‘Europe is not a country’ A frame and discourse analysis of the Dutch political and public debate on the European Union and European integration (1997-2011)

Lodewijk Rijksbaron (11015969) Supervisor: Dhr. Dr. Floris Vermeulen Second reader: Dhr. Dr. Martijn Dekker June 2020 Conflict Resolution and Governance University of Amsterdam

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 List of abbreviations ...... 4 1.1 Political parties ...... 4 2 Introduction ...... 5 3 Epistemology ...... 11 3.1 Social constructionism ...... 11 3.2 Positionality ...... 14 4 Existing discourses on the European Union and European integration ...... 15 4.1 Euroenthusiast, Eurosceptic, Europragmatists and Eurorejcets ...... 15 4.2 The Dutch discourses on the EU and European integration: an overview ...... 16 5 Methodology ...... 20 5.1 Method ...... 20 5.2 Framing the EU and European integration ...... 22 5.3 Data collection and analysis ...... 24 6 Parliamentary debates ...... 28 6.1 Quantitative analysis ...... 28 6.2 Qualitative analysis ...... 31 6.2.1 Treaty of Amsterdam ...... 32 6.2.2 European Constitution ...... 36 6.2.3 Eurozone crisis ...... 40 6.2.4 In conclusion ...... 45 7 De Groene and Elsevier: a debate ...... 47 7.1 Elseviers Weekblad – a supporter of the European projects ...... 48 7.2 De Groene Amsterdammer: ‘no’ to a capitalist Europe ...... 49 7.3 Quantitative analysis ...... 50 7.4 Qualitative analysis ...... 54 7.4.1 Treaty of Amsterdam ...... 54 7.4.2 European Constitution ...... 57 7.4.3 Eurozone crisis ...... 60 7.4.4 In conclusion ...... 63 8 Conclusion ...... 65 9 Bibliography ...... 67 9.1 Primary sources ...... 67 9.1.1 Parliamentary debates and the law on the referendum ...... 67

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9.1.2 Elsevier ...... 68 9.1.3 De Groene ...... 69 9.1.4 Websites ...... 70 9.2 Secondary sources ...... 70

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1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1.1 POLITICAL PARTIES

VVD - People's Party for Freedom and Democracy PvdA - Worker's Party/Labor Party D66 - Democrats '66 CDA - Christian Democratic Party PVV - Party for the Freedom LPF - Pim Fortuyn List GroenLinks - Green Left SP - Socialist Party RPF - Reformational Political Federation GPV - Reformed Political Alliance ChristenUnie - Christen Union (a merge of RPF and GPV) SGP - Reformed Political Party CD - Center Democrats

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2 INTRODUCTION

During the press conference of 13th March 2020, considering the worsening of the spread of the coronavirus in the Netherlands, Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte was asked why there was not more coordination on a European Union (EU) level to tackle the pandemic. This seemed like a better and more effective option since the virus would not stick to physical borders (which are almost obsolete in a European Union context). The answer Rutte gave presented itself, albeit in very dire circumstances, as a suitable introduction to this thesis. The quote is directly translated from the original Dutch transcript of the press conference on 13 March 2020.

‘Interviewer: Would it not be much more effective to coordinate the fight against this pandemic on a European level?

Mark Rutte: No. To start with. Europe is not a country and, if you ask me, I would like to keep it that way. The fact that Europe is not a country, but a cooperation of different countries, means that in some area’s governance is done on a national level […]. So, there are always national differences in a European Union, which is not one country […]. There is coordination and cooperation, but it is inevitable that in a Europe of sovereign member states differences exist.’ (Rijksoverheid, 13 March 2020).1

Europe, or the EU, is not a country but an institution made up of sovereign nation states. The prime minister, in this short transcript, defined the relationship between a member state, in this case the Netherlands, and the European Union. The definition of this relationship, between the EU and the Netherlands is, has always been subject to change in the member states, likewise in the Netherlands. Not so long ago, the Netherlands was seen as the ‘the best performing kid in class’ and a proponent of further European integration. After the economic crisis of 2008 this changed, the Netherlands wanted to get power back from Europe, explaining Rutte’s comment of ‘Europe is not a country, and I would like to keep it that way’ (Segers, 2014). Mathieu Segers (2014) states that while Europe (meaning the European Union) is more important than ever, the interest from the European people for the EU is shrinking. There is a so-called ‘democratic deficit’ when it comes to the European Union. According to Segers (2014), the Dutch population has the feeling that parts of the story about the Netherlands and

1 See link in bibliography for the Dutch text. 5

European integration have been kept from them. How the story of the Netherlands, the EU and European integration is constructed and framed will be the principal aim of this thesis. The current debate about Europe revolves around the question whether you are in favor or against Europe, a question that does not lend itself well to a complex organization like the EU or to the question of how the Netherlands should position itself vis-à-vis Europe.

The Netherlands is a founding father of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a predecessor to the European Union and the so-called first step to European integration. The European integration project was mainly seen as a project to reconcile the animosity between Germany and France, who had been on opposite sides of the two disastrous world wars that dominated the first half of the 20th century, by merging important pillars of their economy, that of steel and coal, under the authority of one entity (Van Meurs et al., 2013). The Netherlands, together with other Western European countries, were invited to join the project. The Dutch government was, in the first instances, skeptical when it came to join an integration project that would not include the United Kingdom, feared a French dominated, political entity (Harmsen, 2008). Moreover, they were hesitant when it came to a community that was supranational instead of intergovernmental, like the just established UN, NATO and OEEC, and was seen as radical. A majority of the Dutch parliament was in favor of international cooperation but without an authoritative entity telling them what to do (Segers, 2013). This supranationalism was, however, the most important element of the plan that was drafted by Jean Monnet, a French top official. Only with supranational institutions could the animosity between France and Germany be curbed and transformed into a fruitful, economic cooperation. Because of the far-reaching integration of the Dutch economy in that of West-Germany, which was agreed upon in the first years after the war, the Netherlands had no choice but to join the project (Segers, 2013). Together with Belgium they did manage to establish a Council of Ministers, an intergovernmental entity that could control the works of the High Authority (the supranational organ in the ECSC).

In the ensuing years of the 1950s, the Netherlands tried to, mainly on economic issues, spur a federal agenda forward. The Dutch government was seen as one of the main instigators of the then far-reaching integration treaty that was signed in Rome in 1957 (Schonefeld, 1999). They were, nevertheless, again hesitant when it came to accept further supranationalization of the community, voting against a majority-vote system, fearing to be overwhelmed by the bigger countries (France and Germany). In general, the attitude of the Netherlands towards European 6 integration at that time can be seen as an instrumental supranationalism: it was used as a tool to further the Dutch (trade) interests in Western Europe (Kiratli, 2016; Segers, 2014) In the ensuing decades this policy of instrumental supranationalism was an important red thread in the Dutch Europe-policy up until the end of the Cold War, with a peak of so-called Dutch Europhilia at the end of the 1980s (Segers, 2014). Segers (2013) goes further in his book on Dutch European integration, and states that because the Netherlands became more and more focused on the European continent and less on the Atlantic (UK and USA), they also became a more sincere proponent of supranational integration. The Netherlands was an important player in the further integration projects of the 1980s and the early 1990s (Segers, 2013).

The fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union completely changed the geopolitical dynamics on which the ECSC and the EEC were established. An ‘open’ Europe, with the possibility of further political integration and the accession of new member states, caused a change in the way the Netherlands thought about the European project and its own position in it, regardless of their initial support for further integration and expansion (Segers, 2013). Further integration indeed happened and was finalized in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice (1997, 2000). With the subsequent enlargement of new member-states the Netherlands started to lose grip on its own destiny. The times of a so-called ‘permissive consensus’, the implicit acceptance of further European integration, were over. More parties, next to the marginal parties that had already voiced their concerns with the European project, became critical of the European Union. The culmination of this more negative stance towards the European project was seen in the rise of Eurosceptic and anti-EU political parties in the Netherlands and the fatal blow of the no-vote in a referendum against the European constitution in 2005 (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010). Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (2010) state that the no-vote ‘dealt a possibly fatal blow to an idea that was already in decline: that political elites could simply proceed by building Europe in the absence of Europeans’ (p. 35). The permissive consensus shifted to a ‘constraining dissensus’: more parties started to become part of the subject ‘Europe’, it was not just deal brokering between elites anymore (Hooghe and Marks, 2009).

Because of the no-vote in the Netherlands (and France), the ratification of the constitution was postponed (Dinan, 2014). Nonetheless, there was an overall reluctance in Brussels (policy- makers and politicians) to let the constitution die out, and also the Netherlands (as well as Great Britain and France) wanted to go through with it, as long as they did not have to hold another 7

referendum on the issue (Dinan, 2014). It took another four years before the so-called Treaty of Lisbon was ratified by all member-states (with the Czech Republic being the last) in 2009. Not long after this ratification, the world fell into the worst financial recession since the Great Recession of the 1920s, a crisis that caused another blow to the trust of the Dutch in the European Union and its future (Segers, 2014). In 2013, Eurobarometer found that more Dutch people were negative than positive the ’image’ of the EU (Eurobarometer Standaard 80, 2013).

Since the instigation of the European cooperation project, significant changes occurred in both the European Union itself, evolving from a small cooperation between six nation-states to one of the biggest economies of the world with 27 member states, as well as the way in which the Netherlands has looked at the European project and integration. The latter is what I want to focus my research on. While there has been much research on the Dutch role in European integration, as we will see in the third chapter, the question of how and if the Dutch stance towards the EU and European integration changed has been left under researched: ‘little attention has thus far been paid to the broader reshaping of the contours of Dutch European ‘discourse’ [...] and the manner in which these have altered over time’ (Harmsen, 2008, p. 317). Research that did focus on the Dutch stance towards the EU either focused only on political parties, or on the television or newspaper media.

The main research question guiding this thesis will, thus, be: How and to what extent did the Dutch public and political debate around the European Union and European integration change between 1997 and 2011? The question of how in this research question is an important one, as it refers to the use of language of both public and political actors. From a social constructionist perspective, which will be epistemology of this research, knowledge about a certain subject is constructed through discourse, ‘a particular way of talking about a subject’ (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002). Only in discursive form things can become tangible. Another important element of this epistemology is that this knowledge production is never solid or fixed, in other words it is subject to change. The use of language is important, because the way in which politicians and media speak about Europe has an influence on how the population thinks of the subject (De Vreese, 2003). In order to extrapolate the how, the use of language, from the data that has been generated, I used a frame analysis. According to De Vreese, ‘Frames are parts of political arguments, journalistic norms, and social movements’ discourse […] endogenous to the political and social world.’ (De Vreese, 2005, p. 53). A frame analysis allows the researcher to dissect how a certain issue is defined, using both a deductive and an inductive approach (Hope, 8

2010). The main research question is rather broadly defined. More specific, I would like to analyze the language and frames used by the ‘actors’ that are part of this research. How do the actors define the relations between the Netherlands and EU and further European integration? What frames are most prevalent during these key moments? Is there a correlation between the political and public debate, do these debates use different language and frames? And, thus, most importantly, to what extent have these discourses and frames changed over time? Segers (2014) writes that when it comes to European integration, there is a distorted view in the Netherlands (p. 138). Consequently, the Dutch population has always been badly informed on the matter (Eurobarometer standard 78, 2011).

The principal aim of this research is to analyze how the media and politicians have spoken of the EU and further European integration. The aforementioned sub questions will be answered by looking at three key moments in the history of European integration, namely the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the European constitution and subsequent referendum (2004-5) and the euro crisis (2011). Moreover, this decade comprises a pro-EU and pro-integration period (1997) as well as the first expressions of a negative stance towards further European integration (2004-5, 2011; Segers, 2013). These moments, thus, allowed me to research if and how the discourse around the EU changed. Moreover, it is during these moments of further integration that the debate about the European Union becomes politicized and is covered extensively by the media (Van Santen and Vliegenthart, 2015). To analyze the political debate, parliamentary debates on the aforementioned key moments have been used. Debates about the EU and European integration are manifold and span different subjects, like foreign affairs, finance and environment to name but a few. I have chosen to only analyze those debates that touch upon the key moments identified. The public debate has been studied by looking at two weekly journals, De Groene Amsterdammer and Elsevier Weekblad. I chose to analyze these sources because they provide more background on issues than newspaper (Bijwaard, 2009).

I have used a timeframe of five months, so for example, the first five months of 1997 have been analyzed, to see how the EU and European integration is constructed and framed around these events. It has to be noted that when referring to ‘the’ public and ‘the’ political debate in this research, I specifically refer to the two weekly journals and the parliamentary debates of the political parties. Naturally, the public debate consists of many more actors, such as television, social media and newspapers. Similarly, the parliamentary debates that I have chosen are just a small section of the available debates and do not include other sources of 9 information such as party manifestos, speeches outside of parliament and national or European elections.

In the first chapter the epistemology of this research will be expanded on as well as my own position in the research, after which a literature review on European discourses will be presented. In chapter four, the methodology will be substantiated. This chapter also provides a literature review of researches that used a frame analysis to analyze either the political or public debate in the Netherlands. The frame analysis that I have chosen for my analysis will be expanded on in the same chapter. The analysis of the three key moments will be divided into two chapters, one focusing on the political debate, the other on the public debate. Both chapters provide an answer to the aforementioned sub questions. To provide an answer to these questions, both a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis is needed. Both chapters include a paragraph analyzing the quantitative side of the frame analysis, answering the questions ‘What frames are most prevalent during these key moments?’ and a part of the question ‘To what extent have these discourses and frames changed over time?’. The qualitative analysis provides an answer the other part of the latter question, as to ‘How do the actors define the relations between the Netherlands and EU and further European integration?’ and ‘What are the most dominant discourses?’.

Another important element of the social constructionist is that the use of language is influenced by the context in which it is said and also by whom it is said (which political party of which weekly journal). The aim is, therefore, to provide important contextualization’s, a so-called ‘thick’ description, of both the zeitgeist as well as the ideological backgrounds of the weekly journals before presenting the findings of this research. In both chapters the question as to whether and how the discourse around the EU and European integration has changed will be provided in the conclusionary paragraph. Lastly, in the conclusion, an answer will be provided to whether there is a correlation between the political and public debate.

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3 EPISTEMOLOGY

3.1 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM

The epistemological foundation of this research is social constructionism.2 Central to this epistemology is that knowledge is constructed through interaction with others (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2009). In other words, through discourse knowledge about the world is constructed (Ibid.). In order to analyze how the Dutch public and political debate around the European Union and European integration is constructed, a theory of social constructionist discourse analysis will be used as a guiding theory throughout this research. A discourse is defined in this thesis as a ‘a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)’ (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002, p. 1). In this research, the ‘way of talking’ is about the European Union and European integration in the Netherlands. Jørgensen and Philips (2002) define four important premises of the social constructionist discourse analysis, drawing from definitions from Berr (1995) and Gergen (1995). After the explanation of these premises, its embeddedness in this research will be explained.

The first premise, in line with the entire social constructionist epistemology, states that the knowledge in the world should not be seen as an objective truth (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002). The way we see the world ‘out there’, in other words our knowledge and representation of the world, is not a reflection of reality. Reality can only come to us in discursive terms, it exists in our discourse, in the way we use language, and because language is not rigid but is subject to change, meaning can also never be completely fixed (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002). Subsequently, the knowledge and representations that we generate of reality are ‘historically and culturally specific and contingent’, meaning that, depending on this historical and cultural context, our views on the world could have been different and that they could change over time (emphasis mine) (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002, p. 5). Important in this regard, is that knowledge in a social constructionist sense, is anti-foundationalist and anti-essentialist. Because all knowledge is contingent, social constructionism opposes the foundationalist view that knowledge can be grounded on a ‘solid base’ (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002, p. 5). In the same vein does social constructionism oppose the essentialist idea that the social world has fixed and

2 In this thesis, I will speak of social constructionism and not of social constructivism, unless there are quotations using that wording.

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authentic characteristics (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002). Following on that premise, Jørgensen and Philips (2002) define that ‘knowledge is created through social interaction in which we construct common truths and compete about what is true and false’ (p. 5). Lastly, the link between knowledge and social action is defined. The authors state that because there are different social constructions of the world, there will also be different ways of acting in that social world, meaning that social constructions of knowledge have effect on the social world.

