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First In: CIA Vs From the rst CIA ocers from the Special Activities Division that set boots on the ground in Afghanistan 15 days after 9/11, until the night Bin Laden was killed by Seal Team 6 under the direction of CIA, discover the secrets of the hunt for the most wanted terrorist in history. How did CIA know who was behind the attacks so quickly? How did Bin Laden manage to escape Afghanistan while he was surrounded? How did CIA pick up his trace years later? Who helped him? Who fought him? What lines have been crossed? These are all the questions that we will answer frankly, thanks to the collaboration of the largest and most secret Intelligence agency in the world. The manhunt told by the people tactically involved in each stage Over time and through other projects, we have established a privileged relationship of trust with CIA and many of it’s most successful executives. For the 10 year anniversary of the death of the “stroller”, the Agency gives us an exceptional, unprecedented access. We will record the words of those who were on the frontline, setting up strategies to counter terrorism. One of them is Mark Kelton. Nameless hero of the Agency, he takes the lead of Islamabad station. His mission is to identify then kill Bin Laden, hidden in his fortress in Pakistan: “There is a good probability he is there, we gotta go. We can’t leave Hitler in his bunker”. His testimony is rare and powerful. The mountains of Afghanistan and the valley of Abbottabad will be the landscapes of our story. We will drop our cameras in to reveal their cinematographic beauties. In this context, the CIA will give us access to archives and declassied information too. Drone footage, mission orders, secret pictures and even the helicopter that brought the rst CIA ocers into Afghanistan. All are storytelling devices. A major documentary CIA vs. Bin Laden. 20 years after 9/11 and 10 years after his death. The most revealing documentary ever produced about the 10 year hunt for Osama Bin Laden by the Central Intelligence Agency. We interview former Directors, CIA case officers, military leaders, members of European intelligence services, and US Congressman who played direct roles in the hunt and elimination of the world’s #1 terrorist. Many of the people most deeply involved with the hunt and killing of Bin Laden have been reluctant to share their stories until now. There was simply no benefit for these quiet professionals, their families, or the agencies they served to be in the public eye. But they have collectively decided that now is the time – to go on record and tell their stories before it’s too late. As far as possible, we will permit testimonies of those who dealt directly with the ex-Al Qaeda leader. His family, his lieutenants, his fighters. Some are now reconciled and tell the daily life in the training camps, the fighting in the mountains, and the fear of the American strikes. This story is also a way to better understand the current issues in the Middle East. The roots of the war waged by the Western powers against terrorism in Iraq and Syria were in the Al-Qaida camps. It was there that, those who would become, years later, the leaders of the Islamic State, were trained. First In: CIA Vs. Bin Laden tells the full, true, first-hand story of one of the greatest manhunts in history. “We will continue to ght you as long as we have weapons in our hands” Osama bin Laden, audiotape aired on Al-Jazeera, 2003 Episode 1 – THE HUNT (2001-2009) Afghanistan, 01/09/23. A Soviet helicopter purchased from a former Soviet satellite state, with CIA “old-timers" on board, is ying through the mountains of Afghanistan. The mission of these seven agents is secret. In com- plete autonomy, they must reconnect with the mujahideen they knew during the Soviet invasion. Their perso- nal relationship with these ghters could provide valuable information to nd the man who was immediately suspected of being responsible for the attacks on the Twin Towers: Osama bin Laden. The man is not an ano- nymous. The agency has been at war with its organization since 1993, the date of the rst attack against the World Trade Center. This commando of seven is the CIA's rst response to nd the main enemy of the United States after 9/11. It’s also the rst step of a global war against worldwide terrorism which begins. Still today the story isn't well known. In just one month, these ocers will analyze the ground to locate Al-Qaeda training camps, and prepare for possible air strikes. But in Washington, Donald Rumsfeld is fuming that his