Confronting Allosemitism in Europe Jewish Identities in a Changing World

Series Editors

Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yosef Gorny, and Judit Bokser Liwerant

VOLUME 21

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/jicw Confronting Allosemitism in Europe

The Case of Belgian Jews

Eliezer Ben-Rafael

LEIDEN | BOSTON Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ben Rafael, Eliezer. Confronting allosemitism in Europe : the case of Belgian Jews / by Eliezer Ben-Rafael. pages cm. — (Jewish identities in a changing world, ISSN 1570-7997 ; volume 21) Includes bibliographical references. Summary: “Only a few decades after the Holocaust, Belgian Jews, like most European Jewries, are under the attack of forces stemming from a variety of sources. How do they confront and stand these new hardships? Research done all over Europe from 2012 through 2013 tried to answer this question. Among the cases investigated, the Belgian Jewry is one of the most interesting. It is both versatile and representative, revealing essential components of the general experience of European Jews today. Conceptual considerations pave the way to the study of their plight that has been, by any criterion, anything but “usual”. Belgian Jews, it appears, are “like” many other Jewries in Europe but “a little more”. They highlight the question: is allosemitism at all surmountable?”—Provided by publisher. ISBN 978-90-04-27405-1 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-27406-8 (e-book) 1. Antisemitism— Belgium—History—21st century. 2. Jews—Belgium—History—21st century. I. Title.

DS146.B4B46 2014 305.892’40493—dc23 2014006678

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual ‘Brill’ typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1570-7997 isbn 978 90 04 27405 1 (hardback) isbn 978 90 04 27406 8 (e-book)

Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Contents

Preface vii

PART A Predicaments 1

1 A Sinuous History 3 From the Beginning 3 Enlightment and Fragmentation 7 Contemporary Challenges 12 In Conclusion 15 2 Antisemitism and Allosemitism 18 Antisemitism 18 Self-Hatred and Other Responses 26 Allosemitism 30 Conclusions 34 3 Contemporary Perceptions and Attitudes of Europe’s Jews 36 The Pew Research Center’s Portrait of Jewish Americans 36 JPR and FRA’s Survey 37 Perceptions of Antisemitism 40 Experiences of Harassment and Discrimination 43 Conclusions 46

PART B Facing Hostility 49

4 Belgian Jews: A Long Story 51 Ever Since the First Clues 51 Belgian Jewry Today 55 Sources of Antisemitism 57 Expressions of Judeophobia 60 Conclusion 66 5 The Belgian Sample 68 The Sample 68 What Jewishness Means 71 Belgian Identification and the Perceptions of Social Reality 74 vi contents

Perceptions of Antisemitism 75 Experiencing Antisemitism 77 Conclusion 81 6 Social Features and Perceptions 83 The Impact of Age Differences 83 Education 88 Gender 93 Marital Status 95 In Conclusion 97 7 Origins of Jewishness and Community 99 The Eda Dimension 99 The Impact of Conversion and Mixed Parenthood 102 The Ecological and Linguistic Divide 108 In Conclusion 115 8 Religiosity and Antisemitism 117 Religiosity as Differentiation 117 Age and Religiosity 125 In Conclusion 131

PART C The Challenge 133

9 Belgian Jewry Compared 135 Summarizing the Data 135 Belgian Jewry among Europe’s Jewries 144 What We Learn 146 10 Neo-Jewishness and Allosemitism 149

A Personal Afterword 155

Appendix 157 1 The Questionnaire (excerpts) 157 2 Conversion and Mixed Parenthood—Impacts on Jewish Religiosity and Identification 177 3 Organizational Structures and Institutions of Belgium Jewry 180

References 182 Index 189 Preface

This work analyses Belgian Jews’ perceptions of, and reactions to, present-day antisemitism in their country. The data on which this book is grounded are drawn from a large-scale research conducted under the auspices of the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). The survey took place during 2012–2013 and was led by the London Institute for Jewish Policy Research and carried out by the Ipsos MORI Agency. It covered a number of European Union countries that included France, the UK, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Sweden, and Belgium. Laura Staetsky and Jonathan Boyd of the IJPR coordinated the work and a number of researchers were in charge of the questionnaire’s elaboration, followed the development of the research work in each country, and analyzed its findings. This team comprised Erik Cohen (for France), Laura Staetsky and Jonathan Boyd (for the UK), Sergio Della Pergola (for Italy), Lars Dencik (for Sweden), Andrej Koczak (for Hungary), Olaf Gloeckner (for Germany) and the author of this volume, Eliezer Ben-Rafael (for Belgium). I am also especially grateful to Laura Staetsky for her cooperation in the composition of the specific JPR report about Belgium, her statistical assistance and the figures that she elaborated and which appear in this volume. I am also very grateful to Yasmin Alkelay for her precious statistical support. The survey data were publicized in November 2013 by the FRA, and several publications are now in process by the IJPR and members of the team; they will come out during 2014 and 2015. The data concerning the Belgium case are presented, analyzed, and concluded in this volume. I am grateful to the heads of the IJPR for inviting me to join the team, giving me an opportunity to participate in this very first attempt to study how European Jews as a whole are reacting to their present-day predicament. This project, that encompasses the strongest Jewries of Western Europe, was solely enabled thanks to the determination of the FRA to endorse it, and the EU Authority’s consent to fund it. It is their wish and will that made this endeavor possible and they deserve the gratitude of all the participant-researchers, the author included. This volume is but one block in a construction currently being built for the study of Jews’ reactions to the present-day revival of allosemitism in Europe. However, the case which it discusses here specifically, that of Belgium, is both versatile and representative, and reveals essential components of the general contemporary experience of European Jews. As such, this study carries an overall analytical and theoretical significance. ∵ viii preface

Part A, that opens this volume, consists of historical, conceptual, and methodological considerations as well as an overview of the pan-European FRA research. Chapter 1 introduces readers to the history of Jews on European soil, in which Belgian Jews play a part. This brief description is enough to reveal that the Jewish plight on this conti- nent has been, by any criterion, everything but “usual.” From the earliest stages, Jews frequently confronted conflictual circumstances and rough relations with neighbors leading to discrimination and persecution. These difficulties were duplicated over centuries and, from “antisemitism” to “allosemitism,” impelled scholars to forge special concepts to analyze the singularity of Jews’ predicaments—and their metamorphoses through the ages—in this part of the world. Those notions draw on a scrutiny of the far-reaching roots of the hatred of Jews, that culminated in the mid-twentieth century in the infamous war waged by the Nazis, across Europe and beyond, against the very existence of Jews. Chapter 2 discusses the paradoxical European-Jewish reality in the post-Holocaust years. Just a few decades after the Nazi assault on Jewry and some respite from anti- Jewish harassment, hatred of the Jew again started spreading throughout Europe. Researchers now speak of neo-judeophobia, anti-israelism, new antisemitism, and allosemitism, to refer to anti-Jewish phenomena that are appearing in different places, and stem out from new circumstances. It is from there that Chapter 3 focuses on the issues tackled by the FRA survey that now assume great importance: to what extent do Jews feel they are again the targets of special animosity? And if so, how do they react to this revived hatred toward them? This chapter presents major general findings of the pan-European survey. Among other aspects, it addresses Jews’ attitudes toward Jewishness itself, their understanding and experiences of present-day hostility toward them, and their reactions to it. Part B then focuses on Belgian Jews in particular. Chapter 4 introduces the case by tracing the historical background of this Jewry up to its general present-day configuration. Further on, the chapter cites some of the public expressions of hostility toward Jews that have multiplied in recent years and have often taken on highly virulent forms. Chapter 5 delves into the analysis of the FRA Belgian data and the set of questions that it investigated. Hence, it elaborates on what Jewishness means to Jews in Belgium; how they describe their society’s major features at this time of economic and social difficulties for Europe as a whole; if and how they perceive present-day antisemitism in their surrounding; if and how they experience it personally; and how they describe the impact of this presence on their life and their plans for the future. Chapter 6 pursues the analysis by looking at the impact of major sociological features that distinguish respondents from each other. This step focuses only on aspects that yield significant differences—by age, education, gender, or marital status—with preface ix respect to the various issues tackled by the survey, from Jewishness to the impact of antisemitism on plans for the future. With respect to the same issues, Chapter 7 studies the differences between respondents obtained in reference to their specific particularistic backgrounds. The intention is to consider the origin of the respondents’ Jewishness (by birth or conversion), their specific legacies (the “eda” or ethnic factor), current community setting, and, last but not least in the Belgian case, their geolinguistic belongingness. Chapter 8 then turns to the differentiation that is the most significant of all other criteria examined thus far, namely religiosity. This factor indeed appears to possess, in relative terms, the greatest weight regarding how respondents perceive their collective identity, the condition of their country, antisemitism around them, and what kind of experience they undergo in this latter respect. To refine this discussion, the chapter also reflects on religiosity in the light of its interactions with age differences. Part C concludes this volume with the formulation of some generalizations. Chapter 9 positions the case of Belgian Jewry, through a comparative approach, within the wider context of European Jewry viewed as a whole. The issue tackled here is whether Belgian Jews are “like others,” “less” or “more” than other Jewries investigated in the FRA survey. In other words, in what respect do they perhaps illustrate singularity, and in what others do they tend to reflect the general average characteristic of Europe’s Jews. And, indeed, it appears that they do exhibit, interestingly enough, some distinc- tive features which are their own. In Chapter 10, we go back to the notion of allosemitism that, in the final analysis, seems most appropriate to the analysis of Belgian Jewry’s plight. The crucial question at this stage is, of course: is it surmountable? The Appendix gives first large excerpts from the questionnaire, thus offering direct access to the main tool of this cross-European research. Second, it provides a selection of statistical data about the impacts of conversion to Judaism and mixed parenthood. Third, it presents the reader with a list of the major institutions and organisations of Belgium’s Jewry.

PART A Predicaments

∵

chapter 1 A Sinuous History

From the Beginning

The story of European Jewry is more than two thousand years old. It has known periods of prosperity but also times of persecutions (Baron 1952). Yet it is quite impossible to describe the history of the Jews and the evolution of their culture without assessing the vicissitudes of their condition as a minority that was repetitively persecuted and harassed in most various circumstances. Among all peoples of the earth, Jews are certainly one of the most conspicuous cases of rejection. Quite uniquely among all categories of the “damned,” hatred of Jews has even received a special label—antisemitism—that has its own long history. As shown by Nichols (1993), cases of expressions of anti-Jewish sentiments are legion and can be traced back more than twenty-four centuries. Jews were the target of mass massacres by non-Jews already in the third century BCE, when Alexandria was home to the largest Jewish diaspora community. Manetho, an Egyptian historian, wrote scathingly of the Jews at that time, while Agatharchides of Cnidus followed suit by ridiculing Jews’ laws as “absurd.” Later on, illustrious historians and writers such as Cicero and Philon signal the presence of a Jewish diaspora in the Roman Empire. After the decline of the community of Alexandria, the Jewish population of Rome gained in importance, especially when prisoners captured in Jerusalem in 63 were brought to the capital of the empire. Under Augustus, 8,000 Jews lived in Rome according to Flavius (1984). Other communities were found in Croatia, the province of Pannonia (Western Hungary), Spain, and Southern Gaul. Jews also left prints dating from the Fifth and Sixth centuries in cities of the Loire and in Narbonne. Here too, in Rome and elsewhere, Jews often had difficult relations with their neighbors. In this context, Chanes (2004) recalls Suetonius’ narrative of the Jews’ expulsion from Rome by Tiberius following the latter’s demand to be worshiped by all as an emperor-god. Jews could by no means accept this. When Christianity became Rome’s official religion, the state’s attitude towards Jews still worsened (Elukin 2007): hostility to Jews was now fueled by theological differences and competition over converts. This hostility was conveyed in church preaching and public statements. The advent of the Middle Ages showed, for a certain period, a softening of the attitude toward Jews by monarchs. Beginning in the ninth century, Jews

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi 10.1163/9789004274068_002 4 chapter 1 could make their homes in Frankish territories, and it is known that Jews held positions at the court of Charles the Great and his successor. Letters from the Cairo Genizah confirm that business relations existed then between Jews of France, Germany, and Egypt. At more or less the same epoch—from the eighth to the eleventh century—one witnesses the flourishing of the Golden Age of Spain’s Jews under Muslim rule. Jews and Christians were classified here, like in the Muslim world as a whole, as dhimmis (People of the Book) and allowed to practice their religion quite freely within given limits. In Spain, most especially in Al-Andalus, a major center of Jewish life took shape that contributed figures like Salomon ibn Gabirol, Maimonides, and Yehuda Halevi (Todeschini 2004). Around 1,000 major communities were also developing beyond Spain, in Northern France, England, and in the Rhine valley. Gershom Ben-Yehuda (960–1028) lived in Mayence, where he headed one of the most prestigious yeshivot (plural of yeshiva, i.e. rabbinical center of learning in Hebrew). Later during the same century, Rashi (1040–1105), the authoritative scholar of the Bible and the Talmud, lived in Troyes, France. However, across Christian Europe the strengthening of the Church’s power brought with it renewed harsh discrimination and persecutions. Some Popes and princes showed more willingness to protect Jews but they were exceptions. Christians acknowledged the roots of their faith in Judaism but, for them, the Church now constituted the new Israel. Jews’ suffering was the reminder of their murder of Christ and punishment for their refusal to recognize him as the Messiah. Some fathers of the Church even argued that Satan dwelt among them. As a “damned nation,” Jews were excluded from many occupations and, quite often, the number of Jews authorized to reside in given places was limited. Their quarters became ghettoes and they were forbidden to enlarge them or to buy land. In a general manner, they were confined to a condition of social vulnerability and their eventual expulsion and confiscation of property became an eventual—and quite usual—source of benefits for princes and kings, under pretexts such as blood libel. Jews were thus expelled from England in 1290, and from France in 1306 for the first time, and in 1394 for a second time after they had been recalled in 1315. At the time of the Crusades (from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries), Jews were subjected to mass slaughter by those fighters on their way to “liber- ate” Jerusalem from Islam and who could not refrain from assaulting Jews, the “infidels” immediately at hand on European soil. Depicted by the Christian narrative as murderers of Christ, Jewish communities were literally destroyed in the Rhineland and other places. Accusations of Jews for ritual murder were now frequently brandished, leading many of them to the stake. In 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council promulgated the obligation for Jews to wear a yellow A Sinuous History 5 badge. With the outbreak in 1348 of the Black Death that lasted for twelve years, Jews were commonly accused of poisoning water sources and were targets of still other massacres. Pope Clement VI tried to protect the Jews by a papal bull (6 July 1348) but this did not prevent, a few months later, the burning alive of 900 Jews in Strasbourg (Germa et al. 2011). The most dramatic scene of Jewish history would move, however, to Southern Europe. The Golden Age of Spanish Jewish culture was ending up with worsening Jewish-Muslim relations and the eventual outbreak of pogroms against Jews. The Almohades who had taken control of the Maghreb and Andalusian territories by 1147, were fundamentalist and treated dhimmis harshly. According to Andrew Bostom (2008), these manifestations of hatred of Jews in Islam derive, here too, from theological teaching. This understanding is not completely shared by Bernard Lewis (2006) who writes that Muslims’ negative stereotypes regarding Jews were not necessarily indicative of hatred. It was only in the late nineteenth-century that political movements that can be described as antisemitic emerged among Muslims. Marvin Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer (2005) tend to contradict this argument by pointing out that there are mostly negative references to Jews in the Quran and the Hadith, and that Islamic regimes generally treated Jews in degrading ways. The Quran makes forty-three specific references to “Bani Isrāʾīl” (the Children of Israel) which, as they show, describe Jews “negatively.” According to them, the hadith are “even more scathing than the Quran” in attacking the Jews who, the authors say, are cursed and anathematized forever by God because they are “cheats and trai- tors; defiant and stubborn.” Jews, it is further noted, killed the prophets and are liars who falsified the Scriptures: it is even contended in these texts that a foul odor emanates from them. In Spain itself, the days of Islam were counted, however, and the Jews’ situation was by no means improving, to say the least. Trouble started in Spain through the reconquest of the country by Christian princes. Anti-Jewish riots took place and spurred emigration to other Mediterranean shores. This was but a preamble to the Inquisition, established in 1478 by Ferdinand and Isabella of Castile, that led to the general expulsion of Jews from the country in 1492, and from Portugal a few years later. For nearly three centuries, the Inquisition pursued the Jews who had converted to Christianity—the Marranos—sus- pecting them of secretly observing Jewish practices. A ban excluded from any official function anyone who did not respond to the rule of limpieza de sangre (purity of blood, meaning absence of any Jewish parentage). It is noteworthy that the Inquisition was officially abolished only in 1834 (Blumenkranz 1972). In the new Protestant Europe as well, Jews were becoming the target of another enemy, namely, Martin Luther. After making vain overtures towards 6 chapter 1 the Jews with the aim of converting them to Reformed Protestantism, he turned against them virulently. In his On the Jews and their Lies (1543/1971), he depicted them as “venomous beasts,” “disgusting scums” and “devils incarnate,” and recommended their oppression and expulsion. Fortunately for the Jews, this approach had but little influence on a Protestant country like Holland, where Jews were accepted as an honorable minority and enjoyed freedom of cult and several privileges of citizenship. A fate that bluntly contrasted, unfortunately, with the expulsions of Jews from several other Christian countries (as well as Spain). These expulsions drove Jews to emigrate to Poland and other Eastern European countries that were ready to welcome them. In 1550, Poland and Lithuania were already home to 160,000 Jews and by 1648, their number had soared to 350,000, representing 5–7% of the general population. Polish Jewry now became the cultural and spiritual center of the Jewish world. Its most prosperous period took place under Sigismund I Jagiello (1506–1548) and his son, Sigismund (1548–1572). From 1580 to 1764, the Council of Four Countries (Va’ad Arba Aratzot in Hebrew) based in Lublin, Poland, was the central gov- erning body of this population residing in Great Poland, Little Poland, Ruthenia, and Volhynia. In the larger communities, yeshivot operated under the leadership of well-known scholars. In 1550, a Hebrew Bible was printed in Krakow, and at the end of the century, Jewish printing houses in the city and in Lublin were producing numerous Jewish books (Ducreux 2011). The state of the Jews in this area deteriorated however with the uprising of the Cossacks that started a new wave of massacres and confrontations. Moreover, Polish Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy were now adopting frankly anti-Jewish stances that compounded the harsh persecutions that targeted them. Yet, at the time, Eastern European Jewry had developed a degree of cultural homogeneity thanks to its common language, Yiddish—an early variant of German mixed with Hebrew elements and borrowings from Polish, Russian, and other languages prevailing in countries where Jews lived. The fact that this language was written with Hebrew characters was by no means trivial it awarded a degree of autonomy that over time engendered a literature of quality (Bregoli & Francesconi 2010). The new difficulties would however leave strong imprints on that community’s culture and life. After all the hardships that had hit their forunners a few generations before, and having enjoyed some years of relative calm and prosperity, the new destabilization explains to some extent the sudden upsurge of powerful mystic movements within the Jewish population. Messianic activities and teachings by Sabbatai Zevi (1626–1676) and, later, Jacob Frank (1726– 1791) took root among Polish and Lithuanian Jews, checked mainly by the A Sinuous History 7 growing influence of Israel ben Eliezer (1698–1760), the so-called Baal Shem Tov (the “Owner of a Good Name,” and in abreviation “Besht”). The Besht him- self sanctified religious fervor and subjective experiences, though he remained loyal to the framework of the Jewish faith. This allowed him to lay down the foundations of Hassidism (derived from hassidut, i.e. dedication) as a current of Judaism that would soon become a main stream in Eastern European Jewry. He also attracted a cohort of followers who, on his death, created Hassidic courts of their own—Chabad-Lubavitch, Aleksander, Bobov, Ger, Nadvorna, Wiznitz and others. In turn, the popularity of Hassidism stirred the proponents of traditional Judaism to counter-attack in the name of Judaism’s legacy of biblic and talmudic learning. They were headed by the teachers and students of the Vilna yeshiva, who became knows as “Mitnagdim” (“Opponents” in Hebrew) and who were led by the Gaon (“Genius”) of Vilna (1720–1797). Yet, excommunication orders against the Hassidim, issued by the Gaon, were unable to prevent Hassidism from taking root in Eastern European Jewry. This brief historical outline of Jewry confirms the assumption that Jews illustrate a singular combination of a very long history—Jews certainly are one of the oldest peoples of the world—and an equally long history of persecution and harassment. Throughout that sinuous historical track and the diversity of situations, it appears that Jews have most often been confronted with rejection; and in fact this challenge is a major factor that gave shape to Jewry itself. This trait, to be sure, has not evanesced with modernity, despite the metamorphoses discernible in the contents and forms of Jewishness.

Enlightment and Fragmentation

At the epoch, indeed, that Mitnagdim and Hassidim confronted each other in the East, Western and Central Europe were, indeed, experiencing the start of a new era, namely, the era of “enlightment” marked by the diffusion of liberalism and tolerance for religious pluralism. The Edict of Tolerance issued by Joseph II of Austria (1781) granted Jews freedom of worship, and a ruling by Louis XVI (1787) granted them similar rights in France. The question of Jews’ duties and rights was now on the public agenda. In France, a process took place in the newly created Constituent Assembly that, over 1789 to 1791, eventually resulted in the granting of full citizenship to Jews. What is more, the armies of the Republic and, later, the Empire forcibly spread the ideas of the French Revolution that included the emancipation of Jews. Hence by the end of the nineteenth century, Jews enjoyed equal rights throughout Europe, except in the Russian Empire that, at the time, included Poland and Romania (Dubnow 8 chapter 1

1916–1920). Elsewhere Jews were now sharing the social space with non-Jews and evolved alongside them, in societies that were becoming increasingly secular. Jews were much less numerous in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe but vibrant communities existed in countries like France, Holland, England, and some German states. This context of emancipation, however, signified not only huge progress in the status of Jews in society, but also an acute crisis for Judaism and reap- praisals of its legacy. One such reappraisal within European Jewry was the appearance of the so-called Haskalah—a Hebrew word meaning knowledge, cultivatedness, and education, and standing for Enlightenment in European languages. The diffusion of this movement, that first appeared in Germany, translated Jews’ desire to fully integrate into European societies and a readiness on their part to minimize their cultural distinctiveness. From this stream soon emerged the Reform movement that advocated the repudiation of what it considered “outdated” practices and approaches, seeing in the Torah and the Talmud mainly sources of ethical inspiration. This movement, which is still a part of world Jewry today, was willing to abandon kashrut (Jews’ dietetic laws), Sabbath observance and, in some circles, even circumcision. The opponents to Reform consisted—and still consist—of orthodox communities that decided to retain the Judaism of traditional settings. For this brand of Judaism, modernity was not to be accepted undiscriminately. Among its followers, however, one could soon distinguish adherents of the “Modern Orthodoxy” of Raphael Hirsch (1808–1888); it endorsed both the duty of Jews’ to stay close to their ancestral values, and their participation in the national society. This trend was opposed by the ultra-Orthodox, comprising both Hassidim and Mitnagdim, who advocated a firm uncompromising loyalty to the Halakha (Talmudic law) and stood for the belief that religious law must govern life in all its aspects. This radicalism adopted bigotry as a mode of behavior and was committed to carrying unambiguous external markers (black clothes, beard for men, wigs for women etc.) that distinguished its followers from other Jews, let alone “regular human beings.” Midway between the Reform and the Orthodox, Conservative (or Masorti) Judaism elaborated a conciliatory in-between approach. This movement argued that the Halakha should be observed as far as it is compatible with the conditions of modern life. The interpretation of the law should also be flexible to allow optimal adaptation of the Jews to the needs of time. Already at this epoch, moreover, tendencies were appearing that devised formulations of Judaism severing the necessary connection of the Jewish identity with religiosity. Jewish socialism that aspired to a new social and world order which respects Jewish particularism, Zionism that fought for the estab- A Sinuous History 9 lishment of a Jewish nation in the historical Land of Israel, and humanistic secularism that wanted, above all, to establish a Jewishness outside religiosity, are all ideologies that assess a worldly reality in which no divine force intervenes, and center on belief in the human mind and the individual’s power to determine his or her individual and collective fate. Judaism is primarily defined here as a culture with its own languages, ethics, traditions, and historical memories. In one sentence, Judaism after emancipation was not the same Judaism as before: not only had the status of Jews been transformed, but so had the relations of Jews to Judaism and its interpretations. Yet while Jews were now often becoming less different from non-Jews, Europe remained nonetheless a major scene for hatred of Jews. One of the peaks of that hatred was the Dreyfus Affair in France in the late nineteenth- and early-twentieth century, when an innocent officer of Jewish origin was accused of treason on behalf of Germany. It was only after a series of revisions of the trial, several years in a penal colony, and an acute confrontation with a powerful anti-Jewish camp that the man was set free and re- integrated in the army. The “affair” revealed to the world the existence in a Western democracy of an antisemitism that did not attack traditional Jews still living in communities of the past but rather a Jew who aspired to assimilate in society, as a citizen dedicated to his motherland. Another “affair” was the world-famous blood-libel trial in Russia (1913) of Beilis, who after several years recovered his freedom. This antisemitism also expressed itself in most violent forms—pogroms—on the eastern borders of Western Europe. Some years before the Dreyfus and Beilis affairs, the assassi- nation of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 had awakened a wave of massacres of Jews that was followed by the expulsion of Jews from Moscow in 1890 and the pogrom of Kishinev in 1903. These events spurred emigration from Eastern Europe to Western Europe and America. In France alone, the Jewish population jumped from 60,000 in 1882 to 120,000 in 1914 (Dubnow 1916–1920). On the other side of the Atlantic, between 1900 and 1924, after 1.75 million Jews migrated from Eastern Europe, there was a concomitant resurgence of antisemitism there too. Jews were discriminated against in employment, access to residential areas, and membership in clubs. They also faced tight quotas on their enrolment in schools and employment in teaching positions in colleges and universities. The lynching by a mob in Marietta, Georgia in 1915 of Leo Frank, falsely accused of raping a 14-year old girl, turned the spotlight on that antisemitism (Chanes 2004). The worst, however, was still to come. During the First World War, the Jews fought like their fellow countrymen on both sides: 6000 Jews died for France, 10 chapter 1 and 12,000 for Germany. And yet in Germany the Jews were quickly accused of being responsible for the defeat in the war. The Nazi party gained popularity with a program grounded in the hatred of Jews. The National Socialist regime instituted repressive legislation denying the Jews basic civil rights (the 1935 so-called Nuremberg laws). The pogrom it launched during the night of 9–10 November 1938—the Kristallnacht—caused hundreds of Jewish victims, and destroyed their property and synagogues. In the years to come, more than 30,000 Jews were deported to concentration camps. Antisemitic laws, agita- tion and propaganda were extended to Nazi-occupied Europe—West, Central and East. In the East, the Third Reich forced Jews into ghettos in Warsaw, Krakow, Lvov, Lublin and many other places until, after the invasion of Russia in 1941, mass murder was conducted by the Einsatzgruppen, which culminated between 1942 to 1945 in a systematic holocaust (Friedlander 2008). That Holocaust was the worst and most devastating cataclysm that Jews had ever experienced in their history, and certainly one of the worst in human history at all. This was antisemitism at its peak, that became, without any pragmatic or instrumental motivation, one of the central goals of the Nazis’ world war. Sixty- five years after the war, the demographic consequences are still apparent: while the world’s population has quadrupled, the world Jewish population has not yet reached its level of 1940; from being 60% of the world’s Jewish population in 1940, only 10% currently live in Europe (Della Pergola 2013). Towards the end of the war, 1.2 million Jews were displaced people seeking a home; hundreds of thousands went to France, Great Britain, Palestine/Israel and elsewhere. Furthermore, from 1948 to 1967, about 235,000 North African and Egyptian Jews took refuge in France while about the same number emigrated to Israel. The end of the war and discovery of the amplitude of the disaster, not only for the nations that had been involved in the fighting, but also for the stateless Jewish people, seemed at first glance to temper the virulence of antisemitism among peoples, with the realization of the immense horror to which it can lead. This assumption, however, did not work for Soviet Russia where antisemitism continued to serve political objectives. This had already been illustrated in the competition between Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky and the numerous liquidations of faithful Bolsheviks who happened to be Jewish. After 1948, that antisemitism would reach a new peak in the USSR during the campaign against “rootless cosmopolitans” (euphemism for “Jews”) and the murder of whole cohorts of poets, writers, painters, and other artists. Antisemitic propaganda in Poland carrying the same slogans resulted in the flight of Holocaust survivors from the country. The Soviet government was in fact conducting a systematic policy of liquidating the Jewish cultural identity—notwithstanding the fact A Sinuous History 11 that a “Jewish nationality” label was affixed to Jews’ identity cards. Jews had been drafted to the war effort during WWII but this did not prevent the resump- tion of persecution when it ended. This policy culminated with the arrest of Stalin’s doctors, all Jewish, for an alleged conspiracy to kill him; they were saved by the dictator’s death in April 1953. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev antisemitism became less violent though Jews were still barred from initiating community activity; in 1967 with the Israeli-Arab war, it flared up again throughout the Soviet bloc. Numerous Jews across the world were now cam- paigning on behalf of those whom Elie Wiesel (1987) called “the Jews of Silence,” that is, Eastern Europe Jewry that was completely cut off from world Jewry. From 1969 to 1980, under the pressure of international opinion, the Soviet regime allowed the migration of about 300,000 Jews—to the United States and Israel. Though, it was not before Gorbachev’s perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union that those Jews gained their freedom. A huge emigration took place, that brought two million Jews to the United States and Israel. While in 1959 the Soviet Jewish population exceeded 2.2 million people, in 2010 Russia was home to no more than 200,000 Jews. A by-product of the exodus was the creation of a new Jewry in Germany numbering some 200,000 Jews, 90% of whom are immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). In a quite contrasting environment, anti-Jewish hatred was alive and well in the Muslim world. Antisemitism there reached a peak during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Rothstein 2009). This was firstly illustrated by the Damascus Affair (1840) when Jewish residents were accused of ritual murder, following the disappearance in the city of an Italian monk and his servant. Interventions with the Ottoman authorities by the consuls of England, France and Austria who were joined by Christian, Jewish and Muslim figures finally resulted—after months of torture of jailed people and the death of several of them—in the cancellation of the trial and the freeing of the nine survivors. Yet following the Affair, a wave of pogroms throughout Syria reached diverse Middle Eastern and North African cities. Decades later, in 1912, the Jewish quarter of Fez in Morocco, was attacked by a Muslim mob and similar assaults took place in Algeria in the 1930s, and in Iraq and Libya in the 1940s (Joffe 2009). All in all, it appears that anti-Jewish feelings resisted the transformation of societies in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries despite the fact that very little remained as it was in the distant past. In view of that continuity, more and more people contended that the solution was not only in the transformation of Jewry and the participation in democratic societies but in attacking the very condition of “otherness” attached to Jewishness as an entity 12 chapter 1 dispersed among peoples over the earth. This “hypothesis” cannot be said as entirely validated in practice, at the present time 65 years and more after the creation of Israel as a “Jewish democratic state.”

Contemporary Challenges

Following WWII, it is to admit that a decline of the hatred of Jews was discernible at least in the Western world during the late 1940s and the 1950s. Yet, anti- Jewish feelings would gradually regain ground. Half a century after the war, the Anti-Defamation League (2012) reported that over 2001, no less than 1,432 acts of antisemitism took place in the United States—acts of harassment, verbal intimidation, threats and physical assaults. One example of antisemitic assessment is that of John Hagee, a leading proponent of “Christian Zionism,” who publicized the view that the Jews had brought the Holocaust on themselves by angering God (Blumenthal 2008). Many Christians do not consider anti-Judaism to be antisemitism. They regard anti-Judaism as the disagreement of religiously sincere people with the tenets of Judaism, while antisemitism, in their view consists of an emotional bias or hatred targeting Jews. The Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) rejected suggestions that it should back away from seeking to convert Jews, a position that critics have called antisemitic, but that Baptists see as consistent with their view that salvation is found solely through faith in Christ. Yet, in recent decades, one observes here and there efforts to create a more positive relationship between Jews and Christians at the level of inter-faith attitudes. The Second Vatican Council, Vatican II, in 1965, produced a document called Nostra Aetate which concluded that anything that does not con- form to the spirit of Christ and might display antisemitism should be expunged from texts taught in Catholic seminaries (Alberigo, Matthew 2006). This open- ness of the Catholic highest instance did but little, however, to prevent the fact that even in Western democratic Europe, hatred of Jews had by no means gone for good. The decline of its acuity observed in the 1950s and 1960s was transi- tory: a few decades were enough to bring about renewed open expressions of anti-Jewish feelings. Bryan Cheyette’s (2011) collection of papers speaks of a genuine explosion of a new antisemitism in Europe in terms of an “alarming rise,” an “upsurge,” a “new wave,” an “eruption,” an “epidemic” and a “virus.” Disparaging the ﬁgure of the Jew, he contends, is more than ever deeply ingrained in British culture and it is again emerging as the very concretization of otherness. A Sinuous History 13

Politicians do not always contribute to calming down this growth of a calamitous phenomenon that has cost in the past so much moral damage, so well-known to many. Political figures in Europe and elsewhere now drop hints of their own animosity toward Jewry that is not alien to their growing sympathy for the Palestinian cause, to Israel’s detriment. It seems that quite unrelated to any realpolitik analysis of the facts of the Middle-East conflict, many present-day public figures tend to emphasize their countries’ multiple economic and political stakes in the Arab-Muslim world—which are by no means balanced by the utility of supporting Israel. This is even more the case since, visually, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appears to be a struggle between a rich, quasi-European, advanced, even colonialist occupier of a territory con- quered by war and inhabited by a poor, non-European, developing, colonized- occupied population. Whatever the genuine deep structures of the conflict on either side, this image is enough to attract the sympathy of many intellectuals, politicians and “regular” individuals for the Palestinian side, and above all, the favor of the most influential media. It is a short road from here to constructing and differentiating “good” and “bad” Jews on the pages of respected newspapers like The Guardian, The Independent, and Le Monde as well as on programs of the BBC, Arte, and France 2. Since the Suez Crisis of 1956 and, more especially, the Six Day War of 1967, these media no longer regard Israel as a country populated by “victims” (that is, “good Jews”). Once it became clear that the creation of Israel had given rise to another category of victims—the Palestinians—every act by Jews toward Arabs is criticized on the basis of the customary expectation that Jews should behave differently, because of their past suffering. This kind of phrasing, to be sure, represents a sophisticated manner of stating the validity of antisemitism as revealed in its unavoidable prolongation, i.e. what is correct for anyone else is not sufficient for Jews. One witnesses here a kind of zero-sum game: the “good Jew” is no longer with us and his “bad” counterpart re-emerges and can be portrayed in colors of the all-powerful and sinful. It is these new prevailing attitudes that the UK’s former Chief Rabbi, Jonathan Sacks did not hesitate to characterize as an antisemitic “tsunami” sweeping Europe. An additional hardship has emerged for Jews in the recent decades in most countries of Western Europe: the arrival, settling, and insertion of a new Muslim immigration whose members share often strongly negative attitudes toward Jews. Muslims, indeed, are a major component of the large migratory currents taking place, ever since the 1980s, over the globe from poor to rich countries. An essential feature of this era of globalization, today they have made Islam the second religion of several European countries. France, for instance, has 14 chapter 1 become home to about six million Muslims from North Africa and the Middle- East, who are now ten times as numerous as the local Jewish community. As an echo of the Middle-Eastern confrontation, for obvious religious-ethnic, linguistic and cultural reasons, this population shares feelings of solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Here, in the diaspora, many among that population tend to associate the local Jewish communities with the Israeli side of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, and direct their anti-Israeli animosity toward local Jewry. From time to time, thousands of Muslims demonstrate in front of synagogues and other Jewish institutions and radical youngsters not infrequently display overt anti-Jewish violence. A situation has thus been created where European Jews are drawn into tense relations and animosity with Muslim local groups, in their country of residence, due to the importing to European soil of the Middle-Eastern confrontation, independent of their own feelings about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Cahen 2005; Goitein 2003). Paradoxically enough, anti-Israeli attitudes take then on forms characteristic of traditional anti-Jewish hatred. Needless to say, the new sociodemographic developments in France, Belgium, and the UK cannot fail to impact on the attitudes of political parties and leaders, if only for purely electoralist interests, and newspapers or TV sta- tions cannot ignore the changes that have taken place in their readership or audience. It is the case that in many instances, those changes encourage these figures and institutions to side up with, or at least show sympathy for, the anti- Israeli camp, even at the cost of arousing acrimony towards local Jewries. This kind of trend found in contemporary France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK is only feebly counterbalanced by conciliatory efforts stemming from some institutions such as the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II). However important such measures may be for the future of Catholicism and Judaism, they carry little weight in the daily reality marked by a tendency of multiplying acts of anti-Jewish harassment, verbal threat or aggressive behavior on the street and other face-to-face contacts (Kantor 2012). This kind of occurrence is particularly frequent near synagogues and Jewish schools, in countries with relatively large Jewish populations. Hence, for instance, in the UK and France, about one hundred violent incidents took place in 2011. That same year, an anti-Jewish murder was reported in Switzerland; in France, a Jewish school in Toulouse was attacked leaving three deaths. All this, not to speak of less dramatic and much more frequent events in numerous countries in Western, Central and Northern Europe. It is also noteworthy that cyberspace, websites, social networks, forums, and blogs have become major conveyers of bigotry, racism and antisemitism. One of the most conspicuous slogans is the allegation of global Jewish power, allegedly behind every world event and at the unconditional service of Israel. A Sinuous History 15

The demonization of Israel is phrased in propaganda publications in most extreme and bluntly antisemitic terms. In these publications, Israel, as a rule, is described as nothing less than the reincarnation of Nazism. In this atmosphere, a rise in confrontations is observed between Jews and people of the radical left—including Jews—whose endemic tendency is to identify with the assumedly “anti-capitalist third world” and thus with Islamist movements assumed to represent the “vanguard” of the struggle against exploitation and “big money.” The focal points of radicalization are university and college campuses, from where boycott, divestment and sanction campaigns are launched against associations, firms and businesses associated in one way or another with Israel. Concomitantly with these developments, a substantial rise is also observed in the strength of the far right, resulting from the economic crisis, the immigration issue, majority-minority relations, and the question of multiculturalism. In several key countries of Europe, nationalistic leaders opposed to the European Union are gaining ground in the polity, while their traditional xeno- phobic discourse that excludes the Jews from the national community is achieving ever more resonance. Today, this rightism is mainly turned against immigration from outside the national borders but beneath that exclusivism lies a general attitude that, in this particular respect, joins in the anti-Jewish turn of the extreme left—even though the leaders themselves may show sufficiently political-minded to exhibit in the open more “rational” and sophisticated attitudes that preclude their being accused of anti-Jewish hatred. All of these as mentioned result in recent years in a proliferation of forms of daily antisemitic incidents as well as the diffusion of brutal antisemitic, anti- Zionist, and anti-Israel messages (Kantor 2012). Some of these incidents may be extremely violent, involving weapons and direct physical threats. The most irritating expression is harassment in the street against people identifiable as Jews—who wear traditional black clothes, a skullcap, or just a chain with a Star of David. In the final analysis, the new socio-political configuration of present-day European countries tends to confront their Jewries with highly difficult challenges that they could not have imagined when they emerged, broken and mourning, from the Nazi Holocaust about 60 years ago.

In Conclusion

This short overview of Jews’ sinuous historical path demonstrates that hatred of Jews differs in each epoch but, as such, is nearly a permanent feature of this saga. One is tempted, in view of today’s sociological reality of world Jewry, to 16 chapter 1 blame the fact that in most circumstances and despite their marginal starting- point, Jews tend as a rule to demonstrate a capacity for social mobility that represents a kind of “red flag” for those non-Jews remaining at the bottom, and a social threat for those standing above who see newcomers asking to share their privileges. This hypothesis might be taken into consideration but still requires empirical validation: are the most socially mobile Jewish communities the target of the most virulent anti-Jewish feelings? Stated this way and at first glance, this question does not incite a univocally positive answer: Jews in Tsarist Russia or in the Muslim countries never belonged, collectively, to the most successful segments of the population. On the basis of the wide literature of experts, another explanation leans on culture contacts marking the major circumstances in which Jews found themselves in various historical steps: some of their identity components, it may be argued in this vein, did not “fit in” with the expectations from Jews on the side of host societies’ cultures and their own identity components. In this perspective, a few sentences may be suggested from the brief outline sketched in the above, that could account for Jews’ hardship in various social and cultural environments:

– Jews who remained loyal to their faith could not but reject the expectations of the Greek (Nichols (1993)), or the Roman (Chanes 2004) to endorse their cults, and could certainly not worship their leaders as divinities. – In a similar vein, in face of Christianity (Elukin 2007) or Islam (Bostom 2008), Jews could not accept either of these monotheisms, and the more so as these stemmed from their own and in contradiction to it. – Jews’ entrance into modernity may again be seen as a likewise drama, even though made of different components: modernity, it must be remembered, entailed not only economic, political and cultural transformations but also nation-building processes whose symbols—religious and historical—were drawn from legacies alien to Jews (Smith 1986). Even if some Jews could make the effort of adopting these identity symbols even at the total detriment of their adherence to their own, it was by no means warranted that non-Jews would accept them as their own “flesh and blood.” – In a comparable manner, many Jews embraced Communism with the hope of creating a society where particularistic identities would become meaningless in terms of belongingness and dignity; the more so as, con- sciously or not, their faith in that ideal possibly drew from the universal- ism embedded in Judaism itself. However, here their drama stemmed from the pragmatics of revolutions which, in the final analysis, created A Sinuous History 17

new social orders that resemble the older ones in more than a few features, and in particular, in their rediscovery of the charisma of the patria that, again, set the Jews apart (Levin 1988). – Last but not least, the Israeli enterprise to create a national Jewish state in the Arab-Muslim Middle-East relied, and still does, on the commitment enacted by the Jewish biblical legacy to this piece of land, while this very enterprise appeared in the eyes of Israel’s neighbors as an intrusion of “foreigners” into their own ancestral patrimonium (Smith 2004; Lesch and Tschirgi 1998).