Based on these four premises this research is guided. To state this clearly, it is generally understood in this research that the European Union and European integration are socially constructed, meaning that their existence is neither solid nor fixed but always subject to change. Vollaard (2013), in his research on Dutch political discourse concerning European integration, underscores the importance of language in these discourses, stating that ‘if language structures reality, then every language has its own reality’. In that vein, it is possible that a concept like the EU changes when new meaning is given to such a concept. He states that this can be done by attaching meaning to, for example, political events and linking them to pre-existing stories and values (Vollaard, 2013). A good example of this is the Brexit of 2016. The European Union, up until the Brexit vote in 2016, was deemed as an institution that was indestructible, only capable of integrating further or strengthening its capacities. Oliver (2013) stated that the Brexit referendum challenged ‘a taboo of contemplating the idea of a member state withdrawing from European integration’ (p. 1321). Even contemplating leaving was tabooed. But because there was a discursive shift in the British political and public debate, the possibility of the UK leaving the EU became more likely and led, albeit not directly, to the departure of the UK on 31st January 2020 (Hänska and Bauchowitz, 2017). Social constructions of knowledge have effect on the social world. Thus, a social constructionist approach defines the European Union not as an ‘objective truth’ or something that is fixed or stable. Since the European Union consists of 27 Member States, it can be argued that the European Union is socially constructed by these countries together through discourse, in forms such as treaties and policies. An ‘ever closer union’ in this regard does not mean that there is pre-conceived idea of what that ‘closer’ entails, in other words it is not essentialist.

Not only on a supranational level is the construction of the European Union defined, this also happens in the individual member states. Alexander Wendt (1999) states in his book Social theory of International Politics, that constructionism encourages us to ‘look at how actors are socially constructed', but it does not tell us which actors to study or where they are constructed.’ (p. 7) Within international relations, the actors we decide to study need to have an international

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‘dimension’. In this research the actor will be the Netherlands and the international dimension will be the EU, looking at how the Dutch public and political debate around the European Union and further European integration changed, taking several key moments in the history of the European project. As stated in the introduction, the Dutch discourse around the EU and European integration has not been fixed or invariable over the decades, which is in line with the social constructionist stance that knowledge is not fixed and can change over time. Jørgensen and Philips (2002) also state that knowledge and the shaping of reality is historically and culturally specific, stressing the importance of providing contextualization of the four key moments that are selected for this analysis. Only by putting the language in its context it is possible to understand the meaning of the discourse and to see how the discourse changes (McCarthy, 1991; Jørgensen and Philips, 2002). By not only looking at two different journals, De Groene Amsterdammer and Elsevier, but also including political debates that take place in the Dutch parliament, a more inclusive narrative can be generated taking into account that the social world is not constructed by one discourse but by a multitude of viewpoints that can compete with one another. The aim of this research is thus not to generate the ‘true’ discourse in the Netherlands on this subject, since there is not one true discourse, the aim is rather to generate a ‘thick’ description of how the public and political debate in the Netherlands have changed over time concerning the EU and European integration. With a ‘thick’ description, I refer to the contextualization of the data that I generated. I aim to put the data in its historical and cultural context, because this contextualization, as Jørgensen and Philips (2002) argued; influence the social construction of reality and thus the debate on the EU and European integration.

Since I will be analyzing two different debates, it will be interesting to see how both discourses relate to one another. Is there an interplay between the two spheres? Taking a social constructionist approach, the production of knowledge influences the social world, thus, expecting a correlation between the political and the public debate. Concerning this correlation, Jørgensen and Philips (2002) have argued that there is indeed a certain element of power present in this competition between discourses. There is no ‘true’ discourse but there is a ‘winner’ in this competition of discourses, which Laclau and Mouffe (1985) define as the ‘hegemonic discourse’: the perspective that dominates in the discourse. A dominant discourse can thus influence the of view people (or journals) have of the world, or in this case the European Union and European integration. In this way, it can be argued that a correlation between the political and public debate is possible. In the case of the European Union and

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European integration, there are various (dominant) discourses that can be distinguished, such as the Eurosceptic or Europhile perspectives. These types of discourses will be explained in the following chapter.

3.2 POSITIONALITY

In a social constructionist epistemology, the researcher always takes a position in the field that is being studied (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002). Important in this respect is that the researcher makes clear what their position is in the research. Moreover, we as individuals are all ‘guilty’ of framing something that we see on the news or read in the newspapers. So, just as I will elaborate on the ‘[the] process or contextual features of news making’ of the weekly journals, I will do the same with the contextual features of news receiving, that is, my own opinion on the matter (Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011). When it comes to the EU and European integration, I am critical of the current situation. This criticism mostly stems from the lack of democratic accountability within the structure of the institutions, taking Ursula von der Leyen’s ‘election’ as a turning point in my understanding of the EU. This does not mean that I am against international cooperation or supranational structures per se, it has to do with the internal politics and workings of the EU at this point. My own critical frame could influence my way of understanding the data. This will be minimized by largely using a deductive method of research (as will be explained in chapter 4), while keeping in mind that there is not such a thing as an ‘objective truth’ (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002; Hope, 2010). First, the data I will generate will be put in its historical context and the standpoints of the political parties and weekly journals will first be provided. In this way, I can correctly place the articles and speeches in its context. Moreover, by being transparent, the data will be available to the reader in the appendix, readers can dispute my interpretations and conclusions (Hope, 2010).

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4 EXISTING DISCOURSES ON THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

4.1 EUROENTHUSIAST, EUROSCEPTIC, EUROPRAGMATISTS AND EUROREJCETS

The discourse around the Netherlands and European integration, as was discussed in the introduction, has fluctuated in almost seventy years of the European project. Both in the media and politically there have been voices in the Netherlands for and against the initiation of the project and further integration in the decades that followed the signing of the Treaty of Paris (1951) and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Dutch debate concerning the European integration project has been subject to many books, dissertations and articles. Before touching upon the Dutch case, it is worth to look at what different discourses around the European Union and European integration have been defined in general.

As explained in the previous chapter, in this thesis a discourse is seen as ‘a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)’ (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002, p. 1). When it comes to the discourse around European Union and European integration the typology developed by Kopecký and Mudde (2002) is widely used or referred to.3 They categorize political parties’ stance on Europe in Euroenthusiast, Eurosceptics, Europragmatists and Eurorejects discourses. The categorization of these four elements is based on their support for the EU on the one hand, and their support for European integration on the other. Euroenthusiast are those that support the general ideas of European integration and believe that these ideas should be institutionalized (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002). Eurosceptics in this typology are parties that support the general ideas of European integration but show pessimism when it comes to the current ideas about that integration (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002, p. 302). They combine Eurosceptic and Euro-pessimist elements. Europragmatists ‘do not support the general ideas of European integration underlying the EU, nor do they necessarily oppose them, yet they do support the EU’ (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002, p. 303). In short, Europragmatists make decisions based on its profitability for their country or constituents. Lastly, there are Eurorejects, who combine a Europhobe and EU-pessimist stance. They do not support the European integration project nor the EU in general.

3 Cited 896 times.

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This typology shows that there is no such thing as ‘a discourse’, there are multiple discourses when it comes to the EU. Other discourse categorizations, put in the Dutch context, will be analyzed in the next paragraph.

4.2 THE DUTCH DISCOURSES ON THE EU AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: AN OVERVIEW

This paragraph will provide an overview of what has been written about the Netherlands and the EU. The main focus will be put on the literature that used a discourse analysis, while more historical works will be briefly summarized. The latter will be used throughout this thesis to provide the historical and cultural context of the three key moments that are central to this research.

Many authors have focused on the initial post-war years, when there was an international willingness to establish international organizations and focused on the considerations of the Dutch political parties and government to go along with these initiatives (Van Heerikhuizen, 1998; Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2001; Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2017; De Bruin, 2010; Griffith, 1990; Segers, 2013-2019). Literature that has dealt with the media in these initial years of European integration is rather absent, with just one study focusing on the coverage of weekly journals (Bijwaard, 2009). While literature that has focused on the media coverage of European integration up until 1990 is less frequent, after 1990, mainly due to digitalization, the number of media analyses increased (see Vollaard, Van der Harst and Voerman, 2015). Then, there is also literature that deals with the entire period of European integration, from 1945 up until the second decade of this millennium, treating the historical context of the decisions of and the role the Netherlands has played in that (Vollaard, Van der Harst, Voerman, 2015; Vollaard, 2005; Vollaard, 2015, Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2017; Segers, 2013; Segers, 2019). Others have focused on the intellectual debate concerning European integration (Hollander, 2011) and the political and parliamentary debates concerning Europe (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013). The Netherlands as a case study has also frequented in comparative analyses or in analyses that take a large number of (candidate) member states (e.g. Kriesi, 2007; Koopmans and Statham, 2009; Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2014; Boomgaarden et al., 2010; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010).

Sources that focus on analyzing the discourses of Dutch political debate around European integration and how these discourses have changed have featured less in academic literature,

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albeit with some notable exceptions. Kiratli (2016), for example, applies a discourse analysis of Best et al (2012) on the political party manifestos of the largest parties in the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. Best et al.’s (2012) discourse analysis looks at three levels, cognitive-evaluative (What does integration stand for?), the emotive level (looking at the emotional affiliation and the projective level (focusing on the future of the EU) (Kiratli, 2016, p. 642). In the Netherlands, Kiratli (2016) focused on the Christian Democratic party (CDA) and the Labor party (PvdA). Although Kiratli’s research is qualitative in nature, it misses contextualization. For a comparative case study, this brings useful insights, but to understand how these discourses have changed and to what extent they have changed is difficult to disseminate. Providing historical and cultural contextualization of these discourses is the aim of this research, as has been done in research by Robert Harmsen (2008), Hans Vollaard (2013) and Harryvan and Van der Harst (2013).

Harmsen (2008) focuses on the discourse of the European integration project shaped by political elites. Harmsen defines a discourse in this regard as ‘the overarching themes in which national representation of European integration are framed’ (Harmsen, 2008, p. 317). By drawing on party programs and official government documents, together with national press coverage and polling data, he analyses the shift of discourse on European integration by taking two specific events, namely the 2005 Constitutional referendum and the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference. Harmsen uses two themes to substantiate his research, namely ‘fit’ and ‘place’. Fit, in this context, is understood as the ‘goodness of fit’ between EU-policies and templates and that of the individual member states. Place refers to the role of a certain country in the EU- decision making process and in European integration as a whole. Harmsen concludes that the federalist framework that was prevalent during the early 1990s, as was described in the introduction, has shifted to a more ‘limits of Europe’ type of discourse (Harmsen, 2008). He states that the ‘fit’ and ‘place’ discourse has turned to misfits and thus has put the EU and its integration under more scrutiny (Harmsen, 2008).

Hans Vollaard (2013) in his article on the structures of the Dutch-Europe debate, tries to dissect how European integration has been shaped in the Netherlands by linking it to discourses about the Dutch identity and place of the Netherlands in the world. The author covers the European integration discourses from the end of the second world war up until the national elections of 2009. The dominant discourse of the initial years of European integration was characterize by the necessity and inevitability of integration (Vollaard, 2013). After these years, a dominant ‘progressive discourse’ emerged, in which Netherlands should be a leading nation when it

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comes to international cooperation. The Dutch were world citizens, not ‘provincialists’ or ‘nationalists’. European interests became Dutch interests during these progressive years. After the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the Netherlands adopted a more functionalist/pragmatic approach, openly rejecting the progressive discourse of the decades before. This more ‘pragmatic’ discourse also included a nationalist discourse, with political parties claiming that member-states should regain control of the decision-making instead of furthering integration (Vollaard, 2013). These discourses were also found in the 2009 national elections. Harmsen and Vollaard have both concluded that the Dutch discourse has changed in the last decades from a positive view towards the EU and further integration to an integration project in which it finds itself becoming more and more uncomfortable, hence the ‘misfit’ discourse Harmsen found and the more pragmatic/nationalist discourse Vollaard found.

Harryvan and Van der Harst (2013), in their analysis of Dutch political parliamentary debates in the Netherlands from 1945 to 2013, defined five categorizations to classify the positions of the political parties when it comes to Europe and further integration. The authors distinguish between ‘Europe-maximalization’, ‘Europe-positivism’, ‘Europe-retaining’, ‘Europe- renationalization’ and ‘Europe-rejecting’.4 Europe-maximalization equals a positive view of European integration, deeming it desirable as a solution for transnational issues and as a political goal in and of itself (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013, p. 18). Europe-positivism is similar to the maximalization attitude, with the exception of not seeing integration as a political goal in itself. These two can be understood as ‘Europhile’ viewpoints. The Europe- renationalization attitude deems the European project as positive in some areas but is of the opinion that the Netherlands has given up too much of their national sovereignty and national competences and want to re-nationalize some of these lost competences. The Europe-rejecting point of view is similar to that of Kopecký and Mudde (2002) and opposes any European supranationalism and deems the European competences over national competences to be of an occupying nature (Harryvan and Van der Harts, 2013. These two can be deemed ‘Eurosceptic’ according to the authors (Harryvan and Van der Harts, 2013, p. 19). The last attitude, Europe- retaining, considers European integration as finished and deems further integration to be unnecessary.

4 These categorizations are translated from the original Dutch definitions of ‘Europa-maximalistisch’, ‘Europe- positivistisch’, ‘Europa-behoudend’, ‘Europa-renationalistisch’ and ‘Europa-verwerpend’.

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These paragraphs have shown that there is broad variety when it comes to defining a national ‘Europe’ discourse, ranging from Eurosceptic, Europe-maximalist or ‘progressive’ discourses to a ‘misfit’ type of discourse. Although the formulations differ, in many cases the types of discourses that are found show similarities. The utilitarian and pragmatic discourses can be seen as Europragmatic, a nationalist discourse as Eurorejectionist or Europe-renationalization, and a progressive discourse concurs with the Euroenthusiast and Europe-maximalist and - positivist discourses. What can also be concluded from this literature overview, is that many researches have focused only on the discourse of the political spectrum of the Netherlands when it comes to European integration. Discourse analyses of the Dutch public debate have been absent, where media is mostly subject to frame analyses (as we will see in the following chapter; Bijwaard, 2009). In general, an analysis that encompasses both political party discourses as well as media discourses in the Netherlands have been absent in the current literature. As Harmsen (2008) points out in his article, ‘little attention has thus far been paid to the broader reshaping of the contours of Dutch European ‘discourse’ [..] and the manner in which these have altered over time’ (p. 317).

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5 METHODOLOGY

5.1 METHOD

Where the social constructionist discourse analysis approach will the guiding theory of knowledge, a frame analysis will be the guiding method in conducting this research. Mat Hope (2010) states that a frame analysis is ‘a discourse analysis method that is principally concerned with dissecting how an issue is defined and problematized.’ (Hope, 2010, introduction). In a similar vein, Entman (1993) defines that to frame is ‘to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.’ (p. 52). I have chosen to use a frame analysis as a method in this research to, in the words of Jørgensen and Philips, ‘categorize the world particular ways’ (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002, p. 98). By categorizing the public and political debates in particular frames, such as an ‘economic profit’ frame, it is possible to define the discourses of the various sources I will analyze. Because I will generate a vast amount of data, it will not be possible to just analyze words or sentences, so I will also look at entire paragraphs or articles. From words, to frames to a definition of the ‘discourse’. As Bateson (1955) has argued ‘statements do not have intrinsic meanings, but only acquire those in a frame that is constituted by context and style’. Taken together, this would allow me, in a larger framework, to see if these discourses have been subject to change over the course of fourteen years of European integration, if there are so-called hegemonic discourses in the Dutch debate and to see if there are correlations between the political and public debate.

The frame analysis will be done by taking both a deductive approach, where you do have predefined frames in mind before analyzing and an inductive approach, without having predefined frames in mind before the research (De Vreese, 2004). The predefined frames in the deductive approach have identifiable characteristics, such as core sentences or keywords. In a deductive analysis you will look for these characteristics (De Vreese, 2004, p. 53). Conversely, with an inductive approach you do not have core sentences or keywords to look for, you build a frame while researching the text. The exact usage of these approaches will be explained in paragraph 4.3. Hertog and McLeod (2001) have criticized the inductive approach for being difficult to replicate or to generalize. Flyvbjerg (2006) has stated, however, that social sciences should not be about making predictions or generating generalizations and should value more

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context-dependent research (p. 3). While taking Flyvbjerg’s stance in account, I have chosen to use predefined frames as ‘any production feature of verbal or visual texts as a candidate for news frames is too broad a view’ (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997, p. 39). These predefined frames will be mentioned in the next paragraph. The aim of this thesis is not, however, to generate generalizable data as this would go against the social constructionist idea that nothing is solid or stable. As I will not focus on the entire Dutch discourse around the EU and European integration, it will be an in-depth analysis of a certain time frame in Dutch history.

