Environmental Politics

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Where did all the environmentalism go? ‘Politics can be different’ (LMP) in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections

Daniel Kovarek & Levente Littvay

To cite this article: Daniel Kovarek & Levente Littvay (2019): Where did all the environmentalism go? ‘Politics can be different’ (LMP) in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Environmental Politics, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2019.1567874 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1567874

Published online: 16 Jan 2019.

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PROFILE Where did all the environmentalism go? ‘Politics can be different’ (LMP) in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections Daniel Kovarek and Levente Littvay

Department of Political Science, Central European University, ,

In April 2018, Lehet Más a Politika (LMP) reinforced its position as the strongest Green party in Central and Eastern Europe, passing the 5% parliamentary threshold for the third time and becoming the sole opposition party to gain votes. In the preceding 4 years, LMP had dealt with the resignation of its most visible co-chair András Schiffer and rebranded itself as an anti-corruption critic of Viktor Orbán’s government, which distracted from the environmental issues. LMP resisted electoral coordination with other parties; consequently, Fidesz gained another supermajority, exploiting the distorted election system it established in 2011, which penalized a divided opposition. LMP, post-election, suffered deep intra-party tensions and the depar- ture of prominent LMP politicians including its co-chairs.

A new broom sweeps clean: LMP before the campaign András Schiffer, LMP’s founder, announced his resignation as co-chair and MP in May 2016. Schiffer was known for his uncompromising stance of being equally critical of the government and left-wing oppo- sition parties. His resignation opened the way for electoral cooperation with parties and other opponents of the government. Schiffer’sreplace- mentinbothrolesbyÁkosHadházyforeshadowed substantial changes in LMP’s agenda. Hadházy came to prominence as a whistle-blower who in 2013 resigned from Fidesz1 after witnessing illicit, partisan allocation of tobacco shop concessions. This leadership change made LMP’s anticorruption messages more credible, but weakened its green character: Schiffer was a doyen of Védegylet,anecopoliticalandpost- globalist NGO, whereas Hadházy had no record of environmental advocacy.

CONTACT Levente Littvay [email protected] © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2 D. KOVAREK AND L. LITTVAY

Issue ownership and messaging: content analysis LMP’s electoral manifesto included dedicated chapters on environmental pro- tection and energy, but these got lost in a contentious and personalized electoral campaign largely devoid of issues. LMP’s shortened 7-point-manifesto focused on social policy and public services, while billboard posters featured a portrait of Bernadett Szél, Hadházy’s party co-chair and LMP prime minister candidate, with the slogan ‘Now it’sourturn!’ (Most mi jövünk!), indicating LMP’sinten- tion to become the governing party – without any reference to potential coalition partners or policy preferences. Similarly, TV ads entitled ‘Let’stakeourfuturein our hands!’ emphasized education, healthcare and immigration of Hungarians abroad with no reference to sustainability, environmental or ecological issues, whereas the 2014 TV ad proclaimed ‘Thefutureisgreen’ andincludedpromises about sustainable jobs and energy independence. Yet between 2014 and 2018 environmental issues were prominent, including: the ongoing construction in Budapest’s City Park, to rehabilitate the largest contiguous green area in the capital and turn it into a museum district; the planned dam in Northern Budapest that would sacrifice the natural shore of the Danube to protect lavish condominiums and hotels; the Russian-financed second block of the Paks Nuclear Plant; and an equestrian stadium that destroyed a popular hiking destination. These issues domi- nated the opposition media agenda, sparking local referendum initiatives and catalysing environmental protests. LMP did not take a stand on the single most important election issue – migration. Its earlier proposal of mandatory tracking of asylum seekers using ankle monitors caused substantial internal tensions leading to the party losing most of its organization in Szeged, a large and traditionally leftist university town. This weakened LMP in a potential electoral strong- hold and dealt a serious blow to its intellectual base, as many life sciences academics left the party. LMP’s sole councillor was the only representative in the Budapest General Assembly to vote against the unpopular bid for the 2020 Summer Olympics, but LMP failed to capitalize on this because the newly formed ’s referendum initiative forced the government to withdraw the bid before voters could voice their opinions. Instead, LMP sought ownership of the anti-corruption agenda. Hadházy, in weekly press conferences – mirroring those of the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff – dubbed ‘Corruption Info’, presented EU funding irregularities and allegations of embezzlement linked to Fidesz ministers and MPs. LMP compiled ‘11 Points Against Corruption’, including transparency measures for private companies, prohibition of state-funded advertisements in the media, prosecution of criminal allegations uncovered by investigative jour- nalists, support of watchdog NGOs, and the creation of ‘investigator judges’ ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 3 to hold members of the Fidesz-appointed Prosecution Service accountable. Several LMP candidates signed a declaration, drafted by Transparency International and other NGOs, advocating anti-corruption measures. Some campaign visuals were even more direct, with messages like ‘Against stealing: LMP’ or ‘Those who stole are going to jail!’.

