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The Secular Transformation of Pride and Humility in the Moral Philophy of David Hume

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The Secular Transformation of Pride and Humility in the Moral Philophy of David Hume Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects The ecS ular Transformation of Pride and Humility in the Moral Philosophy of David Hume Kirstin April Carlson McPherson Marquette University Recommended Citation McPherson, Kirstin April Carlson, "The eS cular Transformation of Pride and Humility in the Moral Philosophy of David Hume" (2016). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 625. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/625 THE SECULAR TRANSFORMATION OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY IN THE MORAL PHILOPHY OF DAVID HUME by Kirstin Carlson McPherson, B.A., M.A. A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin May 2016 ABSTRACT: THE SECULAR TRANSFORMATION OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY IN THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID HUME Kirstin Carlson McPherson, B.A., M.A. Marquette University, 2016 In this dissertation I examine Hume’s secular re-definition and re-evaluation of the traditional Christian understanding of pride and humility as part of his project to establish a fully secular account of ethics and to undermine what he thought to be the harmful aspects of religious morality. Christians traditionally have seen humility, understood as receptivity to God, to be crucial for individual and social flourishing, and pride as the root of individual and social disorder. By contrast, Hume, who conceives of pride and humility immanently in terms of our self-appraisals, sees pride as a key virtue that serves as the ultimate source of moral motivation and deems humility a ‘monkish virtue’ (i.e., a vice). Hume, moreover, sees religious appeals to a transcendent moral source to be a threat to individual flourishing in that they encourage the formation of what he calls ‘artificial lives’ (of which the monkish virtues are an expression) as well as a threat to social concord, insofar as they foster unnecessary religious factions, intolerance, and theologically sanctioned violence. In part to combat this, Hume promotes a wholly secular ethic rooted in common life. I uncover the real points of agreement and disagreement that underlie Hume and traditional Christian conceptions of pride and humility in order to articulate what is essentially at issue between these contrasting perspectives and, ultimately, to identify some of what is gained or lost in Hume’s secularization of ethics. I, thus, explore the reasons that Hume rejects Christian morality and seeks to replace it with a secular one. I then assess whether Hume’s secular perspective has sufficient resources for addressing the biased judgments and rivalries that can arise precisely because of what Hume sees as our natural desire for the ‘passion of pride’ (i.e., for a positive sense of ourselves before others). I conclude both that Hume identifies genuine dangers in attempting to go beyond the human and also that there are genuine dangers in Hume’s attempt to close the window to a transcendent moral source. I, therefore, contend that any adequate view of human flourishing must take account of both these dangers. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Kirstin McPherson, B.A., M.A. I would like to thank and to dedicate this dissertation to my former director, Dr. William Starr, who passed away suddenly shortly after I finished my fourth chapter. His encouragement and support among differences of view has meant so much to me. His cheerful and spirited personality will be always remembered and missed. I would also like to thank my committee, my director, Dr. Stan Harrison, and Drs. Ryan Hanley, Patrick Murray, and Owen Goldin for their friendship, generous gift of time, and insightful feedback. My gratitude exceeds expression. I would also like to thank to my parents, Sue and Stan Carlson, and my siblings Elisa Stansbury and Ken Carlson, and my wonderful in-laws, Susan and Randy McPherson, for all they have been to me. A particular thanks to Elisa Stansbury and Susan McPherson for their great gift (often involving significant self-sacrifice) of taking care of my daughter Clare so that I could write. I could not have completed this dissertation without them. Thanks, finally, to my family. I cannot convey how grateful I am to my precious children, Clare and John, who have made my life rich beyond measure, and to my husband, David, my spiritual and philosophical soul-mate, who makes me better in every way. They have my deepest love. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………. i REFERENCE KEY FOR ABBREVIATIONS OF PRIMARY TEXTS ………………. v INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………… 1 Summary of Chapters ………………………………………………………… 12 The Need for This Study…..