Next to ‘frames’ you also have the verb ‘framing’. Van Zoonen and Vliegenthart (2011) state that in media and communication studies, academics fail to make a distinction between these two. Moreover, when compared to other fields of studies, such as sociology, there is an apparent difference in using these two concepts (Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011). The authors define a ‘frame’ or multiple ‘frames’ as ‘content features of news’, the elements the news outlet focuses most on (Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011, p. 102). De Vreese (2005) states that frames ‘are part of political arguments, journalistic norms, and social movements’ (p. 53). Framing, on the other hand, is defined as ‘[the] process or contextual features of news making and receiving’ (Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011, p. 102). This distinction is relevant for two reasons, one of which will be explained here, the other will be explained in the next paragraph. As I will analyze two weekly journals that have different opinions on the European Union and European integration, their ‘contextual features’ in the newsroom will also differ. The same goes for the Dutch parliamentary debates, where political parties have different views on the EU and European integration.

Because of these contextual features, the authors of the articles or the politicians in the debates will not be individually analyzed but will be treated as part of the journals and the political parties they represent. Taking Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen (2011), ‘that the knowledge, attitudes and behaviors of individual producers are the product of professional and organizational processes in the newsroom, rather than traits or decisions of autonomous individuals.’ (p. 111). It has to be noted that many researches concerning framing and frames, focus on the consequences of certain frames for public opinion, so-called frame-effects (see e.g. Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; De Vreese, 2003; Schuck and De Vreese, 2008; Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgaarden, De Vreese, 2011). The principal aim of this research, however, will be dissecting the language and frames used to describe the EU and European integration in the Dutch political and public debate. Researching frame-effects will therefore not feature in this research.

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5.2 FRAMING THE EU AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The political debates in the Netherlands have mostly been subject to discourse analyses, whereas the public debate has mostly been subject to frame analyses. The Dutch media coverage of the EU has been subject to a number of researches (Vollaard, Van der Harst, Voerman, 2015; ’t Lam, 2012; Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, De Vreese, Schuck, 2010; Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest, 2010; De Beus and Mak. 2009; Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgaarden, De Vreese, 2008; Schuck and De Vreese, 2006; Kleijnnijenhuis, Takens, Van Attevelt, 2005; Van Donselaar, 2009; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). The results of these researches will be very briefly mentioned here but will be expanded on in chapter five and six, where the results of my own frame analysis will be compared with comparable articles.

In a number of the aforementioned researches a frame analysis was used. One of these researches looked at more generic frames like the ‘conflict’, ‘benefit’ and ‘disadvantage’ frames (Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgaarden, De Vreese, 2010). Other researches have looked at the tone of the news coverage, whether it was negative, neutral or positive (‘t Lam, 2012, De Vreese, Banducci, Semetko and Boomgaarden, 2012; De Beus and Mak, 2009). The first two articles found that the news in the Netherlands covering the EU is mostly neutral in nature but is followed by more negative frames. De Beus and Mak (2009) concluded that over the course of their research (1990-2002) the share of negative news had increased. De Beus and Mak (2009), Pfetsch et al. (2004), Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010) and Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), used more specific frames, such as the ‘economic’ frame, the ‘norms and values’ frame or the ‘identity’ frame, in their analyses. This more specific frame-usage research, is more suitable to my research as I aim to generate a ‘thick’ description, whereas most methods ‘are limited in their ability to retrieve detailed information from texts, and especially to establish relationships between actors, issues and frames’ (Vliegenthart, 2007, p. 144). That is not to say, that frames like ‘risk’ or ´opportunity’ will not feature in this research. These frames are usually part of larger frames like the ‘economic prosperity’ frame or the ‘security and ecology’ frame.

In this research, I will use the frames formulated by Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010). Although this research is solely focused on the frames used by political parties, they did so by looking at media outlets. As this research concentrates on both media and political parties, this research method seemed most applicable. I will briefly describe the various frames that they

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identified, after which the following paragraph will expand on my data collection and the use of the frames formulated by Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010).

Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010) disseminate the frames that political parties use with regards to European integration by looking at quality newspapers of six EU member-states of which the Netherlands is one. The authors distinguish between three generic frames: the cultural frame, the economic frame and other utilitarian one. These three frames are then divided into subsections. So, the cultural frame has two subframes, namely ‘national identity’ and ‘multicultural-universalist’. The former emphasizes elements like national boundaries, national sovereignty and references to a specific (homogenous) culture, fearing the loss of these unique features due to further integration. The latter, conversely, welcomes European integration as it ‘contributes to a better understanding between peoples, and that it may remove cultural barriers’ (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest, 2010, p. 500). This frame favors both cultural openness and exchange (multicultural) as well as general moral principles like democracy, civil rights and rule of law (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest, 2010). The second and third frame, the economic and other utilitarian frames refer to both positive and negative aspects. The first frame is divided into ‘labor and social security’ and ‘economic prosperity’ frames (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest, 2010, p. 499). The former focuses both on fear of unemployment, loss of wages and a decline of the social welfare state (negative), as well as on the benefits of EU-membership for the social security of a country (positive). The latter concentrates on European integration in ‘the context of wealth and growth’ (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest, 2010, p. 501). In general it stresses the benefits of the EU internal market its the international competitiveness (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest, 2010) The last frame, ‘other utilitarian’ frames, is divided into a ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame and a ‘security and ecology’ frame (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest, p. 501). The first frame focuses on the action and capacity of the state, referring to, for example, the poor governance of EU institutions (negative) or the necessity of international cooperation to tackle transnational issues (positive). The second and last subframe focuses on the consequences of integration for internal, external and environmental security.

This paragraph and the previous chapter have also shown that analyses that encompass both political party debates as well as media debates have been largely absent in the current literature, especially when it comes to weekly journals (as will be explained in chapter six).

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5.3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

In order to get a comprehensive understanding of the Dutch debate on EU and European integration, I have chosen to look at three different moments of further integration, moments that asked for a constructive debate about how the Netherlands would like to see further integration develop (or not). Van Santen and Vliegenthart (2013) have shown that coverage of the EU increases during important key moments like the Treaty of Amsterdam and the European Constitution. It is during these moments of institutional (European summits), policy (treaties) or national (referenda) events that media attention for the EU was at its highest (Van Santen and Vliegenthart, 2013). By looking at two weekly journals and parliamentary documents, an attempt is made to shed light on how both the political as well as the public constructed and framed the Dutch stance on the EU and European integration. In this way, it is possible to see if and what kinds of shifts have occurred in that debate. Moreover, from a social constructionist standpoint, taking only one side of the debate would go against the idea that ‘the social world is not constructed by one discourse but by a multitude of viewpoints that can compete with one another’ (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002). In the end, this research should generate a ‘thick’ description of the three key moments I have chosen.

For every year that I chose, a so-called anchor point has been chosen. For the first key moment, the Treaty of Amsterdam, I chose the dates during which the Amsterdam summit took place (16 and 17 June 1997), as the anchor point. For the European Constitution, the date of the referendum, 1 June 2005, was chosen. Lastly, the European Summit of 21 July 2011, during which the EU-member states discussed the necessary steps in the eurozone crisis, has been chosen as the final anchor point. All news coverage of Elsevier and De Groene from the five months before these anchor points have been selected. The reason for only looking at the preceding months, and not the succeeding months as well, has to do with density of news coverage, which was significantly higher before the anchor points than after. This data collection has resulted in the following numbers. For the De Groene, I have analyzed 58 articles (19 from 1997, 22 from 2005 and 17 from 2011), for Elsevier 97 articles (21 in 1997, 45 in 2005 and 31 in 2011) have been subject to analysis. In the bibliography (chapter 9) an overview of the parliamentary debates and those articles that were subject to the discourse analyses (paragraph 6.2 and 7.4) can be found.

The collection of the data of these two weekly journals differ in a number of ways. Elsevier, has an archive with a search engine with which you can look for certain words, sentences and

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articles, and you can select a timeslot. To search for relevant articles of 1997, I chose to look for articles that featured ‘Treaty of Amsterdam’, for 2005 ‘European Constitution’ and for the Euro crisis I selected multiple search words, namely ‘European integration’, ‘euro crisis’ and ‘Europe’. I chose to expand the search for the latter event because there was no fixed event that I could focus on as with the other two. Selecting articles for De Groene on the other hand, was different, as their archive does not have a search engine. Their archive is divided into years of publication. So, for these three years, I looked through all editions, usually 50 per year, and selected those articles that featured ‘EU’, ‘Europe’, ‘European integration’ and ‘euro’ in the headlines. I realized that this selection might not give a complete picture of all the articles that featured the EU, so I have tried to also include articles that did not necessarily feature one of the aforementioned words in the headlines but referred to relatable subjects, such as the economy and foreign affairs.

The parliamentary debates have been limited to two debates per selected event (6 in total). I have chosen those debates that treated the focused on the key moments. So, in 1997, I chose those debates in which the Treaty of Amsterdam was directly discussed. Important to note, is that parliamentary debates on the treaty also featured in smaller groups, so-called parliamentary committees, but these debates usually feature highly detailed discussions on the consequences of the treaty. As the aim is to get an understanding of how the political parties frame the relation between the EU and the Netherlands, focusing on miniature details would distort the possibility to get a comprehensive understanding of the political parties’ relation to the EU as a whole. For example, the parliamentary Economic and Financial Committee solely discuss the economic consequences of the treaty, so the chosen frame will always be economic. In the larger debates, the ones I have chosen, the parties focus on their entire stance on the EU and further European integration, allowing me to dissect specific discourses. The last key moment, the Euro crisis, has an already predefined frame, namely the ‘economic consequences’ frame. I have tried to not only focus on the debate on the European summit of July 2011, but also include the yearly debate on the ‘State of the European Union’ in my analysis. This debate discussed the EU as a whole and does not only concentrate on the economic consequences of EU-membership.

After the data selection, I used atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis tool, to analyze the various documents. With a frame analysis, especially when you use predefined frames that have been used in this analysis, it is important to define how you identify these various frames in the text. In general, I used the method of looking for core sentences, paragraphs or keywords that would

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characterize a certain frame. I coded every sentence or paragraph that formulated a value judgment about the EU and European integration, taking the definitions of the six sub-frames formulated by Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010) (see paragraph 4.3). In this way, it is possible to work your way ‘up’ from words, sentences and paragraphs, to frames and, ultimately, to discourses. When researching for such frames in a more qualitative manner, by going through and reading all the debates and articles, it is possible to miss core sentences or paragraphs. To see if I indeed found all relevant sentences and paragraphs, I also searched for key words, related to the frames, such as ‘social security’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘euro’ and so on. Important to note, is that most of the sentences or paragraphs that were coded featured multiple frames, that also related to one another (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest, 2010). So, for example, an article in the Elsevier noticed the following when talking about the implications of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam: ‘under the guise of more efficiency and effectiveness for the EU, national sovereignty of the member-states is reduced’ (Fortuyn, 1997). Here you see a clear example of how the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame is opposed to the ‘national identity’ frame, which corresponds to a loss of national sovereignty. All articles and parliamentary debates have been treated in this manner.

Besides these predefined frames, I have also found two ‘new’ frames over the course of my analysis. Namely the ‘democratic deficit’ frame and the ‘informative’ frame. The ‘democratic deficit’ frame can be divided into two sub-frames, namely a democratic deficit on the national level, the ‘national democratic deficit’ frame, and on a European level, the ‘EU democratic deficit’ frame. The first sub-frame refers to, for example, the (minimal) role the Dutch parliament plays in EU decision-making and the debate, or rather lack of debate, on European issues in the Netherlands. The latter sub-frame, which is a well-known concept when it comes to European Union affairs, refers to the lack of transparency and openness of the EU- institutions as well as the lack of democratic control of the European Parliament. The democratic deficit of the EU can also be deducted from the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame of Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010), focusing on the ‘poor governance of European institutions’, but this, in my opinion, does not cover the entirety of what a ‘democratic deficit’ entails, such as transparency, accountability and a democratic debate (a public sphere so to say). Both sub-frames are, thus, more negative in nature. This frame, ‘democratic deficit’ has been found in both public and political debates and, more importantly, is one of the most found frames in my analysis (as will be explained later).

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The other inductively found frame, the informative frame was only found in the public debate, and refers to those paragraphs and articles that provided the reader with general information about the EU, without also providing a value judgment. I have chosen to highlight this frame as well, because I wanted to analyze if the information about the EU increased or decreased during the key moments. Some authors have concluded that European subject have not increased significantly in the Netherlands over the last decades (Pfetsch et al., 2004). In this way, I could analyze if the weekly journals tried informing their readers on what the EU entails and, more importantly, if that informative frame increased over the years. The results of this analysis will be elaborated on in the coming chapters.

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6 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

In the coming chapters, I will elaborate on the findings of my frame analysis of the political and public debate, with one paragraph focusing on the quantitative results and one paragraph focusing on the content of the frames that were found. By quantifying my data analysis, I will be able to dissect which frames were most prevalent during these years and thus provide an answer to the sub questions ‘What frames are most prevalent during these key moments?’, and ‘To what extent have these frames changed over time?’. In the qualitative part, the focus will be on the language behind the frames used by the political parties and the two weekly journals, providing an answer to the sub question ‘What language is used by the weekly journals/political parties to define the relationship between the Netherlands and EU and further European integration?’. These sub questions will allow me to answer the research question: ‘How and to what extent did the Dutch public and political debate around the European Union and European integration change between 1997 and 2011?’. This chapter will concentrate on the political debate, the subsequent chapter on the public debate.

6.1 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The frequency of the frames used in the political debate has been visualized in Table 1. I have chosen to look at the frames used per year, so 1997, 2005 and 2011, and not to focus on the individual political parties as this paragraph tries to answer the questions ‘What frames are most prevalent during these key moments?’, and ‘To what extent have these frames changed over time?’. This research tries to expand that knowledge by looking at more specific frames, such as defined by Helbling, Hoeglinger, Wüest (2010). The six subframes that they identified, the ‘nationalistic’ and ‘multicultural-universalist’ frames (cultural), ‘labor and social security’ and ‘economic prosperity’ frames (economic consequences) and ‘efficiency and efficacy’ and ‘ecology and security’ frames (other utilitarian), have been used in this analysis (see paragraph 4.2 for explanation). In addition, the ‘national democratic deficit’ and ‘European democratic deficit’ have been inductively identified during the research (see paragraph 4.3 for the explanation). This quantitative analysis will in part be compared to Helbling, Hoeglinger, Wüest (2010) outcome. The authors differentiated their frame prevalence per type of political party, such as socialists, communists and liberals. I will not make the same differentiation per party, but I can, based on the party constellation of the Dutch parliament in the years that I

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analyzed, analyze if their frame prevalence concurs with my own data. The dissection of which party said what and thus, to which discourses these frames refer, will be substantiated on in the following paragraph.

Table 1. Political debate. Type of frame per year, in percentages of the total number of frames

1997 2005 2011 Total percentage Frequency Nationalistic 9,6% 15,0% 14,1% 12,6% 34 Multicultural-universalist 3,8% 5,0% 2,4% 3,7% 10 Economic prosperity 3,8% 12,5% 17,6% 10,8% 29 Labor and social security 17,3% 7,5% 7,1% 11,2% 30 Efficiency and efficacy 25,0% 23,8% 23,5% 24,2% 65 Ecology and security 10,6% 5,0% 20,0% 11,9% 32 National democratic deficit 7,7% 17,5% 8,2% 10,8% 29 European democratic 22,1% 13,8% 7,1% 14,9% 40 deficit Total 100 100 100

(N) 104 80 85 269

As the results in Table 1 reveal, there is a lot of fluctuation in the frame division, although the most prevalent frame, the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame, remains rather consistent. The same can be said of the most infrequent frame ‘multicultural-universalist’. The ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame may refer to ‘the workings of the political system’, ‘the poor governance of the European institutions’ or ‘improving its position on international politics’ (Helbling, Hoeglinger, Wüest, 2010, p. 501). In general, taking the total percentage (fourth column of Table 1), the ‘other utilitarian’ frame, has been most frequently found with more than a third of the total frames. The other frequently used frame is the ‘democratic deficit’ frame, which covers more than a fourth of the total frames found. When taking these two aforementioned frames that emphasize the institutional and democratic character of the EU, almost half of the frames found in 1997 were of that nature (see the first column of Table 1). In the years that followed the prevalence declined somewhat to 37,6% in 2005 and 30,6% in 2011 (see column two and three of Table 1). Considering the fact that the Dutch parliament is responsible for assessing the treaties that are proposed by Brussels, especially the institutional consequences of the treaty for the EU as well as for their own parliament, the prevalence of the two aforementioned frame is not surprising. In addition, Helbling, Hoeglinger, Wüest (2010) found that especially the Green parties, the Christian democrats, the liberals and the social democrats used ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame. Considering the fact that in 1997, these parties combined had 131 seats (of 150 seats), the prevalence of the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame in that year can be explained. The decrease from these two most prevalent frames can be partly explained

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by the fact that in 2005, when not only the EU’s institutional character was subject of discussion but also the role of the Dutch parliament came under scrutiny in the form of a referendum, the focus shifted to the ‘national democratic deficit’.

