The Vaiesikastra S9-1 Referred to in the Yuktidipik Shujun Motegi

Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 36, No. 2, March 1988 The Vaiesikastras9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipik Shujun Motegi The Vaisesika-sutra (=vs)1) is a text of ambiguity, which contains not a few obscure sutras. In the present paper, I would take up VS 9-1 as one of such sutras and discuss its meaning with the help of the reference in the Yuktidipika (=YD)2>, an anonymous commentary of the Samkhyakarika. VS 9-1 runs: kriya-guna-vyapadesabhavad asat. (An effect does not exist in a cause because there is no such inferential mark as kriya-guna-vyapadesa to show its existence in a cause. ) This sutra explains one of the four patterns of non-existence, and as the result supports the asatkaryavad a, which is a typical Vaisesika theory of causation. According to the Vaisesika school, the empirical world is constituted by connection and dissociation of atoms (paramanu). Material beings (karyas) are always newly constituted by connection and dissociation of atoms, so that they can not be supposed to exist (asat) in preceedingly existent beings. To prove this point of view, the sutra presents the inferential mark (linga), that is, kriya-guna-vya- pad esa. Before going into examination of the VS referred to in the YD, we have to cast a glace on the commentaries of the VS to see the Vaisesika tradition of interpretation. The commentaries of the VS don't agree with each other in the reading of the compound word kriya-guna-vyapadesa. Candrananda, for example, interprets VS 9-1 as follows : na tavat karyam prag utpatteh pratyaksena grhyate / napy anumdnena, sati liege tasya bhavat, liiigabhavas ca tadiyayoh kriyagunayor anupalabdheh, na canyad vyapadesa- sabdasucitam lingam asti / tasmat prag utpatter asat / (Candrananda's Vrtti, p. 66. 4-6) (First, an effect is not perceived by direct perception, before coming into existence. Nor it cognized by inference. If there is an inferential mark (in a cause), the existence of an effect may be inferred. But, (in this case, ) there is not an inferential mark -985- (2) The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) (in a cause), for neither kriya nor guna of it is known. Further, there is not other inferential mark that can be called vyapadesa. Therefore, an effect does not exist (in a cause) before coming into existence. ) It is clear from the quoted passage that Candrananda takes kriya, guna and vyapadesa as linga respectively. That is to say, he admits three kind of lingas in this sutra. The whole sutra signifies that an effect does not exist in a cause because there is no such inferential mark as kriya or guna or vyapadesa in a cause. On the other hand, Sankaramisra interprets the compound word as follows in his Upaskara3) : yadi tadanim api karyam ghatadi sad eva syat tada kriyavattvena gunavattvena ca vyapadisyeta. (p. 393. 7-9) The purport of the sutra, in this case, is that, if an effect exists in a cause, it must be designated as something having kriya or guna. But actually, a cause cannot be called as such, so an effect does not exist in it. We have seen above that there are two different ways of reading the compound word of VS 9-14). The YD gives another material to examine the meaning of the compound word. In the YD, the Vaisesika school is seen often refuted. The Samkhya school propounds satkaryavada, according to which the material beings are evolved from one ultimate material being (prakrti), so that every material being is supposed to exist in the previous stage of evolution from prakrti in some latent form. It is needless to say that this theory of evolution is quite contradictory to the asatkaryava"da of the Vaisesika school. To establish the satkaryavada, the author of the YD makes a long argument with a certain Vaisesika school. In the argument, the YD author refers to three reasons, on the ground of which the Vaisesikas try to prove the validity of the asatkaryavada. The three reasons are : (1) dravyantarabhutasydvayavi no nispatti-prati j nanat (p. 48, 15-16), (2) agrahanat (p. 48, 17), and (3) kartr-prayasa-saphalyat (p. 48, 32). VS 9-1 is referred to in the argument on the second reason, i. e. agrahanat, in the following context. The Vaisesikas argue at the beginning with this reason -984- The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) (3) that, if an effect exists in a cause before coming into existence, it must be perceived (grahana) by sense organs when they come near to the cause, because something perceivable by ears etc. is perceived by them when they come near to it. And as an effect is not perceived in a cause, a former does not exist in a latter before coming into existence. The YD author refutes this argument by saying that, even