1955); H.G. Creel, The Birth of China (New York, 1935); Wolfram Eberhard, “Chinas Geschichte bis zum Ende der Han-Zeit,” in Historia Mundi, II, (Bern, 1953, pp.566-569). In examining the Chou period, as well as the transition to empire, Voegelin was assisted by Peter Weber- Schaefer, Oikumene und Imperium. Studien zur Ziviltheolgie des chinesischen Kaiserreichs (Munich, 1968), and Peter - Joachim Opitz, Lao-tzu. Die Ordnungsspekulation im Tao-te-ching (Munich, 1967). These two studies were undertaken at Voegelin’s suggestion at the Institution of Political Science in Munich. Voegelin points out that this research should be understood as furnishing the background to the narrower analysis of the problem of the t’ien-hsia in the present chapter. He also observes that a new dimension has been added to Chinese history, expanding it into Neolithic tribal cultures of the Far East, by the archaeologists. Cf. Cheng Te-K’un, Archaeology in China (3 Vols.; Cambridge 1959, 1960, 1963), with the Supplement to Volume 1. New Light on Prehistoric China (Cambridge, 1966), and Kwang-Chih Chang, The Archaeology of Ancient China (Revised and enlarged edition: Yale University Press, 1968); Marcel Granet, Chinese Civilisation (London, 1930). The exposition of “Traditional History”, pp. 9-51) is followed by the critical account of “The Chief Data of Ancient History” (pp. 53-137); Laurence Sickman, in Sickman and Soper, The Art and of China, Pelican History of Art (Baltimore, 1956), p. 1. 292

“the Ecumene Age” rather than “the ”(Jaspers). One aspect manifested by this spiritual creativity is the chun tzu notion of Confucius..

8.3.1. CONFUCIUS’ INNOVATIVE SAGE NOTION

Almost from the dawn of history, as Cheng Tien-hsi explains, the Chinese have distinguished between two types of men: chun tzu which is literally the sovereign man, i.e. the man of virtue or principles or the Noble Man, and hsiao yun li, the petty man, the man with no virtue or principles.42 Both terms appear in the early Book of History.

The notion of chun tzu is considered central by the Chinese to the formation of character.43 Certain sayings of Confucius confirm this: “The Jiun Tze [chun tzu] does not even for the space of a single meal, deviate from virtue. In moments of haste or pressure, he would adhere to it; and, in hours of danger or confusion, he would adhere to it.”44Cheng Hsien-Tsi contrasts this notion with hsiao yun li, understood as one who is

42Cheng Tien-Hsi, China Moulded by Confucius: The Chinese Way in Western Light (London: Stevens & Sons, 1947). See p. 37, n.3 . Cheng Tien-Hsi cites Bk. IV, Record of Yu (2205 B.C. Also see Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 48. Fung Yu-lan refers to chun tzu, “scholars of the nobler type and hsiao jen meaning “inferior type”. A more recent reference to the chun tzu notion is found in Simon Leys, Translation and notes, The Analects of Confucius (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.), 1997, pp.105- 107. Leys writes: Before Confucius, the word junzi (gentleman) merely indicated social status. A major originality of Confucian thought is to have progressively divested this notion of its social definition and to have endowed it with a new, purely ethical content. This transformation had huge and radical implications, as it was eventually to call into question the fundamental structure of the aristocratic- feudal order. For the old concept of an hereditary elite it substituted the notion of an elite based not on birth or wealth, but purely determined by virtue, culture, talent, competence, and merit. 43D.C.Lau, translated, Confucius: The Analects (Lun Yu), (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1983). Lau writes, “There is no doubt, however, that the ideal moral character for Confucius is the chun tzu (gentleman), as he discussed in more than eighty Chapters in the Analects. Chun tzu and hsiao jen (small man) are correlative and contrasted terms. The former is used of men in authority while the latter is used of those who are ruled. In the Analects, however, chun tzu and hsiao jen are essentially moral terms.” Introduction, p. xi-xii. 44Cheng Tien-Hsi, China Moulded by Confucius, The Chinese Way in Western Light, 1947, p. 38. Cheng Tien-Hsi cites Lun Yu, Pt IV,Ch.5, secs.2-3. The following is from Simon Leys, translation, The Analects of Confucius, 1997: The Master said: “Riches and rank are what every man craves; yet if the only way to obtain them goes against his principles, he should desist from such a pursuit. Poverty and obscurity are what every man hates; yet if the only escape from them goes against his principles, he should accept his lot. If a gentleman forsakes humanity, how can he make a name for himself? Never for a 293

narrow and not liberal and who clings to comfort and is always distressed. He does not

help others, and is not sociable. Confucius radically changed the earlier concept of chun

tzu,45 literally from “son of a ruler” to “superior man”, by arguing that “nobility”

denoted a morally superior man, not a person determined by status or heredity.46 Fung

Yu-lan explains that the chun tzu iwas originally a term applied to feudal princes, but later came to be applied to the one who possessed “princely” moral qualities. Such a person was the “Superior Man”. This person was one whose nature was genuine, and could put the li, rites into practice.47

It is generally agreed that Confucius’ understanding of man was innovative.48In fact it was so radical that it can be referred to as a “social revolution”.49Hughes explains

that in China in the 6th century B.C. there arose thinkers who acknowledged the

importance of the individual and sought “to break away from the group

mind.”50However, Confucius imbued the term chun tzu with a “new content”, that is the

idea of associating the superior man not with heredity but with high ideals of character as

manifested by the practice of (humanity), jen.51 The innovation marked the discovery of

the individual in Chinese society. It was the ability of a man to look at himself and see

himself in relation to others. That was the foundation on which Confucius wished to build

moment does a gentleman part from humanity; he clings to it through trials, he clings to it through tribulations” (4.5). 45Wing- Tsit Chan, translator and compiler, A Source Book, 1963, p. 16. He notes that for Confucius the man of jen is the perfect man. He is the true chun-tzu, he is the man of the Golden Rule. 46Ibid., See also Cheng Tien-Hsi, China Moulded by Confucius, The Chinese Way in Western Light, 1947, p. 38. 47Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1, 1952, p. 68. 48Frederick W. Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China ( New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 39. 49Wing-tsit Chan, translator and compiler, A Source Book, 1963, p.15. Wing-tsit Chan explains that Confucius in his reference to the sage emperors, Yao and Shun and Duke of Chou, was looking back to the past for “ideal men”. 50 E.R. Hughes, The Individual in East and West (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 88. 51Ibid., p. 94. 294

a good government, one that rested not on power, but on the good of the common man.52

On this same subject, Mote has pointed out that “Confucius insisted that the name chun tzu should apply only to those ‘superior men’, those who gave evidence of having achieved a personal superiority of ethical and intellectual cultivation.” This was a revolutionary redefinition of the criterion for assigning status in society and was formulated at a time when the old criterion was becoming obsolete. Some would argue

Confucius’ purpose was to revitalise the aristocracy by challenging its members to play their proper roles.53 The outcome was that Confucius openly invited men of all

backgrounds and classes to be his students in order to become “superior men”, something

that was proclaimed as the universal standard for education.54Chinese society had found

a mechanism for regulating and encouraging social mobility as well as providing a

justification for the ideal of an open society.55

In Confucius’ thought the sage is one who possesses the quality of genuineness or

truth and is opposed to all emptiness and falseness. He referred to this quality as “basic

stuff” consisting of straightforwardness or uprightness (chih).56 Such an expression of

human nature appears in short pithy sayings in the Lun Yu .57 For example :

Zigong asked about the true gentleman. The Master said: ‘He preaches only what he practices’( 2.13).

52Ibid., pp. 94-95. 53Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China, 1971, pp. 39-40. 54 See Leys, The Analects of Confucius, 1997, p. 159. Leys comments, “Confucian education was not an acquisition of technical information, but a development of one’s humanity - it was not a matter of having, but of being. In the universality of his humanism, the Confucian gentleman was the exact equivalent of the honnête homme of classical France”. 55Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China, 1971, pp. 39-40. 56Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, 1952, Vol. 1, pp. 68-69. 57Ibid., p. 67. “Man’s life is to be upright (chih). If one makes crooked this life, one is lucky to escape (disaster)” (IV,17). Also, “When the ‘basic stuff’ (chih) exceeds training (wen) you have the rustic. When training exceeds ‘the basic stuff’ you have the clerk. It is only when the ‘basic stuff’ and training (li) are proportionately blended that you have the Superior Man” (VI, 16) (p. 69). 295

The Master said: ‘The gentleman considers the whole rather than the parts. The small man considers the parts rather than the whole’(2.14). The Master said: ‘A gentleman seeks virtue: a small man seeks land. A gentleman seeks justice; a small man seeks favours’(4.11).58

The Confucian innovation of the chun tzu led to special attention being given to

human psychology. In the Confucian perspective humans were considered equal in their

human nature but different in their practice of virtues. “In their original natures (hsing)

men closely resemble each other. In their acquired practices (hsi ) they grow wide

apart.” [XVII, 2].59Such a view of human nature was taken over by the later

Confucians.60 Confucius, himself never gave an absolutely clear-cut answer as to

whether man’s nature is good or evil. This has remained a major problem for the

Confucian school. The new Confucian understanding of human nature can be referred to

as an “awakening”. Cheng Chung-ying explains that the Confucian age begins with

Confucius’s explicit recognition that the external t’ien (heaven) has an essential link with the internal te (virtue, power) of man and that man should extend himself in a graded love toward other men and thus achieve the universal humanity inherent in us. We may say, therefore, that Confucianism as represented by Confucius is an awakening of man in regard to his relationships to heaven, to other men and to himself. The relationality of man is to be realised in the practice and perfection of virtues such as jen (love and benevolence), yi or I (righteousness), li (propriety) and chih (wisdom in distinguishing good from bad).61

What Cheng Chung-ying is suggesting is something close to Platonic

philosophy.62 Fung Yu-lan confirms this position when he points out that most Chinese

philosophers have elaborated on the “Inner Sage and Outer King” and regard the Inner

58Leys, The Analects of Confucius, 1997. (I have cited from the text of Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, 1952, Vol. 1, unless otherwise stated). 59Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, 1952, Vol. 1, p. 75. Leys, The Analects of Confucius, 1997, trans: The Master said: “What nature put together, habit separates” (17.2). 60Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, 1952, Vol. 1, p. 75. 61See Cheng Chung-ying, “Chinese Philosophy”, Inquiry, 14 (1971), p. 118. 296

Sage as one who has established virtue in himself; the Outer King is one who has

accomplished great deeds in the world. “The highest ideal is for a man to possess both

the virtue of a Sage and the accomplishment of a ruler, and so become what is called a

Sage-king, or what Plato would have termed the Philosopher-king.”63

8.3.2. VOEGELIN’S ANALYSIS OF CONFUCIUS’ CHUN TZU

The elaboration of the chun tzu as “the ideal man” suggests a leap of being did

occur in the Chinese experience. Confucius’ teaching had a civilising effect on human

nature, and contributed to order in society. The sage notion and its cluster of virtues

reinforce the theory that the substance of Confucius’ teaching has provided a basis for a

new human type, as Voegelin has suggested. Confucius set his disciples altruistic goals

and high standards. These features suggest there is some equivalence of the chun tzu

aspirations with the philosopher’s nous.

However, for all its brilliance, Confucius’ teaching did not achieve a

“breakthrough”, i.e. a move from the cosmological type of truth to the anthropological

type. Confucianism never became “radically transcendental” and Confucius’ teaching remained merely as one school among others for three thousand years.64Voegelin

observes that this strange situation has no other comparison in history.65 He states:

Why, then should China be singled out as having this characteristic? The reason is that no other civilisation is distinguished by a galaxy of original, forceful personalities, engaging in spiritual and intellectual adventures which might have culminated in a radical break with the cosmological order, but invariably got bogged down and had to succumb to the prevailing form.66

62 See thesis, Section 3.1.1. 63Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, 1952, Vol. I, p. 2. 64Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, p. 62. 65Ibid. 66Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 285. 297

The complexity of the problem rests not on the absence of differentiation but in its presence. As we have seen, Confucius’ innovative understanding of the sage notion was remarkable, for it envisaged the potential of a person being responsible for his spiritual relation with the Tao. The chun tzu symbol marked the discovery of the autonomous personality as a source of order.67 Voegelin explains:

The order of society, which hitherto, had depended on the Son of Heaven alone, now depended, in rivalry with him, on the sage who participated in the order of the cosmos. In the realm of symbols the new experience of the autonomous person and his will to order became manifest in the transfer of imperial qualifications to the sage. The tao and the teh,68 whose possession entailed the ordering efficacy of the prince the ch’un, now became efficacious forces in the soul of the princely man, the chun-tse. Confucius thus approached the sage and the prince to the point of blending them in a symbol closely related to Plato’s philosopher-king.69

The Confucian innovation had made it possible to access the tao individually.

One was no longer only a member of a society relating to the Tao through mediation of

the ruler; now the possibility had been opened up for the individual to become “a

potential ruler and a rival to the Son of Heaven in mediating the tao - an idea which, as

far as we know, never occurred to an Egyptian.”70

67Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, pp. 61-62. 68Refer to Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 1963. Chan observes that te is not found in the oracle bones on which the Shang ideas and events are recorded, but is a key word in early Chou documents. This fact marked an important shift of thought. The destiny of a dynasty did not depend on some heavenly power but on the practice of “virtue”. There was still recognition of heaven but now man could control his own destiny by his moral deeds (pp. 3-4). See also Peter Boodberg, “The Semasiology: Some Primary Confucian Concepts”, Philosophy East and West 2 (1953), pp. 324-25. Boodberg writes, This character is made up of graphs for “heart” and “upright”. Its meaning suggested keeping true to one’s essence or normal state or function. Te is sometimes described as an acquired quality, and it is significant that the word was often defined by the Chinese scholars by the homonym te, “to acquire” “to obtain”. 69Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, pp. 61- 62. Confucius blended the notion of “sage” and “prince”. 70 Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, p. 62. 298

Although a certain similarity of the chun tzu notion to the philosopher’s nous is

apparent, were there differences? Voegelin suggests there is need to ask what type and

degree of differentiation is found.71 It will be recalled that “differentiation” refers to that

anthropological human type of truth wherein Plato “discovered” the psyche as the site

of transcendence. When we come to examine the Chinese sage notion we find no

evidence of that sharp distinction between transcendence and immanence. Voegelin

attributes the failure to distinguish the difference is due to the Chinese sense of merging.

Voegelin remarked that “the princely man was governed by the same cosmic fatality as

that of the ruler.” For the king had the teh (force) to mediate the cosmic tao (order) to

society through the ming, the decree of heaven; and in the same manner it depended on

the heavenly ming whether the wisdom of the sage was heard and accepted, so that he

would become an effective ordering force in the community.72 Both the emperor and

sage (chun tzu) were subject to the same cosmological fatality of the heavenly ming.

Hence, instead of achieving a sharp break in consciousness between “man” and the cosmos as had occurred in Plato’s experience, what we find is that in the Chinese experience the collective identity persisted. Unlike the philosopher’s nous which challenged the climate of opinion in Greek society, in the case of China the sage was so well attuned to the cosmic Tao that rather than being a force to oppose the dynastic te

[power] he ended up supporting it.73 Furthermore, because the Chinese experience of the

chun tzu notion lacked the radical element of differentiation a new theological

consciousness never developed. Confucianism was never able to break with cosmological

71 Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 286. 72Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, p. 62, n. 13. Voegelin cites Marcel Granet, La Pensee Chinoise (Paris, 1934), pp. 481 ff. See also Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (New York, 1948), pp. 44 ff. 299

thinking. In fact, the Imperial rulers were able to utilise Confucian scholarship to

consolidate their own political power structure. From the time of the Han, Chinese civilisation became an imperial power comparable in achievements and history to the

Roman Empire.