Furthermore, in 2011, with the eurozone crisis and the Arab Spring as the main topics of discussion, the frame shifted to the ‘economic consequences’ frame and the ‘ecology and security’ frame, with the latter referring to internal, external and environmental security. In general, the ‘economic prosperity’ frame increased significantly over the course of the three years of analysis. This frame does not only emphasize the positive economic consequences of integration but also to more technical issues such as ‘budgetary considerations’ (Helbling, Hoeglinger, Wüest 2010)). Interestingly, where the emphasis on economic prosperity increased, that of the ‘labor and social security’ decreased every year. Also, the ‘nationalistic’ frame, emphasizing national sovereignty, increased from 1997 onwards. According to Helbling, Hoeglinger, Wüest (2010), it is mostly the populist parties that use this type of frame. In 1997, populist parties on the left and the right only held a small faction in Dutch parliament, with a total of 5 seats (Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 1994, n.d.). The constellation changed in 2003 and 2010, especially in the latter case, where populist left and right had more than a quarter of the seats in parliament (Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2003, n.d.; Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2010, n.d.). As we will see in the coming paragraphs, the topic of national sovereignty and national identity was put on the agenda in the 1990s and peaked in the early 2000s and 2010s, explaining the growing use of the ‘nationalistic’ frame, not only by those usually associated with nationalistic arguments (Harryvan and Voerman, 2013, p. 294).

This quantitative analysis has provided answers to the sub questions formulated at the beginning of this paragraph. It has shown that the Dutch parliament mainly focused on the institutional side of the EU and European integration. This prevalence remained rather consistent over the years, with the other frames being subject to change. The fact that the prevalence of these less frequented frames differed significantly over the years, indicates that social world has an impact on what is being discussed. Helbling, Hoeglinger, Wüest (2010) also conclude that the position of political parties on European issues depends on the traditional interests of the party regarding national and European issues, if they belong to the political establishment, as well as the context of the country and the issue that is being discussed (p. 516). In the following paragraphs, this combination of contextual factors will be considered when the language behind the frames will be extrapolated.

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6.2 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

In this paragraph I will ‘get behind’ the most prevalent frames that were found and identified in the previous paragraph. The frame analysis has given an indication of what the parliamentary debate focused on when referring to the relationship between the Netherlands and the EU. The quantitative frame analysis, however, does not cover the entire story. Frames give you an insight in the way something is categorized, but normally with frame analyses the language that is used remains hidden (Vliegenthart, 2007). In the frame typology of Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010), the ‘labor and social security’ frame and the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame include both positive and negative assessments of European integration (see paragraph 4.2). Thus, foregrounding and signifying the core sentences and keywords behind the frames that I found is important as to make such distinctions visible, also from the understanding that the language that is used forms our reality (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002). In short, I want to analyze the key words and core sentences that the political parties used, to extrapolate which discourses were most dominant in these debates. Consequently, I can answer the sub questions, ‘How do the political parties define the relationship between the Netherlands and EU and further European integration?’ and ‘What are the most dominant discourses?’.

This paragraph will be divided into three subparagraphs, each focusing on one key moment. The contextualization’s, both of the EU as well as of the Netherlands, will forego the actual analysis, so that the reader understands the setting in which the political parties framed their arguments. I have decided to analyze the discourse based on the prevalence of the frames, while trying to adhere to the order in which the parties spoke. I will give a general account of the discourse behind the frames while sometimes highlighting what individual parliamentarians have said. The referencing will be done by quoting the politician’s party and year of debate between brackets, for example: (Timmermans, PvdA, 2005). But, as stated in chapter 4, politicians in the debates will not be individually analyzed but will be treated as part of the political parties they represent’. The viewpoints of the political parties that were in parliament in 1997, 2005 and 2011 are mentioned throughout the paragraphs.

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6.2.1 Treaty of Amsterdam

6.2.1.1 The 1990s

The 1990s was a decade full of significant changes, both in Netherlands as also in Europe. In 1994, the PvdA had become the biggest party of the Netherlands and formed a coalition with the liberal VVD and social-liberal D66. For the first time in almost a century, the Netherlands did not have a confessional party in the government (Kennedy, 2017).5 This meant that more liberal policies were embedded in the personal sphere of the Dutch population. The Netherlands was already known for its liberal stance on cannabis, a policy other European country denounced as the Netherlands started to become an important base for the illegal international drug trade. Other liberal policies that were initiated in the 1990s were the legalization of gay marriage, the legalization of sex workers and the decriminalization of euthanasia (Kennedy, 2017, p. 373). The 1990s also saw the initiation of a broader discussion about the Dutch national identity, triggered by further European integration, globalization, immigration and the integration of newcomers. Especially Frits Bolkestein, party leader of the VVD, openly questioned and firmly criticized these issues. He advocated for a more functional approach to European integration, in which the national interest of the Netherlands should be central (Voerman and Vollaard, 2017).

While these societal and political shifts occurred in the Netherlands in the 1990s, also on a European level the context changed significantly. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) resulted in far reaching integration between the member-states, in economic, monetary, environmental and social areas. The most important element of the Maastricht treaty was the establishment of a pathway towards a common currency, the euro, and a monetary policy (Economic and Monetary Union, EMU). The Dutch economy was thriving at the time and a large part of the Dutch population was positive about the effects of a globalizing economy. Monetary integration seemed like a logical step, especially for the Netherlands who had always advocated for the EMU and an integrated internal market (Harryvan and Voerman, 2013). Nevertheless, the strict rules that were to be applied to monetary integration, the so-called Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), caused difficulties in many of the member-states, culminating in a fear

5 The coalition led by Cort van der Linden and formed in 1918 was the last coalition without a confessional party.

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that the euro would become a ‘soft currency’ (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013).6 Others criticized the EU, with the EMU and the euro, that it focused too much on the market and not on the social side of the economy. Moreover, in the 1990s, the Netherlands had become a net payer to the EU, with the largest contribution to Brussels per capita (Harryvan and Voerman, 2013). The fact that EU-membership was going ‘to cost money’ did not resonate well with the more Eurosceptic factions in parliament, a subject that would become more contentious over the years. At the same time, the economy of the early 1990s had deteriorated resulting in large unemployment rates throughout Europe.

The main element that needed to be discussed in Amsterdam, was the possible accession of the Central and European States that had been part or were under the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. For the EU to be able to smoothly integrate these new states, the union needed to change institutionally, especially the decision-making procedures needed to be changed. Important questions where the decision-making process and the number of European Commissioners (comparable to ministers on a national level). In line with this further integration, the discussion on the lack of democracy, the ‘democratic deficit’, of the European Union immediately followed the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, with a rejection of the Treaty in a Danish referendum and just a slim majority in France’s referendum. The aim of the Treaty of Amsterdam was therefore to, among other things, bring the EU closer to its citizens (Dinan, 2014). The EU had already gotten closer to its citizens than ever before, as passports, number plates and parental leave, to name but a few, were all Europeanized in the Maastricht treaty (Dinan, 2014; Voerman and Van der Harst, 2013, p. 176).

It is generally understood that the Amsterdam treaty was a disappointment from a standpoint of institutional reform, as only small issues were resolved while others were postponed to a later stage (Dinan, 2014). The treaty is, therefore, mostly remembered for its changes in the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The CFSP was strengthened with specific instruments and issues regarding CFSP were put on the agenda. This led to the establishment of the High Commissioner for Common Foreign and Security Policy, who would oversee finding a common position in the EU (Van Meurs et al., 2013).

6 What a ‘soft currency’ usually refers to is the high inflation that is attached to such a currency. With a hard currency, the inflation is low, and the currency is sought after more. A hard currency is usually a sign of a flourishing economy, whereas a soft currency is not.

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6.2.1.2 Discussing ‘Amsterdam’

In the analysis of 1997, I have chosen to look at one parliamentary debate before the European summit in Amsterdam, and one after. These debates were so-called ‘interruption debates’, which allow parties to interrupt the speeches made by political parties’ representatives. As was put forward in the previous paragraph, the bigger the political party, the longer your speech- time is.7 Especially the debate before the European summit of 16 and 17 June 1997 had many interruptions, partly explaining the higher number of frames as to the other years.

As was highlighted in paragraph 5.1, the frames emphasizing institutional and democratic arguments were the most prevalent frames in the parliamentary debates of 1997. These frames often featured together, sometimes also combined with other frames. Almost all political parties were critical of the treaty and its inability to strengthen the democratic standards of the EU, both in its accountability and transparency and in the decision-making procedures.8 Furthermore, many political parties condemned the lack of institutional reform in particular, because the principal aim of the treaty had been to make the union institutionally ‘ready’ to welcome the new member states. The four biggest parties, D66, PvdA, VVD and CDA, and GroenLinks advocated for a more incisive and transparent Europe which was necessary for the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries. When it came to the strengthening of democratic control, the same five parties acknowledged that small steps had been made, although they all underscored that it had not significantly diminished the democratic deficit. CDA and VVD, while overall advocating for more integration, also stressed the importance of subsidiarity, the principle that decision-making happens as close to the citizens as possible (De Hoop Scheffer, CDA, 1997; Bolkestein, VVD, 1997). In the end, only GroenLinks rejected the treaty partly on the basis of lack of progress..

The arguments focusing on the social aspect of the EU, which corresponds to the ‘labor and social security’ frame, mainly revolved around the inclusion of a ‘social protocol’ in the Treaty. This protocol gave the EU the power to formulate policy to enhance employment opportunities in the union. The leftist parties (D66, PvdA, GroenLinks) were content with the fact that the

7 In 1997, the parliament consisted of twelve parties. PvdA (37 seats), CDA (34 seats), VVD (31 seats), D66 (24 seats), AOV (6 seats), GroenLinks (5 seats), Centrum Democraten (3 seats), RPF (3 seats), GPV (2 seats), SP (2 seats) and Unie 55+ (1 seat). 8 Besides the parties that will be mentioned, CD was not present in one debate, the Group Nijpels focused solely on the antidiscrimination law that was proposed.

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EU had shown it wanted to be ‘more than just an economy’ (Wolffensperger, D66, 1997), and ‘is walking straight, now that the employment opportunities leg has come next to the economic one’ (Wallage, PvdA, 1997). These three parties advocated that the focus on the economy, including the introduction of the euro and the EMU, needed to be placed in a strong social and democratic Europe. The social protocol was criticized by both CDA and VVD who emphasized this issue as a core national task, ‘treaty documents do not create jobs, only health national policy does that’ (Weisglas, VVD, 1997). GroenLinks showed skepticism and rejected the treaty also based on this issue. Their discourse could be described as Eurosceptic: ‘support of the general ideas of European integration but show pessimism when it comes to the current ideas about that integration’ (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002, p. 302). The other parties can be described as more Euroenthusiast, although VVD and CDA showed some reservations on the integration of a more ‘social Europe’. It was mostly the PvdA and D66 that were optimistic about the democratic and institutional future of the EU. The most dominant discourse was thus Euroenthusiast.

Where the bigger parties were mostly critical of the lack of democratic control on a European level, RPF and other smaller parties (CD, SGP, GPV, CD and SP) were critical of the lack of national democratic control over European issues and used mainly nationalistic arguments. The SP was outright critical of the EU, which revolved more around its own elite than around its own citizens (Marijnissen, SP, 1997). As a result the EU had a democratic deficit and a social deficit. The SP can be seen as adhering to a Euroreject discourse, being very pessimistic and outright negative about the future. GPV and RPF indicated that they saw the treaty as a failure, with the GPV noting that the outcome of the treaty had shown that the integration process had reached its limits (Van Middelkoop, GPV, 1997). The RPF regarded the treaty as ‘meagre’ (Rouvoet, RPF, 1997). CD thought the treaty to go too far, and should therefore be tried under criminal law for ‘committing an attack with the attention to put parts or the entirety of the country under foreign domination’ (Janmaat, CD, 1997). If integration should happen, then CD would prefer a stronger European defense organization, away from American domination. The latter three parties, including SGP, have shown a more ‘limits of Europe’ discourse when it came to most issues, preferring a stop on further sovereignty transferal, but at the same time advocating for the accession of new member states (SPG, RPF, GPV) or military integration (CD) (Harmsen, 2008).

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6.2.2 European Constitution

6.2.2.1 A gap between the elites and the people

The debate in the Netherlands about globalization, (European) integration and immigration that was initiated in the 1990s, continued in the new millennium. The end of the 1980s and 1990s, were characterized by a lack of ideological difference between the political parties, lacking an engagement with the population. This paved the way for more populist resistance in the 2000s (Kennedy, 2017). The person who stood at the center of this rising dissatisfaction with the political elites was Pim Fortuyn, an entrepreneur and publicist (and columnist for the Elsevier as we saw in the in previous paragraph). He openly criticized the Islam and denounced the ‘leftist church’ (a name for the political parties on the left) for ignoring the problems of the ‘normal’ Dutch citizens (Kennedy, 2017). Nine days before the parliamentary elections of 2002, Fortuyn was shot dead by an animal activist who perceived Fortuyn ‘as a political danger to the country’ (Kennedy, 2017). The rise of Pim Fortuyn, whose party received 26 seats in the 2002 election, brought to the fore the gap that had arisen between the politicians and the Dutch citizens in the ‘technocratic’ 1990s (Kennedy, 2017).

Tumultuous times succeeded the 2002 elections and culminated in three elections in four years.9 Not only the national integration became a hot topic, also European integration became a contested subject in the Netherlands. A similar gap between the Dutch citizens and the European elites, something Fortuyn himself had already criticized in the Elsevier in 1997, was discernible (Kennedy, 2017). More than ever before, European issues started to cause friction in political parties, culminating in, for example, the secession of Geert Wilders from the VVD as he disagreed with his party’s positive stance on the accession of Turkey to the European Union. It was Wilders, together with politicians from the Socialist Party (SP) and smaller protestant parties that openly criticized the EU and the erosion of national sovereignty, mostly linked to immigration issues. Not only this democratic gap was discernible, the first years of the new millennium were also characterized by a downward spiral of the Dutch economy, with

9 In 2003 another election took place in the Netherlands, which would govern until 2006. The constellation of the parliament was as follows: CDA (44 seats), PvdA (42 seats), VVD (28 seats), SP (9 seats), LPF (8 seats), GroenLinks (8 seats), D66 (6 seats), ChristenUnie (3 seats), SGP (2 seats) (Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2010, n.d.)

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failing growth and growing unemployment (Dinan, 2014). The public critique on Europe grew and saw its most obvious rejection in the referendum on the European ‘Constitution’ in 2005.

The European ‘Constitution’ was initiated after the Treaty of Nice (2000), which had foreseen in some institutional changes to the EU, but left many of the member-states wary of the method of how treaty reform came about (Dinan, 2014).10 As a way to change the usual intergovernmental conference method (IGC), the EU decided to create a convention responsible for drafting a new comprehensive treaty that would increase the democratic accountability of the EU as well as adjusting some institutional procedures within the union itself, such as the voting procedure in the European Council (consisting of the heads of government of the member-states) and the number of commissioners per country. This institutional reform had some urgency as it was intended to facilitate the smooth accession of ten new member-states in 2004.

In addition, the ‘constitution’ would also more clearly demarcate the competence division between the national governments and the European Commission, with, for example, the asylum and visa policy to become a European competence. Its aim was also to invest energy into making the EU more intelligible to its citizens by organizing public meetings, media campaigns and large discussion rounds (Van Meurs et al., 2013). This failed, as the constitution document was unreadable for a normal EU-citizen. The fact that the treaty reform was named a 'constitution', with nation-like characteristics, culminated in the idea that the EU would become a so-called super state (Harmsen, 2008). ‘To bring the EU closer to the people’ was also the reason why a referendum was organized in the Netherlands. The law on the advisory referendum stated the following: ‘to increase the involvement of the citizens in future reforms of the European Union’ (Wet raadplegend referendum Europese Grondwet, 04-02-2005). While the convention was able to produce a treaty document, the discussions between the member-states continued behind closed doors, fulminating the suspicion of the EU citizens to further integration (Van Meurs et al., 2013). Despite these difficulties, the convention treaty

10 I have chosen to put constitution between parentheses because the proposed document was a treaty with constitutional characteristics (such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights comparable to the American Bill of Rights), but not an actual constitution as we know it in the context of a nation-state. Dinan (2014) argues that all the preceding treaties (before 2005) had de facto already functioned as constitutional treaties because the European Court of Justice interpreted it that way (p. 271). Naming it a constitution was more symbolic and hinted at ‘the political nature of the EU project’ (Dinan, 2014, p. 272).

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was presented and signed in Rome in 2004 by the Dutch government. The parliament awaited the result of the advisory referendum of 1 June 2005 to decide to ratify the treaty or not.