In one sentence, cultural and identity aspects seem to contribute, in a way or another, elements of potential animosity. These elements tend to point out that Jews might have been seen as “others” by others, and have seen themselves likewise from them. They may, in part, account for these tensions which have permanently- or nearly so—marked the Jews’ evolving among the peoples of many lands, and which have, by no means, disappeared from the public scene even today. These contentions, however, still request clarification concerning the amplitude of persecutions and anti-Jewish hatred that, in several cases, have erupted in the context of those tensions. That is, the very nature of the attitudes toward Jews that lied behind the virulence of the slogans and banners that were raised against Jews. That this nature is by no means “natural” is shown by the fact that a special notion, antisemitism, was engendered in view of designating these attitudes specifically. chapter 2 Antisemitism and Allosemitism

Antisemitism

Shaul Bassi (2004) cites the historical testimony (1832) of Ludwig Börne, a German Jew who converted to Christianity:

Certain people object to my being a Jew; others forgive me; still others praise me for this; but everybody remembers it . . . [they all] are unable to free themselves [from the mystique of Jewishness].

It is this kind of attitude that qualifies for the term antisemitism as first used by the German William Marr (1879), the founder of the “League for Anti-Semitism.” The term soon became common usage in many languages. According to Marr, Jews constituted physically and morally a distinct inferior race predisposed to be a “slave race.” He could rely on notorious fellows who shared his hatred of Jews—such as Richard Wagner who in 1850 published Das Judenthum in der Musik (“Jewishness in Music”), accusing Jews of being a harmful and alien element to German culture. Marr could also find relevant references in Grimm’s Fairy Tales. At the time, this hatred of Jews was new because, unlike in the past, it was based on racist rather than religious convictions, enhanced by nationalistic sentiments. Antisemitism assumed that Jews’ “rootlessness” had no other basis than genetic. To this persuasion, scientists and philosophers added that Jews share mystical beliefs and an unambiguous tendency to pursue their lives sep- arately from non-Jews. The “empirical evidence” of antisemitism was provided by the publication of the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” These fictitious min- utes of assumed twenty-four secret sessions of “the innermost circle of the rulers of Zion” uncovered (sic) a Jewish plot to enslave the world. Produced in the Synod of Moscow by a Serge A. Niles in 1905, it was disseminated in many languages over the globe. Such pseudo-scientific theories about races had become widespread in Europe by the second half of the nineteenth century. Today, however, such theories of antisemitism encounter difficulties of conceptualization seeing that most Jews do not evince visibly distinct markers. Hence, some definitions are now formulated with the aim of re-setting the scope of the discussion.

These re-formulations have now become a topic of reflexion and coherent thinking on the side of unbiased—but very cautious—researchers. The European Forum on Antisemitism (2013) quotes the inclusive and updated working definition of antisemitism adopted, in 2004, by the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). This definition enounces that:

Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities . . . such manifestations could also target the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with con- spiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

– Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion. – Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allega- tions about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective—such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world conspiracy of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions. – Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews. – Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentional- ity of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust). – Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exag- gerating the Holocaust. – Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations. 20 chapter 2

Examples of the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard to the State of Israel taking into account the overall context could include:

– Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor. – Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation. – Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis. – Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis. – Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel. – However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. – Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic materials in some countries). – Criminal acts are antisemitic when the targets of attacks, whether they are people or property—such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries—are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or linked to Jews. – Antisemitic discrimination is the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others and is illegal in many countries.

From a social-science perspective, Dietz Bering (1992) proposes that antisemites share the belief that Jews are bad by nature. They bring disaster on their “host societies” and the whole world. Hence, it is the duty of antisemites to unmask them. Helen Fein (1993) suggests that this notion consists of persist- ing hostile views of Jews manifested in attitudes, culture, myth, ideology, folk- lore and imagery that are designed to distance, displace, or destroy them as Jews. Bernard Lewis (2006) proposes that antisemitism is marked by two distinct features: (1) Jews are judged by a standard different from that applied to others; (2) they deserve to be accused of “cosmic evil.” Other definitions differentiate between kinds of antisemitism: social antisemitism, economic antisemitism, religious antisemitism, and political antisemitism. Bernard Lazare (2006) and William Brustein (2003) discuss some of these aspects in a broad manner and Gerald Krefetz (1984) summarizes by contending that the notion of antisemitism is a myth and stereotype according to which “[Jews] control the banks, the money supply, the economy, and businesses—of the community, of the country and the world.” Antisemitism And Allosemitism 21

Antisemitism in any form is never far from racism and it worsens the significance of the hatred of Jews. According to William Nichols (1993), even baptism into another faith will not alter by any means individual’s being Jewish. This outlook once justified the hideous stubbornness of the Nazis to eliminate everyone, adult or child, who had even “one drop” of Jewishness in their blood. According to Bryan Cheyette’s (2011) collection of papers, the history of antisemitism is not one-dimensional. It is a history grounded in foundational ambivalences. The ﬁgure of the Jew, he contends, has always been and still is basically ambivalent—which Cheyette calls “antisemitism of tolerance.” Other scholars—from Lewis (2006) to Taguieff (2008)—prefer the concept of new antisemitism to designate this antisemitism that stems from the left, the right, and radical Islam, and tends as a rule to converge on opposition to the existence of Israel as a Jewish State. Jack Fischel (2005) writes, in a similar vein, that the new antisemitism generates a grand coalition of irreconcilable enemies—leftists dedicating a cult to the Palestinian cause, right-wing national- ists for whom Jews are the eternal foreigner, and fundamentalist Muslims who immigrated to Europe carrying here their hatred of Israel and of the Jews. It is this alignment that makes the new antisemitism unique. The proponents of the new concept evince that criticism of Israel and Zionism are most often disproportionate in degree and unique in kind when compared to attitudes toward other foci of conflict worldwide (Powell 2000). Already in 1973, however, Abba Eban, the Foreign Minister of Israel, wrote in the Congress Bi-Weekly:

The old classic antisemitism declared that equal rights belong to all within the society, except the Jews. The new antisemitism says that the right to establish and maintain an independent national sovereign state is the prerogative of all nations, so long as they happen not to be Jewish. And when this right is exercised not by the Maldive Islands, not by the state of Gabon, not by Barbados . . . but by the oldest and most authentic of all nationhoods, then this is said to be exclusivism, particularism, and a flight of the Jewish people from its universal mission (quoted in Azmon 2007).

In a similar vein, Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein (1974) argued time ago that this new antisemitism took the form of indifference to the fears of the Jewish people and inability to understand the importance of Israel to Jewish survival. Cotler (2004), more recently, argues that classical antisemitism is discrimination against Jews as such, and that the new antisemitism, in 22 chapter 2 contrast, is embedded in discrimination and opposition to the embodiment of Jewishness in Israel. Though, the essence of antisemitism is, like in the past, an assault upon the core of Jewish self-definition. Irwin Cotler further main- tains that “classical anti-Semitism is denial of the rights of Jews to live as equal members of whatever host society, and the new anti-Semitism is the denial of the right of the Jews to live as an equal member of the family of nations. These approaches confront opposed views that minimize the significance of the “new” antisemitism, or “antisemitism” at all, in the present-day debate. Brian Klug (2006) contends that people of goodwill who support the Pales tinians resent being falsely accused of antisemitism and that supporters of the Jewish State exploit the stigma of antisemitism in order to silence legitimate criticism of Israel’s policy. The source of hostility to Jews today is the Arab- Israeli conflict. Israel proclaims itself as the state of the Jewish people, and many Jews align themselves with Israel. It is out of this configuration that hostility to Jews as Jews arises. Earl Raab (2002) writes that charges of antisemitism based on anti-Israel opinions generally lack credibility. Steven Zipperstein (2005) believes that a “reasonably informed” person thinks that Israel shares the largest large part of responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Norman Finkelstein (2005) claims that there has been no significant rise at all in antisemitism and that organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League have brought forward charges of new antisemitism to exploit the historical suffering of Jews in order to “immunize Israel against criticism.” According to him, what is called the new antisemitism consists of: (i) exaggeration and fabrica- tion; (ii) mislabeling of legitimate criticism of Israeli policy; (iii) the spillover of criticism of Israel to Jews. Tariq Ali (2004), a British-Pakistani historian and political activist, goes as far as to contend that the concept of new antisemitism amounts to an attempt to subvert the language in the interests of the State of Israel. The French philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff (2008) answers all these by noting that today antisemitism is no longer based on racism and nationalism but, paradoxically enough, on anti-racism and anti-nationalism. It equals Zionism and racism, uses Holocaust denial manufactured material, borrows third-worldist discursive tokens, and the slogans of anti-imperialism, anti- colonialism, anti-Americanism, and anti-globalization, and disseminates the myth of the intrinsically “good Palestinian”—today’s innocent victim par excellence. While the Jews do not, with few exceptions, suffer discrimination in a country like France, they are often victims of stigma, threats, and physical violence. They are victims of the media which disseminate global defamation and endorse radical anti-Zionism. This atmosphere exposes them to permanent suspicion, and in some cases, to the accusation of criminal complicity with the Antisemitism And Allosemitism 23

Israelis. At the same time, anti-Jewish violence is also incited by radical Islamists. It is nothing else than judeophobia, or more accurately neo- judeophobia, that becomes a cultural given on a public scene mechanically and unanimously supportive of the Palestinian cause. This judeophobia cuts across the boundaries between left and extreme left, and its anti-Israelism coupled with anti-Americanism permeates as well all parts of right-wing opinion. One example among a multitude of expressions of neo-judeophobia: a respectable Danish newspaper (The Copenhagen Post 13 December 2012) published a warning to Jews to keep Jewish symbols hidden—echoing a Jewish group, Mosaisk Troessamfund, that advises Jews to avoid wearing the Star of David or the kippah in public. The article informs its readers that 37 antisemitic aggressions occurred in Copenhagen in 2012, including the case of a man whose chain with a Star of David was ripped from his neck. This incident occurred in a district of Copenhagen with a large Middle-Eastern and Arab population. Imran Shah, a spokesperson for a Muslim group denied that there was widespread anti-Jewish sentiment among the country’s Muslim population. Yet both the police and the City Council urged Jews to be particularly cautious these days. In September, the City Council advised Jewish partici- pants of an international food fair not to carry Israeli flags. Copenhagen’s dep- uty mayor for employment and integration faced on this occasion accusations of discrimination. Hatred aimed at Jews is ideologized and expressed in public in the form of harsh statements against Israel and Zionism. It consists of a mixture of systematic hostility towards Israel and exclusive compassion for Palestinians. It reduces the State of Israel to a criminal entity and sustains the increasing Islamization of the Palestinian cause that, for some milieus, symbolizes no less than a global jihad. No text is as clear as the 28th Article of the Hamas Charter (August 1988): “Israel because it is Jewish and has a Jewish population, challenges Islam and the Muslims.” Hence, the objective of this anti-Zionist program could not be more explicit: to “purify” or “cleanse” Palestine from the “Zionist Jewish presence” considered an invasion of the sacred Palestinian land (see also Laurence et al. 1995). Judeophobia accuses the Jews at the same time of being “too community,” too religious, and nationalist. In the same breath, it is also described them as too cosmopolitan. The defense of Palestinians as victims of Zionism is the ide- ological core mode of legitimation for contemporary anti-Jewish violence. Every act of violence against Jews is justified as “revenge for Palestinian children killed by the Zionists,” a theme that awakens the old accusation of “ritual murder.” Pro-palestinianism marks judeophobia, allocating Palestinians 24 chapter 2 features of a messianic people. Taguieff quotes Jean Genet saying: the “Palestinian revolution ceased to be a usual fight for stolen land, it was a meta- physical struggle.” Today, Genet contends, one cannot be pro-Palestinian without being anti-Jewish. At this point, David Hirsh (2007) asks—and answers in his own way—if criticism of Israel is necessarily antisemitic? No, of course not, but who says that it is? The difficult argument for some “critics of Israel” to deal with is that criticism of Israel is often expressed by using rhetoric or images that resonate as antisemitism: holding Israel to higher standards than other states, and for no good reason; articulating conspiracy theories; using demonizing analogies; casting Jews in the role of oppressors; formulating criticism in such a way as to pick a fight with the vast majority of Jews; using the word criticism but meaning discriminatory practices against Israelis or against Jews. From a similar angle, David Matas (2005) and Taguieff (2008) argue that anti- Zionism is indeed a form of antisemitism because it denies the right of Jewish self-determination while defending self-determination for all other nations. An academic boycott of Israel is antisemitic: it aims to punish Israeli academics by applying different standards to those applied to academics elsewhere. Even if that boycott is not motivated by antisemitism, it is nevertheless antisemitic in effect. Furthermore, anti-Zionists think they know something about Israel and Palestine but many of the people seduced by the rhetoric know very little about Judaism. Some circles which consider themselves as left are fighting for their belief that Israel is a unique evil. As a result of their activism, these ideas are invading the mainstream discourse and are no longer marginalized on the extreme left or right. The inseparably pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli mass demonstrations recurrent in many European countries in recent years are certainly not just expressions of hatred of Jews. These protesters have never participated in demonstrations in favor of Israeli victims of terrorist attacks, nor in defense of Arab victims of Arab dictatorships. Pro-Palestinian outrage and compassion are one-way, and aim at one exclusive target. The great ideo- logical novelty lies in the fact that hatred of Jews is now expressed in the language of the “fight against racism” or “human rights.” The new accusation of Islamophobia has been joined to the stock of symbolic weapons: selective racism has begun a new career in the form of anti- Islamophobia. Hence, the changes in the ethnic composition of the European population have created a new monster: present-day judeophobia. It is firstly carried by young jihadists forming a fighting lumpenproletariat often tempted by terrorism in the name of Islam and moved by the hatred of the West—especially the US—and of Jews. This analysis is not too far from that of Wieviorka (2007) who emphasizes the multiple sources of antisemitism. As mentioned earlier, Antisemitism And Allosemitism 25 these sources may include, among others, far-right and far-left circles, given milieus in the Muslim population, youngsters of disadvantaged educational contexts, or the spin-offs of the Middle-East conflict and the sympathy awakened by the Palestinian cause among educated strata. All in all, however, Wieviorka is inclined to see in antisemitism only one aspect of many others of a general societal malaise, and not a major crisis in its own right. Closer to Taguieff and others in his line of thinking, Jacques Déom (2012) insists rather on the antisemitic orientation that can be found in Islam theology and that nurtures the hatred of Jews today in the twofold context of the Middle-Eastern conflict and the encounter of Muslim immigrants with Jews on European soil. Citing the original theology of falsification that stigmatizes Judaism as a per- version of the message of God to men, the Coran, Déom elaborates on today’s notion of Jihad that asks Muslims to conquer the world on behalf of the “true faith” and evinces how difficult it is for Islam to accept the exigencies of a plu- ralistic democracy (D’Iribarne 2013). This perspective, as shown by Déom, is bound these days to Shoa denial and anti-Western Third-Worldism that converge in an uncompromising de-legitimization of the State of Israel and a harsh anti-Jewish posture—indulgent of, if not encouraging, anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli terrorism. This perspective is diffused in recent decades by virulently anti-Israel intellectuals and academics. One thinks here of Alain Badiou (Badiou et al. 2011), for instance, who attacks Israel in a most extreme manner that easily develops into a direct, general anti-Jewish homily. A literature that is often careful enough to be phrased in nuanced and sophisticated wordings that “revises” the role and status of Jews in contemporary history. As an example, Enzo Traverso who dedicates a large part of his scholarly work to the Jewish experience— including the Shoa—attacks Israel at the same time and uncompromisingly stigmatizes it as colonialist and the oppressor of the Palestinian people. In a recent work, Traverso (2013) finally comes up with an attack on Jews in general. He develops a view according to which present-day diaspora Jewry itself has broken up its links with its past contribution to progress and modernity. Ever since the Shoa, he contends, Jews have exploited their “victimhood” to become a well-to-do group that has sunk into conservatism. From this position, Jews contributed not only to the disappearance of antisemitism but to the growth of Islamophobia. In this, Traverso joins Badiou for whom the “genuine” Jews today are the Palestinians. Anyone, and radicals at first, can easily conclude from such “analyses” that Jews belong to the enemy for everyone who fights against the evils of present-day society. All these create an uneasy climate for actors moved by good will who aspire to combat antisemitism. Hence, for instance, the 2004 working definition of 26 chapter 2 the EUMC definition of antisemitism which figured on the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights website was dropped in November 2013 under the pretext that by its legal mandate, this agency is not a standard-setting body; it can neither set nor repudiate any definition. This position, to be sure, took aback many observers: how can the Agency do away with the definition of the plague, antisemitism, which it is supposed to fight against? These developments contribute to the antisemitic atmosphere of many milieus. Rensmann and Schoeps (2011) propose, here, to see this multiplication of manifestations of antisemitism under the title of “modernized antisemitism.” They wish to emphasize with this concept the link between old and new elements in today’s antisemitism and, above all, that antisemitism should be understood in the context of the dissent widespread among some strata with what they perceive as cosmopolitanism and exploitative liberalism. Stereotyped by many as cosmopolitans par excellence, Jews are assumedly the most representative of everything that kind of dissent takes issue with. Francis Kaplan (2011: 47), however, does not accept explaining antisemitism by such specific causes; for him, antisemitism is an a priori posture receiving in each particular conjuncture another rationalization:

. . . nearly one third of the Poles think that the influence of the Jews is too big in their country . . . an Algerian newspaper alleged the far-reaching penetration of Jews in the Algerian State and society while there are nearly no Jews in these two countries . . . the ideologists of antisemitism actually contradict each other: for the ones, they have no ethics . . . , for others, they have too much . . .; for the ones they are counter-revolutionaries . . . , for others, they are too revolutionaries . . .; for the ones they are the masters of the universe . . . , for others, they are miserable . . . An antisemite ideology is not an intellectual error due to ignorance, confusion or stupidity, it is a passion that can be dressed, intellectually, [as one wishes].

Whatever the terminology that is used to qualify the hatred of Jews, what is of no less crucial importance, however, is the question of how do Jews confront the phenomenon: how do they combat it, if they do, and how do they live with it, if they do.

Self-Hatred and Other Responses

Jews have illustrated over the centuries a most varied gamut of reactions to the hatred turned against them. These reactions run from suicide, conversion to Antisemitism And Allosemitism 27

Christianity or Islam to emigration to more tolerant places, turning to mysti- cism or disguisement. A well-known and documented reaction by Jews to hatred in the modern era is self-hatred. Self-hatred designates, in general terms, one’s dislike of the group to which one belongs by any kind of link with it. In the case of the Jew, this attitude accepts the norm often prevailing in the environment that “Jews are bad by nature.” Hence, Jewish individuals might come to hate themselves as Jews—concretizing what is often called “Jewish antisemitism.” Theodor Lessing’s (1930/2004) Der Jüdische Selbsthass (“Jewish Self-hatred”) shows the diffusion of this occurrence among intellectuals who adopted a hateful view of Judaism and, thereby, of themselves. Jewish antisemitism and Jewish self- hatred are not, however, necessarily the same: Jews who agree with antisemitic judgements do not always hate themselves even if they hate other Jews. John P. Jackson Jr. (2001) recalls, in this respect, that the concept developed in late nineteenth-century Germany and was first directed at Eastern European Jews who had immigrated to the country. A first major discussion of Jews’ self-hatred was conducted in the 1940s by Kurt Lewin, who was Lessing’s colleague at the University of Berlin in 1930 (see Reitter 2008). Following Lewin, the concept gained widespread currency. It was used in a derogatory way during the 1940s by “militant” Zionists against the disparaging looks of many well-established Jews toward Jews who moved to Palestine/Israel. One may remind here that the 1963 publication of Hannah Arendt’s (1968) Eichmann in Jerusalem attracted heavy criticism for her con- demnation of the trial as a “show trial.” In the heated discussions this book provoked, more than a few to accuse the author of self-hatred. More recently, Jewish self-hatred, as Sander Gilman (1986) understands it, often refers to Jewish intellectuals who do not deny their Jewish identity but adopt radical anti-Israeli positions. In his own words: “One of the most recent forms of Jewish self-hatred is the virulent opposition to the existence of the State of Israel [by individual Jews].” Jewish antisemitism, he contends, can be disguised as anti-Zionism in the same measure that general antisemitism is often hidden behind anti-Israelism. Alvin H. Rosenfeld (2006) takes also “a hard look at Jewish authors” whose statements go well beyond “legitimate criticism of Israel,” and considers rhetoric that calls into question Israel’s “right to continued existence” to be antisemitic. Self-hatred in Jewish debates about Israel has grown more frequent and more intense in the US, the UK, and France over the past few years. Hence, in 2007 it was reported (Daily Telegraph, 5 February 2007) that an association called “British Independent Jewish Voices” had been jointly created by Nobel Prize winner Harold Pinter, the illustrious historian Eric Hobsbawm, film 28 chapter 2 director Mike Leigh, and prominent actors to stress that British Jews do not unanimously support the Israeli government, and to assert the distinction to be made between Jews in the Diaspora and Jews in Israel. In France, a long series of intellectuals and academics of Jewish origin—from sociologist Edgar Morin to writer Marc Levy—see it an obligation to state their criticism of Israel which, in some instances, goes as far as associating Israel with Nazis in its handling the Palestinian population ( JSS News 18 Deember 2013). Kenneth Levin (2010), a Harvard psychiatrist, comments here that Jewish self-hatred can be referred to both the Stockholm syndrome, where individuals under enduring siege tend to embrace the indictments of their besiegers, however bigoted and outrageous, and the psychodynamics learned from abused children who blame themselves for their predicament and ascribe it to their being “bad.” And yet Jews’ self-hating is not necessarily focused on, or limited to, resentment of Israel. Irving Louis Horowitz (2005) identifies Jewish self-hatred in many cases of Jews who wish to distance themselves from their community. The historian Bernard Wasserstein (2012) contends that many Jews have “internalized elements of anti-Semitic discourse, succumbed to [. . .] psychological surrender.” Yet, self-hatred is not the only possible response of Jews to antisemitism. Another possibility consists in dimming the visibility of Jewishness in public. Deborah Cohen (2002) contends, however, that this strategy only worsens the individual’s sense of being threatened. She quotes Alain Finkielkraut when he says: “Racial hatred and its blind rage were essentially the Jews’ punishment for no longer placing their difference on display . . . Genocide was not imposed on the Jews in spite of their effort to assimilate, but in response to this very attempt.” In the pursuit of “liberty from Judaism,” one option that is always open is conversion to Christianity (or Islam, eventually). It is, indeed, the opinion of Todd M. Endelman (2001) that in the final analysis and facing what may seem to many as a no-solution situation for Jews, individual Jews may find it reasonable to embrace another faith and get rid of their Jewishness. Less radically, Ben Halpern (1956), speaks of duplicating norms prevalent with non-Jews and in this way avoiding the blame that “Jews are a distinct tribe.” Jewishness becomes, then, restricted to the private non-contentious sphere. This model may also signify attachment to non-Jewish revolutionary parties aspiring to create a new society. In this new Eden, it might be hoped, being Jewish would be freed from the predicaments of Jewishness for the benefit of an “all-humanity” ideal dooming antisemitism to total irrelevance. This scenario is well Antisemitism And Allosemitism 29 known in Jewish history and one remembers how massively Jews involved themselves in Communism in the USSR, and how grim were the results. Other forms of response endorse the contrary principle of changing reality in the sense of asserting a Jewishness entitled to full expression. The two major historical responses here were Bundism and Zionism. The Bund, a Jewish socialist movement created in the late nineteenth century in Russia, aspired to draft Jewish workers in the struggle for socialism while setting as the ultimate goal the Jews’ right to establish a secular Jewish nationality within socialism. Bolshevism in Russia and Nazism in the rest of Europe decimated the Bund. Hence, the only collective attempt to extract Jewry from antisemitic realities remained Zionism. The return to Zion has always been an aspiration of Judaism: all along the Middle Ages, a trickle of Jews settled in the Holy Land; Judah Halevi, author of Zionides, died on his way there; Yehiel of Paris and Nahmanides took the same way; Obadiah ben Abraham of Bertinoro created an administration for Jerusalem’s Jewish community in the fifteenth century; Yosef Karo wrote the Shulkhan Arukh in sixteenth-century Safed. More recently, in the late nineteenth-century, when modernity was conquering the whole of Europe, Leon Pinsker (1882) published Auto—émancipation, the first Zionist manifesto and founded the Lovers of Zion movement. The first group of emigrants was organized in 1881 in St. Petersburg, even before the book was published. The movement expanded rapidly with the goal of pushing to the emigration of Jews to Palestine (then part of the Ottoman Empire). This “first aliyah” (immigration to Palestine) consisted of close to 10,000 people. Simultaneously, from 1882, Baron Edmond de Rothschild began buying land in Palestine to settle the newcomers and became one of the most active supporters of the nascent Zionist entity. Less ambitiously, most Jews—non-Zionist as well as Zionist—actually do find significance in their Jewishness, even if they do not immigrate to what is now a Jewish State. As such they sustain the creation of Jewish bodies to respond on their behalf to antisemitism at the level of local, national, and transnational institutions. Jewish leaders, especially in present-day democratic and liberal societies, respond to antisemitic acts by expressing dismay, anger, and requests for reactions on the side of Authorities. Concomitantly, large funds are invested in constructing Holocaust museums in various cities throughout the Diaspora, with the intention of maintaining the memory of the Jews’ terrible suffering. It is expected that these museums will also help in reducing the antisemitic drive among non-Jews and teaching Jews the painful path of their history. This effort may then be seen as an aspect of a more general strategy of strengthening community life, developing community 30 chapter 2 institutions, increasing the density of their activities—in the synagogue or other frameworks—strengthening intercommunity and transnational bodies and allegiances, and above all, investing in education. The self-confidence that these forms of activity and institutions are likely to instill in the mind of Jewish individuals may be seen as a pattern of confronting antisemitism and, if there is no other way, living with it. This Jewish “communitarist” endeavor is encouraged by parallel developments among other groups in this era of globalization and concomitant multiculturalization. Advanced countries are nowadays indeed powerful poles of attraction for immigrants from all over the world who aspire to insert themselves in wealthy societies and to benefit from democratic regimes that are—more or less willingly—tolerant of ethnocultural diversity (Ben-Rafael and Sternberg, eds., 2009).

Allosemitism

Still, this Jewish history remains enigmatic after all: how is it that Jews have always been a target of special attention and feelings, in so many different circumstances? Zygmunt Bauman (1998) who has been much concerned with this question uses the notion of allosemitism; it was coined by Artur Sandauer (translated from the Polish and quoted in Bauman 1998) and it implies the assessment that Jews’ plights in society are radically different from any other social entity’s and require special concepts to be described and analyzed. Jewishness may attract hate or love, but always feelings that are extreme and intense. The object indicated by allosemitism is not just “unfamiliar” or “strange”: in its essence, it does not comply with the general order of things and does not fit either into any other category of phenomena. And still more, the attitude toward its object is extra-temporal and extra-spatial: it consists of a permanent interrogation resulting, each time, from the interplay of continuous historical developments and actual circumstances. Modern antisemitism or hate of Jews, Bauman contends, targets “Jewishness” rather than Judaism: when all over Western Europe the walls of ghettoes were crumbling and Jews were shaving their beards to match the prevalent norms in the non-Jewish environment, by no means did they, in this, bring antisemitism to end. For the antisemite, whatever they do, Jews possess their own inimitable Volkseigentümlichkeit (people peculiarity).It is in this that one may effectively speak of Jews as a “special species.” Bauman (1998) recalls Gombrowicz (1957) for whom the Jews’ unnerving uniqueness goes back many centuries, and he also cites E. M. Cioran (1987) who observed that if to be a man is a drama, to be a Jew is another and as such, the Jew represents the alienated existence par Antisemitism And Allosemitism 31 excellence. He is the man who will never be from here. David Biale (1986) suggests that what explains this unique historical path is widely determined by Jews’ relative lack of power, combined with a myth of centrality within the world. It is Bauman’s own thesis that Christianity marked the Jews as oddities who rebelled against the divine order of the universe. Though they were the ances- tors of Christianity, they refused to disappear once Christianity took over, and continued to haunt the world as living fossils; Jews gave birth to Christ only to disown him. In other words, allosemitism is endemic to Western civilization as a part of the legacy of Christendom. For the Church, Jews have been the embodiment of ambivalence; that is, of disorder. With modernity, Bauman continues, in the footsteps of Jacob Katz (1980), the outcome of Jewish emancipation was the pariah’s successful assault on the highly prestigious professions. The Jews were a low and marginal entity that moved up, and instilled in the higher social spheres the fear of downgrading. This is what Edouard Dumont (n.d.), the bible-writer of modern antisemitism, complained of: ‘In which old parish registers will you find the names of these newcomers, who still a century ago did not even have the right to dwell on the land from which they now chase us away?’ Into this Europe of nations, states, and nation-states, it was only the Jews who did not fit, having only gypsies for company. Jews were not a part of the legitimate population in any one of the nation-states, and their dispersion through many nations was an additional predicament. They were the epitome of incongruity: a non-national nation. Bauman quotes Hannah Arendt’s reporting about Jewish exiles from Germany in France who said: “We have been exemplary Germans, there is no reason why we could not be exemplary Frenchmen.” In 1882, Leo Pinsker (1882/1816) noted: “For the living, the Jew is a dead man; for the natives an alien and a vagrant; for the poor and exploited a millionaire; for patriots, a man without country; for all classes, a hated rival.” The resulting image of the Jew made light of all social, political and cultural obstacles to the idea that the world is essentially an orderly place. Representations of Jews in European literature and art validate this insight. They indeed monotonously repeat their condition as aliens—and this, Bauman says—for 2,000 years. Focusing on the production process of stereotypes and the generation of cultural models, Litvak (2010) elaborates on the roles of both the changing and stable factors underlying their formation. The European cultural model—essentially negative—of the Jew has stemmed from the myths of the Church ever since the fourth century, and persisted through the horrors of the Middle Ages and up to Hitler. It has been an endemic theological-identity 32 chapter 2 need for the Church in its very self-affirmation of identity, independent of the presence or absence around of the Jews themselves. The motivations behind this antisemitism have changed with the circumstances. At this epoch, like in the past, this process may include most far-reaching non-truths, and in fact, Litvak insists, the continuous negative view of the Jew in European culture has been completely independent from what Jews have done (or do) or have not. This is allosemitism in all its desiderata: it sets and defines Jews as people radically apart, irremediably “different” from any other collection of people. This image of the Jew prevails in all European literatures, including and especially Russian literature. The continuity of this image of the Jew is also shown in Weinstein’s (2005) comparative study of two German films, the one produced under Weimar, Das alter Gesetz, which is philosemitic and the other, Jud Süss, that was produced as a tool for anti-Jewish propaganda by the Nazis. In fact, one finds many similari- ties between the two portraits of Jewish men fighting for social acceptance. In both films, the Jew not only aspires to assimilate into the society but that aspiration also causes disorder and ambivalence. Jews in both cases appear as “different,” thwarting the social order, failing to fit into structuring categories, and sharing a tendency to straddle all the usual divides. In response to their respective Jew’s efforts, both films show attempts to contain the Jewish character and re-establish order in response to the situation created by their will to assimilate. In both cases, the chief problem consists of the sexual alliance between the Jewish male and a non-Jewish female. Breaking barriers between the Jewish and the non-Jewish worlds is the issue presented as creating unbearable disorder. The boundaries of the world of the non-Jew are threatened by the Jew’s attempts to transgress them. The threat of the Suss figure legitimizes racist legislation—ultimately genocide—while in Das alter Gesetz, order is re- established by partial assimilation. Viewing these films together reveals the complex affinity between them. The Jew with the best intentions and the one with the worst ones share a fundamental way of thinking; that is, the will to insert themselves among the non-Jews. This is not unexpected, as these films draw their stereotypes from the same culture and vocabulary. In the postmodern era, however—an epoch distant from the Second World War and its sequels—Bauman’s hypothesis is that the impacts of allosemitism are growing less and less acute. Society is becoming multicultural, and identity issues are multiplying. Politics today is increasingly wrapped in identity conflicts, rather than national or class contradictions. Singularities diversify and allosemitism is likely to lose the unique significance it carried in pre-modern and modern history. Differences are no more seen as temporary nuisances; the human essence seems to consist in the universally shared ability to establish Antisemitism And Allosemitism 33 and protect identities’ distinctiveness from each other. But what we have learned from Taguieff and many others about the new antisemitism, seems to temper Bauman’s optimistic perspective: it is indeed rather difficult to state today that allosemitism has lost any validity. We saw in previous pages that Jews continue to be challenged as Jews, and in actual fact increasingly so, by acute resentment around them. Moreover, the notion of allosemitism that Sandauer and Bauman formulated and elaborated conveys another aspect that they themselves did not consider but which draws the concept beyond the textual phrasing that they proposed. This aspect stems from the fact that both Sandauer and Bauman belong to contemporary Jewish scholarship dealing with the Jewish condition. By proposing the notion of allosemitism for analyzing non-Jews’ attitude toward Jews, they also express how Jews may interpret the attitude of non-Jews toward them. In other words, allosemitism is also a model of perception by Jews—at least Sandauer and Bauman—of how non-Jews perceive them. In this vein, allosemitism belongs most plausibly to the store of hypotheses Jews are able to suggest in order to understand, and respond to, antisemitism. An hypothesis that asks whether Jews do effectively view antisemitism as confronting them permanently throughout their history among non-Jews, or rather episodically, only as outcomes of specific conjunctures. From their answers to this questioning, we may comprehend, at least in part, the behav- iors they adopt in face of antisemites, and vis-à-vis themselves. Allosemitism, we noted, may be over-praising Jews or, on the contrary, demonizing them but in any case considering them as outside any “regular” category of people. The negative side, antisemitism, assumes most often that Jews are aiming to conquer the world, and are the cause of all evils. As the joke goes, “the Titanic is the Jews’ fault: Iceberg is a Jewish name, isn’t it?” With modernity, Jews stopped being the “other” of the Church to become the “other of the nation-state,” and eventually, the “other” of Communism and later, the other of “Germaness,” “Aryaness” or other X-ness. Its reality is simply shown in the plethora of anti-Jewish stereotypes: a Christian who steals is a thief, a Jew who steals is a Jew. With the creation of Israel, the Jew was, for a while, on the side of anti-colonialism—Israelis were often praised then as “different Jews”—but after 1967, Jews again stood on the “wrong side,” that of the colonialist and oppressor. Pro-Palestinian attitudes turned mostly antisemitic, including Holocaust denial which is openly proclaimed at conferences held in Muslim capitals. Allosemitism is more influential than always, even when Jews fight others’ cause. Yet despite this vigorous formulation of what antisemitism stands for, Bassi sees no other way out from this condition than what he calls “dialectic 34 chapter 2 assimilation,” by which he means assimilating non-Jewish elements in Jewish culture and adopting new patterns of behavior and speech that might disarm antisemitism. In other words, creating a “non-different other.”

Conclusions

In conclusion, it is obvious from the testimonies, analyses, and suggestions overviewed that the special attitude toward Jews is a kind of code or ground- rule that easily takes root and may be found in the most diverse cultures and at different societal phases. This reality brings Jews everywhere to adopt patterns of confrontation and modes of behavior that would reflect both, and interac- tively, their perceptions of their environment and their relations to their Jewishness. This is the aspect with which this book engages, namely, how Jews see the setting where they evolve with respect to their own destiny as Jews, and through their convictions about what Jewishness stands for. All in all, what was described above yields a gamut of hypotheses that may be summarized as follows:

– The theory of Jewish self-hatred assumes that Jews actually agree with antisemites in their description of Jews as “bad guys”—whether or not this includes themselves, members of their community, or a given category from among their fellow Jews, Israel primarily. – The “dimming-Jewishness-in-public” approach assumes that the acuteness of animosity toward Jews flourishing around them, triggers off Jews’ tendency to become more or less “invisible” as Jews, at least in the public sphere. – The instrumental-conversion line would assume that the ultimate stage of becoming “invisible” as Jews consists of transgressing the collective border and joining other faiths, or the non-Jewish non-religious public. – Still another hypothesis in a similar vein, consists of accepting commitments to pan-humanity ideals that strive to create a social reality where particularistic identities become irrelevant to the classification of individuals. – In a quite opposed direction, the hypothesis of allosemitism views the animosity toward Jews as endemically attached to Jewish history; though today’s multicultural transformation of advanced societies is encouraging optimism and expectations that the impact of allosemitism will grow steadily less significant. Antisemitism And Allosemitism 35

– There is also room however for the expectation that, as far as animosity to Jews is widespread among different cultures, multiculturalization of society will not necessarily result in the moderation of allosemitism but rather in its aggravation. On the other hand, the process of multiculturalization may encourage Jews to find self-confidence in strengthening their own communities through institutionalization, education, the work of memory, and transnational solidarity.

The research now presented considers the validity of these differing perspectives. chapter 3 Contemporary Perceptions and Attitudes of Europe’s Jews

The Pew Research Center’s Portrait of Jewish Americans

The European survey discussed in this volume entailed wide-ranging research into how European Jews currently perceive antisemitism in their environment, and how they tend to react to it. Understandably, this survey had to start with questions intended to portray this Jewry in terms of its Jewishness. By chance, at the same period, Washington’s Pew Research Center (2013) published parallel data elicited by its own comprehensive survey of Jewish Americans. Hence, before presenting the figures describing European Jews’ self-perceptions as Jews, it is of interest to succinctly refer to the “portrait” of Jewish Americans with the aim of setting the image of Europe’s Jewry within the context of Diaspora Jewry as a whole. To quote from the Pew Report, American Jews overwhelmingly state their pride in being Jewish and their strong sense of belonging to the Jewish peoplehood: 94% of U.S. Jews (more precisely, 97% of Jews by religion, and 83% of Jews of no religion) say they are proud to be Jewish. Three-quarters of U.S. Jews (including 85% of Jews by religion, and 42% of Jews of no religion) also reported their “strong sense of belongingness to Jewish peoplehood.” However, the survey also shows that Jewish identity is changing in America: no less than one-in-five Jews now describe themselves as “of no religion,” and moreover, two-thirds say it is not necessary to believe in God to be Jewish. In other words, no few American Jews tend to see Jewishness more as a cultural allegiance than as linked to a religion. This impacts on the dynamics of the community: intermarriage is much more common among secular Jews than among Jews by religion: 79% of married Jews of no religion have a spouse who is not Jewish, compared with 36% among Jews by religion. Moreover, while nearly all Jews who have a Jewish spouse (96%), say they are raising their children as Jewish by religion, among Jews with a non-Jewish spouse much fewer respondents say so (20%). Here, moreover, only 25% report that they are raising their children as “partly Jewish” by religion. Yet the new survey also finds that seven-in-ten Jews say they participated in a Passover meal (Seder) in the previous year, and 53% say they fasted on Yom Kippur.

Concomitantly, respondents show a strong emotional attachment to Israel—though it is markedly stronger among Jews by religion (and older Jews in general) than among Jews of no religion (and younger ones). Overall, about seven-in-ten Jews surveyed say they feel either very attached (30%) or somewhat attached (39%) to Israel, which is essentially unchanged since 2000– 2001. In addition, 43% of Jews have visited Israel, including 23% who have visited more than once. At the same time, many American Jews express reser- vations about Israel’s approach to the peace process. Just 38% say the Israeli government is making a sincere effort to establish peace with the Palestinians, though still fewer—12%—think Palestinian leaders are sincerely seeking peace with Israel. Above all, large majorities of US Jews say that remembering the Holocaust (73%) and leading an ethical life (69%) are essential to their view of Jewishness. More than half (56%) say that working for justice and equality is essential to what being Jewish means to them. And about four-in-ten say that caring about Israel (43%) is essential to their Jewish identity.

JPR and FRA’s Survey

These data that refer to Jews in the USA are not very far from those obtained by the European survey. This latter study was performed in 2012–2013 in nine member-states of the European Union and constitutes the most extensive study of European Jews thus far. It included 5,919 subjects from Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Sweden, and the UK. It consisted of an online open web survey that took place over four weeks. The survey was commissioned by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), and conducted by a joint team from the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) in London and Ipsos MORI. The data were analyzed by JPR’s academic staff, comprising social scientists with expertise in European Jewish life. This chapter draws from the report (Staetsky and Boyd 2013) that the research team submitted to the FRA, which subsequently endorsed and publicized the findings on its own behalf. As shown by Table 3.1, according to estimates, there were, in 2012, 1,410,000 people in Europe who declared themselves as Jewish in national censuses or other surveys, not comprising persons of Jewish origin who preferred not to declare themselves as Jews. This number included members of Jewish households who were not Jewish according to Talmudic law but felt Jewish— as the result of intermarriages. Table 3.1 also specifies the importance of 38 chapter 3

Table 3.1 Jewish population estimates for the 9 European countries surveyed

Country Corea Jewish Enlargedb Jewish Population Population (2012) (2012)

Total 1,027,100 1,410,000 France 480,000 600,000 UK 291,000d 360,000 Germany 119,000 250,000 Hungary 48,200 90,000 Belgiumc 30,000 42,000 Italy 28,200 38,000 Sweden 15,000 27,000 Romania 9,500 18,000 Latvia 6,200 12,000 a. Self-declared plus estimated non-declared Jews of no other religion. b. Also including non-Jewish members in Jewish households. c. Other—non official—sources estimate the number of core Jews around 40000 Source: Della Pergola (2011)

“core” and “enlarged” Jewish populations in the nine countries covered by the survey. Though, researching Jewish populations in Europe is notoriously complex due to the absence or inaccessibility of lists of Jews from which to draw a sample. Hence, the survey adopted the—very approximate —“snowball” method— asking respondents for email addresses of acquaintances and duplicating the method with the new subjects. Jews everywhere were largely concentrated in metropolitan areas—especially in the capital city. Their level of education was relatively high, with percentages of those with at least some post-secondary education ranging from 90% in Romania to 68% in Italy. With some minor variations, most Jews in the sample are employed or retired; very few are unemployed. A sizable minority of the respondents, roughly 20%–30%, are self-employed. All Jewish populations in Europe are known to be ageing, and thus it is not surprising that a majority of respondents belonged to the forty-five-plus age group, and are mostly married, co-habiting or widowed—60%–70% in nearly all countries. Ethnically, most subjects are Ashkenazi, with the exception of France and Italy. Contemporary Perceptions and Attitudes of Europe’s Jews 39

The majority of respondents are long-term residents in their countries, and most were born there—73%. This figure runs from 95% in Hungary to 66% in France, except for Germany where only 35% were born in the country. Hence, it is not surprising that subjects showed themselves to be firmly bound to their countries of residence and, with the exception of Germany where Jews are mostly recent immigrants, they tend to feel “integrated” in their environment, thereby confirming that Jewish identity and identification may be concomitant with attachment to the country in which one lives. In this sample, Jewish identity appears to be fluid and complex. The majority of respondents report strong allegiance to the Jewish identity and vigorous identification with it. Moreover, most have both visited Israel and have family and friends living there. The principal kinds of Jewish religiosity found among respondents are the ultra-Orthodox, the Orthodox, the Reform, the Conservative, the “traditional,” and the “just Jewish”. The major difference between these categories can be defined as follows: the ultra-Orthodox aspires to assert his or her sanctimonious devotion to the faith and the Talmudic law (the Halakha); the orthodox also wishes to keep to the Halakha but does also aspire to integrate society concomitantly; the Conservative aspires to keep to the Halakha as much as possible, in his or her eyes, in the modern world; the Reform sees the Halakha as a source of inspiration but not as a breviary of commands; the “traditional” see him or herself as mainly bound by given customs that command particular respect; “just Jewish” designates the one who feels no obligation vis-à-vis the religion and gives respect only to a few traditions that are mainly markers of collective identity. All in all, it must be noted, average levels of religiosity are rather similar in the different European countries. While it is apparent that respondents in Hungary and Sweden are the less religious in the sample, in the UK and Italy, they are the more religious. Between these two poles, the range of variation is rather narrow. At the same time, the strength of Jewish identification is quite similar in the different countries and tends to be high everywhere: on a scale running from 1 (low) to 10 (high), it stands at over 7 in all countries. In parallel, the differences between these countries are less than one unit on the statistically com- puted index of strength of identity. Moreover, in all countries over 70% of the respondents have visited Israel and 70%–85% have relatives there. In addition, in all countries, a majority of respondents identify as Jewish by birth while the proportion of converts among respondents runs in the range of 10%–15%. The data published by FRA that concern Europe are not identical to those the Pew research indicates for US Jewry, but they still tend to converge regarding some major features. This concerns, in particular, the fact that for no few 40 chapter 3

Jews in Europe and in the US, Jewishness is not necessarily attached to religion and observance. Moreover, and somehow in contrast with this assessment, even where religion is absent, some traditional rites are maintained as identity markers. Furthermore, on both sides of the Atlantic, Jews give importance to the memory of the Holocaust, show interest in Israel, and aspire to an ethical life. Last but not least, Jews are willing, in large numbers, to give their children a Jewish education. Beyond the portraying of European Jewry, the main target of the FRA survey, however, was to consider how Jews in France, Belgium, and elsewhere in Europe perceive, confront, and react to the present-day wave of “new antisemitism.”