8.3.3. CHINA PRESENTS AN OBSCURE PROBLEM

The discussion has explored the divine perceptions of the Chinese and observed

the tendency to merge the order of being. Together with this merging sense there is also

an indication of a lack of tension amongst Chinese thinkers as to which was the greatest

god. The absence strengthened the idea of order perceived as being harmonious with the

cosmos. Hence, all these factors created the situation where the Chinese experience failed

to produce the creative force to enable a complete breakthrough to be achieved.

Voegelin, reflecting on the Chinese experience came to the conclusion that it poses an

“almost insuperable obstacle to analysis”.74 Although the Confucian sage notion

possessed a certain “aptitude” towards anthropological consciousness, that level of

consciousness was never achieved. Confucius’ teaching may have possessed the seeds of

a “religion” or spirituality which perhaps in different circumstances might have flowered,

but unfortunately it was systematically stifled by the on-going ruling powers.

Confucianism, instead of being the creative movement that it should have been, has - as

history has demonstrated - ended up stifling other creative movements. (The

Confucianists strongly opposed all heterodox thought). The determination to suppress the

73Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, p. 62. 74Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 285. 300

creative energy explains China’s predicament today in opposing so-called Western ideas

of democracy and human rights.75

Voegelin has illuminated an inherent characteristic of Chinese thought, which is

the inability to differentiate between the notions of immanence and transcendence. After

the creative period of Confucian teaching, the political order was subject to Ch’in and

Han expansionism. The era is termed as the Ecumenic Age understood as “a period in the

history of mankind which roughly extends from the rise of the Persian Empire to the fall

of the Roman Empire (between the 6th century B.C. and the 6th century A.D.)”76 The

period is characterised as a time of empire building wherein the conquest of many ethnic

societies took place.

The Ecumenic Age was characterised by a fundamental division between the

temporal and the spiritual poles of existence. A shift of consciousness in Chinese thought

took place from the spiritual to the political. The term ecumene77 originally signified the

civilised inhabited world as it was then known. The new consciousness was expressed by

the rulers’ desire to establish an empire as an inclusive enterprise.78 The Ch’in and Han

dynasties were based on a rationale of force and power, and the state sacrifices were

employ ed to gain a large share of the benefits of sacrifices and to legitimise the right to

govern.

75James D. Seymour, “Human Rights in China”, Current History, Sept (1994), pp. 256-259. 76Voegelin’s Order and History, The Ecumenic Age , Vol. 4, 1974, was the result of a major shift in his projected work of six volumes. He had already completed Volumes 1-3 in the late 1950s, then after a spell of seventeen years he broke his original program to take a different approach to understanding consciousness and history. In his introduction, Voegelin explains that his previous studies were still valid but the project in the way he had first envisaged it “was untenable because it had not taken proper account of the important lines of meaning in history that did not run along lines of time” (p. 2). 77Eric Voegelin, “World Empire and the Unity of Mankind”, International Affairs 38 (1962), p. 183. 78Ibid., p. 184. 301

The particular “transformation” of the Confucian age to the Imperial phase was recognised by Voegelin as an “extraordinary”79turn of events. The dynasties were not

overthrown but continued as if there had been no change. Consequently, what remained

was a political structure with no spiritual substance. The earlier understanding of the

cosmological order combined with the ritual experience was displaced. As a result the

Confucian innovation of the chun tzu was never absorbed into mainstream political

consciousness. Bereft of this spiritual substance, the new imperial order relied on power

and kuo [force] alone.80 Voegelin insists that “the end [telos, end, fulfilment] of all

human action does not lie within this world but beyond it.”81 He states, “Organisation, to

be sure, is necessary to the existence of man and society in this world, but no

organisation can organise mankind - even global ecumenicity of organisation is not

universality.”82

The failure of Chinese thought to break from the cosmological mode meant that a

transcendent understanding of human nature never featured as any part of the ordering force of Chinese society. As a consequence in China there was a “less than full conception of man”. The anthropological principle, articulated as the “polis is man

written large” (i.e. the person is more significant than the state) has remained dormant in

China.

8.3.4. ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHE AS THE SITE OF TRANSCENDENCE

79Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 298-299. 80The notion of the chun tzu was taken over by Chinese philosophers but never energised Chinese political thought. The idea that man is the measure of the polis never prevailed in Chinese political order. Instead the idea of the Emperor as the “One-Man” always persisted. Collective consciousness is the underlying reality of Chinese political order. 81Voegelin, “World Empire and the Unity of Mankind”, International Affairs 38 (1962), p.184. 82Ibid., p.188. 302

Voegelin’s analysis of various types of human consciousness is very useful today to highlight the underlying difference of world views encountered in the international arena. His analysis of the principle of differentiation provides a philosophical framework to explore two very different cultural positions taken between modern, democratic countries and nations such as China, which tend to ward off the serious question of human rights.83 It is argued here that China’s legacy of cosmological consciousness is still a present factor in Chinese thinking. The anthropological principle has not as yet taken effect. As Voegelin declares, the principle, i.e. Plato’s discovery that the psyche is the site of transcendence in the human experience, is so powerful that it can act as a

“wedge” between immanent and transcendent truth.84 Societies which do not possess the anthropological consciousness of “man” and society develop a form of order at the risk of the price of the human person.85

The loss of substance is present: “The te is the sacral substance of order which can be accumulated in a family through the merits of distinguished ancestors.”86 The

“sacral substance of order” is understood as te.87 The te validates the dynasty. When the

83See Yuan-li et al., Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988); Ann Kent, Between Freedom and Substance: China and Human Rights (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993); James D. Seymour, “Human Rights in China”, Current History (Sept, 1994), pp. 256-253; Davis Wen-Wei Chang, “Confucianism, Democracy and Socialism: The Communist Search For a New Typology With Chinese Characteristics” Asian Thought and Society, 17, 51 (1992), pp.179-194. 84Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, 1952, p. 60. 85Ibid., pp. 60-61. 86Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 277. See also Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation (New York: Peter Lang, 1993). Introduction, p. 2. Ivanhoe remarks that te, virtue, is related to te, to get or gain. One who has virtue has some sort of hold or a kind of power. In this sense it is specially a power over others. He writes: In this early period the notion of te is almost always found in texts concerning rulers and had the sense of that virtue particularly a good ruler: royal virtue. Royal virtue enabled the king to accomplish a great deal but most importantly it enabled him to get the endorsement of the ancestral spirits. Such support was thought necessary for him to gain and maintain his rule. 87 Te, see above Note 68. Leys also suggests that te “usually translated as ‘virtue’; this translation would be appropriate if the reader could spontaneously understand it in its original, primary meaning: ‘virtue,’ like Latin ‘virtus,’ the Italian ‘virtu,’ or the French vertu, had a connotation of ‘power’ which became 303 dynasty loses the te, then it is time for another dynasty. Order based on te opens the way for frequent upheavals in China. The process of loss is evident in this century for example in 1911, with the change from the Imperial order to a Republic.88 Furthermore, in 1929, there was the May Fourth Protest;89and more recently in 1989, there was the students’ protest against the corruption of Deng Xiao-ping’s rule.90 Each occasion was an attempt by the people (min) to recover the substance of order in Chinese society and on each occasion the protest made by the people failed.91

In this discussion I have demonstrated that the Chinese experience of order still retains cosmological characteristics due to the series of repressive rulers and the enforcement of Confucianism. The creative thinking of Confucius failed to lift the

Chinese experience to an order where “man is the measure of the polis”. The next chapter explores the absence and implicatons of noetic reason in twentieth century China through the soul of the remarkable writer, Lu Hsun.

largely lost in later usage ...”. The Master said: “Failure to cultivate moral power, failure to explore what I have learned, incapacity to stand by what I know to be right, incapacity to reform what is not good - these are my worries.” (p. 150). 88Many works deal with these events, e.g. Jean Chesneaux, Marianne Bastid, and Marie-Claire Bergere, Translated from the French by Anne Destenay, China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution (New York: Pantheon, 1976). 89See Conrad Schirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilisations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), pp. 477-478. 90Refer to Trevor Watson, Tremble and Obey: An ABC Correspondent’s Account of the Bloody Beijing Spring (Crows Nest, NSW: ABC Book, 1990); Donald Morrison ed., Massacre in Beijing: China’s Struggle for Democracy (New York: Warner Communications, 1989). 91This process will occur again and in fact is kept alive by such people as Wei Jingsheng, a Chinese dissident who has spent sixteen years in jail for his attack on the government of Deng Xiao-ping. (See The Weekend Australian, May 31-June 1, 1997. There is a push to give Wei Jingsheng the Nobel Peace Prize. (At present he is in the U.S.A.) 305

CHAPTER NINE

THE LIFE OF REASON AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ORDER IN CHINA:

LU HSUN

In the last section the important chun tzu notion was examined in Confucius’ teachings. The chun tzu notion appeared to be the ideal basis on which to establish a good society, yet the Confucian vision was never realised. Chinese political thought never allowed the ideal to reach a point where the individual was recognised as a foundational principle of society. The Chinese sage notion never completely broke from the cosmological mould. Due to the long reign of oppressive governments order in China was reinforced primarily by power. Confucius’ teachings devolved into a form of legalism and cosmology, known as Han Confucianism, which was an ideology emphasising the collective identity over the individual. It was used to strengthen the emperor’s control over the whole country. Hence by the early part of the 20th century when China was confronted with a formidable challenge from the Western powers,

Confucianism became a useful target to blame for the nation’s failure to modernise.

The aim of this chapter is to continue examining the question of the life of reason in China. The discussion focuses on a well-known Chinese writer, Lu Hsun, and explores his perception of the complexity of the political and social situation in China. His thought provides a comparative framework on which to analyse order in twentieth century China. Some points of convergence are given between Lu Hsun’s thought and

Voegelin’s understanding of order in society that draws meaning from the life of reason. 306

First some introduction to the complexity of the social and political situation is necessary

to show what occurs in a society when the creative minority is suppressed and order is

left to ideologues who enforce their ideas through coercion.1

9.1. TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NEW

ORDER

Under the Ch’ing dynasty, established by the Manchus (1644-1911), the empire

had expanded and gained a certain prosperity and stability. For almost three hundred

years China was ruled by the Ch’ing, which was the second non-Chinese dynasty since

the T’ang dynasty to rule over China. The Manchus were considered by the Han Chinese

as foreign rulers.2As one writer states: “The Chinese inhabitants were turned into

Manchu bond servants (that is, slaves) and were forced to wear their hair in a queue

(pigtail) and to shave the rest of their heads in the Manchu fashion.”3During the Ch’ing

dynasty the Manchus were not allowed to marry Chinese and Manchus were not allowed

to bind their feet.” By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Ch’ing government

was weak. The Confucian officials who supported the Manchus conceded only a

minimum amount of change to meet the challenge from the West.4 The formidable

intrusion of foreign forces into China had begun in the 18th century with Britain taking

the lead. The British had forced the country to open to trade after China’s defeat in the

Opium War (1839-42). The treaty of Nanking (1842) had secured land concessions to

1Voegelin, “Industrial Society in Search of Reason”, in R. Aron, ed., World Technology and Human Destiny, (Ann Arbor: Universtity of Michigan Press), 1963, p. 42. Voegelin raises issues regarding the problem of order in societies that have never had the Christian substance. He acknowledges if “historical dynamics are taken into account the question of ‘goodness’ will require a certain amount of revision and refinement”. 2Conrad Schirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilisations (New York: Harcourt and Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 326. 3Ibid. 307

foreign powers.5 The Chinese government was faced with problems on all sides. Not

only was China challenged externally by foreigners, it lacked a strong, internal direction from its own rulers. Exacerbating these problems was an increase of population to about

430 million, without a corresponding increase in productivity - as well as the ever present

uncertainty of internal uprisings such as the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864).

9.1.1. THE PROBLEM OF WESTERN LEARNING

To meet these challenges, both external and internal, the Confucian officials

debated whether Chinese learning could remain at the heart of Chinese civilisation,

while Western learning could take a subordinate role. The proposition was expressed in

terms of the traditional Neo-Confucian dichotomy between t’i (substance) and yung

(function), that is, Western means for Chinese ends. Some argued that the basic pattern

of civilisation could remain sacrosanct while at the same time some Western technology

could be introduced. This procedure initially allowed the adoption of military

techniques, with other areas of modern knowledge gradually added.6 The policy may have maintained Confucian traditions but for most of the population, particularly women and peasants, Confucianism had for a long time ceased to be meaningful. As one writer expressed this: “It thus becomes abundantly clear that, for all its ornamental value, and

4 Schirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilisations, 1978, p. 446. 5 Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese : The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874, (New York: Atheneum, 1966), p. 10. The British [Alcock] minister reported: To this question of change and the introduction of sweeping and large reforms, both the hopes and fears of Western Power are attached. To it also is undoubtedly linked the future destiny of the Empire, and a third of the human race which constitutes its population ... It has now to be decided whether the political system, clogged with such worn out materials, and decrepit with age, is susceptible of a regeneration, and a new life of adaptation to modern exigencies and foreign civilisation; or whether it is to be dissolved by a process of decomposition and degradation, more or less progressive and complete with all their consequences within and without the Empire. [Cited in Wright, p.315, n.11, [China. No.5. (1871), p. 83, Alcock to Stanley, Dec. 23, 1867.] 6 Schirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilisations, 1978, p. 449. 308

humanising effect, Confucianism was always a tool, never the master, of the traditional

Chinese state, which during the entire imperial age remained highly authoritarian.”7

9.1.2. NEW POLITICAL PARTIES

The political order in China was very unstable after the overthrow of the Imperial system in 1911. A ferment of political ideas abounded in China. The most important was the nationalistic political movement connected with Sun Yat Sen [1866-1925]. He had elaborated his “Three Principles of the People” i.e. nationalism, democracy and the people’s livelihood. These ideas had a strong influence on the Kuomingtang (KMT) and also on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).8 Both groups were to have a major

influence on shaping the political structures of China. In the beginning, there was some

interaction between the two groups but in their struggle to gain supremacy they broke off

relations. In 1927, Chiang Kai Chek, who was then leader of the KMT, took action and

attempted to restrain the rapidly growing CCP. He devastated their incipient group in

Shanghai and then established his own government in Nanking. His goal was military

unification of the country, and in this he was supported by the business community who

were in favour of a national revolution but not a social one.9

Chiang’s approach to Confucianism was ambivalent.10 At first he took a

pragmatic approach, arguing, “If we do not exterminate the red bandits [CCP] we cannot

preserve the old morals and ancient wisdom handed down from our

7Ho Ping-Ti, “Salient Points of China’s Heritage”, in Ho Ping-ti and Tsou Tang, eds., China in Crisis, Vol.1, China’s Heritage and the Communist Political System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 15. 8Schirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilisations, 1978, p. 484. 9 Ibid., p. 487. 10 Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, 1966, p. 303. 309 ancestors.”11However, in 1927 he ordered the abolition of Confucian rites and used the funds for public education on the grounds that:

The principles of Confucius were despotic. For more than twenty centuries they have served to oppress the people and to enslave thought. . . As to the cult of Confucius, it is superstitious and out of place in the modern world. . .China is now a Republic. These vestiges of absolutism should be effaced from the memory of citizens.12

Yet some time later, he was urging his officers to spend their leisure in studying The

Four Books. The KMT were not philosophers but men of action and they took from

Confucius whatever seemed likely to promote internal order. They stressed the importance of li (rites) which they discussed incessantly but it is difficult to know what exactly they meant by this notion.13

Confucianism was useful to Chiang because it was Chinese and could restore the national soul14and at the same time reinforce his own position. He saw the Restoration model15 as an ideal and strove to revive Confucian ideology.16 Li Tsung-jen described this ideology as Chiang understood it:

For over 4000 years the Chinese people were knitted together by a moral code, apart from a common written language, the same blood strain and a cultural

11 Cited in Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, 1966, p. 303, refer to n. 16 [Lu - shan hsün- lien chi, I, 212-131]. 12Cited from Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, 1966, p. 304, see n. 23 [Léon Wieger, Chine moderne, Sienhsien, 1921-31, VII, 79]. 13Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, 1966, p. 306. Wright notes that Chiang Kai-shek referred to these virtues not in positive terms but because he saw them as a means to order, discipline and rules. “In the view of the Kuomingtang ideologists, Confucianism was the most effective and cheapest means ever devised by man for this purpose. They saw that the Confucian order had held together because certain canons of behaviour had been hammered in by precept and example so effectively that deviation from them was nearly impossible.” 14Ibid., pp. 306-308. Wright explains that the idea that people are to be virtuous rather than acquire clothing and food; the Kuomingtang defined revolution in 1935 in the opposite sense of “new” - the idea that “the Chou dynasty was new, new in the sense of slow adjustment and renewal of ancient and unchanging principles”. 15Ibid., This model had been initiated by K’ang Yu-wei in his “Hundred Days Reform”. 16Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, 1966, p. 310 [Lo Erh-Kang, Hsiang-chün hsin-chih, p. 63, 75-80. (Changsha, 1939)]. 310

heritage. The code of morals expounded by Confucius and the rest of our sages is the only reason Chinese exist as a people and as a country. This code of morals distinguishes Chinese from other people by defining the correct relationship between parents and children, husband and wife, brother and sister, teacher and student, friend and friend.17

However, the “code of morals” must be distinguished from the virtues that Confucius

taught (jen and chih and so on); Confucianism had now been hardened into a “code” devoid of spirit. Arthur Wright distinguishes between the old Confucianism (Confucius’

teaching) and the new Confucianism. He comments :

The new Confucianism not only updated Confucian thought, it added new imperatives unknown by the more permissive and amorphous Confucianism of earlier centuries. It is the new Confucianism that insists on segregation of the sexes and complete subordination of women. It is the new Confucianism that gradually develops the concept of loyalty from what it was - a relationship ultimately determined by the conscience of the subject - into what it became - an imperative to unquestioning and total subordination to any ruler, however idiotic or amoral he might be. The new Confucianism was more totalitarian in intent than the old had been, in that it gave the monarch authority to police all private as well as public morals and customs, to extirpate heresy etc. No wonder that later emperors found in it the justification for gathering to themselves more and more of the power they formerly shared with the literati.18

When in 1917 the Russian revolution succeeded, many young Chinese intellectuals were

inspired to change their country in a similarly radical way. Confucianism was something

to reject. They were supported in this resolve by ideas from such thinkers as Immanuel

Kant, John Dewey, and others. These thinkers were an inspiration for

those who were tired of the old ways and were looking for something new to meet the

new political and social challenges. The publication of the New Youth Journal wherein

new ideas were propagated vigorously challenged the Treaty of Versailles (1919). They

contended that the government had given concessions to foreign powers. To voice their

17Cited from Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, 1966, p. 311, refer to n. 65. 311

protest they gathered in great numbers against the government - an incident now called

the May Fourth Movement.

9.2. LU HSUN

Lu Hsun’s own life (1881-1925) spanned this volatile, historical period. China

was forging a path as a modern nation and at the same time attempting to preserve its

national characteristics. He was born on September 25th, in the city of Shao-hsing,

Cheking Province19while the Ch’ing Dynasty was still surviving but was encountering serious difficulties with foreign invaders. He was educated in a school where he learnt

English and had the opportunity to read foreign literature. His preference was for

Russian, the Eastern European writers, and the literature of “oppressed peoples”, those who displayed “a spirit of militant resistance”.20 He responded to works which were

“realistic” and “symbolic.”21He argued that written composition (wenzhang) distorted

the true nature of the self-interpretation of a society. The unofficial literature (xiao-shuo)

rather than classical literature (wenzhang) was his choice.22 At first he considered China

required stability and some reform of the government, but later he changed; he became

more radical and rejected Confucianism23 as an ideology that stifled the creative energies

of individuals.

18 Arthur Wright, “Comments by Arthur Frederick Wright”, in China in Crisis: China’s Heritage and the Communist Political System, Vol. 1, 1968, p. 39. 19A good account of important events in the life of Lu Hsun is found in Chi-Chen Wang, “Lusin: A Chronological Record, 1881-1936”, China Institute Bulletin, 3 (1939), pp. 96-125. 20 Lee Ou-fan, “Genesis of a Writer: Notes on Lu Xun’s Educational Experience, 1881-1909,” in Merle Goldman, ed., Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.183, n. 89, cites Wm. R.Schult, “Lu Hsun: the Creative years” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1955), p. 99. 21Lee Ou-fan, “Genesis of a Writer: Notes on Lu Xun’s Educational Experience, 1881-1909,” p. 188. 22Lee Ou-fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 29. 23It is important to note that Lu Hsun wrote a book on Chinese literature. It is necessary to distinguish between “Confucius’ teaching”and “Confucianism”. 312

Lu Hsun’s concern was in the underlying problems of order in China, which he

diagnosed as the apathy of the individual. He was convinced that exceptional individuals

had the power to change society but only through an intellectual and spiritual revolution.

When established values were breaking down he wished to explore the individual’s

definition of existence.24 He gave precedence to aesthetics and spiritual and ethical

components over political ideology, insisting :

If we want to work out a policy for the present, we must examine the past and prepare for the future, discard the material and elevate the spirit, rely on the individual and exclude the mass. When the individual is exalted to develop his full capacity, the country will be strengthened and will arise. Why should we be engrossed in such trivialities as gold, iron, congress, and constitutions?25

Lu Hsun regarded the individual as unique and as a source of creativity necessary to

bring order to society. It was his contention that China needed “real men”, that is, those

who acquire virtue and act towards others in an open and humane way. Unless the individual is allowed freedom of spirit the problem of disorder will continue in China.

The solution, he said, must take account of the individual’s desire for good. It is not only

those at the top who are oppressive but also those below. In fact the problem was that

each member in society oppresses the other - the whole hierarchical structure of society

has become a force of oppression.26

9.2.1. LU HSUN AND CHINESE CULTURE

Lu Hsun is singular among the May Fourth writers in that he did not reject his

Chinese culture entirely but recognised in the history of literature, art and ancient

writings notions that expressed the authentic Chinese experience. In his writing he freely

24 Lee Ou-fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun , 1987, p. 39. 313

resorted to symbols, character archetypes and capsule statements filled with metaphorical

layers of meaning, impressionistic descriptions and psychological insights. His main

interest was to absorb the counter-traditions, unofficial history, myths, and poetry.27 He

said he was able to “numb the pain in his soul” by returning to the ancients.28The popular, traditional arts such as village operas were of interest because he saw that art and literature must be drawn from human experience not constrained by “culture” and removed from reality. His interest was in those periods that had not yet been fettered with formalism29 and he embraced a cultural-spiritual approach to the study of literary

history.30As Ou-Fan Lee remarks, Lu Hsun was unprecedented in that he explored the

history of Chinese fiction in order to look at the bigger issues.31 He questioned why a

certain type of fiction had come into being and in what way it reflected moral values.

Lu Hsun’s primary interest in literature was to nourish the human spirit, for

literature possessed an emotional power to illuminate principles that underlie the “subtle

mysteries of life” in a way impossible for science. However literature that was consonant

with conventional morality was rejected. He argued that writers were often geniuses

who rebelled against narrow morality by running “counter to the common disposition” of

25 Cited in Lee Ou-fan, “Genesis of a Writer: Notes on Lu Xun’s Educational Experience, 1881-1909”, p. 181. See n. 79, LXQI, 1, pp. 44-51. 26Lu Hsun, Lu Hsun, Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 162. 27 Lee Ou-fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun , 1987, p. 41. 28Ibid., p. 27. 29Ibid., pp. 30-31. Lee Ou-fan writes, “Lu Xun intended to write ... with some bigger issues: How and why did certain works come into being and become popular? How did fiction reflect changes in the values and mores of a certain period and throughout the ages? How did social, political, and relgious factors and trends condition or shape fictional creation? ... an index to the temper of an age and the ‘soul’ of a people” (p. 31). 30Ibid., p. 38. 31Ibid., p. 39. 314 their contemporaries. The writers of genius for him were the Poets of Mara32 (a term drawn from the Indian god). These poets, writers and artists were strong and uncompromising, sincere, truthful and scornful of convention; by their powerful utterances, a national rebirth could be brought about.33

In his essay, “The Power of Mara Poetry” (1907), he celebrated a number of

Western individuals - “warriors of the spirit” who in their struggle against stagnant forms of mediocrity had prophetically shaped history. These lone individuals were the ones who could swing the historical pendulum of “cultural extremities” by reacting against the crass materialism of the masses.34Yet, he asks, where are such warriors now? Who raises a voice for truth, who are the leaders of goodness, beauty and health? He queries,

“Where are those who utter heart warming words, who will lead us out of the wilderness?

Our homes are gone and the nation is destroyed, yet we have no Jeremiah crying out his last sad song to the world and to posterity?”35

9.2.2. LU HSUN AND THE FATE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Lu Hsun’s consciousness of the significance of the individual36 began when he was studying medicine in Japan. The following incident is a key to Lu Hsun’s perception

32Ibid., p. 22. See also Irene Eber, “Reception of Lu Xun in Europe and America”, in Lee Ou-Fan, Lu Xun and His Legacy, 1985. Eber writes, “Lone heroes with no relationship to society are a problem in Marxist criticism, because if they are alone they cannot be positive. Marxist critics have attempted to identify only positive heroes in Lu Xun’s works”, and also notes that “The figure of Ah Q reflects Chinese reality and represents the high point of typicalness in modern Chinese literature” (p. 269). 33Lee Ou-fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun, 1987, p. 21. See also Harriet C. Mills, “Lu Xun: Literature and Revolution”, in Merle Goldman, ed., Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era, 1977, p. 192. 34 Ibid., p. 21. See n. 72 [Fen, LXQI, Vol.1, pp. 63-100] 35 Ibid. 36Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 1952, p. 60. Voegelin refers to the “outbreak of the truth of the mystic philosophers and prophets has attracted the attention of historians and philosophers ever since it came into full view with the enlargement of the historical horizon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.” See also Voegelin, “What is History”, in Eric Voegelin, What is History? And Other Late Unpublished Writings, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited with an introduction by Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul Caringella, Vol. 28, 1990, p. 28. Voegelin refers to the Chinese experience that never culminated in 315

of the importance of the individual and the failure in the national character. After this

realisation he changed the direction of his life. He relates:

I do not know how much progress has been made in recent years in the methods of teaching bacteriology, but in those days lantern slides were used to show the forms of microscopic life. Sometimes, slides of places and current events were shown to fill up the time at the end of the lecture. It was the time of the Russo- Japanese war and there were naturally a great many war slides shown. I sometimes applauded, following the example set by my Japanese classmates. But on one occasion I suddenly encountered Chinese faces on the screen. One of them was bound, surrounded by others, all of strong build but betraying a stupid and vacant expression. According to the caption, the one who was bound was a spy for the Russians and was about to be beheaded by the Japanese military as a warning to the populace, while the crowd that surrounded him were there to enjoy the show. I went to Tokio [Tokyo] before I finished the school year, for this experience made me realise that medicine was not a very important thing, that the people of a weak and backward country could only, no matter how healthy and strong in body, become material for and spectators of senseless warnings to the populace, and that their sickness and death need not necessarily be considered a misfortune. The most important step, I reasoned, was to change their spirit, and the most important means for achieving that end was literature. Thereupon I decided that I would devote myself to the promotion of a literary movement.37

What particularly appalled him was not only the physical brutality depicted on the slide

but also the moral obtuseness of his fellowmen (Chinese students) observing the scene.

To him they appeared oblivious of the tragedy being played out before them and had

evinced no empathy for the victim who was a member of their own nation. To Lu Hsun they appeared as if they had come simply to “enjoy the spectacle.” Such spiritual apathy caused him to be painfully aware of the distance, moral and physical, that separated him

an act of transcendence hence there was “less-than-full conception of man I shall call anthropomorphic ”. 37Cited by Chi-Chen Wang “Lusin: Chronological Record”, China Institute Bulletin, 3 (1939), p.106. The quotation came from Lu Hsun’s Cheers (Na han.), Preface dated Dec.3, 1922. The title suggests “cheering from the sidelines” in contrast to active participation. 316

from his compatriots.38The experience was to leave a lasting impression and to become

the substance of his own literature.