In the end the referendum resulted in an overwhelming victory of the ‘no-camp’ with 61.5% of the voters rejecting the treaty. This no-vote led to the subsequent rejection of the treaty in parliament. It was the first time that the Netherlands had organized a referendum and it had showed the willingness of the Dutch people to speak out on the subject ‘EU’. As Harryvan and Voerman (2013) concluded about the referendum campaign: ‘the rise of Eurocriticism among the population could be defined as a process of politicization of the subject ‘Europe’ and as a growing political awareness among the population of the significance of the European Union’ (p. 249).

6.2.2.2 The first referendum in the Netherlands

The two debates that were part of this analysis consists of one debate concentrating on the European summit of 16 and 17 June 2004, which concluded the ‘constitution’ and one on the referendum of 2005. As stated before, the referendum led to an overwhelming ‘no’, rejecting the European ‘constitution’. Those parties that had advocated in favor of the treaty, CDA, PvdA, VVD, GroenLinks, D66, deplored the outcome but were content with the process of the referendum, which had been proposed by the PvdA, GroenLinks and D66 (Harryvan and Voerman, 2013). These five parties mostly used the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame, trying to emphasize that the ‘constitution’ was a step towards a better and more incisive Europe.

The institutional reforms that had been postponed in Amsterdam (1997) and partly resolved in Nice (2000), had now come to fruition in this ‘constitution’ according to VVD and CDA. D66 emphasized similar positive elements of the treaty, and largely repeated its 1997 stance: ‘an incisive, strong and democratic Europe is of vital national importance’ (Dittrich, D66, 2005). VVD and D66 had been rather staunch when it came to the new treaty, with D66 stating that it was ‘better than nothing and better than Nice’ (Dittrich, D66, 2005). Although VVD referred to the treaty as a ‘glass half full’, their stance of 1997 was repeated: ‘a lot needed to go wrong for someone to vote ‘no’ to a treaty’ (Van Baalen, VVD, 2005). GroenLinks and PvdA were very content with the treaty and regarded it as an ‘unabridged progress’, with more democratic control for the EP and national parliaments as well as more transparency (Timmermans, PvdA, 2005; Duyvendank, GroenLinks, 2005). These parties refrained from using the ‘European democratic deficit’ frame too much, emphasizing the positive sides of the treaty.

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In general, these parties that advocated for a ‘yes, used a similar rational as in 1997, with the exception that also GroenLinks voted in favor of the treaty, namely that it was a ‘step in the right direction’ while not perfect. All parties adhered to an Euroenthusiastic, optimistic discourse. The rejection in the referendum had not changed their opinion on further integration; it just needed to (re-) gain the trust and legitimacy of the Dutch citizens.

A large majority, 85% of the parliament had voted in favor, whereas 61.5% of the population had rejected the treaty. Those parties that had advocated for a 'no', as the rejection was to them the ultimate example of the democratic gap between the 'elite' and the citizens, tabled this discrepancy. In their argumentation many parties emphasized the importance of the national identity and sovereignty, which had been threatened by the ‘constitution’. The ‘nationalistic’ and ‘national democratic deficit’ frames were thus found most often in the analysis of these parties. Wilders (Group Wilders, 2005) stated the people did not want a ‘United States of Europe or a super state’. SP and the ChristenUnie11 were somewhat milder in their assessment, stating the ‘no’ was not a no to cooperation per se, but definitely a rejection of integration and anything ‘that reeked of a constitution or a European state’ (Van Bommel, SP, 2005). ChristenUnie stated that the referendum result had shown that the integration had reached its ‘limits’ (Rouvoet, RPF,2005). LPF, together with the SP and Group Wilders, also criticized the role of the Dutch government which had openly advocated for a yes and had not shied away from spending a lot of money on that. ‘Manipulative’ according to Herben (LPF, 2005). Herben (LPF, 2005) wanted a discussion on where the limits of Europe lay, so that his could be clearly communicated to the people. For now, the population had saved Europe from an ‘enlightened dictatorship’.

All these parties displayed a ‘limits of Europe’ discourse, where they unequivocally rejected the European constitution and its implications. Nevertheless, these parties were not inherently against European cooperation, many competences just needed to be renationalized, attaining to the Europe-renationalization discourse of Harryvan and Van der Harst (2013). The SP had become somewhat more positive about European cooperation in general, as was also concluded by Harryvan and Van der Harst (2013).

11 ChristenUnie was found in 2000, after the GPV and RPF merged together. 39

6.2.3 Eurozone crisis

6.2.3.1 Further integration but without the treaty

The years leading up to the economic crisis of 2009 and beyond, were characterized by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (2007), a treaty largely the same as the European ‘constitution’, but presented as a set of amendments to existing treaties and was, therefore, not an entirely new treaty, or constitution for that matter (Dinan, 2014). The same year the treaty was signed, Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union, creating a union of 27 member-states. Also, the Eurozone, those countries that have the euro as their currency, grew from 12 to 16 members (Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia). The practical integration of the euro seemed to be working out, but the path towards a common currency, as we had seen in 1997, was not straightforward, with various EU-states struggling to keep to the rigid criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) before joining the euro.12 This struggle came quickly to the fore, when it was revealed in 2004 that Greece had lied about its financial

12 The Stability and Growth Pact was formulated at the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). The idea behind it was to guarantee the stability of the euro by putting rigid criteria in place (the budgetary deficit could not be more than 3% of a country’s GDP). This pact came under criticism from then French prime-minister Lionel Jospin, especially because he feared that employment opportunities would suffer from it. He wanted an economic government to oversee the European Central Bank, something Germany, with its national independent Bundesbank, fiercely rejected (Dinan, 2014). In the end the Eurogroup consisting of the ministers of finance of the member states that would join the euro would be in charge of overseeing the fiscal policy. At the same time, it was unsure, based on these SGP-criteria, which member-states would be able to join the euro in 2002. Even Germany, the country advocating for these strict measures (together with the Netherlands and Finland), had difficulties adhering to the them. Simultaneously, countries known for its ‘loose fiscal policy’, Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy, started to change its fiscal and economic policies to make sure they could join to currency project (Dinan, 2014). At the end of the millennium, eleven member-states met the criteria to go over to the last stage of monetary integration. The introduction of the euro went smoothly, but already quite early the difficulties of managing a monetary policy with so many different economies came to the fore. For example, while Ireland experienced an economic boom in the early 2000s, Germany’s economy was stagnating. Because Germany’s economy was (and is) the biggest one in the eurozone, interest rates had to be adjusted to spur Germany’s economy, ‘unintentionally contributing to a property bubble in the booming Celtic Tiger’ (Dinan, 2014). Simply put, interest rates to loan money became cheaper for German’s but at the same time also for Irish people, incentivizing more loans on the island. The EU had become a monetary union without the necessary economic union, which would have led to some degree of convergence in economic policy throughout the eurozone.

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status. Due to the economic growth in a number of member states, the EU was lenient towards Greece (Dinan, 2014). Five years later, in 2009, when the financial crisis had blown over from the United States, it became clear that Greece was unable to finance its own debts, which had been higher than they had told (Van Meurs et al., 2013). The crisis in Greece worsened and in May 2010 a first bailout was agreed upon, after France and Germany had decided a common approach to the crisis in Greece. This did not have the desired effect, to the contrary, Greece’s recession became worse and worse (Varoufakis, 2017). In July 2011, a second bailout was agreed upon by the European leaders (Dinan, 2014). The eurozone crisis started in Greece, but soon similar tendencies were discernible in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (and to a lesser extend in France). It was clear that there was a need for more economic coordination, so that the various economies would converge more. More coordination meant more integration, something that had become sensitive since the European ‘Constitution’ of 2005, especially in the Netherlands (see previous paragraph). Another contentious issue was the start of the Arab spring in 2011, resulting in an influx of migrants that had reached the European outer border, mostly in Italy and later in Greece. The Schengen Treaty had established the abolishment of the EU’s internal borders, but the external borders were put under pressure by the migration. Some spoke of an ‘invasion’ and the issue of migration was directly linked with that of the security within the EU, to such an extent that the border between France and Italy was re-nationalized (Carrera et al., 2010; Fakhoury, 2016).

The Netherlands was also hit by the economic crisis, albeit to a lesser extent than the aforementioned countries, resulting in a growing national debt and increased unemployment (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013). Soon after, parliamentary elections took place, resulting in a minority coalition between CDA and VVD, condoned by the populist PVV which had gained 15 seats in comparison to 2006 (24 in total).13 Combined, the populist parties on the left and on the right had more than a fourth of the seats in parliament in 2010. PVV’s ‘condone accord’ (gedoogakkoord), concentrated on four issues, immigration, security,

13 In 2010 an election had taken place after an early fall of the previous government. The election meant a victory for the liberal VVD. Constellation of the parliament: VVD (31 seats), PvdA (30 seats), PVV (24 seats), CDA (21 seats), SP (15 seats), D66 (10 seats), GroenLinks (10 seats), ChristenUnie (5 seats), SPG (2 seats), Partij voor de Dieren (2 seats). The latter party did not participate in the debates.

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geriatric care and finance (see ‘Concept Gedoogakkoord 2010’).14 The EU was mentioned in relation to labor migration, immigration in general and the EMU. On other issues the coalition was depended on the opposition parties. Nevertheless, because the PVV was openly opposed to the EU and further integration, the coalition had to show some caution when talking about European affairs, at least in a national context (Harrvan and Van der Harst, 2013).

Moreover, the Dutch population was not in favor of more European centralization, growing ever more Eurosceptic since the ‘constitution’ of 2005 (Kennedy, 2017). While they showed caution at home, in Brussels, the Netherlands was in favor of a revival of the SGP and more financial oversight of the European Commission on typical national competences such as pensions and labor costs (the so-called Euro-plus-pact) (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013). The stance of prime-minister Mark Rutte was very rigid when it came to the adherence to the SGP and the loans that were given to those countries that had shown ‘economic recklessness’ (Kennedy, 2017). Although the new Euro-plus-pact had a mandate to oversee all Eurozone- countries, Rutte argued that only those countries who had behaved recklessly had to transfer sovereignty, not the Netherlands (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013). In 2013, contrary to what Rutte had claimed two years before, the new coalition’s budgetary plans were impeded by the ‘Euro-plus-pact’ (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013). The eurozone crisis had put European integration high on the (inter)national agenda again.

In 2011, other than in 1997 and 2005, there was not an official treaty that was proposed. Nevertheless, the EU summits still took place every half a year, with the summit of 16 and 17 July 2011 being an important one. The parliamentary debate in preparation of this treaty has been analyzed. The other debate that was analyzed is the so-called ‘State of the European Union’, which debates the most important developments in the EU of the year before as well as focuses on the vision of the year to come. Members of the European Parliament are also invited to share their thoughts, but in this research I will solely focus on the Dutch parliamentarians.

14 A ‘condone accord’ is an accord in which a minority government finds common ground with, formally, an opposition party on certain issues, in this case immigration, security, geriatric care and finance. When passing through legislation, the minority government can expect support from the opposition party it has a condone accord with. On other subjects, the minority government needs to find a parliamentary majority to pass through policies drafted in the coalition agreement.

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6.2.3.2 A definitive turning point?

2005 was seen as a turning point in European history, the idea of a federal Europe had been buried. Nevertheless, when looking at the statements made by the political parties in 2011, many still argued that more integration was necessary. Three issues that were touched upon can explain the prevalence of the frames found in paragraph 5.2. Firstly, there was the question of further economic integration to tackle the financial crisis (mostly talked about in the context of Greece). Secondly, there was the European semester, a mechanism that allowed the EU to make suggestion to member states to get their financial status sound, as to detect earlier any possible major budget deficits. These two issues explain the prevalence of the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame and the ‘economic prosperity’ frame. Thirdly and lastly, the issues concerning the influx of migrants, the Arab spring and the question of strengthening the external border was discussed. These issues explain the ‘ecology and security’ frame. Concerning the latter issues, only the four biggest parties CDA, PvdA, VVD and PVV touched upon the question of security. CDA and PvdA advocated for a strengthened and more effective management of the external border. VVD and PVV wanted not only strengthened external borders, they also advocated for the possibility of closing its own borders, if the situation so required (Dijkhof, VVD, 2011; Wilders, PVV, 2011).

GroenLinks, D66 and PvdA were very clear about the question of economic integration. They used a combination of the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame and the ‘economic prosperity’ frame to strengthen their argument. All three parties saw the necessity of further economic integration to fight the financial crisis. It was one of those transnational issues, such as the environment and crime, that needed to be tackled on a European level. D66 was unequivocal: ‘we will pay for Greece, no matter how’ (Schouw, D66, 2011). GroenLinks emphasized the necessity of a strong Europe, with at least a partially integrated political union to support the monetary one: it would make Europe stronger and the eurozone less volatile (El Fassed, GroenLinks, 2011). PvdA followed a similar line as the two aforementioned parties: help Greece where reasonably possible and strengthen the economic governance to balance the monetary union. Also, the EP should get more power in budgetary issues. PvdA, just like GroenLinks, advocated for a ‘partial political integration’ (Plasterk, PvdA, 2011). It rejected ‘needless’ centralizations, especially those competences that would be transferred through the ‘backdoor’ such as the national competence on social policy (Plasterk, PvdA, 2011). D66 and Groenlinks were clear which direction Europe needed to go to. PvdA was a bit more reluctant

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to share the same enthusiasm and rejected too much centralization. There discourse can rather be characterized as more pragmatic but still in favor of further integration.

On the economic issues, VVD and CDA were also very clear. The VVD wanted the EU to move to a ‘wealthier, more secure and freer’ EU. ‘Growth, growth, growth’ should be the EU’s motto (Ten Broeke, VVD, 2011). So, in the economy, international crime and foreign policy the EU should play an important role. CDA stated that with the subjects that were on the agenda 2011, such as the financial crisis, climate change and the Arab spring, they were happy to be part of the EU, as these were issues that could not be resolved by one country. More integration to tackle these issues was more than sensible (Ormel, CDA, 2011) The ‘efficiency and efficacy’ in combination with the ‘economic prosperity’ frame that both parties used come to the fore. Although both parties were unequivocal about the benefits of further integration, both parties emphasized the importance of national sovereignty. Political integration, as was discussed by PvdA, D66 and GroenLinks was not advocated by both parties. Moreover, this was the first time that the word ‘sovereignty’ was used by both parties so explicitly. These parties still underlined the importance of integration and only on some issues want to retain national competency (such as social policy and, if necessary, national borders). Their viewpoints can be characterized as in between the Euroenthusiast and Eurosceptic discourses, optimistic about certain elements of integration, but not with all of them (political integration).

Those parties that were very critical on both economic issues were the PVV, SP, ChristenUnie and SGP. Like the other years, they generally used the ‘nationalistic’ frame to strengthen their argument. PVV wanted no further integration whatsoever, any suggestion that would mean a transferal of sovereignty was off the table, ‘because if you give Brussels a finger, they would take your whole hand’ (Bontes, LPF, 2011). The SP was clear: ’no competence transferal, no more money to Europa and no further enlargement’ With more economic integration, SP feared that though there was no support for political integration in the Netherlands, it would be ‘thrusted down our throat’ (Van Bommel, 2011),. Both SGP and ChristenUnie followed a similar line as CDA and emphasized the national competence on social issues. Both parties also advocated for a stop on further integration of member-states in the eurozone, things needed to be tidied up before any further integration was suggested.

All of these parties again adhered to the Eurorejects discourse, referring to the pragmatic- nationalist discourse and the ‘limits of Europe’ discourse, although it must be stated that none

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of them were inherently opposed to European integration, but they agreed the EU had gone too far.

6.2.4 In conclusion

The previous three subparagraphs have provided an overview of the discourse of the parliamentary debates in the Netherlands concerning the EU and European integration. A number of things can be concluded.

Some authors have concluded in their research that Dutch stance towards Europe changed in the 21st century, with Harmsen concluding that the federalist framework that was prevalent during the early 1990s, had shifted to a more ‘limits of Europe’ type of discourse in the early 2000s (Harmsen, 2008). Kiratli (2016) and Vollaard (2013) concluded that over the course of the 1990s and 2000s the discourse changed from a progressive discourse to a more ‘pragmatic’ discourse (Vollaard, 2013) or a ‘more Europe in some areas, and less Europe in some others’ discourse (Kiratli, 2016). Also Harryvan and Voerman (2013) stated that the so- called centrum parties, the labor party, the Christian democrats and the liberals, who governed the Netherlands most of the time after the Second World War and were generally Europhile, can now, in 2013, be characterized as Europe-retaining. They concluded that this new retaining attitude has partly to do with the saturation of European issues (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013, p. 298).

