Naval Surface Forces Readiness: Are Navy Reforms Adequate?

[H.A.S.C. No. 116–5]

NAVAL SURFACE FORCES READINESS: ARE NAVY REFORMS ADEQUATE?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

MEETING JOINTLY WITH SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD FEBRUARY 26, 2019

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 35–338 WASHINGTON : 2019 SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS JOHN GARAMENDI, California, Chairman

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado ANDY KIM, New Jersey, Vice Chair AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma JOE WILSON, South Carolina CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania ROB BISHOP, Utah JASON CROW, Colorado MIKE ROGERS, Alabama XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico MO BROOKS, Alabama ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas JACK BERGMAN, Michigan DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico MELANIE HARRIS, Professional Staff Member TOM HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member MEGAN HANDAL, Clerk

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JIM COOPER, Tennessee K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts JACK BERGMAN, Michigan FILEMON VELA, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., California VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey PAUL COOK, California KATIE HILL, California BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine TRENT KELLY, Mississippi ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice Chair PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member DAVE SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member MEGAN HANDAL, Clerk

(II) C O N T E N T S

Page

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman, Subcom- mittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ...... 3 Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California, Chairman, Sub- committee on Readiness ...... 1 Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...... 2 Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ...... 5 WITNESSES Aquilino, ADM John C., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Department of the Navy ...... 7 Grady, ADM Christopher W., USN, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command, Department of the Navy ...... 6 APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS: Courtney, Hon. Joe ...... 39 Garamendi, Hon. John ...... 37 Grady, ADM Christopher W., joint with ADM John C. Aquilino ...... 43 Lamborn, Hon. Doug ...... 38 Wittman, Hon. Robert J...... 41 DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: Mrs. Luria ...... 55 Mr. Wittman ...... 55

(III)

NAVAL SURFACE FORCES READINESS: ARE NAVY REFORMS ADEQUATE?

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, Feb- ruary 26, 2019. The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Garamendi (chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRE- SENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS Mr. GARAMENDI. Good morning. We are prepared to start here. So welcome to all of you. I saw you down there, and I knew we could start. Very good. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I call to order this hearing, joint hearing of the Readiness and Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee. I would like to state at the outset that we continue to honor and remember the 17 sailors who died in the tragic surface ship collisions of 2017. None of us on this committee, and I am sure within the Navy itself, will forget. And we will continue to mourn those losses that were unfortunately avoidable. Our thoughts remain with their loved ones, with their family and their friends. Over the last 18 months, this committee has held numerous hearings and meetings with Navy leadership in an attempt to understand the causes of those devastating incidents. I appreciate the Navy’s attention to this issue and continued willingness to engage with the committee. I also recognize that implementing significant reforms takes time. Often too much time. However, I am concerned that the Navy has not sufficiently addressed several of the problems responsible for the deadliest naval disasters in four decades. I worry that the Navy leadership remains overly focused on shipbuilding and is not adequately prioritizing the manning and maintenance of its current fleet. I am troubled by reports that the Navy’s investigations were not fully transparent about the extent to which a brutal operational tempo, low morale, and preventable technological challenges contributed to these disasters. I wonder if the Navy could do more to constrain the demand for use of the surface force. Moreover, I worry that Navy is not think- (1) 2 ing deeply enough about how to change its culture to empower officers to voice concerns and install an ethic of rigor and excellence. I look forward to hearing the updates from our witnesses on corrective actions the Navy has taken in the past year, particularly those related to the numerous surface ship provisions included in the fiscal 2019 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. I encourage our witnesses to candidly discuss their efforts and any challenges they face as they work to improve the Navy’s surface readiness. I am also eager to learn more about the degree to which the ongoing and planned reforms will be permanently enshrined in naval policy and doctrine. As the memory of those tragic incidents grows more distant, it is our shared responsibility to ensure that crews and ships will continue to be adequately manned, trained, and maintained. This committee stands ready to assist. With that, I would like to turn to our ranking member, Congress- man Doug Lamborn of Colorado, for any remarks that he may want to make. [The prepared statement of Mr. Garamendi can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is great to be with the members of the Seapower Subcommittee as well. This combined joint hearing is really important, so I am glad that we are having it. And it really is based ultimately on readiness. So thank you for having this important hearing. I would also like to recognize the spouses of our witnesses: Chris- tine Grady and Laura Aquilino. We on this subcommittee know the vitally important role our precious military families play in the readiness and resilience of our troops. And we appreciate your presence and support here today. Welcome to this hearing. We all recognized too late that Naval Surface Forces, especially forward-deployed ships, were being run too hard. Ship’s maintenance suffered, as did crew training and proficiency. Tragically, it took the deaths of 17 sailors to bring the problem to light and force all of us, the Navy and Congress alike, to pay attention. True to form, the Navy and the Congress took decisive action, including, particularly in this subcommittee, in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act. Now, nearly 2 years since the fatal collisions and over a year since our last public hearing on this topic, it is time to review the state of Naval Surface Forces. I am concerned with three things: Have the corrections employed made a difference? What further actions are needed? And do any of the changes implemented need to be reversed? I note that our witnesses today are responsible for both the operational control and readiness of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Vesting a single official with the pressures of both responsibilities was part of the problem in 2017, although such vesting was at a lower level of command. 3 I am interested in understanding how these commanders weigh these disparate responsibilities and whether institutional protec- tions are in place to prevent overuse of the fleet in the future. While I am confident in the abilities of our witnesses, I want to ensure that their successors are equally equipped to withstand the imperatives of operational pressures when they are unsure their ships and crews are ready. I deeply respect the military expertise that must come to bear when determining whether a ship’s crew is trained and ready to operate the complex team operations of a modern warship, whether the ship is mechanically ready, and whether that ship and crew can perform the mission expected. We are eager to understand how we assure safe deployments into the future. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony. [The prepared statement of Mr. Lamborn can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 38.] Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. I look forward to working with you and the committee as we go forward. And now I would like to turn to the chairman of the Seapower Committee, Mr. Courtney. STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEA- POWER AND PROJECTION FORCES Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Lamborn. I look forward to continuing the close and ongoing work between the two committees, Readiness and Seapower, that we have conducted over the last year and a half on the issues before us today. To new members on the subcommittee, today’s hearing is about the fourth or fifth public hearing that we have had jointly since the series of tragedies that occurred at sea, as well as classified brief- ings and obviously staff meetings that have intensively investi- gated those occurrences which claimed the lives of 17 sailors in 2017. Again, to put that into perspective, that is a number that far sur- passed the number of U.S. casualties in Iraq and Syria in 2017. Two of those sailors came from Connecticut. One, Dustin Doyon, was an electronics technician from Suffield, Connecticut. His loss still is a deep wound in the community. And I want to just again publicly thank his parents as well as again all the families who have stayed in close contact with both the Navy and Congress, again, to make sure that their lives were not lost in vain and that there will be real change to prevent those from occurring again in the future. These hearings have given our committee and the public a great- er understanding of both the immediate and systemic issues that contributed to this stomach-turning loss of life. The hearings also resulted in significant statutory provisions enacted in last year’s 2019 John McCain National Defense Authorization Bill that codified a variety of the changes to surface fleet operations and proce- dures. And I mention Senator McCain because, actually, he was the most adamant during the conference during the 2019 NDAA to 4 make sure that the many recommendations actually are now a part of law and statute. And, again, his passion was really, I think, important for everybody in terms of the making sure that we do everything possible to avoid this in the future. Today’s hearing is the first review by the new Congress on how these changes are being executed. For the record, I also want to publicly note the professional staff of the Government Accountabil- ity Office [GAO] that has been diligently following up and investi- gating the work of Surface Fleet Forces in the Indo-Pacific Com- mand’s efforts in the last year and has provided a thorough report card that I would encourage members to review as a measurement of the Navy’s follow-through on some of its own recommendations. Today’s hearing also follows a new round of lengthy investigative press articles on the collisions of USS Fitzgerald and McCain. These articles describe in great detail the many individual tragedies that occurred and the broader systemic issues that contributed to these collisions. I commend the reporters for their contributions to the public’s understanding of readiness challenges facing our fleet. In the wake of last year’s inquiries by the Navy and Congress, there were a number of critical deficiencies identified, including the lack of crew certifications for critical tasks and conflicting authority for tasking and readiness. One particular area identified that I remain concerned about is the challenge of manning the fleet. Do we have enough sailors on board our surface ships, and are they qualified for the roles they are expected to take on? The Navy and Congress have worked together to turn the strategic requirement for the Navy’s presence to long-term shipbuilding plans, authorization bills, and funding as we begin a drive towards a 355-ship Navy. At the same time, there are approximately about 6,000 to 8,000 open billets across the current Navy. And recent re- porting to Congress shows that manning issues continue to persist across the fleet. As we continue to invest in the new construction of ships needed to grow the fleet, we must also ensure that we are making a con- current investment in personnel to ensure that we have the proper number of sailors to man these ships. We must be prepared to plan for and make investments in the personnel necessary to operate a growing fleet. I will be interested to hear from the witnesses on how they are working to address the manning shortfalls before them. And I look forward to seeing in the fiscal year 2020 budget the investments needed to man the growing [surface] fleet in the coming years. Finally, while it is clear that major mistakes were made on individual ships, I think it is also clear that there were broader problems that existed within our forward-deployed forces. These issues did not exist in the vacuum of a select few. Readiness and over- tasking concerns have been voiced at the highest level of leadership. The American people must have the confidence in their leaders that when the alarm bells are rung, they will be followed up by real action. Our sailors and our families deserve nothing less. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 39.] 5