9.2.3. DIARY OF A MADMAN

His essay, “The Diary of a Madman” was a violent attack on society. It boldly

declared that for four thousand years Chinese history in reality had been a chronology of

a cannibalistic culture.39 Lee Ou-fan suggests that the tone of this essay is in line with the

prevailing anti-traditionalism of the May Fourth intellectual stance. Other writers had

also popularised the notion lijiao chiren (eating people) which suggested that the

established rituals and moral tenets in Chinese culture had the effect of cannibalising the

Chinese people, literally eating away their spirit. Chinnery, discussing the influence of

Western literature on The Diary of a Madman, remarks, “The central idea of the story is

that society is cannibalistic and that orthodox Confucian morality was merely a cover for

cannibalism. This idea was in tune with the anti-Confucianism of the New Culture

Movement.”40 However, by turning the May Fourth slogan [lijiao chiren] into an

extended metaphor in a fictional work, Lu Hsun had heralded the “call to arms” for the

“generals” of the publication, The New Youth.41

9.2.4. LU HSUN’S PERCEPTION OF REALITY

Further examination of The Madman reveals a picture of someone with an

increasingly sharpened perception of reality. The Madman’s growing “insanity” provides

38Marston Anderson, The Limits of Realism: Chinese Fiction in the Revolutionary Period, (California: University of California Press, 1990), p. 78. See also Lee Ou-Fan, “Genesis of a Writer,” in Modern Chinese Literature, 1977, pp. 178-179. 39Lee Ou fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun, 1987, p. 54. 40J.D. Chinnery, “The Influence of Western Literature on Lu Xun’s Diary of a Madman”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, 23 (1960). Refer to p. 314, n.1, an article by Wu Yu in Xin Qingnian entitled “Cannibalism and the Doctrine of Propriety” in which he wrote 317

the basis for the process of unusual cognition which will lead to full realisation of the

inhuman nature of society and culture. The imagery in the story intensifies the theme by

external signals such as sensory perceptions, exemplified by snarling and glances from a

dog and a neighbour, gossip and comments from people on the streets. Increasingly,

these perceptions lead to doubts and introspection, as the Madman questions the

rationale of ordinary reality. His questioning prompts him to gaze beyond his immediate

environment to his country’s historical past through the reading of texts.42By combining

his observations of people’s behaviour towards each other Lu Hsun was able gradually

to obtain an insight into what he termed cannibalism in Chinese history.43 He deconstructed the intended meaning to declare that human beings possess animal instincts which can at times be more cruel than animals.44 What he had in mind was to present a “counter perspective” of China’s cultural heritage. Lee Ou-fan explains that

“The Diary of Madman” points to a kind of purposeful reversal of values. What it implies is that official history, typically considered “civilised”, is in reality “barbaric” and that history disdained by Confucian officials was of greater interest.45 The alternative

version points to an alienated dissent, epitomised by the perennial frustration of doomed

prophets, who invariably being ahead of their time must suffer the fate of

concerning Lu Xun: “...he has torn away the disguise of the knavish dissemblers who wear the mask of propriety in order to eat people”. VI, 6, 578-80. 41Lee Ou-fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun, 1987, p. 54. 42Ibid., “At several junctures, the protagonist cites what these ‘books’ said over the centuries - from the Zouzhuan. (The Zuo Commentary) to Bencao gangmu (The Catalogue of Flora and Fauna) - an act reminiscent of Lu Xun’s own scholarly research” (pp.54-55). 43Lee Ou-fan, Voices from the Iron House:A Study of Lu Xun, 1987, p.55. He notes, “there is an increase of animalistic overtones dog, wolf cub”, there is a refrain of the view of the slight difference between man and brutes. 44Ibid. 45Ibid., p. 54. “The Madman is regarded as insane by conventional society in the same way as Xi Kang and other ‘sages of the Bamboo Grove’ in the Wei-Jin period had been taken as ‘crazy’ and immoral by defenders of the mingjiao (prescribed teaching)”. 318

misunderstanding and persecution by the very people they wish to serve. The larger

allegorical themes of Lu Hsun’s subsequent works must be understood from this

perspective.46

Lee Ou-fan suggests that the Madman’s insight can be taken at two levels. One

explores the question of cannibalism and the other considers the nature of human

evolution.47 Both levels are important if one is to understand what Lu Hsun regards as

the true nature of “real men”. Lu Hsun declared that the Chinese people possessed an

ingrained slave mentality which arose not only from external forces but also from an internal feature of the national character.48 He attributes this slave mentality to the “dark

Confucian ideas which need to be wiped out.” He wrote, “Brother, probably all primitive

people ate a little human flesh to begin with. Later, because their thinking was changed,

some of them stopped eating people and tried so hard to do what was right that they

changed into men, real men. But some are still eating people - just like reptiles.”49 Lu

Hsun attributed the slave mentality to the hierarchical system laid down in China since the earliest times. In ironic tones he observed “the excellent system decided by the ancients” and that “there are ten suns in heaven, ten degrees among men; so those below serve those above, and the ruler waits on the gods. Thus princes are subject to the king, ministers to the princes, knights to the ministers...[and so on down to the lowest

46Ibid. 47Ibid., p. 55. 48Lu Hsun felt that the 1911 revolution had been betrayed. In 1925 he had written “It Suddenly Occurred to me”. I feel that for a long time there has been no such thing as the Republic of China. I feel that before the revolution I was a slave and that after the revolution I was soon betrayed by the ex-slaves and became their slave. I feel that it is necessary to start everything afresh. (Under My Lucky Star, p. 9). Cited by Chi-Chen Wang in “Lusin: Chronological Record.” 1939, p. 118. 49Cited in Lee Ou-fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun, 1987, p. 56. See n.13, p. 209, the quotation is from LXQJ, Vol. 1, pp. 429-31. 319 slave].”50He pointed out that even if “the lowest slaves have no subjects, we need not worry... for they have wives and children who rank even lower... Thus in this cycle everyone is all right, and whoever dares to object is condemned for trying to rise above his station.”51

He criticises the present situation observing that “China’s ancient spiritual civilisation has not been destroyed by the ‘Republic’. The only difference is, the

Manchus have just left the [cannibalistic] banquet....China is nothing but the kitchen where these feasts are prepared”.52“Cannibalism” had been long entrenched, to change the course of history it is necessary to change the national character. Lu Hsun perceived

Chinese society as an enmeshing net: once born into this net it was difficult to escape the pervasive influence of its culture.53

To attain some semblance of humanity it was necessary to face the facts and reveal all the appalling aspects of Chinese society. He increasingly felt the urgent need to raise the moral consciousness of China and for this reason “The Diary of a Madman” assumes great significance.54 Yet the picture of China appeared so dark that at times Lu

Hsun felt it was almost impossible for it to change at all.55 He wrote :

50Lin Yu-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Anti traditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), pp. 121-123, see n. 51. [Lu Hsun, “Teng-hsia man-pi.” Fen, LHCC, 1:314-15.] Lu Hsun cites, “From the record of the seventh year of Duke Chao” (535 BC) in the Tso-chuan. 51Ibid. 52Ibid. 53Ibid., p.120. Lin Yu-sheng comments that the statement “‘Save the children’, is a desperate cry; but no inference can be drawn from the internal logic of the piece to indicate a realistic hope of saving children. On the contrary, the madman feels that the children whom he has encountered all harbour cannibalistic intentions. This is not surprising, since they have all been brought up and socialised in a cannibalistic society - in the words of the madman, ‘They must have learned [it] from their parents.’ [ Lu Hsun “K’uang-jen jih-chi,” Na-han, LHCC,1: p. 10] 54Lee Ou -fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun, 1987, p. 53. Lee writes, “But Lu Hsun has reinvented the form with an extremely subjective point of view unprecedented in Chinese diarist literature: it registers the ravings of an allegedly insane person suffering from a case of worsening persecution 320

Everything requires careful consideration if one is to understand it. In ancient times, as I recollect, people often ate human beings, but I am rather hazy about it. I tried to look this up, but my history has no chronology, and scrawled all over each page are the words: ‘Virtue and Morality’. Since I could not sleep anyway, I carefully went over it for half the night until I began to see the words between the lines, the whole book being filled with these words, -ch’ih jen (‘eat people’).56

The only way to combat the problem was to change the character of the individual by the

acquisition of knowledge (wisdom). At the same time, he felt that humans themselves

conspire against their own evolution. Because of their long history of “cannibalism” he

considered it was not possible for the Chinese to change into “real men,” for they

appeared locked into a vicious cycle of existence “wanting to eat others and at the same

time afraid of being eaten themselves” until they are wiped out altogether.57 He observed,

“What we Chinese call civilisation is really only a feast of human flesh for the delectation of the rich. What we call China is only the kitchen where this feast is prepared.”58 In this statement Lu Hsun not only castigated the behaviour of the rich

towards the poor but insisted that most people can be potentially victims and cannibals,

like the crowds who glared at the Madman on the street. He had written: “These people -

some of then have been pilloried by the magistrate, some have had their wives taken

away by bailiffs, some have had their parents driven to suicide by creditors; yet they

complex. Moreover the diary itself is preceded by a pseudo-preface written by an implied author in a typical classical style and voicing a conventional set of values.” 55Ibid., p. 199. “It is above all Lu Hsun’s critical spirit that defines his personal integrity and his intellectual conscience. And if ‘Lu Hsun’s spirit’ is still needed today... [it is in the] notion of ‘literature as a spiritual inquiry’, creative writing as a form of restless probing of self and society”. 56Lin Yu-Sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Anti-traditionalism in the May Fourth Era, p.119 [Lu Hsun, “K’ang-jen jih-chi,” Na-han, LHCC, 1:12]. 57 Lee Ou-fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun, 1987 p.56. The Madman’s story has also an enigmatic ending, a cry to “Save the children!” The appeal is in line with the May Fourth thinkers yet the true story’s ending is mentioned in the beginning where it is implied that the author announces that the Madman is “cured” of his madness, thus annulling the validity of everything in the Diary, including the final message. 321

never looked as frightened and as fierce as they did yesterday.”59 Chinese society was

permeated with “cannibalism” through and through: “Wanting to eat men, at the same

time being afraid of being eaten themselves, they all look at each other with the deepest

suspicion ... ”60 The whole society appeared static and oppressive. It was the hierarchical system that allowed the degradation of the individual.61 He added with irony, “we have

already prepared ourselves well in advance by having noble and common, great and small, high and low. Men may be oppressed by others, but they can oppress others themselves. They may be eaten, but they can also eat others. With such a hierarchy of repression, the people cannot stir, and indeed they do not want to. For though good may come of it if they stir, trouble may also result.”62

Added to this depressing picture was the additional problem of the presence of

the foreigner. He observed, “But more and more people, including some foreigners, are praising China’s ancient civilisation. I often think that if any foreigner coming here were to frown in and show his hatred for China, I should thank him from the bottom of my heart; for such a man would not batten on our people’s flesh.”63 He recalls:

This tyranny towards our own people and submission to foreigners is surely the same as the old hierarchy. China’s ancient spiritual civilisation has not been destroyed by the ‘Republic’ after all. The Manchus have simply left the feast: that is the only difference from the past... . Our vaunted Chinese civilisation is only a feast of human flesh prepared for the rich and mighty. And China is only the kitchen where these feasts are prepared.

58Cited in Chinnery, “The Influence of Western Literature on Lu Xun’s Diary of a Madman”, 1960, p.315, [Lu Xun quanji, I]. 59Ibid., p. 315. Chinnery cites from Lun Hsun, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 1957, p. 10. 60Ibid., See n. 2, [Lu Xun quanji, 1, 314]. 61Ibid., pp. 314-315. 62Lu Hsun, Lu Hsun, Selected Works, Vol. 2, Translated by Yang Xian Yi and Gladys Yang (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980), p. 155. 63Ibid., p. 153. 322

Those who praise China because they do not know this are excusable, but the rest deserve to be condemned forever!64

He accused the hierarchical system of deadening the people’s feelings for each other. He declared that the hierarchy imposed from ancient times had “estranged men from each other, they cannot feel each other’s pain; and because each can hope to enslave and eat other men, he forgets that he may be enslaved and eaten himself.” He proclaims that from the earliest time of Chinese civilisation “countless feasts - large and small - of human flesh have been eaten” heedless of the cries of the weak. He declares, “Feasts of human flesh are still being spread even now, and many people want them to continue. To sweep away these man-eaters, overturn these features and destroy this kitchen is the task of young folk today!65 However, Lu Hsun realised that even the young were as susceptible

to the same attitudes as their elders. He reflects on his unpleasant memories of the first

May 4th demonstration. He writes, “how politely the military just beat unarmed teachers and students with the butts of their rifles, looking as intrepid as cavalry charging over a field of young shoots, while the students fled with cries of alarm like sheep before tigers or wolves.” If this display was not enough he then observed “students banded together to attack their enemy”. He questions their unruly behaviour and notes, “Did they not also knock down some children they came across? And at school did they not spit at their enemies’ children and force them to run home? Is this not just like the old tyrants’ idea of exterminating whole clans?”66

Lu Hsun’s vision of society appears dark but as he himself stated it was necessary

to look at the facts before a cure could be applied. It was very difficult to examine the

64Ibid., p. 156. 323

social situation in preparation for some solution, because of the prevailing negative

behaviour of people towards each other.

9.2.5. CHINESE SOCIETY AND “THE IRON ROOM”

The vivid imagery of “cannibalism” used to describe the oppressiveness and the loss of order in Chinese society was accompanied by another metaphor: the “high wall” or in some texts the “iron house”. The fetters of the old society had reinforced a hierarchical division of people and on this account Lu Hsun declared things had come to such a pass that the ability to communicate between members was nigh impossible. The

“iron room” metaphor suggests that each member of society was imprisoned and hence prevented from real communication. Lu Hsun was mindful of the lack of awareness of the social and political issues from his contact with those publishing La Jeunesse. An oppressive silence appeared to reign by the failure to arouse any sympathetic interest or even opposition. To describe such an ominous situation Lu Hsun used the phrase the

“iron room”. He reflected, “Supposing there is an iron room which has absolutely no window or door and is impossible to break down. Supposing there are many people fast asleep in this room and they are being gradually suffocated to death. But since they will pass from sleep to death, they will not experience the fears and sorrows of approaching death.” Ironically he asks if the writers of La Jeunesse should raise people from their inertia would not “these unfortunate few suffer the inescapable agonies of death. Do you think that you are doing them a kindness?” On the other hand he thinks, “But if a few should wake up, you cannot say there is absolutely no hope of breaking down the iron room.” Debating thus within himself Lu Hsun came to the conclusion he should

65Ibid., p. 157, “Some notions by the Lamplight”, written in April, 29, 1925. 324

contribute to the paper. “Therefore I ended by promising to write something for him. This

was The Diary of a Madman.”67

Although Lu Hsun complied with his friends’ request for an article, he had strong

reservations of any success. He exhibited the same sense of the hopelessness of the

situation in his essay on the “Great Wall.” He wrote, “I always feel there is a great wall

surrounding us: its material is made of old bricks from ancient times and the new bricks

which have been added reinforce it. These two kinds of things have combined to form a new wall which hems us in.”68 Here Lu Hsun was condemning the feudal laws that

bound society. What was needed was to be more broadminded and open to new ideas,

“to free ourselves from our fetters to appreciate any future genius.”69 He remarked, “The

Chinese always have an air of ego-mania, unfortunately, it is not the ‘ego-mania’ of an

individual but the collective kind of ‘patriotic ego-mania’”.70 Such “collective mania” and “patriotic mania” were negative forces used to forge group unanimity against dissidents, and to declare war against the small minority of the talented. He commented on those in power, “They themselves have no special talents to boast of, so they turn their country into their double image; they elevate its customs and institutions to great heights for praise. In glorifying their national essence they naturally glorify themselves.”71 Lu

Hsun reflected, “Unfortunately China is very hard to change. Just to move a table or

66Ibid., p. 162. 67The quotation is cited by Chi-Chen Wang in “Lusin a Chronological Record”, China Institute Bulletin, 3 (1939), p. 111. It is found in the preface to Lu Hsun’s , “Cheers”. 68Lu Hsun, Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 167. 69Ibid., p. 98. 70Cited in Lee Ou-Fan , Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun, 1987, p.69 [Lu Xun, “Nola zouhou zenyang” (What happens after Nora leaves Home) Fen (The Grave), LXQJ, Vol. 1, p. 163. 71 Lee Ou-Fan, Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun, 1987, p. 69. 325

overhaul a stove probably involves shedding blood; and even so, the change may not get

made. Unless some great whip lashes her on the back, China will never budge.”72

9.2.6. THE DIFFICULTY OF ABANDONING THE OLD ORDER

Lu Hsun increasingly felt that no matter what superficial changes came about,

ultimately in the popular mind the old order would persist. The main problem was that

the reform itself was erected upon the substratum of tradition and could never be

separated from it. The old does not disappear but becomes the foundation for everything

that is later built.73 China’s weakness lay in intellectual and moral terms. Its greatest

deficiency was a lack of sincerity and love between people. The cure required was the

re-establishing of “real men” and then order in society could develop. He said, “We must

honour the individual and free spirit. If this is not done China will wither and die. In the

past China was materialistic and distrustful of genius ... and so destroyed it with

materialism and imprisoned it with mob rule. China’s collapse was thereby hastened.”74

Although Lu Hsun’s picture of Chinese social reality appears harsh his

assessment of the problem had raised new questions. He realised that unless the basic

problem was resolved, which was to allow freedom of expression, nothing, could be

achieved. Lu Hsun’s diagnosis of the deep-seated problem in China is in line with other

great thinkers already referred to. There was Plato who had argued that a periagoge

(turning around) was necessary (Parable of the Cave) and St. Paul’s metanoia (change of mind, nous). Confucius himself had put forward his innovative interpretation of the sage together with his emphasis on the importance of the great virtues (jen, compassion,

72Lu Hsun, Lu Hsun, Selected Works, Vol. 2, 1980, p. 92. 73Lee Ou-fan, ed., Lu Xun and His Legacy (California: University of California Press, 1985), p. 112. Refer to Lin Yu-sheng, “Lu Xun, The Intellectual”, p. 112. Lin Yu-sheng remarks that Lu Hsun’s “nihilism” is different from that of Turgenev and Dostoevsky. 326

chih, conscientiousness, li, relationships and so on).75 Each of these thinkers had

recognised that true order arises only when the individual (to be distinguished from

individualism) is acknowledged. Similarly, Voegelin referred to “the order of the soul”,

and elaborated on Plato’s discovery that the psyche is the site of transcendence. Lu Hsun

and Confucius never referred specifically to “transcendence”; however, they always

recognised the importance of the whole man. Their perception of spiritual reality was not

limited to “moral codes” but included a morality that required the practice of the virtues.