Perceptions of Antisemitism

In all countries investigated, a majority or close to a majority of the respondents thinks that antisemitism is an acute problem in their surroundings. Each of the specific categories of antisemitic expressions raised by the survey— harassment, vandalism, threats, antisemitic graffiti, insults on the web and the like—is reported as a “big” or “fairly big” problem by a significant proportion of the respondents, i.e. by at least one-third of the respondents. Antisemitism on the internet is perceived to be among the most dominant expressions in all countries. Antisemitism in the media is likewise perceived so in six of the countries, and desecration of cemeteries ranks third, in five of the countries. It is noteworthy, however, that a large proportion of respondents, comparable to the proportion of those identifying antisemitism as a severe problem, also pointed out the actuality in society of a range of other problems such as racism, religious intolerance, immigration, crime, unemployment, the state of the economy, the state of health services, and government corruption. The relative position of antisemitism in that list varied quite significantly from country to country. In Germany, it is regarded as the greatest problem on the list; in France and in Sweden, it comes third, after unemployment in both instances and racism (Sweden) or the state of the economy (France). In contrast, it comes lower on the list in the UK (where only government corruption stands lower), and in Italy, Latvia and Romania. In these latter cases, two items come lower: religious intolerance in all three of them, followed by racism in Latvia, immigration in Romania, and the state of health services in Italy. Of special interest is the finding that antisemitism is reported as being on the increase by a majority of respondents—in all countries except Latvia. The percentage of respondents indicating that antisemitism has increased over the past five years is especially high in Hungary, France, and Belgium, where one Contemporary Perceptions and Attitudes of Europe’s Jews 41 observes the largest proportions of respondents who also indicated that antisemitism is a “very big” or a “big” problem. Racism as well is reported to be on the increase by a majority of respondents in all countries except Latvia. It should be noted, however, that the proportion of respondents thinking that racism is on the increase is lower than the corresponding proportion in relation to antisemitism in seven of the nine countries, with Italy and Romania being the exceptions. What is more, all specific expressions of antisemitism considered are reported as having increased during the past five years by a significant proportion of respondents in all countries. Antisemitism on the internet is the expression most commonly perceived as increasing, in all nine countries. In the following of the internet, antisemitic hostility in public places and in the media are the next two phenomena perceived to be on the increase. In parallel, the highest proportions of respondents (around one-third) reporting personal antisemitic experiences of verbal insult/harassment and/or physical attack were found in Hungary and Belgium. The lowest proportions were found in Latvia, Italy, and Germany, where 14%–17% of the respondents reported such personal experiences. In the remaining countries (UK, France, Sweden, Romania) one-fifth to one-quarter of the respondents reported such experiences. In addition, in Hungary and Belgium, around 40% of the respondents witnessed other Jews being subjected to antisemitic verbal harassment and/or physical attack. In all other countries, approximately one-quarter to one-fifth of the respondents witnessed such incidents occurring to others. Moreover, the percentage of respondents reporting that their children/ grandchildren had been subjected over the previous 12 months to an antisemitic attack varies in the range of 5%–10% in Latvia and Italy, the lowest level in this sample, and around 20% in Belgium, Romania and Hungary, for the highest level. At the same time, a significant proportion of respondents worries about becoming a victim of a verbal or physical attack in the near future. The highest proportions of respondents (one half to 40%) are found in France and Belgium; the lowest in the UK and Romania where the proportion of respondents is nevertheless about one third. Further on, the survey offered the respondents 14 different statements for them to define what an antisemitic verbal expression consists of. With respect to all the statements considered, little variation differentiated the different countries. Out of fourteen statements, seven were considered antisemitic by an overwhelming majority (above 70%) nearly everywhere. Three of these statements deal with the manipulation by Jews of the memory of the Holocaust; two relate to assumed “Jewish power;” and two refer to Jewish particularistic concerns and interests. The remaining statements can be subdivided into two groups. The first group includes six statements on Jews’ incapacity to integrate 42 chapter 3 into the wider society, Jews’ sharing recognizable features, the undesirability of marriage with Jews, and support for a boycott of Israeli goods. These statements are considered antisemitic by over 50% of the respondents nearly everywhere. The last group of two statements consists of criticism of Israel, and Jews being a religious group and not a nation. Whilst criticism of Israel is considered to be antisemitic by a considerable large minority of Jews (approximately 20%–45%), it is clear that it is in the contents of the criticism rather than the fact of it that antisemitism is perceived. The survey also asked respondents whether or not they had personally heard from non-Jews the statements considered, during the previous twelve months. Here, it is the characterization of Israelis as Nazis that was the most frequently heard by respondents. Over a half of respondents in Sweden, Italy, France, and Belgium reported that they heard this kind of utterance from non- Jews during the last year. From one-third to a half reported hearing it in the UK, Germany, Romania and Hungary, and 14% in Latvia. Except for Latvia and Romania, the second most often heard claim is that Jews exploit the Holocaust for their own purposes. The claim that the Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated is the third statement more frequently heard in the sample (though it is second in Latvia and Romania where 30%–40% of respondents overheard it in the previous twelve months). The conviction that Jews have too much power in the country’s economy, politics, and media is most common among non-Jews according to large majorities of respondents in Hungary or France (60%–75%) or at least important minorities (30%–40% ) in all other countries apart from the UK (about 25%). Moreover, 40%–60% of respondents in Romania and Hungary and 10%–24% in all remaining countries heard non-Jews charging Jews with responsibility for their respective country’s current economic crisis. These antisemitic statements were heard in many contexts by respondents, especially on the internet, though they were also heard in social interaction, in public, and in political speeches. When asked to describe the person(s) who made these statements, about half to three-quarters of respondents in Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK mentioned people with left-wing political views and Muslim extremists. Right-wing individuals were also mentioned but rather less frequently—approximately one-third of the respondents in most countries with the exception of Hungary, Italy, and Romania where this category was designated by 40%–80% of the respondents. A clear distinction is notable here between the perceptions of Jews in Western and Central Europe. In Western Europe, hostility to Jews is clearly pointed out to the political left and Muslim Contemporary Perceptions and Attitudes of Europe’s Jews 43 extremism; in Central Europe, it is far more focused on the political right and, to a lesser extent, Christian extremism. A somehow resembling distinction comes up regarding how Israel and/or the situation in the Middle East affects how safe Jews feel. Around 90% of the respondents in Belgium and France reported that the Israeli-Arab conflict has a significant impact on their safety as Jews, compared to around 40% in Latvia and Hungary. In almost all other countries a majority of approximately 50%–70% reported that the conflict significantly impacts on their safety. On the other hand, the majority of respondents in Belgium, Italy and France (around 60%) states that they feel blamed or accused by people in their country for anything done by the Israeli government. In the UK, Germany and Sweden the corresponding proportion runs around 45%. In Latvia, Hungary and Romania this percentage is lower—between 6% and 20%. This atmosphere, it could be hypothesized, may influence Jews’ life plans. In this respect, three countries stand out in particular: Hungary, France, and Belgium where 40%–50% of the respondents reported that they had considered emigrating because they did not feel safe as Jews in their country of residence. Roughly, one-fifth to a quarter of respondents in the remaining countries reported the same. Nearly one-fifth of respondents in France and Belgium either have moved or have considered moving out of their neighborhood for the same reason. In the remaining countries, this percentage varies between 5% and 10%. However, in the sample as a whole, nearly 40% of the respondents have actually moved or considered moving out of their area of residence.

Experiences of Harassment and Discrimination

The research also explored different forms of harassment. Offensive or threatening comments to individuals are the kind most frequently mentioned in all countries. The prevalence of this type of harassment is especially high in Hungary and Belgium, where a quarter of all respondents reported that they experienced it in the last twelve months, and a third in the past five years. It is relatively low in Latvia, Sweden, Italy, and the UK, where the corresponding figures for the previous twelve months vary in the range of 10%–15%, and for the past five years between 15% and 25%. Offensive comments posted on the internet are the second most frequent type of harassment. This is especially the case in Romania and Italy where 15%–20% reported that they had experienced this kind of offense. In the remaining countries, the prevalence of this type of harassment varies in the range of 5%–15%. 44 chapter 3

Respondents who reported experiences of antisemitic harassment were further asked about the identity and number of perpetrators involved in particular incidents (the most serious incident, whatever the number of reported incidents). In Germany, Hungary, and Italy, a quarter to a half of respondents indicated individuals whom they identified as right-wingers. In Hungary and Italy, extremist Christians were also indicated by 10%–15% of the respondents. On the other hand, left-wingers were mentioned as perpetrators by one-fifth to two-fifths of the respondents in Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, and the UK. In these countries as well as Germany, extremist Muslims were also mentioned by a quarter to two-fifths of the respondents. Interestingly enough, respondents who reported experiencing a personal antisemitic incident in the survey had not turned to the police or any other organization. In nearly all countries, fewer than 20% of respondents stated that they had reported to the police. About 50% of the respondents were actually convinced that such reporting would bear no result. An important minority (one-fifth to one-third) contended that such incidents occur all the time and it is pointless to turn to the authorities. About one-fifth of the respondents also indicated that they were deterred by bureaucratic time-consuming proce- dures of reporting. Those who reported the incident to some association principally contacted a Jewish organization. Data concerning antisemitic physical attacks on Jews show that this kind of incident takes place on a larger scale than vandalism of Jewish property, but on a smaller scale than harassment. The highest prevalence of physical attacks was observed in France and Belgium where 10% of the respondents reported they had been victims of such attacks at least once in recent years. The lowest prevalence is observed in Romania and Latvia. In the remaining countries, 5%–8% of the respondents had experienced an antisemitic physical attack in recent years. When it comes to discrimination proper, it appears that in Germany, France, Romania and Belgium, over one-fifth of respondents stated that they have personally felt discriminated against recently on the basis of their religion. In the remaining countries, the proportion ran from 5% to 20%. Additionally, in Germany, Romania, and Sweden about one-fifth of the respondents reported they had been discriminated against on an ethnic basis—the same datum fluc- tuated between 5% and 15% for the remaining countries. Those respondents who experienced discrimination as Jews specified that these events took place principally when they were searching for a job, at work, or in the context of an educational institution. Most importantly, the data also revealed an undeniable tendency of the respondents in most countries to avoid wearing clothes, items, or symbols that Contemporary Perceptions and Attitudes of Europe’s Jews 45 might identify them a priori as Jews. About one-fifth to one-third of the respondents stated that they never carry or display objects that others might recognize as Jewish. In Sweden and France, the percentage amounted to 40%–50% of the respondents. The lowest figures were found in the Romanian and Latvian samples (10% and 5% respectively). With the exception of Latvia, of those who ever carry or display their Jewishness in some way, 60%–80% of respondents hide it in public at least occasionally. Another issue that was of interest to the researchers in the context of this atmosphere concerns the fact that in recent years in several countries, calls are being made to ban the Jewish practices of brit milah (circumcision) and shechita (kosher slaughter). One remembers in this respect that a court in Cologne, Germany, ruled in 2012 that circumcision is not medically necessary and constitutes an assault on a child’s right to decide on his or her religion. Seeing that both milah and shechita are fundamental elements of Jewish observance, the research explored respondents’ attitudes to an eventual ban of these practices. The survey indeed showed that above 80% of the respondents in Sweden and Germany had heard non-Jews suggesting that these religious practices should not be continued in their country. The lowest proportions were found in Romania (7%), Hungary and Latvia (around 20% in each country). In the remaining countries, such suggestions were heard by 50%–60% of the respondents. In a general manner, a prohibition of circumcision represented a “very big” or a “big” problem for 90% of the respondents in France, Belgium and Italy, and 70%–80% in the UK, Sweden, Germany and Romania. In Latvia and Hungary the proportion was 40%–50%. On the other hand, for about 70% of respondents in Italy, France and the UK, a prohibition of traditional slaughter represented a serious problem; 50%– 60% of respondents in Belgium, Germany, Romania and Hungary; 30%–40% in Latvia and Sweden. One more issue: most subjects in most countries were aware that the law forbids discrimination against Jews in the areas of employment, business opportunities, education—and that, if this was not sufficient, organizations offer support to victims. Moreover, it is notable that respondents mostly believed that their countries have a special law against denying or trivializing the Holocaust. This means that Jews in Europe—in most cases at least—live in an atmosphere where antisemitism is a social fact surrounding them but that they do not live, or do not perceive themselves living in antisemitic states. Democracy, volens nolens, does protect the civil rights of Jews in the same measure as of the non-Jews’. 46 chapter 3

Conclusions

In conclusion, this research constituted an extensive survey of Jews across Europe and the data may be viewed as broadly representative of the segment of the Jewish population engaged, to whatever degree, in the community life of their respective countries. Staetsky and Boyd’s report (2013) concludes the analysis of those data by emphasizing a number of features characterizing the sample. The main conclusions may be listed as follows:

– Background. Most Jews in the sample were born in their country of present-day residence and they felt a sense of belonging to it. A large proportion possesses higher education, and is employed, self-employed or retired. Respondents also shared a strong sense of Jewishness and identification with Jewish peoplehood. – Antisemitism: a serious and growing problem. Two-thirds considered antisemitism to be a serious or very serious problem in their country— together with other hardships. Antisemitism was categorized among the most acute issues in Germany, France and Sweden, of a somehow lower gravity in Belgium and Hungary, and towards the bottom in the UK, Italy, Latvia and Romania. Moreover, no less than three-quarters of respondents believed that antisemitism has worsened in their country over the past years. The problem was considered more acute in France, Hungary, Belgium, and Sweden, less so in Romania and Latvia. But it was perceived by most as increasing everywhere. – Antisemitism in the plural. Some substantial differences between perceptions of antisemitism appeared in more Western and less Western Europe. In more Western countries, anti-Jewish prejudice and violence is influenced by the Israel-Palestinian conflict, while in less Western Europe antisemitism is predominantly driven by right-wingers. The situations in France and Hungary represent the epitome of these two types: particularly high levels of incidence are recorded in both places, but in Hungary antisemitism is perceived as linked to right-wing politics, whereas in France it is mostly associated with Muslim radicalism. – Incidents of violence and harassment. Respondents in all countries report low levels of anti-Jewish discrimination in contexts like restaurants, sporting clubs, and public services. On the other hand, antisemitic verbal threats and harassment are common, and often marked by physical attack. – Vulnerability and insecurity. Clear indications show that Jews feel vulnerable and anxious about antisemitism. Whilst Jewish life continues, there Contemporary Perceptions and Attitudes of Europe’s Jews 47

is evidence to indicate that some Jews stay away from Jewish sites or events out of concern for their safety. Furthermore, close to half of all respondents are worried about becoming a victim of a verbal attack or harassment, and more than a few about a physical attack. Three-quarters of respondents do not wear, carry, or display items in public that might identify them as Jews. Almost three-quarters of respondents say that the Israeli-Arab conflict affects how safe they feel as Jews, and four in ten feel that they are commonly blamed for the actions of the Israeli government. All these factors combine to create a situation in which close to a third of all Jews across this sample have considered emigrating because they do not feel safe as Jews. In many respects, an uncomfortable feeling gets instilled that the particulars of Jewish life and identity are seen as beyond the conventionally acceptable. – Impacts of Middle East tensions. One may read in the responses to the survey a spillover of the Israel-Palestinian conflict into Europe, particularly in more Western Europe where there are sizeable Muslim immigrant populations. Half of all respondents claim there they heard Muslims making antisemitic statements. A third of those who experienced recent antisemitic harassment or attacks describe the perpetrators as Muslims. – Under-reporting. Widespread under-reporting of antisemitic incidents indicates that much of what is taking place remains unacknowledged. In none of the countries investigated do more than a third of all such incidents reach the police. Under-reporting is due to a lack of trust in efficacy of reporting. – Antisemitism online. Respondents reported that they had most commonly encountered antisemitism on the web, and three-quarters that online antisemitism has increased over the past years. None of the other contexts—hostility in public places, the media, political life, graffiti, desecration of cemeteries, and vandalism—reached the same levels. This may reflect the pervasive, virtual, and viral character of the internet itself. At the same time, these data demonstrate that antisemitism has found support in new technologies, and contributes to the overarching feelings of anxiety and insecurity among Jews. – Antisemitism in the media. Nearly 60% of respondents felt that antisemitism in their country’s media has increased over the last years. The media, of course, is a difficult source to pin down. However, drawing on Jewish community discourse, this perception is related to media reporting of events concerning Israel, which is often felt to be biased—to say the least. Whilst most Jews in this sample do not regard criticism of Israel as 48 chapter 3

antisemitic, a perceived bias against Israel in the media is viewed as part of a wider phenomenon of “ambient antisemitism”—an overarching sense that hostility towards Jews is becoming more widespread and acceptable.

It is in the context of these generalizations about Europe’s Jewry, that the following chapters delve deeper into one specific case, that of Belgian Jewry. This case, as it will be shown, is best described as “like the other European cases, but a bit more.” One indeed finds here all the traits that chart the portrait of Europe’s Jews in general but in several respects, these traits are in this case more salient than in any other European sample. In brief, and in this sense, Belgian Jewry is a kind of “ideal-case” that merits special attention. PART B Facing Hostility

∵

Chapter 4 Belgian Jews: A Long Story

Ever Since the First Clues

The wars of Vespasian and Titus brought to Rome Jewish captives who ultimately found their way, either willingly or unwillingly, to Gaul and the Iberian Peninsula. Other Jews followed the Roman legions on their path of conquest in the West and the North. It is also widely acknowledged that the first settlement of Jews in this rich and fertile country now known as Belgium took place as early as the second century AD. The Frankish kingdom, founded by Clovis (486) included Belgium and with it a Jewish community that, like its sister communities under the early Carolingians, was prosperous and enjoyed tranquility. Jewish merchants apparently conducted profitable commercial relations with different parts of Minor Asia and Eastern Europe (see Teitelbaum 2008; Lehrer 1946; Schreiber 1999). This period came to an end with the establishment of the feudal regime. The Jews were handed over to the whims of unfriendly rulers who imposed on them numberless restrictions. In the twelfth century, Benjamin of Tudela (1993) refers to them, and in the fifteenth century the “Maharil” (1365–1427) writes about the religious customs of the Jews of Flanders. Jews, in this area, do not seem at any time to have attained much importance in the world of learning and science, but appear to have been sometimes successful as bankers, and craftsmen. Many prints of their existence in different parts of the country can still be found. In several towns, one finds a “rue des Juifs” or “Jodenstraat.” A memorial of that past is a white stone with a Hebrew inscription found in 1872 on the grounds of a hospital in the city of Tirlemont. A Hebrew document dis- covered in the royal archives is a memorandum on the margin of a bond con- tracted on October 26, 1344. On several occasions, Jews in Belgium were robbed, despoiled, and massa- cred. They experienced hardships in the thirteenth century when Henry III, the Duke of Brabant, and Margrave of Antwerp explicitly expressed (in 1261 precisely) the wish to expel the Jews because they were “usurers.” In 1321, however, Jews expelled from France found refuge on Belgian territory, in Mons, where a district was assigned to them for residence. In the middle of the century, though, a massive anti-Jewish campaign was led in Brussels and Leuven and drove them out from the city. The Jews of Belgium, like their brethren all over Europe, were persecuted on charges of infant ritual murders and

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi 10.1163/9789004274068_005 52 chapter 4 poisoning wells. A series of massacres took place during a twenty-year period, culminating in mass killing in Brussels (1370). At the beginning of the sixteenth century, a number of Marranos from Spain and Portugal arrived in the country but several attempts were made to expel them. In 1532 and 1549 and again in 1550 decrees were issued by the court against sheltering Marranos, but the numbers of these secret Jews increased daily. They took an active part in the uprising of the Netherlands that ended up with the establishment of country were religious liberty was proclaimed. In Belgium itself, Jewish newcomers started settling in Antwerp, though for another 150 years Jews were denied citizenship and persecution was common. Their position remained precarious and they remained subjected to special taxation. During the eighteenth century, Jews in Belgium continued to be subjected to harassing enactments, but they still grew in numbers and many achieved prosperity. Some families of wealth moved in from Germany and Holland and settled in the main cities of Belgium. Yet, it was not until 1794 and with the arrival of the army of the French Revolution that Jews were allowed to settle freely in Antwerp. Under the influence of the French, many Belgian writers and publicists took up the cause of the Jews. The most distinguished of these was the Prince de Ligne who published a memoir counter-attacking Voltaire’s anti-Jewish pamphlets, and eulogizing the Jews’ virtues and character. He pre- dicted a great destiny for them if they were granted full civil and political rights. In 1815, these efforts bore fruit as Jews obtained full freedom and all citizenship rights. The Jews of Belgium then numbered about 12,000, divided since the imperial decree of 17 March 1808, into consistorial circumscriptions of nine departments. After Belgium became independent in 1831, Judaism was recognized as an official religion. After 1880, again Belgium’s Jewish population grew significantly as numerous Eastern European Jews fleeing the Tsarist regime settled in the country. By World War II, about 90,000 Jews lived in Belgium, most of them of Central and Eastern European origin. Ever since the nineteenth century, and apart from a few small communities dispersed in provincial towns, two distinct regions attracted the Belgian Jews, each of which pertaining to another urban space—namely, Antwerp and Brussels. The Jewish community of Antwerp was officially established in 1816, and it was the first legally recognized Jewish community. The first Jewish public prayers were held in the private home of a notable who had received the approval of city authorities. The Jews of Antwerp also acquired possession of a cemetery in 1828. On the eve of WWII there were about 55,000 Jews in the area, many of them—more or less recent—Eastern and Central European immigrants. As for Brussels, it numbered about 35,000 Jews in the late 1930s, Belgian Jews: A Long Story 53 the vast majority of them of the same origin, although some essential differences separated the two populations. Firstly, there was the different linguistic environment: Antwerp is a Flemish-speaking city while Brussels which is officially bilingual leans actually to francophonie. Secondly, in Antwerp, a large part of the Jewish population is religious, nay even ultra-Orthodox, while most Jews in Brussels hardly keep to the observance of a few commands. This is due to the fact that important ultra-Orthodox groups settled in Antwerp from Eastern Europe and attracted the religious elements that arrived later on. Thirdly, Jews in Antwerp developed here the diamond industry and business while, at the same time, Jews in Brussels turned to crafts and commerce in domains they had often already practiced in their countries of origin—clothing, women’s bags and the like. At the time, both in Antwerp and in Brussels, most Jews had in common the use of Yiddish and in each center, there were Jewish organizations, Zionist and anti-Zionist parties, as well as newsletters and very active charities. Hence, in the context of Catholic Belgium, Jews constituted a milieu of their own. This reality was to be annihilated with the outbreak of World War II. Belgium was quickly overrun by German military invasion in May 1940, and officially surrendered eighteen days later (Poumon 1959; Steinberg 2004). Although the cabinet fled to London where it established a government- in-exile, King Léopold III, as well as the head of government and the com- mander of the Belgian army remained in the occupied land. During the four years of occupation, German authority was exercised through a military governor while the national administration was carried out by the regular civil service. Since most Jews were not Belgian citizens but recently-arrived refugees from Germany, Austria and Poland, their condition became most vulnerable once the Nazis’ anti-Jewish policy was activated (1942). Many Jews went into hiding soon after learning about the start of mass deportations to the East (August 1942). This was possible only thanks to the courage of thousands of non-Jewish Belgians who were ready to risk their life by offering Jews places to hide. Still, by July 1944, tens of thousands of Jews were deported eastward— mostly to Auschwitz. These deportees were Jews of non-Belgian citizenship, mostly Polish, Czech, German or Russian. Quite exceptionally, the German military governor had, indeed, responded to a plea from the Belgian Catholic Church and the Queen-Mother and exempted Jews with Belgian citizenship from deportation. This was also applied to those who were citizens of the United States, Britain and the British dominions, and Latin American countries. Yet, at the same time, and as detailed by the Black Book (WJC 1981), the 54 chapter 4

German authorities killed 200 people each month in the Breendonck camp in Belgium. Later on, the Nazis took over a Belgian military camp in Mechelen, the Dossin Kazern, which served as a pre-deportation site. According to different sources, the number of Jews exterminated by the Nazis in Belgium varies from 57,000 to 24,000. The general estimate is that nearly half of the Jews who lived in the country before the war were exterminated in the Holocaust. No few Jews played a role, however, in Belgium’s anti-German underground. They were among the first to take an active part in the resistance movement. The country’s first Jewish group was organized in late 1941 and a so-called “Ninth Jewish Brigade” was established which set fire to factories, derailed trains and attacked garages. In one spectacular case, in April 1943, in an open battle between Jewish partisans and Germans, many among the latter were killed while the partisans got away without loss. One important event symbolizes more than any other the resistance opposed by Jews to the Nazis (Schreiber 2006). On 19 April 1943, the twentieth convoy of Jewish deportees to the East was attacked, while still on Belgian territory (a few dozen kilometers from its starting-point) by three partisans, two of them Jews, who managed to stop the train and open several cars, allowing dozens of deportees to escape. After the attack was overcome by the armed Germans who accompanied the train, a second attempt of sabotage was made by deportees from the inside, who broke doors and jumped from the moving train. Again the train stopped, and the Germans launched a hunt after the escapees. All in all about 225 people escaped and survived this venture. By extraordinary circumstances, this unique attempt to oppose the Nazi extermination machine from a deportation train took place on the same day as the outbreak of the revolt of the Warsaw Ghetto in Poland. At this epoch, diverse Jewish resistance groups were created clandestinely, independently from the official representative framework of Belgian Jews, the Conseil des Associations juives de Belgique-AJB. A major arm of this Jewish underground was the Committee for the Defense of Belgian Jews (Comité de Défense des Juifs en Belgique-CDJ) that took principally care of finding hiding places for children. Besides this structure, a variety of groups—leftist Zionists, rightist Zionists, Bundists, Communists, and others—worked independently. Some were combat units and others were busy to find hiding places, collecting money to support families that hid children or obtaining false certificates. It is notable that the Catholic Church adopted a firm stand and cooperated with Jewish underground organizations. The Protestant Church in Belgium, in contrast, neither issued any proclamations nor gave any instructions to its members regarding “Jewish affairs”. Nonetheless, many Protestant clerics provided Jews with hiding places and showed abnegation. Belgian Jews: A Long Story 55

Belgian Jewry Today

After the war, the Jewish communities of Belgium that had lost about half of their members, received new immigrants, first from Eastern Europe—survivors of the Holocaust, principally from Poland—and later on and in smaller numbers, from North Africa—following French de-colonization (Freifeld 1972; Poumon 1959; Schreiber 2000). Up to now, the main bulk of Belgian Jewry consists of people born in Belgium whose parents emigrated from Eastern Europe with little material resources. These people experienced the Shoa here at a young age or were born to survivors shortly after it. This population is concentrated in Brussels and Antwerp, leaving nuclei in a few other cities—Charleroi, Ostend, Ghent, Liege, Mons, Arlon and Waterloo. In total, it now comprises 40,000–42,000 Jews. About 19,000–20,000 live in Antwerp and a similar number in Brussels. The vast majority belongs today to the middle class; in Brussels, it is involved in the fur, textile, and leather industries and, in Antwerp, the diamond industry. Thanks to Belgium’s prosperity that took off after World War II with the recovery from wartime, Jews achieved significant economic mobility and in less than twenty years reached middle and upper-middle class stand- ings. Many of the next generation entered family businesses or professional careers, and thus since the 1970s, Belgian Jewry constitutes a quite wealthy population. Clouding this picture is the acute crisis of the last decades that occurred in the diamond sector, and the rise, in this area, of new groups of business people. This concerns mainly Jews of Antwerp who controlled 70% of the diamond sector in the late 1990s and in the 2000s control only 30% of it; this branch is thus losing much of its “Jewish character.” Seen from within, Belgium’s Jewish population is one of the most dynamic and structured in the Jewish diaspora. Already in March 1832, a few people had founded the Consistoire Central Israélite de Belgique along the French model instituted by Napoleon. This framework draws its legitimacy from the Belgian Constitution that endorses the principle of equality among faiths and cults. The Consistoire facilitates the insertion of Jewry in society and provides support to institutions in the realm of Jewish education and culture. For years, this Consistoire was headed by old-timer upper-class bourgeois of Dutch or German origin, though newcomers from Eastern Europe were becoming the predominant actors as their number increased in the Jewish population. From the 1950s on, Jewish institutions and organizations were to multiply in Belgium and in 1969, they created a coordination body, the Committee of Coordination of Belgium’s Jewish Organizations (CCOJB), to speak on their behalf. Vis-à-vis the outside, this body also constitutes the Belgian section of the World Jewish Congress. 56 chapter 4

Today, and in spite of their limited number, Belgian Jews have created more than a dozen Jewish schools, several Jewish magazines, nearly 50 active synagogues (30 of which are in Antwerp). In both Antwerp and Brussels, one finds a Sephardic synagogue and in Antwerp, a Georgian synagogue as well. Several kollelim—religious frameworks for religious learning—also exist for adult learners in Antwerp. In Brussels, on the other hand, there is one Reform synagogue in addition to the Sephardic one. The Union Israelite Liberale de Belgique represents in Brussels non-orthodox Judaisms. Moreover, as Brussels is the capital of the European Union, it also hosts the headquarters of international and regional Jewish organizations such as the European office of the World Jewish Congress and the European Union of Jewish Students. In addition, one also finds here Zionist youth movements, non-religious clubs and two museums—one in Brussels dedicated to the legacy of Belgian Jewry, and another, a Shoa Museum, located in the Dossin military camp, Mechelen, Moreover, Radio Judaica broadcasts around the clock, while each week several lectures about a Jewish or Israeli topic take place somewhere in Brussels or Antwerp. Antwerp especially, but Brussels too, have several kosher restaurants, food stores, and Jewish bookshops. Last but not least, in Brussels as well as in Antwerp, there is an Institute for Jewish studies attached to a major university of the city. Some of these institutions are supported by the federal state and regional authorities. From a cultural and religious point of view, substantial differences still exist between the Jewish populations of Antwerp and of Brussels. The community of Antwerp is one of the last places in the world where, thanks to a heavy proportion of ultra-orthodox Jews (40%–50%), Yiddish is still a living language in the community. A high percentage (95%) of the Jewish children receives here a religious education. On the other hand, Jews in Brussels are more numerous to consider themselves liberal or not religious at all. It is estimated that half of their children attend Jewish schools, two out of three of which are not religious. Geographical distinctions overlap additional lines of division. Antwerp belongs to the Flemish region while Brussels is autonomous and officially bilingual—though the prevalent language is French. Hence, Jews in Antwerp, especially the young, are Flemish-speakers but francophone in Brussels. In Antwerp, as mentioned, many people still use Yiddish as a vernacular among themselves and in the family, while in Brussels Yiddish consists principally of a register of tokens only serving as identity markers. Many Jews in Antwerp, as mentioned, belong to the religious and or the ultra-orthodox; most Jews in Belgian Jews: A Long Story 57

Brussels are secular and rarely attend synagogue (Rabi 1976). While Jewish people with black hats and suits, beards and side-locks are visible on Antwerp’s streets, most Jews in Brussels are much less visible. More importantly, while a wide majority of Jewish children in Antwerp attend a Jewish school—that, as a rule, is religious—only about 50% do in Brussels and mostly in a non- religious institution. Furthermore, both communities exhibit an intense community life but, while in Antwerp, a large part of this activity centers around different congregations—from Lithuanian Judaism to Hassidic courts (Belz, Gour, Chabad and others)—some of which are isolationist and others proselyte, in Brussels, in contrast, community activity takes place mainly in secular clubs marked by political orientations. Hence, unsurprisingly, in Antwerp, the readiness to marry a non-Jewish partner is weaker than in Brussels (Gutwirth 1996). On the other hand, one may note that new solidarity symbols are common to both Brussels’ and Antwerp’s Jewries besides their common celebrations of traditional festivals. This concerns primarily commemorations of the Shoa memory and of the deportation from Belgium, and Yom Ha’atzmaut (Israel’s Independence Day). These events are particularly important to Begian Jews, whatever their specific community. Interestingly enough, neither in Antwerp nor in Brussels can one find a strongly convinced alignment of Jews with one of the two antagonistic linguistic camps that fight each other for decades: Jews do not show, in either community, any special tendency to align themselves on “Flemishness” or “Walloonness.” It may be noted at this point, that from both Antwerp and Brussels, there has been a recent increase in aliyah (emigration to Israel) by young people—several hundred per year. This latter point is probably not alien to the increase of antisemitism in this country.

Sources of Antisemitism

As a whole, this description of Belgian Jewry could bring out a picture of tranquility where belongingness to an advanced nation and community activism are concomitant and undisturbed. The truth is, however, that this picture is strongly tainted by the recent multiplying expressions of virulent antisemitism. Hatred of Jews was in fact already strong in the nineteenth century as shown by the many narratives found in works by nearly all important Belgian writers like Maurice Einhorn, Verhaeren and Maeterlinck. In the twentieth 58 chapter 4 century, Georges Simenon, the illustrious writer of thrillers, gave credit to the putrid Protocoles of the Sages de Zion in a series of articles in La Gazette de Liège, while Hergé, the illustrious creator of Tintin, was also openly antisemitic. One may suggest that this antisemitism is probably not the monopoly of intellectual circles but somehow reflects as well the long anti-Jewish culture conveyed by the Catholic Church. This culture is still exhibited in public in the major cathedral of Brussels, Sainte Gudule, where ten out of fifteen stained- glass windows illustrate Jewish ritual murders of Christian children. As rem- nants of that old ferocious anti-Jew attitude that reigned in the Middle-Ages and still leaves traces in the ecclesiastical institution, one may cite some utterances of high dignitaries who have not interiorized the new attitudes of Vatican II. Hence, Archbishop Joost could comment in a speech given in the open that a “sexually obsessed” person like Bill Clinton could be elected President of America only thanks to the support of “big business” and the Jews. In a way, no few statements by dignitaries also reveal that for numerous Catholics, still now, the return of Jews to their original land is ontologically unacceptable. For them, Zionism negates the assumed mission of the Jews designated by the Church many centuries ago to be a witness of the victory of Christianity. This anti-Jewish attitude might have had some influence even on liberal-minded, socialist, or anarchist individuals who had been raised in this culture. To this aspect should be added that as an economically advanced country politically involved in international affairs, Belgium—like other Western states such as France, the UK and others—, have many interests in Arab countries, and the Muslim world as a whole. These interests can by no means encourage Israel’s friends on the global scene. They are hardly counterbalanced by the benefits represented by relations with a tiny country like Israel. While this factor is not the only one that plays here a part of importance, it most probably influences Belgium’s diplomatic strategy regarding an issue such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. It also possibly contributes to account for the quite reserved reactions of the Belgian establishment to public expressions of antisemitism. Also intervenes in the aggravation of antisemitism in Belgium the growing Arab-Muslim population in the country. In the 2000s, it constitutes nearly 5% of the country’s total population and it numbers about one-fifth of Brussels’. The linguistic landscape of whole neighborhoods of Brussels and Antwerp are overwhelmingly Arabic, while movements, clubs and, above all, circles of study attached to mosques, are legion and still multiply. Notably, in election campaigns in the twenty-first century one observes the growing presence of an Belgian Jews: A Long Story 59

European Arab League competing for municipal and national elections. A major item of its program is making Arabic an official language in Belgium, in addition to Flemish, French and German. The party’s principal tenet is antisemitism and antizionism, and, on the international scene, it is close to the Lebanese fundamentalist Shiite Hezbollah. This party has failed up to now to win a seat in any elected body but its capability to launch public campaigns and incite riots cannot be ignored. In 1991 the Syrian Bassam Abou Ata Ayachi, created the Belgian Islamic Center that became a hive of Islamic activism. It issues slogans in a style like: Jews are pigs and sons of monkeys; Israel is Israeheil. On the same site, the virtues of the hatred of Jews are enumerated: Jews are qualified as “unworthy people, disobedient and transgressors, (. . .) loose, shocking and weak, (. . .) magnet cause of trouble that spread corruption on earth and of extreme arrogance.” These facts underline that the presence of a large Arabic-Muslim population on Belgian soil constitute a breeding-ground for small groups to grow out, organize and plan non-normative politics. Such developments find natural allies in the veteran Belgian society when it comes to crystallizing an anti- Jewish anti-Israeli coalition. This issue, indeed, is a unique example where far-left and far-right meet. The far-left is today strongly turned toward Third-Worldism in its critique of Western capitalism and thus naturally inclined to identify with the Palestinian cause. That cause is also an extraordinary occasion to get linked to Third-World political activists despite the fact that these new allies are mostly fundamentalist Islamists while left-wingers belong rather to the anti-religious Marxist tradition. On the other hand, antizionism and antisemitism are also spheres where Arab-Muslim activists can find a common language with the far-right, whose antisemitism is a major facet of its xenophobia. The combination of all these forces explains somehow why such a tiny population—42,000 Jews out of a total of ten million Belgians—could become a focus of hatred and marginalization. This combination of factors also accounts for why this tiny population, could, in Belgium but not only there, become the target of the new judeophobia and be designated, explicitly or implicitly, as representative of Israel. What does not ease this plight is the contribution of Jewish anti-Zionists. Inheritors of the historical trend of Jewish communism, one finds in Belgium a movement like the Union des Progressistes Juifs de Belgique which proclaims that “We all are Palestinians,” decrying Sharon’s and Israel’s “crimes against humanity.” On numerous occasions, they appear with slogans that are no less anti-Israeli than those of Israel’s worse enemies. To them one may add those Jewish academics and intellectuals who similarly assert themselves 60 chapter 4

“anti-Israeli Jews”. The activism of these Jews, hardly contribute to moderate the overall antisemitic overtones of the anti-Israeli campaigns. Both Belgium’s Jewry and the State of Israel actually constitute in this configuration perfect scapegoats. As scapegoat theory goes (Erner 2005; Girard 1982; Wilcox 2009), these entities simply represent a continuation of the Jewish history: for centuries, indeed, Jews constituted a target of victimization on behalf of assumed “evils.” By assaulting, harassing, or insulting Jews, as such and, today, as supposed “representatives” of Israel, antisemites may feel they are striking at, and weakening, a powerful opponent, while in fact the very rationale of their acts resides in the vulnerability of their target. And indeed, the small Belgian Jewry is quite isolated—though still protected by the democratic regime and its humanistic values as well as by non-Jewish people of good will—in confronting judeophobia on the soil of Belgium.

