140 140 TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION? 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN CEE

There Will Be a Liberal East-Central Europe Again!

GÁBOR HORN GÁBOR HORN 141

fter the collapse of the Soviet degree – in Brussels, illiberal politics have Union, there was a distinct a scenic appeal, social-psychological re- need for the achievements of searches prove that in moral questions liberalism. The parties that em- central-European citizens decide based on braced the rights, freedoms, liberal values. Without question, among the andA the values of a market economy en- young population, the desire of freedom is joyed more significant voter support, while the guiding principle. the non-liberal parties viewed some liber- alized basic values as self-evident. At the end of the 1980s, the unbearability of the communist system became clear Living in Prague, Berlin or in 1989 in every country of the Eastern Block. The was liberating and intoxicating. Neither my helpless indulgence of the Soviet Union generation, nor the one before us believed strengthened this phenomenon – for ex- that the Soviet soldiers would leave the ample, in certain countries (Czechoslovakia, country and that the communist nightmare , East Germany, Poland), the Soviet would come to an end. Just like for Buda- soldiers were strictly prohibited to inter- pest, called at that time the “Happiest Bar- vene. A few years earlier, this would have rack” in the Soviet Bloc, the same disbelief been unimaginable. The sudden freedom was felt in Honecker’s DDR or Ceausescu’s was unexpected to those who did not live Romania, a country suffering from even among active oppositionists or those who greater atrocities than the rest of the region. were proficient in international politics. The In all these states, even if to different de- accelerating disintegration of state socialism grees, communism made freedom and the was smooth to varying degrees in different hope of a western life impossible. countries.

On the one hand, the popularity of basic In Poland, in the summer of 1988, Lech liberal values in the post-communist states Wałęsa, the founder of Solidarity, was invited is related to the fact that most countries of the region actually had liberal opposition (except the Polish movements, which had a rather complex identity) so the voters also viewed them as the strongest anti-commu- nist forces. IN DIFFERENT On the other hand, there was an unwavering consensus about basic liberal values – ex- NATIONAL cept the extremist parties, as well as regards the fact that belonging to the European Un- PARLIAMENTS AND – ion is gratifying and valuable with all its op- portunities and obligations. TO A LESSER DEGREE – IN BRUSSELS, All of this ended with the worldwide eco- nomic crisis in 2008, in the aftermath of ILLIBERAL POLITICS which the popularity of far-right parties rose and certain central-European conserva- HAVE A SCENIC tive parties radicalized. Although in differ- ent national parliaments and – to a lesser APPEAL 142 TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION? 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN CEE

In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic, the one- party system degraded gradually, and more IN BULGARIA, or less without violence. While the forma- CZECHOSLOVAKIA, tion of a new political system needed many closed-door negotiations, the general pub- HUNGARY, lic remembers the change of the regime as a symbolic event, which embodied the de- AND THE GERMAN sire of freedom.