For Lu Hsun, the hope of establishing order in China rested on the principle of allowing

“real men” to develop. Only when this freedom is allowed in society can any real change

arise.76

Lu Hsun’s hope for the future was clouded with pessimism. He was convinced

that no matter what superficial changes came to China ultimately the old order would

prevail. His essay “The Popular Mind” noted that “even after all these years [our]

opinions are still the same. The modern mind is in fact extremely ancient.” Earlier he

had remarked that “although the names are new, the opinions are as they always were

....[The Chinese may] wish to have their skills new, [but] they want their thought to be

old.”77

9.2.7. LU HSUN AND THE CCP

74Lu Hsun, Selected Works, Vol. 2 , “Waiting for a Genius”, pp. 95-99. 75The distinction between “virtues” and “moral code” is made here. The former demands the behaviour of the whole man, that is, knowledge and actions, whereas moral codes can be kept and be considered as conventions of society without any spiritual element being acknowledged. 76Voegelin draws on Toynbee’s term in “In Search of Reason”, in R. Aron, World Technology and Human Destiny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), p. 34. Voegelin writes, that one of the postulates of classical politics is that “the ‘quality’ of society depends on the degree to which the life of reason, actively carried out by a minority of its members, becomes a creative force in that society.” 77Cited in Theodore D. Huters, “Hu Feng and the Critical Legacy of Lu Xun”, [Lu Xun, “Renxin hen gu” (The Popular Mind is ancient), Re feng (Hot Wind ) Lu Xun quanji (Complete Works, 1981, Vol. 1 3352] in Lee Ou-fan, Legacy, p. 131. 327

Because there is some confusion regarding Lu Hsun’s political stance it is

necessary to look at Lu Hsun’s position in relation to the CCP. His literary destiny has

irrevocably been bound up with the Communist ideology even though he distanced

himself from party politics in his lifetime. Goldman declares that, “Ironically the great

revolutionary was praised by Mao Tse-tung and his party. Lu Hsun adopted a rather

sceptical attitude toward revolution. His deeply rooted scepticism expressed more than seven decades ago is today proving highly insightful”. Goldman argues that Lu Hsun’s thought has been distorted by the CCP to fit their own political slant. “Like the traditional

Chinese dynasties, the Communist Party has often used famous figures for its own political purposes. And, more than any other person in the twentieth century, perhaps, the

Party has used the prestige of China’s pre-eminent modern writer, Lu Xun, for a wide variety of political, ideological, and factional purposes.”78 Goldman points out that the

Party since Lu Hsun died in October 1936 has reinterpreted his life many times to justify

their various changes of policy. His work has been twisted to reflect values that were

foreign to him. The Party used his work as a blueprint of the Communist future.79 Yet as

Goldman notes, “At the end of his life he fiercely criticised the Party organisation in

Shanghai as well as the Guomingdong but he has been presented as an obedient follower

of both the Party and Mao.” The Party opposed the idea that literature was a weapon with

which to fight injustice, inequality, and government wrongdoing.80

Lu Hsun’s association with the Revolutionary Left began in late 1932; and this

was only to encourage the young to do something for their country, which was being

78Merle Goldman, “The Political Use of Lu Xun in the Cultural Revolution and After,” in Lu Xun and His Legacy, 1985, p.180. 79Ibid. 80Ibid., pp. 180- 181. 328

divided up by the Great Western Powers and at the same time being invaded by the

Japanese. The hope for China was bleak. The deeper problem for Lu Hsun lay in

changing the national character.

Several decades after Lu Hsun’s death his aspirations for change in Chinese

attitudes were fulfilled only to the extent that the old society was destroyed by the

Communist party; but his old fears were realised. The socialist revolution largely

equated the transition of power from one “emperor” to another, but did not alter the

fundamental political structure.81Mao compared himself to the Ch’in emperor82 and exercised power in the same totalitarian fashion. Commenting on the turn of events, Lu

Tonglin states, “Ironically, cultural nihilism in this case has literally led to a repetition of history in its most conservative and regressive aspect, the imperial system.”83

The Chinese have been slaves of the emperor and his officials: with the coming of

the Communists they have become slaves for a second time. The deep seated problem

that Lu Hsun so clearly articulated still remained. The creative minority still do not have

a voice. Goldman points to a speech made in 1981, by the journalist Wang Ruoshui who

characterised the Cultural Revolution as a “gigantic catastrophe for our party and our

people.” Wang asked, as did others, how it was possible for just a few people, led by

Mao, to throw a great nation of 800 million people ... into such utter chaos? He pointed out that the root of the problem rested in the anti-rightist campaign. He stated, “From that time on many intellectuals no longer dared to speak and to criticise shortcomings in

81Lu Tonglin, Misogyny, Cultural Nihilism, and Oppositional Politics, Contemporary Chinese Experimental Fiction (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 17. See n. 51, where Lu Tonglin cites Harrison Salisbury, The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston: Little Brown, 1992). 82Ibid., p. 26. See n. 4, where Lu Tonglin cites , “Qingyuan chun:xue” (Snow), in Shici. 83Ibid. 329

the party’s work” and that, “speaking out was treated as a crime.” Wang Ruoshui argues

that failure to speak out constitutes a problem in China to the present day. “That the

masses dare not criticise the party is very harmful to the party and is very dangerous.”84

Goldman remarks that Wang Ruoshui became a strong advocate of human rights

in 1988. He [Ruoshui] stated, “Why could such a situation of an individual reigning

above the law, his authority crushing everything, happen in the Soviet Union and again

in China, but could not happen in countries like England, France and the United

States?”85 Wang Ruoshui argued that to attribute the problem to the cult of personality

alone was an insufficient answer since it was the system itself that was responsible. The

system had encouraged the suppression of peoples’ rights because “systems change people”.86

9.3. POINTS OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN LU HSUN AND VOEGELIN

To analyse the underlying malaise in Chinese political order some meeting points

between Lu Hsun and Voegelin are highlighted. Even though Lu Hsun’s work has to

some extent been hijacked by the Communist Party there is a renewed interest in his

thought. The reason is that what he had to say is of perennial concern for all. By

perennial interest is meant something that pertains to human nature, no matter what time

or place: his work is profoundly concerned with man’s tension in existence. It is on this

84 Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 51-52, n. 52. Goldman cites Wang Ruoshui, “An Important Lesson of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ Is That We Must Oppose the Personality Cult,” Jing bao (March 1989), pp. 66-69, JPRS-C, no. 89078, July, 1989, p. 4. See also, Goldman, Sowing the Seeds, 1994, p. 250. 85Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era, 1994, p. 250, see n. 48. 86Ibid., pp. 250-251. Goldman refers to Rong Jian who in late 1988 believed that “Chinese intellectuals were spiritually destroyed ...by the transformation of the world outlook that went on for years... As a result, they came to believe that they [were] not critics, but somebody to be criticised”. Goldman 330

level that several points of convergence between Voegelin and Lu Hsun can be drawn.

The most pertinent relate to the fact that each thinker insisted on the need for a full

potential of human participation in the full structure of reality. Voegelin insisted on the

need to recognise the transcendent dimension in human existence. Lu Hsun was acutely

aware of the need for the spiritual only to the extent that he saw the need for society to

allow freedom for the creative spirit of man in order to influence the open society.87 To explore this insight in more depth the discussion examines three themes: first, the importance of a disinterested criticism of society; second the image of the “intellectual disease” (“spiritual disease” - Voegelin); and third, the comparison of society to that of an “iron house” (“closed society” - Voegelin).

9.3.1. LU HSUN: A CRITIQUE OF SOCIETY

Both Lu Hsun and Voegelin insisted on the need for the critic of society to be fearless. Lu Hsun, the social realist, had stated that “in times of crisis the writer must above all be a fearless critic of society, tough and honest” and that “the brave man draws his sword against the strong; the coward goes against the weak.” He contended that “not only must the writer dare to call a prostitute a prostitute and a hero a hero but he must also challenge those who would make the prostitute a hero and the hero a prostitute.” 88

For him, “The writer’s task is to react and fight back immediately against what is

comments, “They had lost their role not only as critics of the government but also as spokesmen for the people”. See n. 53. 87Chinnery, “The Influence of Western Literature on Lu Xun’s Diary of a Madman”, 1960, p. 320. Chinnery points out that Lu Hsun saw the struggle against society largely in individual terms, an idea commonplace in traditional literature. Although the idea of a sharp contradiction between the individual and society was emphasised in literature there was also the situation where the non-conforming scholar could be forced into a position of isolation. 88 Harriet C. Mills, “Lu Xun: Literature and Revolution - From Mara to Marx”, in Merle Goldman, Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era, 1977, p. 220. 331

harmful...to resist and attack.”89He took his writing seriously and held that, “Works

which are opiates will perish along with those who administer or take narcotics. The

essays which live on must be daggers and javelins which, with their readers, can hew out

a bloodstained path to a new life.”90He readily criticised those who would make light of

the problems of society under the form of and warned that in China “humour

must become satire directed against society or degenerate into ... common

joking.”91Such an attitude he considered reprehensible, for it avoided reality and was an

abdication of social responsibility.92

He also insisted that the writer’s task is to react and fight back against injustice.

The writer should expose injustice and tear down the mask of righteousness. As Mills remarks on Lu Hsun’s intensity, “His own work made him shudder because it was like the ‘cry of an owl reporting things of ill omen’; the more correct the report, the more disastrous for China. It was like a losing game. So, like a street peddler of rusty nails and broken crocks, he simply ‘spread out’ his zawen (essays) hoping someone would find something useful. They were expendable”. His views shifted through the years but he was always “true to himself.”93

89 Mills, “Lu Xun: Literature and Revolution - From Mara to Marx”, in Merle Goldman, Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era, 1977, p. 218. She writes that his criticism of society extended to topics such as “public policy, particularly Guomindong censorship, government terror and the policy of non- resistance to Japan. There were also subsidiary themes - defects in the Chinese character, the government’s attempted revival of Confucianism, and the classical language and the popular reaction to it.” His aspirations were strong because he wished “to help those who are working to benefit the Chinese masses.” 90Quotation from Mills “Lu Xun: Literature and Revolution - From Mara to Marx”, p. 220. 91Ibid. 92Ibid. 93Ibid. 332

Lu Hsun undeviatingly pursued the problem of the “Chinese national character.”

He was well aware that centuries of oppression from Confucianism together with

despotic governments had so moulded the Chinese character that he felt it was impossible

to change. He made it clear that he did not reject Confucian ideology only to replace it

with other ideologies, even Marxism. Chinese attitudes must change from a slave

mentality to what he called “real men”. Lu Hsun criticised the lack of an interior self

(what in his parable of Ah Q94he called a slave mentality) which means one who only

lives by “instinct” or passions. He argued that unless there was a modicum of self

awareness (the Confucian teaching of self-cultivation of the virtues) there would be no

change. Lu Hsun held that “the superior man (chun tzu) in the true Confucian sense, as

referred to earlier, is one seeking true humanness, jen. At the same time, he also

carefully emphasised that his philosophy of the “individual” was not a program of selfish

indulgence but a philosophy to free the individual’s creative potential.95 He stressed the

teaching of Confucius (jen, altruism) and opposed selfish indulgence.96 He also

recognised the superiority of the intellectual/spiritual element of man over the material,

as did Confucius; he sought not merely speculative knowledge but that wisdom which leads to self-cultivation and the good of others.

9.3.2. VOEGELIN’S CRITIQUE OF SOCIETY

94Refer to Irene Eber, “Reception of Lu Xun in Europe and America”, in Lee Ou-Fan, Lu Xun and His Legacy, 1985, p.269. “The figure of Ah Q reflects Chinese reality and represents the high point of typicalness in modern Chinese literature”. 95Mills, “Lu Xun: Literature and Revolution-From Mara to Marx”, 1977, p. 191. 96Ibid., Mills writes that his philosophy was aimed to “free the creative potential of men like Stiner, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Ibsen, and especially Nietzsche. To hamper the free development of such genius spelled disaster, because these rebellious, dissatisfied, and searching minds not only hastened the demolition of the past’s outmoded processes but pointed the way forward to new stages in man’s ever evolving struggle.”.. . “What was true in philosophical terms was true for literature”. 333

Lu Hsun’s critique of society takes a comprehensive view of society. Voegelin

also insisted that the philosopher must be one who resists disorder in society in his

attempt to develop right order in his soul.97 He too argued that resistance against disorder

was not merely against the system of government or against structures of society but

against forces that deform the spirit and dignity of the human being. Resistance to this

disorder includes opposition to those ideological forces that continue to reduce human

nature to the material level only and fail to acknowledge the full structure of reality. It is

in this sense that Voegelin’s analysis is illuminating. “Philosophy” as Voegelin

understood it has its origin in the resistance of the soul to its destruction by society. This philosophy is an act of resistance illumined by conceptual understanding.98 Hence the

philosopher is one who is in opposition to the .99 The philosopher struggles

against the forces of destruction in society which are alien to the true order of existence.100

9.3.3 THE “SPIRITUAL DISEASE”

The second point of convergence is that both writers referred to an intellectual/

spiritual “disease.” Lu Hsun in his diagnosis of the nature of the Chinese character had

97Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, p. 69. See also Autobiographical Reflections, 1989, p. 93. Voegelin writes, “The term philosophy does not stand alone but gains its meaning from its opposition to the predominant philodoxy. Problems of justice are developed in the abstract but in opposition to wrong conceptions of justice, which in fact reflect the injustice current in the environment. The character of the Philosopher himself gains its specific meaning through its opposition to that of the Sophist, who engages in misconstructions of reality for the purpose of gaining social ascendance and material profits.” (p.94). 98Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, p. 69 99Ibid., pp. 68-69. 100Ibid., Voegelin refers to The Republic and sees this as pointing to the necessity of recognising that for order to be restored, “the restoration must be at the strategic point of the “ignorance of the soul” by setting aright the relation between man and God. ... On the level of conceptual symbols, Plato expresses his insight through the principle that society is man written in larger letters” (368d-e). 334

referred to this as an “intellectual disease” (ssu-hsiang shang ti ping).101 He used the

image as a medical analogy, and elaborated on the idea by extending it to that terrible

congenital disease of the human body, syphilis. He referred to the Chinese character as

one moulded by “dark and confusing ideas” (hun-luan ssu-hsiang).102Lin Yu-sheng comments, the image may seem crude, unfair, and even quite bizarre to one not involved in the May Fourth iconoclastic movement, but to Lu Hsun the image “not only conveyed, through the analogy of the organic effect of syphilis on the human body, his conception of the organismic effect of the intellectual disease on the Chinese people, but

also expressed his horror and disgust about the very nature of the Chinese people.”103The intellectual disease had affected people like syphilis, in every sphere of activity, and made Chinese tradition, which itself was the product of these activities, totally abhorrent for him. Even if the Chinese managed a new start it was uncertain whether they would be able to rid themselves of the “dark and confusing elements in the blood vessels.”104The character of a people once formed was difficult to change; the important thing was the will for change,105 which can be achieved by “wiping out the dark and

confusing ideas” in the minds of the people. He referred to “the books of Confucianism

and Taoism which helped to spread darkness and confusion.”106

9.3.4 VOEGELIN’S ANALYSIS OF THE “SPIRITUAL DISEASE”

In a similar way Voegelin had used the phrase “spiritual disease.” He explains:

101Lun Yu-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, 1979, p.117. See n. 28. 102Ibid., p. 116. 103Ibid., p.117. 104Ibid., see n. 29. 105cf periagoge, Gk. a turning around, Plato’s term for the cognitive and moral orientation toward the True and the Good as such. 106Lin Yu-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, p. 117. See n. 31 [Lu Hsun “Sui-kan lu san-shih- pa.” HCn,5,5:17,or Je-feng, LHCC,1:390]. 335

Society can destroy a man’s soul because the disorder of society is a disease in the psyche of its members. The troubles which the philosopher experiences in his own soul are the troubles in the psyche of the surrounding society which press on him. And the diagnosis of health and disease in the soul is, therefore, at the same time a diagnosis of order and disorder in society.107

Voegelin argued that disorder in society has its roots in the psyche of man and therefore to regain order in society it is necessary to restore the health of the soul. The “health of

the soul” is explained in The Republic, in a dialogue which expounds the just life of the

individual. The dialogue is enlarged to “become an inquiry into order and disorder in

society, because the state of the individual psyche, in health or disease, expresses itself in

the corresponding state of society.”108The word “disease” is qualified by the term

“spiritual” (Voegelin) or “intellectual” (Lu Hsun). A spiritual disease in Voegelin’s

exposition refers to the loss of the life of reason. Lu Hsun’s use of “intellectual disease”

refers to an absence of moral orientation by the individual in the political life of society.

The explanation of the “disease” relates to the loss of righteousness (chih), humanness

(jen), conscientiousness (chung) and altruism. Without “the life of reason” or Confucian

sage-virtues the order of the soul and the order of society cannot be realised.

9.3.5. LU HSUN AND THE “GREAT WALL”

The presence of the “intellectual /spiritual disease” is connected to the third

notion which is the “closed society” (Voegelin) or the “iron house” (Lu Hsun). Lu Hsun

was deeply conscious of the cultural and hierarchical division that existed in Chinese

society. It was not only between rich and poor but between male and female, young and

old, the rulers and the people. In fact, the “walls” had become so fixed that society could

107Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, p. 69. 108Ibid., p. 70. 336 be likened to an “iron house”, an image which conjures up a society oppressive to the point of suffocation of spirit.109

109William Lyell, translater, Lu Xun, Diary of a Madman and other Stories (Honolulu: University Press, 1990), p. xxiv. Refer also to Chiu-yee Cheung, “Beyond east and west: Lu Xun’s apparent ‘Iconoclasm’ and his understanding of the problem of Chinese traditional culture”, Journal of Oriental Society of Australia , 20 & 21 (1988-89), pp. 1-20. 337

9.3.6. VOEGELIN AND THE CLOSED SOCIETY

There has already been some discussion in Chapter 7 on what Voegelin meant by a “closed society”. A closed society occurs when all the essential substances, such as organism, person and society are closed.110He explains that society is closed when the reality of the transcendent dimension (Plato’s Good, Thomas Aquinas’ Being) is dismissed from public consciousness. Then the national spirit becomes entirely focused on itself. Voegelin argues that an extreme form of this is manifested in communism, fascism or national socialism.111The process of closure can be drawn out over centuries.

The long- term consequence is that in such a society the creative potential of the individual is stifled to the point that noetic reason can never flourish as an ordering force in society.112

In his essay “Equivalence of Experience and Symbolisation of Order,” Voegelin claimed that “what is permanent in the history of mankind is not the symbols but man himself in search of his humanity and his order.”113Lu Hsun was very conscious of the existential state of the “Chinese man” as evoked in his penetrating writings which were

110Voegelin, “Growth of the Race Idea”, 1940, p. 303. 111Ibid., pp. 306-7. He elaborates the stages: The first step in this direction is taken with the idea of state sovereignty setting up every political unit as closed within itself, not recognising a common transcendental power centre, overshadowing them all, as did the power theory of Dante. A second step is the idea that the legally and politically closed unit should be closed economically, too, an idea which was worked out most elaborately in Fichte’s Closed Commercial State. And the third step is taken when the political unit is supposed to be also a spiritually closed unit having as its living force a national spirit, much as the organism has its ‘formative urge’ (Blumenbach), or the personality its ‘demon’ (Goethe), or ‘energy’ (Carus). 112People are regarded merely as “masses” or expendable commodities. Zhi Sui-li wrote that in a meeting with Nehru, “Mao considered the atom bomb a ‘paper tiger’ and that he was willing that China lose millions of people in order to emerge victorious against the so-called imperialists. ‘The atom bomb is nothing to be afraid of, China has many people. They cannot be bombed out of existence. If someone else can drop an atomic bomb, I can too. The deaths of ten or twenty million people is nothing to be afraid of.’ Nehru was shocked”. Refer to Zhi Sui-li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994), p.125. 338

critical of the social order in China. The problem, he argued, could only be solved by a

spiritual renewal of the individual.

Lu Hsun’s perception of reality is similar to Confucius’s approach in a respect for

“heaven” (T’ien), but that is all. However, indirectly he argued that China had need of

something to move from the “broken images” of the past to some spiritual renewal. In

his essay on the “European man” he argued that “the complex origins of the splendour

and power of European civilisation” is found in “a monistic factor”, that is, “the nature of

European man.”114Lu Hsun perceptively recognised the need for the potential of the

individual to be allowed to act as an ordering force in society. Hence his reference to

“European man”. He was acutely aware of the difficulty of implementing principles of

democracy and human rights in a political structure which appeared to have lost the

essence of its national character. He saw only a society where “people eat people”, ch’ih

jen.

9.4. LU HSUN’S CHINESE WORLD VIEW

Some commentators question why Lu Hsun’s thought never quite broke free

from the particularity of his Chinese world view. Lin Yu-sheng writes that the Chinese

world view gives emphasis to the idea of the unity of Heaven and man (tianren heyi).115

Transcendent reality in the Chinese context is understood as immanent in the cosmos, of

113Voegelin, “Equivalences of Experience and Symbolisation in History”, in Published Essays,1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 115. 114Lin Yu-sheng, “The Complex Consciousness of Lu Hsun”, in The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, 1979, p. 113. See n. 20 [Lu Hsun, “wen-hua p’ien-chih lun”. Fen, LHCC,1:193]. 115This aspect was examined at length in thesis, Section 8. 2. 339

which man is an integral part. The transcendent is never separated from the cosmos

which is a specifically Chinese view.116Lin Yu-sheng explains:

The Confucian conception of the unity of Heaven and man (or the unity of the mind of Tao and the mind of man) entails that transcendental meaning is immanent in human life and is to be found by human effort rather than created by human will and thinking. The Confucian man is not separated from the cosmos; the Tao has both an objective aspect in the cosmos and a subjective aspect in man’s mind. Since man, whose nature partakes of the Tao (or Heaven), is endowed with innate moral and intellectual energy and judgement by which he can recognise the meaning of Tao in the cosmos his effort to find meaning will never be an alienated act - an effort solely within the subjective self in confrontation with a blind and meaningless world.117

The idea of merging is a determining element in Lu Hsun’s consciousness;118and although he recognised the importance of the individual his strong link to the cosmological experience seems to impede him from moving out of this mould. Thomas

Metzger observes that in Neo-Confucian thought there is conjoining between the external world and the individual’s consciousness.119 He points to the idea of merging of

consciousness and the external world in Lu Hsun where “the self oscillated erratically

between the status of a victim and that of demigod. The self had immense capabilities, but they could be exercised only in a slippery cosmic arena.”120Metzger’s reference to the “slippery cosmic area” emphasises the absence of differentiation between the transcendent and immanent in Lu Hsun’s thought.

116 Western thought in classical and Christian philosophy makes a clear distinction between transcendence and immanence. 117Lin Yu-sheng, “The Morality of Mind and Immorality of Politics: Reflections on Lu Xun, the Intellectual”, in Lee Ou-fan, Lu Xun and His Legacy ( Berkeley, University of Calif. Press, 1985), p.115. 118See thesis Section 7.2. on Voegelin’s use of “substance”. Refer also to Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 1952, pp. 76-77. 119See reference to Thomas Metzger, Escape from Predicament, Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 134, in Theodore Huters, “Blossoms in the Snow: Lu Xun and the Dilemma of Modern Chinese Literature”, Modern China, 10 (1984), p. 49. 120 Cited in Huters, “Blossoms in the Snow, Lu Xun and the Dilemma of Modern Chinese Literature”, Modern China, 10 (1984), p. 49. 340

9.4.1. LU HSUN’S TENTATIVE BREAKTHROUGH

Although Lu Hsun’s experience of reality still retained its cosmological

characteristics he appears to have moved tentatively towards the anthropological type of

truth121as did Confucius, with his comprehensive recogition of the potential of the

human being. In this respect Lu Hsun’s work should be regarded as an “achievement of

consciousness.”122His struggle, bordering on despair at times, arose not only from the

political situation which offered little hope for renewal from the traditionalists who had

supported the Emperor; the KMT who were corrupt and self-seeking, in fact were a new

breed of warlords, or the Communists. His despair in fact was rooted in the acute

realisation that the youths who supported the CCP were not going to prevail because the

core of the problem lay in the national character. Lu Hsun could see the enigma acutely

but his “despair” overshadowed any hope to redeem the situation. The key point in

understanding Lu Hsun lay in the fact that he understood China had exhausted its

“substance”.

From this examination of Lu Hsun’s thought in the framework of Voegelin’s

analysis of order I would argue that Lu Hsun’s brilliance is exhibited in his willingness to

recognise that Chinese substance was exhausted and it was imperative to look for

something new. Political ideology was devoid of real creativity and power to change the

deficiency of the national character. There was a persistent pattern, the imperial rule, the war lords, then the KMT and finally the Communists. Even the behaviour exhibited by

121See Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 1952, p. 70. The anthropological principle refers to man as the measure of society because God is the measure of his soul (Plato and Aristotle). 122Voegelin uses the idea of “advance”, “leap of being” or “achievement” in relation to consciousness not in a progressivist sense but in a philosophical sense of differentiation of the three “human types”: cosmological, anthropological and soteriological. 341

the young students revealed latent tendencies to “eat men” and so Lu Hsun’s illumination

of the problem of society appeared “dark” indeed.

It must be observed that Lu Hsun’s concern for China was of a Confucian

character displayed in the significance he gave to renewing the national character - the

chun tzu notion. He lucidly realised that three thousand years of civilisation had not

made any impression on the nature of man. He appeared to be pointing to the need in

China for a “spiritual revolution”.

The phrase a “leap in being” is useful here. Why did a “leap in being” not appear in the Chinese experience? Although Lu Hsun himself never used the phrase, I would argue that he was grappling with the need for China to move towards the anthropological

human type. (Hence his oblique reference to the monistic European human type.) It was

not his desire for an utopian vision of a new world of the communists - a so-called

“paradise” but the recognition that the problem lay in renewing the substance of the soul.

9.5. CHINA TODAY- THE OPPRESSIVE NATURE OF SOCIETY

The present state of China perpetuates the loss of order. Ho Ping-ti observed that

in spite of the loquacity of Western-trained Chinese intellectuals, Western democratic

thoughts and institutions have never really found a place in twentieth century China

except for Marxism-Leninism. This ideology “not only fits China’s unbroken tradition of

autocracy but has helped to make the Maoist state more authoritarian than ever

before.”123 Ho Ping-ti elaborates :

First, the prevailing of the civilian idea in traditional Chinese government administration should not blind us to the hard fact that every dynasty was founded on military strength or by the transference of military power.... But the success

123 Ho Ping-ti, “Salient Points of China’s Heritage”, in Ho Ping-ti and Tsou Tang eds., China in Crisis: China’s Heritage and the Communist Political System, Vol. 1. (1968), pp. 1-37 and p.15. 342

and duration of a dynasty depended primarily on the ability of the founder and his successors to keep the imperial army effectively centrally controlled and to design various institutional checks by which to forestall the rise of regional military contenders. From the dawning of the first empire in 221 B.C. to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 there had not been a single exception....

