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Where Did All the Environmentalism Go? 'Politics Can Be Different' (LMP) in the 2018 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections

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Where Did All the Environmentalism Go? 'Politics Can Be Different' (LMP) in the 2018 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections Environmental Politics ISSN: 0964-4016 (Print) 1743-8934 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fenp20 Where did all the environmentalism go? ‘Politics can be different’ (LMP) in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections Daniel Kovarek & Levente Littvay To cite this article: Daniel Kovarek & Levente Littvay (2019): Where did all the environmentalism go? ‘Politics can be different’ (LMP) in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Environmental Politics, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2019.1567874 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1567874 Published online: 16 Jan 2019. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 70 View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fenp20 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1567874 PROFILE Where did all the environmentalism go? ‘Politics can be different’ (LMP) in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections Daniel Kovarek and Levente Littvay Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary In April 2018, Lehet Más a Politika (LMP) reinforced its position as the strongest Green party in Central and Eastern Europe, passing the 5% parliamentary threshold for the third time and becoming the sole opposition party to gain votes. In the preceding 4 years, LMP had dealt with the resignation of its most visible co-chair András Schiffer and rebranded itself as an anti-corruption critic of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government, which distracted from the environmental issues. LMP resisted electoral coordination with other parties; consequently, Fidesz gained another supermajority, exploiting the distorted election system it established in 2011, which penalized a divided opposition. LMP, post-election, suffered deep intra-party tensions and the depar- ture of prominent LMP politicians including its co-chairs. A new broom sweeps clean: LMP before the campaign András Schiffer, LMP’s founder, announced his resignation as co-chair and MP in May 2016. Schiffer was known for his uncompromising stance of being equally critical of the government and left-wing oppo- sition parties. His resignation opened the way for electoral cooperation with parties and other opponents of the government. Schiffer’sreplace- mentinbothrolesbyÁkosHadházyforeshadowed substantial changes in LMP’s agenda. Hadházy came to prominence as a whistle-blower who in 2013 resigned from Fidesz1 after witnessing illicit, partisan allocation of tobacco shop concessions. This leadership change made LMP’s anticorruption messages more credible, but weakened its green character: Schiffer was a doyen of Védegylet,anecopoliticalandpost- globalist NGO, whereas Hadházy had no record of environmental advocacy. CONTACT Levente Littvay [email protected] © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2 D. KOVAREK AND L. LITTVAY Issue ownership and messaging: content analysis LMP’s electoral manifesto included dedicated chapters on environmental pro- tection and energy, but these got lost in a contentious and personalized electoral campaign largely devoid of issues. LMP’s shortened 7-point-manifesto focused on social policy and public services, while billboard posters featured a portrait of Bernadett Szél, Hadházy’s party co-chair and LMP prime minister candidate, with the slogan ‘Now it’sourturn!’ (Most mi jövünk!), indicating LMP’sinten- tion to become the governing party – without any reference to potential coalition partners or policy preferences. Similarly, TV ads entitled ‘Let’stakeourfuturein our hands!’ emphasized education, healthcare and immigration of Hungarians abroad with no reference to sustainability, environmental or ecological issues, whereas the 2014 TV ad proclaimed ‘Thefutureisgreen’ andincludedpromises about sustainable jobs and energy independence. Yet between 2014 and 2018 environmental issues were prominent, including: the ongoing construction in Budapest’s City Park, to rehabilitate the largest contiguous green area in the capital and turn it into a museum district; the planned dam in Northern Budapest that would sacrifice the natural shore of the Danube to protect lavish condominiums and hotels; the Russian-financed second block of the Paks Nuclear Plant; and an equestrian stadium that destroyed a popular hiking destination. These issues domi- nated the opposition media agenda, sparking local referendum initiatives and catalysing environmental protests. LMP did not take a stand on the single most important election issue – migration. Its earlier proposal of mandatory tracking of asylum seekers using ankle monitors caused