DEMOCRATIC Irrespective of how the liberal parties per- formed in the first democratic elections in REPUBLIC, respective countries of the post-Soviet bloc, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reburial of Imre THE ONE-PARTY Nagy and other martyrs, or the Velvet Rev- SYSTEM DEGRADED olution meant an unimaginable liberation from the oppression or national terror. So, GRADUALLY, regardless of who voted for which party, the freedom – which the previously mentioned AND MORE OR LESS events stood for – was one of the most im- portant and inalienable basic values for the WITHOUT VIOLENCE whole region. In Hungary, for instance, most of the society greeted the change of a re- gime with euphoria, which showed in the – still unprecedented – civil and political to negotiate with the communist leaders, activity. Numerous civil organizations and which was followed by the inauguration of trade unions were formed. Many people the first anti-communist prime ministership joined the newfound democratic parties. of Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the spring of 1989. The appealing status of political presence While this process was not free of political showed in the high numbers of voter turn- or street conflict, it showed conspicuous out throughout the region. differences compared to the 1970s. Those who had earlier been important fig- At the same time, in Romania, dictator Nico- ures of the opposition became the lead- lae Ceaușescu won yet another election and ers of the new political systems. In 1989 continued on his path of the exploitation of in Czechoslovakia, Václav Hável, who was police forces – including the arrest of László formerly banned from writing in his own Tőkés, a Hungarian ethnic dissident pastor. country, was elected president. In 1990, in The communist regime tried to deaden the Poland, so was Lech Wałęsa. That same year rebellion (which started in Timisoara) at first in Hungary, Árpád Göncz, the hero of the to obey Mr. Ceaușescu’s commands. Then, 1956 revolution, also took the helm as the on the sixth day of the demonstration, the head of state. police forces stopped following orders after the suicide of the defense minister, Vasile During the first free elections in all former Milea. Eventually, Nicolae Ceaușescu and Soviet states, liberal parties were very popu- his wife were executed. lar. In Hungary, two parties (SZDSZ, Alliance of Free Democrats and , Allience of GÁBOR HORN 143

Young Democrats) obtained seats in parlia- ment, while in Czechoslovakia liberals had the majority in both regions of the country (Civic Forum in Czechia and Public Against WITH Violence in Slovakia). In the once eastern- THE TRANSITION German provinces, the conservative-liberal parties won without exception. In Poland, FROM COMMUNISM, in the Lower House of parliament (Sejm), liberal-Christian-democratic and social- THE LIBERAL WORLD democratic parties received the most votes, while Solidarity became the second most AND ITS ATTACHMENTS powerful force in the Senate. BECAME A PART With the transition from communism, the liberal world and its attachments became OF EVERYDAY LIFE a part of everyday life for the citizens of the FOR THE CITIZENS former Eastern Bloc. The basic rights, free- dom of speech and assembly, all parts of the OF THE FORMER democratic life became undeniable. Private property – apart from the obvious finan- EASTERN BLOC cial value – gained an intellectual meaning. Entrepreneurs’ success in the market was now driven solely by their talent and endur- ance. Finally, trust in capitalism emerged, At the time of accession, the EU enjoyed creating chiefly positive connotations in the widespread popularity in Central European minds of most of Eastern European society. societies. The majority supported these at- In the 1990s, far-right parties reappeared tempts even in those countries where po- – only now they identified their main en- litical parties regarded as problematic from emy as globalism instead of communism. the Brussels’ perspective were the most The normative liberal forces – reflecting on successful. the political turn of the last ten years – did not give the most effective answer to the However, recently, the spread of illiberalism, appearance of emotional and economi- a phenomenon frequently discussed in rela- cal anti-Westernism, anti-Semitism, and tion to Hungary, may now be observed in xenophobia. Although parties with a far- other countries (including Poland). right agenda entered parliament, they were not a significant force. Wanting to catch up DISRUPTING THE LIBERAL with the West, the newly formed national CONSENSUS governments were working hard to get the The Great Recession in 2008 wrecked countries of the Eastern Block to join NATO Hungary’s economy, which – among other and the European Union (EU) as soon as reasons – caused the socialist-liberal coa- possible, which happened soon thereafter. lition government to lose the trust of the In addition to economic recovery and new people1. The referendum of 2008, which opportunities for all post-Soviet states and their citizens, these developments further 1 strengthened the fundamental importance Nevertheless, the 2008 financial crisis cannot be com- pared to the loss in human capital and economic pros- of freedom among public opinion. perity caused by the communist regimes in the region. 144 TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION? 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN CEE

had become a keystone of the then gov- ernment’s downfall, proved that in regards to certain questions, people were reluctant to approve of reforms and a capitalist at- WITHOUT REALIZING titude, and instead required the assistance IT OR REFLECTING and intervention of a strong state2. IT IN THEIR Those who lost the most in the crisis became severely vulnerable, which greatly contrib- VOTES, MOST uted to the 2010 success of the Fidesz party and its moderate, catch-all promises, along HUNGARIANS ENJOY with the far-right party with its anti- bank rhetoric. THE ACHIEVEMENTS

