Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 36, No. 2, March 1988

The Vaiesikastras9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipik

Shujun Motegi

The Vaisesika- (=vs)1) is a text of ambiguity, which contains not a few obscure . In the present paper, I would take up VS 9-1 as one of such sutras and discuss its meaning with the help of the reference in the Yuktidipika (=YD)2>, an anonymous commentary of the Samkhyakarika. VS 9-1 runs: kriya-guna-vyapadesabhavad asat. (An effect does not exist in a cause because there is no such inferential mark as kriya-guna-vyapadesa to show its existence in a cause. ) This sutra explains one of the four patterns of non-existence, and as the result supports the asatkaryavad a, which is a typical Vaisesika theory of causation. According to the Vaisesika school, the empirical world is constituted by connec- tion and dissociation of atoms (paramanu). Material beings (karyas) are always newly constituted by connection and dissociation of atoms, so that they can not be supposed to exist (asat) in preceedingly existent beings. To prove this point of view, the sutra presents the inferential mark (linga), that is, kriya-guna-vya- pad esa. Before going into examination of the VS referred to in the YD, we have to cast a glace on the commentaries of the VS to see the Vaisesika tradition of in- terpretation. The commentaries of the VS don't agree with each other in the reading of the compound word kriya-guna-vyapadesa. Candrananda, for exam- ple, interprets VS 9-1 as follows : na tavat karyam prag utpatteh pratyaksena grhyate / napy anumdnena, liege tasya bhavat, liiigabhavas ca tadiyayoh kriyagunayor anupalabdheh, na canyad vyapadesa- sabdasucitam asti / tasmat prag utpatter asat / (Candrananda's Vrtti, p. 66. 4-6) (First, an effect is not perceived by direct perception, before coming into existence. Nor it cognized by inference. If there is an inferential mark (in a cause), the exis- tence of an effect may be inferred. But, (in this case, ) there is not an inferential mark -985- (2) The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) (in a cause), for neither kriya nor guna of it is known. Further, there is not other inferential mark that can be called vyapadesa. Therefore, an effect does not exist (in a cause) before coming into existence. )

