Air Power in Joint Operations: a Game Changer in a Limited Conflict with China
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JUNE 2020 ISSUE NO. 374 Air Power in Joint Operations: A Game Changer in a Limited Conflict with China ARJUN SUBRAMANIAM ABSTRACT Any future limited conflict between India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will primarily be fought in a high-altitude environment along parts of the 4,000-km- long Line of Actual Control (LAC). With the Indian Army likely to be constrained by the terrain and numerical parity to fight a largely positional battle with limited mobility and offensive options, air power offers several asymmetric opportunities to create operational advantages on the ground. To leverage the IAF’s current qualitative advantage, India must keep an eye on the future and ensure that the rapid modernisation of China’s air force does not erode the IAF’s competitive advantage. This is possible only if India steps up on the induction cycle of cutting-edge platforms, sensors and weapon systems, and improves the jointness and integration of its air and land operations. Attribution: Arjun Subramaniam, “Air Power in Joint Operations: A Game Changer in a Limited Conflict with China,” ORF Issue Brief No. 374, June 2020, Observer Research Foundation. Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think tank that aims to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed analyses and in-depth research, and organising events that serve as platforms for stimulating and productive discussions. ISBN: 978-93-90159-49-9 © 2020 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. Air Power in Joint Operations: A Game Changer in a Limited Conflict with China INTRODUCTION Indian strategists have not focused on this opportunity, in part because “they draw Following a border face-off with China in June pessimistic conclusions regarding China.”2 A 2020, one of the most revealing aspects of the retired Indian Army general has cautioned internal debate in India has been the muted against reading too much into the report, discussion amongst military and strategic stating that the Indian military must build a analysts on the contours of a possible limited position of “relative strength” in some areas conflict between the two countries. Indeed, to be able to sustain a multisectoral conflict. these would likely be discussed within the secretive realms of the national-security This brief argues that some of the establishment. Such face-offs are always ‘pessimistic conclusions’ attributed to Indian complicated and usually follow a predictable strategists in the report by O’Donnell and pattern of escalation, posturing, rhetoric and, Bollfrass, could be the result of a land-force finally, de-escalation. centric mindset among Indian military planners. It is considered necessary to have However, the recent face-offs across a positional and defensive operational multiple points of stress in Eastern Ladakh strategy in conditions of near-parity to fight have been increasingly complex and volatile, a likely limited conflict across the Line of following the bloody encounter between the Actual Control (LAC). Consequently, the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation employment of airpower across missions and Army (PLA) in the Galwan Valley on 15 roles has remained of peripheral interest to June 2020. Since the bloody skirmishes at security planners until now. The fast-tracking Nathu La in September–October 1967, this of the purchase of 12 additional SU-30 is the first time the two countries have come MKI jets from HAL and 22 upgraded MiG- this close to a limited conflict. Feeding into 29s from Russia, which were already in the the complexity is a recent report on the pipeline, signals a realisation that airpower India–China military balance, “The Strategic could emerge as a key element in future Postures of China and India,” written by India–China conflicts.3 Frank O’ Donnell and Alexander K. Bollfrass, researchers at the Harvard Kennedy LESSONS FROM OPERATION FalCON School.1 The report is based on open-source information and is evidence that little In 1987, Army Chief General Sundarji, Lt. remains ‘secret’ except the thoughts of the General Narahari (4 Corps Commander) and commanders and their ability to deal with Major General J.M. Singh (5 Div. Commander), complex situations. with support from Air Chief Marshal Denis Lafontaine, ushered in a refreshingly new “India has key under-appreciated joint operational strategy. Before the conventional advantages that reduce its disengagement process was initiated in mid- vulnerabilities to Chinese threat and attacks,” 1987 following the Sumdorong Chu crisis, argue O’ Donnell and Bollfrass, noting that the extensive employment of airpower 2 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 374 JUNE 2020 Air Power in Joint Operations: A Game Changer in a