Meanwhile, one of the most important OF THE FREE Hungarian parties of the regime change of WORLD 1989-90 – the Alliance of Free Democrats – had lost its political weight and was dis- solved. The aforementioned 2010 election brought about the crisis of liberalism in Hun- The second Fidesz-government had a very gary. Noteworthy, it was not only because popular slogan: “The last eight years”, which of its winner – the populist Fidesz party, but was not only a generalized condensation, also because it was symptomatic – the me- but also the onset of the politics revolving dia wrote about the voters of green parties around attacking the banking sector and in- and LMP (which is a globalization- and EU- ternational institutions, like the IMF. These critical party) as the orphans of voters of the kinds of attacks became more forthright Alliance of Free Democrats. This diagnosis and frequent as Viktor Orbán’s government was a rather good reflection of the liberal moved toward a more manifest nationalism voters’ options at the time. during and after the 2015 refugee crisis. One of the most infamous ones was the gov- In the campaigns of the right-wing parties, ernment’s poster-campaign against George banks or the International Monetary Fund Soros and Brussels. were made to represent the real fight for people’s hearts and minds.. To Fidesz (Al- Later, the Fidesz party further disrupted liance of Young Democrats), Jobbik (For liberalism and the authority of the West in a Better Hungary), and part of their voters, the eyes of Hungarian citizens. Meanwhile, the banks, the EU, and the international through its economic relations, the govern- funds were deemed as the institutionaliza- ment got the idea of opening the country tion of liberal views and their financial col- and thus started emphasizing the impor- lapse. tance of a friendly relationship with Rus- sia. With the so-called ‘Eastern Opening’ the government tried to expand Hungary’s 2 According to a 2010 Pew Research Study, in 2010, 72% economic opportunities, but at the same of Hungarians siad that the country was worse off eco- nomically as under Communism:. See: Wike, R. (2010) time relativized Western values and liberal Hungary Dissatisfied with Democracy but Not Its Ideals. civic liberties. Available [online]: https://www.pewresearch.org/glob- al/2010/04/07/hungary-dissatisfied-with-democracy- but-not-its-ideals/ GÁBOR HORN 145

Since 2010, the continuously changing po- According to János Kis, a former leader of litical system under the rule of Prime Minister the democratic opposition and an influential Viktor Orbán and his acolytes has less and contemporary philosopher: less liberal elements. While during the sec- ond election term of the Fidesz-government “In a democracy based on the competition the familiar, moderate, conservative figures of parties, the party that casts the majority still played significant roles, they gradu- in the elections will become the govern- ally disappeared from the political scene. ment; the minority will be the opposition In 2014, Viktor Orbán himself described his of the government. Although the opposi- regime as ‘illiberal’. However, many people tion doesn’t have a part in governing, it can in the European People’s Party are still, even hold the government accountable. They are today, reluctant to recognize the real nature the public power factor that can force the of Mr. Orbán’s system. government to defend its decisions in public debate; they can push the government to According to Viktor Orbán himself, the main a certain degree of self-restraint. But wheth- reason behind the conflict is the different er or not to withhold unprotected decisions, attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. they can make it easier for voters to make The successful fight against immigration in informed decisions in the next elections”5. the 2014 election shows that Hungarian society has no need for a liberal approach We cannot see anything from this system toward certain human rights issues. today – on the national and local level, the government’s overt power is not con- At the same time, it is spectacular that, if strained by democratic competition de- the concept is not conscious – not only as scribed above. Just like it was not granted in regards moral issues, but also in day-to-day the three decades after 1956, during the dic- politics – the majority of voters represent tatorship of János Kádár, when there were a liberal standpoint, regardless of party sym- also sham elections. The Hungarian system pathies, as evidenced by the response to the is increasingly moving towards a ‘state capi- idea of the internet tax and the closure of talist’ model, where the power of state mar- shops on Sundays3. ket distortion rivals the socialist era.