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. I would like to now turn to Mr. Wittman, the ranking member of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTA- TIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino for attend- ing this important hearing. I also want to welcome their wives: Christine Grady and Laura Aquilino. Thank you so much for joining us today. We appreciate your sacrifice as you, too, are part of our Navy family. Last year, we had a hearing with Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson to discuss Navy reforms and recommendations to re- spond to deficient readiness highlighted by the loss of 17 sailors aboard the USS John McCain and USS Fitzgerald. These readiness reforms were codified in the Comprehensive Review and Strategic Readiness Review. Navy continues to make progress toward accomplishing the goals that Navy leadership determined would be necessary to correct deficient readiness. However, the committee has learned much since that hearing that appears unaddressed in these seminal documents. For example, we have learned that the readiness deficiencies are systemic and engross the entire fleet. We have learned that severe manning deficiencies exist afloat because of an imbal- ance in the afloat and ashore billeting and an overall deficit in afloat billets. We have learned that Navy allows ships to begin the basic and advanced predeployment training without the required number of sailors. We have learned that the limited-notice INSURV [Inspec- tion and Survey] inspections are bearing a true depiction of the material readiness of the fleet. The readiness picture is not as pretty as when ships have months to prepare and cannibalize their fellow shipmates. And, finally, we have learned that the basic and advanced tenets of enlisted training are perilously askew and will take years to rebuild. In summary, the basic elements of manning, training, and equipping are challenged across the fleet and will take years of leadership focus and sustained funding to correct. My fear is that the Navy will measure their progress against the Comprehensive Re- view and the Strategic Readiness Review checklist and will miss the fundamental overhaul necessary to right a sinking ship. Because these systemic challenges were not adequately addressed in the Comprehensive Review or the Strategic Readiness Review, we will undershoot the mark and miss true structural re- form. Some pundits have indicated that the sailors that stood the watch on the decks the USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald were at fault and cited numerous safeguards that failed to prevent these tragic deaths. However, I have come to an alternative conclusion. It is apparent that senior leadership failed to put adequate systems in place to prevent these collisions. It is apparent that senior leadership’s ac- 6 ceptance of unnecessary risk to meet COCOM [combatant commander] demands led to the deaths of 17 of our Nation’s finest. It is apparent that the Navy classifies innumerous products to hide the true depth of readiness challenges that plague the Navy today. And it is most important to me that if the appropriate reforms are not properly implemented, these problems and these deaths will continue. Last year, Dr. Holmes of the Naval War College asked, who watches the watchers in the United States Navy? At a hearing with Secretary Spencer and CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Richardson on this same subject, I indicated that we will watch the watchers. I remain committed to ensuring that we must not forget the lives lost on the USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald. I look forward to continuing to advocate for these fallen sailors and ensuring real structural reforms are put in place. [Toward] this endeavor, I think the Navy has gone a long way to ensure minimum standards are set in place to ensure basic safety and mission proficiency, yet we have a long ways to go. Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield the balance of my time. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 41.] Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you, Mr. Wittman. And, Mr. Lamborn, your leadership in the past Congress brought us a long way towards this issue, and I thank you for your hard work in the previous Congress and look forward to working with you as we continue this Congress. And, of course, Mr. Courtney, your role as chairman of the committee. It is now my pleasure to welcome to the hearing Admiral Grady and your wife. Behind you, I think Christine is back there somewhere. There she is. Welcome. And also Admiral Aquilino and your wife, Laura, is back there. So thank you so very much for joining us today. If you will present your testimony. STATEMENT OF ADM CHRISTOPHER W. GRADY, USN, COM- MANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND, COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES NORTHERN COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Admiral GRADY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman Courtney, Ranking Members Lamborn and Wittman, and distinguished members of both subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to testify along with my Pacific Fleet colleague and partner on the readiness of our surface forces. As a fleet commander, I consider my duty to ensure the welfare of the people I lead, the center of the universe, our sailors, our government civilians and their families, to be my first and most sol- emn responsibility. While we cannot bring back the 17 heroes that we lost 18 months ago, the entire Navy is focused on never letting that happen again. And to the Gold Star family members, you humble us every day, and I hope you know that I am firmly committed to giving our sailors everything they need to safely and effectively perform their mission. 7 Since learning the hard lessons of 2017, your Navy has aggressively implemented a series of actions to prevent any such tragedy in the future. We are focused on safe operations, increasing fleet effectiveness, and ensuring long-term sustained readiness by establishing a culture of operational excellence. Some examples of actions taken were included in our joint written statement for the record. And I look forward to discussing these and others in more detail with you this morning. Now, ensuring adherence to standards alone, though, while necessary, is not enough for our Navy to win decisively in high-end conflict. And as such, we aim to progress the Navy’s culture beyond mere compliance and toward a culture of operational excellence, a culture where we view standards as the absolute minimum, and then strive for peak warfighting readiness. Our sailors, our officers, our civilian shipmates are embracing this challenge knowing that we value their contributions and what they do matters to the secu- rity of our Nation. While each fleet commander has separate authority, responsibility, and accountability for generating and employing ready forces, we do so to the same standard as we had laid out in the recently published Navy Integrated Readiness Instruction. And as the Fleet Forces Commander, I am responsible for setting that single standard in concert with my fellow fleet commanders. And we do this knowing that it is one fight, one Navy. The fleet commanders are in position to provide readiness oversight, and together we approach this with the strongest sense of urgency. We are currently safe to operate. We are a more effective Navy. But the hard work has only just begun. Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. And many thanks to both committees and to the Congress for your continued support of your Navy. And I look forward to your questions and our discussion. Thank you. [The joint prepared statement of Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] Mr. GARAMENDI. Admiral Aquilino.

STATEMENT OF ADM JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Admiral AQUILINO. Mr. Chairman, Chairman Courtney, Ranking Members Lamborn and Wittman as well as the distinguished members of the subcommittees, on behalf of the sailors, civilians, and families who serve in the Pacific Fleet of the world’s finest Navy, I would first like to thank you for your substantial readiness investments you have made in us. Armed with your support, we continue to aggressively take action to rebuild our readiness. That said, there is still great work to do. To the family members of the brave sailors we lost on Fitzgerald and McCain, we will never forget them, and they motivate me every day. We are implementing the recommendations of the Com- prehensive Review, Strategic Readiness Review, and the GAO to ensure we address all those core issues identified. We are confident that we have made/are making the changes to be sure the fleet is 8 operating safely, and it is certified to execute all the missions assigned. If the ships in the Pacific Fleet are not ready to safely sail, they don’t get underway, and that is my responsibility. The improvements we are making are ongoing. It is also important to note that the readiness of the fleet is fragile, and it is also perishable. We are committed to ensure our units are manned, trained, and equipped to execute the Nation’s calling. I want to thank you for your continued support in providing the stable and consistent funding needed to support our Navy. The challenges to our Nation’s in- terest require a Navy in the Pacific that is always ready to fight. Ensuring our readiness is the foundation and key to our success, and I look forward to your questions. Mr. GARAMENDI. As is the historic practice of the committee, we will start with the chairpersons and then the ranking members and then go to those members who were here first before the gavel came down. And so we will follow that practice. And that means I get to start. So, gentlemen, you have set in place a series of standards. Pre- sumably, the implementation of those standards is the responsibility of not only you but the chain of command down to the commander of the ship. Can you assure us that the standards are actually being in place at the level of the ship, the surface vessel? Admiral Grady, if you want to start with the standards. You might want to talk a little bit about what they are and specifically, as said by our colleagues here, the manning, the tempo, as well as the material readiness of the ship. So talk about the standards, and then, Admiral Aquilino, if you could talk about actually imposing those standards on the operations. Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Those standards are across the pillars of man, train, and equip as we have heard today. So it starts with ensuring that each ship in every unit has operating and functioning equipment with the appropriate redundancy to get the mission done. And we are very focused on that, and with your help, we are being successful in doing that. The training, then, is broken up and the standards are established in three various phases. There is the basic phase, the advanced phase, and the integrated phase of training. That training is measured and assessed. And those standards are maintained such that they do not advance from one phase to the next until those standards have been met across all three phases. That builds on a foundation of certifications for each individual as well. So our sailors and our officers are well trained as well. And then we bring them together as teams because teams are absolutely critical to what we do. And then the manning piece is very foundational to the work that we do. And so, as has been pointed out, we have some manning challenges that we are working through right now. The number specifically is 6,200 billets at sea that are not filled right now, although the Navy, with your help, has purchased those billets, and we will 9 be flowing them into the fleet over time. And the goal is to have them on the ship at the beginning of the maintenance phase. Now, as we work our way through that hole of 6,200 billets and man the ships to that requirement, we do take some risk. And so sometimes we have to take some risk in the maintenance phase before we have all of the people onboard. But it is, I believe, both fleet standards that no one deploys without the full complement of people that they will have. So it starts with the individual, the officer and the sailor, the training that we give them. It then builds into the team phase across three basic phases. And then the certifications happen at the very highest end at the largest aggregation of, say, a strike group. And then we ensure that the ships are equipped with the appropriate gear. I can tell you that we in the Atlantic Fleet—and I think I speak for all the fleet commanders—we do not ask a ship nor direct a ship to go on mission if they are not certified to do the job. And I have made sure that that is the case. And, indeed, there have been several occasions where I have said that ship is not ready. We will need more time. And that is the highest form, I think. We know what the requirement is, and if they are not ready, they are not going. Mr. GARAMENDI. So, Admiral Aquilino, you are given the standards. How do you apply them? Admiral AQUILINO. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the question. So Admiral Grady and I, in conjunction, we develop the standards. He is responsible to the CNO to identify those. Our training organizations implement those standards across the fleet in the form of Carrier Strike Group 4, 15, and our Afloat Training Group organizations. We have implemented a path where those organizations actually operate across the coast with each other to ensure that we understand the standards; we are grading against the standards; and then those are absolutely evaluated, assessed, and determined whether or not those units meet the standard. To Admiral Grady’s point, we have both taken a top-down view of what it needs to—what we need to do to execute those standards from our levels of responsibility. And I also have terminated two deployments for units that were not assessed to have the appropriate level of training to deploy and execute their missions. Additionally, I took an entire strike group, again with the ap- proval of Admiral Davidson, the combatant commander, because we meet his responsibilities. We have reduced their requirement to remain ready longer in order to free up manning concerns and pos- ture those forces to be able to be ready for the next cycle of employment, given the rest, the time they need in order to ensure that they are ready. I could not do that without the help of Admiral Da- vidson, who supported that, as he has identified in the CR [Com- prehensive Review], that the improper balance between operations, training, and maintenance needed to be reconciled. Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you for mentioning Admiral Davidson, who apparently said at a meeting of commanders of the ships and admirals: If you can’t take your ships to sea and accomplish the mission with the resources you have, then we will find someone who will. 10 How does that fit with what you just said? Admiral AQUILINO. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure—I wasn’t at any meeting. I don’t know what he said. I don’t know if it was accurate. What I can tell you is deeds that he has implemented match the guidance that he has given me. So, by him reducing some of the operational demands in the Pacific, to me, that is a pretty strong example of someone who understood the concerns when the report was written and doing his part to ensure that it doesn’t happen again as well. Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. Let me now turn to my colleague, Mr. Courtney. Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, just to sort of, I think, fill up the context in terms of the two incidents which we talked about earlier this morning. There are actually four at-sea incidents which took place in 2017. In addition to the Fitzgerald and the McCain, the USS Antietam also grounded on January 31, 2017. And the USS Lake Champlain col- lided with a fishing trawler in May. So, you know, the one sort of common thread of all four of those incidents is they all occurred in the Pacific region in the 7th Fleet. And, Admiral Aquilino, as you know, I mean, there has always been sort of a carve-out for the Pacific Command in terms of this whole question of who decides the decision to task a ship versus who decides in terms of whether the ship is ready. The Congress actually wrestled with this issue in terms of whether or not to change that carve-out by law. And, you know, there was a decision made to sort of give the Navy an opportunity to sort of see if they can sort of reorganize this whole decision-making process. You just described where you terminated two deployments with the new arrangement. Again, if you could just sort of talk about that a little bit more just sort of, you know, the mechanics of how that process, you know, gets resolved when there is a conflict between the resource end versus the tasking end. Admiral AQUILINO. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. So the process that we have implemented is a part of my normal operations each day and week. I am briefed 3 days a week on the exact readiness of the force that is deployed and if there are manning issues, training issues, or equipment issues on that ship. And in my role, we support those equipment issues that need to be fixed. And, again, we execute our role. Once a week, I talk to every one of my commanders. We talk about the longer term view of the readiness of the force as well as upcoming deployers to make sure they are on track. And then, once a week, in an additional meeting, I talk about those ships and maintenance to make sure that the ones getting ready to go in and the ones that are in are progressing as we need them to progress. Now, if any of those indications show me that I have a problem coming up or one immediately identified that we were not aware of, I have a voice to the combatant commander. And when I determine that ship is either not manned, trained, equipped, unsafe, un- certified, number one, I would terminate their ops and then have that conversation with the combatant commander. 11 As you know, the world gets a vote. So, depending on what is going on, we have had very frank conversations. And, again, in the instances I identified, Admiral Davidson concurred with my recommendations, and we did not deploy those ships. Mr. COURTNEY. So the way that operates, is there like a manual? Is there like a written directive that sort of, you know, instructs the different commands, you know, in terms of how this proceeds and who decides? Admiral AQUILINO. So the readiness instruction just signed out identifies the responsibilities. It stops right here. But below me my three-star subordinate commanders also are aware, and they are responsible to also take the same review that I have. They then speak with me. I believe the process is structured in a way such that all the subordinate commanders understand the responsibilities, they understand the standards, and they know that they owe me a voice that says, ‘‘Hey, I am not ready to deploy,’’ and that has to come to me for decision. Mr. COURTNEY. So, again, because this really, in my opinion, really kind of goes to the heart of, you know, all the analysis that we sort of went through over the last couple of years, which is, you know, whether or not there is a safety break, I think that was Ad- miral Richardson’s term during the hearings last Congress, to really sort of say, you know, this deployment really just can’t occur because there is lack of certifications, there is equipment issues, et cetera. And it sounds like, again, you worked out an arrangement that really has changed the way that decision is made. The question I guess that a lot of us—still sort of nags us is just whether or not there is going to be an enduring structure after you move on to other things and, you know, your replacements, you know, that there is going to be something in place because, really, when we wrestled with this in terms of the NDAA, you know, that really was sort of the question, whether we need something more permanent and just sort of—so can you just sort of talk about that in terms of whether or not you think this is just going to sort of fade away as the issue maybe losses its public, sort of, spotlight, or whether or not there is something more enduring? Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. I think it actually is formalized in our instructions as well as the roles and responsibilities assigned to each of the commanders. So I implement for the CNO on the Pa- cific side the title 10 responsibilities to man, train, and equip the fleet. Those standards are set by Admiral Grady in coordination with us. And, again, we adhere to those rigorously. The employment responsibilities, I execute for Admiral Davidson. So I believe they are formalized and understood. And while Chris and I continue to work together, I am confident that whoever comes behind us will also—they will have the same responsibilities and roles. And it is institutionalized in a way where I think we get away from that problem set. And if I give Chris a chance to talk, all these were focused on the Pacific, but we are doing the exact same thing to the same standards fleetwide. 12

