In South Vietnam, airpower was subor- dinated to a ground strategy—and the ground strategy didn’t work. A F-100 Supersabre sends a 750-pound bomb hurtling toward its target in Vietnam. The In-Country War by John T. Correll he prevailing military wis- US involvement began as advice Vietnam, directed by political decisions, dom going into the 1960s was and training for the South Vietnamese was essentially that of a war of attrition,” that the United States should armed forces but the mission expanded. said Army Gen. William C. Westmore- Tnot get bogged down in a ground war in In mid-1965, the United States plunged land, commander of Military Assistance Asia. This admonition was well known into what it had so often been warned Command Vietnam, MACV. to policy-makers in the White House and against—a land war in Asia. By the end The assumption was that “search the Pentagon as they struggled with the of 1965, there were 155,000 US troops and destroy” operations could win the impending problem of Vietnam. on the ground in South Vietnam, with war in the South by inflicting more In late April of 1961, the new Presi- more on the way. casualties than the enemy was prepared dent, John F. Kennedy, was cautioned By decree from Washington, the to withstand. Westmoreland—who de- again by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who “In-Country” War in South Vietnam vised the attrition strategy—dismissed had fought two wars in the Pacific and took precedence over all other efforts any concern about “Asia’s legendary Far East. MacArthur told Kennedy it in Southeast Asia. The air campaign hordes of manpower” and said the war would be a mistake to commit American against North Vietnam, the interdic- in Vietnam was against “an enemy with soldiers on the Asian mainland. tion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the relatively limited manpower.” Nevertheless, two weeks later, JFK’s “secret war” in Northern Laos were Despite assurances from the White National Security Council asked the strictly secondary to the ground war in House and MACV that the war was going Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine “the South Vietnam. well, progress was difficult to see, and size and composition of forces which The In-Country War was run by the after the Tet Offensive of 1968, the at- would be desirable in the case of a Army. The other services—primarily the trition strategy lost whatever credibility possible commitment of US forces to Air Force—flew hundreds of thousands it might once have had. Vietnam.” The Chiefs estimated that of sorties in support of the ground war, Tet, envisioned by North Vietnam “40,000 US forces will be needed to but they had little say in the strategy. as a master stroke to end the war, was clean up the Viet Cong threat.” “The US military strategy employed in a colossal military failure for the com- 64 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2007 munists. Despite that, it was the turning mand. Second Air Division, which later the US air base there. For the moment, point of the war. The scope and strength became 7th Air Force, was also activated they had no other mission. of the offensive, amplified by graphic as the air arm of MACV. During the 1964 election campaign, news reports flowing back to the United Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force President Lyndon B. Johnson had de- States, undercut public confidence and Chief of Staff, argued without success clared that “we are not about to send support for the war. that the locus of the war was in North American boys nine or ten thousand After Tet, the United States made Vietnam, not in the South, and declared, miles away from home to do what Asian no serious attempt to win. The driving “We should stop swatting flies and go boys ought to be doing for themselves.” objective became “peace with honor,” after the manure pile.” Six months later, he would reverse his which meant settling with the enemy and position and send American troops to getting out of Vietnam. Withdrawal of US Gulf of Tonkin Incident Vietnam. ground troops began in July 1969. US forces, supposedly limited to The opening rounds of Rolling Thun- Vietnam came along just after the training and support, engaged routinely der did not amount to much. There Kennedy Administration introduced in combat on a clandestine basis during were not many sorties flown and the “Flexible Response” in 1961. Flexible the “advisory” period. The combat role targets were chosen by officials in Response was not a highly developed broke into the open in 1964 when US Washington—who were more inter- doctrine but was more a concept or even naval vessels were attacked in the Gulf ested in sending signals than in fight- a philosophy of conflict. Its emphasis of Tonkin by North Vietnamese patrol ing a war—to be as nonprovocative was on having a number of military boats, and the Air Force moved fighters as possible. Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, options—particularly conventional op- and bombers into Southeast Asia. commander of US Pacific Command, tions—with which to meet a crisis. It In response to attacks on air bases in said the bombing was “completely was the seedbed of “limited war.” South Vietnam, US Air Force and Navy insignificant.” He added, “The North Flexible Response was based in con- airmen struck selected targets in North Vietnamese probably didn’t even know siderable part on the theories of retired Vietnam. They began with small-scale the planes were there.” Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, the former reprisal raids and escalated in March The politicians gave this weak-willed Army Chief of Staff. 1965 to Operation Rolling Thunder, effort less than a month before they Taylor had been opposed to the Eisen- sustained air strikes against the North. decided that Rolling Thunder was a hower Administration’s doctrine of On March 8, a week after Rolling failure and shifted to a ground option. Massive Retaliation and the associated Thunder began, two battalions of US On April 1, the White House changed prominence of the Air Force in national marines landed at Da Nang to defend the mission of the marines at Da Nang The In-Country War Staff map by Zaur Eylanbekov by John T. Correll strategy. He resigned and wrote An Uncertain Trumpet, published in 1959. It called for more emphasis on non- nuclear, limited war and a much bigger role for the ground forces. Kennedy read the book and was impressed. Taylor’s concept of flexible response seemed to fit with the challenges emerging in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union had already de- clared its support for “wars of national liberation.” Insurgency in South Vietnam was of particular concern. In 1961, the White House ordered the armed services to develop capabilities to de- feat counterinsurgency and dispatched special forces, including a detachment of air commandos, to assist the South Vietnamese government. Kennedy in 1961 recalled Taylor to active duty, and in 1962 he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MACV was established in 1962 as a At peak deployment in 1968, USAF had 56 squadrons and 1,200 aircraft based in subunified command of US Pacific Com- South Vietnam. They were arrayed at 10 major bases, depicted here. AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2007 65 US Military Personnel in South Vietnam recognized that that shibboleth was progress. However, the expectation of subject to modification in terms of wearing down the enemy turned out to Air Force All Services the nation’s objectives, as it had been be wrong. North Vietnamese and Viet 1960 68 875 modified in the past.” Cong fighting strength kept increas- 1961 1,006 3,164 The first approach to employing the ing instead of decreasing. MACV had 1962 2,429 11,326 ground force was the “enclave strategy,” critically misjudged the staying power advocated by Taylor, who by that time of the adversary. 1963 4,630 16,263 had become US ambassador to South “In any case,” Westmoreland said, 1964 6,604 23,310 Vietnam. Under that concept, US troops “what alternative was there to a war of 1965 20,620 184,314 would occupy secure enclaves along the attrition? A ground invasion of North 1966 52,913 385,278 coast and range out as far as 50 miles Vietnam was out.” The White House for selected operations, after which would not approve a more aggressive 1967 55,908 485,587 they would return to the enclaves. Other approach for fear that China or even 1968 58,434 536,134 ground force action would be the job the Soviet Union might be drawn into 1969 58,422 475,219 of the South Vietnamese army. the war. Disengagement was not an 1970 43,053 334,591 Westmoreland did not like the enclave option either. strategy and he managed to replace it Gen. John P. McConnell, who had 1971 28,791 156,776 with “search and destroy” operations replaced LeMay as Air Force Chief of 1972 7,608 24,172 in which US troops could be deployed Staff, argued for an air strategy, but he June 1973 14 49 anywhere MACV wanted them to go. was no more successful than LeMay The main objective was to eliminate had been. The official view was that Except for 1973, totals are as of Dec. 31. Whereas most Army forces in large enemy units. “It was, after all, the place to win the war was on the Southeast Asia were stationed in the enemy’s big units—not the gue- ground in the South.