personnel (Department of Defense) would not be “rst in”. When the Congress asks the CIA Director, George Tenet, why he still has not located bin Laden, he answers: "because he is hiding ..." On the ground, helped by the Northern Alliance (former army of Massoud), the CIA leads a erce campaign to locate and destroy Taliban shelters housing Al-Qaeda ghters. Gary Bernstein, head of the CIA in Kabul, learns that Osama bin Laden, cornered by air strikes, has taken refuge in the mountains of Tora Bora, close to Pakistani border. During the mutiny of a prison un the North, Johnny Spann is the rst American KIA (Killed in Action) during this new war on Terrorism. Other American soldiers will lose their lives during this ght. These deaths will aect the political and strategic choices. Do we need more men on the ground? Bin Laden will take advantage of American wavering and the collusion of some Afghan leaders to escape to Pakistan during the Battle of Tora Bora. In January 2002, the CIA lost all trails of the terrorist. “Capture or kill”. The order is simple, but the mission complex. To trace Osama bin Laden, the CIA interrogates the other terrorists involved in the attack, conned in its secret prisons. Each name, each track is studied by hundreds of analysts. In this hunt, Occident takes knocks: Madrid in March 2004, London in July 2005 ... Al-Qa- eda kills 200 people. The American agency is hit too. But the investigation is progressing. The interrogation under torture of some Al-Qaeda executives reveals the existence of message carriers in charge of passing bin Laden's orders to the rest of the organization. One of them seems more important than the others. His war name is Abu Amar Al Kuwaiti. But while closing in on Bin Laden, CIA suers its biggest loss in history in a suici- de bombing at Camp Chapman in Afghanistan when a “triple” agent working for Jordanian GID, CIA, and Al Qaeda blows himself up along with 7 of CIA’s most experienced Bin Laden hunters. This will not go unpu- nished… Episode 2 – THE KILLING (2009-2011) After 4 years of tracking Al Kuwaiti’s movements, the CIA drones nally manage to follow Al-Kuwaiti in his white Suzuki SUV to a mysterious residence not far from Abbottabad. It consists of a main building surroun- ded by two high white walls. Someone of importance lives here, but who? The CIA sends its best station-chief on the spot to determine who lives in this fortress: Mark Kelton. He establishes tight surveillance of the house with drones and a team on the ground. They take thousands of pictures, they try to recover the DNA of the occupants of the house. Mark is convinced, the man who walks sometimes in the yard is Bin Laden. It remains to convince his hierarchy to act. The information is so sensitive that the CIA will speak directly with the Presi- dent. Leon Panetta, director of the CIA, presents four options to Barack Obama. One of them is to send CIA’s Special Activities Division, SEALS, or both: "I'll sleep on it," says Obama. The next morning, he orders the attack. 30 April 2011, Barack Obama is with his team, at the annual White House Correspondents Association dinner. That night, he keeps a secret. The oensive against bin Laden was launched by the Navy Seal Team 6. It has been a month since this elite unit train without knowing the purpose of this mission. In a model of the Abbo- ttabad compound, installed in CIA facilities and hidden from satellite view, 23 men and a dog repeat each phase of the mission. Through a faithful reconstitution, we will explain the assault of May 2, 2011. That night, in a raid of 40 minutes, the Seals killed Osama bin Laden, Al Kuwaiti and his brother, and one of his sons. They also retrieved a mountain of documents about Al-Qaeda activities. 9 hours and 30 minutes later, bin Laden's body is immersed into the Arabian Sea, while United State celebrates the death of the most wanted man on the planet. In the spotlight for a while, the Navy Seal Team 6 then resumes the course of its clandestine missi- ons against terrorism. In August, one of his helicopters is shot down by the Taliban. The elite unit lose 20 men. The hunt by those who did it 20 years after 9/11, the CIA give us access to the people (agents and analysts) involved in tracking down bin Laden. In addition, thanks to a relationship of trust established over time, the agency will help us to interview those who were at the highest level of command and those who were in frontline. We have conrmed the participation of CIA Case Ocers, CIA Analysts, former CIA Station Chiefs, U.S.
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