Where their research showed that the dominant, or hegemonic, discourse in the political debate shifted to a more pragmatic discourse, this research has shown that in the debates surrounding the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Constitution, the dominant discourse was still Euroenthusiastic, as it had been in the 1990s and before, and that only in 2011 this discourse somewhat changed. The bigger governing parties (D66, PvdA, CDA and VVD) concluded that both treaties (1997 and 2005) were not perfect but a step in the right direction. Also the VVD, who was seen as more (Euro)pragmatic after the Bolkestein leadership, stated that ‘a lot needed to go wrong for someone to vote ‘no’ to a treaty’ (Van Baalen, VVD, 2005). CDA and VVD did show appreciation for a stronger role of national parliaments, although this was said in the context of European subsidiarity and not in the context of the ‘nationalistic’ frame, that is, absolute renationalization of competences.

The pragmatic discourse in the parliamentary debates came more to the fore in 2011, when also VVD and CDA spoke of national sovereignty and they, together with PvdA, openly

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stated that the EU should focus more on some issues and less on others. This more pragmatic discourse distorts the fact that, just like GroenLinks and D66, these parties were in favor of more integration on transnational issues, which amounted again to a lot more transferal of sovereignty and competences. When it came to ‘less Europe’, mainly social policy was mentioned. The dominance of the pragmatic discourse that was found by other researches, should be, based on this research be seen as ‘light Euroenthusiasm’. In other words, ‘more Europe’ was way more than ‘less Europe’.

It is important to highlight the existence of these various discourses within one party because CDA, VVD and PvdA usually form a coalition and formulate European policy. As Harryvan and Van der Harst (red, 2013) concluded that governing parties rhetorically claim to propagate for ‘less Europe’, while in terms of policymaking they tend to stand for ‘more Europe’ (p. 298). The fact that this Euroenthusiastic (and ‘light’ Euroenthusiasm) discourse was dominant did not mean there were no other discourse competing. The ‘constraining dissensus’ had taken more solid form over the years. The SP, PVV, CD and LPF and the smaller protestant parties, SGP, GPV, RPF (later ChristenUnie), pertained to the ‘limits of Europe’ type of discourse, or an outright rejectionist stance on the EU and further integration. These parties have always been a minority in parliament. As Vollaard (2013) stated, although the pragmatic and nationalist perspectives became more apparent in these elections, a majority of the parliament was still pro-European. Their negative discourse about Europe seemed to have no effect on the other parties, only in 2011 the general discourse moved somewhat more to a Eurosceptic or pragmatic discourse. Nevertheless, it is also difficult to speak of one ‘discourse’ pertaining to these parties, as many used various discourses depending on the subject in question, as was also concluded by Harryvan and Voerman (2013). Even those parties advocating for less Europe were fervent supporters of enlargement in 1997 (SGP, RPF, GPV), or more integration in some areas, such as social policy (SP) and economy (PVV, LPF). An outright rejection of European integration in general was not discernible.

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7 DE GROENE AND ELSEVIER: A DEBATE

Before turning to the actual analysis of the three key moments in the Elsevier and De Groene, I will provide a brief overview of the two journals that will be analyzed. As was put forward in the chapter four of this thesis, every news outlet is subject to framing: that is ‘[the] process or contextual features of news making’ (Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011, p. 102). Thus, it is important to elaborate on these contextual features, which I understand as the ideology or political belief that is guiding the opinion making of these two weekly journals. Another important element is to get a grasp of their opinion on the European integration project. I have chosen to analyze weekly journals because they have been under researched when it comes to the coverage of the EU. When Dutch media coverage of the EU featured in research, it has generally focused on daily newspapers (Vollaard, Van der Harst and Voerman (red), 2015). Although weekly journals and daily newspapers cover similar or the same subjects, weekly journals provide more substance and interpretation. As this research will provide a ‘thick’ description, weekly journals are a better fit (Bijwaard, 2009). I have decided to analyze De Groene Amsterdammer and Elsevier because they represent each side of the political spectrum, where De Groene has a progressive-left (socialist) signature, Elsevier has a more liberal- conservative signature. Important to note is that the Elsevier has a much wider circulation than De Groene, but since the other well-known, and bigger weekly journals such as Vrij Nederland and HP/De Tijd are not digitalized, De Groene has been chosen to feature in this research.15 In addition, De Groene initially had a bigger online reach than Elsevier as their road to the internet initially failed (Van der List, 2005). All in all, De Groene is a good fit for this research since it has always had a broad focus on international issues.

For the following paragraphs, I have made use of two books that have illustrated the history of De Groene and Elsevier (Hartmans, 2002; Van der List, 2005). Since there are limited sources that focus on these weekly journals and their relation to European integration, I used Bijwaard’s (2009) extensive study on the coverage of the first decades of weekly journals like De Groene and Elsevier has been used. This study will give an insight into how these journals have historically thought about European integration, while realizing it does not contain a

15 Elsevier had a circulation of 135.459 (2004) and 132.949 (2005), 130.942 (2009). De Groene Amsterdammer 12.871 (1995), 13.303 (2000), 14.431 (2009).

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comprehensive picture of the decades following the EEC up until the start of my research (1997).

7.1 ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD – A SUPPORTER OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECTS

Elseviers Weekblad, as it was initially called (now called Elsevier Weekblad and hereafter Elsevier), was officially founded during the Second World War but only really started circulation after the end of the war (Van der List, 2005).16 The aim of the journal was to create an independent journal with an outspoken opinion and a journal that would not fear to call things by their names (Van der List, 2005). In a national context, Elsevier was critical of the progressive movements that were present in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s (Van der List, 2005). That is not to say, however, that they were supportive of any (conservative or liberal) political party in particular. Elsevier claims that after the end of pillarization in the Netherlands, they lost their ideological signature (Van der List, 2005). It is difficult to put a clear frame around the journal, something that was substantiated by a survey, which concluded that the Dutch population does not have a clear image of the journal (Van der List, 2005). According to Arendo Joustra, the current editor in chief, Elsevier is a progressive newspaper in the sense that they want to change things. It does not, however, shy away from being called conservative or ‘right-wing’ (Van der List, 2005). The readers of Elsevier are the ‘working backbone of the Netherlands’, according to Joustra (Van der List, 2005: p. 258).

When touching upon European integration and the ECSC, Van der List states that Elsevier underscored the welfare that the European cooperation has brought but urged politicians not ‘to give in to European illusions’, and always have the national interest in mind (Van der List, 2005: p. 89). Conversely, in the 1970s, as part of their ‘statement of principles’, they were a proponent of deepening and strengthening the EEC.17 Bijwaard (2009) states that, when commenting on the Schuman plan and the ESCS, Elsevier was in favor of European integration but hesitant when it came to the restrictions to a free market zone that were put in place by the High Authority (p. 31). The failure of the European Political Community (PDC)

16 Before the war, Elsevier had a monthly circulation under the name Elsevier’s Geïllustreerd Maandschrift. Only after the war it started as a weekly journal. 17 It has to be stated that editor F.A. Hoogendijk, a member of the liberal VVD party, formulated this 'statement of principles'.

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and the European Defense Community (EDC), according to the journal, caused a stop to the European integration general, something it deplored (Bijwaard, 2009). The Netherlands, and other small countries, would have benefited most from a strengthening of supranational institutions as that would strengthen the Dutch position in relation to Germany and France. In the same vein, Elsevier showed support for the EEC and saw opportunities, especially economically, for the Netherlands. It described the Treaty of Rome ‘as one of the most important treaties ever drafted’ (Bijwaard, 2009, p. 79). Nevertheless, it was critical of the economic consequences of the treaty for the Netherlands (the Netherlands would profit greatly from an open world market, less from just a continental one as was concluded in Rome).

7.2 DE GROENE AMSTERDAMMER: ‘NO’ TO A CAPITALIST EUROPE

De Groene Amsterdammer (hereafter: De Groene) is the oldest journal of the Netherlands and was founded in 1877. The journal started with a progressive-liberal signature but over the course of the first decades of the 20th century started to lean more towards the left and openly supported the workers union (Hartmans, 2002). Throughout the 50s, 60s and 70s, the journal functioned as a forum for parties on the left side of the political spectrum, with a focus on the conflicts between ‘East’ and ‘West’. Also in a national context they were supporters of the progressive movements that emerged in 1960s and 1970s. On their 90th anniversary, the journal stated that their journalistic tradition could be best summarized by calling it ‘radical’, aiming to not analyze the world superficially but by going to its roots (literally) (Hartmans, 2002). More specifically, they concentrated on the faults of capitalism and ways in which society could be transformed to become more just and equitable (Hartmans, 2002). In essence, De Groene and Elsevier had the same goal in mind, providing readers not with news flashes that were more common for daily newspapers, but to provide essential background information to understand the issue at its core. Their signature, however, was different. Where De Groene had a socialist signature, Elsevier was more conservative (Lunshof, 1959).

De Groene was one of the most critical voices when it came to the establishment of the ECSC. When commenting the newly found European Community, it expressed its concerns for the ‘steel cartel’ and feared the possible far-reaching influence of France and Germany in the project. Another aspect that did not stroke with the journal was its lack of democratic scrutiny, since the Dutch population was left in the dark when it came to the implications of

49 the ECSC (Bijwaard, 2009). When it came to the next steps of European integration, such as the EPD and the EDC, the De Groene paid little to no attention. On the EEC (the result of the Rome treaties), however, the journal was very rejectionist: it could not be sympathetic to European integration that was built on capitalistic grounds. That is not to say, however, that De Groene did not support European integration as a goal in itself, they just preferred a closer association with the Soviet Union (Hartmans, 2002). Overall, it can be concluded that De Groene, as far as current research has shown, was not a supporter of European integration and was seen as the most Eurosceptic journal of the Netherlands of that time (Bijwaard, 2009).

Elsevier had proven itself to be one of the most vocal supporters of the first steps in the European integration project, whereas De Groene was the exact opposite. A lot has changed since the Treaty of Rome, both in the Netherlands as well as in Europe. Although I cannot cover the period 1957-1997 due to limitations caused by the Covid-19 virus, this thesis will try to also shed light on the viewpoints of the two journals in the years 1997-2011. Did De Groene remain Eurosceptic and Elsevier Europhile, as they were in the old days, or did both journals undergo changes of opinion as well? And, importantly, in what way did they define the relation between the Netherlands and the EU and European integration?

7.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

As pointed out in the previous paragraphs, Dutch weekly journals have been under researched when it comes to this subject. Moreover, most of these publications, which have been briefly mentioned in chapter four, focused on the presence of ‘conflict’, ‘benefit’ or ‘disadvantage’ frames (Boomgaarden et al., 2010) or positive or negative frames in Dutch media (Pfetsch, et al., 2004; Beus and Mak, 2009; ‘T Lam, 2012), and less on specific subjects (see Pfetsch et. al, 2004; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; De Beus and Mak, 2009). Lastly, I included the ‘informative’ frame to research if there was a fluctuation discernible in the number of articles that tried to solely inform the reader. Over the years, did both journals pay more or less attention to the European Union? Just like in chapter five, this chapter will provide an answer to the sub questions What frames are most prevalent during these key moments?’, and ‘To what extent have these frames changed over time?’. Throughout this paragraph, I will relate my findings to the aforementioned literature.

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My analysis covered 58 articles of the De Groene and 97 articles of Elsevier. Although I have covered the same period of analysis, the Elsevier had significantly more news coverage of the EU than the De Groene. A reason for this, is that Elsevier has a different journalistic format than De Groene. The Elsevier changed its format in the 1990s from longer, more expansive articles to a journal with shorter articles, more infographics and summarized information, and, thus, with fewer in-depth articles (Van der List, 2005). De Groene, on the other hand, concentrates on in-depth and more expansive journalism (Over de Groene, n.d.). So, where Elsevier pays more attention to the EU and further integration quantitatively, De Groene has longer but fewer news articles on the EU. Another factor that plays a role in the quantitative discrepancy, is the search method. As explained in paragraph 4.3, Elsevier has an archival search engine with which I could filter on European subject.

With De Groene, however, I had to do the archival search manually, increasing the possibility of overlooking articles that were not directly referring to the EU. In general, the absence of frequent news coverage on the European Union, as can be found in De Groene, is something that can be generally concluded of the Netherlands, although it has increased since the 1990s (Pfetsch et al., 2004; Van Noije, 2010). Consequently, this quantitative difference is also visible in the number of frames that have been found (see Table 2 and 3). In Table 2 and 3, an overview is provided of the empirical results of the frame analysis. The number of frames found are translated into percentages of the total number of frames found (95 frames for De Groene, 165 for Elsevier). With these tables, it is easy to disseminate which frames have been most frequently found per year and in total.

Table 2. Elsevier Weekblad. Type of frame per year, in percentages of the total number of frames 1997 2005 2011 Total percentage Frequency Nationalistic 25% 13% 24% 20% 33 Multicultural-universalist 4% 0% 4% 2% 4 Economic prosperity 11% 0% 8% 6% 10 Labor and social security 11% 9% 18% 13% 20 Efficiency and efficacy 10% 17% 4% 11% 19 Ecology and security 2% 0% 2% 1% 2 National democratic 13% 26% 8% 17% 28 deficit European democratic 6% 9% 16% 10% 16 deficit Informative 20% 27% 16% 22% 36 Total 100 100 100 100 (N) (54) (63) (51) 169

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Table 3. De Groene Amsterdammer. Type of frame per year, in percentages of the total number of frames 1997 2005 2011 Total percentage Frequency Nationalistic 6% 4% 6% 5% 5 Multicultural-universalist 3% 0% 3% 2% 2 Economic prosperity 0% 0% 9% 3% 3 Labor and social security 24% 4% 9% 13% 12 Efficiency and efficacy 0% 19% 11% 10% 9 Ecology and security 6% 0% 0% 2% 2 National democratic deficit 30% 27% 6% 20% 19 European democratic deficit 27% 30% 26% 27% 25 Informative 3% 19% 31% 18% 17 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% (N) (33) (27) (35) 95

As has been substantiated in the previous paragraphs, Elsevier and De Groene have different ideological backgrounds and consequently frame the EU and European integration differently. Table 2 and 3 clearly show some of these ideological differences, although the differences become clearer when you look at the actual argumentation behind the use of a certain frame (this will be expanded on in the following paragraph). The main difference between the two journals is the individual frame that is most frequently found. Elsevier, a proponent of early European integration, always emphasized the importance of preserving the national interest in a European context (Bijwaard, 2009; Van der List, 2005). A similar conclusion can be drawn from this frame analysis, with the ‘nationalistic’ frame, besides the ‘informative’ frame, being the most frequently used frame in the Elsevier (20% of the total number of frames, see Table 2). In the year that the ‘nationalistic’ frame was not the most prevalent frame, it was the ‘national democratic deficit’ frame that was found most often. In short, the articles of the Elsevier were mostly nationally framed.

Losing national sovereignty was not a focus point in the De Groene. On the contrary, the journal almost never talked in terms of loss of sovereignty in the context of European integration. One might expect the presence of the opposite frame, the ‘multicultural- inclusive’ frame, to be more present. This was also not the case, as the democratic deficit frames, both nationally and European, featured most often (almost half of the frames found were focused on democratic issues). Only in 2011, when the national democratic deficiency was discussed less, De Groene’s focus shifted to the ‘economic consequences’ frame, which, considering the fact that the euro and further financial integration was the subject at hand, is

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not surprising. De Groene was, thus, mostly concerned with the legitimacy and democratic control of the EU and the Dutch parliament.

When you take not the individual frames but the three group frames defined by Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010), the ‘cultural’, ‘economic consequences’ and ‘other utilitarian’ frames, and the ‘democratic deficit’ frame that was inductively found, the Elsevier also used the democratic deficit argument most often in their articles on European integration, with more than a quarter of the total frames (see fourth column Table 2: 10% + 17%). The ‘democratic deficit’ frame was often found together with the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame (in 1997 and 2005 in the Elsevier and in 2005 and 2011 in the De Groene). The focus on democracy in both weekly journals concurs with previous research done by De Beus and Mak (2009), which found that the most used image of defining the EU is in terms of democracy, especially by emphasizing its (lack of) efficiency. Moreover, the authors conclude that the most leftist newspaper in their analysis focused mostly on institutional and governmental issues, such as democratic standards, as did De Groene (De Beus and Mak, 2009).

Examining the other frames, more similarities between the journals can be found, with ‘economic consequences’ frame (19% in Elsevier and 17% in De Groene, see total percentage column of Table 2 and 3) and the ‘informative’ frame (18% and 22% respectively) appearing most often. In general, the frequency division of the chosen frames does not diverge significantly from what other researches have concluded (De Beus and Mak. 2009; Pfetsch, 2004). For example, the ‘informative’ frame, those sentences and paragraphs focusing on providing more information about the EU without a value judgment, has increased significantly in De Groene and moderately increased in the Elsevier in comparison to 1997. This is in line with research from Van Santen and Vliegenthart (2015), who concluded that EU coverage has in increased in the last decades, although mainly around specific moments, such as European elections or European summits (p. 302).

