140 140 TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION? 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN CEE There Will Be a Liberal East-Central Europe Again! GÁBOR HORN GÁBOR HORN 141 fter the collapse of the Soviet degree – in Brussels, illiberal politics have Union, there was a distinct a scenic appeal, social-psychological re- need for the achievements of searches prove that in moral questions liberalism. The parties that em- central-European citizens decide based on braced the rights, freedoms, liberal values. Without question, among the andA the values of a market economy en- young population, the desire of freedom is joyed more significant voter support, while the guiding principle. the non-liberal parties viewed some liber- alized basic values as self-evident. At the end of the 1980s, the unbearability of the communist system became clear Living in Prague, Berlin or Budapest in 1989 in every country of the Eastern Block. The was liberating and intoxicating. Neither my helpless indulgence of the Soviet Union generation, nor the one before us believed strengthened this phenomenon – for ex- that the Soviet soldiers would leave the ample, in certain countries (Czechoslovakia, country and that the communist nightmare Hungary, East Germany, Poland), the Soviet would come to an end. Just like for Buda- soldiers were strictly prohibited to inter- pest, called at that time the “Happiest Bar- vene. A few years earlier, this would have rack” in the Soviet Bloc, the same disbelief been unimaginable. The sudden freedom was felt in Honecker’s DDR or Ceausescu’s was unexpected to those who did not live Romania, a country suffering from even among active oppositionists or those who greater atrocities than the rest of the region. were proficient in international politics. The In all these states, even if to different de- accelerating disintegration of state socialism grees, communism made freedom and the was smooth to varying degrees in different hope of a western life impossible. countries. On the one hand, the popularity of basic In Poland, in the summer of 1988, Lech liberal values in the post-communist states Wałęsa, the founder of Solidarity, was invited is related to the fact that most countries of the region actually had liberal opposition (except the Polish movements, which had a rather complex identity) so the voters also viewed them as the strongest anti-commu- nist forces. IN DIFFERENT On the other hand, there was an unwavering consensus about basic liberal values – ex- NATIONAL cept the extremist parties, as well as regards the fact that belonging to the European Un- PARLIAMENTS AND – ion is gratifying and valuable with all its op- portunities and obligations. TO A LESSER DEGREE – IN BRUSSELS, All of this ended with the worldwide eco- nomic crisis in 2008, in the aftermath of ILLIBERAL POLITICS which the popularity of far-right parties rose and certain central-European conserva- HAVE A SCENIC tive parties radicalized. Although in differ- ent national parliaments and – to a lesser APPEAL 142 TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION? 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN CEE In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic, the one- party system degraded gradually, and more IN BULGARIA, or less without violence. While the forma- CZECHOSLOVAKIA, tion of a new political system needed many closed-door negotiations, the general pub- HUNGARY, lic remembers the change of the regime as a symbolic event, which embodied the de- AND THE GERMAN sire of freedom. DEMOCRATIC Irrespective of how the liberal parties per- formed in the first democratic elections in REPUBLIC, respective countries of the post-Soviet bloc, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reburial of Imre THE ONE-PARTY Nagy and other martyrs, or the Velvet Rev- SYSTEM DEGRADED olution meant an unimaginable liberation from the oppression or national terror. So, GRADUALLY, regardless of who voted for which party, the freedom – which the previously mentioned AND MORE OR LESS events stood for – was one of the most im- portant and inalienable basic values for the WITHOUT VIOLENCE whole region. In Hungary, for instance, most of the society greeted the change of a re- gime with euphoria, which showed in the – still unprecedented – civil and political to negotiate with the communist leaders, activity. Numerous civil organizations and which was followed by the inauguration of trade unions were formed. Many people the first anti-communist prime ministership joined the newfound democratic parties. of Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the spring of 1989. The appealing status of political presence While this process was not free of political showed in the high numbers of voter turn- or street conflict, it showed conspicuous out throughout the region. differences compared to the 1970s. Those who had earlier been important fig- At the same time, in Romania, dictator Nico- ures of the opposition became the lead- lae Ceaușescu won yet another election and ers of the new political systems. In 1989 continued on his path of the exploitation of in Czechoslovakia, Václav Hável, who was