November 30, 1960 Record of Meeting of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The Godesberg Programme and Its Aftermath
Karim Fertikh The Godesberg Programme and its Aftermath A Socio-histoire of an Ideological Transformation in European Social De- mocracies Abstract: The Godesberg programme (1959) is considered a major shift in European social democratic ideology. This article explores its genesis and of- fers a history of both the written text and its subsequent uses. It does so by shedding light on the organizational constraints and the personal strategies of the players involved in the production of the text in the Social Democra- tic Party of Germany. The article considers the partisan milieu and its trans- formations after 1945 and in the aftermaths of 1968 as an important factor accounting for the making of the political myth of Bad Godesberg. To do so, it explores the historicity of the interpretations of the programme from the 1950s to the present day, and highlights the moments at which the meaning of Godesberg as a major shift in socialist history has become consolidated in Europe, focusing on the French Socialist Party. Keywords: Social Democracy, Godesberg Programme, socio-histoire, scienti- fication of politics, history of ideas In a recent TV show, “Baron noir,” the main character launches a rant about the “f***g Bad Godesberg” advocated by the Socialist Party candidate. That the 1950s programme should be mentioned before a primetime audience bears witness to the widespread dissemination of the phrase in French political culture. “Faire son Bad Godesberg” [literally, “doing one’s Bad Godesberg”] has become an idiomatic French phrase. It refers to a fundamental alteration in the core doctrinal values of a politi- cal party (especially social-democratic and socialist ones). -
Beyond Social Democracy in West Germany?
BEYOND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN WEST GERMANY? William Graf I The theme of transcending, bypassing, revising, reinvigorating or otherwise raising German Social Democracy to a higher level recurs throughout the party's century-and-a-quarter history. Figures such as Luxemburg, Hilferding, Liebknecht-as well as Lassalle, Kautsky and Bernstein-recall prolonged, intensive intra-party debates about the desirable relationship between the party and the capitalist state, the sources of its mass support, and the strategy and tactics best suited to accomplishing socialism. Although the post-1945 SPD has in many ways replicated these controversies surrounding the limits and prospects of Social Democracy, it has not reproduced the Left-Right dimension, the fundamental lines of political discourse that characterised the party before 1933 and indeed, in exile or underground during the Third Reich. The crucial difference between then and now is that during the Second Reich and Weimar Republic, any significant shift to the right on the part of the SPD leader- ship,' such as the parliamentary party's approval of war credits in 1914, its truck under Ebert with the reactionary forces, its periodic lapses into 'parliamentary opportunism' or the right rump's acceptance of Hitler's Enabling Law in 1933, would be countered and challenged at every step by the Left. The success of the USPD, the rise of the Spartacus move- ment, and the consistent increase in the KPD's mass following throughout the Weimar era were all concrete and determined reactions to deficiences or revisions in Social Democratic praxis. Since 1945, however, the dynamics of Social Democracy have changed considerably. -
Adenauer SPD - PV, Bestand Erich Ollenhauer
Quellen und Literatur A) Quellen: Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP) Dörpinghaus, Bruno 1-009 Ehlers, Hermann 1-369 Fricke, Otto 1-248 Gottaut, Hermann 1-351 Gottesleben, Leo 1-359 Hermes, Andreas 1-090 Hilpert, Werner 1-021 Hofmeister, Werner 1-395 Kather, Linus 1-377 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg 1-226 Küster, Otto 1-084 Laforet, Wilhelm 1-122 Lenz, Otto 1-172 Merkatz, Joachim von 1-148 Meyers, Franz 1-032 Strickrodt, Georg 1-085 Wuermeling, Franz-Josef 1-221 CDU-Landesverband Hamburg III-010 CDU-Landesverband Schleswig-Holstein III-006 CDU-Landesverband Westfalen-Lippe III-002 Ring Christlich-Demokratischer Studenten (RCDS) IV-006 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Demokratischer Kreise (ADK) VI-010 CDU-Bundespartei - Bundesvorstand VII-001 - Vorsitzende VII-002 - Wahlen VII-003 - Bundesgeschäftsstelle VII-004 Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI) IX-002 Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD) Korrespondenz Ollenhauer - Adenauer SPD - PV, Bestand Erich Ollenhauer 665 Quellen und Literatur Archiv des Liberalismus (AdL) A 15 Bundesparteitag 1953 A 1-53 Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus (StBKAH) 05.05 06.09 12.12 12.29 12.32 II/4 111/47 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA) Bestand Bundeskanzleramt: B 136/1881 NL Friedrich Holzapfel NL Jakob Kaiser Bundestag, Parlamentsarchiv (BT PA) Ges.Dok. I 398 Bundesgesetzblatt, Gesetz- und Verordnungsblätter der Länder, Verhandlungen und Drucksachen des Deutschen Bundestages und dgl. sind nicht eigens aufgeführt. B) Literatur: ABGEORDNETE DES DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAGES. Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen. Hrsg. vom Deutschen Bundestag. 3 Bde. Boppard 1982-1985. Zit.: ABGEORD- NETE. ABS, Hermann J.: Konrad Adenauer und die Wirtschaftspolitik der fünfziger Jahre. In: KONRAD ADENAUER 1 S. 229-245. Zit.: ABS: Konrad Adenauer. -
Kurzbiographien Der Gescheiterten Kanzlerkandidaten 435
Kurzbiographien der gescheiterten Kanzlerkandidaten 435 Kurzbiographien der gescheiterten Kanzlerkandidaten Kurzbiographien der gescheiterten Kanzlerkandidaten Kurt Schumacher (geb. 1895) war Kriegsfreiwilliger im Ersten Weltkrieg. Er studierte Rechtswissenschaften und Nationalökonomie, 1926 erfolgte die Promo- tion. Von 1920-30 arbeitete er für die Parteizeitung „Schwäbische Tagwacht“. Seit 1918 Mitglied der SPD, war er 1924-31 Abgeordneter seiner Partei im würt- tembergischen Landtag, seit 1928 gehörte er dem Fraktionsvorstand an. 1930-33 war er Abgeordneter des Deutschen Reichstages. Im Nationalsozialismus war er 1933-43 im KZ inhaftiert und wurde 1944 erneut verhaftet. Auf dem ersten Nachkriegsparteitag 1946 übernahm er den Parteivorsitz der Westzonen-SPD. Bei den Wahlen zum Ersten Deutschen Bundestag trat der als Spitzenkandidat der SPD an. Bis zu seinem Tod 1952 war Schumacher Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages und Fraktionsvorsitzender der SPD. Erich Ollenhauer (geb. 1901) trat 1918 in die SPD ein. Seit 1920 war er Sekre- tär und Mitglied des Hauptvorstandes des Verbands der Arbeiterjugendvereine Deutschlands und 1928-33 Vorsitzender des Verbands der Sozialistischen Arbei- terjugend Deutschlands. Zugleich arbeitete er 1923-46 als Sekretär der Sozialis- tischen Jugend-Internationale. Seit April 1933 Mitglied des SPD-Parteivorstands, gehörte er 1933-46 dem Exilparteivorstand in Prag, Paris und London an. Nach seiner Rückkehr nach Deutschland wurde er 1946 stellvertretender Parteivorsit- zender. 1949-63 war er Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages. 1952 trat er die Nachfolge Schumachers im Parteivorsitz und im Vorsitz der Bundestagsfraktion an, beides blieb er bis zu seinem Tod 1963. Bei den Bundestagswahlen 1953 und 1957 war er Spitzenkandidat der SPD. Willy Brandt (geb. 1913) wurde als in Lübeck geborener Herbert Ernst Karl Frahm 1929 Mitglied der Sozialistischen Arbeiterjugend und trat im Jahr darauf in die SPD ein. -
Germany Long Form
10/3/93 (Final alterations: 6/11/99) GERMANY Data on Party Leadership Change (from Leader A to Leader B) First Form for Party Party: Christian Democratic Union Party Founding Date: October, 1950 Long Record #: G.C.0 Change#: 0 A. Venue of Leadership Position(s) of leadership involved: Chancellor or Party Chairman B. Identification/Characteristics of Leaders Leader A: Konrad Adenauer Characteristics of Leader A at time of leadership change: Birthdate: January, 1876 (Former) occupation: Assistant state prosecutor, city administrator, deputy for the city of Cologne, Chairman of the British Zone. Faction/tendency identified with (if any): None Other relevant information on the new leader's character, orientation, leadership style, etc.: Strongly anti-utopian and was fundamental in pushing for a more pragmatic platform. Highly influential party leader. 10/3/93 (Final alterations: 6/11/99) GERMANY Data on Party Leadership Change (from Leader A to Leader B) Party: Christian Democratic Union Long Record #: G.C.1 Change #: 1 Date of Change: October, 1963 A. Venue of Leadership Position(s) of leadership involved: Chancellor or Party Chairman B. Identification/Characteristics of Leaders Leader A: Konrad Adenauer (See previous record for detailed information on Leader A) Leader B: Ludwig Erhard Characteristics of Leader B at time of leadership change: Birthdate: February 4, 1897 (Former) occupation: Trained in economics and sociology, he joined the staff of Nuremberg Business school from 1928-1942. Removed by Nazis for refusal to join party. After war, he joined the government as an economist. Faction/tendency identified with (if any): None Other relevant information on the new leader's character, orientation, leadership style, etc.: Promoted a "social market economy," favored free markets, but controls on monopoly, cartels and labor unions. -