In contrast to the weakness of European monarchies which aided the rise of democracy, the persistent historical fact is that the Chinese state has always derived its ultimate power from the army, and this has largely predetermined its authoritarian character.124

On this sombre note the discussion concludes, for while economic rationalism may

successfully prevail in some pockets in China, for the vast majority life has changed little

politically or economically. The absence of the anthropological human type is also

evident in Taiwan. The progress towards Lu Hsun’s vision of reality is slow, as one

Chinese writer imprisoned for nine years found to his cost when he did “speak out.”125

In a critique reminiscent of Lu Hsun, Bo Yang states:

Actually, the Chinese in China are worse off today than they were in the nineteenth century. The most depressing thing is now, over the past hundred years, almost every hope that the Chinese people have embraced has gone up in smoke. And whenever a fresh hope appears on the horizon, promising some improvement in people’s lives, it invariably ends up causing them great disappointment and making the situation worse. And when another hope appears, promising similar progress, it too ends up bringing in its wake only further disillusionment, greater disappointment and more horrendous disasters.126

Not only have foreigners bullied us; what is worse, for centuries we’ve been tormented by our own kind - from tyrannical emperors to despotic officials and ruthless mobs.127

124 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 125Bo Yang, The Ugly Chinaman. And the Crisis of Chinese Culture (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991). In the Preface, Bo Yang writes, “In the 1960’s, I wrote a number of newspaper columns in which I criticised various inequalities and injustices in Taiwan society. Because of what I wrote the Kuomingtang government accused me of being a ‘communist spy’, jailed me, and attempted to get a military tribunal to sentence me to death.” Bo Yang was released from prison in 1970. 126Ibid., p. 5. 127Ibid., p. 7. 343

Why must Chinese people who have the guts to speak the truth suffer so terribly? I have asked a number of people from the mainland why they ended up in prison. Their answer was, ‘Because I said a few things that happened to be true’. And that’s the way it is. But why does telling the truth land one up in such unfortunate circumstances? The way I see it, this is not a personal problem, but a fundamental flaw in Chinese culture.128

We Chinese should neither blame our parents nor our ancestors, but rather the culture that our ancestors have bequeathed us. This huge country with one quarter of the world’s population, is a pit from which it cannot extricate itself. When one observes the way people in other countries carry on interpersonal relations, I envy them. The traditional culture of China has conferred upon the Chinese a wide range of unseemly characteristics.129

The underlying question remained, as Lu Hsun wrote: “Since the revolutionaries

will replace the old rulers in a revolution, why should the people trust their new rulers more than the old if human beings in power cannot surrender their possessive nature?”130

128Ibid., p. 8. 129Ibid., p. 10. 130Lu Tonglin, Misogyny, Cultural Nihilism, and Oppositional Politics, Contemporary Chinese Experimental Fiction, 1995, p. 17. See n. 50. 344

He wrote:

Revolution, counter-revolution, non-revolution. The revolutionaries are killed by counter-revolutionaries. The counter-revolutionaries are killed by the revolutionaries. The non-revolutionaries are sometimes taken from revolutionaries and killed by the counter-revolutionaries, sometimes taken for counter-revolutionaries and killed by revolutionaries, and sometimes killed by either the revolutionaries or the counter-revolutionaries for no apparent reason at all. Revolution, revolution, revolution... .131

131 Lu Hsun’s “Little Observation” (hsiao tsa-kan) is cited by Chi-Chen Wang in “Lusin: A Chronological Record, 1881-1936”, China Institute Bulletin, 3 (1939), p. 119. Voegelin describes the problem of “revolution” as a movement. He states:

Betrachten wir die Grundbegriffe. Aristoteles spricht von einer metabole oder kinesis der Gesellschaft, d. h. von Bewegungen und Umstürzen einer relativ dauerhaften, etablierten Ordnung. Er fragt sich, warum eine relativ stabile, balancierte Ordnung in Unordnung gerät; denn wenn mandie Ursachen der Störung kennt, dann kann man möglicherweise institutionelle Rezepte entwickeln, um die Unordnumg zu verhindern. Die Problemstellung ist also primär pragmatisch. Unordnung nun entsteht im allgemeinen durch Stasis. Der Begriff wird gewöhnlich als Revoltion übersetzt. Das ist nicht nur falsch, sondern verdunkelt einen wichtigen ProzeI. Denn Stasis bedeutet Feststellen order Sich-Feststellen. Wenn jemand sich in einer Position verhärtet und dem geschmeidigen Zusammenspiel der Gesellschaft Widerstand leistet, dann gerät die Ordnung in Unordnung. Denn in der Reaktion auf die Verhärtung der einen Position verhärten sich andere als Gegenpostionen; es entstehen die Konflikte, die zu Umstürzen führen. Das Problem der Verhärtung steht im Zentrum der Revolutionstheorie - Institutionen beginnen zu vertfallen, wenn aus dem einen oder anderen Grunde der VerhärtungsprozeI einsetzt.

[Trans: Let us consider the fundamental principles. Aristotle speaks of a metabole or kinesis of society, i.e. of movements and of a relatively permanent, established order. He wonders why a relatively stable, balanced order falls into disorder; for when one knows the causes of the disturbance, one can possibly develop institutional formulae to prevent the disorder. Thus the framing of the problem is primarily pragmatic. Disorder originates through stasis. The principle is usually translated as revolution. That is not only wrong, but it also obscures an important process, because stasis means confirming, or confirming oneself, i.e. self-confirmation. When someone becomes obdurate in a position and opposes the team effort of the society, then order falls into disorder; because as a reaction against the obduracy of the one position, others become obdurate as a counterposition; conflicts arise which lead to revolutions. The problem of obduracy is the centrepoint of the theory of revolution - institutions begin to decline when, for one reason or another, the obduracy process sets in. Refer to Eric Voegelin, “Der Mensch in Gesellschaft und Gesschichte”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 14 (1964), p. 6. [Trans. Rosemary van Openbosch]. 345

CONCLUSION

I have examined the life of reason from the perspective of Eric Voegelin’s thought.

He understood the life of reason as “a new luminosity of existential order”.1 It was

Voegelin’s contention that “the life of reason” was displaced by “the climate of opinion”

which has dominated philosophy for the last two hundred years or more. Since the

appearance of the Enlightenment emphasis has been given to rational action as expressed

in the sciences, the development of technology and pragmatic rationalisation.

Consequently the life of reason has been reduced to rational activity understood merely

as a principle of science. Noetic reason, which includes consciousness of God (the

ground of being), the cosmos, the fragility of human existence, immortality and

mortality, was dismissed as irrelevant.

In order to examine the life of reason I began by exploring in Chapter 1 the

background and influences which led Voegelin to his particular philosophical development.

Chapter 2 considered the gradual recognition that post-Enlightenment philosophy had

reduced the life of reason to rationalisation. A turning point came when Voegelin arrived at

the realisation that what was needed was a theory of consciousness, if the full structure of

reality was to be restored.

Chapter 3 reflected on Voegelin’s insight into the thought of Plato and Aristotle.2

The classical writers had made a great advance in understanding consciousness when they

1 Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 266. 2 See Voegelin, “Wisdom and Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 352. Voegelin wrote, “Plato rather than any of the great figures in Egyptian, Persian, Hindu, or Chinese civilizations stand en arche of our present problems, because his Vision has revealed the noetic core of questing consciousness, and because his articulation of the vision has created insights into the 346

acknowledged that the psyche is the site of transcendence. The philosophy of Plato and

Aristotle together developed a science of the nature of man. This to Voegelin was one of the

great achievements of Western civilisation. He wrote: “The effort of the Greeks to arrive at

an understanding of their humanity has culminated in the Platonic-Aristotelian creation

of philosophy as the science of man.”3 In his discussion on Platonic-Aristotelian

philosophy Voegelin elucidated the life of reason. In the essay, “Reason: The Classic

Experience”,4 Voegelin considered the discovery of “reason” by the Hellenic

philosophers a turning point in the history of consciousness of humans. He pointed out

that Plato used daimonios aner, “spiritual man”, to refer to the philosopher who

possessed noetic reason, whereas Aristotle used spoudaios or “mature man”. The

Classical philosophers’ discovery of noesis laid down a foundational principle of order in

Western civilisation. Voegelin explained that Plato especially was very much aware that

man, in his tension toward the ground of existence, was open toward reality.

The fourth chapter explored the radical shift of consciousness that took place in

noetic reason in the Judaeo-Christian experience. The transcendent dimension was

experienced in a new way. A “leap in being”5 took place. The major feature of this shift was

manifested by the intensity of the experience of the divine which overwhelmed the soul of

Moses. A more intense experience occurred in the Christian experience with the presence of

the spirit of Christ [pneuma]. The writer of the Letter to the Colossians had used the term theotes to express the Christian experience of divine reality. The new experience was to

noetic core which have remained constant in the Western process of philosophizing, even if they are honoured as frequently by deformative action as by noetic reenactment and elaboration.” 3Eric Voegelin, “On Classical Studies” in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, p. 258. 4Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, in Published Essays, 1966-1985, Vol. 12, 1990, pp. 265- 291. 5Voegelin, Order and History, Israel and Revelation, Vol. 1, 1956, pp. 9-10. 347 influence the development of Western consciousness and in turn shape the type of order that was to predominate order in Western society. Ideally order was based on the principle that man is the measure of the polis and God is the measure of man.

The fifth chapter drew attention to the role of mysticism in preserving noetic knowledge in Western thought when noesis was attacked by contentious dogmatism. Two thinkers, Jean Bodin by his notion of vera religio, and Henri Bergson with his idea of the

“open soul”, had recognised the importance that noesis played in creating order in society.

Rather than restricting consciousness to dogmatic or conceptual knowledge, they acknowledged that a spiritual principle was necessary to lift human consciousness from dogmatic (Bodin) or expansionist (Bergson) thinking to generate order in society. These thinkers, according to Voegelin, are isolated examples of scholars who did not succumb to reductionism. I have also discussed the role of concepts in mysticism to point to the connection between the life of reason and the theological virtues in the works of St. John of the Cross and St. Thomas Aquinas.

The sixth chapter examined the symbol homonoia, a notion embedded in Western history going back as far as Heraclitus. Plato and Aristotle recognised the significance of homonoia. The same symbol was picked up by Alexander the Great and used in his speech at the Banquet of Opis to signify a sense of universality. In the Christian era, the symbol was used by Paul to express Christian unity. Voegelin understood the important connection of the divine Nous to man’s nous, hence homo-noia. Homonoia indicates a type of unity that has the potential to transcend boundaries - race, ethnic origins and other divisive particularities.

Homonoia remained an underlying principle present in political order in the West until the post-Enlightenment period. 348

However, the delicate balance of consciousness was always subject to challenge from those who could not face the full dimension of reality. Chapter 7, shows how

Voegelin’s analysis is effective in examining those who dismiss the transcendent from the order of human existence. This type of thinking has given rise to what Voegelin calls

“destructive forces” or gnosticism in western society. Gnostic thought generates a false consciousness when an attempt is made to change the order of reality and set up a new

“world”. When these forces are unleashed, order in society is left open to the dominance of ideologies. To some extent the Church had acted as a buffer against the destructive, gnostic forces. Yet the Church had failed to take a firm stand at the Reformation, hence a new form of Christianity arose termed by Voegelin “eschatological”. This new type of Christianity rejected the substance of Christianity and opened the way for ideologies to take root in

Western civilisation. These destructive forces tore apart the former order which had been based on the Hellenist and Judaeo-Christian foundational principles.

The order of society formerly based on Classical and Christian notions was now diminished. Nominalism dismissed the transcendent. The loss of noetic reason was accompanied by the loss of homonoia. The new order reflected the consciousness of the age which was influenced by thinkers such as Hobbes, and later Dewey and Giddings. Hobbes’ idea of order was based on the “” whereas Dewey and Giddings put forward ideas of order expressed by terms such as “community of kind”, or “consciousness of group”. When the life of reason lost its transcendent dimension, reason became “empirical reason”, “practical reason” and “rationalisation”.

The last two chapters examined the life of reason in the context of China. The aim was to examine equivalent structures that appear present in the life of reason as understood 349

in the West. Chapter 8 examined the Confucian sage notion (chun tzu) which pointed to

consciousness as an ordering principle. The Confucian understanding of chun tzu manifested

a consciousness that broke from the former ritual order of the Shang. The Confucian

understanding emphasised the responsibility of the individual and in this way opened the

way for a new form of order in Chinese society. Voegelin declared that Confucius’ teachings on the chun tzu constituted a “brilliant breakthrough” from the earlier mythic thought in

which man and gods can merge to a new awareness of autonomous responsibility of self. At the same time, Voegelin recognised that the Confucian sage notion was never allowed to become an ordering principle in Chinese society due to the oppressive governments that persisted in Chinese history. The dynasties from the Han and Ch’in onwards never allowed room for an order based on the Confucian sage notion of autonomous responsibility. Hence in Chinese society the chun tzu never featured as an ordering principle. Instead the creative minority was persistently repressed, a legacy which remains in China to the present day.

Chapter 9 examined the life of reason in modern China. The work of Lu Hsun was explored in relation to the problem of order in China. His writings inquire into the repressive nature of Chinese society. He criticised the rulers of China. Lu Hsun’s inquiry into the political order found that the people were subject to the rulers’ self-interest. In vibrant metaphors he presented a critical analysis of the problems of order in China. Ideas such as the “iron wall”, the “Ah Q nature” of man and his reference to the “spiritual disease” of society highlighted deep-seated problems in Chinese society.

Both Voegelin and Lu Hsun recognised the importance of man and the necessity of spiritual reality, vital ingredients that contribute to order in society. Converging lines of 350

thought begin to emerge between Lu Hsun’s critical interpretation of society and Voegelin’s

analysis of order.

It is my contention that Voegelin’s thought on noetic reason has offered an

important understanding of modern problems relating to order. Voegelin’s hermeneutical

exposition of noetic reason has kept alive an essential characteristic of Western

civilisation. Voegelin has provided a philosophical framework helpful in investigating

religious-philosophical differences between China and the West.

By examining the anthropological type of human consciousness as manifested in

Hellenic thought and the differentiated experience in the Judaeo-Christian experience it is

possible to analyse the precise differentiation of types of consciousness more easily. The

analysis is particularly useful when discerning philosophical differences between immanence and transcendence, terms often used indiscriminately in religious and philosophical discussions. Voegelin insisted on the principle that one cannot call

philosophy what is not philosophy.6 Still, as he reflects, if it is not philosophy “there is

something. This raises the question yet to be considered: what is it?”7

Voegelin’s analysis of noetic reason considered three types of consciousness - the

anthropological (Hellas), the soteriological (Judaeo-Christian) and the cosmological.

When anthropological and soteriological differences are examined it is possible to

analyse more easily cosmological experience. Chinese consciousness displayed a strong

sense of merging between the cosmic, spirits, humans and natural phenomena. The

emphasis given to merging, together with the absence of differentiation, opened the way

6See Voegelin, Order and History, The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 286, n.17. Voegelin explains that the incomplete breakthrough what is commonly called “Chinese philosophy” has been thoroughly treated in Peter Weber-Schaefer, Oikumene und Imperium (Munich, 1968), 24 ff. 7Voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin, 1980, p. 70. 351

for Chinese consciousness to adhere easily to the ideology of atheistic Marxism, accepted

as an ideology of gods without shapes.

Voegelin’s findings are relevant today in the investigation of current political

trends. The “New Confucianism” present in countries popularly known as the so-called

“Asian Tigers” considered Confucian ideology an argument to support economic

pragmatism.8 Yet as recent events have shown “New Confucianism” was not influential

enough to establish political order as an ideology that allows those in power to be

accountable for their actions. Without the freedom of the press and other media it is not

possible to have an open society.

Much has been written on human rights and their significance for political order.

Although there is basic agreement on the importance of rights and acceptance that

democracy is necessary for good order in society, there has been little investigation into the

source of these principles. A certain complexity is now present if as Voegelin insists Western

society has dismissed noetic reason. Consequently, important implications arise. In the

debate on human rights it would appear that Western consciousness is operating with a deformed consciousness. As a result in the international arena when Western ideas encounter

Eastern thought we have the meeting of two very different types of experience of political

order. Western consciousness is now formed by an absence of noetic reason yet at the same

time it is striving to create an environment open to the importance of human rights and

democracy.

8Some indication of merging is found in the Hong Kong Takeover in the attitude of business people willing to be transmogrified by the incoming government. Evidence of this merging appears prominently in the discourse of those responding to questions regarding the loss of freedom. Refer to the documentary, “The Last Governor”, 1997, ABC TV; See also M.& D. Elliot, “Why the world watches,” The Bulletin/Newsweek, 27 May, 1997, pp. 48-53. 352

On the other hand, we have the present Chinese government claiming that issues

such as human rights are of Western origin and are not essential to Chinese culture.9 Hence

democracy and human rights are regarded by non-western countries as a form of

individualism. Unfortunately this is correct to some extent, because Western consciousness

as has been explained is now operating on a deformed consciousness10 by regarding noetic

reason as irrelevant to political order.