police forces – including the arrest of László formerly banned from writing in his own Tőkés, a Hungarian ethnic dissident pastor. country, was elected president. In 1990, in The communist regime tried to deaden the Poland, so was Lech Wałęsa. That same year rebellion (which started in Timisoara) at first in Hungary, Árpád Göncz, the hero of the to obey Mr. Ceaușescu’s commands. Then, 1956 revolution, also took the helm as the on the sixth day of the demonstration, the head of state. police forces stopped following orders after the suicide of the defense minister, Vasile During the first free elections in all former Milea. Eventually, Nicolae Ceaușescu and Soviet states, liberal parties were very popu- his wife were executed. lar. In Hungary, two parties (SZDSZ, Alliance of Free Democrats and Fidesz, Allience of GÁBOR HORN 143 Young Democrats) obtained seats in parlia- ment, while in Czechoslovakia liberals had the majority in both regions of the country (Civic Forum in Czechia and Public Against WITH Violence in Slovakia). In the once eastern- THE TRANSITION German provinces, the conservative-liberal parties won without exception. In Poland, FROM COMMUNISM, in the Lower House of parliament (Sejm), liberal-Christian-democratic and social- THE LIBERAL WORLD democratic parties received the most votes, while Solidarity became the second most AND ITS ATTACHMENTS powerful force in the Senate. BECAME A PART With the transition from communism, the liberal world and its attachments became OF EVERYDAY LIFE a part of everyday life for the citizens of the FOR THE CITIZENS former Eastern Bloc. The basic rights, free- dom of speech and assembly, all parts of the OF THE FORMER democratic life became undeniable. Private property – apart from the obvious finan- EASTERN BLOC cial value – gained an intellectual meaning. Entrepreneurs’ success in the market was now driven solely by their talent and endur- ance. Finally, trust in capitalism emerged, At the time of accession, the EU enjoyed creating chiefly positive connotations in the widespread popularity in Central European minds of most of Eastern European society. societies. The majority supported these at- In the 1990s, far-right parties reappeared tempts even in those countries where po- – only now they identified their main en- litical parties regarded as problematic from emy as globalism instead of communism. the Brussels’ perspective were the most The normative liberal forces – reflecting on successful. the political turn of the last ten years – did not give the most effective answer to the However, recently, the spread of illiberalism, appearance of emotional and economi- a phenomenon frequently discussed in rela- cal anti-Westernism, anti-Semitism, and tion to Hungary, may now be observed in xenophobia. Although parties with a far- other countries (including Poland). right agenda entered parliament, they were not a significant force. Wanting to catch up DISRUPTING THE LIBERAL with the West, the newly formed national CONSENSUS governments were working hard to get the The Great Recession in 2008 wrecked countries of the Eastern Block to join NATO Hungary’s economy, which – among other and the European Union (EU) as soon as reasons – caused the socialist-liberal coa- possible, which happened soon thereafter. lition government to lose the trust of the In addition to economic recovery and new people1. The referendum of 2008, which opportunities for all post-Soviet states and their citizens, these developments further 1 strengthened the fundamental importance Nevertheless, the 2008 financial crisis cannot be com- pared to the loss in human capital and economic pros- of freedom among public opinion. perity caused by the communist regimes in the region. 144 TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION? 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN CEE had become a keystone of the then gov- ernment’s downfall, proved that in regards to certain questions, people were reluctant to approve of reforms and a capitalist at- WITHOUT REALIZING titude, and instead required the assistance IT OR REFLECTING and intervention of a strong state2. IT IN THEIR Those who lost the most in the crisis became severely vulnerable, which greatly contrib- VOTES, MOST uted to the 2010 success of the Fidesz party and its moderate, catch-all promises, along HUNGARIANS ENJOY with the far-right Jobbik party with its anti- bank rhetoric. THE ACHIEVEMENTS Meanwhile, one of the most important OF THE FREE Hungarian parties of the regime change of WORLD 1989-90 – the Alliance of Free Democrats – had lost its political weight and was dis- solved. The aforementioned 2010 election brought about the crisis of liberalism in Hun- The second Fidesz-government had a very gary. Noteworthy, it was not only because popular slogan: “The last eight years”, which of its winner – the populist Fidesz party, but was not only a generalized condensation, also because it was symptomatic – the me- but also the onset of the politics revolving dia wrote about the voters of green parties around attacking the banking sector and in- and LMP (which is a globalization- and EU- ternational institutions, like the IMF.