Admiral GRADY. That is absolutely right. And, Mr. Chairman, it is a very valid concern that we transition from—into this persistent culture of excellence. In this regard, then, I do believe that we have well codified the requirements for certification and this idea that, across all eche- lons, then, being able to put the firebreaks in place to achieve that balance between maintenance, training, and operations are in place. Ultimately, too, though, I think it gets down to the level of, do we feel that that commanding officer has the confidence to speak up when he needs to speak up, and does he have the mechanisms by which to do that? Lung [Admiral Aquilino’s call sign] described his battle rhythm of his ability to then keep his finger and his subordinate commanders’ fingers on the pulse of the readiness of the fleet. I have a very similar battle rhythm. I will give you one additional example that both he and I do, and that is the phase transi- tions. Remember I talked about basic, advanced, and intermedi- ate—or integrated phases and the maintenance phase. We take a look at each ship and every strike group before they transition phases to make sure that they are ready to do that. And back down to the CO [commanding officer] level, one of the things that I think will go a long way to codifying and institution- alizing that beyond Chris and I here is the requirement for COs to issue a 90-day letter to their type commander after they take command. This is a direct feedback to their type commander on the condition of their ship, the man, the train, the equip, across all the pillars of readiness. And that has been a very powerful voice for the commanding officer. And then you build on that with these touchpoints that we have with our commanding officers to their subordinate, to our subordinate commanders, be it at the strike group or the type commander level. And then having the trust that I think Lung and I do going up the echelon to say: I am not going to send that ship. And in my case, it was either replace it with another one that was ready, or they are going to come 3 weeks late because I need to finish the training. And we have had great success in that. Mr. GARAMENDI. Admiral, thank you very much. Let me now turn to Mr. Lamborn. Mr. LAMBORN. Well, thank you. We have had a good discussion on readiness and what needs to happen. I also want to talk about procurement and funding, which is my colleague’s sort of wheel- house. But we all have a say in what happens at the NDAA level. These accidents demonstrated clearly that the operational demands on the Navy were too high. In short, the Navy has too few ships and trained crews to perform all of the missions requested and required. To continue on the path to recovery, how important is the sustained top line at the recently enacted levels? For both of you. Admiral GRADY. I will start. Thank you for the question, sir. When you look at building the Navy the Nation needs and, just as importantly, fighting with the Navy the Nation has, knowing that 70 percent of the force that we have now we would fight with in 2030, the consistent, stable, and predictable funding is abso- 13 lutely critical to the fleet. And we thank you for your support in that. Without that, we are unable to plan effectively or be better partners with the industrial base, which I think is absolutely critical so that we can establish that demand signal with them and be better partners with, for instance, the private shipyards. So the criticality, then, of critical—a consistent, stable, and predictable funding cannot be underestimated. Admiral AQUILINO. Thanks, sir. So I think what I would say is, against the threats that exist today, capabilities, sizes, and you could argue intent, the Navy the Nation needs is one that is bigger, more lethal, networked, and ready. I think you have seen everything that has come out of the CNO that talks about those things. But for the challenges in the Pacific that I have, the challenges that Chris and I both work from the At- lantic and Pacific side, that is pretty accurate of what we believe we need in the future. So it is critical. Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. And thank you for your answers. I got another question or two. And before I go any further, Admi- ral Grady and Admiral Aquilino, I just want to thank you for your service, and your wives also, because they contribute. Thank you for what you are doing and have done and will do for our country. Now, at current levels of funding, how long will it take the Navy’s shipbuilding program to produce enough cruisers and de- stroyers to lessen the operational pressure? And with all of the classes of ships competing for funding, I expect that improvement will still take some considerable time. Admiral GRADY. Sir, I would agree with you. That will take time. And so the stated goal of 355 I think is an appropriate target. Three different studies have looked at that. So somewhere in the nature of 355 of what it would take to meet the challenges of great power competition that all three fleets face. It will take time to get there and consistent and stable funding to do that. And it could be—it won’t be next year or even within the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. It will be beyond that. And so having that consistent stable funding to build to the 355 a worthy goal, which I think is borne out by the challenges of the international environment. But it will not be overnight. It will take time. Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. Admiral Grady has it absolutely right. But there is another component of it. So, while we strive to get bigger, there is a critical aspect of getting bigger just doesn’t mean buying a ship, right? There is a wholeness aspect to the Navy that is needed. So we need to buy the ship. We need to buy the people. We need to buy the parts. We need to buy the maintenance. And when we have all that, then we will be on the sustainable path to be able to maintain and employ the larger Navy that is needed. So it is a critical aspect. The ship by itself helps a little. But also all those other things are absolutely needed. Thank you, sir. Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. So just to summarize, what I am hearing you say is that although we had considerable funding in the past, the last fiscal year and this fiscal year, when we had a sizeable 14 plus-up, you are saying that that current sustained level needs to continue for years into the future to do the job properly. Admiral AQUILINO. Absolutely. Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. Mr. GARAMENDI. The question of how to fully fund all parts of a 355-ship Navy is going to be part of our work as we get into the budget in future hearings. Your question is right on. Mr. Wittman. Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Grady, Admiral Aquilino, thanks again for joining us today. Thanks for your service. I want to begin with you, Admiral Grady, and ask you a question with regard to manning. How many sailors is the Navy short of to perform the missions? And what is the Navy doing right now to es- sentially man up? And then a question for both of you: Is it acceptable for you to send ships on predeployment training and predeployment workups when they are short of the required number of sailors for a deployment cycle? Admiral GRADY. Thanks, sir. The number of billets that we need to be full—or in whole for the fleet is 6,200. And I am confident that my partner over at the CNP [Chief of Naval Personnel] has worked hard to program and budget to that requirement. It will take some time to get that. It takes a while to get there. And then, of course, as we build the Navy the Nation needs, that number may rise as new ships come in. So that is the number. We are working hard to get there. It won’t happen overnight. Again, it takes a while to train. And then when they do come, that is not a master. That is an apprentice. And they have to become a journeyman, a supervisor. So that takes time to work its way through. But 6,200 is the number. And we are working hard to be fully funded to that. Ideally, when we execute the workup cycle for a strike group, say, the date that we wish to have everyone in place is at the beginning of the maintenance phase. That makes absolute sense. And as we work our way out of that hole, we do buy some risk there in the maintenance phase and delay that date, that kind of hard date, further into the training cycle. And with the ultimate goal of deploying in full at the required levels of the right number of people and the right skill sets there that they bring to the ship. So we do buy some risk now as we work through that 6,200, particularly in the maintenance phase. I do believe that, when we push a ship out to do the basic phase, that both Admiral Aquilino and I look very hard at that risk calculus if they are not fully manned to that level. And we would not let them go if they were not. Additionally, if there were additional tasking, which can happen during the workup phase, we have established a minimum training requirements matrix that all three fleets have agreed to such that, from a manning and a training perspective, you will only go do those missions that you are trained and certified to do even before the ultimate certification for deployment. That is new, and that is 15 an important addition to our surface force readiness manual and how we think about minimum training requirements for the ships. Admiral AQUILINO. Thanks, sir. So is it acceptable? Again, with the risk calculus talked about by Admiral Grady, we do it only when we understand the risk. That said, that is why the model has identified the need for those sailors, right? The best ships come out when those ships are fully set up, they do all the training together, they deploy together. That said, the Navy rotates. We do rotate 30 percent every year. And the structure on the ships, we train those sailors as well. They show up trained. They continue to train in a team. So that does happen. But there is one thing that we have implemented to ensure that we understand exactly the risk we accept. Before any of those ships begin that basic phase, we have tasked them to execute a ready- for-sea assessment. So we understand what is on the ship. We have a team that looks at them before they begin that basic phase for those that are not fully manned. And that gives us a level of confidence that they are either ready or not on top of the other things. Admiral GRADY. Just to go into a little bit further, part of that ready-for-sea assessment includes bridge resource management workshops. And in this, we have learned and rely heavily upon our civilian shipmates from the Military Sealift Command, the strategic sealift officers, to come give us an external view of both the individuals and the teams that are onboard. So it is a key and new element where we learn from the best of the best on the civilian side. And that bridge resource management workshop is a key part of the ready-for-sea assessment. Mr. WITTMAN. I think those are great points. Let me get you to dive a little bit deeper into that. I think what you all have done as far as training, whether it is changes at Sur- face Warfare Officers School [SWOS], whether it is in certifications for basic seamanship, for rules of the road, are all good things. But I am still concerned about some of the structural elements of how sailors advance in higher skill levels there within the surface fleet. There are some elements like lack of deck handling time for junior officers, a generalist approach to both deck and engineering billets, the CO/XO [commanding officer/executive officer] fleet-up, and also, too, issues of adopting some international watch-standing standards for officers on the deck and people that are standing watch. So I wanted to get an idea about what do you think should be done in those areas of structural reforms within the Navy to make sure that we have some certainty there with experience levels and level of knowledge? Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir. I will start with the standards of training, certification, and watchkeeping. Again, learning from the best of the best in the civilian infra- structure and our civilian shipmates, we took a look at all of the— and I will use the Surface Warfare Officers School as an example. We took a look at all of the PQS [Personnel Qualification Stand- ards] there. And now nearly two-thirds of all of our PQS there now meets STCW [International Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers] standards. Additionally, all of the 16 instructors at SWOS are certified in accordance with the STCW standards. When we look at surface warfare maritime requirements and DC [damage controlman] requirements and measure them against the STCW, we exceed third mate requirements. Similarly, in our new SWO [surface warfare officer] logbook, we exceed third mate requirements. So I think we have done the right thing and continued to learn from the best of the best in the civilian world. Now, in terms of the, for instance, surface warfare officer [SWO] training that we provide them and the SWO career path, if you will, we have recognized that it is all about the appropriate experience. So, on the SWO career path, the total duration at sea for a young division officer is now going to be 4 years. Some split of notionally 30 months on the first ship—important that it is 30 months on the first ship because they get a chance to really sink their teeth in, get a lot of moving water under the keel. But the option does persist for them to stay 4 months, 4 years if the captain so desires to give them even more time. And from a SWO division officer training, we have increased that training from 14 to 23 weeks, much more time in the classroom and then in the simulators before they get a chance to go out and really put it to work. Across the SWO milestone careers, from ensign to captain to full captain, we have instituted 10 milestone checks, three of which are go/no go. You can fail this and not move on. This is the culture of excellence at work. And to this point, 5 percent of those folks have been asked to leave the command pipeline because they were not ready. And then, finally, more experience in ships. So, in the past, we used to take a division officer and allow him or her to, after their first 24 months, say, serve up on a staff. We don’t do that anymore. Only the best of the best will serve 4 years and then get to go to one of those staffs, similarly, for department head training. And on the enlisted side, we have focused on things like quarter- master and operational specialist training that are so critical to navigation, seamanship, and shiphandling. And across the curriculum there to include how we use the Voyage Management System and electronic navigation or automated information systems and how those two teams work together, we have significantly improved that pipeline. I guess the last one is I believe that the complexity of a modern Navy warship demands that we not have a topside officer and an engineering officer. I think this is absolutely critical. I am going to give you a personal story, if you don’t mind, sir. I was a department head in the USS Princeton back in the early 1990s. As many of you may recall, they suffered a mine detonation during Operation Desert Storm. The two officers that were on watch and responded to that were the weapons officer and the engineering officer, both of whom so well understood the complexity of their systems, the integration of the combat systems, and the engineering plant, how to maneuver the ship, that they were able to keep fighting for 72 hours by pointing the forward deckhouse up- threat into Iraq. 17 I think, given the complexity, that is why you need officers who are both engineers and topside ship drivers and warfighters. Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. We are now going to go to the clock, and we are going to take questions from the members that arrived in order prior to the gavel. That would be you, Mr. Cisneros. You can start. Mr. CISNEROS. Thank you both for being here today. I am a Navy veteran, and I enjoyed my time onboard ship and look back very fondly on it. The thing I want to kind of dive into a little bit and when I read about the Fitzgerald was the lack of manning and how that cruiser had, basically, if you go back 10 years ago, was—I think well over 350 was the manning and had been reduced to under 300. And watches had been eliminated such as your port and starboard look- outs. I want to know if that situation has been corrected on all our Navy ships. Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir, it has. So some decisions were taken, for all the right reasons, in the past to try to leverage technology, for instance, to see whether we could get to a minimal or optimal manning construct. And so, in your day, you probably had a lot more sailors onboard the ship, similarly for me when I was a young division officer. So those decisions were taken. And as we sailed in that environment, we recognized that that was too few. And, indeed, since 2012, you know, the number on a DDG [guided-missile destroyer] was 240. In 2017, it is about 270. And we will be funded to—back up to very close to the original size for a guided-missile destroyer in 2023 of about 318 and 320. So, while we had worked hard to see if we could—because personnel is expensive, and so that did not work out well, and now we are buying back to a larger size crew complement for a destroyer, for example. Admiral AQUILINO. And, sir, from the Pacific side, all the forces that are deployed right now meet the standard we have set of 95 percent fill and 92 percent fit, which is the right job—the right per- son with the right skills in the right job. That was one of the big changes that we have absolutely pulled up to the highest level to make sure that nobody’s out there well below a level that somebody didn’t know. Mr. CISNEROS. And going back to the changes that you made at SWOS, the Surface Warfare Officers School, now that they are spending more time there, they got rid of the former program, I think, where they were learning on CDs onboard the ship. But you have a group of officers who went through that program who may not be, as we will say, as good ship drivers as they could be if they have gone to the programs going now. How are we going back to correct those who may be department heads right now to make sure that we are bringing them up to speed? Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir. That is a great point for those officers who have not benefited from the improvements in basic division officer training that we give them now, that started in 2012. Those 18 officers who are now becoming department heads or soon-to-be captain—XOs [executive officers] and captains. We have instituted these 10 career milestone checks where we ensure that they are meeting the new and improved standards. We are providing them more in-classroom time not the CD-based kind of ‘‘SWOS in a Box’’ that you are referring to. And this includes assessments too, so from the classroom assessment to that which we do in the trainer, which is very, very high-fidelity training. So we are able to recognize that not all training is the same. We accomplish that by their returns to SWOS. And, of course, there is a leadership issue there too. So the COs are now working very, very hard to train their wardrooms to the appropriate level. So I feel confident that, whether they are part of the—a graduate of the new Basic Division Officer Course or not, they will have the appropriate training. And if not and they don’t meet the requirement in one of those three touch points, then they don’t make the cut. Admiral AQUILINO. And, sir, I am encouraged, because as a naval aviator, I have now taken a look at the training that my surface counterparts have implemented, specifically the use of simulation right now in the form of our LCS [littoral combat ship] training for both officer, enlisted. There is new technology that allows you to be more effective in your training. That model is going to be transitioned into the destroyer type/ model/series as well. So the way we train is getting better. That will allow us to be able to more quickly get those up to speed who haven’t had it. Mr. CISNEROS. All right. I yield back my time. Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. Mr. Joe Wilson. Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman John Garamendi, and Admi- rals, thank you very much for your service and for your Navy families. It is particularly impressive to me to be here with great appreciation because I am here as the very grateful dad of a member of the U.S. Navy, and so I just so appreciate your service. I am also— had the opportunity sadly to visit the USS Fitzgerald at Yokosuka, Japan, and I saw where our devoted sailors were tragically killed. I want to thank you for every effort to avoid such an accident ever to occur again. And in line with that, Admiral Aquilino, the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John McCain were forward deployed in Japan for over 20 years. This extensive overseas homeporting contributed to deferred depot maintenance, and also overall deteriorated the conditions of the ships. What are the Navy’s plans to implement the National Defense Authorization Act requirement that ships return to the U.S. after 10 years overseas, and then is the Navy considering ways to increase ship repair capabilities in the Pacific, such as the Guam shipyard? Admiral AQUILINO. Sir, thank you for the question. So the Fitz- gerald and McCain absolutely are on track, first of all, to be able to become repaired, get the required training they need, and then to deploy with the confidence that is required. I will start with the Guam piece. Again, Admiral Davidson had asked that we take look at capabilities that exist across the theater to ensure that we are postured correctly in time of crisis. And we 19 are taking a look at Guam and what capabilities might be there, how we might want to use them, again, to increase our overall ca- pacity. The Yokosuka repairs—again, I believe now that we have had—we have given the operational role to the Naval Sea Systems Command in Yokosuka, that will certainly help make sure that we execute the right level of maintenance when we are forward deployed, and we absolutely are developing a plan right now to ensure we can get to the 10-year limit that you have identified, and I am waiting to take a brief on how we are going to do that. That will also take a little bit of time to implement. One of the considerations there is the ship crew members and the families, so we don’t, over the next 2 years, have to swap five ships out, and we will work with Congress, sir, to make sure we get that right. Mr. WILSON. And I am grateful that you have brought up about looking into Guam. The strategic location is absolutely incredible. Three hours to everywhere, and the patriotic people of Guam are just—should be so treasured, and I look forward to seeing what response you have further on that. Additionally, at the 2017 readiness hearing that I chaired, I asked the Government Accountability Office about its June 13, 2017, report which identified readiness issues just 4 days before the Fitzgerald incident. The GAO statement indicated that the expired training certifications likely played a role in the incidents. Please discuss the changes that the Navy has made since the GAO report was published in 2017. Who certifies the ships homeported within the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility? Have reforms been instituted specifically as to waivers? Admiral AQUILINO. Absolutely, sir. So there are no more waivers, unless granted by me; so any waiver or request to operate in a manner that doesn’t meet the identified standards are my decision alone. And so from a top-down perspective, I don’t know what else we could do. To date, I have granted no waivers. With regard to the certs, again, my battle rhythm for understanding, again, 3 days a week, on every ship that is out, whether or not they have the appropriate manning, the level of training, and the certification, is briefed to me 3 days a week. If any of those don’t meet the requirement to execute the assigned missions then they will not be tasked. Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. And, Admiral Grady, in the statement you provided, you mention the important role of nuclear deterrence. The nuclear triad is critical to protecting the homeland and strategic deterrence. What investment is the Navy making to strengthen our nuclear deterrence? Admiral GRADY. Well, of course, sir, the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad is our SSBN [ballistic missile submarine] force. And so the maintenance and sustainability of the current Ohio- class SSBN force is absolutely critical to the viability of that nuclear triad. Secondly then, is the follow-on to the Ohio-class submarine, which is the Columbia-class submarine, and I believe with the support of the committee and the Congress, we are working toward achieving that. 20 And finally, there is the investments in the E–6 airplane that is part of the apparatus airborne command and control platform and all of the connectivity that allow us in a contingency or a crisis to command and control the nuclear deterrent. And so, across those three things, the Navy is significantly invested in that, probably number one mission. Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Ms. Houlahan. Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. And thank you, gentlemen, for coming. I very much appreciate your time, and as we have talked, I am the daughter and the granddaughter of Navy officers. I have four Active Duty cousins right now, three of whom are in the Navy, one of whom is a submariner and one is a Navy SEAL. The third a Navy nurse. And so, I have a personal appreciation for the impact that you all have and the impact in operational demands have on the sailors at the individual level and at the family level, as well. Lack of training and resourcing at the individual level amplified at the organization level has significant impact as we have seen obviously. In fact, my father actually authored something for the Navy Proceedings on this very subject. He is a naval historian now in his retirement. Admiral Grady, my question is for you. The October 2017 Com- prehensive Review stated, quote, ‘‘Today, proficiency in seamanship and navigation competes for time and attention with the expanding tactical duties of our naval professionals at sea. Further, the operational demands for surface ships to perform these missions continue to increase, even as the size of the surface force in the Navy has decreased.’’ So my question for you is when you were commis- sioned, sir, how long was your first course of instruction as a surface warfare officer? Admiral GRADY. It was 4 months. Ms. HOULAHAN. Four months? Admiral GRADY. Yes, ma’am. Ms. HOULAHAN. And how long is that same training course today? Admiral GRADY. It is 23 weeks now. Ms. HOULAHAN. And so, I also, in addition to being an Active Duty member myself in the Air Force, was a teacher for a time, and my question to you is when you shrink the level of instruction that significantly, you clearly must have to compromise something, or have you compromised something? And if you have, sir, what do you think that you have compromised? Admiral GRADY. Well, time is always one of the more important training commodities and resources that we attempt to manage, but I think compromise is not a term I would use. I think we found efficiencies, particularly in the modernized delivery of training content, and so, to your colleague commented on CD-based training, that was not effective; we thought it would be, but it was not. And so now the appropriate mix of classroom training and simulator training and practical work has bought us the efficiencies, I think, in the new Basic Division Officer Course at 23 weeks with the appropriate amount of time to come very close to what I learned back in 1984. 21 I would tell you that in that time, it was a lot of PowerPoint, and it was kind of seapower through memorization. And the course that we have now is not that. It is much more practically oriented with rigorous assessments, even in that Basic Division Officer Course. My own son is a graduate of that course, and he would tell you it was pretty hard. And that is good. And that is what we need. And so I think less compromise, but more getting better at the modernized delivery and understanding the learning science. And I would tell you, too, that that passes over to how we train our enlisted sailors. So as we bring Ready, Relevant Learning online that is one of the three lines of effort, how do you deliver modernized content, recognizing the science of learning? And I think we have come a long way there. Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. And the Comprehensive Review identified the need for additional training and focus, and in the initial training environment, it wasn’t as extensive of a program as it possibly currently—I am sorry, as it was. Has the Navy consid- ered expanding the scope of the initial surface warfare training to include real-world and simulated seamanship and navigation training? Admiral GRADY. Yes, ma’am, we have. So there is that first 23 weeks, which, again, starts with classroom training but then spends a lot of time in the simulator. The rest of the pipeline training for a junior officer will include two junior officer of the deck courses, which will all be simulator-based, and then finally, an officer of the deck, simulator-based course with repeated touch points at our Surface Warfare Officers School. Far beyond—particularly from the simulation and training perspective in the simulator, far beyond what I ever had. Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. And my last question is actually kind of switching gears a little bit and talking a little bit about the maintenance of ships. Will the modernization of our aging public yards exacerbate the backlog that already exists, do you feel? Admiral GRADY. It is certainly a requirement that we modernize our public shipyards. So the Secretary’s shipyard improvement operational program, the SIOP, which is a 20-year program for about $22 billion, is absolutely critical. So if you walk our shipyards today, fantastic artisans and craftsmen in each of those, mas- ters of their trade, but they are just not laid out well. That is one example of what we need to do with that $22 billion over 20 years. So we need to modernize the delivery of the maintenance, which includes everything from getting the right capital equipment on board to how we lay out from an efficiency perspective each of our public yards. I would tell you, too, that I believe that is happening in the private shipyards, too, and I would encourage them to do that as we work to be a better partners with them. Ms. HOULAHAN. And I have no more time, but that was actually my follow-on question, which had to do with the privatization op- portunities with shipyards, as well. I thank you very much for your time, gentlemen. I yield back. Mr. GARAMENDI. Ms. Houlahan, thank you for raising the shipyard issue. We will be spending a lot of time on that in the days ahead. Mr. Kelly, you are next. 22