It is clear from the quoted passage that Candrananda takes kriya, guna and vyapadesa as linga respectively. That is to say, he admits three kind of lingas in this sutra. The whole sutra signifies that an effect does not exist in a cause because there is no such inferential mark as kriya or guna or vyapadesa in a cause. On the other hand, Sankaramisra interprets the compound word as follows in his Upaskara3) : yadi tadanim api karyam ghatadi sad eva syat tada kriyavattvena gunavattvena ca vyapadisyeta. (p. 393. 7-9) The purport of the sutra, in this case, is that, if an effect exists in a cause, it must be designated as something having kriya or guna. But actually, a cause cannot be called as such, so an effect does not exist in it. We have seen above that there are two different ways of reading the compo- und word of VS 9-14). The YD gives another material to examine the meaning of the compound word. In the YD, the Vaisesika school is seen often refuted. The school propounds , according to which the material beings are evolved from one ultimate material being (prakrti), so that every material being is sup- posed to exist in the previous stage of evolution from prakrti in some latent form. It is needless to say that this theory of evolution is quite contradictory to the asatkaryava"da of the Vaisesika school. To establish the satkaryavada, the author of the YD makes a long argument with a certain Vaisesika school. In the argument, the YD author refers to three reasons, on the ground of which the Vaisesikas try to prove the validity of the asatkaryavada. The three reasons are : (1) dravyantarabhutasydvayavi no nispatti-prati j nanat (p. 48, 15-16), (2) agrahanat (p. 48, 17), and (3) kartr-prayasa-saphalyat (p. 48, 32). VS 9-1 is referred to in the argument on the second reason, i. e. agrahanat, in the following context. The Vaisesikas argue at the beginning with this reason -984- The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) (3) that, if an effect exists in a cause before coming into existence, it must be per- ceived (grahana) by sense organs when they come near to the cause, because something perceivable by ears etc. is perceived by them when they come near to it. And as an effect is not perceived in a cause, a former does not exist in a latter before coming into existence. The YD author refutes this argument by saying that, even if an effect is not directly perceived by a sense organ, its ex- istence in a cause is cognized by inference (anumana), a valid way of knowledge admitted by the both schools. And again, the Vaisesikas try to deny the possi- bility of employing inference in this occasion. They, here, state the reason to cor- roborate their argument. The reason is kriya-guna-vyapadesasa?nbhavat, which is of almost the same wording as VS 9-1 and can be regarded as one of the then circulated forms of VS 9-1 or a part of it. The Vaisesikas go on to explain this phrase in detail with examples, which is as follows5) : yad dhi pratyaksato nopalabh.yate tat kriyayastiti samsucyate / yatha harmyavsthitanam trnam udvahanad vayuh gunena, yatha malatilatagandhena vyapadesena va karyadina yathendriyani / (A) (p. 48, 30-31) In this passage (A), inferential marks, viz. , kriya, guna and vyapadesa are mentioned, as found in the Candrananda's commentary on VS 9-1. And as an example for kriya, the upward movement of leaves is cited. We can infer the existence of wind by seeing the upward movement of leaves on the roof. Like- wise, we can infer the existence of jasmine grass by smelling its fragrance. Fra- grance is an example of guna. Further, we can infer the existence of sense organs from their function etc (karya, something done by sense organs). Function is an example of vyapadesa. This may be the most reasonable understanding of the passage (A), because three examples seem to be given and each of them corres- ponds to each of three reasons respectively. But in this way of reading, it may be questioned how it is possible to call the function of sense organs vyapadesa. As the usual meaning of vyapadesa is designation or name, it seems impossible to call this example vyapadesa. I shall return to this problem later. The compound word kriya-guna-vyapadesa appears twice in the present argument of the YD. First, it is used in the above quoted passage (A). Second, it is referred to by the YD author in the course of refutation of the Vaisesika -983- (4) The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) point of view. The passage in question will be quoted below : vyapadesas to karyakaranaparyayah/so 'yuktah/ kasmat? anekantat/dravyagunatvakarmatvadtnam kriyagunakaryakaranabhavo 'tha ca sattvam isyate 'tha lingaparyayah/.../ / anaikantikatvam ca samanam / nispattyanantaram dravyasya astitabhyupagamad agunavato dravyasya gunarambhah / karmaguna aguna iti vacandd (VS 7-1-12) utpannamatram dravyam niskriyam nirgunam avatisthate iti vah paksah / (B) (p. 51, 18-24)