…………………………………………………… 26 A Preliminary Note on the Terms of Pride and Humility……………………... 30 I. PRIDE AND HUMILITY IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION………………...…... 38 I. Pride and Humility in Augustine…………………………………………….. 39 II. Pride and Humility in the Christian Humanist Tradition as Represented by Aquinas………………………………………………………………………… 50 III. Pride and Humility in the Hyper-Augustinian Tradition…………………… 61 a. Humility as Self-Depreciation……………………………………….. 64 b. The Nature/Grace Divide and Implications for Pagan Virtue……….. 74 c. The Passivity of Human Agency…………………………………….. 80 d. Mistrust of Reason and Theological Voluntarism…………………… 88 IV. Conclusion………………………………………………………………….. 94 II. HUME’S CRITIQUE OF RELIGIOUS MORALITY AND HIS SECULAR ETHIC OF ORDINARY LIFE…………………………………………………………………. 97 I. Skepticism, Naturalism, and Religion in Hume’s Philosophy ……………... 103 II. Hume’s Epistemological Critique of Religious Morality as Pertaining to Christian Morality ….………………………………………………………… 122 a. Hume’s Epistemological Rejection of Morality Based in Revealed Religion .……………………………………………………………… 123 b. Hume’s Critique of Morality Grounded in Natural Religion ……… 132 iii III. Hume’s Secular Morality of Common Life ……………………………… 140 IV. Hume’s Moral Critique of Christian Morality……………………………. 145 a. The Dubious Origins of Christian Belief…………………………… 146 b. The Dangers of Religious Morality………………………………… 151 III. HUME’S REHABILITATION OF PRIDE AS A VIRTUE AND HIS CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIAN HUMILITY…………………………………………………………….. 162 I. Pride and Humility as Passions…………………………………………….. 164 II. The Virtue of Pride………………………………………………………… 168 a. Pride as a Virtue……………………………………………………. 168 b. Pride and Sympathy………………………………………………… 182 c. Pride and Moral Motivation ……………………………………….. 190 III. The Vice of Humility……………………………………………………... 199 IV. Assessment of Hume’s Critique………………………………………….. 211 a. Hyper-Augustinian Humility………………………………………. 212 b. The Christian Humanist Humility of Aquinas …………………….. 225 IV. THE PASSION OF PRIDE AND PROBLEMS FOR FLOURISHING…………. 229 I. The Passions of Pride and Humility………………………………………... 230 a. The Nature of Pride and Humility as Passions …………………….. 231 i. The Basic Structure of Pride and Humility ………………… 232 ii. Modifications to Hume’s Account ………………………… 235 iii. Sources of Pride…………………………………………… 247 b. Pride and Love of Fame …………………………………………… 253 c. Pride and Motivation ………………………………………………. 264 iv II. Pride and Human Flourishing……………………………………………… 268 a. Pride and Moral Epistemology …………………………………….. 269 b. Pride and Individual Flourishing ………………………………….. 281 c. Pride and Social Flourishing……………………………………….. 288 III. Conclusion………………………………………………………………... 298 V. THE LIMITATIONS OF HUME’S ACCOUNT OF PRIDE AS A VIRTUE……. 300 I. Prideful Concern for Character and the Problem of Faction ………………. 303 II. Proper Pride and Individual Flourishing ………………………………….. 328 VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIAN HUMANIST HUMILITY……………. 344 I. Humean and Christian Humanist Conceptions of Proper Self-Assessment… 345 II. Normativity, Moral Ontology, and Motivation……………………………. 362 III. Christian Humanist Humility, Faction, and Individual Flourishing……… 382 IV. Conclusion………………………………………………………………... 391 CONCLUSION: HUMILITY, RELIGION, AND HUMAN FLOURISHING ……… 393 BIBLIOGRAPHY.……………………………………………………………………. 420 v REFERENCE KEY FOR ABBREVIATIONS OF PRIMARY TEXTS* David Hume: T = A Treatise of Human Nature EHU = An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding EPM = An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals NHR = The Natural History of Religion D = Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ESY = Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary LDH = The Letters of David Hume NL = New Letters of David Hume LG = A Letter from a Gentleman Aristotle: NE = Nicomachean Ethics Augustine: CG = City of God C = Confessions CT = On Christian Teaching Aquinas: ST = Summa Theologiae Pascal: P = Pensées OC = Oeuvres Complètes vi Pierre Nicole: ME = Moral Essays CS = Of Charity and Self-Love Martin Luther: LW = Luther’s Works John Calvin: ICR = Institutes of the Christian Religion *See Bibliography for full citation information for these works. 1 INTRODUCTION In this dissertation I want to examine Hume’s attempt to establish a fully secular account of ethics, which is one of the first of its kind and continues to be influential today.1 I will focus specifically on Hume’s secular transformation of the traditional Christian understanding of pride and humility as a key locus for seeing what is at stake in Hume’s project.2 In the Christian tradition, pride and humility are defined primarily in relation to God, where humility is regarded as a fundamental virtue and pride as the root of sin. By contrast, for Hume pride and humility are defined immanently in terms of one’s self-conception in relation to social approval and disapproval, where pride is seen
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