Expressions of Judeophobia

Today, antisemitism (Kotek 2004) is indeed intimately linked to an aggressive anti-israelism finding its expression in an extraordinary mediatisation in Belgium of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its demonstrations take place on the street, on the internet and on university campuses. In the atmosphere it creates, anti-Israelism easily develops into unlawful forms of protest—desecration of cemeteries, insults and threats. It endangers Jewish children coming out from Jewish schools; it incites the writing of letters of threat to Jewish public figures; it justifies aggressions against orthodox Jews recognizable by external markers; it dictates posters on walls; it launches calls to jihad against the Jews from the voice of imams in mosques. All these do not always lead to vigorous condemnations by journalists or politicians, and in no few instances, articles by respected figures or letters of readers in major newspapers mock Jewish reactions of indignation. Antisemitic speech can be heard at all levels of Belgian society, justified by antizionism. An antizionism that becomes a general taken-for-granted attitude. A decent person may utter disparaging sentences about the Jewish faith, and a journal may use demonizing formulas regarding Jews, Zionists or Israel, without feeling the need of setting limits to “reasonable” utterances. Moreover, any Jew who shows a certain “positive” interest in Israel is immediately tagged aggressively. This anti-Israelism, says Kotek, has become a genuine cultural code, if not a civil religion. The Jew, qualified as Zionist, is now blamed for anything that goes “wrong” in the world. The Belgian press is almost unanimous independently of its political orientation that any frustration in the Belgian Jews: A Long Story 61

Muslim-Arab world relates to the Palestinian issue and is caused by Israel’s policy. Actually, no other conflict in the world and in history is now receiving as much attention. The crudest accusations can be stated against Israel. According to a large part of the Belgian press, Israelis, if not Jews in general, are murderers of children and enemies of humanity. As a rule, Israel is depicted as a theocratic and racist state where opponents are threatened with imprisonment. On the other hand, the Palestinians are the object of a genuine passion. They are viewed as victims of all evils and as a heroic nation resisting unhuman oppression. Palestine, Kotek assesses, is always right; its cause is just, as explained by imams and preachers who are quoted by politicians and journalists without any dis- cernment; the Palestinian fight is a resurgence of the Muslims’ struggle against the Crusaders; the terrorists are the saints of this war. Countless intellectuals contribute to this conceptual structuring. A renowned journalist published, for instance, in 2000 in Espace et Liberté that there was never a Jewish temple in Jerusalem; two years later, the same journal published that Israelis are responsible for the renewal of antisemitic terrorism in Europe. Young Muslims, it was contended, cannot just stand by without reacting to the suffering of their brethren in Palestine, perpetrated by Israelis who aim to eradicate the Palestinians from the surface of the earth. Newsletters, even of small and unknown associations, define Israelis as the new Nazis. Some politicians go so far as to propose banning Zionists from Belgium, or at least from any public function. One politician even proposes rescinding the Belgian nationality of pro-Israel Belgians. Kotek pursues and contends that this anti-Israel mood in the milieus of the media and politics encourages Belgium’s Muslims in their attacks against the Jewish community. Things go so far that, in 2002, a contributor to a popular Flemish magazine P-magazine directly attacked the Jewish religion. Jews, he contended, are to be blamed on behalf of human rights and antiracism. In November 2000, posters—seemingly linked to the Belgian far-right—were stuck on Jewish buildings in Brussels signed “European Intifada;” they showed two armed fedayeen and a swastika under the slogan “Israel murderer”. Another pertinent example of this antisemitic anti-Zionism is the publication in the highly respected weekly, Vif-L’express, of a paper by a professor at Liege University that “reveals” patterns in Israelis’ behavior that are “typically Jewish.” Accordingly, the Zionist “crimes” simply express the fundamentally criminal nature of Jewishness. A writer in the Belgian leading newspaper, Le Soir, asks: how could Jews who sustained so much suffering inflict the same on the Palestinians and close them up in concentration camps all over the West Bank? These accusations 62 chapter 4 seemingly allay the feelings of self-guilt of antisemites. In some instances, official administrations are clearly influenced by this turmoil around Jews which are notably stronger in the Flemish part of the country than in the French- speaking region. The popular far-right Flemish Vlaams Block which campaigns for the amnesty of World War II criminals, shows sympathy for Holocaust denial, and elaborates on “Jewish racism.” All these, however, do not gainsay that numberless francophone movements, parties and public figures tend to see Israel in similar terms, i.e. as the concretization of absolute evil oppressing the Palestinian People. Radical Islamism is commonly viewed here as the vanguard of anti-imperialism. Actually, both on the right and the left, the temptation is strong to seek electoral support among the new Arab-Muslim Belgian population. This also explains that Belgium is now a country where a manifestation of thousands may again shout “Death to the Jews” in public, for three hours, without being disturbed by the police—as it has effectively happened. Belgium, according to Kotek, is not an antisemitic country and Jews are by no means discriminated against socially; yet speech is now free to reach the highest peaks of anti-Jewish defamation. One outstanding manifestation of this atmosphere, on 7 February 2004, in a main central space of Brussels, pro- Palestinian militants disguised as Israeli soldiers “acted the Apartheid Wall,” “threatening,” “beating” and “killing” other actors disguised as Arab women, children and old people. Even individuals who wish to present themselves as “friends” of the Jew may be uncomfortable and under the pressure of the surrounding, utter ambiguous formulations when requested to speak out. Hence, as underlined by Mischaël Modrikamen (23 October 2013), a political Jewish figure, the Premier of Belgium could publicly state that the Jewish community is a “friend of Belgium.” Which, willingly or unconsciously, excluded the Jews from the Belgian nation itself. All these cases, however, have spurred some figures—including ministers— to call for a radical reaction to antisemitic acts and expressions. Christian Laporte, a prominent journalist and editor of Belgium’s main Catholic news paper, La Libre Belgique, wrote (24 September 2011) that it is now most urgent to respond to the growth of antisemitism. The Jewish community, he argued, feels it is being sacrificed for the sake of other Belgian interests. It is still pleas- ant for a Jew to live in Belgium but the question is how long that will remain the case. He pointed out that a survey by the National Broadcasting Authority (RTBF) shows that hundreds of Jewish families are leaving or thinking about leaving Belgium because they feel unsafe. Another testimony, on the Flemish side, appeared in the major newspaper in this language, De Standaard, in an article of several columns on the front page, captioned: “Jews are leaving Antwerp.” According to its calculations, in Belgian Jews: A Long Story 63

50 year time there will be no more Jews in Antwerp. The article emphasizes that Jews live in this city in a climate of insecurity, while the young are now quitting in larger numbers than in the past. They leave to study in New York, London, or Israel, because they consider Antwerp as a city hostile to Jews. In a same vein, the correspondent of a Danish newspaper, Dagens Nyheter (23 March 2009) emphasized that this community, which was once prosperous and well-established, is now encountering ever more difficulties. The diamond industry is in crisis, but the worst of all is the rise of antisemitism. In one instance among many, at a football match opposing a local team and Israelis, the fans of the former started singing Nazi songs and shouting “death to Jews.” Another example: during an Israeli campaign against the Gaza Strip, a demonstration of protest against Israel degenerated into riots, the burning of cars, and an attack against a synagogue—without any vigorous reaction by the establishment. Joël Rubinfeld (2004), a Jewish public figure in Brussels, aspires to calm down the tension by pointing out that most acts of antisemitism in Brussels stem from the Arab-Muslim neighborhoods which are underprivileged areas where frustration prevails. Youngsters, he suggests, find in the Israel-Palestinian conflict an outlet for their frustrations, in the context of their critique of Zionism and Israel. Though, he admits at this point that beneath this anti- Israeli attitude one easily discovers deep-seated antisemitism that accounts for the fact that at the entrance of Jewish schools, one may often observe groups of hooligans who deliberately attack children coming out Antisemitism, however, as mentioned, is not foreign either among academic, professional, journalistic and political elites. At the university, posters in the worst antisemitic vein (“Hitler didn’t kill enough of you” and the like) are on display on walls, and Jewish students are directly aggressed by fellow- students passing by. Throughout the campus, leftist and Arabic-Muslim groups pursue members of pro-Israel movements. From time to time, they conquer the spaces between buildings with street-theatre “performances” demonizing the Israelis. These manifestations may be sustained by non-Muslim groups like the Federation des Etudiants Francophones which articulates slogans of its own “against the discriminatory and colonialist policy of the State of Israel.” In April 2001, 327 professors and assistants published a letter of identification with the Palestinian cause at the request of the students’ organization, blaming Israelis for war crimes and crimes against humanity. As a matter of routine, Jews today abstain from exhibiting markers of Jewishness, and it may happen that Jewish teachers are ousted from their classes in high schools by Muslim pupils. In some cases, Molotov cocktails are thrown at synagogues. What is more, non-Jewish political foes may 64 chapter 4 stigmatize each other with accusations of Zionism: in Antwerp, the major and his administration were accused by rivals to be under the dominance of “fanatic Zionists” who assumedly “dictated the law in the city”. In December 2002, a statement was published on the site of this faction: We do not recognize Israel and Israel does not exist for us; we do not recognize the Jews and they do not exist. Le Soir, Belgium’s leading newspaper in French, as well does not resist the temptation to follow suit. It publishes news reports entitled eloquently: “The Israelis are strangling us,” “Daily and intolerable injustice,” “They [the Israelis] came and demolished our homes,” “The desperate weariness of Palestinians.” An article by journalist Agnes Gorissen in Le Soir, fully justifies the act by a Palestinian who drove into a group waiting at a bus stop in Tel Aviv, killing eight people. “Despair,” said the journalist, “can turn a driver into a murderer.” The attention to Israel is such that information about the Jewish state often takes precedence over Belgian news. Thus, on November 3, 2003, a strike broke out simultaneously in Belgium and Israel. The industrial action in Israel lasted four hours before an agreement was reached with the employees, while the parallel strike in Belgium lasted 24 hours. On the website of the daily, the Israeli strike was allocated an information of 2,687 characters while 2,149 characters were sufficient for the narration of the local strike. It is also remarkable that the editorial anti-Israeli line adopted by the Belgian Radio and Television Diffusion Authority (RTBF) on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict does not hesitate to present the Hamas as a “moderate” Islamist movement that is opposed to the recourse to violence. In contrast, it was argued, Israel is exercising “state terrorism that asphyxiates the people of Palestine.” In the weekly Flemish P-Magazine, Rodolphus De Groote could write: “I do not like the shape of the land of Israel. For me, the shape is much too narrow and too long. It reminds me of a tapeworm.” A few lines are enough for De Groote to spread his anti-Semitic venom, denouncing “the Holocaust industry,” reviving the Nazi terminology of “Jewish vermin” and equating the Jews’ Auschwitz with the Palestinians’ Ramallah. Rubinfeld (2004) remarks that in 1993 the Belgian Parliament adopted the principle of so-called “universal jurisdiction,” a law that allowed prosecution of alleged perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, even if they had been committed outside Belgium by non-Belgians, and against non-Belgians. It is on the base of this law that on 18 June 2001, 23 Lebanese and Palestinian plaintiffs petitioned the Belgian courts for crimes committed pur- portedly by Arik Sharon, the Defense Minister of Israel, in Sabra and Shatilla in 1982. In the indictment, no mention was made of the person recognized as Belgian Jews: A Long Story 65 responsible for the slaughter—Elie Hobeika, the head of the Christian- Lebanese Phalange militia. Of the thirty complaints addressed to the court in Brussels under the law of universal jurisdiction—including for Saddam Hussein, Yasser Arafat, Fidel Castro, and Augusto Pinochet—only the one filed against Sharon was favored by the press. For two years, the case poisoned Belgian-Israeli relations. It was only in 2003 that the law was revoked, following threats by the US government to move NATO’s headquarters out of Belgium, following an Iraqi petition to the court against George Bush for acts committed during the Gulf War (1991). Judeophobia in Belgium is very similar to that prevailing in France at the same time, with the difference that, in some respects, the Belgian political elite has showed much less energy to combat it than its French counterpart. One can even say that the Belgian political scene has been an active focus in warming antisemitic spirits. Hence, for instance and as reported by Belgian press, following the US-British intervention in Iraq, the president of the Socialist Party, Elio Di Rupo, the country’s Prime Minister since 2013, said that “the risk is great that the Israeli government will profit from this intervention, as the world’s attention is focused on Iraq, to decimate even more the Palestinian people.” In a same vein, in a Belgian Flemish TV interview (in February 2001), the Vice-President of the Vlaams Block, Roland Raes questioned the number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust and the authenticity of Anne Frank’s diary. When asked about the existence of Nazi gas chambers, his response was: “I would doubt it. I think that what we were given to believe was greatly exaggerated.” The turmoil caused by these statements compelled him to resign from the party’s vice-presidency but he remained an active member of its leadership. Few political voices speak out with force and conviction against this anti- Israelism and antisemitism. In Belgium, it is mainly the liberal right, the MEP, which is ready to blame and denounce the antisemitic climate, proposing proj- ects of laws intended to fight antisemitism. Jacques Déom (2012), a researcher, shows the universality of this antisemitism. The acuteness of the current antisemitic atmosphere in some non-marginal milieus of Belgian society validates this assessment. Robert Wistrich (2010) sustains in this respect that Islamic anti-Jewish feelings are widespread throughout the Arab-Muslim world, which means that anti-Jewish sentiments are not caused solely by socio-economic factors afflicting Arab-Muslim individuals here or there. Whatever the correct hypothesis, Isi Leibler (2013) in his report for the Jerusalem Post contends that antisemitism has reached a peak never attained ever since the Holocaust. 66 chapter 4

The gravity of the phenomenon nowadays in Belgium is expressed in strong wording in a speech by Maurice Sosnowski, President of the CCOJB (20 September 2011). At a gala evening, in the presence of ministers and high- ranking national dignitaries, he spoke of the trauma caused to many Jews by the harshness of antisemitic manifestations. He reminded his audience that, as mentioned in the above, in a public march, young Muslim did not hesitate to use old slogans like “Death to Jews” and to mock the “Shoa myth.” He emphasized that representatives of all democratic parties participated in that demonstration, and none of them protested against the virulent antisemitic overtones. At another event of a different kind, a public discussion focusing on Israeli “crimes”, the Union of Jewish Students of Belgium and the European Union of Jewish Students issued similar statements against the permission granted to organizers of this event, held in the Free University of Brussels, with the participation of notorious antisemites from France.

Conclusion

In brief, Jews have been in Belgium ever since the Roman Empire but their fate thereafter has been very turbulent; periods of tranquility and prosperity have alternated with times of persecution and misery. Throughout the feudal times, Jews suffered from their dependence on the Church and the whims of the princes. Since the French Revolution, however, an upgrading of their status offered them the opportunity to stabilize their life condition. Belgium, it must be emphasized, granted Jews full recognition as an authorized religious community, as soon as the country achieved independence. Belgium, however, is divided into two regional linguistic entities and, as a result, Jews also endeavor an inner division and differentiation between two communities—Antwerp where Flemish is the legitimate language and where Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews came to form a substantial part of the local Jewry, and the francophone Brussels, where non-religious Jews prevail in the community. This differentiation has been maintained over the years despite the fact that, in the context of the large Jewish Eastern European immigration, both spaces of Jewry were overwhelmingly populated by Yiddish-speaking people of that origin. Because that group of immigrants were of recent arrival, most Jews in Belgium did not hold Belgian nationality when World War II broke out and therefore could not benefit from the exemption from deportation—obtained by Belgian figures from the German Command—granted to those Jews who held this nationality. Half of the Jews survived, thanks to many non-Jewish Belgian Jews: A Long Story 67

Belgians who hid Jews (especially children) during the Occupation, at the risk of their own life. Other Jews participated significantly in the resistance movement against the Germans. Ever since the end of the war, Belgian Jewry has known social mobility and stable life conditions. During the years, it has also achieved strong structura- tion—from synagogue-building to the creation of inclusive educational frameworks. All in all, Belgium’s Jewish population is today one of the most dynamic and structured in the Jewish diaspora, reflecting both religious and non- religious forms of Judaism and allegiances to Israel. That picture is today tarnished by the recent multiplication of expressions of virulent antisemitism and anti-Israel and anti-Jews demonstrations. This antisemitism stems from a variety of sources: the far-reaching anti-Jewish feelings conveyed by the Catholic Church, Belgium’s present-day interests in the Middle-East, right-wing nationalism hostile to non-Belgian origins, left-wing forces siding up with the “Third-World” and Palestine, and last but not least the Arab-Muslim population which has recently increased to a significant size and often expresses its anti-Israel and anti-Jewish feelings with virulence. On the top of this amalgamation, there are quite a few Jews who aspire to present themselves as “good Jews,” i.e. Jews who do not belong to those who “do evil”. Belgian Jews, in these respects, represent an ideal scapegoat. As scapegoat theory goes (Erner 2005; Girard 1982; Wilcox 2009), Jews belong to the well-to- do and therefore may be assimilated to those who prevail in society. As such, they are a target of resent in the eyes of all those who feel themselves frus- trated by their present lot and as outside the affluent population. On the other hand, Jews constitute a segment of their own in the middle or upper-middle class which is distinct from others and which shares a relatively vulnerable status. Hence, attacking these people can grant a feeling of “achievement” at the measure of the frustration resented by attackers. The more vulnerable this status of the Jews that they confront simultaneously forms of antisemitism that hardly relate to present-day socioeconomic or political configurations. All these are good reasons to assume that the ways Jews in this country react to antisemitism may be of general significance and transgress the boundaries of the Belgian Jewry. It is this issue—what does it mean to be Jewish in this context of revival of judeophobia—that is the subject-matter of the following chapters. Chapter 5 The Belgian Sample

The Sample

In the context of the above, the research in Belgium was quite complex. The major worry of the officials of the Jewish community concerned the appease- ment of antisemite manifestations and achieving governmental measures that would strengthen Jews’ feelings of security. Some groups and organizations were less patient than others, however. The Union of the Jewish Students of Belgium (UEJB) and of the European Union (EUJS), issued strong statements against steps taking place at the university that, according to them, fuel antisemitism—inviting antisemites to public debates, projecting antisemitic / antizionist films, tolerating graffiti and the like. The questions for the researchers were, of course: How Jews in Belgium— like in other European countries—view this antisemitic and anti-Israeli “noise” around them? Do they really feel that they are surrounded by hostility? Do they perceive that they might be the object of denigration? If so, how do they react? Are they willing to tolerate the present-day situation? Do they consider the possibility of emigrating? On the basis of the descriptions of the former chapter, respondents’ responses in Belgium to these queries were assumed to provide a genuine “ideal type” of the modes adopted by contemporary Western Jewry to confront antisemitism. Figure 5.1 shows how far Belgium Jews are an urban population. Table 5.1 indicates that the Belgian sample numbers 438 Jewish respondents. The majority of them are French-speaking and one-fifth are Flemish-speaking, with a few who use other languages (Hebrew, Yiddish, or others). Since it is generally assumed that the Flemish-speaking Jews of Antwerp constitute about 40% of the country’s Jews, it is clear that the Francophones are overrepresented. The reason lies in the fact that Antwerp’s Jewry comprises a large portion of ultra- orthodox—nearly half of the community—and that this kind of population is categorically reluctant to answer any kind of survey. In other words, the sample is representative of Belgian Jewry only as far as the non-ultra-orthodox are concerned. Table 5.1 shows that the distribution of age groups gives a special weight to the 60+ year-old group, which is probably not far from the objective distribution in the population seeing today’s greater longevity. Men are also overrepresented as compared to women, which is probably accounted for by the

The capital The suburbs or A town or a A country A farm or city/ a big city outskirts of a small city village home in the big city countryside Figure 5.1 Survey respondents by location of residence in Belgium, %

Table 5.1 General Characteristics of the sample (N=438; %)

Languages used in daily life by respondents French Flemish Others 75.3. 20.5 4.2 Antwerp Other Flemish areas Brussels Other French areas 21.8 9.8 55.5 12.9 Age –40 40–60 60+ 25.5 32.8 41.7 Gender Men Women 63.3 36.7 Marital status Single Partner/married Separate, divorced, widowed 18.0 66.0 16.0 Education Up to secondary education Higher education 28.4 72.6 Employment Employed Self-employed Retired Other 36.0 26.6 17.9 19.5 70 chapter 5

Primary school or Lower secondary Higher secondary University attendance no qualications school (general, school (general, professional or professional or technical) technical) Figure 5.2 Educational composition of survey respondents, % N=438. Category ‘Don’t Know’ with 8 persons (1.8% of the sample) was excluded from calculation of percentages.

greater use of the internet by men. On the other hand, the distribution of respondents according to marital status seems fairly representative: two-thirds of the respondents live as couples, with one-third who consists of singles— bachelors, divorced, separated, widows or widowers. In addition, the large majority of the respondents have had some kind of post-secondary education— academic or professional—, which is quite the norm throughout the Jewish diaspora (Fig. 5.2). Last but not least, many respondents are part of the workforce, whether as salaried employees or self-employed. Beyond the differences of social paths, general a priori knowledge about Belgian Jews confirmed by the prevalence among respondents of the combination of higher education (whether post-secondary or academic, and whether complete or incomplete), employment status and place of residence (not indicated in the table) shows that the vast majority of Belgian Jewry belong to an urban middle-class community. This population might be further graded between lower-middle and upper-middle strata, but this specification appeared as of no substantial discriminant effect, which allows to see the community as a whole as a middle-class population. The Belgian Sample 71

What Jewishness Means

Before turning to the topic of antisemitism itself, the first issue tackled by the survey was the nature of respondents’ allegiance to Jewishness. In this respect, respondents were primarily asked about their attendance of Jewish frameworks. Table 5.2 shows that more than a third do not attend an orthodox synagogue of a kind, one quarter a liberal synagogue (Reform or Conservative) and the others attend rather a secular Jewish framework or no Jewish framework at all. All in all, attendants of a synagogue of any category are slightly more than a half with nearly half of them attending a non-orthodox one. Table 5.3 pursues further about Jewish identity and Jewish identification. At first glance, it appears that Jewishness is here mainly non-religious, though a wide majority observes some traditions. A given percentage of the sample defines itself as “liberal Jews” and only a few define themselves ultra-Orthodox or “Haredim.” Interestingly, despite the prevalence of “non-religiosity,” the religious injunction of circumcision appears of crucial importance to many, and this is further sustained by the tendency to express strong or very strong identification with Jewishness. This also clearly appears in the importance given to the memory of the Shoa, feeling part of the Jewish People, the duty to combat antisemitism, retaining some Jewish culture, and supporting Israel. Moreover, the large majority has visited Israel, and many have some relatives there.

Table 5.2 Respondents by community affiliation (N=438; %)

Synagogues/Jewish clubs attended by respondents1 %

An ultra-orthodox synagogue 4 An orthodox synagogue 27 A non-orthodox synagogue 25 A non-religious Jewish club 16 Other / Does not belong to any Jewish framework 28 Total 100

1 Individuals who stated they attend a club and a synagogue were joined to the kind of synagogue they attend 72 chapter 5

Table 5.3 Belgian Jews’ allegiance to Jewishness (N=438; %)

Religiosity Not Some Observe Religious religious traditions traditions 35.8 33.6 20.5 4.8 Self-Defined Jewishness Just Jewish Liberal Traditional Orthodox Haredi Other 40.6 14.4 27.7 10.5 2.2 4.6 How far a problem for you is the prohibition of: big Problem Little No Circumcision 67.0 19.4 7.6 5.9 Ritual slaughter 33.6 24.9 19.0 22.5 Feeling part of the Jewish People: Importance Very Important Fairly important Unimportant Don’t know 72.5 20.5 5.9 1.1 Supporting Israel: Importance 59.4 23.8 15.3 1.5 Keeping Jewish Culture (Music, Literature, Art): Importance 52.4 37.6 9.4 .7 Combating Antisemitism: Importance 76.2 19.9 3.8 .2 Remembering the Shoa: Importance 80.3 17.0 2.4 .2 Self-graded strength of Jewish identification Low Middle range High Very strong 2.4 9.8 35.3 52.4 Have you ever been to Israel Yes No 91.0 9.0 Relatives in Israel Yes, many Some No/don’t know 22.1 76.6 23.4 The Belgian Sample 73

Additional observations reveal that when comparing two different classifica- tions of self-definition as Jew, “just Jews” appear to be more numerous than the “not-religious.” This means that some self-declared “just Jews” probably position themselves in the “keep some traditions” category, thereby evincing how difficult it is for Jews to say about themselves that they have “no religion” and to detach themselves from any tradition—even when thinking of themselves as “not religious”. On the other hand, it also emerges that respondents are more prone to present themselves as “Orthodox” or “Haredi” than as “religious.” For several religious subjects, it appears, the very notion of “religious” speaks less than “observe traditions.” In their mind, seemingly, to be a Jew implies observance—before defining themselves as Jews in religious terms. Considering what is more or less important in respondents’ Jewish allegiance (Table 5.3), all the criteria examined get a large majority of “very important” and “important.” If one ranks these criteria in order of relative importance, “remembering the Shoa” comes first, followed by “combating antisemitism.” Undoubtedly, the past is still vivid in respondents’ minds and this memory combines with a critical perception of the current antisemitic atmosphere. Coming in third is the importance of the allegiance to the Jewish People followed, at some distance, by support for Israel and observing given Jewish patterns. This gradation shows that solidarity with Israel is concomitant with the allegiance to the Jewish world, and does not come in its place. The additional questions about visiting Israel and having relatives there bring out that in the mind of respondents the Jewish state belongs to what Jewishness means to many Jews today. This Jewishness, moreover, matters to respondents and for many of them quite a lot. This kind of Jewishness evidenced by most Belgian Jews—i.e. those represented in the sample that include but a few ultra-orthodox—clearly belongs to that cluster of Jewish identities defined elsewhere (Ben-Rafael 2002) under the title of peoplehood. This cluster groups these formulations of Jewish identities that view the singularity of Jewishness firstly as culture, conveyed and elaborated by a given collective throughout its history. This perspective may or may not include religiosity, and when it does, it may still respond to different formulations. Hence, in brief, Belgian Jews illustrate a community where a large majority endorses a Jewishness that does not take religiosity for granted but which exhibits a quite strong degree of commitment to—and identification with— not only Jewishness as such but also Israel, and thereby, it may be assumed, the Jewish world as a whole. 74 chapter 5

Belgian Identification and Perceptions of Social Reality

In this context, subjects’ attitudes toward the Belgian identity and their perceptions of the country’s general circumstances take on all their interest. A major finding here, shown in Table 5.4, is that identification with the Belgian identity is quite strong but clearly less so than with Jewishness. Most Belgian Jews do feel Belgian, but more than a few—over a third—show no strong identification. These findings probably relate to some extent to perceptions of the existence of antisemitism in the country, though it is also to be underscored that respondents do not see antisemitism as the only difficulty challenging Belgian society (Fig. 5.3). According to Table 5.4, respondents do indeed perceive “big problems” in other important respects of the social reality: unemployment, an economy in crisis, crime rates, immigration, racism, or religious intolerance. The only sphere asked about that is seen with less gravity is public corruption. However, and as seen below, in respondents’ minds, antisemitism is by no means a negligible failure of society—among all the other failures.

Racism

Crime levels Immigration Antisemitism Unemployment State of the economyReligious intolerance Government corruption State of the health services

Figure 5.3 Proportion of respondents saying that selected social and economic issues represent a very big or a fairly big problem in Belgium (438; %) The Belgian Sample 75

Table 5.4 Belgian identification and perceptions of Belgium’s social reality (N=438; %)

Self-Graded Strength of Belgian Identification

Low (1/2) Middle (3/4/5) High (6/7/8) Strong/very (9/10) 16.6 20.5 39.3 23.6

Are these issues problems in Belgium Big Problem Little/no Don’t k

Unemployment 84.7 12.7 13.7 1.5 Crime 79.9 12.4 1.7 6.0 Immigration 79.3 16.4 3.5 0.9 Racism 78.6 17.9 2.2 1.3 Economy 73.8 21.0 2.8 2.4 Religious intolerance 57.4 31.0 10.0 1.5 Public corruption 31.0 41.7 20.5 6.8

Perceptions of Antisemitism

Table 5.5 shows that antisemitism is indeed perceived by a large majority of the respondents as a big or fairly big problem. The same is true of racism and both, it is believed, have increased over the years—though antisemitism clearly more than racism. Antisemitism is primarily expressed on the internet and in graffiti, as well as in acts such as desecration of cemeteries, aggressive behavior against individuals on the street, and disparaging comments about Jews and Israel in the media. All in all, the last five years have witnessed increased antisemitism in all its forms of expression, but especially on the internet, in parlance with non-Jews, and in political speeches. Table 5.5 requests appreciations of respondents regarding a whole series of possible expressions of antisemitism or racism. The table shows, in this respect, that the two weaker appreciations characterize a small proportion of the respondents and that the two more assertive categories typify, most of the time, at least two-thirds of them. A wide consensus among respondents appears regarding the very fact that antisemitism—that comes ahead—and racism—that follows it—are “big problems” today in Belgium and that both phenomena have intensified over the past few years—again, antisemitism particularly. Moreover, large majorities resent hostility both on the street and the internet. 76 chapter 5

Table 5.5 Perceptions of antisemitism in Belgium (N=438; %)

Big problem Fairly big Exists Little/not Don’t k Antisemitism 34.5 42.1 19.7 2.0 1.7 Racism 31.9 46.7 17.9 2.2 1.3 Past 5 years A lot Somehow Same Decreased Don’t k Racism increased 39.5 38.6 16.4 2.8 2.6 Antisemitism increased 57.0 30.3 9.2 1.8 1.7 Big problem quite big Exists Little/not Don’t k Anti-Jewish graffiti 21.4 30.1 37.1 6.1 5.2 Desecr J. cemeteries 20.1 20.1 36.5 16.8 6.6 Hostility on street 34.7 38.4 21.4 3.9 1.5 Media 36.9 33.2 22.5 5.7 1.7 Internet 56.8 27.5 8.5 1.5 5.7 Vandalism J. buildings 2.10 32.8 35.4 5.2 5.7 5 year increase/decrease A lot Somehow Same Decreased Don’t k In general 59.0 30.0 10.0 1.0 1.0 Graffiti 17.9 32.1 32.3 3.1 1.3 Desecration 8.3 21.2 43.9 7.7 19.0 Hostility on street 36.7 49.0 16.8 3.1 3.5 Vandalism 14.0 32.3 36.0 4.8 12.9 Media 38.4 30.8 22.3 3.5 5.0 Political life 20.1 32.3 33.6 5.4 8.5 Internet 59.8 22.5 6.3 1.1 10.3 Antisemitic comments Big problem quite big Exists Little/not Don’t k Discussions of people 29.3 38.2 24.2 3.7 4.6 On internet 58.7 24.5 7.6 1.7 7.4 Political speeches 23.8 30.3 32.1 9.2 4.6

Respondents are also mostly aware of antisemitic sayings circulating in their surroundings. The main utterances relate Jews to Israel’s assumedly “reprehensible” acts, assuming their responsibility for them. Another major antisemitic reproof: Jews exploit the Shoa for their own interests. This casts a slur on an essential component of what Jewishness means to respondents. In addition, with lower frequency, different sayings circulate that are part of the usual antisemitic stockpile—the Shoa is a myth; Jews have too much power; they are The Belgian Sample 77 responsible for the country’s crisis, they are not a nation; they are unable to integrate society because they are moved by interests of their own. On the other hand, a majority of respondents also define the people they would name as antisemite. In this respect, they indicate those who support a boycott of Israel, who say that a Jew is recognizable by external traits, who would not marry a Jew, and who demonize Israel. Moreover, as a rule, for the respondents antisemitic acts stem mainly from non-central social layers. These elements—primarily identified as Muslim extremists and leftists—have a public presence through demonstrations, harassment, or vandalism, by incessantly reacting, through a variety of strate- gies, to events in the Middle-East. It is thereby that they impact on Jews’ feelings of personal safety in Belgium (Fig. 5.4).

Experiencing Antisemitism

In terms of the respondents’ personal experiences, Fig. 5.5 and Table 5.6 shows that no less than 27% of the respondents were insulted or harassed in the past year on the ground of their Jewishness.

A great deal A fair amount A little Not at all Figure 5.4 To what extent the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts on how safe you feel as a Jewish person in Belgium 78 chapter 5

Antisemitic Experience of Antisemitic Antisemitic Witnessing Having a close harassment discrimination physical attack vandalism someone being person on the basis of subjected to subjected to religion/belief antisemitic antisemitic or ethnicity incident incident Figure 5.5 Respondents that they had experienced antisemitic aggressions on the grounds of religion/faith or ethnicity at least once in the past twelve months (438; %)

Moreover, 30% witnessed other Jews being insulted or harassed. It is often the case that acts of antisemitism occur in the workplace (52.4%) or, less so, at school (19%). In other words, antisemitic confrontations are an aspect of daily life and are by no means exceptional—even though the majority of the respondents have not experienced antisemitism personally during the past few years (Fig. 5.6). It is to note that among the respondents who have personally gone through such experiences, very few (one out of less than 10) turned to the police or to agencies—Jewish or not Jewish—that care for victims of such incidents. Seemingly, the people concerned do not believe in the efficacy of public institutions for the sanctioning of antisemitic acts or their prevention. This explains why the majority of respondents are worried—at least “somehow”—about being once victims, of such antisemitic acts, whether verbally or physically. The research focused on two issues of particular importance in the latter respect (Table 5.7). The first concerns the extent to which the presence of antisemitism influences people to the point of bringing them to consider moving out their area of residence, or even the country itself. The second issue concerned routine life: the extent to which antisemitism causes respondents to avoid appearing in public with markers of Jewishness. Regarding the first issue, the data show that about half the respondents have not considered moving to another country and nearly 80% have not considered moving to another area of residence within the country. Hence, for many respondents, antisemitism does not constitute a sufficiently strong reason—or is not sufficiently acute as such—for causing people to alter their life mode. Antisemitism, it appears, is The Belgian Sample 79

Table 5.6 Experiences of antisemitism (N=438; %)

How worried are you about being a victim? Very Worried Not too Not at all Verbal or harassment 24.5 37.6 30.1 7.9 Physical harassment 18.8 33.4 35.4 12.4 In last year you often heard Much Quite Sometimes Never People blame you for Israel’s acts 16.6 44.3 31.4 7.6 Israelis behave like Nazis 15.3 44.5 28.2 12.0 Jews exploit the Shoa 14.0 32.5 35.8 17.7 Jews have too much power 8.3 27.3 34.3 30.1 The Shoa is a myth 3.7 18.8 39.1 38.4 Jews are responsible for the crisis 3.7 16.4 34.9 45.0 Jews are a religion, not a nation 3.9 14.6 35.4 46.1 Jews are unable to integrate society 2.6 10.9 29.7 58.8 Antisemites are Yes No Christian extremist 16.2 83.8 Right-wing 31.9 68.1 Left-wing 57.9 42.2 Muslim extremist 60.8 39.2 Is an antisemite one who— Yes Probably Maybe No/don’t k supports boycott of Israel 46.7 27.7 15.9 9.6 says a Jew is recognizable 43.9 28.6 20.7 6.8 would not marry a Jew 30.8 26.2 28.4 14.6 criticizes Israel 10.5 22.9 41.7 24.8 The Mid-East conflict affects your safety 68.1 24.0 6.6 1.3 80 chapter 5

Never Occasionally Frequently All the time The Holocaust is Jews are Jews exploit Israelis behave Jews have too a myth or has responsible for Holocaust “like Nazis” much power in been the current victimhood for towards the Belgium exaggerated economic crisis their own Palestinians purposes Figure 5.6 Pattern of response to the question how often, in the least twelve months, the respondents had heard or seen non-Jews suggest that (438; %).

Table 5.7 Have you considered moving as a result of antisemitism (N=438; %)

Considered moving to another country to another area

Have moved 1 7 Have considered 40 10 Have not considered 49 78 Prefer not to say 9 5

not a crucial factor for most subjects in planning their life project—even though more than a few disagree with this attitude. On the other hand, data also indicate that antisemitism does play a role at the level of daily life for many: no less than 20% of the respondents have ceased altogether to display markers of Jewishness, 16% frequently and 22% occasionally. Only 21% refuse to do so in any circumstances (for another 21%, the question does not arise as they never displayed such markers anyway). Hence, all in all, on the basis of these data, it appears that antisemitism does impact on respondents’ daily life, but not disproportionately: people may change some habits, and make some concessions in the context of their present-day circumstances, but they do not reach drastic decisions. The Belgian Sample 81

Conclusion

In conclusion, the profile illustrated by the sample may be assumed to be quite representative of Belgium’s Jewry—excluding ultra-orthodox Jewry—where educated middle-class people prevail. This population constitutes an ethnocultural group in which the followers of the ancestral religion are a minority. This chapter indicates how far major components of collective identity are the memory of the Shoa, affinity with Israel, and selective observance of traditional patterns. This Jewishness can be conceptualized in sociological terms, as symbolic transnational ethnicity, or in a Jewish-sociology perspective, a form of peoplehood. This ethnicity by no means erases allegiance to the national Belgian identity—though this allegiance seems, at first glance, to be less “speaking” to respondents than the Jewish allegiance. At the same time, respondents’ perceptions of the social reality in Belgium are not very optimistic. These perceptions express an awareness of two blocs of problems: difficulties in the realms of employment and the national economy, on the one hand, and social ills emerging from massive immigration of newcomers, on the other. In total, then, respondents’ replies to the relevant questions yield a rather grim picture of Belgian society’s present-day circumstances.

Not at all worried Not very worried Fairly worried Very worried Worried about Worried about Worried about Worried about themselves: Verbal themselves: family and friends: family and friends: insults/harassment Physical attack Verbal Physical attack insults/harassment Figure 5.7 Are you worried about becoming a victim of antisemitic acts or that people close to you will, in the next twelve months (438; %) 82 chapter 5

What most probably contributes to this kind of perception is subjects’ cogni- zance of antisemitism in their surroundings. Antisemitism, they attest, exists and has worsened over the years, taking on new forms with the expansion of use and practice of the internet. Many respondents resent antisemitism in a variety of domains—the media, the political scene and the like—that do not touch them directly because they remain impersonal, but they agree, though, that they contribute to fomenting a general atmosphere of malaise. Several respondents were personally victims of antisemitic acts even if, as a rule, they did not approach the Authorities or other supportive agencies because they do not believe that these bodies are able to provide efficient help (Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 5.8). This is yet another factor that contributes to instilling in Jews feelings of insecurity and vulnerability, which in the final analysis is the major present- day effect of the new antisemitism. Belgian Jews do find, even today, open paths for their personal aspirations to education, professional formation, and career achievement. Antisemitism in Belgium is more a condition that concerns them as a collective, and is of somehow less significance for their individual life within society. At this point, however, the question that arises is whether the differences of opinions and perspectives found in the sample do present some particular sociological or Jewish-sociological significance. Roughly speaking, one may ask here, among other questions, whether or not the younger agree with the older, women with men, the more educated with the less educated, the religious with the non-religious, the Ashkenazim with the Sephardim, the Jew by birth with the converted.

Never Occasionally Frequently All the time Avoiding Jewish events or sites Avoiding certain places in a local area Figure 5.8 Do you avoid visiting Jewish events or sites because you do not feel safe as a Jew there or on the way there (438; %) chapter 6 Social Features and Perceptions

Following the general overview of the Belgian sample, this chapter now pursues in greater details how far differences of attitudes and perceptions among respondents relate in one way or another to given categorizations. The following pages consider under this title four customary sociological differentiations—age, education, gender, and marital status. Later chapters consider criteria more specifically related to Jewish sociology. One criterion which is usually taken into account in opinion research and that is not used here is socioeconomic status (SES). This feature is indeed of little utility in this case since, as mentioned in the general description of the sample, the Jewish population of Belgium mostly belongs to the urban middle- class. Regarding the other variables, the following tables focus on those relations that brought up differences that are statistically significant (at the level of p<.01).

The Impact of Age Differences

Table 6.1 divides the respondents into two categories: respondents aged less than 45, versus 45 and over (with the absolute numbers of cases, i.e. the N values, affixed in brackets to each variable). This table presents all the items of the questionnaire that yield significant differences with age categories. In a general manner, large differences between age categories were not found regarding a long series of issues, including many of the most important ones. Above all, no differences were found with respect to the understanding of Jewishness, practices of Jewishness and identification with the Belgian identity. What was said about these issues in the description of the general profile of Belgian Jewry is quite valid for both age categories considered. On the other hand, significant differences were found with respect to some topics pertaining to perceptions of the general conditions of the country, the existence and features of antisemitism in the country, and personal experiences of antisemitism. Regarding the general conditions prevailing in the country, it appeared that the younger respondents are slightly less pessimistic than the older with respect to the appreciation of the gravity of unemployment in Belgium, the state of the national economy, and the increase of racism, in general.

On the other hand, the older deplore, less than the younger, the general state of religious intolerance. All in all, the younger respondents seem relatively more optimistic than the older regarding the general circumstances of Belgian society at the time of the research.

Table 6.1 The impact of age (%)

–45 +45

Unemployment (N = 432) a problem 79.7 89.8 not a problem 20.3 10.2 State of the economy (428) a problem 66.4 81.2 not a problem 33.6 18.8 Religious intolerance in Belgium (428) a problem 68.2 55.6 not a problem 31.8 44.4 Has racism increased? Increased 72.4 84.5 Stayed the same or decreased 27.6 15.5 Expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public places (432) a problem 82.3 71.2 not a problem 17.7 28.8 In the PAST year, have you witnessed any of the following antisemitic incident (424) Yes I have witnessed other Jew(s) being verbally insulted 40.0 31.1 Yes, I have witnessed other Jew(s) being physically attacked 1.4 26.5 Yes, I have witnessed other Jew(s) being both verbally insulted 2.8 3.6 and attacked How worried are you about a relative becoming a victim of insults or harassment (439) Worried 77.6 68.3 not worried 22.4 31.7 How often do you feel people accuse/ blame you for anything done by Israel? (439) Frequently 71.1 56.1 Occasionally 28.9 43.9 (Continued) social features and perceptions 85

Table 6.1 (Continued)

–45 +45

Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians—In past year, how often heard (439) Frequently 68.4 56.4 Occasionally 31.6 43.6 The interests of Jews are very different from the interests of the rest of the population—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? (429) Yes 68.0 77.7 No 32.0 22.3 Always notes who is Jewish among acquaintances—Would consider a non-Jew to be antisemitic if said? (415) Yes 46.7 60.4 No 53.3 39.6 Criticizes Israel—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? (431) Yes 26.0 38.9 No 74.0 61.1 Supports boycotting Israeli products—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? (431) Yes 69.6 79.5 No 30.4 20.5 How often do you avoid certain places in your area because you don't feel safe there as a Jew? (287) Frequently 20.4 10.5 Occasionally 79.6 89.5 In the past 5 years, have you considered emigrating because you don't feel safe as a Jew? (400) Yes, I have moved to another area or neighborhood .7 1.9 Yes, I have considered moving to another area or neighborhood 57.6 36.0 No, I have not considered moving 41.7 62.1 Received offensive or silent phone calls—Frequency experienced in past 5 years? (430) Never 90.5 90.8 once or twice 6.8 2.8 3 or more times 2.7 6.4 (Continued) 86 chapter 6

Table 6.1 (Continued)

–45 +45

Loitered, waited for you or followed you in a threatening way— Frequency 5 y. (430) Never 78.9 92.2 once or twice 12.9 5.7 3 or more times 8.2 2.1 Posted offensive comments about you on the internet—Frequency 5 y. (399) never 77.4 87.0 once or twice 8.0 6.1 3 or more times 14.6 6.9 In 5 y, how often somebody physically attacked you—hit pushed or threatened you (423) Never 73.8 87.4 once or twice 17.2 10.1 3 or more times 9.0 2.5 Denying or trivializing the Holocaust—Is there a law in Belgium against? (417) Yes 22.2 10.6 No 77.8 89.4 Felt discriminated against/harassed in past 12 months as a Jew? (426) Yes 11.6 3.6 No 88.4 96.4 Religion or belief—Felt discriminated against/harassed in past 12 months on this basis? (418) Yes 33.8 16.1 No 66.2 83.9 The police—would treat you better, worse, or same as others because you are Jewish? (353) would treat you worse 12.6 6.0 would treat me the same as other people 84.0 90.2 would treat me better 3.4 3.8 (Continued) social features and perceptions 87

Table 6.1 (Continued)

–45 +45

In the last year, have you heard non-Jews suggest that circumcision and traditional slaughter not be allowed? (224) Yes, about circumcision 19.2 13.9 Yes, about traditional slaughter 17.8 27.2 Yes, about both 63.0 58.9 A prohibition of circumcision (brit milah)—How big a problem would this be for you? (413) Yes, about circumcision 80.3 66.5 Yes, about traditional slaughter 15.0 24.1 Yes, about both 4.8 9.4

When it comes to antisemitism, beyond the consensus found between categories regarding a wide range of items, it appears that the younger are more affirmative of the reality of hostility toward Jews in general, and in the public space in particular. While one would expect the younger to be less sensitive to external incidents because they are less vulnerable than the older, it is in fact the opposite that was found—the younger appear to share greater sensitivity to exposure to antisemitism. These findings (see also Fig 6.1) relate to the perceptions of personal experiences of antisemitism. On a whole series of issues, the younger show stronger awareness of the difficulties created by antisemitism. They are more worried about their families and are more sensitive to the blame leveled at them for Israel’s acts considered as blameworthy. They hear more often that Israelis behave like Nazis vis-à-vis Palestinians, and also report with more insistence than the older about threats and disparaging attitudes which they received from antisemites. Moreover, while only a few older respondents complain that they were victims of violence, more younger respondents mention such experiences. The same goes for discrimination and harassment on religious grounds. In this atmosphere, they tend more than the older respondents to avoid some places or events that might be “dangerous” for Jews. Unsurprisingly, in this context, they also tend to consider emigrating more seriously. On the other hand, the older respondents heard more often than the younger that “Jews have very different interests than the rest of the population,” 88 chapter 6

Aged ‒ years Aged ‒ years Aged + years Antisemitism in Antisemitic Experience of Considered Belgium harassment in discrimination on emigrating or increased in the the past the basis of emigrated in the past years months religion/belief or past years ethnicity in the past months Figure 6.1 Differences between age groups on selected indicators of perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in Belgium (438; %)

and they also mention more frequently that a non-Jew antisemite would always note who is a Jew among his or her acquaintances, or support boycotting Israeli products. These aspects do not yet counterbalance the relatively more numerous items where the younger show more sensitivity to antisemitism and antisemite acts. What possibly supports this conclusion is that the younger maintain with more firmness than the older, that they would be deeply affected if circumcision was to be abolished by authorities. In brief, while age is not a most crucially differentiating variable— polarization was by no means found between age categories—where differences (however slight) do appear, the direction, in most cases, is toward heightened sensitivity to antisemitism among younger respondents.