When we read this passage (B) paying attention to the underlined parts and compare it with the passage (A), we, here, find another interpretation of the compound word kriya-guna-vyapadesa. Here, vyapadesa is considered to be a synonym of karya-karana (a causal relation), and the compound word kriya-guna- vyapadesa is changed into kriya-guna-karya-karana-bhava, i. e. , a causal relation of action or quality' The interpretation of vyapadesa made here by the YD author gives us a very strange impression. This interpretation is quite different from not only that of the passage (B) but all the interpretations made by the VS commentators. In this sense, we should say it is very unique. This leads us to an assumption that the interpretation found in the passage (B) may not be based on the Vaisesika tradition of interpretation, though the YD author is referring to the Vaisesika's idea. Taking this assumption and the whole argument in the passage (B) into consideration, the following surmise -seems to be most appropriate. Facing the objection of the Vaisesikas, the author of the YD had to reject it in some way. He intended to reject the Vaisesikas' reason, i. e. kriya-guna-vypade- sasa,'. nbhavat, as anekanta or anaikantikatva (not a definite reason). If the reason of the Vaisesikas doesn't lead to a definite conclusion, it can be rejected as ane- kanta. What, then, is a definite conclusion in this case ? The definite conclusion is that an effect does not exist in a cause. If the reason kriya-guna-vyapadesasa- mbhavat' leads also to the other conclusion, it is called anekanta. To reject this reason as anekanta, all that the YD author must do now is to prove that some- thing can exist without kriya-guna-vyapadesa. If he can show such a thing or case, the reason of kriya-guna-vyapadesasambhavat is to be rejected as anekanta, -982- The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) (5) because an effect can exist in a cause without kriya-guna-vyapadesa. What kind of thing or case does satisfy the aim of the YD author ? The YD author, then, resorts to the phenomenon of pakaja which is explained by the Vaisesika school with a special attention. The Vaisesikas hold that the black color of the atom of earth changes into red when it is burned up (paka), while the -nature of atom as substance does not change. According to this theory of pakaja, there must be a moment when red color doesn't appear yet just after disappearance of black color. At this very mo- ment, the atom of earth exists without either of black and red colors, that is to say, without quality (nirguna). So far as the moment is concerned, it is possible for the YD author to point out that an effect can exist without guna6). Deciding to employ the phenomenon of pakaja as the example, the YD author next aims at showing that his argument goes on along with the Vaisesika thou- ght, and quotes the authorative text of the Vaisesika school, i. e. , the VS. The sutra which explains the phenomenon of pakaja is as follows : agunavato dravyasya gunarambhah / karmaguiza aguna (VS 7-1-12) As regards the quotation of the VS 7-1-12, there still remains a difficulty. There is not a word of vyapadesa in the sutra. The YD author must explain vyapadesa in some way which cannot be explained by the sutra itself. He resorts to the way of treating vyapadesa as a synonym of karya-karana which does not seem to oppose the process of pakaja. Then, the compound word kriya-guna-vyapadesa can be expressed as kriya-guna-kar'ya-karana. With this change, two aims of the YD author are satisfied. That is to say, he could eliminate the word vyapadesa from the compound word, and the process of pakaja does not seem to be con- tradicted with the new implication of the compound whose meaning is now a causal relation of kriya or guna'. Though, apparently in the process of pakaja, there is not a causal relation between gunas of an effect and a cause, it is not his main intention to prove non-existence of the causal relation between two gunas. Rather, with the suggestion of non-existence of causal relation, he finally intends to show the possible existence of a thing of no guna or kriya. Now the author of the YD has shown that there is a. case in which an effect can exist without its guna or kriya, and that this is proved on the basis of the -981- (6) The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) testimony of the VS. The Vaisesikas, therefore, cannot hold that an effect does not exist in a cause with the reason that no kriya or guna of an effect is perceiv- ed in a cause. As there is a possibility that a thing exists without its guna or kriya, the Vaisesikas' reason does not lead us to a definite conclusion desired by them. Therefore, it can be rejected as anekanta. Let us state briefly the above mentioned assumption. The author of the YD, first, decided to take a phenomenon of pakaja as an example, because it would be contradictory to the Vaisesikas' reasoning. Second, to give his argument an adequate ground, he intended to quote a phrase from the Vaisesika's authorative text, i. e. VS 7-1-12. Then, what he must do is to change the compound word kriya-guna-vyapadesa to go with VS 7-1-12. Because the word vyapades'a is not seen in VS 7-1-12, he eliminates the word vyapadesa from the compound word by giving a definition to vyapadesa. From the above mentioned assumption, it is understood that the interpretation of vyapades'a as karya-karana is made by the YD author from the necessity of rejecting the Vaisesika view. This interpretation is, accordingly, not necessarily based on the Vaisesika thought, Though it is not certain whether the interpreta- tion is the original idea of the YD author himself or he employed some traditional way of interpretation of the word, it is not directly based on the Vaisesika doct- rine. So, it is not at all strange if the interpretation goes contradicted with. the explanation found in the passage (A) which is quoted to elaborate the Vaisesika tenet. Concerning the interpretation of the compound word in VS 9-1, therefore, it is safe to assume that the Vaisesika thought is reflected not in the passage (B), but in the passage (A) . Lastly, we shall return to the problem left unexamined, which is about the example of vyapadesa in the passage (A). Here, the Vaisesikas state an example with the help of which vyapadesa will be well confirmed as linga. The example is that the existence of sense organs is inferred from their function. The problem is how it can be called vyapades'a to infer the existence of sense organs on the ground of their function. So far, I have not found any convincing answer to the problem. Candrananda, who took the same way to read the compound word, only states on this point : vyapade'a-sabda-sucitam lingam. This statement is