When looking at those specific key events that were chosen, it can be concluded that, when taking both journals together, Elsevier and De Groene largely framed their articles according to the subject in question. In 1997, when a comprehensive treaty was drafted almost all frames were present; in 2005, when a constitution was proposed, the institutional frames, ‘efficiency and efficacy’ and the ‘democratic deficit’ frame, were most prevalent. Lastly, in 2011, during the eurozone economic crisis, the ‘economic consequences’ frame was only the most frequently used frame in the Elsevier, with De Groene focusing mostly on the

53 democratic consequences (second used frame was the ‘economic consequences’ frame, covering 18% of the total frames of 2011). Hence, providing context is important to understand the choice of frames, although both journals use some frames, the ‘nationalistic’ frame in Elsevier and ‘European democratic deficit’ frame in De Groene, consistently throughout the years.

7.4 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Similar to paragraph 5.2, this qualitative paragraph will focus on answering the sub question ‘How do the political parties define the relationship between the Netherlands and EU and further European integration?’ and ‘What are the most dominant discourses?’. The contextualization’s that have been given for each key moment in the previous chapter, are also applicable to the qualitative analysis of the two weekly journals. After every key moment, a subparagraph concentrates on the discourses that were discernible from both journals. The referencing of direct quotes will follow a similar line as in the political debate (name author, journal, date of publication). The articles that are cited in this analysis can be found in the bibliography (paragraph 9.1.2 and 9.1.3).

7.4.1 Treaty of Amsterdam

7.4.1.1 Elsevier

As was seen in Table 3 of the previous paragraph, the Elsevier combined various frames in their argumentation. Combining the ‘nationalistic’ and ‘national democratic deficit’ frame with the 'efficiency and efficacy' frame and ' economic consequences' frame.

The Elsevier followed a similar line of critique when it came to the national debate on the EU. The Dutch debate about Europe was too polarized, according to Beunders (Elsevier, 1997) with both sides using war-like rhetoric to win over public support, and that while a (normal) debate about giving up sovereignty to Europe is of importance to member states. As H.J. Schoo (Elsevier, 1997) argued ‘that the nation-state has always been the corner stone of European cooperation’. He was annoyed by the way in which the political elite framed the limitlessness of the Dutch nation-state and Europe, captured by ‘the fear to exclude’. The EU would benefit from limiting itself, as Schoo (Elsevier, 1997) put it himself: ‘in a tiny-Europe enough work still needs to be done. The EMU, for example’.

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Fortuyn (Elsevier, 1997) criticized the EU for being a ‘pressure cooker’. All measures that were proposed to enhance EU’s efficiency and efficacy, like a common foreign and defense policy and a common currency, were to the detriment of the national sovereignty. Moreover, any democratic control to counter these far-reaching measures was absent. Nevertheless, the ‘euro- elite’ does not want to give in and slow the integration process down, with consequences that unfathomable (Fortuyn, Elsevier, 1997). This ‘pressure cooker’, according to Fortuyn (Elsevier, 1997), will play into the hands of what the EU is so determined to erase, European nationalism. De Hen (Elsevier, 1997) also criticized the national debate, which seemed to brush aside the negative consequences of the euro, while the euro was about ‘giving up the oldest sovereign rights of a government, its currency’. In that vein, he continued the article by listing seven disadvantages of the euro. The comments by Fortuyn and De Hen are good examples of how the ‘nationalistic’ frame, in this case to retain sovereignty on monetary policy, is strengthened by accentuating the lack of democracy of the EU and the Dutch politicians, as well as debunking the claim that it would make the EU more efficiency and effective (the 'efficiency and efficacy' frame) or prosperous (‘economic prosperity’ frame). Only Joustra (Elsevier, 1997) was outright positive of the EMU, stating that, ' if the monetary union had not been invented already, the Netherlands should have done it’ (Joustra, Elsevier, 1997). This is a clear example of how the ‘economic prosperity’ frame is used to advocate for the introduction of the euro.

7.4.1.2 De Groene

As we saw in paragraph 6.3, the De Groene used the 'democratic deficit' frame most often. The 'national democratic' frame was mostly evoked to criticize the lack of the debate in the Netherlands, which characterized as ‘consistently lagging behind five years’, as well as the content of the debates that were held. De Groene was therefore relieved about the attention ‘European unification’ had gotten, and praised the the manifesto 70 Dutch economists had written to argue against the EMU (De Rijk, 1997). De Groene was wary of the fact that criticism before this manifesto had mostly come from a ‘nationalistic perspective’ and praised it for looking beyond this nationalistic tendency (De Rijk, 1997). De Rijk (1997) was less positive about the response of politicians, who she blamed for its tenacity when talking about Europe, claiming it was ‘dangerous’ to postpone integration, as it could fuel anti-European sentiments.

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Not only the ‘national democratic deficit' frame was frequently found at De Groene, also the democratic deficit of the EU and 'labor and social security' frame were evoked often. Especially the 'backdoor' and 'secretive' way of decision-making and the 'asocial' character of the EU were denounced by the journal. Van der Meer and De Rijk (De Groene, 1997) referred to the EU as a ‘democratic crater’ and an ‘oligarchical government' (Van der Meer and De Rijk, De Groene, 1997). When evoking the 'labor and social security' frame, the authors feared that the EMU would unleash an ‘undressing contest’ between the member-states to become the most competitive in the EU. This would lead to a deterioration of, the already shrinking, employment opportunities. It was, thus, not a coincidence that Europe turned out asocial, as ‘the neoliberal character of the EU is enshrined in all European treaties’ (Van der Meer and De Rijk, De Groene, 1997).

Nonetheless, more cooperation did not have to oppose a more social Europe, but the base of the entire project needs to be adjusted. Pulling out the Treaty of Maastricht and a referendum in all member states would be a good start (Van der Meer and De Rijk, De Groene, 1997). According to another article in De Groene, the EU needed an ideological base that could legitimize a ‘political, united Europe’ (Van Os and Van Os, De Groene, 1997). As soon as they had reached that, the introduction of the euro would not matter that much (Van Os and Van Os, De Groene, 1997). According to Brouwer (De Groene, 1997), a good solution would be more control for the European parliament.

7.4.1.3 Europhile, Eurosceptic or pragmatic?

When it comes to the public debate about the Treaty of Amsterdam, it is difficult to put one label on the journals. Both journals adhere, when it comes to the democratic deficit of the EU, to the Eurosceptic discourse: supporting the idea of the European Union, but critical of the current ideas on integration. The De Groene talked about the EU being the most ‘oligarchical government in Europe’ and Elsevier called European integration a ‘pressure cooker’. Elsevier framed the EU in its national embeddedness and openly talked about ‘Europe’s boundaries’, corresponding to the ‘limits of Europe’ discourse as formulated by Harmsen (2008). De Groene was not very optimistic when it came to further integration, highlighting the inherent neoliberal character of the EU. A better and social EU could happen, but then the entire fundament of the EU needed to be changed, something regarded as nearly impossible to achieve.

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Overall, where Elsevier sometimes referred to positives of (economic) integration, in general both journals were rather negative about the future of the European Union in general and the Treaty of Amsterdam in particular.

7.4.2 European Constitution

Considering the topic of democratization and institutional reform of the Union, it is not strange that the 'democratic deficit' frame was the most prevalent in 2005 both in Elsevier and De Groene (see the second column in Table 2 and 3). In the Elsevier, the 'democratic deficit' frame featured mainly alongside the ‘nationalistic’, ‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame and ‘labor and social security’ frame. Where in 1997, both journals were critical of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the way it was communicated to the citizens, in 2005 Elsevier was unequivocal in their stance on the ‘constitution’. They proclaimed an editorial ‘no’ to the treaty and paid significant attention to both the Dutch as well as the French referendum (which took place three days before the Dutch referendum). Despite the editorial ‘no’, they also reserved articles for columnists that had a different opinion on the matter. In general, Elsevier had more journalists and columnists covering the EU in 2005 than in 1997. This active stance also explains the significant increase of attention the Elsevier had for European matters (from 21 to 45 articles). De Groene was also critical of the constitution and refrained from taking an active stance on the matter. The unintelligibility of the ‘constitution’ made it impossible to deduct any what the consequences of the treaty could be. The editors from De Groene decided to dedicate minimal attention to the referendum itself and more to visions and ideas on Europe’s future, albeit often referring to the constitution and its implications (Smeets, De Groene, 2005). This explains the marginal increase of articles that were found in comparison to 1997 (19 to 22 articles).

7.4.2.1 Elsevier

Elsevier’s main reason for advocating a ‘no’ in the referendum had to do with giving up ‘vital national interests’. These interests mainly had to do with asylum and visa policy that would be transferred to the European level, making it impossible for the Netherlands to decide who to let in and who not.18 The journal saw a negative correlation between immigration and the social welfare state of the Netherlands (Elsevier, 2005). In an editorial article ‘No!’, editor-in-chief

18 In actuality, the ‘constitution’ included the passage that the member-states would retain their right to decide how many people they would let in (see article III-267.5 of the constitution).

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Arendo Joustra (Elsevier, 2005) feared an influx of immigrants to ‘the social paradise on the North Sea’, which would add to the already existing problems with immigration. The EU and further integration is framed here as opposing something that belongs to the national competence (‘nationalistic’ frame), namely the nation’s social security (‘labor and social security’ frame). But, as Joustra (Elsevier, 2005) mentioned in the same article, this is not a rejection of European cooperation but a ‘vote for national self-determination’. A ‘no-vote’ would strengthen the Dutch bargaining power, hoping it would lead to an opt-out like Denmark had gotten after Maastricht (Joustra, Elsevier, 2005). ‘A pause for reflection’ of the integration process could have a ‘healing effect’, according to Wynia (Elsevier, 2005).

The government, on the other hand, had decided to openly campaign for a ‘yes-vote’, with the uninteresting slogan ‘Europe. Pretty important’ (Harryvan and Voerman, 2013). Similar to 1997, Elsevier denounced the way in which Dutch politicians tried to communicate the importance of voting in favor of the constitution, because just like in 1997, a war-like rhetoric was prominent in the political referendum discourse, with ministers claiming that a ‘no’ would lead to war or a complete collapse of the economy. Harryvan and Voerman argued that the fear-invested rhetoric of these politicians actually lead to an increase of no voters (2013). As De Winter (Elsevier, 2005) explained ‘Donner [Minister of Justice] is afraid of war, but it will be a different war than the one he expects – the one against Brussels, the lack of democracy and the loss of national sovereignty’. De Winter (Elsevier, 2005) feared a ‘monster state’ with an unfathomable bureaucracy. Here you see clearly how the Elsevier frames the democratic deficit of the EU as undermining Dutch sovereignty, under the pretense that it would lead to more efficient and effective decision-making (‘efficacy and efficiency’ frame).

Although the Elsevier was mainly critical of the proposed 'constitution', they also gave room to columnists who advocated for the 'constitution'. Bart Tromp (Elsevier, 2005) was the main columnist who denounced the rhetoric of not only politicians favoring the ‘constitution’, but also the rhetoric of those advocating for a ‘no’, such as fellow-columnist Leon de Winter and Elsevier in general. A ‘no’ would not lead to war as some argued, but a ‘yes’ would also not lead to a ‘super’ or ‘monster’ state (Tromp, Elsevier, 2005). Actually, Tromp (Elsevier, 2005) argued the ‘constitution’ would be an advancement in comparison to earlier treaties, such as Nice, as national parliaments and the European Parliament would get more power.

7.4.2.2 De Groene

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De Groene, just as in 1997, criticized the lack of willingness from the European political elite to engage in a normal debate with its citizens. Van der Velden (De Groene, 2005) denounced those European politicians that had always advocated for more direct citizen involved, and now feared that that same involvement would hamper the ratification of the ‘constitution’. Continuing, De Groene, stated that the constitution was not there for the people, it was only there to eliminate tension between national and economical factions by drafting new rules and procedures. The constitution has nothing to do with democracy, or efficiency, rather ‘the constitution is meant to move away from democracy, to a post-democracy.’ (Lock and Venema, De Groene, 2005). So instead of moving ‘Europe’ to a public arena, it is dealt with in ‘backrooms’, completely depoliticizing the decision-making process (Lock and Venema, De Groene, 2005). De Groene stated that Europe is not what it seems, headlining ‘Ceci n’est pas une constitution’ referring to the Magritte’s pipe titled ‘ceci n’est pas une pipe’, you are not seeing what you are seeing (Van der Velden, De Groene, 2005). The EU had a tendency to create mock institutions. The European Commission pretended to be independent while in practice they are controlled by European leaders, and the Parliament is not a real parliament, as they do not have legislative powers (Van der Velden, 2005).

Conversely, De Groene also criticized those politicians fervently advocating for a ‘no’, who while criticizing other politicians of deceiving the public about Europe, were doing the same exact thing (Hurenkamp, De Groene, 2005). De Groene used similar argumentation as Tromp, being critical of the discourse, as a ‘no’ would not lead to war or crisis, as was claimed by politicians, but to the status quo, that is the Treaty of Nice (2000).

7.4.2.3 Dissecting discourses

The limits type of discourse that had been deducted from Elsevier’s coverage of the Treaty of Amsterdam continued in 2005, when the journal advocated for a ‘no’ in the referendum. Their main reason was the far-reaching competence ‘meddling’ of Europe in the visa and migration policy. Voting ‘no’ was not a rejection of European cooperation but could have a ‘healing effect’, possibly redrawing the competence division between the EU and the Netherlands. Many articles in Elsevier, and also in De Groene, again denounced the level and rhetoric of the debate in the EU and the Netherlands, a rhetoric that had not changed much in comparison to 1997. The ‘backdoor’ and ‘fear of the public opinion’ kind of decision-making was sharply criticized by both journals. Although De Groene was less fixated on the subject at hand, their covering was influenced by the institutional changes the ‘constitution’ proposed, calling out

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the European elite for moving away to a ‘post-democracy’ with ‘mock institutions’. The foundations of the European Union, with no inherent democratic features, are undesirable. Both journals can be seen as still portraying the Eurosceptic discourse as in 1997, although the Elsevier also hinted at a Europe-renationalization discourse: transferring competence on EU- level back to the national level.

Interesting to note is that because there were also political parties (and columnists) actively advocating for a ‘no’, also their rhetoric was criticized as misleading, something that had not occurred in 1997. The Dutch parliament had thus become more actively diverse in its opinion on Europe (as was put forward in the previous chapter).

7.4.3 Eurozone crisis

7.4.3.1 Elsevier

As stated in chapter five, the Dutch population was not in favor of more European centralization, growing ever more Eurosceptic since the ‘constitution’ of 2005 (Kennedy, 2017). Elsevier had two columnist that published almost weekly a column on the eurozone crisis and the role the Dutch coalition played in it. The attention that the journal had given the European ‘Constitution’ had declined somewhat, but in comparison to 1997, it had increased significantly (21 to 31 articles). Having advocated for a preservation of national sovereignty and more democratic accountability in both 1997 and 2005 and a ‘no’ and opt-out on asylum and visa policy in 2005, Elsevier grew wary again of the procedural side of decision-making in Brussels and criticized to a large extend the policies that were spurred by France and Germany. Some journalists agitated against more competence transferal, others understood that it was going to happen, mostly wondering how ‘more Europe’ would come about.

Stellinga (Elsevier, 2011), belonging to the former group of journalists, spoke of the new plan of Merkel and Sarkozy as ‘Germanisation’, asking the question ‘how much power do we want to transfer to Europe?’. It was something that Stellinga (Elsevier, 2011) thought the Dutch parliament should thoroughly debate on, but it was not happening. While the EU had gradually been ‘pinching’ power from the national governments, the answer to the question of who could be held accountable for these actions, or who could be voted on if someone did not agree with course of action, was ‘no one’ (Elsevier, Stellinga, 2011). In the same vein, Wynia (Elsevier, 2011) stated that the Dutch parliament should be wary of proposals like the

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Euro-plus-pact because once you transfer those competencies ‘you’ll never get them back’. On European affairs, the government should inform the parliament better. Nevertheless, closing the door on Europe, Stellinga (Elsevier, 2011) argued, was not an option, the Netherlands had profited too much from the internal market. Joosten (2011) and Joustra (2011), belonging to the latter group, were sure that more integration was on its way but Joosten was wondering what was going to happen exactly. ‘More Europe’ was a given, but in what way? ‘Nobody knows’ (Joosten, Elsevier, 2011). The inevitability of further integration was blurred by national politicians, like Rutte, who openly lied about it not happening (Joustra, Elsevier, 2011).