A Comment on Recent Literature on Soviet and Comintern Involvement in the Spanish Civil War
Rev29-03 26/2/08 12:29 Página 205 Frank Schauff* A comment on recent literature on Soviet and Comintern involvement in the Spanish Civil War In many spheres of twentieth century history, the end of the Soviet Union and the partial opening up of a lot of archives in Moscow and other capitals of the former Social- ist bloc have admitted to improve the base for research. Nonetheless, if talking about the former Soviet archives, there have to be made some restrictions to this reappraisal of the situation. First, some of the main Moscow archives have at least partially closed their material again after a short period of nearly complete openness in the first half of the 1990s. Then some of the major archives were either more or less closed as the Presiden- tial Archive or major parts of the archives were made unavailable for researchers because of national security deliberations. Historians could not be quick enough to use the win- dow of opportunity during these two or three years. This situation has not changed very much since the mid-nineties. The second problem is simply a practical problem. Certain- ly, historians of Russia and the Soviet Union were able to make use of the material, but historians – as in our case on Spanish history – had more problems in using the archives for the lack of Russian (and in the Communist International’s case also German) lan- guage knowledge. This implied that only a few of those who were interested in Spanish history and especially the Civil War would be able to use the vast amount of material available even under the aforementioned restrictions. -
Quellen Und Literatur
QUELLEN UND LITERATUR ZEITZEUGENGESPRÄCHE Hans Willgerodt, Universitätsprofessor, Neffe von Wilhelm Röpke; Interview v. 31. Januar 2006 Geert Müller-Gerbes, Journalist, ehemaliger Pressereferent des Bundespräsidenten; Interview v. 8. Februar 2006. Peter Heinemann, Notar, Sohn von Gustav Heinemann; Interview v. 24. Februar 2006. Barbara und Manfred Wichelhaus, Tochter und Schwiegersohn von Gustav Heinemann; Interview v. 22. März 2006. Jürgen Schmude, Jurist, Bundesminister a.D., Interview v. 15. November 2006. Erhard Eppler, Lehrer, Bundesminister a.D.; Interview v. 10. Januar 2007. UNGEDRUCKTE QUELLEN Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn Nachlaß Gustav Heinemann, Teil I Nachlaß Gustav Heinemann, Teil II Nachlaß Erich Ollenhauer Nachlaß Kurt Schumacher Nachlaß Helene Wessel Nachlaß Adolf Scheu Nachlaß Fritz Erler Bestand Erhard Eppler Protokolle des SPD-Parteivorstandes Sammlung Organisationen des SPD-Parteivorstandes: GVP Sammlung Willems Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Bad Honnef/Rhöndorf Nachlaß Konrad Adenauer Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin Nachlaß Gerhard Schröder Nachlaß Paul Bausch Nachlaß Ernst Lemmer Bestand der Ost-CDU Bestand der Exil-CDU Bestand des Kreisverbandes der CDU Essen Archiv der Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin Bestand MfS-ZAIG: Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe Bestand MfS-HA: Hauptabteilung Quellen und Literatur 337 Bestand -
Bulletin 10-Final Cover
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 61 “This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse”1 The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives Introduced and annotated by Christian F. Ostermann I. ince the opening of the former Communist bloc East German relations as Ulbricht seemed to have used the archives it has become evident that the crisis in East uprising to turn weakness into strength. On the height of S Germany in the spring and summer of 1953 was one the crisis in East Berlin, for reasons that are not yet of the key moments in the history of the Cold War. The entirely clear, the Soviet leadership committed itself to the East German Communist regime was much closer to the political survival of Ulbricht and his East German state. brink of collapse, the popular revolt much more