-980- The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) (7) too short to get a clear idea. All that I can do here is to present a mere guess which is as follows : It is an undeniable fact that we have experiences of seeing or hearing something. From this fact, it may be inferred that there must be something which is responsible for seeing or hearing in our body, though it is not seen or heard, that is to say, unperceived. Something unperceived is necessarily required to exist, otherwise the fact can not be well explained. This must be a process behind the example of sense organs and their function. This process of assuming something necessarily required is a pretext, which, then, can be called by the word of vyapadesa. If we take vyapadesa as a pretext7), we manage to get a meaning from the passage (A). The meaning will be as follows : an effect does not exist in a cause, becsuse nothing is perceived, which necessarily requires to assume something else (an effect) to exist in the cause. Before concluding the present paper, I would like to mention some additional points which have been noticed in the course of examination of the relevant ma- terials. (1) Concerning the way of reading VS 9-1, Candrananda's interpretation is attested by a text of other philosophical school, i. e. the YD. (2) There is an agreement in the manner in which they introduce lingas of kriya-guna-vyapadesa between the Vaisesikas referred to in the YD and Candra- nanda's Vrtt, i on VS 9-1. Both first take pratyaksa as means for showing non- existence of an effect, and then resort to anumana. This manner of interpretation is not found in any other commentary of the VS. (3) As regards the form of VS 7-1-12, the sutra transmitted in Candrananda's Vrtti is verbatim agreed with the one quoted in the YD8).

1) Vaisesikasutra of with the commentary of Candrdnanda, critically ed. by Muni Sri Jambuvijaaji, (GOS 36), Baroda, 1961. I follow thle numbering of the sutra given in this text. 2) Yuktidipikd, an ancient commentary on the Samkhya-Karika of Isvarakrsna, ed. by R. C. Pandeya, Delhi-Varanasi-Patna, 1967. 3) The Upaskara ed. by P. J. T. Panchanana, (Bblioitheca Indica 4, 5, 6, 8, 10) Cal- cutta, 1861 (Reprint 1981). 4) The other commentary of the VS by an anonymous author, i. e. Vyakhya, ed. by A. Thakur, Darbhanga, 1957, reads as follows : abhavo dravyam kriyavan gunavan -979- (8) The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) kriya-gunavan iti vyapadeskbhavat / vyapadesa upalambhah sabdaprayogo va / (p. 80, 10-11) Here, vyapadesa is not treated as an independent linga. This kind of interpretation is the same as that of the Upaskara. 5) The punctuation of the passage (A) seems to be improper. The other printed edition of the Yuktidipika, that is, Yuktidipika critically edited by P. Chakravarti, (CSS 23), Calcutta, 1938, reads the relevant passage as follows : yatha harmyavasthaitanam gunodvahanad vayuh/ gunena yatha malati lata/ gand- hena vyapadesena va karyadina, yathendriyani/ (p. 58, 12-13) This manner of punctuation is not clear, either. The punctuation of the passage (A) should be corrected in the following way : yad dhi pratyaksato nopalabhyate tat kriyayastiti samsucyate / yatha harmyava- sthitanam trnanam udvahanad vayuh, gunena yatha malatilata gandhena, vyapa- desena va karyadina yathendriyani / 6) As regards kriya or , nothing Is stated explicitly. The author of the YD might deliberately ignore it, thinking that it is sufficient if the example of guna works well. 7) As regards the word avyapadesya in the Nyayasutra 1-1-4, some views on the relation between the word and its object are mentioned in the Nyayabhasya and in the Nyayavarttika. But in all the views found there, it is the existence of the word that makes it possible to infer an object denoted by it. This kind of inference does not help understand the example in question. Because in this example it is not the existence of the word indriya but the existence of its function that must be rega- rded as linga. 8) The Upaskara omitted this sutra. The form transmitted by the Vyakhya is: kar- maguna aguna. (Key Words) Vaisesikasutra, Yuktidipika, vyapadesa (Assoc. Prof., Shinshu University)

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