Education

A second attribute on which the analysis focused is education. Education is, indeed, a significant factor in most studies of ethnocultural groups. It is accepted that, as a rule, education tends to spur members of ethnocultural groups to distance themselves from particularistic legacies and to move closer to society’s prevailing culture. To check the relevance of this proposition to Belgian Jewry, respondents were divided into three categories: individuals who completed less than full secondary education (–SE); those who completed secondary education (SE) but not more; and those who achieved some post-secondary or higher education (+SE). Table 6.2 shows the results, social features and perceptions 89 concentrating again only on those variables that yielded significant differences between categories (p<.01). All in all, education, it appears, is not a very crucial variable here, but one can distinguish three categories of findings relating to the three categories considered:

1. Respondents who have not completed their secondary education (–SE) show less sensitivity to hostility toward Jews in the public space than the other two categories. The same is true for antisemitism in the media, and in political life. As a corollary, they also tend to report less than others that they have been the target of antisemitic comments or have witnessed expressions of antisemitism against other people. Hence, fewer of them have considered the possibility of moving out from their area of residence because of antisemitism. Furthermore, people of this level of education tend to be less aware than others of legal dispositions that ban denying the Holocaust or trivializing it. 2. Respondents who completed secondary education (SE) show particular tendencies only with respect to two variables: they have heard a bit more than others that Jews are to be blamed for the economic crisis that Belgium goes through in recent years; they have heard, like others, that some non-Jews say they are not willing to marry a Jew but are less convinced than other respondents that this is an expression of antisemitism. 3. Finally, respondents whose education is higher—professionals or academics—are more worried than others that their children or grandchildren could be victims of antisemitic harassment and have considered, more than others, the possibility of emigrating from Belgium because of the antisemitic atmosphere. At the same time, they are more aware than others that legal dispositions make discrimination illegal and that support organizations are ready to extend some help.

In brief, education does not yield genuine gaps between categories. Topics like Jewishness, practices of Jewishness, or identification with the Belgian identity, did not produce any education-linked cleavages. To the extent that some differences were found, they show that the better educated are both more sensitive to antisemitism and to the current atmosphere in society vis-à-vis Jews, and also more aware of institutions and legal dispositions that should protect Jews from prejudice and discrimination. In addition one notes that more education somehow relates to lesser sensitivity to the antisemitic nature of negative attitudes toward Israel—especially regarding the boycotting of Israeli products. 90 chapter 6

Table 6.2 The impact of education (%)

–SE SE +SE

State of the economy (N = 417) a problem 79.5 85.9 72.9 not a problem 20.5 14.1 27.1 Expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public places (420) a problem 59.1 71.8 77.5 not a problem 40.9 28.2 22.5 Expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public places (420) Increased 60.5 78.2 82.3 Stayed the same or decreased 39.5 21.8 17.7 Antisemitism in the media (426) Increased 67.4 73.3 74.1 Stayed the same or decreased 32.6 26.7 25.9 Antisemitism in political life (392) Increased 50.0 63.9 57.1 Stayed the same or decreased 50.0 36.1 42.9 Antisemitism on the internet (383) Increased 85.0 90.0 93.4 Stayed the same or decreased 15.0 10.0 6.6 In the last 12 months, have you personally witnessed any of the following types of antisemitic incident (414) Yes, I have witnessed other Jew(s) being insulted 12.2 34.2 32.3 Yes, I have witnessed other Jew(s) being physically attacked 2.4 .0 2.0 Yes, I have witnessed other Jew(s) being both insulted and 2.4 .0 4.0 attacked No, I have not 82.9 65.8 61.6 Verbal insults or harassment—How worried about becoming a victim (427) Worried 59.1 62.0 63.5 not worried 40.9 38.0 36.5 Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis— How frequently heard in past 12 months how often heard/ seen non-Jewish people (427) Frequently 13.6 30.4 18.4 Occasionally 86.4 69.6 81.6 (Continued) social features and perceptions 91

Table 6.2 (Continued)

–SE SE +SE

Would not marry a Jew—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? (413) Yes 65.9 46.8 62.3 No 34.1 53.2 37.7 Thinks that Jews have recognizable features—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? (412) Yes 76.7 72.2 73.3 No 23.3 27.8 26.7 Supports boycott of Israeli goods/products—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? (419) yes 84.1 83.5 72.6 no 15.9 16.5 27.4 Verbal insults or harassment—How worried about child(ren)/ grandchild(ren) or another relative becoming a victim? (202) worried 52.4 53.8 64.1 not worried 47.6 46.2 35.9 Physical attack—How worried about child(ren)/ grandchild(ren) or another relative becoming a victim ? (202) worried 66.7 53.8 51.4 not worried 33.3 46.2 48.6 How often, if at all, do you avoid visiting Jewish events or sites because of a lack of safety as a Jew? (304) Frequently 2.3 1.3 3.9 Occasionally 97.7 98.7 96.1 In the past five years, have you considered emigrating because you don't feel safe living in Belgium as a Jew? (277) Yes, I have moved to another country 2.5 4.2 .7 Yes, I have considered emigrating 37.5 38.9 45.1 No, I have not considered emigrating 60.0 56.9 54.2 In the past five years, have you considered moving to another area because you don't feel safe as a Jew? (286) Yes, I have moved to another area 2.3 8.9 7.3 Yes, I have considered moving to another area 2.3 10.1 11.9 No, I have not considered moving to another area 95.3 81.0 80.8 (Continued) 92 chapter 6

Table 6.2 (Continued)

–SE SE +SE

In past 5 years, has someone sent you emails, text messages, or cards that were offensive or threatening (297) Never 83.3 90.8 82.2 once or twice 4.8 6.6 8.8 3 or more times 11.9 2.6 9.1 Loitered, waited for you or deliberately followed you— Frequency experienced from somebody in past 5 years (297) Never 95.3 89.7 85.9 once or twice 2.3 9.0 8.8 3 or more times 2.3 1.3 5.4 Someone made offensive or threatening comments to you in person—Frequency experienced from somebody in past 5 years? (296) Never 72.7 64.9 56.8 once or twice 18.2 16.9 22.0 3 or more times 9.1 18.2 21.3 In the past 5 y, how often, if at all, has somebody deliberately damaged or vandalized your property with graffiti? (293) Never 85.7 88.5 80.5 once or twice 14.3 9.0 13.7 3 or more times 2.6 5.8 In the past 5 years, how often, if at all, has somebody physically attacked you? (291) Never 86.0 79.5 83.2 once or twice 11.6 16.7 12.0 3 or more times 2.3 3.8 4.8 When applying for a job—is there a law in Belgium that forbids discrimination against Jewish people? (258) Yes 51.6 48.4 70.9 No 48.4 51.6 29.1 When entering a shop, restaurant, bar or (night) club?—is there a law that forbids discrimination against Jews? (254) Yes 51.4 45.3 63.8 No 48.6 54.7 36.2 (Continued) social features and perceptions 93

Table 6.2 (Continued)

–SE SE +SE

Do you know of any framework that can offer support or advice to people who have been discriminated? (304) Yes 65.9 68.4 79.9 No 34.1 31.6 20.1 Denying or trivializing the Holocaust—is there a law in [Country] against? (288) Yes 2.3 16.0 16.0 No 97.7 84.0 84.0

To polarize the picture a bit by leaving aside the middle-term category (SE), and interpreting the data in an extreme mode—that is, considering only what they seem to point to—the less educated tend to be more impervious to the issue of hostility toward Jews while the more educated tend to emphasize that hostility more but, at the same time, to underemphasize its significance toward Israel.

Gender

When it comes to differences among respondents by gender, as shown by Table 6.3, it appears that there are hardly any aspects that create a gap between men and women regarding the overwhelming majority of questions investigated. As for perceptions of the general Belgian situation, the only variables that elicit significant differences are: (1) women’s less positive opinions about the country’s health services; (2) their more critical views of corruption in public services. In other words, while the sample in general is not too appreciative of the conditions of life in Belgium, women seem less so with respect to specific items. Perhaps not unrelatedly, women seem more severe than men regarding the gravity of antisemitism and some of its expressions. More women than men report that antisemitic graffiti are multiplying in the public space and that this is also the case with the desecration of cemeteries and antisemitic vandalism against Jewish institutions. Moreover, women more than men assert having received antisemitic “material” in the post and that discrimination against 94 chapter 6

Table 6.3 Impact of gender (%)

Male Fem

Health services in Belgium (N = 430) a problem 13.5 22.6 not a problem 86.5 77.4 Government corruption (410) a problem 30.2 40.7 not a problem 69.8 59.3 Antisemitic graffiti (380) Increased 53.1 65.1 Stayed the same or decreased 46.9 34.9 Desecration of Jewish cemeteries (357) Increased 30.4 49.2 Stayed the same or decreased 69.6 50.8 Vandalism of Jewish buildings or institutions (381) Increased 49.0 62.9 Stayed the same or decreased 51.0 37.1 How often, if at all, do you avoid certain places because you don’t feel safe there as a Jew? (439) Frequently 16.5 9.4 Occasionally 83.5 90.6 Someone posted offensive comments about you on the internet (399) Never 80.3 83.7 once or twice 7.9 6.8 3 or more times 11.8 9.5 Felt discriminated against/harassed in past 12 months on this basis? (426) Yes 17.5 No 100.0 82.5 The police—Treat you better / worse /same as others because you are Jewish? (353) They would treat me worse 10.6 3.4 They would treat me the same as others 85.1 94.1 They would treat me better 4.3 2.5 social features and perceptions 95

Jews in Belgium can hardly be denied. Furthermore, women are to some extent more cautious than men about avoiding places or events where antisemitism is known to be rife. On the other hand, men complain more than women when it comes to relations with officials—police, landlords, or agency personnel— possibly because they might be more frequently in contact with these people than women are. It remains that, all in all and as said, no deep differences oppose men and women. The main observation is that besides their more disparaging attitudes toward some national institutions, women are a bit more aware of the sever- ity of given aspects of antisemitism. It is not to exclude that such differences might be accounted for by stronger feelings of vulnerability among women.

Marital Status

Another variable that was considered from a sociological viewpoint is marital status. This variable was formulated according to the following possibilities: being single (S); married or living with a partner (M/P); widowed, separated, or divorced (W/S/D).

Table 6.4 The impact of marital status (%)

S M/P W/S/D

Unemployment (N = 428) a problem 76.0 88.6 87.5 not a problem 24.0 11.4 12.5 Health services (427) a problem 11.7 15.8 26.8 not a problem 88.3 84.2 73.2 Expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public places (428) a problem 84.9 74.8 65.8 not a problem 15.1 25.2 34.2 Verbal insults or harassment—How worried about becoming a victim (435) Worried 70.5 65.1 46.6 not worried 29.5 34.9 53.4 (Continued) 96 chapter 6

Table 6.4 (Continued)

S M/P W/S/D

Jews are responsible for the current economy—In past 12 months how often heard/seen non-Jewish people say that (435) Frequently 9.0 22.5 21.9 Occasionally 91.0 77.5 78.1 Jews “interests are very different from others”—Would consider a non-Jew to be antisemitic if said? (425) Yes 66.2 73.8 86.3 No 33.8 26.2 13.7 Loitered, or followed you in a threatening way—Frequency experienced from somebody in 5 years? (426) Never 75.3 89.1 94.5 once or twice 14.3 7.6 4.1 3 or more times 10.4 3.3 1.4 Religion or belief—Felt discriminated against/harassed in past 12 months on this basis? (414) Yes 30.6 22.6 11.8 no 69.4 77.4 88.2 A prohibition of circumcision (brit milah) and/or traditional slaughter—How big a problem would this be for you? (411) Yes, about circumcision 75.3 74.0 58.0 Yes, about traditional slaughter 21.9 17.5 33.3 Yes, about both 2.7 8.6 8.7

Table 6.4 shows again that differences between categories are by no means dramatic. Among the moderate differences statistically significant, one notices that the category of singles stands out in some respects vis-à-vis the two others. While single respondents perceive grosso modo Belgian society like the other respondents, they tend to somehow underestimate the gravity of unemployment. Regarding perceptions of antisemitism, they are more sensitive than others to its public manifestations, especially in comparison with the last category (W/S/D) and they are also more worried about being victims of insults and harassment. Moreover, these respondents have also heard more often some antisemite sayings, and more of them report discrimination. social features and perceptions 97

At two other respects, the widowed, separated, or divorced respondents (W/S/D) stand out by stressing more than others the deficiencies of Belgium’s health services, and what is more crucial here, the harsh significance for Jews of an eventual ban on circumcision by the Authorities. In sum, while these findings are not too systematic, they tend to show a general convergence between categories. Besides the last—quite secondary— findings concerning the W/S/D category which cannot be easily deciphered, one is led to conclude that, in some respects, single respondents tend to display more sensitivity than others to antisemitism and to be more worried personally as well. These findings converge with what was found previously with respect to age, and the relative distinctiveness of the younger in comparison with the older.

In Conclusion

Following the overview of the Belgian sample, this chapter discussed the extent to which different approaches tend to characterize different social categories. Social status was irrelevant here, in view of the wide socioeconomic homogeneity of Belgian Jews. Regarding age categories, however, it appeared that the younger respondents are slightly less pessimistic than the older, with respect to the general situation of the Belgian society. On the other hand, the younger deplore more than the older the spread of religious intolerance. With respect to antisemitism, the younger appear as more aware of its reality, and are also more sensitive to Jews’ feelings. Related to these perceptions, the younger express more worry about their families and resent more than the older the blame leveled at them for Israel’s “reprehensible” acts. They also hear more often the comparison of Israelis to Nazis in the way they lead their conflict with the Palestinians, and also report more threats that they received from antisemites. More younger respondents also reveal personal experiences of antisemitism and tend more than the older to avoid places that might be “dangerous.” Last but not least, they acknowledge more often that they have considered emigrating, which however does not prevent the older respondents from hearing antisemitic utterances more often than the younger do. Education is another factor of differentiation between respondents— though by no means a crucial one. Less educated respondents show less sensitivity to hostility toward Jews in public, in the media, and in political life. Yet they also tend to report less than others that they have been, in person, targets of antisemitic comments or have witnessed expressions of antisemitism against others. Respondents who received a secondary education show little 98 chapter 6 particular tendencies while respondents who received a higher education are more worried than others about eventual victimization or harassment of their children and grandchildren, and have more often considered emigrating from Belgium On the other hand, more education is somehow related to less sensitivity to the antisemitic nature of negative attitudes toward Israel. When it comes to differences by gender, it is almost impossible to speak of any gap between men and women regarding the large majority of issues investigated. The main differences are that women are more decisive regarding the gravity of antisemitism and some of its expressions. More women than men report that antisemitic acts are multiplying. They are also somehow more cautious than men about avoiding sites known as dangerous for Jews. Marital status is again far from impacting dramatically on respondents’ answers to the survey. What was observed was that single people tend to emphasize less the issue of unemployment, are more sensitive than others to public manifestations of antisemitism, and more worried about becoming victims of insults and harassment. All in all, one can by no means speak of sociological variables as digging deep gaps between categories within the sample. The criterion that appears of special interest concerns age: above all, one sees here that the younger do by no means appear to be less sensitive to the phenomenon of antisemitism and its various expressions. Moreover, a set of no-findings can also be pointed out here with interest: none of the variables considered with respect to Jewishness and Jewish identification yielded significant differences. The pattern identified from the general analysis of the sample holds for all categories of respondents, as far as the focus is on age, gender, education, or marital status. These no-findings validate that the Jewishness defined in previous pages as diasporic and ethnocultural, holds for respondents independently of the sociological variables taken into consideration. The question that now arises is whether this generalization holds as well for criteria pertaining to Jewish sociology. chapter 7 Origins of Jewishness and Community

In the following of the discussion of the link of respondents’ social attributes to the issues investigated by the research, this chapter focuses on Jewish variables in particular, i.e. the correlations with specific Jewish legacies, the origins of Jewishness and belongingness to different communities.

The Eda Dimension

The notion of eda (plural edot)—congregation in Hebrew—generally refers in Jewish sociology to the specific cultural origin of respondents’ Jewishness (Ben-Rafael and Sharot 2007). The wide majority of Belgian Jews originate from Central and Eastern Europe where the Yiddish-speaking so-called Ashkenazi (German in old Hebrew) culture dominated for centuries. In the second generation after moving to the West, these Ashkenazim no longer use Yiddish as their vernacular but they still often refer to it as their particular legacy, and retain some tokens and expressions as symbolic markers. Not all Belgian Jews are Ashkenazim, though, for over the years Jews from different origins settled in the country. The majority originated from North Africa and shared values and patterns that had been influenced by a longstanding past in Muslim environments. Others were also offspring of Sephardic Judaism, the other major legacy of Spanish origin that had flourished in Spain. Following the norm now in vigor in Israel and many other places in the Jewish world, the term Sephardic will be used in the following to designate in general Belgian Jews of non-Ashkenazi origin.1 In the Belgian FRA sample, 15% of the respondents represented this Sephardic Jewish population, which quite fits general estimates of their demographic weight among non-ultra-orthodox Belgian Jews. Table 7.1 shows that differences between edot are by no means

1 Over the years, and in North Africa, in particular, a symbiosis developed between the original North African Jewry and the Sephardic Jews who settled there after the expulsions from Spain and Portugal and the notion of Sephardic Jewry got to apply to the whole non-Ashke- nazi population. The use of the term Sephardic was further generalized to all non-Ashkenazi Jews in Israel and elsewhere in spite of the fact that some communities tend to keep to their original appellations—like the Sephardics of some Latin American cities or the Yemenite Jews in some places in Israel.

Ashkenazi Sephardi Mixed Other Don’t know Figure 7.1 Respondents by subgroup (438; %)

Table 7.1 Eda and Jewishness (%)

N 418 Ashk Seph

Jewish culture (such as Jewish music, literature and art)— Importance? Important 93.0 84.8 not important 7.0 15.2 Self-Graded Strength of Jewish Identification Low 2.0 .8 Middle 8.1 13.3 High 31.9 41.4 strong/very strong 58.1 44.5 Have you ever been to Israel Yes 94.0 83.6 No 6.0 16.4 Relatives in Israel Yes, many 25.7 14.1 Yes, a few 59.3 46.1 One or two 13.3 36.7 None 1.7 3.1 N = 428 origins of jewishness and community 101 dramatic. To the extent that such differences do appear, they give some edge to Ashkenazics with respect to the importance they see in the retention of Jewish culture, their visiting Israel and their links with relatives living there. But somehow, Sephardics seem to identify a bit more than Ashkenazim with Jewishness.

Table 7.2 Eda and confrontations with antisemitism (%)

Issues and scales Ashk Seph

Physical attack—How worried about becoming a victim Worried 49.0 60.2 not worried 51.0 39.8 N = 428 300 128 Physical attack—How worried about close family member becoming a victim Worried 57.7 67.8 not worried 42.3 31.3 N = 428 300 128 Jews have too much power—how often heard in past 12 months Frequently 31.3 44.5 Occasionally 68.7 55.5 N = 428 206 71 Jews are only a religious group and not a nation—In past 12 months, how often heard Frequently 15.7 26.6 Occasionally 84.3 73.4 N = 428 300 128 The interests of Jews are very different from the interests of the rest? Yes 77.5 66.7 No 22.5 33.3 N = 419 293 126 Supports boycotts of Israeli goods/products: antisemitic? Yes 79.3 68.3 No 20.7 31.7 N = 420 294 126 Made offensive or threatening comments to you in person Never 64.5 51.2 once or twice 18.1 24.0 3 or more times 17.4 24.8 102 chapter 7

From Table 7.2 it comes out that that Ashkenazim are less worried about being victims of attacks—personally and with respect to their families. This stronger self-confidence, it may be suggested, follows from the fact that Ashkenazim have mostly deeper roots in Belgium than the non-Ashkenazim. Similarly, they seem to attach less importance than non-Ashkenazim, or are less sensitive, to some antisemitic statements heard or read in the surroundings.

The Impact of Conversion and Mixed Parenthood

Turning from Jewish origins to the origins of Jewishness, the sample shows that some respondents (59 out of 438, i.e. 13.5%) are not Jews by birth, but by conversion. Hence, an additional issue of interest in the present context concerns the degree to which converted and non-converted Jews differ from each other regarding the commitment to Jewishness and perceptions of antisemitism. The data are not clear-cut (Table 7.3): only a few significant differences between the categories appear. The major ones—by no means drastic either— concern the fact that converted Jews look be more sensitive to antisemitic expressions circulating in the surroundings such as talk of outlawing circumcision, and non-Jews’ unwillingness to marry a Jew. These converted show also particularly hurt regarding the contention that Jews exploit the Holocaust for their present-day interests. Moreover, converted Jews remind more than others acts of discrimination toward them against a religious background. On the other hand, Jews by birth feel more threatened by antisemitism and, additionally, they also report having more relatives residing in Israel.

Table 7.3 The impact of conversion (%)

birth conv

Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes— In past 12 months, how often heard non-Jews say Frequently 44.8 62.7 Occasionally 55.2 37.3 N = 423 364 59 Would not marry a Jew—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 54.7 78.9 No 45.3 21.1 N = 410 160 12 (Continued) origins of jewishness and community 103

Table 7.3 (Continued)

birth conv

Made offensive or threatening comments to you in person— Frequency experienced from somebody in past 5 years? Never 62.8 41.4 once or twice 16.9 39.7 3 or more times 20.3 19.0 N = 413 355 58 In the last 12 months, have you heard non-Jews suggest prohibiting circumcision and traditional slaughter Yes, about circumcision 13.5 30.6 Yes, about traditional slaughter 24.2 22.2 Yes, about both 62.4 47.2 N = 214 178 36 Religion or belief—Felt discriminated against/harassed in past 12 months on this basis? Yes 20.4 34.5 No 79.6 65.5 N = 403 348 55 Relatives in Israel Many 25.8 1.7 Some 58.0 42.4 No 16.2 56.0 N = 423 364 59

All in all, one does not find any kind of polarization among respondents according to origins of Jewishness: converted Jews appear to behave and feel quite similarly to others with respect to antisemitism as well as Jewishness– even though, for obvious reasons, converts have fewer links to Israel. Whenever some difference is found, it depicts the converted as more sensitive to antisemitism. When one now considers respondents who are the offspring of mixed families, the research distinguished between those whose mothers are the non-Jewish member of the family from those where fathers were not born Jewish. One can then compare these categories with each other, as well as with respondents stemming from homogeneous Jewish families. As shown 104 chapter 7 in Table 7.4, subjects with not-Jewish born mothers seem to have heard anti semitic statements more often than others in their environment, and also appear to be more worried about their children’s safety. More of them report having moved or considered moving to a different area due to antisemitism, and to have experienced antisemitic comments personally. Yet, they express weaker Jewish identification, and visit Israel less often, since they have fewer relatives there.

Table 7.4 Impact of non-Jewish-born mothers* (%)

Issues HF MNJB

Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians—In past 12 months, how often heard non-Jewish people Frequently 56.5 75.5 Occasionally 43.5 24.5 N = 434 336 98 Would not marry a Jew—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 54.0 74.7 No 46.0 25.3 N = 421 326 95 Verbal insults or harassment—How worried about child(ren)/ grandchild(ren) becoming a victim? Worried 58.1 75.6 not worried 41.9 24.4 N = 205 160 45 In the past five years, have you moved or considered moving? Yes, I have moved 5.0 12.8 Yes, I have considered 7.8 17.0 No, I have not considered 86.3 70.2 N = 414 320 94 Sent you emails, text messages, letters or cards that were offensive or threatening—Frequency experienced Never 86.6 76.6 once or twice 6.4 12.8 3 or more times 7.0 10.6 N = 422 328 94 (Continued) origins of jewishness and community 105

Table 7.4 (Continued)

Issues HF MNJB

Made offensive or threatening comments to you in person— Frequency experienced past 5 years? Never 63.7 46.9 once or twice 17.1 30.2 3 or more times 19.2 22.9 N = 424 328 96 A private letting agent or landlord—Treat you better worse same as others They would treat me worse 8.4 2.9 They would treat me the same as other people 90.2 91.4 They would treat me better 1.5 5.7 N = 345 275 70 Self-Graded Strength of Jewish Identification Low 1.8 2.1 Middle 7.2 16.7 High 33.7 40.6 Very strong 57.3 40.6 N = 431 335 96 Have you ever been to Israel Yes 93.5 81.6 No 6.5 18.4 N = 434 336 98 Relatives in Israel Yes, many 26.2 8.1 Some 58.6 42.9 No 15.4 49.0 N = 434 336 98

* HF=Homogeneous families of mixed parenthood; MNJB=mother not Jewish-born

The same general tendencies come up among respondents whose fathers are not Jewish-born (Table 7.5). These subjects also hear more often expressions of antisemitism—“Jews are not a nation but only a religion”—and define as antisemite individuals who refuse to marry a Jew. They also feel more that they 106 chapter 7 may be discriminated on religious background. While they see less than other respondents that racism is increasing recently, they also report less receiving antisemitic mails or threats.

Table 7.5 Respondents whose fathers are not-Jewish born—perceptions of antisemitism* (%)

HF FNJB

Racism increased? Increased 83.3 69.4 Decrease or remained the same 16.7 30.6 N = 420 348 72 Jews are only a religious group and not a nation—In past 12 months, how often heard Frequently 15.4 33.8 Occasionally 84.6 66.2 N = 431 357 74 Criticizes Israel—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 32.5 45.2 No 67.5 54.8 N = 424 351 73 Would not marry a Jew—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 55.3 73.2 No 44.7 26.8 N = 424 347 71 Sent you emails, text messages, letters or cards that were offensive or threatening Never 86.2 74.3 once or twice 7.4 10.0 3 or more times 6.3 15.7 N = 419 349 70 Made offensive or threatening comments to you in person Never 63.1 43.7 once or twice 17.1 32.4 3 or more times 19.7 23.9 N = 421 350 71 (Continued) origins of jewishness and community 107

Table 7.5 (Continued)

HF FNJB

Posted offensive comments about you on the internet—Frequency in past 5 years? Never 85.8 73.1 once or twice 6.5 9.0 3 or more times 7.7 17.9 N = 392 325 67 Felt discriminated against/harassed in past 12 months Yes 4.6 15.3 No 95.4 84.7 N = 419 347 72 Religion or belief—Felt discriminated against/harassed in past 12 months Yes 20.2 33.3 No 79.8 66.7 N = 411 342 69

* HF=homogeneous Jewish family mixed parenthood; FNJB=father not Jewish by birth

No less significant is the fact that these respondents, like converts to Judaism or Jews whose mother was not born Jewish, feel less committed to Jewishness, feel less part of the Jewish people, and visited Israel less, having often less relatives who reside there. All in all, we see that beyond the different nuances regarding the diverse items investigated, the same general tendencies appear among respondents who converted to Judaism, whose mothers were non-Jewish born, or whose fathers were non-Jewish born. In all three categories (see Tables 7.3–7.6), there is by no means less sensitivity to antisemitism and, with respect to some aspects, even more sensitivity than among other respondents. At the same time, this sensitivity is concomitant with a weaker allegiance to Jewishness. These data lead to the conclusion, and this is in accordance with common sense judgments, conversion or mixed parenthood correlate somehow with a weaker feeling of belongingness to the Jewish collective. This aspect, however, by no means impacts on the capability of individuals to react to antisemitism. In this respect, the converted and the son or daughter of converts remain as steadfast—even more so in given respects—as the son or daughter 108 chapter 7

Table 7.6 Respondents whose fathers were not-Jewish born—traits of Jewishness (%)

HF FNJB

Feeling part of the Jewish People—Importance? Important 96.1 87.5 not important 3.9 12.5 N = 411 355 72 Self-Graded Strength of Jewish Identification Low 1.7 2.7 Middle 7.0 20.5 High 32.1 47.9 Very strong 59.2 27.8 N = 428 355 73 Have you ever been to Israel Yes 94.4 73.0 No 5.6 27.0 N = 431 357 74 Relatives in Israel Yes, many 25.8 5.4 Some 59.4 36.5 No 14.8 7.2 N = 431 357 74

of homogeneous Jewish families. This point is important, bearing in mind the large number of mixed marriages taking place in Western Jewry in general.2

The Εcological and Linguistic Divide

Another divide of Belgian Jewry overlaps the primary division of the Belgian population itself, that is, the geolinguistic distinction between the French- speaking and the Flemish-speaking parts of the country (Ben-Rafael and Ben-Rafael 2012; Dubois 2005; Schiffino 2003; Witte & Van Velthoten 1998).

2 See Appendix 2 for FRA’s all-European findings with respect to Jews by conversion and of mixed parenthood. origins of jewishness and community 109

Brussels, with the country’s first Jewish community, belongs to the former, and Antwerp where the second community lives, belongs to the latter. These two parts of the country have for years been disputing over the relative privileges of their respective tongues and the contours of their areas of dominance. Much of the country’s internal politics revolve around this issue, up to the point that it accounts for the emergence on either side—especially on the Flemish side—of separatist forces aspiring to make Belgium a confed- eration, or even two separate states. As a result, all major political parties are now divided into Flemish and French factions independent from each other. It is in this context that comparing the respondents’ answers to the questionnaire according to this line of divide is relevant. The methodological problem, however, consists of the fact that the research was unable to penetrate the ultra-orthodox community which, in Antwerp, constitutes an important component of the local Jewry. With this reservation in mind, the analysis presented in Tables 7.7 and 7.8 shows that differences are, indeed, quite important, even though hardly essential. Table 7.7 firstly reveals that the French-speaking (Brussels) respondents are more critical of the general reality of Belgian society—with respect to crime rates, unemployment, the condition of health services and, more generally, the state of the economy. This finding may be linked to the relatively lower standard of living of this part of the Jewish community in comparison to Antwerp’s Jews—many of whom are employed in the diamond industry and commerce—in comparison with Brussels’, where Jews are principally trade- persons, craftsmen, or professionals. On the other hand, the Flemish-speaking respondents are more critical of the issue of immigration in Belgium. This probably relates to the particular acuteness of this problem in Antwerp which is a stronghold of the nationalist party openly opposed to North African immigration and latently antisemitic as well. However, among both French-speakers and Flemish-speakers one does find a similar awareness to antisemitism. Each side emphasizes different aspects but both are conscious of the plague. The major difference, in this respect, concerns the fact that in Antwerp respondents are more sensitive to the issue of Israel and more critical of discussions about boycotting it. They are also more reactive to antisemites’ accusations that they are “unable to integrate” Belgian society. More respondents from Brussels, on the other hand, consider as antisemites people who say that Jews are recognizable. Such a sentence is less unacceptable for Antwerp’s respondents who know that many of their community fellows are ultra-orthodox and deliberately display a surplus of external markers. 110 chapter 7

In the same context, while French-speaking respondents report a general increase in anti-Jewish discrimination, more Flemish-speaking respondents tend to see this kind of discrimination as targeting Judaic religiosity in particular. More of them also maintain that the police or other institutions tend to behave with them unfairly.

Table 7.7 The geolinguistic dimension (%)

Antwerp Brussels

Crime level a problem 72.4 84.6 not a problem 27.6 15.4 N = 332 98 234 Unemployment a problem 78.1 89.5 not a problem 21.9 10.5 N = 335 96 239 Health services a problem 5.3 19.8 not a problem 94.7 80.2 N = 331 94 237 Immigration a problem 85.6 73.5 not a problem 14.4 26.5 N = 335 97 238 Antisemitic graffiti a problem 39.1 60.4 not a problem 60.9 39.6 N = 319 92 227 Desecration of Jewish cemeteries a problem 25.0 52.0 not a problem 75.0 48.0 N = 317 92 225 Vandalism of Jewish buildings or institutions a problem 37.1 64.9 not a problem 62.9 35.1 N = 322 97 225 (Continued) origins of jewishness and community 111

Table 7.7 (Continued)

Antwerp Brussels

Antisemitic graffiti Increased 45.3 58.5 Stayed the same or decreased 54.7 41.5 N = 291 86 205 Vandalism of Jewish buildings or institutions Increased 41.1 56.9 Stayed the same or decreased 58.9 43.1 N = 299 90 209 Jews are not capable of integrating society—In past 12 months, how often heard non-Jewish people say that Frequently 26.5 8.3 Occasionally 73.5 91.7 N = 339 98 241 Jews are only a religious group and not a nation—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 50.0 34.1 No 50.0 65.9 N = 326 94 232 Jews are not capable of integrating society—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 72.2 89.8 No 27.8 10.2 N = 333 97 236 The interests of Jews are very different from others’—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 62.8 79.8 No 37.2 20.2 N = 332 94 238 Does not consider Jews to be nationals—Would consider a non- Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 87.6 95.4 No 12.4 4.6 N = 337 97 240 (Continued) 112 chapter 7

Table 7.7 (Continued)

Antwerp Brussels

Would not marry a Jew—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 46.3 61.0 No 53.7 39.0 N = 326 95 231 Thinks that Jews have recognizable features—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 59.2 77.0 No 40.8 23.0 N = 37 98 239 Supports boycotts of Israeli goods/products—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 86.5 71.7 No 13.5 28.3 N = 337 96 237 Do you know of any authority or organization that can offer support or advice to people who have been discriminated against—for whatever reason? Yes 62.2 83.0 No 37.8 17.0 N = 339 98 241 Felt discriminated against/harassed in past 12 months Yes 1.1 9.4 No 98.9 90.6 N = 330 95 235 Religion or belief—Felt discriminated against/harassed in past 12 months on this basis? Yes 34.0 16.1 No 66.0 83.9 N = 324 94 230 The police—Treat you better /worse /same as others because you are Jewish? They would treat me worse than other people 21.3 3.6 They would treat me the same as other people 72.5 93.4 They would treat me better than other people 6.3 3.0 N = 277 80 197 origins of jewishness and community 113

All in all, the geolinguistic divide does not yield tangible and systematic results. What was found revolves around the fact that a good part of the Jewish population of Antwerp is closer to the traditional legacy than in Brussels. Differences in perceptions and experiences of discrimination result in a kind of zigzagging: each group insists on other aspects. Broadly speaking, the geolinguistic division which, in Belgium, is of utmost importance, has little systematic significance for the Jewish population in spite of its inner contrasts with respect to the languages used in everyday life. The geolinguistic aspect is, however, only one aspect of the ecology of Jews. By Jewish ecology, we also refer to the fact that Jews in Belgium can be found both in neighborhoods where many other Jews live and in areas where Jews are much less numerous. Table 7.8 distinguishes the respondents who answered at least “quite a number” to the question “Do you live in an area where other Jews live?” from respondents who answered “none” or “only a few.”

Table 7.8 The impact of living in a “Jewish neighborhood”* (%)

Jwa nJwa

Crime levels a problem 90.5 80.3 not a problem 9.5 19.7 N = 405 95 310 Government corruption a problem 53.8 27.1 not a problem 46.2 72.9 N = 385 93 292 Antisemitism on the internet Increased 97.8 90.1 Stayed the same or decreased 2.2 9.9 N = 373 91 282 The Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated—In past 12 months, how often heard/seen non-Jewish people Frequently 32.0 21.4 Occasionally 68.0 78.6 N = 410 97 313 (Continued) 114 chapter 7

Table 7.8 (Continued)

Jwa nJwa

Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians—In past 12 months, how often you heard/seen non-Jewish people Frequently 70.1 57.5 Occasionally 29.9 42.5 N = 410 97 313 Jews are only a religious group and not a nation—In past 12 months, how often heard/seen non-Jewish people Frequently 27.8 16.0 Occasionally 72.2 84.0 N = 410 97 313 Verbal insults or harassment—How worried about child(ren)/ grandchild(ren) close becoming a victim? Worried 81.0 59.7 not worried 19.0 40.3 N = 191 42 149 In the past 5 years, have you moved or considered moving to another area or neighborhood for safety? Yes, I have moved 8.4 6.7 Yes, I have considered moving 20.0 8.1 No, I have not considered moving 71.6 85.2 N = 392 Have you ever been to Israel Yes 85.6 92.7 No 14.4 7.3 N = 410 97 313 Relatives in Israel Yes many 9.3 25.6 Some 52.6 54.6 No 38.2 19.8 N = 410 97 313

* Jwa=Jewish area: nJwa= non-Jewish area origins of jewishness and community 115

It appears that respondents who live in areas where Jews are more numerous than “only a few” constitute a minority of about a quarter of the sample; nevertheless, they do total nearly 100 individuals and as such can be significantly compared with the other respondents. It appears that these respondents are more critical of given present-day aspects of the Belgian society. They are also more sensitive to the growing antisemitism in the country and more worried about the safety of their children and grandchildren. These respondents have proportionately fewer relatives in Israel and visit Israel less often. As a rule, differences are by no means dramatic but the ones that do appear tend to indicate that where Jews have more interaction among themselves, they also seem to see non-Jewish society more critically than others—both with respect to the general situation of Belgium and the reality of antisemitism. Interestingly, no significant difference was found with respect to Jewishness.

In Conclusion

The aspects overviewed in the above add additional touches to the picture drawn out in the previous chapter. In brief,

– One cannot speak of polarization between Jewish eda categories despite the real divergences that appear here and there. – As for the impacts of conversion and mixed parenthood, it appears that beyond the different nuances, one obtains the same general tendencies among respondents who converted to Judaism or who are offspring of mothers or fathers who were not Jewish-born. In all three categories, there is by no means less sensitivity to antisemitism than among other Jews regarding most issues considered, and in fact with respect to some of them, respondents in these subsets show even more sensitivity than other respondents. – This sensitivity is concomitant with a somewhat weaker allegiance to Jewishness. Hence, and in accordance with common sense judgment, conversion or mixed parenthood correlate with a weaker sense of belongingness to the Jewish collective which, however, is by no means linked to less sensitivity to antisemitism. A lesser awareness of Jewishness does not correlate with weaker identification. – The geolinguistic divide does not yield systematic results. The Jewish population of Antwerp is closer to the Jewish legacy than Brussels’ but, at the same time, differences in perceptions and experiences of discrimination 116 chapter 7

result in no more than a kind of zigzagging. Thus, the geolinguistic division that plays a crucial role among non-Jewish Belgians is of little significance for Jews, notwithstanding differences of daily languages. – As for the wider ecological question of where Jews live physically, differences are again far from dramatic. Where Jews have more interaction among themselves they also seem to view the non-Jewish society and the reality of antisemitism more critically. chapter 8 Religiosity and Antisemitism

Religiosity as Differentiation

As a matter of fact, the self-definition of Jewishness as formulated with respect to Jewish religiosity is the variable with the highest differential impact among respondents on their perceptions of, attitudes toward, and reactions to Belgian reality and antisemitism. This variable was considered here by distinguishing categories widely used in the Jewish sociological literature and which were reminded already in previous pages. The first category is “orthodox” which includes all respondents who consider themselves bound by the Halakha (Talmudic law); most of them see themselves “modern” orthodox and not “ultra-orthodox” and numbered, in total 54 respondents (12%). The second category consists of subjects who define themselves as non-orthodox religious, including Conservative and Reform Jews who, in Belgium, are mostly designated under the label of “liberal;” this group numbered 70 respondents (16%). The third category responds to the term “traditional;” these respondents do not define themselves as religious but value the observance of some major customs pertaining to the Jewish legacy. This group, also often designated as “ethnic Jews,” numbered 118 respondents (27%). The fourth category counts these respondents who consider themselves non-religious Jews, secular Jews or “just Jewish.” They numbered 170 respondents (40%). Finally, 21 subjects (5%) defined themselves in various singular manners (Jewish Buddhist or other forms of faith mixing). In the following, they are called “others” for all practical purpose. The total amounted to 433 (see Fig. 8.1 and Fig. 8.2). Differences firstly appear between categories regarding perceptions of the Belgian reality at the time of the survey (Table 8.1). The main finding, rather unexpected for individuals emphasizing normativeness, concerns the under- rated perception by Orthodox of the acuteness in Belgium of crime rates. Moreover, the issue of unemployment is less apprehended by traditional Jews, seemingly because they themselves, for probably independent reasons, do not experience the vicissitudes of this scourge. Furthermore, all categories but “others” see immigration as one of Belgium’s crucial social problems. However, all in all, religiosity does not create a polar difference between respondents regarding major problems on the national agenda: the differences between categories are by no means drastic and systematic.