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also want to thank the spouses and children, who pay such a huge price for our Na- tion. I also want to recognize our senior enlisted leaders right behind you, and as you guys know in command, you can’t exist without great senior enlisted leaders, and that is why we are the greatest military in the world is because of our senior enlisted leaders. We have to fight today with what we have, especially in your area of the world. Having traveled the Pacific Rim last spring with Senator Inhofe, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in the Senate, the time and distances that are there we have to be capable, and we have to have every ship in the fight at the right place at the right time just to hold until we can get the rest of our fleet there. America is the greatest power in the world like many powers before us, and being an Army guy, it is hard for me to admit this, but America is a great power because of the seapower. And we control the seas, just as Britain was and Spain and France and Japan, and you go on and on. You have to be able to control the seas in order to be a great power. I am concerned right now in that region with the firepower ratios that we have with China, who has many ground-based systems to support their fleet. Also concerned with the standoff that we have. Fully supportive of a 355-ship Navy, which I think gets us to the place, but using all of our allies, okay, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Guam, all those things in that area, are we capable of fighting tonight and withholding, and are we leveraging all our ground, air, and sea to make sure that we have the right firepower ratios at the right time? Admiral AQUILINO. Sir, thanks for that question. There has certainly been growth in some of our principal adversaries in the Pa- cific with regard to their force structure, as well as their capabilities. I am here to tell you, I am ready tonight. The force that we have certainly has—well, let me put it this way: We fight the away game, as you have identified. So when some adversaries are able to do stuff on their shores, the away team is going to go to that fight, we have to be able to sustain that fight, and we can do that today. Additionally, you brought up the allies and partners. It is critical that we work with our allies and partners. You know, one of our asymmetric advantages is our adversaries have no partners. That is pretty important, sir. So your observations are absolutely accurate, but we are ready to fight tonight. Admiral GRADY. If I could, sir, your Navy is the contact, blunt, and surge force that is written into the National Defense Strategy, and I would love to host you down in Norfolk to maybe have a classified session where we can talk about some of these exchange ratios, or I am sure Lung would happy—would be happy to have you out there. And the other element I would mention is we have to be able to fight with the joint force, as well, and we are doing that. Mr. KELLY. My next question kind of goes off, and it is not on my notes, so one of the things that keeps me awake at night, and I hope it keeps you guys awake at night, is our inability—the number of hospitals we have, both for soft power and hard power, especially in that area of the world, the hospital ships that we have, 23 and also the icebreakers that we have that some of our competitors are ahead of us. You know, China has a huge number of icebreakers as does Russia in that area. Tell me how icebreakers affect your fleets and your ability to maneuver and do the things that you need to do in that region? Admiral AQUILINO. If you don’t mind, sir, I will start with the specific question on the hospital ships. So each year, we do an operation called Pacific Partnership, where we take a hospital ship or one of our other ships with deployed medical teams that go out and do humanitarian missions across the region. We do that every year. That is the soft power you are talking about. And before I give it to Chris to talk about icebreakers, I would just like to say, you know, my goal is to sleep well every night. I would like my counterpart to not sleep well at all. Mr. KELLY. I am with you on that. Admiral GRADY. I guess I would add that the idea and the issue of combat medicine is really important for the Navy to get a hold of, and so in Lung’s AOR [area of responsibility], that idea of a golden hour is not going to be there, and we have to be ready to think innovatively on how we are going to do that. So adaptive force packaging on smaller ships in addition to the two hospital ships that we have that provide that soft power we need to—cre- ative thinking on that, and rest assured that we are both doing that with our fleet counterpart in Europe. Now to the icebreaker question, it is clearly evident that the Arc- tic is a new frontier. And so, a lot of folks flowing into the Arctic for a host of various reasons from the demand for fish stocks and proteins to what is on the bottom to our adversaries perhaps trying—or at least one adversary trying to create a bastion up there. So icebreakers will enable us to fight more effectively in that environment. And so, we support the—our fellow sea service, the Coast Guard, in their initiatives to get more icebreakers into their force. And, again, we will fight together with them as we push into the Arctic and the more cold. Mr. KELLY. And my time is expired. I yield back. Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you, Mr. Kelly. I have been waiting for this next questioner. She comes with some experience as an executive officer on a cruiser, Mrs. Luria. Mrs. LURIA. Well, thank you, Admirals, for being here today. And in advance of the hearing, I reviewed the Comprehensive Review. I went back and reviewed the Balisle report, several GAO reports, and numerous other examples where over time, we identify problems, we implement corrective actions, but we fail to sufficiently assess and follow through with these before we find ourselves back here again at yet another hearing to take more corrective actions, and, you know, find ourselves with more avoidable mishaps. And as we have acknowledged, we are here today because of the tragic loss of 17 lives of our sailors because we continue to be in- capable of properly manning, training, and equipping our surface forces, in my mind, to perform the most basic functions of seamanship and navigation. And for nearly two decades, we prioritized efficiency over effectiveness as is clearly delineated in the Balisle report, and you have touched on the fit and the fill and where we are getting, you know, 24 closer to the manning we need, but just as a comment, I would urge that we look back at what we did with the Top Six Roll-Down, and that we have actually rolled back up to the right skill sets to fill those numbers in the future. And, you know, in the Comprehensive Review, I feel that we face, yet again, another damning report that shows we prioritize breadth over depth of experience and expertise and proficiency in our surface forces, and due to the limitations of time, I have a few yes-no questions, and I would ask that you keep it to that just so that we can move on. And, Admiral Aquilino, did you find this report, the Comprehen- sive Review, to be a fair critique of our surface navigation training at the time? Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, ma’am. Mrs. LURIA. And my problem, and from my own personal experience in having gone through this entire career pipeline and then served as a division officer, department head, XO, dealt with the junior officers who had, you know, only learned through ‘‘SWOS in a Box,’’ is that our corrective actions overwhelmingly required the same people through OJT [on-the-job training] who have gone through the same ineffective training that you have described as inadequate, to fix the problem. And it is encouraging that you mention that we have enlisted the force of our civilian mariners through, you know, a more robust BRM [bridge resource management] course, but again, that is probably only several days, and I just have a feeling that we continue to use OJT to train ourselves with the same people who don’t have the right proficiencies. And, you know, I just tried to put it in the context for you, Admiral Aquilino, thinking that you are an aviator, and if we had a similar report that found that aviators weren’t able to fly planes safely. So you had a plane crash, you had 17 people die in this plane crash and you did an investigation and found out that that pilot did not know how to fly his plane. And then we did another report and we found out that most of our pilots did not know how to fly planes, do you feel that we are really putting that same sense of urgency into the corrective actions in our surface force as an example such as that? Admiral AQUILINO. So the differences are—I don’t know if it is very easy to make that similar analogy, but your point is absolutely valid. I think we did focus on efficiency back in a time when there was clearly very extreme pressures on funding pieces. Mrs. LURIA. They are only going to give me 5 minutes, so the question is do you feel the sense of urgency? When you are implementing these actions, do you feel that it has the appropriate sense of urgency, and do you have the resources to apply the sense of urgency that this deserves? Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, so I believe we are taking the right actions, yes, ma’am. Mrs. LURIA. Okay. And to further amplify that, you know, as the commander of the Pacific Fleet, your theater has really the most complex and challenging environment, you know, with the BMD [ballistic missile defense] threat, tension on the Korean peninsula, near-peer adversaries, increasing naval activity from China and Russia and, you know, each of these require the highest competen- 25 cy and the highest skills to conduct major combat operations in your theater. And, you know, does the status of our simple basic navigation and seamanship training that raises concerns about competency of our surface forces give you confidence that our surface forces can fight at the highest level against our adversaries in the Pacific? Admiral AQUILINO. Absolutely, with one comment. So that is not just a question for the Pacific. Your Navy will surge to wherever— as you know, wherever the fight is. So if the fight starts in the Pa- cific, my belief is I will get a lot of Admiral Grady’s forces and vice versa if it starts in the Atlantic. So we trained the skill sets and we are ready to operate wherever crisis breaks out. Mrs. LURIA. Okay. And my last comment, you know, and I thought a lot about this in reading through the Balisle report specifically, is that we have moved away from training to fundamentals. We learned relative motion with a popsicle stick and a grease pencil on a SPA–25 radar repeater, and we knew with the rigor of, you know, every 3 minutes putting this on a MOBOARD [Basic Maneuvering Board] and looking out the window, we understood what we were looking at around us. And I feel that, you know, we have advances in technology that are very important and are very critical tools, but just from my personal experience, my observation is that we have moved away from the absolute fundamentals behind the technology that we use, and have we restored a foundation in those fundamentals in the training before we go to the simulation and the ARPA [Automatic Radar Plotting Aid] and all of the tools that are out there to be used today. Admiral GRADY. I am confident the answer to that is yes, and to your earlier comment about OJT, we have broken the chain of that, so what we have put in place has broken the chain of unqualified people training unqualified people. I would be delighted to host you up at SWOS to show you the improvements that have been made, or at the fleet concentration centers for Basic Division Officer Course and the Advanced Division Officer Course, the two JOOD [Junior Officer of the Deck] Courses, the OOD [Officer of the Deck] Course. I think you would be impressed and come away with great- er confidence. Mrs. LURIA. I appreciate that, and I will look forward to that as well, and you know, my experience as SWOS as a division officer is they crammed 3 weeks of training into 6 months, and it was not rigorous at all, and no one failed, so I hope we have turned that paradigm around. And thank you again for your time. Mr. GARAMENDI. Gotta love it. One of the attributes of the Readi- ness Committee is the freshmen that have joined the committee. They come with an extraordinary set of experiences and able to not only ask questions, but understand answers that many of us wouldn’t know. I look forward to a second round, and you gentlemen could, too. Let’s see. We are going to Mr. Waltz, you are next. Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I want to echo the gratitude to your families. I tell people all the time, yes, of course, thank your veteran, but take an extra step and thank spouses, parents, children, it truly is a team effort for our All-Volunteer Force, so thank you all for being here. 26 I grew up the son and grandson of Navy enlisted chiefs in Jack- sonville, Florida, and then defected and spent 23 years in the Army, so bear with me. I want to go back to the 6,200-sailor shortage and just ask you a few questions on that. How long, and forgive me if I missed it, but how long in the timeline to fill that shortage? What percentage of the overall, you know, of the overall force does that represent? And then just some detail on is that across the board? Is that certain types of ships? Is that older versus newer where technology is filling in in certain types of systems? Subsurface, surface? Can you just kind of flesh that out for me for a minute? Admiral AQUILINO. I will have to get back to you on the percentage. So I can tell of my—between 140 and 150,000 sailors in the Pacific, 6,200, you know, if we take 60 percent of that, it is mine. So that is the applicability. It is balanced across all of the forces and—— Mr. WALTZ. Okay. Admiral AQUILINO [continuing]. Different ships have different sizes, so it is kind of difficult—we don’t just say, Hey—— Mr. WALTZ. Forgive me, Admiral. What I want to get at is there a certain rating, is there a certain kind of low-density/high-demand type of rating that you are having a hard time with, or is it kind of spread across the force? Admiral AQUILINO. I would say it is spread evenly. There is critical NECs [Navy Enlisted Classifications] or capabilities that each of the ship needs. One of those that was called out in the report was quartermasters, that there is not enough at sea, that there is too many ashore, so we review all that. When we put ships out, they must have the correct amount of those critical capabilities on board or they don’t go. Mr. WALTZ. How long has the shortage persisted? Has this been for decades? Has it been for years? Was it a result, just to be candid, of sequestration and shortfalls in the last 10 years? Like what is, just very quickly, on the nucleus of the problem? Admiral AQUILINO. I would say the history is the shortfalls persisted for a number of years, but I will tell you in the past 4 or 5, we are working, as Admiral Grady identified, in the correct direction. So back in 2000 and I think it was 12 [2012], the number was 260 on a DDG. And today that number, the requirement is up at 315. So it has persisted for a while. We continue to get there. We thank you for your support. We have added 7,500 alone last year in the budget that we couldn’t have done that without the teamwork that you provide. So on the right track. I think we get there in 2023 to get to 100 percent. Mr. WALTZ. If we don’t continue the current level of funding obviously, you know, then that is going to change that trajectory? Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. Admiral GRADY. You are helping us buy our way out of that hole, but then the new ships will be coming, so we will have to continue to man the fleet for the new ships, as well. Mr. WALTZ. Okay. Admiral, you mention—well, let me—you men- tioned that you had actually stopped some deployments, ships weren’t ready, fleets weren’t ready. Operationally what couldn’t you 27 do when that happens, what risks did you take in your AOR [area of responsibility] when that doesn’t happen? Admiral AQUILINO. We took risk in the form of a single deployment to the Western Pacific in support of the—or deployment to the South Pacific Islands that we were supporting in conjunction with our Coast Guard partners. That is one. I reduced a ship that was supposed to go to the Rim of the Pacific exercise, and then we took risk with regard to surge forces that if crisis were to have broken out, they would have needed additional training before they could have gone. That is the risk. Admiral Davidson also reduced one of the missions that was pre- viously in my job jar based on the current environment. He re- moved that again for now. The enemy gets a vote, so those could easily come back if the times were different. Mr. WALTZ. So I just want to get in my remaining time, it is my understanding U.S. PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] sets the requirement, but then also sets the fill. And that is a carve-out. Is that still the case? I know some other members, my colleagues have gotten at that, but is that—is that basically the plan going forward? I just find that coming from my background to be odd, to be candid. Admiral AQUILINO. That is actually not accurate. Mr. WALTZ. Okay. Admiral AQUILINO. So PACOM sets the requirement. This is what I need to do the missions that the President has assigned to him. Mr. WALTZ. Right. Admiral AQUILINO. When each year the Navy produces a sourc- ing solution or here are the forces that we will deploy in the next year, what we have pushed forward now over the past couple of years is a supply-based model. So there are many requirements as set by Admiral Davidson and the other combatant commanders that we currently are not filling. The Secretary of Defense adju- dicates those differences between what is needed by the combatant commander and what has been put forward by the services. So that is really the accurate model and the way it works. Mr. WALTZ. Would you be able to provide—would you be able to provide for the record what isn’t being filled then, I mean, what the gaps are going forward in that supply-based model? Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] Mr. WALTZ. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. I yield back. Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. And I will now turn to Mr. Golden. Mr. GOLDEN. Thank you very much, sir. Just a couple of quick thoughts for the subcommittee as a whole, because I want to say as a Marine Corps infantryman, I am not the subject matter expert on sailing around in naval ships. Thankfully, I have got Congress- woman Luria sitting next to me to drill into the weeds on that. But the extent of my experience really is riding around out in the At- lantic and taking a splash in an AAV [amphibious assault vehicle] to invade Virginia, which I will say as a native New Englander, I enjoyed. But, you know, I just wanted to point out to the committee, and I think that this is a great hearing and one that is nec- 28 essary, that my understanding of what Congress’ role should be in regards to oversight really lies in the world of dictating to the Navy who it is that we fight or compete with and why. And I really looked to you all in the Navy to come before these committees and talk about the where do we fight and where do we compete with them, and more importantly, what do we need to do it, to win and to do it as safely as possible. It is a dangerous job, but we ought to give you all the equipment, ships, and personnel necessary to accomplish that mission with the least amount of lives lost and put at risk as possible. So I just want to encourage you. In this subcommittee, I suspect that we are going to be looking to work together to get you what you need. So don’t hesitate to tell us what that is. And, you know, I recognize this in you as officers, and I want to thank you and tell you I respect very much that you sat up there with your opening statements and took full responsibility for these incidences, which is what good officers and good leaders do, and I appreciate that very much. You did not offer any excuses. You probably could have pointed a finger right back at Congress as we look, I think, to maintain operational tempo while also talking about your need to shift to address threats from Russia and increasing competition from China. It would make sense to this Marine, you might have to take a step back in order to prepare for that mission and achieve that high level of readiness. Yet, we are asking you just to hit the accel- erator button, and so, with that I think comes a great responsibility to talk about how we are going to free up additional resources, because if we are not going to, you know, decrease the requirements, then I think we are going to have to give you more ships and more Navy personnel down the road. So, you know, I would just share from you from the enlisted perspective I have been on deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq in a Marine infantry unit, and people—you know, we lose people, people get injured, people get hurt, and as those numbers go down, you increase the amount of time that you are standing post out on pa- trol really no down time whatsoever. And we train for operating tired, but none of us are perfect, and ultimately, you push people too hard, and that is where mistakes happen, and I am sure that had something to do with this. And I know you keep that in mind, but, you know, the very best sailors in the world, you push them too hard, they get overtired, mistakes will happen, and that gets back to you all coming in here and telling us what you need to make sure that they don’t have to be in that position. So thank you very much, and I look forward to working with everyone on the committee. Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much. Your comments are well taken. Mr. Bergman. Mr. BERGMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of you in the room today, especially those of you wearing the uniform—wearing the uniform, and those who will bring the next gen- erations into uniform. I would like to, maybe, take a little different take on the keeping our adversaries awake at night. I would like for our potential adversaries to sleep very well at night, knowing they have made the very wise decision not to challenge us, because 29 if this world had some more good sleep time in it we would probably make some better decisions across the globe. And when it comes to rest for your crews, whether, you know, off watch that down time is essential for your commanders, your watch officers, your engineering officers, whoever has the watch to make the best decisions at the time. You know, it is great to have a fellow naval aviator. I will keep my hands down. I won’t talk with my hands, okay, but the idea is that readiness is an honest assessment of the effectiveness of a training curriculum. Back in the early 2000s, then CNO Vern Clark spent, I think, $11 billion in the New Center at Great Lakes when they closed Orlando, moved all the operations there because in chatting with him back in that timeframe he realized that these young men and women who were in boot camp to become effective members of a team were going to have to have different kinds of training experiences and that involved the extensive simulation that they have there in Great Lakes. And for anyone who has never seen it, a tour there would be, I think, greatly beneficial to a lot of our members who have not under—had the opportunity to excel under the rigors of training like they have at Great Lakes. Now having said that, any schoolhouse left unattended tends to set its own standards, fall in love with its own curriculum sometimes. So to what extent has the Navy had to overcome what we might call the schoolhouse mentality in which the schoolhouse being reluctant to change, but yet, you know as the leadership in the Navy, you have to change. Would you care to make a comment on how you have made strides going forward with that bringing the schoolhouse along with you? Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir, I will jump in there. So the feedback mechanism that we have implemented across the Navy with regard to the lessons learned that we take out of conflict that we are in today whether it be Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, each deployment that the units are on those feedback loops plug directly back into our training mechanisms in the form of Strike Group Four, Strike Group 15, Top Gun, and SMWDC [Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center], so that the crews and the teams that go through our training are identified and trained to the latest threats that exist. And in a closed session, I can give you some of those critical things that we learned and that we quickly implemented with regard to adjusted training, such that the next team out the door would be the most up to speed for the threats they might see. Admiral GRADY. And I would add that this is the central concept of the Navy’s Ready, Relevant Learning program. This idea that stasis is bad and that you have to have the virtuous feedback loops to say are we on plan with the training we are provided. And so from a Ready, Relevant Learning perspective, three lines of effort for that: What is the career continuum? When is the right time and right type of training to deliver to a sailor throughout their career path? Secondly is that modernized delivery that we talked about before recognizing the advances in the science of learning and how our young people learn. And then the third, to your point, sir, the third line of effort is one that we call integrated content development. And that is the 30 virtuous feedback loop that our type commanders—the surface boss, the aviation boss, the submarine boss—they are the ones that own the appropriate training, build a feedback mechanism into the schoolhouse to say this we need to add, we don’t need more of that, we need more of this, and that is what Ready, Relevant Learning is going to bring us in that third line of effort. Mr. BERGMAN. Is the attitude that it is okay to fail, in fact, training is—you are supposed to fail in training because if you haven’t, if the training is perfect, if everybody gets 100 on every exam, obviously your standards probably aren’t stringent enough, is the attitude there that it is okay to fail, just don’t fail twice at the same thing? Admiral GRADY. Well, I think failure breeds great learning. Of course, back to the surface warfare officer pipeline, if you fail in one of those three check points, then we are not going let you command a ship. But to your point, failure helps learning and so test a little, learn a lot. Mr. BERGMAN. Thank you, and I see my time has expired. Just one closing quick one. Rising—we hear a lot that rising tides lift all boats. Rising standards lift all performance. Thank you very much. Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you Mr. Bergman. Mr. Gallagher. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to clarify something you said earlier, Admiral Grady, was that the initial SWO training went from 4 months to 23 weeks, right? Admiral GRADY. No, sir. It went from 4 months back when I was—— Mr. GALLAGHER. Yeah. Admiral GRADY [continuing]. To nothing—— Mr. GALLAGHER. To nothing. Admiral GRADY [continuing]. To SWOS that was administered as OJT with computer-based training CD–ROMs, to 17 weeks of rees- tablishing the basic division or accession course, to now 23 weeks plus three additional courses as part of their junior officer training. Mr. GALLAGHER. Got it. That is helpful. Last summer, Defense News reported there was a widespread shortfall in basic seamanship across the surface fleet, so out of 164 randomly selected newly qualified first tour division officers at SWO school, a review found at least some concerns with the shiphandling skills of nearly 85 percent of the group. How did littoral combat ship officers fare relative to the rest of the fleet? Admiral GRADY. They fared quite well. You are referring to one of the immediate and controlling actions we took following the tragic loss of our 17 shipmates, and that was OOD competency checks. So we went around the fleet and sampled, and this is what we found. The train to qualify, train to certify model that the littoral combat ship uses, as Admiral Aquilino said, is amazingly effective and I believe you will see it brought to the rest of the fleet over time. And what we are finding with the—those that are trained in those simulators, both in Jacksonville or Mayport and in San Diego, is that those officers are very, very advanced in their ability to drive the ship when it is really moving water under the keel. Mr. GALLAGHER. I mean, I think it is fair to say, I think you would agree, based on what we just said, that the live virtual con- 31 structive training environment is a distinguishing aspect of LCS and also has been positively correlated with their superior performance in that sample size. Admiral GRADY. Absolutely. Mr. GALLAGHER. So, I guess with that in mind, does the Navy have any plans or what plans does the Navy have to bring that sort of LCS-style simulation training to other platforms across the surface fleet, and what are the associated timelines with those plans if they exist? Admiral GRADY. Well, it starts with the build-out of our Navy seamanship and shiphandling trainers in all of the fleet concentration areas, and by 2019, by the end of 2019, we will have these high-fidelity simulators built out in all of the fleet concentration areas, but this is just an interim solution. The goodness in these is the fidelity of the trainer plus the teamwork that comes in. So it is not just the bridge, it is not just the combat information center, and one of the things we learned from the tragedies is the ability to work together. So the interim solution is the build-out of the NSST [navigation, seamanship, and shiphandling trainer] trainers in all of the fleet concentration areas. After that we are working to build maritime shiphandling training centers in both Norfolk and San Diego that will fully in- culcate this idea of high-fidelity simulators for bridge, CIC [combat information center], and the team, and that is to the tune of about $240 million or so, and that will be done in the early 2020s. Admiral AQUILINO. Sir, there is one point highlighting with regard to the simulation capability. There is another aspect of the training that I believe has been embraced by my surface counterparts. It is a part of Naval Aviation culture, and that’s the vigorous self-assessment. And if you go to the LCS trainer, and you see a commander going through the program being trained by a lieuten- ant who is a weapons and tactics instructor telling the commander, Hey, you did that wrong, that vigorous self-assessment with the no- holds-barred, or gloves off, no retribution, has been easily as effective as the simulation itself for us to get better and to work towards that culture of excellence. Admiral GRADY. And I would add, it is the simulation that en- ables that, because we can play it back and show them what they did wrong. And additionally, we have identified 14 high-stress sce- narios that we can do over and over again to help them learn. You can’t really do that underway on a ship all the time because of other operational requirements, but we can put this plan, brief, execute, and debrief process to work because of the high-fidelity simulation and really learn much faster. High-velocity learning. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield the balance of my time. Mr. GARAMENDI. Just a quick follow-up. The use of simulators you said 20—in the early 2020s to get this advanced simulation program underway? Admiral GRADY. So the interim—the interim capability that we have, which will approach the full build-out, will be this year. We will finish this year. But then the larger build-out in both the two major fleet concentration areas will conclude in the 2022 timeframe. 32