Limited Conflict with China to support both defensive and offensive the growing capability of air power in operations on the Tibetan Plateau was mountainous terrain and inadequately discussed during Exercise Chequer Board, explored its escalatory limits in the India- a table-top exercise initiated in the Indian Pakistan and India-China context. Though Army’s Eastern Command and spread across the offensive application of air power in the to war colleges and other formations that Kargil Conflict contributed significantly to were lined up across the LAC. Amongst the conflict termination, there was much scope key takeaways was an emphasis on exploiting for improvement.5 Since then, however, air power to secure tactical gains, which could there has been rapid capability accretion and be leveraged during subsequent diplomatic/ movement in joint capability, all of which political negotiations. will play an important role in any future India-China conflict. In sustained correspondence with the author during interviews for a forthcoming The Balakot strikes of February 2019 book, Lt. Gen. J.M. Singh stressed that air demonstrated the Modi government’s power was and remains the key to tackling willingness to explore the impact of the Chinese in Tibet. “We must have the preventive offensive air power against a capability to gain and maintain a favourable significantly weaker adversary in a less-than- air situation for limited periods of time, war situation. While it would be foolish to and carry out interdiction to back shallow superimpose a similar template across the multi-pronged thrusts across road-less LAC, a greater debate is required on the terrain to outflank the Chinese build-up that optimal ways of leveraging Indian air power will take place on the existing road and rail on/across the LAC, should situations escalate networks.”4 beyond face-offs. Indeed, this was a risky strategy, and THE PLAAF FORGES AHEAD Singh emphasised on the need to shape such an environment using helicopters for Much has changed in the last few decades. inserting special forces; moving infantry The People’s Liberation Army Air Force and guns; and maintaining capabilities of (PLAAF) has moved quickly to counter the airpower offence to interdict rail and road growing qualitative advantage of the IAF by links in Tibet. This was a simple air–land battle putting in place a dense, multilayered, and concept, with no fancy pronouncements of lethal air-defence network of radars and the attacking targets in depth or in the Chinese latest Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), which hinterland. include the S-300, S-400 and the HQ-9.6 The Harvard report does not refer to this Defence Minister George Fernandes had at all. While the PLAAF has increased the unambiguously stated in 1998 that China frequency of the visits by fighter squadrons was India’s principal adversary. However, equipped with fourth-generation aircraft to India has only sub-optimally leveraged airfields in the Tibetan Autonomous Region ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 374 JUNE 2020 3 Air Power in Joint Operations: A Game Changer in a Limited Conflict with China (TAR),7 it has rightly concentrated on and the limited number of Rafales. The LCA building on its proven strength of ground- MK-1 and IA, which are likely to equip six to based air-defence networks and network- seven squadrons over the next 8–10 years, centric operations, instead of attempting can be considered at best a “modest and not to match the IAF with airborne fighter strong fourth-generation platform.” platforms. In 2030, a comparison between the PLAAF The Harvard paper engages in a bit of and the IAF is likely to be as follows. As part ‘India overreach’ by suggesting that the of its offensive inventory, the PLAAF could IAF’s current inventory of fourth-generation have up to 50 squadrons of ‘strong fourth- fighters (Mirage-2000s, MiG-29 UPG and generation fighters,” 10 squadrons of modest SU-30 MKI) are more than a match for the fifth-generation J-20-class aircraft, and PLAAF SU-30s, J-10s and J-11s.8 This might five to six squadrons of the H-6 long-range be qualitatively true, but quantitatively, bombers with significant stand-off capability the Harvard paper’s estimation is not (cruise missiles with ranges of more than corroborated by those of other studies. O’ 500 km. The IAF’s air-launched Brahmos Donnell and Bollfrass suggest that the PLAAF cruise missile has a maximum range of 300 can bring to bear only 101 such platforms km). In a ‘hot war’ scenario, the anticipated in the theatre against the estimated Indian airfield-receiving capacity on the TAR could strength of 122. In another detailed paper in double from the existing six airfields, given the Small Wars Journal, titled “Assessment the speed at which Chinese infrastructure of the Growth of PLAAF Capabilities,” is being built on the Tibetan plateau.