Does not Attends/is a Attends/is a Attends/is a Attends/is a Other belong to member of member of a member of member of synagogue any Jewish Jewish clubs liberal an orthodox particular framework of no synagogue synagogue strictly religious orthodox character synagogue Figure 8.1 Respondents by synagogue/community affiliation, (N=433; %)

Mixed Just Jewish Orthodox Traditional None of these

Reform/Progressive

Haredi (strictly-Orthodox) Figure 8.2 Respondents’ Jewish identity categories (N=438; %)

When turning to antisemitism, again religiosity appears to matter regarding some items. Two of them are too unsystematic to yield clear conclusions, but two others are more coherent and interesting. The two first issues concern the desecration of cemeteries and vandalism against Jewish buildings. The traditional respondents are more sensitive to the first type of acts while the orthodox are less so to the second, each time comparatively religiosity and antisemitism 119 to the attitudes of the other categories. These differences are hard to interpret and comment on. On the other hand, regarding both antisemitism in the media and in political life, the quite high level of agreement among all respondents that these phenomena are real, does not prevent the categories of “just Jewish” and “others” to see them as less crucial than respondents who are more religious or closer to religion–liberals, traditionals and orthodox. This latter finding gives the impression that religiosity or closeness to religiosity do shar- pen individuals’ sensitivity to expressions of antisemitism.

Table 8.1 Jewish religiosity: the Belgian reality of antisemitism (%)

Just J Lib Trad Orth Mix/no

Perceptions of the Belgian reality The general rate of crime a problem 84.1 84.6 88.1 70.2 57.1 not a problem 15.9 15.4 11.9 29.8 42.9 N = 431 170 65 118 57 21 Unemployment a problem 86.6 89.4 91.4 73.7 81.0 not a problem 13.4 10.6 8.6 26.3 19.0 N = 432 172 66 116 57 21 Immigration a problem 75.9 81.5 86.6 85.7 61.9 not a problem 24.1 18.5 13.4 14.3 38.1 N = 435 174 65 119 56 21 Antisemitic acts Desecration of Jewish cemeteries a problem 40.1 45.2 57.5 30.2 40.0 not a problem 59.9 54.8 42.5 69.8 60.0 N = 410 162 62 113 53 20 Vandalism of Jewish buildings or institutions a problem 55.2 62.3 66.7 41.1 60.0 not a problem 44.8 37.7 33.3 58.9 40.0 N = 414 163 61 114 56 20 Antisemitism in the media a problem 65.1 68.8 83.2 75.0 60.0 not a problem 34.9 31.3 16.8 25.0 40.0 N = 431 172 64 119 56 20 (Continued) 120 chapter 8

Table 8.1 (Continued)

Just J Lib Trad Orth Mix/no

Antisemitism in political life a problem 42.7 51.6 62.4 60.0 47.6 not a problem 57.3 48.4 37.6 40.0 52.4 N = 428 171 64 117 55 21 Antisemitism in political life Increased 49.0 58.7 64.9 70.0 55.0 Stayed the same or decreased 51.0 41.3 35.1 30.0 45.0 N = 401 157 63 111 50 20

From this assumption, it is a short way to reflections on the differential concern with Jewishness and attitudes to Jewishness: the “just Jewish” and “others” appear to be less emotive regarding their attribute as Jews. A same line of differentiation appears regarding the findings that tackle the impact of antisemitism on respondents’ self-confidence (Table 8.2). It transpires that the “just Jewish” and “others” are less worried about becoming victims of antisemitic acts—insults, harassment, attacks—than are the liberals, the traditional and the orthodox. Similar results are obtained when subjects are asked if they are worried about their children or grandchildren: it is among the traditional that one finds the relatively larger number of those who avoid—on some occasions at least—attending Jewish events or places, out of fear for their safety. When it comes to the antisemitic atmosphere reigning in the surroundings, one again finds a relative differentiation between “just Jewish” and “others,” on the one hand, and groups closer to religiosity, on the other. And indeed, the liberal, the traditional and the Orthodox testify more than “just Jews” or “others” that they are often blamed by non-Jews for Israel’s actions vis-à-vis Palestinians. In a similar vein, these categories are also more convinced that non-Jews who support the boycott of Israeli products are antisemites. Quite the same distinction comes up between categories of respondents according to how frequently non-Jews tell them that “Jews are too powerful” or that “Jews cannot integrate into society.” Still the same order between categories holds for the assessment that “Jews’ interests are very different from those of others.” religiosity and antisemitism 121

Orthodox/ Haredi Non-Orthodox/ Haredi Antisemitic Experience of Worried about Avoided Jewish harassment in the discrimination on becoming a victim sites/events and/ past months the basis of of antisemitic act or places in local religion/belief or area ethnicity in the past months Figure 8.3 Differences between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews (traditional, reform/progressive, just Jewish) on selected indicators of perceptions and experiences of antisemitism (438; %)

Hence, on a whole series of questions, it emerges that beyond the general quite unanimous conviction of the reality of antisemitism in Belgium, greater sensitivity is found among the respondents—Liberals, Traditional and Orthodox— who are closer to religiosity or are more religious. This seems to indicate that Jewishness represents for them a somehow stronger emotional involvement. Among those who share closeness to religiosity, moreover, one sees another differentiation that appears between the orthodox, on the one side, and the other categories—including liberals and traditional—, on the other (Table 8.3). Hence, the orthodox have considered more often than any other category emigrating from Belgium because of the antisemitic climate. They have also experienced more often threatening antisemitic utterances. What is more, they are assertive of having experienced discrimination on religious background and tend more often than others to blame the police, landlords, or courts for discriminatory attitudes against Jews. These feelings may well be the conse- quence, at the subjective level, of the fact that orthodox Jews do carry external markers immediately recognizable. As such, these Jews are more visible to non-Jewish interlocutors. They might thus be inclined to interpret the latter’s behavior toward them as influenced by that fact. 122 chapter 8

Table 8.2 Religiosity and personal experience of antisemitism (%)

Just J Lib Trad Orth Mix/no

Personal experience of antisemitism Verbal insults or harassment—How worried about becoming a victim worried 55.4 65.2 65.0 82.5 52.4 not worried 44.6 34.8 35.0 17.5 47.6 N = 439 175 66 120 57 21 Physical attack—How worried about family member or close becoming a victim worried 57.1 51.5 70.8 68.4 57.2 not worried 42.9 48.5 20.2 31.6 42.9 N = 439 175 66 120 57 21 Antisemitic atmosphere in the surroundings How often you feel people blame you for anything done by the Israeli Government because you are Jewish? Frequently 53.1 66.7 65.0 73.7 57.1 Occasionally 46.9 33.3 35.0 26.3 42.9 N = 439 175 66 120 57 21 Jews have too much power (in the economy, politics, media)—In past 12 months, how often heard/seen non-Jewish people Frequently 28.6 40.9 43.3 42.1 19.0 Occasionally 71.4 59.1 56.7 57.9 81.0 N = 439 175 66 120 57 21 Jews are not capable of integrating society In past 12 months—how often heard/seen non-Jews say Frequently 8.6 16.7 14.2 29.8 .0 Occasionally 91.4 83.3 85.8 70.2 100.0 N = 439 175 66 120 57 21 Jews' interests are different from others— Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said Yes 84.2 69.8 65.5 65.5 81.0 No 15.8 30.2 34.5 34.5 19.0 N = 429 171 63 119 55 21 (Continued) religiosity and antisemitism 123

Table 8.2 (Continued)

Just J Lib Trad Orth Mix/no

Antisemitic attitudes Would not marry a Jew—Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 65.7 66.2 50.0 36.4 90.0 No 34.3 33.8 50.0 63.6 10.0 N = 425 169 65 116 55 20 Thinks that Jews have recognizable features— Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 82.1 70.8 71.4 61.4 55.0 No 17.9 29.2 28.6 38.6 45.0 N = 434 173 65 119 57 20 Supports boycotts of Israeli goods/products— Would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? Yes 68.6 75.0 81.4 91.1 71.4 No 31.4 25.0 18.6 8.9 28.6 N = 431 172 64 118 56 21

Table 8.3 Religiosity, worry about antisemitism and discrimination (%)

Just J Lib Trad Orth Mix/no

Antisemitism as worrying Verbal insults or harassment—How worried about child(ren)/grandchild(ren) or another relative becoming a victim? Worried 55.8 81.5 63.5 64.7 25.0 not worried 44.2 18.5 36.5 35.3 75.0 N = 207 86 27 52 34 8 How often do you avoid visiting Jewish events or sites because you do not feel safe as a Jew? Frequently 4.0 .0 2.5 1.8 14.3 Occasionally 96.0 100.0 97.5 98.2 85.7 N = 439 175 66 120 57 21 (Continued) 124 chapter 8

Table 8.3 (Continued)

Just J Lib Trad Orth Mix/no

How often do you avoid places or locations in your neighborhood because you don't feel safe there as a Jew? Frequently 9.1 9.1 14.2 31.6 19.0 Occasionally 90.9 90.9 85.8 68.4 81.0 N = 378 175 66 120 57 21 In the past 5 years, have you considered moving because you don't feel safe living there as a Jew? Yes, I have moved to another area .6 .0 1.9 6.0 .0 Yes, I have considered moving 36.4 32.8 55.6 56.0 36.8 No, I have not considered moving 63.0 67.2 42.6 38.0 63.2 N = 400 162 61 108 50 19 Made offensive or threatening comments to you in person—Frequency experienced from somebody in past 5 years? Never 63.4 54.7 67.2 41.1 52.4 once or twice 19.8 32.8 15.5 17.9 19.0 3 or more times 16.9 12.5 17.2 41.1 28.6 N = 429 172 64 116 56 21 Do you know of any organization that can offer support or advice to people who have been discriminated? Yes 81.1 75.8 75.8 57.9 76.2 No 18.9 24.2 24.2 42.1 23.8 N = 439 175 66 120 57 21 Antisemitism and discrimination Religion or belief—Felt discriminated against/ harassed in past 12 months on this basis? Yes 14.4 25.8 14.7 54.7 35.0 No 85.6 74.2 85.3 45.3 65.0 N = 418 167 62 116 53 20 (Continued) religiosity and antisemitism 125

Table 8.3 (Continued)

Just J Lib Trad Orth Mix/no

The police—Treat you better/worse/same as others because you are Jewish? They would treat me worse 4.9 3.9 6.9 27.9 6.7 They would treat me the same 94.4 90.2 89.2 60.5 93.3 They would treat me better .7 5.9 3.9 11.6 .0 N = 353 142 51 102 43 15 The court system—Treat you better/worse/ same as others because you are Jewish? They would treat me worse 5.6 2.1 7.9 20.0 6.7 They would treat me the same 94.4 95.8 92.1 80.0 93.3 They would treat me better .0 2.1 .0 .0 .0 N = 318 A prohibition of circumcision (brit milah)— How big a problem would this be for you? A very big problem 61.8 61.3 81.7 94.7 47.1 N = 413 157 62 120 57 17

It remains, as the saying goes, that “paranoids also have enemies” and that wearing ostentatious signs of collective identity may awake a priori feelings of no few interlocutors toward Jews.

Age and Religiosity

All in all, the diverse variables studied thus far and analyzed comparatively have generated a nuanced overall picture of the sample and the ways its members view Jewishness and confront antisemitism. Among all these variables, religiosity and age stand out—they appear to carry the relatively strongest significance on the perceptions and attitudes of subjects. This fact justifies, as such, pursuing further at this stage and considering the impacts of the interaction of these two variables, and the extent to which they then contribute additional pertinent knowledge. 126 chapter 8

The sample was thus divided into four categories on the basis of a dichoto- mization of both age and religiosity. Age categories—indicated by the letter A in the following tables—differentiated again respondents who were less than 45 years of age (–A) from those who were 45 and over (+A). Religiosity—indicated by the letter R—was dichotomized according to “non-religious” that grouped the “just Jews” and “others” (–R), on the one hand, and “religious”— that grouped the traditional, liberal and orthodox (+R), on the other. Tables 8.4–8.6 show only the findings where statistically significant differences were found between the two categories. All in all, these findings lead to the five following conclusions.

(1) The differences between categories are not very salient. (2) The non-religious are less sensitive to antisemitism than the religious— both among the younger and the older; they are also less committed to Judaism and to Israel, and less critical of Belgian reality. (3) The older non-religious are less sensitive to antisemitism and less committed to Jewishness than the younger non-religious. (4) Continuity is remarkable between the younger and older religious groups. (5) The younger non-religious are more committed to Jewishness and more sensitive to antisemitism than the older non-religious illustrating a pattern that is closer to the younger and older religious.

The data indeed indicate the emergence of three categories of findings. Comparing younger non-religious respondents (–A/–R) and younger religious respondents (–A/+R), one obtains:

(1) –A/–R appear to differ meaningfully from –A/+R with respect to how far racism is a problem in Belgium, and how far this problem is increasing over time. (2) –A/–R tend to consider less than –A/+R as antisemitic people who see in Jews only a religious group or note who is Jewish among their acquaintances.

The younger religious seemingly live more among themselves and are less sensitive to the development of racism in general in the country, while on the other hand, the people who are close to religion also feel that Jews are primarily a religious group. In addition, to be religious means carrying external symbols of one’s faith and this might explain the difference of sensitivity to these questions between –A/+R and –A/–R. All in all, it seems, however, that the differences between these two groups are limited. religiosity and antisemitism 127

Table 8.4 Correlations age/religiosity: perceptions of Belgium and of antisemitism

–A/–R –A/+R +A/–R +A/+R

1. Crime levels (e.g. assault, theft)— 1.87 1.86 2.00 1.74 +A/–R: less as How big a problem in Belgium? problem 2. Racism—How big a problem in 2.15 1.79 2.01 1.85 –A/–Rr see it Belgium? less as problem 3. Antisemitism—How big a problem 1.98 1.87 2.11 1.75 +A/–R see it less in Belgium? as problem 4. Racism—Increased/decreased in 2.33 1.95 1.83 1.68 –A/–R see it as past 5 years in Belgium? decreased 5. Antisemitism—Increased/Decreased 1.93 1.57 1.71 1.41 –A/–R and in past 5 years in B? +A/–R see it as decreased 6. Antisemitism in the media—How 2.18 1.87 2.18 1.85 –A/–R see it less big a problem in Belgium? as problem 7. Antisemitism in political life—How 2.63 2.16 2.63 2.38 –A/–R and big a problem in Belgium? +A/–R see it less as problem 8. Expressions of hostility towards Jews 1.83 1.74 2.14 1.82 +A/–R see it as in public—past 5 years decreased 9. Antisemitism in the media— 2.30 1.93 2.26 1.70 +A/–R see it as Increased/decreased in past 5 years decreased 10. Antisemitism in political life— 2.60 2.18 2.49 2.18 –A/–R and Increased/decreased in past 5 years +A/–R see it as decreased

Comparing now the older non-religious (+A/–R) and the older religious (+A/+R), more points of divergence appear:

(3) The same differences in perceptions appear at diverse respects of the reality of antisemitism (4) It may also seen that the +A/–R is, at the same time, more aware of the existences of laws (5) +A/–R are relatively less sensitive to the abolition of the brith milah and oblivion of the Jewish culture

Table 8.5 Correlations age/religiosity—experiencing antisemitism

–A/–R –A/+Rr +A/–R +A/+R

1. Verbal insults or harassment— 2.22 2.00 2.50 2.16 +A/–R are less How worried about becoming a worried victim? 2. Physical attack—How worried 2.46 2.28 2.63 2.34 +A/–R are less about becoming a victim ? worried 3. Verbal insults or harassment— 2.15 1.87 2.41 1.95 +A/–R are less How worried about family worried 4. Physical attack—How worried 2.37 2.03 2.52 2.11 –A/–R and +A/–R about family? are less worried 5. How often do you feel that people 2.24 2.12 2.60 2.27 +A/–R heard it less blame you for the Israeli government often 6. Heard Jews are not capable of 3.34 3.46 3.60 3.30 +A/–R see it less as integrating into society—past 12 m problem 7. Jews are responsible for the cur- 1.44 1.27 1.51 1.30 +A/–R consider it rent economic crisis—antisemitic? less as antisemitic 8. Jews have too much 1.65 1.41 1.69 1.46 +A/–R consider it power—antisemitic? less as antisemitic 9. Jews exploit Holocaust for their 1.73 1.40 1.65 1.29 –A/–R and +A/–R purposes—antisemitic if said? less see it as antisemitic 10. Israelis behave “like Nazis” 2.02 1.44 1.89 1.42 –A/–R and +A/–R towards Palestinians—antisemitic less see it as if said? antisemitic 11. Jews are only a religious group 2.90 2.68 2.68 2.44 +A/–R consider it and not a nation—antisemitic? less as antisemitic (Continued) religiosity and antisemitism 129

Table 8.5 (Continued)

–A/–R –A/+Rr +A/–R +A/+R

12. Always notes who is Jewish 2.73 2.44 2.18 2.24 –A/–R less see it as among acquaintances—antisemitic? antisemitic 13. Criticizes Israel—antisemitic? 3.20 2.87 2.86 2.62 –A/–R and +A/–R less see it as antisemitic 14. Physical attack—How worried 2.62 2.38 2.84 2.22 +A/–R see it less about child(ren)? as problem 15. Avoid certain places because you 3.41 3.16 3.62 3.43 +A/–R see it less don't feel safe there as a Jew? as problem 16. In the 5 y, considered emigrating 2.47 2.39 2.81 2.51 +A/–R less considered emig 17. Emails etc. offensive or threaten- 5.51 5.58 5.68 5.31 +A/–R less ing—in past 5 years? experienced

(1) One first observes a sharper evaluation of crime levels, among +A/–R than among +A/+R. (2) One also sees that +A/–R share a sharper view of the reality of racism and of antisemitism (3) The same differences in perceptions appear at diverse respects of the reality of antisemitism (4) It may also seen that the +A/–R is, at the same time, more aware of the existences of laws (5) +A/–R are relatively less sensitive to the abolition of the brith milah and oblivion of the Jewish culture

In other words, one can clearly identify that among the older stratum of respondents, religiosity makes a genuine difference: the non-religious appear to be less rigorous with respect to Jewishness than the older religious. On the other hand, paradoxically, the older non-religious also appear as more sensitive to the development of antisemitism. 130 chapter 8

When comparing now the younger and the older religious, the following appears:

(1) Differences are minimal in this respect. Quite in parallel with -A/-R and +A/-R, the older show somewhat less sensitiveness to the antisemitism reigning in Belgium, its practical expressions, and related worries. (2) The older religious are also slightly less sensitive than the younger religious to the influence Israeli events may have for them.

Though these differences appeared as statistically significant, they seem of limited impact, in comparison to the convergence of the younger non-religious and religious.

Table 8.6 Correlations age/religiosity—antisemitism and Jewishness

-A/–R –A/+R +A/–R +A/+R

1. A prohibition of circumcision— 1.56 1.23 2.05 1.39 –A/–R see it less as How big a problem for you? problem 2. A prohibition of traditional 2.44 1.98 2.72 2.18 –A/–R and +A/–R see slaughter—How big a problem? it less as problem 3. Feeling part of the Jewish 1.74 1.19 1.83 1.14 –A/–R and +A/–R see People—importance? it less important 3. Supporting Israel—importance? 2.13 1.65 1.98 1.36 –A/–R and +A/–R see it less as important 4. Jewish culture (such as Jewish 1.68 1.67 1.81 1.42 +A/–R see it less music, literature and art)— important importance? 5. have never been to Israel— .20 .07 .23 .02 –A/–R and +A/–R less Been to/Visited Israel? visited Israel 6. Do you have relatives living in 3.17 2.80 3.31 2.85 –A/–R and +A/–R Israel? have less relatives in Israel religiosity and antisemitism 131

In Conclusion

As it could be expected beforehand, the data show that religiosity correlates with stronger commitment to and identification with the Jewish identity. However, and less in accordance with expectations, there seems to be a shift in tendencies when it comes to the younger non-religious who appear to be closer to the religious than the older non-religious. This might be an outcome of the fact that many of these younger respondents attended Jewish schools that did not exist some decades ago. But in any case, the data invalidate the hypothesis that removal from religion brings about over generations, a growing distancing from Jewishness. Instead, the data support the assumption that Jewishness can be retained on an ethnocultural basis and that younger people may even illustrate a kind of “comeback” to Jewishness—whether under the influence of Jewish education, pressures stemming from antisemitism or else. Moreover, the data also show that even among the older non-religious there is no less sensitivity than among others to the phenomenon of antisemitism. On several issues, it even seems that this category of respondents is even more sensitive than the religious. Phrased the other way round, stronger feelings of Jewishness attached to religiosity do not yet signify stronger sensitivity to the Jewish plight when confronting antisemitism. Jews’ sensitivity to antisemitism, it appears, does not depend on how they relate to Jewishness or religiosity. All in all, beyond the differences in age and types of attitudes toward religion, Belgian Jews do converge in many respects with American Jews as portrayed by the 2013 Pew Research (2013). They, too, overwhelmingly say they are proud to be Jewish and have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people, while many of them, like in the US, describe themselves as having no religion. Most say it is not necessary to believe in God to be Jewish but still participate in Passover meals and many of them even fast on Yom Kippur. Despite the diversity in attitudes toward religion, Belgian Jews like their American coun- terparts have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people and emotional attachment to Israel.

PART C The Challenge

∵

chapter 9 Belgian Jewry Compared

Summarizing the Data

This chapter summarizes the major findings presented in the all-above. This summary yields a general overview of the case of Belgian Jewry’s position vis-à-vis antisemitism today, on the basis of its self-perception as a Jewish population. In the following, this general picture is set in perspective with the data referring to European Jewry as a whole, as represented by the set of samples included in the FRA survey. In that part of the chapter, the aim is to learn how far Belgian Jewry conforms to the norms and conditions prevailing in other European Jewish communities and to what extent, and in what respects, Belgian Jews are “different.” Finally, the chapter is concluded with a few assessments of “what new did we learn” from this research. It is first to remind that the ultra-orthodox (Haredi) community which is a substantial component of Antwerp’s Jewry has shown reluctance to participate in the research. This attitude is quite usual with this population, which strongly objects to any investigation trying to “delve into its affairs.” Hence, as mentioned, the Belgian sample should be seen as representative only of the non-ultra-orthodox Jewish population of the country, i.e. roughly about 85% of this population. One more factor of unbalanced representation in the sample is the fact that more males than females responded to the questionnaire. This is probably due to the more frequent access to computer activity by men. On the other hand, it seems that the quite normal distribution of age categories, the large majority of people living in couples, and the high number of people who received some form of higher education reflect quite faithfully the population investigated. The same applies to the fact that about two-thirds of the sample consisted of salaried employees or self-employed individuals. It was shown that this Jewry is attached to Jewishness and tends to observe some Jewish traditions, even though one finds here many people who do not see their Jewishness commanding religiosity while a significant minority is affiliated with a non-orthodox synagogue. Yet, despite this unascertained status of religion among the Belgian Jews, these respondents tend to react virulently to any attempt by official bodies to question the custom of circumcision (Fig. 9.1). As emphasized earlier, the Jewishness of this Jewry is strongly anchored in the memory of the Shoa, a

Prohibition of circumcision Prohibition of traditional slaughter A very big A fairly big Not a very Not a problem problem big problem problem at all Figure 9.1 Ban of circumcision and trad. slaughter would represent a problem (%)

. . . . . . . Religiosity score

. . . Strength of Jewish identity score . .

Mixed Traditional Just Jewish None of these Orthodox/Haredi Reform/Progressive

Figure 9.2 Religiosity and strength of Jewish identity feeling of belonging to the Jewish People, a drive to combat antisemitism, a desire to transfer Jewish values and customs to the young through education and, last but not least, a feeling of closeness to Israel as a Jewish State. A majority has, indeed, visited Israel and has relatives and friends there. As shown by belgian jewry compared 137

Figure 9.2, religiosity is by no means the only predicator of commitment to the Jewish identity: as far as Belgian Jewry is concerned, religion is one dimension of Jewishness that does not exclude others. At the same time, this population shares a quite clear allegiance to the Belgian Nation, though with more hesitancy than to the Jewish People. Besides this, there is also a strong awareness of major national problems that are shaking the country’s stability: many deplore high rates of unemployment in Belgium and the threatening economic crisis, the soaring crime rates, the expansion of racism, the spread of religious intolerance, and the social difficulties entailed by the influx of immigration. Respondents also express clear perceptions of the presence of antisemitism in the country. Antisemitism is, indeed, a very serious problem for a large majority who feel that it has become worse over the recent years. It is increasingly present on the internet, through street graffiti, acts of vandalism in cemeteries, hostile gestures in public places, insults to Jewish passersby—not excluding some political speeches or media broadcasts. About a quarter of the respondents indicated that they have been recently victims of antisemitic acts, though they willingly ignored the possibility of reporting the incidents to the police or other public institutions—Jewish or not-Jewish. People, it appears, do not believe in the efficiency of these bureau- cracies: such reporting, they say, is useless. Yet respondents are worried that they or their relatives could be victims of verbal or physical acts of antisemitism.

The Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own... Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians Jews have too much power in Belgium (economy,... Does not consider Jews living in Belgium to be Belgians Jews are not capable of integrating Belgian society Supports boycotts of Israeli goods/products Thinks that Jews have recognisable features The interests of Jews in Belgium are very diferent... Would not marry a Jew Jews are only a religious group and not a nation Always notes who is a Jew among his or her acquaintances Criticises Israel Figure 9.3 Is anti-Semite the one who says 138 chapter 9

Moreover, a large majority contend that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict impacts on their safety: many non-Jews tend to blame non-Israeli Jews for sharing the responsibility of assumedly reprehensive Israeli acts. They are shocked to hear Israel compared to Nazis and they may feel the same when they are told that Jews use the Shoa memory for their needs. Many respondents complain that Jews are thought of as “powerful,” responsible for the economic crisis and that, on the top of all, they are not a nation but just a religious congregation. In particular, they also resent being accused of incapacity to integrate Belgian society. Belgian Jews accuse Muslim extremists for a good part of the antisemitic acts taking place in the country recently. Sensitive as they are to expressions of antisemitism, respondents also define as antisemites, non-Jews who refuse to marry a Jew or who contend that Jews are recognizable by external traits. In addition, it goes without saying that in their eyes anyone who supports boycotting Israel is definitely an antisemite. Figure 9.3 shows which statement respondents consider to be more deroga- torily antisemitic than others. It appears that the subjects are primarily sensitive to infringing the memory of the Holocaust. Next come the denigration of Jews as assumedly responsible for social ills, or of Israel for its supposed Nazi- like behavior vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Figure 9.3 presents a variety of assessments that all hurt the sensitivity of Jews but do not cause the same painful wounds. Unrelated to their inner divisions, respondents exhibit a wide consensus on most topics except for some variables which account for significant differences. Age does not create polarization but as far as differences appear, they indicate a greater sensitivity of the younger vis-à-vis antisemitism. Education plays a role, though relatively limited: the less educated are slightly less sensitive to antisemitic manifestations and less worried about becoming a victim of antisemite aggression. The more educated are more ready to consider emigration though they are also more aware of the anti-discrimination laws existing in Belgium and the activity of support organizations. On the other hand, more education also relates to less sensitivity to the antisemitic significance of boycotting Israel (Fig. 9.4). Gender is not a crucial variable either. To the extent that some differences appear, women as a whole are more pessimistic in their opinion about the general situation in Belgium, more aware of the increase of antisemitism in the country in recent years, but at the same time, less critical of institutional discriminatory practices. belgian jewry compared 139

Aged ‒ years Aged ‒ years Aged + years Antisemitism in Antisemitic Experience of Considered Belgium harassment in discrimination on emigrating or increased in the the past the basis of emigrated in the past years months religion/belief or past years ethnicity in the past months Figure 9.4 Perceptions and experience of antisemitism, according to age (%)

Marital status also relates to very few differences between the categories. Single subjects resent slightly more the gravity of unemployment, are less sensitive to expressions of antisemitism but are also more worried about becoming victims of insults and discrimination. On the other hand, they are relatively less sensitive to prohibition of circumcision. The geolinguistic differentiation is somehow more significant. In Brussels, Jews are more critical of the country’s situation and also emphasize more the reality of antisemitism though they are also more aware of the existence of support organizations. In Antwerp, Jews are more prompt to designate immigration as a major Belgian problem and also to report more verbal expressions of antisemitism with respect to Israel. They may also feel discriminated by institutions on religious background. All in all, few major variables create deep differences among respondents, and this also true for the differentiation between Jews by birth or by conversion, or between Jews born to homogeneous Jewish families or mixed parenthood. The same holds for the divide between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, and according to the distinction between those living in Jewish areas and those living elsewhere. Things, however, are a bit different when it comes to religiosity, the most significant factor of intra-Jewish differences among all criteria considered. All categories of respondents according to religiosity, except “others,” depict Belgium’s situation pessimistically—emphasizing especially the issue of unemployment. 140 chapter 9

Moreover, Orthodox, liberals and traditionals resent—more than do “just Jewish” and “others”—the antisemitic expressions overheard in the media and political life. The Orthodox, it is true, are less sensitive to vandalism and the traditional more sensitive to the desecration of cemeteries but, at the same time, the Orthodox and traditional are more worried than others to be—they themselves or their relatives—victims of antisemite violence.

Table 9.1 Overview: Identity and perceptions of Belgium and antisemitism*

age Gen rel geoling J-area eda J-bo moth fath

Jewish identity Feel part J Peop FnJb– Supporting Isr T/O/L++ Jewish culture As+ Jewish Identification L/T/O+ As+ MnJb– FnJb– Been to Israel JA– As+ MnJb– FnJb– Relatives in Israel O/T+ A+ JA– As+ Jc- MnJb– FnJb–

Perception of Belgian general situation Crime levels B+ JA+ Unemployment –Y pess T– B+ Racism Crisis of Economy –Y pess B+ Health Services fe+ B+ Relig intolerance + Y pess Immigration A+ Government corrupt. fe+ JA+ Racism increased + Y pess FnJb–

Antisemitism (AS) in Belgium AS graffiti B+ Desecrat. cemet T+ B+ Vandalism O– B+ public hostility + Y AS in media J– AS in political life J– AS on the internet AS graffiti increase fe+ (Continued) belgian jewry compared 141

Table 9.1 (Continued)

age Gen rel geoling J-area eda J-bo moth fath

Desecr cemet incr fe+ Vandalism incr fe+ B+ AS in political AS in internet JA+

*Abbreviations: – or +: for “emphasize more” or “less” As: Ashkenazi the criterion “education”: was taken out here NA: not Ashkenazi Y: less than 45 years of age Jb: Jewish born; fe+: women more than men Jc: converted T=traditional; O=orthodox; J=just Jewish MnJb: mother non-Jewish born; A: Antwerp; B: Brussels FnJb: father non-Jewish born JA: Jewish area AS: antisemitism/antisemitic

Together with the liberals, the Orthodox also feel more acutely that support for boycotting Israel is antisemitism. They also report more strongly that they are blamed for Israel’s assumed reprehensive actions and hear more frequently than others antisemite stereotypes addressed to Jews. Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 show clearly that not every variable is of equal impact. Differences in religiosity carry the largest number of significant correlations with given aspects of Jews’ perceptions and reactions to antisemitism. Age differences (see Figure 9.3) come in second and, in interaction with religiosity, also elicit some additional significant differentiations. Geolinguistic differences also play a role, though of lesser impact; gender and other variables are of still weaker significance.

Table 9.2 Overview of correlations: Experiences of antisemitism*

age Gen edu Rel geoling J-area eda J-bo Mothebo Fath

Experience of antisemitism and worry witnessed Y+ 1– worried be victim J/R– worried attack NA+ worried for family Y+ T/O+ worried attack fam T/O+ NA+ Is-Ar conflict impact (Continued) 142 chapter 9

Table 9.2 (Continued)

age Gen edu Rel geoling J-area eda J-bo Mothebo Fath blamed for Israel Y+ L/T/O++ gov Js respons crisis Y+ 2+ Js too powerful L/T/O+ NA+ exploit Holoc Jc+ Holoc = myth JA+ Isr “like Nazis” Y+ JA+ MnJb+ Js only a relig gr JA+ NA+ FnJb+ J can't integrate O/L/T++ A+ exploit Holo:AS Jc+ J rel: AS A+ can't integ: AS B+ J interest diff-AS Y– J+ B+ As+ notes who J—AS Y– Criticizes Israel— Y– FnJb+++ AS consider a non- Jewish person to be antisemitic if said? J not national—AS B+ not marry Jew–AS 2– O– B+ Jc+ MnJb+ FnJb+ J recognizable-AS O– B+ Supp boyc Is-AS Y+ 3– J– A+ As+ worry insult child 3+ L+ JA+ MnJb+ Physical attack ch

Impacts of AS on behavior avoid visiting J event Y+ R+ certain places fe+ O+ 5y considered emigr Y+ 3+ O/T+ 5y moved other area 1– JA– MnJb+ offens messag 5y As+ MnJb– FnJb+ threats Y+ threatening experi Y+ (Continued) belgian jewry compared 143

Table 9.2 (Continued)

age Gen edu Rel geoling J-area eda J-bo Mothebo Fath offens comments Y+ 1– O+ As+ Jc– MnJb– FnJb+ offens on the net Y+ fe+ FnJb+ 5y was attacked Y+

*Abbreviations: see Table 9.1. Education: 1=incomplete secondary education; 2=secondary education; 3=higher education

All in all, we learn from Table 9.1 that Jewish identification is stronger among the orthodox and the traditional and also, from a different angle, among Ashkenazim, the Jewish-born and the offspring of homogeneous Jewish families. Moreover, perceptions of the country’s general condition and of antisemitism are clearly more pessimistic among French-speakers and their younger cohorts. Table 9.2, that focuses on the experience of antisemitism and its impacts, shows that:

– French-speakers are more sensitive than Flemish-speakers – the younger, compared with the older, are both more sensitive to antisemitism and more worried about it – gender is of less significance – education is not very impactful either, and not too systematic – Religiosity, on the other hand, interacts significantly with many variables – Living in a Jewish neighborhood, eda, and origins of Jewishness have little impact

As for Table 9.3, which focuses on awareness of rights and feelings of discrimination, it appears that this awareness and these feelings are stronger among respondents with higher education, and that discrimination itself is primarily reported by the Flemish speakers and the Orthodox—the latter, of course being the most “visible” Jews. In conclusion, no direct relations connect views of antisemitism and feelings of discrimination. This finding signifies that one cannot speak of Belgium as an antisemitic country but only as a country where antisemitism does widely exist in society and given milieus. This adds up to a second finding of general 144 chapter 9

Table 9.3 Awareness of rights and feelings of discrimination

age gen edu rel geolin J-area eda J-bo Moth Fath

Awareness of rights aware law job dis 3+ law anti-disc gen 3+ know support autho 3+ O– B+ law ag denying hol Y+ 1–

Feelings of being discriminated Felt discri 12 m Y+ fe+ B+ FnJb+ rel discri 12 m Y+ O+ A+ Jc+ FnJb+ police discrim as J fe– O+ A+ agent or landlord fe– O+ A+ heard circ/slaug Jc+ prohib circ probl Y– O/T+ trad slaughter O/T+

*Abbreviations: see Tables 9.1 and 9.2

significance: feelings of discrimination are directly linked to Jewish identification, not to perceptions of the presence of antisemitism. Only Orthodox show both strong Jewish identification and strong feelings of discrimination. However, the data also unequivocally confirm that other categories like the traditional or the Ashkenazim—in other words, the wide majority of the Jewish community—do suffer from antisemitism. The question that now stands out is: Is this Jewish condition unique among European Jewries or does it reflect a more general all-European reality?