Without realizing it or reflecting it in their FAILED POPULIST REVOLUTION votes, most Hungarians enjoy the achieve- AND LIBERAL CHALLENGERS ments of the free world – from the sacred- OF ILLIBERALISM ness of privacy, to the variety of goods in This temporary disillusionment could be an the shops. Due to the fact that they do not important learning period for those who un- want to give up the rights they fought to gain dertake the task of making freedom a po- thirty years ago, we can trust in the recovery litical asset. The liberal Momentum party, of liberalism4. well represented in the 2019 European Par- liament election, devotes great energy to 3 The 2014 Internet tax proposal triggered massive pro- building a nation-wide base, trying to out- tests in Budapest. As a result, the government withdrew the proposal. Apart from this, the socialist party initiated perform the Alliance of Free Democrats, a referendum against the mandatory closure of shops on Sundays – the government revoked that plan as well. – instead of the nationalist, far-right Jobbik (For a Better Hungary), or the anti-capitalist, anti-globalist LMP (An- 4 The results of the 2019 European Parliamentry elec- other Politics is Possible). tions confirm this phenomenon, as the left-liberal Democratic Coalition and the liberal Momentum Move- 5 Kis, J. (2013) “Gondolatok a demokráciáról”, [in]: Élet és ment parties became the major forces of the opposition Irodalom, Vol. 57(19), p. 5. [in Hungarian] 146 TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION? 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN CEE

the EU, the Western values, and experiences of the Hungarian voters, give hope to the THE HUNGARIAN liberal advocates of Hungary. SYSTEM All in all, we can trust – and that is what we need to work towards – that the European IS INCREASINGLY community, which has been protecting its members for more than seven decades MOVING TOWARDS since the Second World War, has made hu- man rights declared and preserved. Despite A ‘STATE CAPITALIST’ the unnecessary administrative regulations, the European Union also let the market live MODEL, WHERE and has an appeal to citizens who lost their freedom. These dissatisfied people can THE POWER herd their country to a self-correcting path OF STATE MARKET as soon as they have an opportunity and a liberal European institutional framework DISTORTION RIVALS is granted. THE SOCIALIST ERA With the loss of liberalism, Hungary has wasted some valuable time that is yet to come. It will take years of hard work to re- build a stable liberal democracy again. Nev- whose voters – after 2002 – have been ertheless, as Western values and individual mainly residents of Budapest. The party’s freedoms are still respected by major soci- promising presence (which was founded etal groups in Hungary, it is my unshakable by intellectuals who studied in the west) faith that it is going to happen. shows that for university students and young workers, freedom, the European Union, and Western values are still unquestionable.

While the Austrian, Italian, and Polish allies of Viktor Orbán still had electoral support in the last elections, the year of the rebellion did not fully come true in 2017, nor since then. Following the French and Austrian presi- GÁBOR dential elections and Dutch parliamentary HORN elections, the 2019

elections also demonstrated the failure of Chairman of the Board at Republikon Foundation a right-wing populist takeover. Whereas in since 2010. At the time of the regime change, he was Hungary, Fidesz achieved great success, a prominent figure of the union movements. After that he joined the SZDSZ (the Alliance of Free Democrats) in Poland, the main opposition party, Civil and became an MP in 1994 and the campaign direc- Platform (which is somewhat critical of PM tor of the party. Between 2002 and 2008 he worked as under-secretary for coordination in the Hungarian Orbán) defeated the ruling Law and Justice Prime Minister’s office as well. For 10 years, he was party, which was becoming more and more teaching economics and finance and then took part in extremist. The failed populist electoral re- the founding of the Economic Polytechnic Foundation School, where he worked as director of the curriculum bellion, as well as the ongoing migration in until 2002 GÁBOR HORN 147