Wynia (Elsevier, 2011) was more critical than his colleagues and talked of a ‘coup d’état’. He criticized the ‘efficiency and efficacy’ argument of the EU by stating that more Europe meant more centralization of more competences, such as social-economic and fiscal policies. This was not in the interest of the Netherlands, as it would lead to a lack of competitiveness and an erosion of the social security in the Netherlands. Here, Wynia (Elsevier, 2011) used a similar argument as De Winter did in 2005, more integration is not to the benefit of the Netherlands, to the contrary, more integration leads to erosion of the economy and social security. A revisal of the contours of Europe was necessary. So, those that wanted to ‘keep the good sides of the EU’ should look at what can be ‘limited’. No more transfer of powers to Brussels, no common defense and security policy and no transfer union (Wynia, Elsevier, 2011). Who ignored this ‘truth’ would boost the European integration, but only to its ‘demise’ and nothing more (Wynia, Elsevier, 2011).

7.4.3.2 De Groene

Also De Groene came to the conclusion that there were more alternatives solving the eurozone crisis. ‘Europe’s alternatives’ was one of the first headlines of De Groene in 2011. Criticizing Merkel’s statement ‘alternativlos’ when talking about the future of the euro, Haegens (De Groene, 2011) stated that there were definitely alternatives to the course that had been chosen. The Netherlands feared an ‘economic super government’ in Brussels, resulting in a loss of sovereignty on economic policy. Nevertheless, more harmonization and coordination could be a good incentive for leftist parties and unions to advocate for a minimum wage and a tax system to take on multinationals. 2011 is ‘the year of the truth’, either the EU would become more powerful, or the euro as we know it would evaporate, according to Haegens (De Groene, 2011). In any case, a ‘social movement’ should be 61

initiated to counter the ‘political elite’ and to fill the void of the democratic deficit of the EU (Haegens, De Groene, 2011). Vendrik (De Groene, 2011) came to a similar conclusion, stating that centralization of financial-economic policy would be a logical step, although he also stated that ‘there is no alternative’, those that wanted to keep the euro needed to move forwards. In these passages, ' the efficiency and efficacy' frame is used in combination with the 'labor and social security' and ' economic consequences' to advocate for more integration. Engelen (De Groene, 2011) focused on the difficulty of balancing national and European politics. Up until the 1990s, Engelen explained, there was something like an implicit electoral support for the EU; now this support has shifted to ‘explicit skepticism’, with a European elite looking for an answer to that skepticism (Engelen, De Groene, 2011).

In a special on Europe, Mak (De Groene, 2011) underlined the danger, which lay behind not finding the answer to the skepticism Engelen hinted at: 'If the EU is incapable of reinventing itself, we will lose grip on our future’. He stated that the Eurozone crisis is not just an economic crisis it is also inherently political. Here, the 'European democratic deficit' frame comes to the fore. On the one hand there is a need for centralization on economic and fiscal policy, but on the other hand nations are wary of giving more power to the Brussels (Mak, De Groene, 2011). More efficiency and efficacy without a stronger democratic level was not possible. But if Europe tried to actually become a democracy with a chosen president and national democratic processes, it would not be as ‘vulnerable’ as it is now (Mak, De Groene, 2011). In short, ‘if there is any European problem bigger than the euro crisis, it is the democratic deficit, and it is growing, and it could mean the end of all of our dreams’ (Mak, De Groene, 2011).

7.4.3.3 More integration, nobody knows in what way

What can be deducted from both journals is that the economic crisis that started in 2009 was seen as another crossroad of European integration. Both journals had identified to some extent that it was inevitable to have more (economic) integration with a crisis like this.

Two discourses can be discerned in the Elsevier. To a certain extent, the journal showed a more Europragmatic discourse, acknowledging that ‘more Europe’ would be beneficial in solving the eurozone crisis. On the other hand, it remained critical of transferring more national competences to Brussels and denounced the national and European democratic deficit. The Eurosceptic discourse of the past two key moments was still very much present.

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De Groene also changed to a more Europragmatic and sometimes Euroenthusiast discourse: more integration as a solution for transnational issues. Although criticizing the lack of democracy in the EU and the Dutch debate on the EU, the journal advocated that more integration could lead to better social standards throughout Europe and would make it less vulnerable to criticism. A similar argumentation was found in 1997, when Van der Meer and De Rijk (De Groene, 1997) also argued, albeit being very pessimistic, that the EU could become social and democratic.

7.4.4 In conclusion

In the previous three subparagraphs, I have tried to answer the sub question ‘How do the weekly journals define the relations between the Netherlands and EU and further European integration?’ and ‘To what extent have these discourses changed over time?’. By looking at the language behind the frames identified in paragraph 6.1, it was possible to dissect which discourses were present in the journals. The most dominant discourse of these three key moments is the Eurosceptic discourse: supporting the idea of the European Union, but critical of the current ideas on integration (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002).

These ‘current ideas on Europe’ were, however, interpreted differently by both journals. De Groene, was very critical of the democratic standards of the EU and the way the Dutch parliament and politicians dealt with European affairs throughout the three key moments. Elsevier, while also critical of the democratic standards both nationally and on a European level, insisted on the importance of the nation-state and the preservation of national competences. This came to the fore in 2005, when they openly advocated for a ‘no’ in de Dutch referendum. More integration is not per definition better. Taking these three key moments together, it can also be concluded that the language that was used, was rather negative in tone. For the large part, both journals focused on the negative sides of the European Union and further integration, concurring with the conclusion of De Beus and Mak (2009), who concluded that between 1990 and 2002, the positive news coverage in the Netherlands decreased.

This chapter has shown that when we refer to ‘Euroscepticism’, only the critique on the current ideas of European integration features in this discourse. Where the overall discourse of both journals was Eurosceptic, their alternative ideas showed something different. Over the course of these three key moments, De Groene advocated for a different integration path,

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with a social, environmental and democratic foundation. These proposed alternatives advocated a more integrated Europe, hinting at a Euroenthusiast discourse. Where De Groene proposed ideas of a more but differently integrated union, Elsevier’s alternative ideas on the course of European integration would be to increase the power of national parliaments in the decision-making procedure and to revise the competence division between the EU and its member-states (e.g. on the asylum and visa policy). Nevertheless, there were also voices in the Elsevier that focused on the benefits of more integration in some areas (as can be seen in 1997 and 2011). So here, the alternatives to the prevalent Eurosceptic discourse are a combination of the Europe-renationalization discourse (some competence to be transferred back to the Netherlands) and the Europragmatic discourse (where beneficial, more integration).

In short, this chapter has identified that, while a quantitative frame analysis is important in a frame analysis, it does not allow for a complete picture to be drawn about a certain debate. In combination with a qualitative frame analysis, discourses on the European Union and further integration can dissected. Moreover, the qualitative analysis has shown that defining a discourse as uniformly ‘Eurosceptic’, does not account for those alternative ideas on Europe, that might feature different or more positive discourses.

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8 CONCLUSION In this conclusion, I will focus on the question as to whether there is a correlation between the political and public debate. Chapter 5 and 6 have shown that the most prevalent frames and discourses in both debates have remained rather consistent over the three years of analysis, although there were also fluctuations discernible which mostly had to do with context of the debate. When comparing the two debates, a few things become clear.

Firstly, the prevalence of the frames (see Table 1 and Table 2 and 3). When looking at the quantitative difference between the political and public debate, it can be concluded that both debates evoked institutional and democratic frames most often, although the public debate focused consistently on the Dutch and European democratic shortcomings, whereas the parliament evoked the governance of the EU more often (‘efficiency and efficacy’ frame). Only in 2005, there was an increased salience of the ‘national democratic deficit’, with a reflection in the political debate on the role of the national parliaments in the EU, Interesting to note, is that in both debates the ‘multicultural-universalist’ frame is almost completely absent. Moreover, the political debate evokes all the possible frames, whereas the public debate seems to be focusing more on specific issues. This comparison has shown that there is overlap in the frame prevalence in both debates, but also that they deviate from one another.

Secondly, the language. Where the political debate in general emphasized the positive elements of the EU and further integration, or at least the positive steps that had been taken, the public debate was overall very negative. Van Santen and Vliegenthart (2013) concluded that the conflict frame was prevalent in the 1990s and especially 2005, and that negative news coverage of the EU had increased.

Thirdly, the discourse. Where the prevalent frames overlapped, the prevalent discourses diverged. The dominant discourse of the public debate on the situation of 1997, 2005 and 2011 concurred more with the argumentation and language of the Eurosceptic or Euroreject political parties than to the Euroenthusiastic parties. In this sense, there was some overlap between the political and public debate, but not from the dominant discourse of the political debate. The focus of the two weekly journals was not just on the European level, national politicians, national decision-making procedures and the national debate about Europe were harshly criticized – this had already started in 1997, before the Eurosceptic or Euroreject discourse increased quantitatively in the parliament (with the rise of LPF, PVV and SP). The more government politicians started using defeatist or war-like language, the more the

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journals started to criticize the European project. The mistrust that was seen in the referendum of 2005 was already commonplace in both journals. Their response in 2005 was telling, Elsevier openly advocated for a ‘no’, and De Groene did not even try to inform their readers about the specifics of the ‘constitution’ as if it was a lost cause already. Schuck and De Vreese (2008) found that in the case of 2005, positive news coverage let to more rejectionist votes in the referendum, so-called ‘reversed mobilization’. The political discourse somewhat changed in 2011, with more parties focusing on the role of the nation-state in the EU. It seemed like 2005 was a wake-up call for the political parties, although if they had looked in De Groene and Elsevier this growing negative stance of a part of the population towards ‘an ever-closer union’ was easily detectable. In other words, the dominant discourse in the political debate was opposed to the dominant discourse in the public debate. Consequently, this 'thick' description of the political and public has shown, as was stated in chapter two, that there is no such thing as a ‘true’ discourse, ‘the social world is not constructed by one discourse but by a multitude of viewpoints that can compete with one another’ (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002).

Many researches concluded that the decades following the Treaty of Maastricht, especially the early 2000s, meant a definitive break with Dutch political enthusiasm for Europe (see chapter five). This research has shown, however, that by looking at three key moments of integration, the most prevalent frames and dominant discourses in the political and public debate did not change significantly. The dominant discourses of 1997 were to a large extent still the dominant discourses in 2011, although bigger parties like the CDA and VVD adopted a more pragmatic stance towards Europe. But, ‘more Europe’ was way more than ‘less Europe’. Another element that changed in the discourse was the quantitative presence of more Eurosceptic and Euroreject discourses in the Dutch parliament. Those frames that were less frequent were subject to more fluctuations, which can in part be explained by the contextual features in which the frames were found, such as the subject of the treaties and the ideological background of the political parties and weekly journals.

Moreover, this research has tried to show the difficulties of formulating ‘one’ discourse per party or journal, or even entire debates for that matter. Even when the dominant discourse of the public debate was Eurosceptic, their alternatives to the ‘current ideas on Europe’ showed different discourses. Similar conclusions can be drawn with political parties that showed an overall Euroreject discourse while at the same time emphasizing that European integration in some sense is beneficial to the Netherlands.

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9 BIBLIOGRAPHY

9.1 PRIMARY SOURCES 9.1.1 Parliamentary debates and the law on the referendum

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (1996-1997). De brief van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over de stand van zaken met betrekking tot de aanstaande Intergouvernementele conferentie in Amsterdam (24609, nr. 18). Nr. 82, pp. 5667-5713. Published 29 May 1997. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-19961997-5667-5713.html.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (1996-1997). Europese Raad te Amsterdam. Nr. 94, pp. 6519-6564. Published 27 June 1997. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h- tk-19961997-6519-6564.html.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2003-2004). Debat over de op 17 en 18 juni te Brussel gehouden Europese Top. Nr. 87, pp. 5555-5587. Published 2 July 2004. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20032004-5555-5587.html.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2004-2005). Debat naar aanleiding van de uitslag avn het referendum van 1 juni 2005 over het Europees grondwettelijk verdrag. Nr. 86, pp. 5134- 5177. Published 13 June 2005. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk- 20042005-5134-5177.html.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2010-2011). Debat over de Staat van de Europese Unie. Nr. 86, item 3. Published 21 June 2011. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20102011-86-3.html.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2010-2011). Debat over de agenda van de Europese top. Nr. 96, item 2. Published 25 July 2011. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20102011-96-2.html

Wet raadplegend referendum Europese Grondwet. (2005, 4 February). Accessed from https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0017966/2005-02-04.

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9.1.2 Elsevier

The entire archive of Elsevier can be found here: http://archief.elsevierweekblad.nl/index.do. 1997 Beunders, H. (1 March 1997). Kop of munt voor Europa. Elsevier, issue 9, p. 50.

De Hen, P. (1 February 1997). Zeven bezwaren tegen de euro. Elsevier, issue 5, p. 62.

Fortuyn, P. (3 May 1997). Snelkookpan Europa. Elsevier, issue 18, p. 22.

Joustra, A. (7 June 1997). Amsterdams verdrag geen sluitstuk. Elsevier, issue 23, p. 36.

Schoo, H. (31 May 1997). Europa’s grenzen. Elsevier, issue 22, p. 12.

2005

De Winter, L. (23 April 2005). Tegen de monsterstaat. Elsevier, issue 21, p 12.

Joustra, A. (16 April 2005). Nee!. Elsevier, issue 15, p. 6.

No author. (7 May 2005). Europa en onze sociale zekerheid. Elsevier, issue 18, p. 22.

Tromp, B. (28 mei 2005). Ik stem vóór. Elsevier, issue 21, p 44.

Wynia, S. (28 May 2005). Pas op de plaats. Elsevier, issue 21, p 12.

2011 Joustra, A. (9 April 2011). Rutte is gewaarschuwd. Elsevier, issue 14, p. 2.

Joosten, C. (19 February 2011). In de mist van Europa. Elsevier, issue 7, p. 12.

Stellinga, M. (12 February 2011). Germanisering. Hoeveel macht willen we afdragen aan Europa? Rug toekeren geen optie, braaf volgen evenmin. Elsevier, issue 6, p. 8.

Wynia, S. (12 February 2011), Merkozy’s belastingkartel. Elsevier, issue 6, p. 46.

Wynia, S. (12 March 2011). Slechte signalen. Tweede Kamer moet opletten dat kabinet niet weer bevoegdheden weggeeft aan Brussel. Elsevier, issue 10, p. 8.

Wynia, S. (2 July 2011). Vlucht vooruit. Elsevier, issue 26, p. 8.

Wynia, S. (2 July 2011). Europa is veel te groot. Elsevier, issue 26, p. 18.

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9.1.3 De Groene

The entire archive of De Groene can be found here: https://www.groene.nl/edities.

1997

De Rijk, M. (19 February 1997). Ook economen kunnen kiezen. De Groene, issue 8.

De Rijk, M. (16 April 1997). In 2002 zullen we deze eurotop vervloeken. De Groene, issue 16.

Van der Meer, J. and De Rijk, M. (4 June 1997). Elf stenen door de euroruiten. Het is niet een toevallig weeffoutje dat Europa asociaal uitpakt, het neoliberale karakter van Europa is vastgelegd in alle Europese verdragen. De Groene, issue 23.

Van Os, H. and Van Os, P. (16 april 1997). “Verkiest rechtvaardigheid”. De Groene, issue 16.

2005

Hurenkamp, M. (29 April 2005). Europopulisme. De Groene, issue 17.

Lock, G. and and Venema, H. (20 May 2005). Europa Special: De nieuwe anitpolitiek van Europa. De Groene, issue 20.

Smeets. H. (6 May 2005). Het gedachtegoed en de antikiezers. De Groene, issue 18.

Van der Velden, B. (25 March 2005). Europa is niet wat het lijkt. Ceci n’est pas une constitution. De Groene, issue 12.

2011

Engelen, E. (6 July 2011). Jokkebrok. De Groene, issue 27.

Haegens, K. (25 January 2011). Europa’s alternatieven. De Groene, issue 4.

Haegens, K. (13 April 2011). Eurodictatuur. De Groene, issue 15.

Mak, G. (8 June 2011). Gigantisch in alles, maar zonder agressie. De Groene, issue 23.

Vendrik, K. (9 February 2011). Euro 2.0. De Groene, issue 6.

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9.1.4 Websites

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Rijksoverheid.nl, (2020). Letterlijke tekst persconferentie na ministerraad 13 maart 2020.[online] Available at: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/mediateksten/2020/03/13/letterlijke-tekst- persconferentie-na-ministerraad-13-maart-2020 [Accessed 20 March, 2020).

Parlement.com. Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 1994. [online] Available at: https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvx0/tweede_kamerverkiezingen_1994 [Accessed 14 June 2020].

Parlement.com. Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2003. [online] Available at: https://www.parlement.com/id/vhnnmt7j3lxt/tweede_kamerverkiezingen_2003 [Accessed 14 June 2020].

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