It is precisely here that Voegelin’s thought offers a philosophical analysis of cultural

and philosophical differences between the West and the East. The recovery of the principle

that man is the measure of the polis and God is the measure of man ensures a sound basis for

developing the importance of human rights and democracy. Noetic reason possesses a

universal potential and gives authenticity to those human aspirations which desire a just

political order. Homonoia as a symbol of unity transcends the narrow limits of nationalism,

ethnicity and even gender. These symbols are far removed from that ideology which

supports the totalitarian demands for the annihilation of the human person.

Noetic reason must again be recognised as a crucial dimension of human

consciousness to preserve the fragile order in society. For, as this thesis has demonstrated,

order in society arises from the life of reason. Voegelin declared that order in society “will

be realised to the degree in which the potentiality of noetic order becomes actualised in the

9Frank Ching, “The Year of Living Dangerously”, Current History, A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, September (1996), pp. 272-276; Richard McGregor, “China’s New Trade-Off”, The Weekend Australian, April 19-20 (1997), p. 26. The article refers to China’s comprehensive defeat of the censure at the annual session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Wu Jainmen is quoted, “The Chinese people have followed their own path for 5000 years - no one can stop them, certainly not a few anti-China resolutions. No force can stop 1.2 billion people from advancing.” See also Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Triadic Chord: Confucian Ethics, Industrial East-Asia and Max Weber, (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 1991). 10A “deformed consciousness” refers to consciousness that has dismissed an aspect of reality - in this case - the notion of the transcendent. 353

souls of men who live in society. Justice is ultimately founded in nous and philia.”11

Furthermore, “the ‘quality’ of society depends on the degree to which the life of reason, actively carried out by a minority of its members, becomes a creative force in that society.”12

Successive political upheavals in this century have manifested what occurs when

noetic reason is abandoned. Voegelin pointed out the consequences that arise when "the

bonds linking the community with the transcendental divine centre are severed." At that point a society becomes focused on itself and is self-centred.13 Voegelin first raised the

problem of disorder in relation to racism in Germany and he observed that some countries

have a stronger propensity for racism than others.14 Rather than order based on the life of

reason, in those societies order is shaped by ideologues15 and becomes a tool in the hands

of those who enforce a regime for their own ends.

Evidence of this political confusion is present in the tension between Western

democracies and the leaders of China. For while there is some agreement that human rights

are important, the Chinese position is very different from the stance taken by Western

democracies. It is known that China theoretically propounds human rights, though this

theoretical elaboration is very different from its current practice. The deeper reality is that

China has never in its long history taken into its political order the principle that recognises

the human person’s understanding that their existence in openness to the truth of God is the

11Voegelin, Order and History, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. 3, 1957, pp. 320-321; Voegelin refers to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1167b 3-4 - politike philia, “political friendship”. 12Voegelin, “Industrial Society in Search of Reason”, in Aron, ed., World Technology and Human Destiny, 1963, p. 34. 13Voegelin, "The Growth of the Race Idea", Review of Politics, 2 (1940), p. 306. 14Ibid., p. 312. 15Voegelin, “Industrial Society in Search of Reason”, 1963, pp. 38-40. 354 measure of the polis. Without this first foundational principle political order cannot be effected in that or in any other society.16

16Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, 1952, p. 69. Voegelin writes: The truth of man and the truth of God are inseparably one. Man will be in the truth of his existence when he has opened his psyche to the truth of God; and the truth of God will become manifest in history when it has formed the psyche of man into receptivity of the unseen measure. This is the great subject of the Republic: at the center of the dialogue Plato places the Parable of the Cave, with its description of the periagoge, the conversion, the turning around from the untruth of human existence as it prevailed in the Athenian sophistic society to the truth of the Idea [Plato, Republic 518d-e]. 355

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is divided into three sections. The first is a chronological listing of

those works by Eric Voegelin which were cited or consulted for this thesis. The second

section is a list of works on Voegelin, and the third section consists of works cited or

consulted that were relevant to the discussion.

PRIMARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Voegelin, Eric. On the Form of The American Mind. Edited by Barry Cooper and Jürgen Gebhardt. Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt Thomas A. Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol.1. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1993. [Translation of Über die Form des amerikanischen Geistes. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1928].

Voegelin, Eric. Race and State. Edited by Klaus Vondung. Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas A. Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol 2. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1994. [Translation of Rasse und Staat. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1933].

Voegelin, Eric, The Authoritarian State. Edited by Erika Weinzerl. Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas A. Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol 4. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1994. [Translation of Der Autoritäre Staat, Vienna: Springer, 1936].

Voegelin, Eric, Political Religions. Translated by T.J. DiNapoli and Peter Emberly. Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986. [Translation of Die politischen Religionen. Ausblicke. Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer,1939].

Voegelin, Eric. The New Science of Politics: An Introduction. Chicago, Illinois: Chicago University Press, 1952.

Voegelin, Eric, Order and History. 5 Volumes. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1956-87. Volume 1 : Israel and Revelation. 1956. Volume II: The World of the Polis.1957. Volume III: Plato and Aristotle.1957. Volume IV: The Ecumenic Age.1974. Volume V: In Search of Order.1987.

356

Voegelin, Eric, Science, Politics and Gnosticism. Translated by William J. Fitzpatrick. With a new Foreword by Eric Voegelin. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1968. [Translation of Wissenschaft, Politik und Gnosis, Munich: Kösel, 1959, and “Religionsersatz: die Gnostischen Massenbewegungen unserer Zeit.” Wort und Wahrheit 15,no.1 (1960): 5- 18]. Chicago: Regnery, Gateway Edition, 1968. [Voegelin delivered this as a lecture in 1958.]

Voegelin, Eric, Anamnesis. Translated by Gerhard Niemeyer. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978. [Partial translation of Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik. Munich: R. Piper, 1966. Includes a new first chapter by Eric Voegelin “Remembrance of things past”, and the paper “Reason: The Classic Experience.” Southern Review, N.S. 10 (1974): 237-64].

Voegelin, Eric, Autobiographical Reflections. Edited with introduction, by Ellis Sandoz. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1989.

Voegelin, Eric, From Enlightenment to Revolution. Edited by John H. Hallowell. Durham: Duke University Press, 1975.

Voegelin, Eric, Conversations with Eric Voegelin. Edited by R. Eric O’ Conner. Thomas More Institute Papers, Vol. 76. Transcripts of four lectures and discussions in Montreal, in 1965, 1967, 1970 and 1976.] Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1980.

Voegelin, Eric, Published Essays, 1966-1985. The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Edited with an introduction by Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12, Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1990.

Voegelin, Eric, What is History? And Other Late Unpublished Writings. The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Edited with an introduction by Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul Caringella, Vol. 28, Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1990.

Emberley, Peter and Barry Cooper, translators and editors, Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1993.

ARTICLES

Voegelin, Eric. “Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law”. Political Science Quarterly, 42 (1927), pp. 268-276.

Voegelin, Eric. “The Growth of the Race Idea”. Review of Politics, 2 (1940), pp. 283- 317.

Voegelin, Eric. “Siger de Brabant”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (1944), pp.507-26.

357

Voegelin, Eric, “Nietzsche, “The Crisis and the War”. The Journal of Politics, 6 (1944), pp. 177-212.

Voegelin, Eric. “The Origins of Scientism”. Social Research, 15 (1948), pp. 462-94.

Voegelin, Eric. “Political Theory and the Pattern of General History”. In Research in Political Science. The Work of the Panels of the Research Committee, American Political Science Association, edited by Ernest S. Griffith, pp. 190-201. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1948.

Voegelin, Eric. “Necessary Moral Bases for Communication in a Democracy”. In Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society. pp. 53-68. Papers delivered at a Conference on Communication. Fourth in a series of Anniversery Celebrations, 20-23 March 1956. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1956.

Voegelin, Eric. “Industrial Society in Search of Reason”. In World Technology and Technology and Human Destiny, pp. 31- 46. Edited by Raymond Aron. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963. Originally published as “La Société Industrielle à la Recherche de la Raison”. In: Colloques de Rheinfelden, pp. 44-64. Edited by Raymond Aron and George Kennan. Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1960.

Voegelin, Eric. “On Readiness to Rational Discussion”. In Albert Hunold, ed. Freedom and Serfdom, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1961. pp. 269-84. [Translation of “Diskussionsbereitschaft”. In Albert Hunold ed., Erziehung und Freiheit, pp. 355-72. Stuttgart, Rentsch, 1959].

Voegelin, “Les perspectives d’avenir de la civilisation occidentale”. In L’Histoire et ses interpretations. Entretiens autour de Arnold Toynbee, edited by Raymond Aron, pp. 133- 51. The Hague: Mouton, 1961.

Voegelin. Eric, “Toynbee’s History as a Search for Truth”. In Edward T. Gargan, ed, The Intent of Toybee’s History, Chicago, Illinois: Loyola University Press, 1961, pp. 183-98.

Voegelin, Eric. “World Empire and the Unity of Mankind”. International Affairs, 38, (1962), pp. 170-183. (The Stevenson Memorial Lecture, No. 11, 1961).

Voegelin, Eric, “Rembrance of Things Past”, pp. 304-314. In Published Essays, 1966- 1985, edited by Ellis Sandoz. Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990, pp. 213-55. [From Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis, trans. and ed. Gerhart Niemeyer (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univerisity of Notre Dame, 1978, pp. 3-13]

Voegelin, Eric. “What is History?”, pp.1-51. In What is History and Other Late Unpublished Writings, edited by Thomas Holleck and Paul Caringella. Vol. 28 Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1990.[Completed about 1963] 358

Voegelin, Eric, “Anxiety and Reason”. pp. 52-110. In What is History and Other Late Unpublished Writings, edited by Thomas Holleck and Paul Caringella. Vol. 28 Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1990

Voegelin, Eric. "The German University and the Order of German Society: A Reconsideration of the Nazi Era". Intercollegiate Review, 29 (1985), pp. 7-27. [Translation by Russell Nieli of “Die deutsch Universität und die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft.” Die deutsch Universität im dritten Reich, edited by H. Kuhn, pp. 241-82. Munich: Piper, 1966].

Voegelin, Eric. “On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery”. In Published Essays, 1966-1985, Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990, pp. 213-55. [First published in Studium Generale 24 (1971): 335-68.]

Voegelin, Eric. “On Debate and Existence”. In Published Essays, 1966-1985, Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990, pp.36-51. [First published in Intercollegiate Review 3 (1967), pp. 143-52.]

Voegelin, Eric, “Der Mensch in Gesellschaft und Gesschichte”. Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 14 (1964), pp. 1-13.

Voegelin, Eric, “Ersatz Religion”. In Science, Politics and Gnosticism, Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1968.

Voegelin, Eric. “Configurations in History”. In The Concept of Order, edited by Paul G. Kuntz, pp. 23-42. Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 1968.

Voegelin, Eric. “Philosophies of History: An Interview with Eric Voegelin”. In New Orleans Review (1973). pp. 135-39.

Voegelin, Eric, “On Classical Studies”. In Published Essays, 1966-1985, Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990, pp.256-264. [First printed in Modern Age, 17 (1973), pp. 2-8.]

Voegelin, Eric, “Reason: The Classic Experience”. In Published Essays, 1966-1985, Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990, pp.265-303. [First printed in Southern Review, 10, (1974), pp. 237-64.] 359

Voegelin, Eric, "Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in History". In Published Essays, 1966-1985, Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol. 12. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990, pp.115-133. [Eternita è storia: I valori permanenti nel divenire storico, (Florence: Valecchi,1970), pp. 215-34].

Voegelin, Eric. “The Eclipse of Reality”. In What is History? And other Late Unpublished Writings edited by Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul Caringella. Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, vol. 28. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990, pp. 111- 162. [This essay was completed about 1969.]

Voegelin, Eric. “Autobiographical Statement at the Age of Eighty-Two”. Lonergan Workshop 4, Supplement 1: The Beginning and the Beyond: Papers from the Gadamer and Voegelin Workshops (1984): 111-31.

Voegelin, Eric. “The Gospel and Culture”. In Published Essays,1966-1985, pp.172-212. In Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol 12. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990.[1971]

Voegelin, Eric. "Immortality: Experience and Symbol". In Published Essays, 1966-1985, pp. 52-94. Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol 12. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990.[1965]

Voegelin, Eric. “Wisdom and Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation”. In Published Essays, 1966-1985, pp. 315-375. Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, edited by Paul Caringella, Jürgen Gebhardt, Thomas Hollweck and Ellis Sandoz, Vol 12. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Lousiana State University Press, 1990.[1983]

Voegelin, Eric. “Eric Voegelin to Alfred Schütz”, On Christianity, January 1, 1953”. In P.J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981, pp. 449-457.

360

UNPUBLISHED WORKS

Voegelin, Eric, Wechselwirkung und Gezweiung. Ph.Disseration, Vienna Univeristy, 1922.

Voegelin, Eric, Unpublished Notes, Box 57.5. “PART FOUR. CHRISTIANITY AND ROME: Chapter I, The Rise of Christianity” in "Speeches and Writings", Chapter 3, “The Emperor”, S3: The Christian Theory of Law, b. The Reception of the Stoic Theory, p.75. Unpublished Manuscripts, Hoover Institution Library Archives, Stanford University, Eric Voegelin Papers, Box No. 57. 5. Folder ID. 5.

Voegelin, Eric. “Speeches and Writings, Unpublished Notes, Box 57.4 Chapter Three, S 5. “Homonoia-The Empire People”. (Hoover Institution Library Archives).

Voegelin, Eric, Structures of Consciousness”. 22 Nov., 1978, given at a Conference on “Hermeneutics and Structuralism: Merging Horizons” held at York University, Toronto, Canada, 21-24, November, 1978. A transcription of this lecture is found in the Voegelin-- Research News, Volume 2, No. 3, September 1996.

SECONDARY SOURCES

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Caringella, Paul, “Voegelin: Philosopher of the Divine Presence”. In Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin’s Significance for the Modern Mind, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991, pp. 174-205.

Dallmayr, Fred, “Voegelin’s Search for Order”. Journal of Politics, 51 (1989), pp. 411-430.

Doran, Robert, Theology and the Dialectics of History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.

Dupré, L., "A Conservative Anarchist: Eric Voegelin 1901-1985". , A Journal of Literature, History and the Philosophy of History, 14 (1985), pp. 423-431.

Emberley, Peter and Cooper, Barry, Faith and Political Philosophy: Correspondence between Strauss and Voegelin 1934-1964 , University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993.

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361

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Germino, Dante, “Preliminary Reflections on the Open Society: Bergson, Popper, Voegelin”. In The Open Society in Theory and Practice, Dante Germino and K. von Beyme, eds., The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1974, pp.1-25.

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Germino, Dante, Political Philosophy and the Open Society. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1982.

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Lawrence, Fred., ed. The Beginning and the Beyond: Papers from the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences. Lonergan Workshop, Vol. 4. Supplementary Volume. Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1984.

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Appendix 1

TABLE 1

PERSON SOCIETY HISTORY Divine Nous Psyche-Noetic Psyche-Passions Animal Nature Vegetative Nature Inorganic Nature Apeiron Depth

Eric Voegelin, From “Reason: The Classic Experience”, in Published Essays, 1966- 1985, Vol. 12 1990, p.289.

(A Diagram Voegelin gave his students to classify false theoretical propositions by assigning them their place on the grid.)