Belgian Jewry among Europe’s Jewries

Setting the Belgian data in the context of those describing the other Western- European Jewries investigated by the FRA survey, is of great interest at this point, as it may contribute to an overall description of the present-day condition of Europe’s Jewry in general. This kind of comparison also indirectly reveals how far one can speak of common features of European Jewries as belgian jewry compared 145 a whole. The countries that participated, besides Belgium, were France, the UK, Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Sweden (several other countries with small Jewish communities were also considered but did not yield representative samples). As shown in Figure 9.4, it appears that the variance between the different Jewries, including the Belgian case, is relatively limited on any issue. This variance between cases runs, in heuristic terms, from “a bit more” to “a little less” with respect to the average norm referring to the sample as one whole. The “a lot more” or “a lot less” assessments are quite absent. In this vein, it is worth underscoring that Belgian Jews, when compared to the general European average, appear to be a little less religious and, at the same time, a little less attached to the local national identity. On several other issues, they rather align themselves on the Jewish-European average norm: Jewish identity and identification, the sense of societal integration, sensitivity to antisemitism, or rejection as antisemitic of too vehement anti-Israel attitudes. However, in other and more numerous respects, Belgian Jews demonstrate stronger assertive attitudes than European Jews as a whole: they visit Israel more often; they see the antisemitism prevalent in their country with more gravity; they report a stronger influence of the Israel-Palestine conflict on their condition as Jews and their sense of personal security. Furthermore, they have more often considered emigrating from their country of residence and accuse more openly extremist Muslims of fomenting current antisemitic campaigns. Grosso modo, Belgian Jews, one can say, are “like others but a little more.” It may be asked, especially regarding the case of Belgian Jews, how do they man- age to evolve in this surrounding that is more than occasionally unfriendly to Jews? The answer to this query, we suggest, lies not only in the fact that one also finds among the non-Jews many individuals who resent the present-day antisemitism stemming from a variety of milieus. Another part of the answer is that despite the predicaments of current antisemitism which marginalize the status of Jewry on the public scene—here like elsewhere in Western or Central Europe—and aggravate its vulnerability, as far as this case is concerned at least—and it may well be the case of other European Jewries as well—this is also a community exhibiting exceptional dynamism and producing, so to speak, collective resources that build up inner power. These are resources that allow Belgium’s Jews, if not to check and eradicate the virus of antisemitism, at least to confront it and, above all, to “live with it.” This dynamism, as already mentioned, takes multiple forms and is con cretized in many structures: it includes dozens of synagogues, a large number of other community institutions, thriving clubs for adult members, a number 146 chapter 9 of youth movements and student organizations, a series of magazines, numerous newsletters published by associations, a radio station, a museum and several research centers attached to major Belgian universities. Above all, Belgian Jewry supports exceptional Jewish educational structures. table 9.4 Belgian Jews among Western European Jewries considered as one whole

A bit less Average A bit more

Religiosity V National-local identity V Jewish identity V Feeling of societal integration V Anti-Israelism is antisemitism V Characterization of antisemite speech V Official organs do show out as antisemite V Have visited Israel V Were recently threatened V Antisemites are mainly Muslim extremists V Gravity of antisemitism reigning in the society V Worsening of antisemitism in the past five years V Have changed or consider changing neighborhood V Have considered emigrating because of security V concerns Frequency of encountering antisemitic events in V past 5 years Impact on one’s life of the events of Israeli- V Palestinian conflict Feelings of being blamed for Israel’s assumed V “unbearable” acts

What We Learn

The all above has shown what the investigation has unveiled in the reality investigated. At this final stage of the work, however, one may also ask, and this is more important, what is now known and was not known before this investigation. In this respect, some elements of answer that possibly apply not only to the Belgian case, may be enounced: belgian jewry compared 147

1. Jewishness, it is has clearly appeared, may be vivid, highly identified with and dynamic—like in Belgium—even when many members of the community define themselves as non-religious. What is more, antisemitism that reigns in the surroundings, by no means necessarily weakens the dynamism of the community. Actually, this dynamism probably supports people in present-day adversity. 2. Converted Jews or Jews of mixed parenthood do not necessarily remove themselves from Jewishness and from Jewry. They may express weaker Jewish identity but not, ipso facto, weaker Jewish identification. 3. In this Belgian community—and probably not only here—, strong importance is given to the Memory of the Shoa—in addition to the respect of symbols inherited from the Jewish legacy. It may be said that this Memory has become a central element of today Jewishness. 4. The Belgian community is very much divided along congregational lines, sociological criteria and specifically Belgian divides (including language and region). Though, despite all these, it is evinced by the data that Belgian Jews, as a whole, remain marked by strong common features despite the psychological distance between Brussels’ prevalently secular and French-speaking Jewry and Antwerp’s prevalently religious and Flemish-speaking Jewry. 5. Belgian Jews identify with the Belgian collective identity despite the fact that this country is deeply divided between ethnolinguistic entities and that Jews belong to each of them. Yet, in spite of this identification with Belgium, Jewishness appears by no means as less important, to say the least, to respondents. 6. Religious respondents, of both younger and older age, share a higher commitment to Jewishness than the older non-religious but this is less true with respect to the younger non-religious. Among the latter, one observes a strengthening of Jewishness in comparison with the older non-religious. This phenomenon gainsays the hypothesis of a gradual decline of Jewishness among the non-religious over generations. 7. Israel plays a role in the rise of antisemitism in Belgium in the context of its belligerence with the Palestinians and the tensions that exist between it and its neighbours. This conflict fuels the animosity in Jewish-Muslim relations on Belgian soil, in echo of Middle-Eastern events. This situation, however, does not weaken Jews’ solidarity with Israel that constitutes an axis of Jewish identification—even though criticism of Israel as such is not necessarily tagged as illegitimate. 8. Regarding the confrontation itself with expressions of antisemitism in Belgium, one observes a discrepancy between the sharpness of the 148 chapter 9

perception of this plague and the threat it represents for Jews’ status, and, on the other hand, the lack of trust in the efficacy of Authorities’ capability to combat it. Hence, Jews finds themselves, and in Belgium seemingly like in other small-scale communities, in a genuinely vulnerable position. 9. The assets of Belgian Jews in this situation consist primarily in the fact that Belgium, as a state, is not a discriminatory antisemitic state. Secondly, the Jews belong to the socially mobile elements of the society and are able to eke out a comfortable way of life. Thirdly (which was not investigated but is known from other sources), the Jewish community appears as able to maintain an outstanding level of dynamism. chapter 10 Neo-Jewishness and Allosemitism

The essential points we can now make as concluding assessments can be summarized as follows. Belgian Jewry, and with it, to one degree or another, the different Jewries of Western Europe, reveal today a Jewishness that was quite unknown in previous decades. By this we mean a Jewry grouping people who share different formulations of Jewishness, among whom the non-religious constitutes one of the prevailing ones. This Jewry, for its most, is not faithful to many traditions and rites inherited from the Jewish legacy but it still widely keeps to some of its markers—at least under a secular version. Despite the heterogeneity of their manners to be Jewish, these people still define themselves as “Jews” and, for many of them, do participate, in some ways, in the Jewish community. A community that, in contrast to expectations of some observers decades ago, currently displays exceptional dynamism and a capacity to set up educational structures, cultural institutions, political frameworks, media, museums, and many other concrete expressions of Jewishness. This Jewish population sees as imperative to nurture the memory of the Shoa and provides Jewish education and knowledge to the young. That these efforts are not vain is shown by the data that we uncovered. To be sure, no few individuals choose to stand outside the community and to downplay their Jewish background. Though, such people were not reached by the survey and for these who were reached, it has appeared that they represent a Jewry strongly attached not only to Jewishness but also to Israel—independently of their eventual critiques of the latter’s policies. That this kind of syndrome is not unique to Belgian Jews is shown by the all-European FRA survey and, to some extent, as confirmed by the recent Pew research in the US, by many American Jews. We might call this syndrome, following the present-day mode of terming new phenomena, “neo-Jewishness.” This notion—that implies, among other aspects, a wide liberty of selection of Jewish markers which do not prevent all-Jewish solidarity, and includes attachment to secular new values—especially the Memory of the Shoa and identification with Israel. This syndrome, like any form of Jewishness, requires sacrifices, however. We have seen in Belgium that it exposes Jews to harassment, attacks, even physical violence by antisemites who are today articulating on the public scene, a hatred of Jews, it too, under new forms—“neo- antisemitism” or “neo-judeophobia”. This hatred has not deleted the well-known visions of the past propagated at the time by churches and exploited by

nationalist and fascist demagogy. That antisemitism has by no means disappeared and as the world grows more and more removed from World War II and the shame and horrors of the Holocaust, it is being expressed more and more openly and frequently. Yet, in addition to this “classic” hatred of Jews, other powerful factors of antisemitism have sprung up with new carriers granting new meanings to the rejection of Jews. At this point, it is to recall the analysis of Taguieff (2008) who points out to the new anti-Jewish wave growing from the media, political circles and assessments of intellectuals. In the background, there is the Arab-Muslim demonization of Israel that gets the floor on all possible international scene, articulated by a multiplicity of “specialized” organizations. The public weight of these forces hostile to Israel impact unavoidably on the public opinion, political parties and elites that lean, anyway, in the direction of the huge interests of the West in the Muslim part of the globe, incomparable to anything that Israel might offer in return for political backing or moral support. What still sharpens the gravity of this reality for Jews and Israel is the demographic transformation, stemming from immigration, taking place in European countries. A large portion of this immigration originates from the Muslim world, and especially the Arab-Muslim countries. This new public identifies with the Palestinian cause by solidaristic reflex on the basis of religion and ethnicity and most often voices with power its unfriendly attitudes toward both Israel and local Jewish communities that are amalgamated with the Jewish state. It is under these anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish banners that Islam is gaining a new status in Europe: in many countries—and Belgium at their head—it is now the second national religion. In more than one European state, Jews are encouraged—more or less tacitly—to avoid emphasizing their Jewishness in public. On the Belgian scene, we have seen, this new population possesses an electoral weight overtaking by far that of the Jews (there are about 40,000 Jews in Belgium, but around 500,000 Muslims). Moreover, it is also to observe that large segments of Europe’s Muslim population—and this is the case of Belgium’s—experience precarious socioeconomic conditions while the Jews appear in the eyes of many a recent immigrant from Morocco or Algeria as a well-to-do community. This fact encourages extremists to channel immigrants’ discontent under the banner of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli slogans. The more so the case, that Jews remain a distinct part of the “prosperous” that, because of its relative social distinctiveness, can be attacked without entailing an overall class clash between the “rich” and the “poor”. These are the ideal conditions for making the Jew a perfect scapegoat: it is a community associated with Israel, the worst of all enemies; it is Neo-jewishness And Allosemitism 151 perceived, from the low-class quarters, as an affluent—and thus exploitative— population and thus representing a “class enemy;” above all, it is not an organic part of the strongest strata of the society but rather a distinct minority among them, and thus, a convenient vulnerable target for attacks from “below”. As a matter of fact, this is not the first time that Jews serve as scapegoat. In its original meaning, a scapegoat is a person or group of persons who “pay” for what others have done. As such, the phenomenon gives free expression to feelings of frustration by displacement toward individuals who are sufficiently weak to be hurt without too much risk for the attackers but who, by some aspects of their social position, are capable of symbolizing the source of frustration itself. It has been shown in the literature that Jews could serve in many cases as scapegoats because of their position as minority groups, and who due to their economic status or because of myths circulating about them might constitute such “displaced objectives” (Erner 2005; Girard 1982; Prigent 2003). In other words, Jews today find themselves again in a condition that they have known, under one form or another, in many other circumstances. Yet, the new contours of the present-day Jewish condition still justifies speaking now of neo-antisemitism or neo-Judeophobia. In the atmosphere that prevails today vis-à-vis Judaism and Israel in given milieus, one may expect here and there violent incidents to erupt that are of more serious significance than just street insults. We think here of genuine terror attacks by extremists of various brands against Jewish figures and institutions—as has indeed happened in recent years. All in all, recent developments in Europe cannot but throw doubt on the future of Jewish life there. A part of a positive answer to this question is the very fact that after all, Belgian Jews, like in most European Jews, still enjoy quite comfortable life-conditions. They do not encounter state-sponsored antisemitism or visible discriminatory practices on their career paths. Moreover, while antisemitism has become a matter of daily expressions, Jewish life itself is more vibrant than ever and is enjoying a renaissance. The survey, however, also shows that many Jews are quite pessimistic about the future of Jewry in their country. Quite a few say that if they were younger, they would leave. Some fear rejection from the public sphere. Some also apprehend the new opposition to religious practices stemming from ruling circles in reaction to the spread of Islam which assumedly jeopardizes some of the essentials of Western laïcité (or secularism). In the following of the symbolic ban by schools of Muslim women’s hijab, Jewish boys are also to stop wearing a kippah (skullcap). Several European countries are now discussing a ban of circumcision and ritual slaughter by both Jews (kashrut) and Muslims (halal). For Jews, such measures would irremediably cause a degradation of Judaism’s status. 152 chapter 10

Above all and as also emphasized by Taguieff (2008), neo-antisemitism is firmly linked these days to an anti-Israelism which, as he states it, has become a genuine civic religion. In this atmosphere, even good intentions may receive a biased significance and cause misunderstandings raising interrogations. One remembers, here, a French Prime Minister who condemned an attack against a synagogue in Paris and distinguished between “Jewish victims” and “innocent victims.” Another example was produced by a Belgian Prime Minister when he spoke of the Jews in Belgium as “good friends of the Belgian Nation,” implicitly excluding Jews from the notion of “Belgian Nation.” These awkward utterances may be of no significance but they add up to numberless descriptions and examples of antisemitism that, as for them, are by no means “invol- untary”. It is true that a Jew can go on the street safely in Brussels or Antwerp, but it is not less true that he will probably feel safer if he refrains from putting a kippah on the top of his head. Though, the findings of this research which concerns Jews’ perceptions of, and reactions to, that antisemitism invalidate most of the hypotheses proposed in these respects and reminded in the conclusion of Chapter 2. It appears that respondents by no means manifest tendencies to self-hatred and to any kind of agreement with antisemites’ blaming Jews. Moreover, the “dimming- Jewishness-in-public” approach is infirmed by the firm commitment to Jewishness and unambiguous feelings of solidarity vis-à-vis Israel of many respondents. No tendency appears that would indicate an assumed tendency among Jews to get “invisible” as Jews, let alone to go over from Jewishness— even when bluntly laïque—to another faith. In the same vein, one hardly detects among respondents velleities to set forward humanitarian or political ideals in place of commitments to Jewishness. Even if some respondents do share such convictions, this by no means receives an expression in self-removal from Jewishness. From here, one comes back to Zygmunt Bauman’s notion of allosemitism. Bauman, it is to recall, follows here the historian Artur Sandauer who uses this concept to describe the Jewish Diasporic experience. According to Sandauer, Jews have always been the subject of a special relation that could not compare to the prevailing attitude in society towards any other case of minority groups. While allosemitism is sometimes marked by excessive sympathy and admira- tion, in most cases—and every time for other causes and circumstances—it justifies the Jews’ marginalization and discrimination—nay even persecution. The Jew, in this perspective, is the “other” par excellence, a benchmark that most of the time embodies the very principle of social rejection. Neo-jewishness And Allosemitism 153

Bauman thinks that this notion is the thread that runs along Jews’ world history and evinces that this population has always been seen by non-Jews as per- sonifying attributes that are their own only. This notion, however, it is also Bauman’s conviction, loses its relevance in the new current postmodern reality. As is well-known, Bauman is the great thinker of the postmodern condition of the present time. He describes this era as one where all particularistic collective identities have become legitimate and require full recognition and legitimization. As a result, an essential trait of this era is the hubbub of claims that are raised and articulated simultaneously—but not necessarily with the same exigencies—by the greatest variety of groups that now compose the social setting. In such chaotic or quasi-chaotic surroundings, the public display of particularisms has become the rule and the ambitions proper to any population are literally drowned in the din of claims. This means, as for Jews, that their claims contrast with those overheard all around in the very same manner that the claims of each other group do vis-à-vis all others’. Hence, in the final analysis, where to be special applies to anybody, Jews as such do not contrast anymore, neither vis-à-vis their environment as a whole, nor vis-à-vis other actors. Finally, they are able to find the same relative peace—or relative lack of peace—as others do. Our research, however, does not confirm this quite optimistic conclusion. What has appeared is that those new groups which have given form to Belgium’s new multiculturalism by no means represent a part of the solution to the longstanding issue of the hatred of Jews in the society: some of these groups—and the most important ones—rather contribute to the aggravation of this hatred. It seems that multiculturalism in Belgium as well as in France and the UK, comprehends entities that carry with them and bring to their new societies, incitements of their own to fuel the hatred of Jews. By their demographic and cultural substratum, they rather contribute to create a configuration where anti-Jewish forces gain in power. Together with the international, political and pragmatic circumstances outlined earlier, they inflame a revival of allosemitism, setting thereby new practicalities for Jewish history to continue. Allosemitism, however, can also be viewed from a different angle and receive a new interpretation that warrants its pertinence in the context of our data. It can, indeed, be viewed, not as—or not only as—a tool for deciphering historical circumstances, but also, and rather, as a prism of interpretation by Jews of events occurring to them as victims of non-Jews. This perspective fits the cases of Sandauer and Bauman, who are both Jewish thinkers who focus on and interpret the plight of Jews. In concrete terms, this model of interpretation by Jews sees the look of non-Jews on them as unique and reserved to them only. 154 chapter 10

A look which Jews understand as different, in essence, from any look of non- Jews at other minorities. Under this light, allosemitism becomes a relevant hypothesis for investigat- ing the Jews’ response to antisemitism. This hypothesis asks whether Jews see that antisemitism as endemic to their history among the peoples of the earth, causing them as such to stand out perpetually in confrontation with their surroundings. The negation of this hypothesis would mean that Jews see antisemitism as manifestations of specific occasional circumstances. Our data definitely support this subjective definition of the allosemitism hypothesis. It was shown that Jews see themselves victims of antisemites who merge their allegiance to Judaism with their leaning to Israel. On the other hand, the respondents reveal in their answers to the FRA questionnaire no hint of racism vis-à-vis the non-Jew—whoever the non-Jew is. This is even more the case that, as coming up in respondents’ answers, Belgian Jews feel hurt by the frequent disparaging attitudes toward them of politicians, the media and the internet, while they themselves feel unquestionably belonging to the Belgian nation. On top of all these, Jews are in Belgium a tiny group and they can hardly explain why so few—normative—people are the cause of the anger in so many other people. Hence, all in all, even without being aware of the concept itself, the assumption of subjective allosemitism appears appropriate to describe how Jews perceive, confront and react to, their present-day plight as Belgian Jews. Ultimately, however, it is to note that the answers to the survey by no means exclude that, in the mind of respondents, specific circumstances and temporary pragmatic contingencies could well equally stir up or appease the hatred of Jews, and thus, the pertinence of what we called subjective allosemitism.

As Rabbi Akiva said, Hakol tsafuj ve-hareshut netuna, that is, “everything is determined and everything is allowed.” A Personal Afterword

This work is carried out at the intention not only of bona fide academics and students interested in antisemitism. It is also hoped by the author that it may be of some interest to people curious of the ways Jews perceive present-day antisemitism. The case of Belgium, indeed, carries no few general lessons for contemporary Jewry in general. For me, the author, however, this work is also a kind of closing a circle. I was born in Belgium in 1938 from Polish Jewish immigrants. When World War II broke out and the country was occupied by the Nazis, my parents urged up to hide me with a non-Jewish family in s small town of Southern Belgium, just a couple of days before they themselves were captured by the Gestapo. They were brought to Malines, the transit deportation camp in Belgium and after a few months they were embarked in one of these sinister trains of deportees to the East. Though, when still on the territory of Belgium, they suc- ceeded to jump out from the train and were among the very few of this convoy who survived. The war over and the family re-united, it was the fate of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine/Israel that was our daily worry. I engaged at the age of 14 in a pioneer youth movement and emigrated to a borderline kibbutz in Israel immediately after high school, aspiring to find there, once for all, the “solution” to the “Jewish problem”—another word for allosemitism. Though, to be a sovereign nation soon appeared to be an extraordinary challenge for Jews, implying numberless obstacles, some of which could and can be successfully overcome, and others were and are bound to disappointing failures. The severest difficulty to accept is that this chain of uproars on the way of Israel to become a “nation like others” feedbacks on what Diaspora Jews now endure as Jews in many places in the contemporary context of societal transformations and that is by no means alien to allosemitism either. It is this convergence that pushed me to look back at this diaspora where I was born, persecuted, saved, and grew up, and where I forged my life commitments.

Appendix

1 The Questionnaire (excerpts)

Perceptions and Experiences of Antisemitism among Jews in selected EU Member States (excerpt) Do you consider yourself to be Jewish in any way—this could be on the grounds of your religion, culture, upbringing, ethnicity, parentage or any other basis? 1. Yes; 2. No

What age were you on your last birthday?

1 19 or less 2 20–29 3 30–39 4 40–49 5 50–59 6 60–69 7 70–79 8 80 and above

In your opinion, how big a problem, if at all, are each of the following in today? A. Crime levels (e.g. assault, theft) B. Unemployment C. Racism D. State of the economy E. Health services F. Antisemitism G. Religious intolerance H. Immigration I. Government corruption 1. A very big problem 2. A fairly big problem 3. Not a very big problem 4. Not a problem at all Don’t know

On the whole, do you think that over the past five years the following have increased, stayed the same or decreased in? A. Racism; B. Antisemitism 1. Increased a lot 2. Increased a little 3. Stayed the same 4. Decreased a little 5. Decreased a lot Don’t know

In your opinion, how big a problem, if at all, are each of the following in today? A. Antisemitic graffiti B. Desecration of Jewish cemeteries C. Vandalism of Jewish buildings or institutions D. Expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public places E. Antisemitism in the media F. Antisemitism in political life 1. A very big problem 2. A fairly big problem 3. Not a very big problem 4. Not a problem at all Don’t know

On the whole, do you think that over the past five years the following have increased, stayed the same or decreased? A. Antisemitic graffiti B. Desecration of Jewish cemeteries C. Vandalism of Jewish buildings or institutions D. Expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public places E. Antisemitism in the media F. Antisemitism in political life 1. Increased a lot 2. Increased a little 2. Stayed the same 3. Decreased a little 4. Decreased a lot Don’t know appendix 159

From what you have seen or heard, to what extent, if at all, are the following a problem in Belgium: A. Antisemitic reporting about Jews in the media Antisemitic reporting about Israel in the media B. Antisemitic comments about Jews in discussions people have (e.g. at the workplace, at school, or elsewhere Antisemitic comments about Israel in discussions people have (e.g. at the workplace, at school, or elsewhere C. Antisemitic comments about Jews on the Internet (including discussion forums, social networking sites) Antisemitic comments about Israel on the Internet (including discussion forums, social networking sites) D. Antisemitic comments about Jews in political speeches and discussions Antisemitic comments about Israel in political speeches and discussions 1. A very big problem 2. A fairly big problem 3. Not a very big problem 4. Not a problem at all Don’t know

In the LAST 12 MONTHS, have you personally experienced any of the following types of antisemitic incident? 1. Yes, I have been verbally insulted or harassed 2. Yes, I have been physically attacked 3. Yes, I have been both verbally insulted or harassed AND physically attacked 4. No, I have not been verbally insulted or harassed, or physically attacked Don’t know

In the LAST 12 MONTHS, have you personally witnessed any of the following types of antisemitic incident? 1. Yes, I have witnessed other Jew(s) being verbally insulted or harassed 2. Yes, I have witnessed other Jew(s) being physically attacked 3. Yes, I have witnessed other Jew(s) being both verbally insulted or harassed AND physically attacked 4. No, I have not witnessed other Jew(s) being verbally insulted or harassed, or physically attacked Don’t know 160 appendix

How worried, if at all, are you that you will be a victim of the following when you are in the street or in any other public place in in the next 12 months BECAUSE you are Jewish? A. Verbal insults or harassment B. Physical attack

1 Very worried 2 Fairly worried 3 Not very worried 4 Not at all worried

How likely, if at all, do you think it is that you will be a victim of the following when you are in the street or in any other public place in the next 12 months BECAUSE you are Jewish? A. Verbal insults or harassment B. Physical attack

1 Very likely 2 Fairly likely 3 Not very likely 4 Not at all likely

In the LAST 12 MONTHS, has a family member or a person close to you (such as your parent, children, your partner, other relative or close friend) been subjected to an antisemitic incident? 1. Yes, they have been verbally insulted or harassed 2. Yes, they have been physically attacked 3. Yes, they have been both verbally insulted or harassed AND physically attacked 4. No, they have not been verbally insulted or harassed, or physically attacked Don’t know

How worried, if at all, are you that a family member or a person close to you (such as your parent, children, your partner, other relative or close friend) will be a victim of the following when they are in the street or in any other public place in in the next 12 months BECAUSE they are Jewish? A. Verbal insults or harassment B. Physical attack appendix 161

1 Very worried 2 Fairly worried 3 Not very worried 4 Not at all worried

How likely, if at all, do you think it is that a family member or a person close to you (such as your parent, children, your partner, other relative or close friend) will be a victim of the following when they are in the street or in any other public place in the next 12 months BECAUSE they are Jewish? A. Verbal insults or harassment B. Physical attack

1 Very likely 2 Fairly likely 3 Not very likely 4 Not at all likely

To what extent, if at all, do the following impact on how SAFE you feel as a Jewish person? A. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict B. Events in the Middle East

1 great deal 2 fair amount 3 little 4 Not at all

How often, if at all, do you feel that people accuse or blame you for anything done by the Israeli government BECAUSE you are Jewish? 1. All the time 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Never

In the LAST 12 MONTHS, how often, if at all, have you personally heard or seen non- Jewish people in suggest that: A. Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis B. Jews have too much power in (economy, politics, media) 162 appendix

C. Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes D. The Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated E. Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians F. Jews are only a religious group and not a nation G. Jews are not capable of integrating into [COUNTRY—NATIONAL] society H. The interests of Jews in [COUNTRY] are very different from the interests of the rest of the population 1. All the time 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Never

In the LAST 12 MONTHS, WHERE did you hear or see these comments? Amongst the general public (e.g. in the street, on public transport) 1. In political speeches or discussions (e.g. in parliament, in a trade union) 2. At cultural events (e.g. the arts, theatre, film) 3. At political events (e.g. a demonstration) 4. At sports events 5. In academia (e.g. at university, at school) 6. On the Internet (e.g. blogs, social networking site) 7. In a social situation (e.g. amongst friends, colleagues) 8. Somewhere else (specify) 9. Don’t remember

In the LAST 12 MONTHS, from whom did you hear these comments? A person/people with a particular political position 1. A person/people with a particular religion/faith 2. Someone else (specify) 3. Don’t remember

In the LAST 12 MONTHS, how would you describe the political position of the person/s who made these comments? Please select as many as apply. 1. Extreme / far left 2. Left-wing 3. Centre 4. Right-wing 5. Extreme / far right Don’t know appendix 163

In the LAST 12 MONTHS, as far as you know, how would you describe the person/s who made these comments in terms of their religion or faith? Please select as many as apply. 1. People of no religion 2. Christian 3. Buddhist 4. Hindu 5. Jewish 6. Muslim 7. Sikh 8. Any other religion (write in) Don’t know

In your opinion, would you consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she says that: A. Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis B. Jews have too much power in (economy, politics, media) C. Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes D. The Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated E. Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians F. Jews are only a religious group and not a nation G. Jews are not capable of integrating into society H. The interests of Jews are very different from the interests of the rest of the population 1. Yes, definitely 2. Yes, probably 3. No, probably not 4. No, definitely not Don’t know

And in your opinion, would you consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she: A. Always notes who is Jewish among his/her acquaintances B. Criticises Israel C. Does not consider Jews living in to be D. Would not marry a Jew E. Thinks that Jews have recognisable features F. Supports boycotts of Israeli goods/products G. Calls for a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 164 appendix

1. Yes, definitely 2. Yes, probably 3. No, probably not 4. No, definitely not 5. Don’t know

Do you CURRENTLY have any children or grandchildren at kindergarten or school? 1. Yes, 1 child or grandchild at kindergarten or school 2. Yes, more than 1 child or grandchild at kindergarten or school 3. No

To the best of your knowledge, in the LAST 12 MONTHS, [has/have] your [child/grandchild, children/grandchildren] experienced any of the following at school or kindergarten, or on the way there BECAUSE they were perceived to be Jewish? 1. Yes, verbal insults or harassment 2. Yes, physical attack 3. Yes, both verbal insult or harassment AND physical attack 4. No, none of the above Don’t know

How worried, if at all, are you that your [child/grandchild, children/grandchildren] will become a victim of the following at school or kindergarten, or on the way there BECAUSE they are perceived to be Jewish? A. Verbal insults or harassment B. Physical attack

1 Very worried 2 Fairly worried 3 Not very worried 4 Not at all worried become a victim of the following at school, kindergarten, or on the way there in the next 12 months BECAUSE they are perceived to be Jewish? A. Verbal insults or harassment B. Physical attack

1 Very likely 2 Fairly likely 3 Not very likely 4 Not at all likely appendix 165

Have ANY of your children ever attended a JEWISH school or kindergarten? 1. Yes, currently attending 2. Yes, in the past 3. No, never 4. Not applicable, my children are too young to be in school or kindergarten 5. Not applicable, I have no children

Have you ever considered taking your children out of Jewish school or Jewish kindergarten BECAUSE you were worried about their safety as a Jew while there, or on their way there? 1. Yes, I have taken them out 2. Yes, I have considered taking them out but have not done so 3. No, I have never considered taking them out Prefer not to say

How often, if at all, do you avoid visiting Jewish events or sites BECAUSE you do not feel safe as a Jew there or on the way there? 1. All the time 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Never

How often, if at all, do you avoid certain places or locations in your local area or neighbourhood BECAUSE you don’t feel safe there as a Jew? 1. All the time 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Never

In the PAST FIVE YEARS, have you considered emigrating from BECAUSE you don’t feel safe living there as a Jew? 1. Yes, I did emigrate but have returned to [COUNTRY] 2. Yes, I have considered emigrating but I have not yet done this 3. No, I have not considered emigrating 4. Prefer not to say

In the PAST FIVE YEARS, have you moved or considered moving to another area or neighbourhood in BECAUSE you don’t feel safe living there as a Jew? 1. Yes, I have moved to another area or neighbourhood 2. Yes, I have considered moving to another area or neighbourhood but I have not yet done this 166 appendix

3. No, I have not considered moving to another area or neighbourhood Prefer not to say

In the PAST 5 YEARS in , how often, if at all, has somebody: A. Sent you emails, text messages (SMS), letters or cards that were offensive or threatening B. Made offensive, threatening or silent phone calls to you C. Loitered, waited for you or deliberately followed you in a threatening way D. Made offensive or threatening comments to you in person 1. Once 2. Twice 3. 3–5 times 4. 6–9 times 5. 10 or more times 6. Never Don’t know

In the PAST 12 MONTHS in, how often, if at all, has somebody: A. Sent you emails, text messages (SMS), letters or cards that were offensive or threatening B. Made offensive, threatening or silent phone calls to you C. Loitered, waited for you or deliberately followed you in a threatening way D. Made offensive or threatening comments to you in person 1. Once 2. Twice 3. 3–5 times 4. 6–9 times 5. 10 or more times 6. Never Don’t know

You said somebody has in the past 12 months. Did this happen, in your opinion, partly or completely BECAUSE you are Jewish? 1. Yes 2. No Don’t know appendix 167

You said somebody has . How many of these incidents in the past 12 months have happened, in your opinion, partly or completely BECAUSE you are Jewish? 1. 1 2. 2 3. 3–5 times 4. 6–9 times 5. 10 or more times 6. None of them Don’t know

WHO did this to you? Please select all that apply. 1. Family/household member 2. Neighbour 3. Colleague, boss or supervisor at work 4. Someone from school, college or university 5. A customer, client or patient 6. Someone with a right-wing political view 7. Someone with a left-wing political view 8. Teenager or group of teenagers 9. Doctor, healthcare worker 10. Police officer or border guard 11. Public official (e.g. a civil servant) 12. Private security guard 13. Someone with a Christian extremist view 14. Someone with a Muslim extremist view 15. Someone else (specify) Don’t know

Did you or anyone else report this incident to the police or to any other organisation? 1. Yes, to the police 2. Yes, to another organisation 3. Yes, to both the police AND another organisation 4. No, it was not reported Don’t know

Apart from the police, how would you describe the authority or organisation(s) to which you reported the incident? Please select as many as apply. 1. A Member of Parliament 2. A local government councillor 168 appendix

3. A Jewish authority figure (e.g. a rabbi, a leader in a Jewish organisation) 4. A Jewish organisation specialising in security and/or antisemitism 5. Another Jewish organisation 6. Someone in authority at your workplace, school or university 7. The media 8. Other organisation Don’t know

Why did you not report the incident to the police? Please select all that apply. 1. It was enough that I reported it to some other organisation 2. Fear of intimidation from perpetrators 3. I don’t trust the police 4. Nothing would happen or change by reporting the incident(s) 5. I was concerned I would not be believed or taken seriously 6. It was not worth reporting because it happens all the time 7. It would have been too bureaucratic, time-consuming 8. Somebody stopped me or discouraged me 9. I dealt with the problem myself or with help from family or friends 10. I was too emotionally upset to report it 11. I didn’t want anybody to know about the incident 12. Somebody else had reported it 13. The police found out about it on their own 14. Other reason(s) (specify) Don’t know

Following ALL the incidents from over the PAST 5 YEARS> that happened in your opinion partly or completely BECAUSE you are Jewish, have you done any of the following? A. Confronted the perpetrator(s) about what they were doing B. Moved to another area C. Changed your phone number/email address D. Stopped using your social networking (e.g. Facebook) account E. Talked about the incidents with friends or relatives F. Changed your workplace G. Changed your appearance, to look less Jewish H. Changed your name, to appear less Jewish I. Considered emigrating to another country 1. Yes 2. No Does not apply appendix 169

In the PAST FIVE YEARS, how often, if at all, has somebody deliberately damaged or vandalised your home, car, or other property for example with graffiti? 1. Once 2. Twice 3. 3 times 4. 4 times 5. 5 times 6. 6–9 times 7. 10 or more times 8. Never Don’t know

And did this incident happen, in your opinion, partly or completely BECAUSE you are Jewish? 1. Yes 2. No Don’t know

In the PAST 12 MONTHS, how often, if at all, has somebody deliberately damaged or vandalised your home or your car, for example with graffiti? 1. Once 2. Twice 3. 3 times 4. 4 times 5. 5 times 6. 6–9 times 7. 10 or more times 8. Never 9. Don’t remember

And did this incident happen, in your opinion, partly or completely BECAUSE you are Jewish? 1. Yes 2. No Don’t know

And how many of these incidents in the past 12 months have happened, in your opinion, partly or completely BECAUSE you are Jewish? 1. 1 2. 2 3. 3 170 appendix

4. 4 5. 5 6. 6–9 7. 10 or more 8. None of them Don’t know

In the PAST 5 YEARS, how often, if at all, has somebody physically attacked you—that is, hit or pushed you—or threatened you in a way that frightened you? This could have happened anywhere, such as at home, on the street, on public transport, at your workplace or anywhere else. 1. Once 2. Twice 3. 3 times 4. 4 times 5. 5 times 6. 6–9 times 7. 10 or more times 8. Never Don’t know

And did this incident happen, in your opinion, partly or completely BECAUSE you are Jewish? 1. Yes 2. No Don’t know

In the PAST 12 MONTHS, how often, if at all, has somebody physically attacked you— that is, hit or pushed you—or threatened you in a way that frightened you? This could have happened anywhere, such as at home, on the street, on public transport, at your workplace or anywhere else. 1. Once 2. Twice 3. 3 times 4. 4 times 5. 5 times 6. 6–9 times 7. 10 or more times 8. Never 9. Don’t remember appendix 171

And did this incident happen, in your opinion, partly or completely BECAUSE you are Jewish? 1. Yes 2. No Don’t know

And how many of these incidents in the last 12 months have happened, in your opinion, partly or completely BECAUSE you are Jewish? 1. 1 2. 2 3. 3 4. 4 5. 5 6. 6–9 7. 10 ore more 8. None of them Don’t know

From what you know or have heard, is there a law that forbids discrimination against Jewish people in the following situations: Yes No DK When applying for a job? 1 2 9 When entering a shop, restaurant, bar or (night)club? 1 2 9 When using healthcare services? 1 2 9 When renting or buying a flat or a house? 1 2 9

Do you know of any authority or organisation in that can offer support or advice to people who have been discriminated against—for whatever reason? 1. Yes 2. No

From what you know or have heard, is there a law in [A02:COUNTRY] against: Yes No DK Denying or trivialising the Holocaust? 1 2 9 Incitement to violence or hatred against Jews? 1 2 9 172 appendix

In the PAST 12 MONTHS have you personally felt discriminated against or harassed on the basis of any of the following grounds? Yes No DK F01a Ethnic background 1 2 9 F01b Gender 1 2 9 F01c Sexual orientation 1 2 9 F01d Age 1 2 9 F01e Religion or belief 1 2 9 F01f Disability 1 2 9 F01g For another reason (specify) 1 2 9

During the LAST 12 MONTHS, have you done any of the following in: Yes No Looked for a job? 1 2 Worked/been employed? 1 2 Looked for a house or apartment to rent or buy? 1 2 Used public or private healthcare services? 1 2 Attended school, university or other training, either yourself or one of your children (if applicable)? 1 2

During the LAST 12 MONTHS, have you personally felt discriminated against BECAUSE you are Jewish in any of the following situations: Yes No DK When looking for work? 1 2 9 At the work place, by people you work with? 1 2 9 When looking for a house or apartment to rent or buy? 1 2 9 By people working in public or private health services? 1 2 9 By people working in a school or in training? 1 2 9

Do you ever avoid wearing, carrying or displaying things that might help people recog- nise you as a Jew in public, for example wearing a kippa/skullcap, magen david/Star of David or specific clothing, or displaying a Mezuza?

1 All the time 2 Frequently 3 Occasionally 4 Never appendix 173

Thinking about the following organisations in [A02:COUNTRY], in your view, would they generally treat you worse than other people in the country, better than other people in the country, or the same as other people in the country BECAUSE you are Jewish? A. The police B. A private letting agent or landlord C. The court system D. A local doctor’s surgery 1. They would treat me worse than other people 2. They would treat me better than other people 3. They would treat me the same as other people Don’t know

In the LAST 12 MONTHS, have you personally heard or seen non-Jewish people suggest that circumcision and traditional slaughter (shechita), should NOT be allowed to take place in? 1. Yes, about circumcision (brit mila) 2. Yes, about traditional slaughter (shechita) 3. Yes, about both circumcision (brit mila) AND traditional slaughter (shechita) 5. No, I have not heard or seen any such suggestions

How big a problem, if at all, would the following be for you as a Jew? A prohibition of circumcision (brit mila) A. A prohibition of traditional slaughter (shechita) 1. A very big problem 2. A fairly big problem 3. Not a very big problem 4. Not a problem at all Don’t know

Which of the following Jewish practices, if any, do you personally observe? 1. Attend Passover Seder most or all years 2. Do not switch on lights on the Sabbath 3. Attend synagogue weekly or more often 4. Eat only kosher meat at home 5. Light candles most Friday nights 6. Fast on Yom Kippur, most or all years 7. None of these 174 appendix

Of which synagogue body, if any, are you currently a member? Please select all that apply

1 Do not belong to a synagogue 2 Masorti Synagogue 3 Liberal Judaism 4 Orthodox Synagogue 5 Reform Judaism 6 Other

Which of the following comes closest to describing your current Jewish identity? 1. Just Jewish 2. Reform/Progressive 3. Traditional 4. Orthodox (e.g. would not turn on a light on Sabbath) 5. Haredi (strictly-Orthodox) 6. Mixed—I am both Jewish and another religion 7. None of these

How important, if at all, are the following items to your sense of Jewish identity? A. Believing in God B. Feeling part of the Jewish People C. Sharing Jewish festivals with my family D. Strong moral and ethical behaviour E. Keeping kosher F. Supporting Israel G. Jewish culture (such as Jewish music, literature and art) H. Combating antisemitism I. Remembering the Holocaust J. Donating funds to charity K. Studying Jewish religious texts L. Observing at least some aspects of Shabbat (the Sabbath) 1. Very important 2. Fairly important 3. Fairly unimportant 4. Very unimportant Don’t Know appendix 175

Please position yourself on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 according to the strength of your Jewish identity, where 1means very low strength and 10 means very high strength. Very low strength Very high strength

1 10

Don’t know

Please tell us how strongly you feel you belong to Belgium. 1. Very strongly 2. Fairly strongly 3. Not very strongly 4. Not at all strongly Don’t know

Have you ever been to Israel? 1. I have never been to Israel 2. I have been to Israel as a visitor/on holidayI have lived in Israel for more than one year 3. I was born in Israel

Where were you and your parents born? Α. You Β. Your mother C. Your father Don’t know 1. 2. In another European Union Member State 3. Elsewhere in Europe 4. Israel 5. United States 6. Other country (specify) Don’t know

Where were you, your parents and your spouse/partner born? for each person A. You B. Your mother C. Your father D. Your spouse/partner 176 appendix

1. 2. In another European Union Member State 3. Elsewhere in Europe 4. Israel 5. United States 6. LIST OTHER COUNTRIES 7. Somewhere else (specify) Don’t know

Which of the following categories BEST describes you and your family? for each person A. You B. Mother C. Father 1. Jewish by birth 2. Jewish by conversion 3. Not Jewish Don’t know

Which of the following categories BEST describes you and your family? for each person A. You B. Mother C. Father D. Spouse/partner 1. Jewish by birth 2. Jewish by conversion 3. Not Jewish Don’t know

Which of the following categories BEST describes you? Please select one response 1. Ashkenazi 2. Sephardi 3. Mixed 4. Other Don’t know appendix 177

2 Conversion and Mixed Parenthood—Impacts on Jewish Religiosity and Identification

1 Conversion and secularizm (χ2)

Jewish by birth Jewish by conversion

Less Secular 2780 146 2926 51.3% 27.1% 49.2% Mid-secular 2005 274 2279 37.0% 50.9% 38.3% More secular 630 118 748 11.6% 21.9% 12.6% Total 5415 538 5953 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% χ2 (2)=124.332 p<.001

Finding: Jews by birth are significantly less secular

2 Conversion and Jewish identification (χ2)

Jewish by birth Jewish by conversion

Low Jewish 361 40 401 Identification 6.7% 7.5% 6.8% Mid Jewish 1141 164 1305 Identification 21.2% 30.8% 22.1% High Jewish 3879 328 4207 Identification 72.1% 61.7% 71.1% Total 5381 532 5913 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% χ2 (2)=28.188 p<.001

Jews by birth are significantly higher on Jewish identification 178 appendix

3 The impacts of fathers’ conversion on secularism of respondents (χ2)

Father Jewish by Father Jewish by birth conversion

Less Secular 2595 26 2621 50.8% 44.1% 50.7% Mid-secular 1903 25 1928 37.2% 42.4% 37.3% More secular 611 8 619 12.0% 13.6% 12.0% Total 5109 59 5168 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% χ2 (2)=1.055 p=.590

There is no significant difference between respondents whose fathers are Jewish by birth and by conversion regarding religiosity/secularism

4 The impacts of fathers’ conversion on respondents’ Jewish identification (χ2)

Father Jewish by Father Jewish by birth conversion

Low Jewish 328 10 338 Identification 6.5% 16.9% 6.6% Mid Jewish 1038 13 1051 Identification 20.4% 22.0% 20.5% High Jewish 3713 36 3749 Identification 73.1% 61.0% 73.0% Total 5079 59 5138 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% χ2 (20)=10.999 p<.01

Respondents whose fathers are Jewish born show stronger identification appendix 179

5 The impacts of mothers’ conversion on secularism of respondents (χ2)

Mother Jewish by Mother Jewish by birth conversion

Less Secular 2612 80 2692 50.8% 45.2% 50.6% Mid secular 1923 76 1999 37.4% 42.9% 37.6% More secular 605 21 626 11.8% 11.9% 11.8% Total 5140 177 5317 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% χ2 (2)=2.458 p=0.293

No significant difference regarding religiosity/secularity between respondents whose mothers are Jewish-born or converted

6 The impacts of mothers’ conversion on respondents’ Jewish identification (χ2)

Mother Jewish by Mother Jewish by birth conversion

Low Jewish 335 14 349 Identification 6.6% 8.2% 6.6% Mid-Jewish 1071 36 1107 Identification 21.0% 21.1% 21.0% High Jewish 3704 121 3825 Identification 72.5% 70.8% 72.4% Total 5110 171 5281 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% χ2 (2)=0.735 p=0.692

No significant difference regarding Jewish identification between respondents whose mothers are Jewish-born or converted 180 appendix

3 Organizational Structures and Institutions of Belgium Jewry

Institutions, associations and frameworks of Belgium’s Jewish community Community Institutions and Organizations Consistoire central israélite de Belgique : www.jewishcom.be Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations in Belgium, 68 Av. Ducpetiaux, 1060 Brussels FORUM der Joodse Organisaties Lange Herentalsestraat 48, Antwerp Cercle Ben Gourion—Radio Judaica http://www.cerclebengourion.be/ Centre communautaire laïc juif de Bruxelles : www.cclj.be Communauté israélite orthodoxe de Bruxelles : http://www.ciob.be/ Union des progressistes juifs de Belgique : www.upjb.be Union des déportés juifs de Belgique : http://users.swing.be/deportes Museums and Research Institutes Musée juif de Belgique : www.mjb-jmb.org Musée juif de la déportation et de la résistance : www.cicb.be Fondation de la mémoire contemporaine : www.fmc-seh.be Fondation Auschwitz—Mémoire d’Auschwitz : www.auschwitz.be Institut d’études du judaïsme à l’ULB : www.ulb.ac.be/philo/judaism Institut voor Joodse Studies—Universiteit Antwerpen : www.ua.ac.be/IJS Centre d’études et de documentation Guerre et sociétés contemporaines : www.Cegesoma.be Jewish Community Indemnification Commission : www.combuysse.fgov.be Press and Media Belgisch Israelitisch Weekblad : http://www.fbg.be/90054 Regards : www.cclj.be/regards Radio Judaica : www.radiojudaica.be Synagogues and congregational centers Brussels Communauté Israélite de Bruxelles, Rue Joseph Dupont 2 Grande Synagogue de Bruxelles, rue de la Régence 32 Communauté Israélite Orthodoxe et Synagogue, Rue de la Clinique 67A Communauté Sépharade, Rue du Pavillon 47 Synagogue Simon & Lina Haïm, rue du Pavillon 49 Foyer Sépharade, Avenue Winston Churchill 150 Communauté de Schaerbeek and Synagogue Adat Israël, Rue Rogier 125 Communauté de St-Gilles and Synagogue Ahavat Reïm, Rue de Thy 73 Communauté d’Uccle-Forest, Av de Messidor 11 Synagogue Maale, Communauté de Waterloo, Av Belle Vue 140 Communauté Israélite Libérale de Bruxelles, Synagogue Beth Hillel Rue des Primeurs 80 appendix 181

International Jewish Center, [email protected] La Congrégation Israelite Sépharade Unifiée, Rue de Rosendael 154 Oratoire de l’Aéroport, Bruxelles National Beth Israel, Av de Stalingrad 75 Beit Ytzhak, Av du Roi 115–117 Habad, Av du Roi 87 Or-Ha’yim, Rue Pierre Decoster Chaare Tzion, Rue Boetendael 147 Other towns Arlon, Rue St. Jean Charleroi, 56 rue Pige au Croly Ghent, Bloch’s Bakery, Veldstraat Knokke, Van Bunnenlaan 30 Liege, Rue Leon Fredericq 19 Ostend, Maastrichtplein 3 Antwerp Alexander, Isaballalei 44 Belz, Van Spangenstraat 6 Berditchev, Zurenborgstraat 20 Beth Haknesset Machsike Hadass, Oostenstraat 43 Beth Haknesset Portugueese, Hoveniersstraat 31 Beth Haknesset Shomre Hadass, Van den Nestlei 2 Beth Itschok, Mercatorstraat 56 Beth Jacob, J. Jacobstraat 22 Beth Menachem, Oostenstraat 13 Beth Mordechai, Van Leriusstraat 54 Bobov, Lamorinierstr Chabad House, Brialmontlei 48 Daas Sholem—Shotz, Bialmontlei 32 Eisenman, Oostenstraat 29 Gitschotel, Marsstraat 50 Gur, Ant. Van Dijckstraat 43 Heichal Aharon, Van Leriusstraat 38 Klausenborg, St. Vincentlusstraat Lubawitch, Brialmontelei Machsike Hadass, Jacob Jacobsstratt 22 Moryah—Shomre Hadass, Terlisstraat 35 Or Shraga (Kolel), Van Leriusstraat 22 Rav Amiel, Isabellalei 65 References