substantial internal tensions leading to the party losing most of its organization in Szeged, a large and traditionally leftist university town. This weakened LMP in a potential electoral strong- hold and dealt a serious blow to its intellectual base, as many life sciences academics left the party. LMP’s sole councillor was the only representative in the Budapest General Assembly to vote against the unpopular bid for the 2020 Summer Olympics, but LMP failed to capitalize on this because the newly formed Momentum Movement’s referendum initiative forced the government to withdraw the bid before voters could voice their opinions. Instead, LMP sought ownership of the anti-corruption agenda. Hadházy, in weekly press conferences – mirroring those of the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff – dubbed ‘Corruption Info’, presented EU funding irregularities and allegations of embezzlement linked to Fidesz ministers and MPs. LMP compiled ‘11 Points Against Corruption’, including transparency measures for private companies, prohibition of state-funded advertisements in the media, prosecution of criminal allegations uncovered by investigative jour- nalists, support of watchdog NGOs, and the creation of ‘investigator judges’ ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 3 to hold members of the Fidesz-appointed Prosecution Service accountable. Several LMP candidates signed a declaration, drafted by Transparency International and other NGOs, advocating anti-corruption measures. Some campaign visuals were even more direct, with messages like ‘Against stealing: LMP’ or ‘Those who stole are going to jail!’. Personalization of the campaign: Szél 2018 This was the first election in which LMP explicitly nominated a Prime Ministerial candidate, anticipating that if the opposition won a majority, LMP was in a good position to offer a candidate on whom both leftist parties and Jobbik could agree. This led to the party’s most personalized campaign to date, a strategy markedly different from previous elections (Papp and Zorigt 2016). Party activists carried ‘Szél LMP 2018ʹ signs everywhere. LMP’s 30-s advertisements showed slow-motion clips of Szél meeting people and giving speeches, with Szél herself as the narrator. Szél’s nomination sent a strong message in times when the government was reluctant to ratify the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating (domestic) violence against women, there were no women cabinet members, the proportion of female MPs had stagnated at around 10% and especially after the Prime Minister’s infamous refusal to comment on the recall of the Hungarian Ambassador to the United States because he was ‘not dealing with women’s issues’. Szél’s approval and predictors of LMP support Figure 1 presents the time series for LMP’s support on a hypothetical vote choice question (bars) and Szél’s favourability along with other party leaders.2 The difference between the party preference and Szél’sstrongsupportisstriking, highlighting how opposition voters are willing to support other opposition candidates. Using data from a post-election survey, Figure 2 presents a model of Szél’s favourability ratings as predicted by how much people like the various political parties and by demographics. The survey asked respondents to rate party leaders’ (and parties’) likability on a 0–10 scale, with a higher score indicating more favourable opinions.3 Szél was not notably unpopular among the supporters of any party, but, negating the strategy of appealing to women with a female candidate, she was relatively unpopular among women. A multinominal regression model (Figure 3), compares LMP voters (as reference category) to nonvoters and voters of other parties, including a catch-all ‘left’ category for minor opposition parties.4 Ideologically, LMP supporters are most comparable to other small players in the party system, to the right of MSZP–P and DK, and to the left of Fidesz and Jobbik. Most 4 D. KOVAREK AND L. LITTVAY Figure 1. Favourability of Prime Ministerial candidates of major parties and LMP’s support (bars) between 2015 and 2018. Source: Medián Opinion and Market Research Institute. Figure 2. Regression coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for socio- demographic and political predictors of Bernadett Szél’s favourability. Predictors are dummy coded for categorical variables and scaled as a unit-change constituting two standard deviations for continuous ones. Source: CSES5 Election Survey. ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 5 Figure 3. Multinominal regression coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for socio-demographic predictors of party vote, with LMP as the reference category. Predictors are dummy coded for categorical variables and scaled as a unit- change constituting two standard deviations for continuous ones. Source: CSES5 Election Survey. results are nonsignificant due to the small number of LMP voters (4%), but LMP voters are relatively
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