if an effect is not directly perceived by a sense organ, its existence in a cause is cognized by inference (anumana), a valid way of knowledge admitted by the both schools. And again, the Vaisesikas try to deny the possi- bility of employing inference in this occasion. They, here, state the reason to cor- roborate their argument. The reason is kriya-guna-vyapadesasa?nbhavat, which is of almost the same wording as VS 9-1 and can be regarded as one of the then circulated forms of VS 9-1 or a part of it. The Vaisesikas go on to explain this phrase in detail with examples, which is as follows5) : yad dhi pratyaksato nopalabh.yate tat kriyayastiti samsucyate / yatha harmyavsthitanam trnam udvahanad vayuh gunena, yatha malatilatagandhena vyapadesena va karyadina yathendriyani / (A) (p. 48, 30-31) In this passage (A), inferential marks, viz. , kriya, guna and vyapadesa are mentioned, as found in the Candrananda's commentary on VS 9-1. And as an example for kriya, the upward movement of leaves is cited. We can infer the existence of wind by seeing the upward movement of leaves on the roof. Like- wise, we can infer the existence of jasmine grass by smelling its fragrance. Fra- grance is an example of guna. Further, we can infer the existence of sense organs from their function etc (karya, something done by sense organs). Function is an example of vyapadesa. This may be the most reasonable understanding of the passage (A), because three examples seem to be given and each of them corres- ponds to each of three reasons respectively. But in this way of reading, it may be questioned how it is possible to call the function of sense organs vyapadesa. As the usual meaning of vyapadesa is designation or name, it seems impossible to call this example vyapadesa. I shall return to this problem later. The compound word kriya-guna-vyapadesa appears twice in the present argument of the YD. First, it is used in the above quoted passage (A). Second, it is referred to by the YD author in the course of refutation of the Vaisesika -983- (4) The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) point of view. The passage in question will be quoted below : vyapadesas to karyakaranaparyayah/so 'yuktah/ kasmat? anekantat/dravyagunatvakarmatvadtnam kriyagunakaryakaranabhavo 'tha ca sattvam isyate 'tha lingaparyayah/.../ / anaikantikatvam ca samanam / nispattyanantaram dravyasya astitabhyupagamad agunavato dravyasya gunarambhah / karmaguna aguna iti vacandd (VS 7-1-12) utpannamatram dravyam niskriyam nirgunam avatisthate iti vah paksah / (B) (p. 51, 18-24) When we read this passage (B) paying attention to the underlined parts and compare it with the passage (A), we, here, find another interpretation of the compound word kriya-guna-vyapadesa. Here, vyapadesa is considered to be a synonym of karya-karana (a causal relation), and the compound word kriya-guna- vyapadesa is changed into kriya-guna-karya-karana-bhava, i. e. , a causal relation of action or quality' The interpretation of vyapadesa made here by the YD author gives us a very strange impression. This interpretation is quite different from not only that of the passage (B) but all the interpretations made by the VS commentators. In this sense, we should say it is very unique. This leads us to an assumption that the interpretation found in the passage (B) may not be based on the Vaisesika tradition of interpretation, though the YD author is referring to the Vaisesika's idea. Taking this assumption and the whole argument in the passage (B) into consideration, the following surmise -seems to be most appropriate. Facing the objection of the Vaisesikas, the author of the YD had to reject it in some way. He intended to reject the Vaisesikas' reason, i. e. kriya-guna-vypade- sasa,'. nbhavat, as anekanta or anaikantikatva (not a definite reason). If the reason of the Vaisesikas doesn't lead to a definite conclusion, it can be rejected as anekanta. What, then, is a definite conclusion in this case ? The definite conclusion is that an effect does not exist in a cause. If the reason kriya-guna-vyapadesasambhavat' leads also to the other conclusion, it is called anekanta. To reject this reason as anekanta, all that the YD author must do now is to prove that something can exist without kriya-guna-vyapadesa. If he can show such a thing or case, the reason of kriya-guna-vyapadesasambhavat is to be rejected as anekanta, -982- The Vaisesikasutra 9-1 referred to in the Yuktidipika (S. Motegi) (5) because an effect can exist in a cause without kriya-guna-vyapadesa. What kind of thing or case does satisfy the aim of the YD author ? The YD author, then, resorts to the phenomenon of pakaja which is explained by the Vaisesika school with a special attention.

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