Personalization of the campaign: Szél 2018 This was the first election in which LMP explicitly nominated a Prime Ministerial candidate, anticipating that if the opposition won a majority, LMP was in a good position to offer a candidate on whom both leftist parties and could agree. This led to the party’s most personalized campaign to date, a strategy markedly different from previous elections (Papp and Zorigt 2016). Party activists carried ‘Szél LMP 2018ʹ signs everywhere. LMP’s 30-s advertisements showed slow-motion clips of Szél meeting people and giving speeches, with Szél herself as the narrator. Szél’s nomination sent a strong message in times when the government was reluctant to ratify the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating (domestic) violence against women, there were no women cabinet members, the proportion of female MPs had stagnated at around 10% and especially after the Prime Minister’s infamous refusal to comment on the recall of the Hungarian Ambassador to the United States because he was ‘not dealing with women’s issues’.

Szél’s approval and predictors of LMP support Figure 1 presents the time series for LMP’s support on a hypothetical vote choice question (bars) and Szél’s favourability along with other party leaders.2 The difference between the party preference and Szél’sstrongsupportisstriking, highlighting how opposition voters are willing to support other opposition candidates. Using data from a post-election survey, Figure 2 presents a model of Szél’s favourability ratings as predicted by how much people like the various political parties and by demographics. The survey asked respondents to rate party leaders’ (and parties’) likability on a 0–10 scale, with a higher score indicating more favourable opinions.3 Szél was not notably unpopular among the supporters of any party, but, negating the strategy of appealing to women with a female candidate, she was relatively unpopular among women. A multinominal regression model (Figure 3), compares LMP voters (as reference category) to nonvoters and voters of other parties, including a catch-all ‘left’ category for minor opposition parties.4 Ideologically, LMP supporters are most comparable to other small players in the party system, to the right of MSZP–P and DK, and to the left of Fidesz and Jobbik. Most 4 D. KOVAREK AND L. LITTVAY

Figure 1. Favourability of Prime Ministerial candidates of major parties and LMP’s support (bars) between 2015 and 2018. Source: Medián Opinion and Market Research Institute.

Figure 2. Regression coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for socio- demographic and political predictors of Bernadett Szél’s favourability. Predictors are dummy coded for categorical variables and scaled as a unit-change constituting two standard deviations for continuous ones. Source: CSES5 Election Survey. ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 5

Figure 3. Multinominal regression coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for socio-demographic predictors of party vote, with LMP as the reference category. Predictors are dummy coded for categorical variables and scaled as a unit- change constituting two standard deviations for continuous ones. Source: CSES5 Election Survey. results are nonsignificant due to the small number of LMP voters (4%), but LMP voters are relatively young, more educated and most urban. Surprisingly for a ‘New Left’, green-alternative party, they are more union- ized than voters of any other major party. Ironically, women were less likely to support LMP, the only major party with a female candidate for Prime Minister and with gender quotas for parliamentary candidates. 6 D. KOVAREK AND L. LITTVAY

Bilateral withdrawals from candidacy The majority of seats in the Hungarian parliament are elected through single-member district (SMD) plurality. To defeat Fidesz, by preventing the highly fragmented opposition from splitting the vote, requires heavy coordination between parties that, although agreeing that defeating Fidesz is their most important goal, have irreconcilable differences. A party con- gress resolution obliged LMP to field their own candidates in all SMDs and to reject cooperation with any party with government experience, effectively excluding the possibility of electoral coordination with the two largest leftist parties, MSZP–P and DK, and restricting potential allies to organizations below the electoral threshold, and Jobbik. Sensing growing public pressure, LMP co-chairs engaged in unsuccessful negotiations with all parties, concluding that only ‘full-scale coordination’ of opposition parties could defeat the government. Yet this seemed impos- sible as the left-liberal bloc and Jobbik were unwilling to negotiate with each other. Four days before the election, LMP rejected MSZP-P’s last comprehensive proposal, leaving room only for bilateral negotiations or unilateral withdrawals. Six LMP candidates withdrew, instructing voters to support candidates representing MSZP–P (3), Jobbik (1), EGYÜTT (1) and DK (1). One LMP candidate did not formally withdraw but urged support for the strongest, Jobbik, challenger. In return, Szél and Hadházy faced no MSZP–P, DK, EGYÜTT or Momentum rivals. Despite the withdrawals, neither co-chair won SMD seats, although Szél lost by only 0.42%. Following the withdrawal of all left-liberal opposition candidates, Antal Csárdi won LMP’s first-ever SMD mandate, defeating the Fidesz candidate 49% to 42%.