Alberigo, Giuseppe; Sherry, Matthew (2006). A Brief History of Vatican II. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. Ali, Tariq (2004) “Notes on Anti-Semitism, Zionism and Palestine”, Counterpunch, March 4. Aluma Solnick (2002) “Based on Koranic Verses, Interpretations, and Traditions, Muslim Clerics State: The Jews Are the Descendants of Apes, Pigs, And Other Animals”. MEMRI Special Report—No. 11, 1. Anti-Diffamation League Survey (2012) American Attitudes Towards Jews in America. NY. Arendt Hannah (1968) Eichmann in Jerusalem—A Report on the Banality of Evil. Alameda, CA: The Viking Press. Atzmon, Gilad (2007) The Politics Of Anti-Semitism: Zionism, The Bund And Jewish Identity Politics, in Dissent Voice 4.12.2007. Badiou Alain, Aloni Udi, Žižek Slavoj, Butler Judith (2011) What Does a Jew Want?: On Binationalism and Other Specters, NY: Columbia University Press. Baron, Salo Wittmayer (1957) A Social and Religious History of the Jews, Volume III, New York, Columbia University Press. Bassi Shaul (2004) “Resisting Jews: Allosemitism and the dialectic of assimilation” In Marco Fazzini ed. Resisting Alterities: Wilson Harris and other avatars of otherness, Amsterdam, NY: Rodopi, 209–213. Bauman Zygmund (1998) ‘Allosemitism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern’ in Bryan Cheyette & Laura Marcus (1998) Modernity, Culture and the Jew, Stanford: Stanford UP (143–156). Benjamin of Tudela (1993) The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela: Travels in the Middle Ages. Trans. Marcus Nathan Adler. Columbia, South Carolina: Joseph Simon/ Pangloss Press. Ben-Rafael, Eliezer (2002) “Introduction”, Jewish identities: Fifty intellectuals answer Ben-Gurion, Leyden and Boston: Brill. Ben-Rafael, Eliezer and Ben-Rafael Miriam (2012) “Le paysage linguistique belge: Un chaos intelligible” in Helot Ch., Barni M., Janssens R. and Bagna Carla (eds.) Linguistic landscapes, multilingualism and social change, Frankfurt-Am-Main: Peter Lang, 69–86. Ben-Rafael Eliezer, M. Lyubansky, O. Gluckner, P. Harris, Y. Israel, W. Jasper and J. Schoeps (2006) Building a Diaspora: Russian Jews in Israel, Germany and the USA, Leyden and Boston: Brill. Ben-Rafael, Eliezer and Sternberg, Yitzhak (eds.) (2009) Transnationalism: Diasporas and the Advent of a new (dis)order, Leyden and Boston: Brill. references 183

Ben-Rafael, Eliezer, Sharot, Stephen (2007), Ethnicity, Religion and Class in Israel, Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. Biale David (1986) Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History, NY: Schocken Books. Blumenkranz Bernhard (1972) Histoire des Juifs en France, Toulouse: Privat Éditeur. Blumenthal, Max (2008) “My Interview With Pastor Hagee On His Anti-Semitic Statements” Huffington Post October 1st. Bordeyne Philippe et Laurent Villemin (2006) Vatican II et la théologie: Perspectives pour le XXIe siècle, Paris: Cerf. Bostom Andrew G. (Editor) (2008) The Legacy of Jihad. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books. Boxill, Bernard (2001) Race and Racism, Oxford: Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Bregoli Francesca, Francesconi Federica (2010) ‘Tradition and transformation in eighteenth-century Europe: Jewish integration in comparative perspective’, Jewish History Volume 24, 3–4, pp. 235–246. Brustein, William (2003) Roots of hate: antisemitism in Europe before the Holocaust. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. Cahen, Claude (2005) “Dhimma” in Encyclopedia of Islam. Leyden: Brill. Cambridge Dictionaries online 2013. Cazenave, Noël A., Alvarez, Darlene (1999). “Defending the White Race: White Male Faculty Opposition to a White Racism Course” Race and Society 2: 25–50. Chanes, Jerome A. (2004). Antisemitism: a reference handbook. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. Cheyette Bryan and Marcus Laura eds. (1998) Modernity, Culture, and ‘the Jew’, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Cheyette, Bryan (1993) Constructions of ‘the Jew’ in English Literature and Society: Racial Representations, 1875–1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cioran, Emil M. (1987) The Temptation to Exist, London: Quartet Books. Cohen, Deborah (2002) Who Was Who? Race and Jews in Turn-of-the-Century Britain. Journal of British Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 460–483. Cotler, Irwin (2004) “Human Rights and the New Anti-Jewishness”, Front Page Magazine.com, (February 16). Darwin, Charles (1871), The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, London: John Murray. Dawidowicz, Lucy S. (1977) La Guerre contre les Juifs, Paris: Hachette. DellaPergola, S. (2011) “Jews in Europe: Demographic Trends, Contexts, Outlooks”, in: Schoeps, J., Glöckner, O. with Kreienbrink, A. (eds.) A Road to Nowhere? Jewish Experiences in Unifying Europe. Leiden/Boston, Brill, 3–34. DellaPergola, Sergio (2013) ‘World Jewish Population 2012’ Current Jewish Population Reports, vol/issue: 7 (NY). 184 references

Déom, Jacques (2012) Qu’est-ce que l’antisémitisme? Bruxelles: Fondation de la Mémoire contemporaine. Dietz Bering (1992) The Stigma of Names: Antisemitism in German Daily Life, 1812–1933. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. D’Iribarne, Philippe (2013) L’Islam devant la démocratie, Paris: Gallimard. Dubnow Simon (1916–1920) History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, Philadelphia: Avotaynu. Dubois S. (2005) L’invention de la Belgique—Genèse d’un État-Nation, Bruxelles: Éd. Racines. Ducreux Marie-Elisabeth (2011) ‘Les Juifs dans les sociétés d’Europe centrale et orien- tale du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle’ dans Germa, Antoine, Lellouch, Benjamin et Patlagean Évelyne (eds.) Les Juifs dans l’histoire, Seyssel, Fr: Éditions Champ Vallon. Dumont Edourd (n.d.) La France juive: Essai d'Histoire Contemporaine, Paris: Flammarion. Elukin, Jonathan (2007) Living Together Living Apart: Rethinking Jewish-Christian Relations in the Middle Ages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Endelman Todd M. (2001) “In Defense of Jewish Social History” Jewish Social Studies 7.3: 52–67. Erner, Guillaume (2005) Expliquer l’antisémitisme, Paris: PUF. European Forum on Antisemitism (Retrieved 5.12.2013) “Working definition of antisemitism by the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)”, http://www.european-forum-on-antisemitism.org/working- definition-of-antisemitism/English/. Fein, Helen (1993) Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Finkelstein, Norman (2005) Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Antisemitism and the Abuse of History, Berkeley: University of California Press. Finkielkraut, Alain (2000) Une Voix vient de l’autre rive, Paris, Gallimard. Fischel, Jack R. (2005) “The New Anti-Semitism”, The Virginia Quarterly Review, Summer: 225–234. Flannery, Edward H. (2004) The Anguish of the Jews: Twenty-Three Centuries of Antisemitism, St Antonio TX: Stimulus Books. Flavius Joseph and Betty Radice (1984), The War of the Jews, London: Penguin Classics. Forster, Arnold & Epstein, Benjamin (1974) The New Anti-Semitism. McGraw-Hill. Freifeld, Esther (1972) La communauté sépharade de Bruxelles, Bruxelles: ISTI. Friedlander Saul (2008) The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews. London: Phoenix. Gabriel Mark A. (2003) Islam and the Jews: The unfinished battle Lake, Mary, FL: Charisma House. Gateston Institute, International Policy Council (2013) Attitudes Toward Jews in Belgium, NY. references 185

Germa, Antoine, Lellouch, Benjamin et Patlagean Évelyne (eds.) (2011) Les Juifs dans l’histoire, Seyssel, Fr: Éditions Champ Vallon. Gilman, Sander (1986) Jewish Self-Hatred: Antisemitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Girard, René (1982) Le Bouc émissaire, Paris: Grasset. Goitein, Shelomo Dov (2003) A Mediterranean Society: An Abridgment in One Volume, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Gombrowicz Withold (1957) Dziennuki 1953–1955, Paris: Instytut kltury. Gutwirth, Jacques (1996) ‘Le Judaïsme anversois aujourd’hui’ Revue des études juives 4, pp. 365–384. Halpern (1956) The American Jew, NY: The Theodor Herzl Foundation. Hilberg, Raul (2006) La Destruction des Juifs d’Europe, Paris: Gallimard 3 vol. Hirsh, David (2007) Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections New Haven, CT Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism (YIISA) Occasional Papers. Horowitz, Irving Louis (2005) “New Trends and Old Hatreds,” Springer New York Society Journal, Vol. 43 No. 1. Jackson, John P., Jr; Jackson, John P. (2001) Social Scientists for Social Justice: Making the Case Against Segregation. NY: NYU Press. Joffe, Josef (2009). “Antisemitism in Araby”, Newsweek, 28 February. Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism (2012) Overview of Main Trends in 2011, Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University and Kantor Center, April 18. Kaplan, Francis (2011) La Passion antisémite habillée par ses idéologues, Paris: Le Félin—Kiron. Katz Jacob (1961) Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile relations in Mediaeval and Modern times Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961. ——— (1980) From Prejudisce to Destrction: Antisemitism 1700–1933, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. Khaleel Muhammed (2004) “Muslim Exegesis, the Hadith and the Jews” Judaism, vol. 209/210 (53): 3–11. Klug, Brian (2006) “In search of clarity”, Catalyst, March 17. Kotek, Joël (2004) La Belgique et ses Juifs: de l’antijudaïsme comme code culturel, À l’antisionisme comme religion civique (Paris: Les études du crif, 2004: 2–43). Krefetz Gerald (1984) Jews and Money: The Myths and the Reality, Minneapolis, MN: Book Sales. Laurence F. Bove, Laura Duhan Kaplan (1995) From the Eye of the Storm: Regional Conflicts and the Philosophy of Peace, Amsterdam: Rodopi Press. Lazare, Bernard (2006). Anti-Semitism: Its History and Causes. NY: Cosimo. Le Cour Grandmaison, Olivier (2005) Coloniser, exterminer. Sur la guerre et l’Etat colo- nial, Paris, Fayard, 2005. 186 references

——— (2009) La République impériale—Politique et racisme d’Etat, Paris: Fayard. Leibler, Isi (2013) ‘Antisemitism in Belgium Reaches New heights’ Jerusalem Post (24/9). Lesch, Ann M. and Tschirgi, Dan. (1998) Origins and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: West Port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. Lessing, Theodor (2001) La haine de soi: Le refus d’être juif, Paris: Berg international. ——— (1930/2004) Jewish Self-Hatred, Tel-Aviv: Nativ (Hebrew). Levin, Kenneth (2010) “The Psychology of Populations under Chronic Siege”, Post- Holocaust and Anti-Semitism, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Accessed Feb 2010. Levin, Nora (1988) The Jews in the Soviet Union Since 1917. New York: New York University Press. Lewis, Bernard (1984). The Jews of Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ——— (2006) “The New Anti-Semitism”, The American Scholar, Volume 75 No. 1. Litvak, Leonid (2010) The Jewish Personna in the European Imagination: A case of Russian Litterature, Standford: Standford University Press. Luther, Martin (1543/1971) On the Jews and Their Lies, Trans. Martin H. Bertram, in Luther’s Works, Philadelphia: Fortress Press. Maharil (1427/1989) Sefer Maharil: Minhagim, Jerusalem: Mif’al Torat Hakhme Ashkenaz, Makhon Yerushalyim (Heb). Marr Wilhelm (1897) Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum von nicht con- fessionellen Standpunkt (“The Victory of Judaism over Germandom: From a Non- Denominational Point of View”) Bern:Rudolph Costenoble. ——— (1879) Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum (Victory of Judaism over Germanity). Bern: Rudolph Costenoble. Marvin Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer (2005) Anti-Semitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Matas, David (2005) Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism. Toronto: Dundurn Press. McGarty, Yzerbyt Vincent Y. and Spears Russell (2002) Stereotypes as Explanations: The formation of meaningfuls beliefs about, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. Memmi, Albert (1994) Le Racisme, Paris éd. Gallimard. Modrikamen Mischaël (2013) ‘Notre démocratie et ses enemis’, Libre Belgique, 23 Octobre. Nichols, William (1993) Christian Antisemitism, A History of Hate Lanham, Maryland: Jason Aronson, Inc NY: Federation of American Zionists. PewResearchCenter (2013) A portrait of Jewish Americans: Findings from a Pew Research Center Survey of U.S. Jews. Washington, D.C. Pinsker, Leo (1882/1916) Auto-Emancipation: an appeal to his people by a Russian Jew. Poumon, Emile (1959) ‘Juifs de Belgique’ Revue Nationale 306 pp. 1–146. references 187

Powell Lawrence N. (2000) Troubled Memory: Anne Levy, the Holocaust, and David Duke’s Louisiana, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Prigent, Yves (2003) La Cruauté ordinaire, Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. Raab, Earl (2002) “Antisemitism, anti-Israelism, anti-Americanism”, Judaism, Fall. Rabi, Wladimir (1976) ‘Bruxelles: Vers une communauté laïque’, L’Arche 227, pp. 36–40. Reitter, Paul (2008) “Zionism and the Rhetoric of Jewish Self-Hatred”, The Germanic Review 83(4). Rensmann, Lars and Schoeps H. Julius (2011) “Politics and Resentment: Examining Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the Euroepan Unition and Beyond” in Rensmann, Lars and Schoeps H. Julius (eds) Politics and Resentment: Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopitanism in the European Union, Boston and Leydent: Brill: 9–82. Rosenfeld Alvin H. (2007), “Rhetorical Violence and the Jews,” The New Republic, February 27. Rothstein, Edward (2009) “Nazis’ ‘Terrible Weapon,’ Aimed at Minds and Hearts”, The New York Times, 23 February. Rubinfeld, Joël (2004) ‘Les habits neufs de l’antisémitisme en Belgique’ in Ouvrage col- lectif, Les habits neufs de l’antisémitisme en Europe, Denver: Café Noir. Sacks, Jonathan (22.6. 2011: “The New Antisemitism is a Virus” in Jewish Journal.com. Salo Wittmayer Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, Volume II, Ancient Times, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1952. Sandauer, Artur (1985) ‘O sy tuacji pisarza polskiego pochodzenia zydowskiego w XX wieku (Rzecz, kt6rnie ja powinienem by{napisac)’ (On the Plight of the Polish Writer of Jewish Origin in the Twentieth-Century: An Essay which I should not have written), in Pisma Zebrane, vol. 3 (Warsaw: Czytelnik). Schiffino N. (2003) Crises politiques et démocratie en Belgique, Paris: L’Harmattan. Schreiber, Jean-Philippe (1999) L’immigration juive en Belgique du moyen âge à la pre- mière guerre mondiale, Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. ——— (2000) ‘Les Juifs en Belgique: Une présence continue depuis le XIIIe siècle’ Les Cahiers de la Mémoire Contemporaine pp. 13–37. Schreiber, Marion (2006) Rebelles silencieux: L’attaque du 20e convoi pour Auschwitz, Bruxelles: Racine. Slezkine, Yuri (2006) The Jewish Century, Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press. Smith, Anthony (1986) “State-Making and Nation-Building,” in John Hall (ed.), States in History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 228–263. Smith, Charles D. (2004) Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict: A History With Documents. Bedford: Boston: St. Martin’s. Spencer, Herbert (1864) Principles of Biology, London and Edinburg: Williams and Norgate. 188 references

Staetsky, Laura and Boyd, Jonathan (2013) Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews of selected EU member states, London: Institute of Jewish Policy Research and Ipsos MORI. Steinberg, Maxime (2004) La Persécution des Juifs en Belgique (1940–1945), Bruxelles: Complexe. Taguieff, Pierre-André (2008) La Judéophobie des Modernes: des Lumières au jihad mon- dial, Paris: Odile Jacob. Teitelbaum, Viviane (2008) Salomon; vous êtes juif ? L’antisémitisme en Belgique, du Moyen Age à Internet, Bruxelles: Luc Pire. Todeschini, Giacomo (2004) ‘Franciscan economics and Jews in the Middle Ages: from a theological to an economic lexicon’ in McMichael Steven J. and Myers Susan E. (eds.) Friars and Jews in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Leiden: Brill, 99–117. Traverso, Enzo (2013) La Fin de la Modernité Juive : Histoire d’un Tournant Conservateur, Paris: La Découverte. Trigano, Shmuel (2009) “Introduction : La face cachée du nationalisme en terre d’Islam” in Trigano, Shmuel (éd.) La Find du judaïsme en terres d’Islam, Paris : Denoël, 9–50. Wasserstein, Bernard (2012) On the Eve, London: Simon and Schuster. Weinstein, Valerie (2005) ‘Dissolving boundaries: Assimilation and allosemitism in the E.A. Dupont’s Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict: A History With Documents. (1923) and Veit Harlan’s Jud Süss (1940)’ German Quaterly 78.4. Wiesel, Eli (1987) The Jews of Silence, NY: Random House. Wellman, David T. (1993). Portraits of White Racism. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Wilcox Clifton W. Scapegoat: Targeted for Blame (2009 Parker, CO Outskirts Press. Wistrich, Robert S. (2010) A Lethal Obsession: Antisemitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad, NY: Random House. Witte, E. & Van Velthoten, H. (1998) Taal en Politiek. De Belgishe casus in een historisch perspectief. Brussels: VUB Press. Wieviorka, Michel (2007) The Lure of Anti-Semitism: Hatred of Jews in Present-Day France, Boston and Leyden: Brill. World Jewish Congress (WJC), Jewish Black Book Committee (1981) The Black book: the Nazi crime against the Jewish people, Ann Arbor: Nexus Press; The University of Michigan. Zipperstein, Steven (2005) “Historical Reflections of Contemporary Antisemitism” in Derek J. Penslar et al., ed., Contemporary Antisemitism: Canada and the World, Toronto: University of Toronto Press Index

academics. See intellectuals sources of 24–25, 57–60, 79tab. AEL (Arab European League) 59 types of 18, 20 age anti-Zionism 24, 152 correlation between religiosity and in Belgium 59, 60–61 125–130 Jewish 27, 28, 59–60 impact on allegiance to Jewishness Antwerp Jewry 126, 130tab., 131 Brussels Jewry vs. 53, 56–57, 66 impact on experience of antisemitism in diamond industry 53, 55, 63 128–129tab., 139fig. Jewish organizations 53 impact on perception of antisemitism language of 53, 56 83–88, 97, 127, 127tab., 138, 139fig. perception of antisemitism AJB (Conseil des Associations juives de 110–112tab., 139 Belgiques) 54 profile 53 Akiva, Rabbi 154 religious/cultural/educational facilities Alexandria 3 56, 57 Ali, Tariq 22 size of community 52, 55, 68 allosemitism Arab European League (AEL) 59 definition 30, 32, 152–154 Arabic 58–59 impact of 32–33, 34 Arab-Israeli conflict. See Israeli-Arab conflict Almohades 5 Arendt, Hannah 27, 31 Das alter Gesetz (film) 32 Ashkenazim American Jews 9, 12 in Belgium 99–102, 139 survey on 36–37, 131, 149 in Europe 38 Anti-Defamation League 22 experience of antisemitism 101tab. anti-Judaism Jewishness of 100tab., 143 antisemitism vs. 12 Austria 7 antisemites Auto-émancipation (Leon Pinsker) 29 as defined by Belgian Jews 79tab., Ayachi, Bassam Abou Ata 59 85tab., 91tab., 97tab., 102tab., 104tab., 106tab., 111–112tab., 122–123tab., Baal Shem Tov 7 137fig., 138 Badiou, Alain 25 antisemitism 26–28, 34, 152. See also Bassi, Shaul 18, 33 allosemitism; classical antisemitism; Bauman, Zygmunt 30, 31, 32–33, 152–153 contemporary antisemitism; survey on behavior of Jews Belgian Jewry impact of antisemitism on 34, 142tab. anti-Judaism vs. 12 Beilis Affair 9 definition 18–19, 20–21, 25–26 Belgian Islamic Center 59 history 3–17, 22 Belgian Jewry. See also Antwerp Jewry; increase in 57, 67, 82, 147 Brussels Jewry; survey on Belgian Jewry Jewish 26–28, 34, 152 Belgian vs. non-Belgian citizenship perception by European Jews 40–43, 53–54, 66 46 community life 56, 57, 67 racist and religious convictions 18, congregations 99–102, 115, 118fig., 147 21, 22 discrimination and persecution 14, 41, responses to 26–30, 65, 78 43, 44, 51–52 190 index

emigration 57, 62 Brustein, William 20 expulsion 51–52 Bundism 29 history 51–55, 66 language 53, 56, 108–110 Carolinguan Empire 4 origin 52, 99–102 Catholic Church 54, 58, 67 profile 55–57 CCOJB (Committee of Coordination of safety of 62–63, 151 Belgium’s Jewish Organizations) 55 size of community 52, 55, 150 CDJ (Comité de Défense des Juifs en socio-economic status 51, 150–151 Belgique) 54 Belgium. See also Belgian Jewry cemeteries antisemitism in 60–66 desecration of 40, 93, 94tab., 110tab., anti-Zionism in 60–61 118, 119tab., 140 Arab-Muslim population 58–59, 62, Chanes, Jerome A. 3 67, 150, 153 Cheyette, Bryan 12, 21 Belgian-Israeli relations 60, 64, 65 Christians political standpoints towards Jews 59, discrimination and persecution by 4, 62, 65, 67 5–6, 12, 44 revival of antisemitism 57, 67 Ciorin, E.M. 30 sources of antisemitism 57–60 circumcision universal jurisdiction 64–65 prohibition of 45, 72tab., 87tab., Ben Abraham, Obadiah 29 96tab., 125tab., 135, 136fig., 151 Ben Eliezer, Israel 7 classical antisemitism Benjamin of Tudela 51 new antisemitism vs. 21–22, 150 Ben-Yahuda, Gershom 4 Clement VI 5 Bering, Dietz 20 Cohen, Deborah 28 Besht 7 Comité de Défense des Juifs en Belgique Biale, David 31 (CDJ) 54 Black Book (WJC, 1981) 53 Committee of Coordination of Belgium’s blaming Jews. See scapegoat position of Jews Jewish Organizations (CCOJB) 55 Börne, Ludwig 18 Communism 17, 29 Bostom, Andrew 5 communitarianism 29–30, 35 Boyd, Jonathan 46 community affiliation 71tab., 118fig. Breendonck Camp 54 congregation. See also Ashkenazim; Brezhnev, Leonid 11 Sephardim British Independent Jewish Voices 27–28 in Belgium 99–102, 115 Brussels impact on perception of antisemitism Arab-Muslim community in 63 101tab., 115, 147 Brussels Jewry. See also survey on Belgian Conseil des Associations juives de Belgiques Jewry (AJB) 54 Antwerp Jewry vs. 53, 56–57, 66 Conservative Jews 39. See also Liberal in crafts and commerce 53, 55 Jews Jewish organizations/movements 53, Consistoire Centrale Israélite de 56 Belgique 55 language 53, 56 Constituent Assembly (France) 7 perception of antisemitism contemporary antisemitism 12–17, 26, 30 110–112tab., 139 in Belgium 65–66, 67 profile 53 classic antisemitism vs. 21–22, 150 religious/cultural/educational facilities examples 19–20 56, 57 conversion size of community 52, 55 impact on Jewishness 147 index 191

impact on perception of antisemitism employment 102–103tab., 115 of European Jews 38 to Christianity 5–6, 18, 28 Endelmann, Todd M. 28 Cotler, Irwin 21–22 enlightenment 7–12 Council of Four Countries (Va’ad Arba Epstein, Benjamin 21 Aratzot) 6 Espace et Liberté 61 EUJS (European Union of Jewish Dagens Nyheter (Danish newspaper) 63 Students) 68 Damascus Affair 11 EUMC (European Union Monitoring Centre De Groote, Rodolphus 64 on Racism and Xenophobia) 19, 26 Denmark 23 Europe Déom, Jacques 25, 65 discrimination and persecution in diamond industry (Antwerp) 53, 55, 63 40–41, 46 Diaspora Jewry immigration in 150 Israelian Jewry vs. 27–28 Jewish population in 38tab. survey on 36 Muslim community in 13 Di Rupo, Elio 65 European Forum on Antisemitism (2013) discrimination 44, 45 19 experience of Belgian Jews 86tab., European Jewry 92–93tab., 94tab., 96tab., 121, Belgian Jewry vs. 135, 144–146 124–125tab., 143, 144tab. education 38 Dossin Kazern (Mechelen, Belgium) 54 employment 38 Dreyfus Affair 9 experience of antisemitism 145, Dumont, Edouard 31 146tab identity of 39 Eastern Europe 6, 11 integration 145, 146tab. Eban, Abba 21 perception of antisemitism 145, economic antisemitism 20 146tab. economic situation religiosity 39, 145tab. perception by Belgian Jews 74tab., residency of 39 75tab., 81, 84tab., 90tab., 94tab., 95tab., survey on 37–40, 135, 144–146, 149 140tab. European Union Fundamental Rights economic status of Jews 42, 150–151 Agency (FRA) 26, 37, 135, 144, 149, eda. See congregration 154 Edict of Tolerance (1781) 7 European Union of Jewish Students (EUJS) education 68 of European Jews 38 European Union Monitoring Centre on impact on perception of antisemitism Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) 19, 88–93, 97–98, 138, 143 26 Egypt 4 expulsion of Jews 3, 4, 6, 9, 51–52 Eichmann in Jerusalem (Hannah Arendt) 27 Federation des Etudiants Einhorn, Maurice 57 Francophones 63 emancipation of Jews 7–8, 9, 16, 31 Fein, Helen 20 emigration of Jews 6, 9, 11, 29. See also Finkelstein, Norman 22 moving of Jews Finkielkraut, Alain 28 from Belgium 57, 78, 80tab., 85tab., Forster, Arnold 21 87, 88fig., 91tab., 97, 121, 129tab., 139fig., Fourth Lateran Council (1215) 4 145 FRA (European Union Fundamental Rights for safety reasons 43, 85tab., 91tab. Agency) 26, 37, 135, 144, 149, 154 192 index

France Hungary discrimination and persecution in 14, discrimination and persecution in 41, 15, 40, 44 43 expulsion from 4, 51 Jewish community in 4, 7, 9, 28 image of Jews 13, 31–32, 33, 36. See also Muslim community in 13–14, 153 scapegoat position of Jews Frank, Jacob 6 Inquisition 5 Frank, Leo 9 insecurity of Jews. See safety of Jews French Revolution 52, 66 Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) 37 Gaon of Vilna 7 integration of Jews 8, 32, 42, 120, 122tab., gender 145, 146tab. impact on perception of antisemitism intellectuals 93–95, 98, 138 antisemitic expressions by 13, 25, 61, Genet, Jean 24 63 Germany Jewish, anti-Israeli 27, 28, 59 discrimination and persecution in 40, intermarriage 36. See also mixed 41, 44 parenthood Jewish community in 4, 11 internet Gershom, Rabbeinu 4 antisemitic expressions on the 14, 40, Gilman, Sander 27 41, 43, 47, 76tab., 82, 90tab., 94tab. Gombrowicz, Withold 30 Ipsos MORI 37 Islam Hadith 5 status in Europe 13–14, 25, 59, 150, 151 Hagee, John 12 Islamophobia 24, 25 Halakha 8, 39 Israel 17 Halevi, Judah 29 attachment of Jews to 37, 40, 136, 149 Halpern, Ben 28 boycott of 24, 85tab., 101tab., 112tab., Haredi community (Antwerp) 121fig., 120, 123tab., 141 135, 136fig. See also Orthodox Jews comparison with Nazi Germany 28, Haskalah 8 42, 61, 80tab., 85tab., 104tab., 128tab., Hassidim 7, 8 138 Hergé 58 criticism on 24, 27, 85tab., 106tab. Hirsch, David 24 demonization of 15, 20, 22, 23, 25, 28, Hirsch, Raphael 8 61, 150 Hobeika, Elie 65 Israelian Jewry vs. Diaspora Jewry Hobsbawm, Eric 27 27–28 Holland 6, 14 Jewish anti-Israelism 27–28, 59 Holocaust 10 role in antisemitism 147 Belgian victims 54 solidarity with 72tab., 73, 152 denial/trivialization of 12, 19, 25, 33, Israeli-Arab conflict. See also scapegoat 42, 45, 65, 79tab., 86tab., 89, 93tab., position of Jews 113tab., 137tab., 138 impact on safety of Jews 43, 77tab. exploitation of 42, 64, 76, 80fig., mediatisation of 60–61 102tab., 128tab., 137tab., 138 as source of antisemitism 22, 47 remembrance of 29, 37, 40, 41, 72tab., Israeli-Arab war 11 73, 93tab., 135, 147 Israeli-Palestinian conflict 13, 14, 22, 47 Horowitz, Irving 28 impact on safety of Jews 138, 145 index 193

perception in Belgium 60–61, 145 Laporte, Christian 62 pro-palestinianism 13, 14, 22, 23–24, Latvia 150 discrimination and persecution in 40, Italy 41, 44 discrimination and persecution in 40, Lazare, Bernard 20 41 left-wing politics antisemitic expressions 15, 42, 43, 44, Jackson Jr., John P. 27 59, 62, 67 Jewish antisemitism 26–28, 34, 152 Leibler, Isi 65 Jewish neighborhoods Leigh, Mike 28 antisemitism in 114–115tab. Le Soir 61, 64 Jewishness/Jewish identity Lessing, Theodor 27 of American Jews 36 Levin, Kenneth 28 of Belgian Jews 71–73, 81, 100tab., Levy, Marc 28 108tab., 130tab., 135, 136tab., 137, Lewin, Kurt 27 140tab., 147 Lewis, Bernard 5, 20, 21 cultural vs. religious allegiance 36, liberal Jews 40, 143 allegiance to Jewishness 136fig. of European Jews 37, 39 in Belgium 117 Judaism vs. 30 experience of antisemitism 121tab., pride in 36 122–123tab. surveys on 36, 37 experience of discrimination 121, Jewish socialism 8 124–125tab. On the Jews and their Lies (Martin Luther) perception of antisemitism 6 119–120tab., 121fig. JPR (Institute for Jewish Policy Research) perception of social and economic 37 reality 119tab. Das Judenthum in der Musik (Richard worry of being victim of antisemitic Wagner) 18 acts 121fig., 123tab. Judeophobia 23–24 La Libre Belgique 62 in Belgium 60–66 Lithuania 6 Der Jüdische Selbsthass (Theodor Lessing) Litvak, Leonid 32 27 Lovers of Zion 29 Jud Süss (film) 32 Luther, Martin 5–6

Kaplan, Francis 26 Maeterlinck, Maurice 57 Karo, Yosef 29 Maharil 51 Katz, Jacob 31 marital status Khrushchev, Nikita 11 impact on perception of antisemitism Klug, Brian 22 95–97, 139 kosher slaughter. See traditional slaughter Marr, William 18 Kotek, Joël 60–61, 62 Marranos 5, 52 Krefetz, Gerald 20 Matas, David 24 Kristallnacht 10 media antisemitic expressions in 13, 40, 41, language 47–48, 60–61, 64, 76tab., 82, 90tab., impact on perception of antisemitism 119tab., 127tab. 109–113, 115–116, 139, 143 Mitnagdim 7, 8 194 index mixed parenthood perception of social and economic impact on perception of antisemitism reality 117, 119tab. 103–107, 115, 139 worry of being victim of antisemitic Jewishness and 147 acts 121fig., 123tab., 140 modern antisemitism. See contemporary Orthodox Judaism 8 antisemitism Modern Orthodox Jews. See Orthodox Jews Palestine. See Israeli-Palestinian conflict Modrikamen, Mischaël 62 Perry, Marvin 5 Morin, Edgar 28 Pew Research Center (Washington) Mosaisk Troessamfund 23 36–37, 131, 149 moving of Jews. See also emigration of Jews Pinsker, Leon 29, 31 for safety reasons 43, 85tab., 91tab., Pinter, Harold 27 114tab., 124tab. P-Magazine 61, 64 within Belgium 78, 80tab., 86tab., 90, pogroms 9, 10, 11 92tab., 105tab., 115tab., 125tab. Poland Muslim immigrants 25, 150, 153 discrimination and persecution in 6, Muslims 10–11 discrimination and persecution by 5, Jewish community in 6 11, 42–43, 44, 138 political activists mystic movements 6–7, 8 attitude towards Jews 59, 67 political antisemitism 13, 14, 42–43, 151, Nahmanides 29 152. See also left-wing politics; right-wing nationalistic sentiments 18, 22 politics neighborhood in Belgium 58, 59, 61, 65, 76tab., 82, impact on perception of antisemitism 91tab., 119, 120tab. 113–114tab., 143 Portugal 5 neo-antisemitism 149, 151, 152 power of Jews 14, 19, 41, 42, 79tab., 80fig., neo-Jewishess 149 101tab., 120, 122tab., 128tab., 137fig., 138 neo-judeophobia 23, 24, 149, 151 prevention of antisemitism 65, 78, 148 Netherlands 6, 14 Protestant Church 54 new antisemitism. See contemporary The Protocols of the Elders of Zion 18 antisemitism public places Nichols, William 3, 21 antisemitic expressions in 41, 84tab., Niles, Serge A. 18 90tab., 95tab. Ninth Jewish Brigade (resistance movement, Belgium) 54 Quran 5 non-orthodox religious Jews. See liberal Jews non-religious Jews. See secular Jews Raab, Earl 22 Nostra Aetate (Second Vatican Council) racism 12 antiracism 22, 61 antisemitism based on 18, 21, 22 Orthodox Jews 39 in Europe 41 allegiance to Jewishness 136tab. increase in 41, 75, 76tab., 83, 84tab., in Belgium 117 106tab., 127tab., 140tab. experience of antisemitism 121fig., perception by Belgian Jews 74fig., 122–123tab. 75tab., 76tab., 84tab., 106tab., 126, experience of discrimination 122fig., 127tab., 140tab. 124–125tab. selective 24 perception of antisemitism Radio Télévision Belge Francophone 119–120tab., 121fig., 140 (RTBF) 62, 64 index 195

Raes, Roland 65 schools Rashi 4 antisemitic expressions at 44, 60, 78 Reform Jews 8, 16, 39. See also Liberal Schweitzer, Frederick M., 5 Jews Second Vatican Council (1965) 12 religiosity secular Jews 118 of Belgian Jews 72tab., 73, 117–130 allegiance to Jewishness 136tab. correlation between age and 125–130 in Belgium 56–57 of European Jews 39 experience of antisemitism impact on allegiance to Jewishness 122–123tab. 130tab., 132, 136fig., 137 experience of discrimination 121, impact on experience of antisemitism 124–125tab. 122–123tab., 128–129tab. perception of antisemitism impact on perception of antisemitism 119–120tab. 119–120tab., 126, 127tab., 139–140, 141 perception of social and economic Rensmann, Lars 26 reality 119tab. reporting of antisemitic acts 78, 82, 137 worry of being victim of antisemitic resistance groups (World War II) 54 acts 120, 121fig., 123–124tab. rights of Jews 7, 10, 21, 22, 52 self-definition awareness of 45, 143–144 of Belgian Jewry 72tab 73, 117 right-wing politics self-determination, right to 20, 24 antisemitic expressions 15, 42, 43, 44, self-hatred 26–28, 34, 152 59, 62, 65, 67 Sephardim ritual slaughter. See traditional slaughter allegiance to Jewishness 100tab. Romania in Belgium 99–102, 139 discrimination and persecution in 40, experience with antisemitism 101tab. 44 Shah, Imran 23 Rome 3 Sharon, Arik 64–65 Rosenfeld, Alvin H., 27 Shoa. See Holocaust Rothschild, Baron Edmond de 29 Shulkhan Arukh (Yosef Karo) 29 RTBF (Radio Télévision Belge Francophone) Simenon, Georges 58 62, 64 Six Day War (1967) 13 Rubinfeld, Joël 63, 64 slaughter, traditional Russia 6, 11 prohibition of 45, 72tab., 87tab., Russian Orthodoxy 6 96tab., 136fig., 151 social antisemitism 20 Sacks, Jonathan 13 social mobility of Jews 16 safety of Jews social situation in Belgium 62–63, 77fig., 82fig., perception by Belgian Jews 74tab., 94tab., 124tab., 151 75tab., 81, 84tab., 94tab., 95tab., 140tab. in Europe 43, 46–47 Sosnowski, Maurice 66 sanctioning of antisemitic expressions Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) 12 78, 82 Spain Sandauer, Artur 30, 33, 152–153 discrimination and persecution in 5 SBC (Southern Baptist Convention) 12 Jewish community in 4 scapegoat position of Jews 9, 60, Staetsky, Laura 46 150–151 Stalin, Joseph 10, 11 Belgian Jews 60, 67, 79tab., 84tab., De Standaard (Belgian newspaper) 90tab., 122tab., 128tab. 62–63 Schnoeps, H. Julius 26 Suez Crisis (1956) 13 196 index survey on American Jewry 36–37, 131, 149 religiosity and experience of survey on Belgian Jewry 68–70 antisemitism 122–123tab., age and experience with antisemitism 128–129tab. 128–129tab., 139fig., 143 religiosity and perception of age and perception of antisemitism antisemitism 119–120tab., 121fig., 83–88, 97, 128tab., 138, 139fig. 123tab., 139–140, 141 allegiance to Jewishness 71–73, 81, reporting of antisemitic acts 78, 82, 108tab., 115, 130tab., 135, 136fig., 137, 137 140tab., 143, 147, 149 safety of 62–63, 77fig., 82fig., 91tab. awareness of rights 144tab. survey population 68–70, 71tab., Belgian identification 74, 147 81–82, 118fig., 135 congregation and perception of worry about being victim of antisemitism 101tab., 115, 147 antisemitism 79tab., 81fig., 91tab., conversion and perception of 120, 121fig., 123tab., 137, 141tab. antisemitism 102–103tab., 115 survey on European Jewry 37–40, 149 definition of antisemite 79tab., Belgian survey vs. 135, 144–146 85tab., 91tab., 96tab., 102tab., 104tab., Sweden 106tab., 111–112tab., 122–123tab., 137fig., discrimination and persecution in 40, 138 44 education level and perception of Switzerland antisemitism 88–93, 97–98, 138, discrimination and persecution in 143 14–15 European survey vs. 135, 144–146 symbols/markers experience of antisemitism 77–80, visibility of Jewish 23, 28, 34, 44–45, 84–87tab., 88fig., 90tab., 94tab., 47, 63, 78, 80, 149, 151–152 95–96tab., 101tab., 140–143tab., 148 synagogue attendance 71tab., 18fig. experience of discrimination 86tab., synagogues 56 92–93tab., 94tab., 121, 124–125tab., 143, Syria 11 144tab. gender and perception of antisemitism Taguieff, Pierre-André 21, 22, 24, 25, 33, 94–96, 99, 138 150, 152 geolinguistic differences and perception traditional Jews 118 of antisemitism 110–113, 115–116, allegiance to Jewishness 136tab. 139, 143 experience of antisemitism 121fig., marital status and perception of 122–123tab. antisemitism 95–97, 98 experience of discrimination 121, mixed parenthood and perception of 124–125tab. antisemitism 103–107, 115, 139 experience of economic situation 117 neighborhood and perception of perception of antisemitism antisemitism 113–114tab., 115, 143 119–120tab. perception of antisemitism 75–77, perception of social and economic 76tab., 85tab., 88fig., 101tab., 137, 138, reality 119tab. 140–141tab. worry of being victim of antisemitic perception of racism 76tab., 84tab. acts 121fig., 123–124tab., 140 perception of social and economic traditional slaughter issues 74tab., 75tab., 81, 84tab., prohibition of 45, 87tab., 96tab., 90tab., 94tab., 137 136fig., 151 Traverso, Enzo 25 Trotsky, Leon 10 index 197

Vif-L’express 61 UEJB (Union of the Jewish Students of violence against Jews Belgium) 68 in Europe 41, 46 ultra-Orthodox Jews 39, 135. See also physical attacks 41, 44, 78fig., 79tab., Orthodox Jews 81fig., 86tab., 92tab., 101tab., 122tab., in Belgium 56–57 128tab. Union des Progressistes Juifs de verbal attacks 41, 43–44, 79tab., 81fig., Belgique 59 84tab., 90tab., 94tab., 95tab., 101tab., Union of the Jewish Students of Belgium 103tab., 104–105tab., 106–107tab., (UEJB) 68 114tab., 122tab., 124tab., 128tab. United Kingdom visibility of Jewish symbols/markers 23, discrimination and persecution in 4, 28, 34, 44–45, 47, 63, 78, 80, 149, 151–152 14, 15, 40 Vlaams Block 62, 65 Jewish community in 4, 27–28 Voltaire 52 multiculturalism in 153 United States Wagner, Richard 18 discrimination and persecution in 12 Wasserstein, Bernard 28 Jewish community in 9 Weinstein, Valerie 32 survey on American Jewry 36–37, Wiesel, Elie 11 131, 149 Wievorka, Michel 24–25 universal jurisdiction Wistrich, Robert 65 in Belgium 64–65 working environment universities antisemitic expressions in 44, 78 antisemitic expressions at 15, 60, 63 World War I 9–10 USSR World War II 10 discrimination and persecution in 10, Belgium Jewry in 52, 53–54 11 Jewish resistance groups 54

Va’ad Arba Aratzot (Council of Four Yehiel of Paris 29 Countries) 6 Yiddish 6, 53, 99 vandalism 137, 138fig. Yitzchaki, Shlomo 4 anti-Jewish graffiti 76tab., 92tab., 94tab., 110tab., 140tab. Zevi, Sabbatai 6 desecration of cemeteries 40, 76tab., Zionides (Judah Halevi) 29 93, 94tab., 110tab., 118, 119tab., 140 Zionism 8–9, 29 of Jewish property 44, 76tab., 94tab., anti- 24, 27, 28, 59–61 110tab., 118, 119tab. in Belgium 56 Verhaeren, Emile 57 Zipperstein, Steven 22