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. We spent a lot of time at this hearing on training. There are the other pieces of this puzzle need to be more fully explored, particularly the readiness of the ship itself, the equipment, maintenance, and the like. We will pick that up at a later time. I think we have run through all of the witnesses. I see Mr. Courtney has returned. So I think we have finished the hearing. Without further questions from the members, we will adjourn the hearing. Before I adjourn, I want to thank Admiral Grady, Admiral Aqui- lino, and your spouses for joining us today and for the rest of the support. We will continue this—the focus of this hearing was prin- cipally on the Pacific. We know that is not the only place the Navy operates, and we will spend a little more time next time we go through this, probably in maybe 6 months from now, come back and review the progress along the way. Keeping in mind what Mr. Wittman said, he suggested that we take the responsibility to be the oversight, and we will. So with that the hearing is adjourned. Admiral AQUILINO. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Admiral GRADY. Thank you, sir. [Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] A P P E N D I X

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

FEBRUARY 26, 2019

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN Mr. WITTMAN. Admirals, in testimony before this committee last year, Secretary Spencer and CNO Richardson indicated their support to strike an appropriation lim- itation, otherwise known as the Inouye amendment. Specifically, CNO Richardson indicated ‘‘this Inouye amendment . . . is an artificial seam that inhibits [Navy] from establishing a single standard.’’ Do you agree with the Secretary and CNO that the Inouye amendment and other forms of arbitrary congressional direction to Navy should be eliminated? Admiral GRADY and Admiral AQUILINO. We agree with the Secretary and the CNO that § 8056 of Public Law 115–141 and other similar congressional directives that limit Navy’s flexibility should be eliminated. The generation of combat ready forces across the Navy is executed to one standard that is governed by the Inte- grated Readiness Instruction (OPNAVINST 3000.16) signed by the CNO 15 Feb 2019. These standards guide readiness policies and certifications of all Navy forces regardless of their geographic location. Mr. WITTMAN. Admirals, in response to a continuing concern as to material readiness, Congress required Navy to adopt a limited notice INSURV inspection program. Compared with the previous INSURV strategy, what have been the fleet impacts to this limited notice INSURV strategy and what are the results? Admiral GRADY and Admiral AQUILINO. NDAA–19 directed INSURV to conduct minimal notice inspections by 1 January 2020. INSURV has developed a plan to conduct 24 ‘‘pilot’’ inspections to determine the best method to implement our understanding of minimal notice and is on track to execute no notice material inspections on all ships and submarines by 1 October 2019. As of 1 Apr 2019, INSURV has conducted six minimal notice ‘‘pilot’’ inspections with no significant adverse impacts on ship schedules and scores have been 5 to 10 percent lower than previous averages for DDGs and CGs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA Mrs. LURIA. Admiral Grady, the IMO has established requirements for the safe navigation of merchant vessels through the standards of training, certification, and watchkeeping (STCW) for seafarers. Why is the Navy so hesitant to require the same standards for its officers and why do our accession sources not require a similar level of sea time and subsequently actual at-sea time gaining proficiency in per- forming your job before advancing to the next level? Before they take command submariners have a comprehensive evaluation through the Submarine Commanders Course, which requires proficiency in navigation and warfighting, yet no similar requirement exists or is recommended in your corrective actions. Should I take from that that warfighting on the surface is not as important as warfighting on the subsurface? Before a strike group deploys, the culmination of their training is the Joint Taskforce Exercise, which is where you as the fleet commander certify a ship for deployment. How many strike groups in the last 10 years have failed the JTFEX? This report has identified that Surface Warfare Officers and crews lack basic navigation fundamentals, which has not come to light in the culminating training event. So is this culminating event in which you certify the ship for deployment adequate since it has never identified any of these problems? Admiral GRADY. (a) As outlined within the recent NDAA Section 334 Report to Congress, the Surface Navy is not hesitant to require the same standards for its officers, and has adopted significant portions of the STCW requirements where they align with those of Surface Warfare. We have completed a side-by-side comparison of the IMO STCW/3rd Mate and SWO qualification requirements and extracted those applicable to the U.S. Navy. Some portions of STCW bear minimal or no application to Surface Warfare requirements. As such, wholesale adoption is not practical. Surface Warfare training includes both Navigation, Seamanship, and Shiphandling (NSS) requirements and a breadth of maritime warfighting skills. With respect to effectively navigating and handling ships, Surface Warfare NSS requirements are comparable to those of the USCG and the Merchant Marine, as (55) 56 shown below. Areas in which Surface Warfare Mariner’s Skills training bears full STCW/USCG accreditation include Bridge Resource Management (BRM) and Elec- tronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) training. Some areas in which Surface Warfare Mariner’s Skills requirements are comparable to STCW/ USCG requirements, and for which accrediting is forthcoming, include Automated Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) set up and employment, to be fielded in 2021 in conjunction with the standup of OOD Phase I and the Maritime Skills Training Centers (MSTCs). Some requirements in SWO mariner skills training that are aligned with STCW/USCG requirements, but for which USCG accreditation has not been granted credit or for which additional Surface Community training modifications are required include conducting celestial navigation, maintaining an anchor watch, or use of IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP). Areas in which STCW/ USCG requirements have little or no application to Surface Warfare requirements include cargo handling and stowage, operating life-saving appliances, or applying medical first aid. (b) No. Maritime Warfighting is a long-standing Surface Warfare core competency. The Surface Warfare Officer Requirements Document (SWORD) outlines specific career milestone expectations for: Navigation, Seamanship, & Shiphandling (‘‘Drive the Ship’’), Maritime Warfare (‘‘Fight the Ship’’), Program & Material Management (‘‘Manage the Ship’’), and Leadership (‘‘Command the Ship’’). Since its inception, one-half of the 6-month Surface Warfare Officer Department Head Course is devoted to Maritime Warfare and developing the most proficient Tactical Action Offi- cers (TAOs). Additionally, approximately 4 months of additional tactical and maritime warfare training (as determined by billet and combat systems baseline) is re- ceived via Division Officer and/or Department Head Billet Specialty Training (BST). Key Navy training commands such as: Naval Surface & Mine Warfare Development Command (NSMWDC), Tactical Training Groups Atlantic & Pacific (TACTRAGRU- LANT/PAC), Expeditionary Warfare Training Command (EWTGLANT/PAC), Car- rier Strike Groups FOUR & FIFTEEN (CSG–4/CSG–15), the Surface Warfare Offi- cer’s School (SWOS), and the Center for Ship’s Combat systems (CSCS) ensure robust maritime warfighting training to the Surface Force, provide critical maritime warfare training/assessment at individual and team levels, and bear significant SWO staff representation. (c) The Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) is the culminating event for deployment certification, and is not focused exclusively on specific or discrete navigation skills. Instead, COMPTUEX is an integrated, multi-warfare event that tests command & control, offensive/defensive capabilities, and supported/supporting commander missions and roles within a Joint environment. The exercise stresses the integrations of Naval, Joint, and Coalition forces executing combined missions within a multi-threat environment. Mrs. LURIA. Admiral Aqualino, did you find this report to be a fair critique of surface navigation training? Yes or no? Yet your corrective actions require the same people who have gone through the same ineffective training—which you have described as inadequate—to fix the problem. We have marginalized the stringency for establishing similar high standards on our surface ships that we require in our aircraft and submarines. If a similar report found that aviators were not able to fly and navigate airplanes safely—if you had an aircraft crash and kill 17 people and you did an investigation and found out that the pilot didn’t know how to fly the airplane—and then you did a comprehensive report and you found out that the majority of your pilots didn’t know how to fly—Do the corrective actions in this report have a similar sense of urgency (as in my example) that is needed to fix this problem in the surface force? Yes or no? As the Commander of Pacific Fleet your theater has some of the most pressing challenges that exist in the Navy today: BMD threat Tension on the Korean Penin- sula Increasing naval threat from China & Russia Each of these requires the highest competency to conduct major combat operations in your theater. Does this report—which raises concerns about competency in the most basic navigation skills— give you confidence that surface forces can conduct these major combat operations if required? Yes or no? Sailors know that the work that they do is dangerous. Flight operations are dangerous. Underway replenishments are dangerous. Boarding vessels is dangerous. Combat operations are dangerous. But navigating through a shipping channel on a routine basis should not be dangerous. We owe it to these sailors, to their families and loved ones, to get it right this time. Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, I believe these reports to be fair critiques of surface navigation training at the time the reports were released. Yes, we are treating these re- 57 ports and taking actions with a similar sense of urgency as you describe. Yes, I have confidence that the ships I have deployed and the ones that we are deploying have been certified on the prerequisite skills to not only navigate safely but are ready to execute major combat operations. Æ