Election results and the aftermath LMP gained 7.06% of party list votes (404,429 voters – the largest support since it was founded in 2009), securing parliamentary representation for the third consecutive election, with one SMD and 7 PR list mandates. One was nominated by LMP’s ally ‘New Beginning’ (Új Kezdet), consisting mostly of independent mayors and municipal-level rural politicians. The sole EGYÜTT MP also joined LMP’s parliamentary group following his party’s failure to pass the electoral threshold. After the election, commentators quickly depicted LMP’s unwillingness to resign in favour of the stronger opposition candidates in districts where Fidesz won with only a plurality as the main reason why the government won a supermajority. Intra-party tensions between advocates of coordina- tion and non-coordination remained high. The climax came when the party secretary (a former MP) physically assaulted Hadházy during the latter’s ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 7 disciplinary hearing. LMP expelled the former politician from the party, whereas Hadházy was banned from all party offices for 2 years, leading to his resignation from LMP and its parliamentary group. Many other prominent party members, including parliamentary candidates, faced internal ethics investigations. Charges included (alleged) co-operation with Fidesz, organizing or taking part in withdrawals without formal approval of the party congress (despite the consent of both co-chairs) or maintaining shared business interests with Fidesz oligarchs. Disciplinary measures were twice initiated against Szél (apropos of electoral coordination and public criticism of LMP’s stance on the Sargentini report),5 leading to Szél being banned from assuming any new party positions for 3 years. The ethics com- mittee also forbade several other party members from running for public office for 1–5 years, triggering the exit of one otherwise unaffected LMP politician. Eventually, Szél left both LMP and its parliamentary group in October, with the EGYÜTT MP also quitting the parliamentary faction on the same day. Thus LMP had lost both its co-chairs and 3 MPs in less than 4 months. New Beginning also broke its ties with LMP, but stayed in the parliamentary faction. LMP’s single MEP also left the party. Several prominent party members (current and former) characterized LMP’s half-year-long turmoil, exacerbated by the participatory democracy elements of its organizational structure (Kovarek and Soós 2016), as the consequence of using disciplinary commissions as a weapon to decide questions of alliance politics and to purge central party positions of those favouring cooperation with the opposition. The aftermath appears to repre- sent the success of the isolationist wing of LMP.

Conclusions The current turmoils afflicting the party would normally be seen as an electoral death sentence, yet, before the 2014 election, LMP survived a split over electoral cooperation, in which most of the party’s popular figures and some 100–200 members departed, leaving the party with a somewhat con- servative and isolationist membership (Kovarek 2016). LMP voters are more conservative on certain social issues (e.g. many regard immigration as a ‘threat to culture’) than green voters in Western Europe, and less cosmopolitan than Hungarian leftist parties. LMP’s new MPs might only enlarge these differences, as some embrace a more law-and-order approach, having policy positions on migration identical to the radical right. In addition to the traditional urban green electorate, LMP draws heavily from centrist, rural voters and right-leaning moderates in county seats. This Janus-faced character of the party leads to plenty of infighting. The answer LMP gave to the seemingly unsolvable puzzle of electoral coordination positioned LMP closer to other left-wing parties but, to some extent, it also led to 8 D. KOVAREK AND L. LITTVAY

Table 1. Political parties in Hungary. Abbreviation Full name PM candidate Ideology PR vote share Fidesz Fiatal Demokraták Viktor Orbán Nationalist/ 2,824,551 votes Szövetsége populist right (Alliance of Young (49.27%) Democrats) Jobbik Jobbik Magyarországért Gábor Vona Far-/radical right 1,092,806 votes Mozgalom (Movement for a Better (19.06%) Hungary) MSZP–P Magyar Szocialista Gergely Karácsony Social 682,701 votes Párt – Párbeszéd democratic/ greena (Hungarian Socialist (11.91%) Party – Dialogue) LMP Lehet Más a Politika Bernadett Szél Green 404,429 votes (Politics Can Be Different) (7.06%) DK Demokratikus Koalíció Ferenc Gyurcsány Social liberal 308,161 votes (Democratic Coalition) (5.38%) Momentum Momentum Mozgalom None Centrist 175,229 votes (Momentum Movement) (3.06%) EGYÜTT Együtt – A Korszakváltók Viktor Szigetvári Liberal 37,562 votes Pártja (Together – Party for (0.66%) a New Era) aKarácsony is the co-chair of Párbeszéd, a splinter party founded by ex-LMP members, promoting green values and co-operation with leftist parties. the loss of its ecopolitical character. Time will tell if LMP continues to represent green issues. Nominating a life-long environmental activist, Erzsébet Schmuck, founder and former chairwoman of the National Society of Conservationists as head of the Parliamentary Committee on Sustainable Development – the only standing committee chaired by an LMP politician since 2010 – seems to be a promising step in a green direction.

Notes

1. See1 Table for more information on political parties. 2. Question wordings are ‘If the elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for?’ and ‘In the upcoming years, would you like to see [the given politician] in an important political role?’, respectively. 3. Respondents could also pick ‘Don’t know’ or mark if they were unfamiliar with the particular politician. These responses were removed from our analysis. 4. The category includes Momentum, EGYÜTT, Munkáspárt, Kétfarkú Kutyapárt and one intentional invalid vote. 5. The proposal by the , calling on the Council to sanction Hungary for a ‘serious breach’ of EU values.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 9

Funding

Survey data collection was supported by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, CEU Research Support Scheme and CEU Intellectual Themes Initiative Comparative Populism Project.

ORCID Daniel Kovarek http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3385-3742 Levente Littvay http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2022-6886

References

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