wide- Unlike his fellow Stalinist leader, Hungary’s Matyas spread and prolonged, the resentment of SED leader Rakosi, who was quickly demoted when he embraced the Walter Ulbricht by the East German population much more New Course less enthusiastically than expected, Ulbricht, intense than many in the West had come to believe.2 The equally unenthusiastic and stubborn — and with one foot uprising also had profound, long-term effects on the over the brink —somehow managed to regain support in internal and international development of the GDR. By Moscow. The commitment to his survival would in due renouncing the industrial norm increase that had sparked course become costly for the Soviets who were faced with the demonstrations and riots, regime and labor had found Ulbricht’s ever increasing, ever more aggressive demands an uneasy, implicit compromise that production could rise for economic and political support. -
Bundestagsdebatte Vom 23. Januar 1958
Gesprächskreis Geschichte Heft 81 Otto Dann Eine Sternstunde des Bundestages Gustav Heinemanns Rede am 23. Januar 1958 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Historisches Forschungszentrum Herausgegeben von Michael Schneider Historisches Forschungszentrum der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Kostenloser Bezug beim Historischen Forschungszentrum der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Godesberger Allee 149, D-53175 Bonn Tel. 0228-883473 E-mail: [email protected] http://library.fes.de/history/pub-history.html © 2008 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Bonn (-Bad Godesberg) Titelfoto: dpa/picture-alliance, Frankfurt/Main Foto: Der Spiegel, Hamburg Umschlag: Pellens Kommunikationsdesign GmbH, Bonn Druck: bub - Bonner Universitäts-Buchdruckerei, Bonn Alle Rechte vorbehalten Printed in Germany 2008 ISBN 978-3-89892-931-8 ISSN 0941-6862 3 Inhalt Die Bundestags-Debatte vom 23. Januar 1958 ........................ .5 Gustav Heinemanns Rede ......................................................... 8 Resonanzen und Reaktionen ................................................... 13 Gustav Heinemann und Thomas Dehler ................................. 20 Der Weg in die SPD................................................................ 28 Gustav Heinemann in der SPD................................................ 33 Die Kampagne „Kampf dem Atomtod!“................................. 37 Deutschlandpläne .................................................................... 43 Ausblick: Godesberg............................................................... 48 Anhang ................................................................................... -
INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING in the NETHERLANDS Exile
INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING IN THE NETHERLANDS Exile Publishing in the Netherlands Some thirty thousand German exiles entered the Netherlands between 1933 and 1940. An estimated fi ve hundred of these were socialist and communist party offi cials, labor leaders and other political exiles. Th e others fl ed Germany because they were or were considered to be Jewish. Th is included a sizable number of Eastern Europeans, who had fl ed to Germany before and were now considered stateless or unwel- come. Th e Dutch government initially took a rather liberal position with regard to the German exiles. Th ere were no visa requirements. Th ose who asked, were provided with political asylum, but with the stipulation that they refrain from political activity. But as the infl ux of political and Jewish exiles grew, so did the government eff orts to stem the tide. Border security increased, combined with stricter control of labor permits. Several of the political exiles used Amsterdam as the city from which they planned to continue their activities. Th e Sozialistischen Jugend- Internationale, moved its headquarters from Berlin to Amsterdam and from there it continued its publication Internationale Sozialistische Jugendkorrespondenz. Its editor was Erich Ollenhauer (1901–1963). Ollenhauer had moved to Prague in 1933, and from there he directed many of the German Socialist Party (S.P.D.) activities. Aft er the war, Ollenhauer would play a major role in German politics. Th e Internationalen Arbeiter-Assoziation also used Amsterdam as its base to continue publication of Die Internationale. Anarchosyn- dikalistisches Organ, which had been published in Berlin since 1927. -
Security Versus Unity: Germany's Dilemma II
NOT FOR PUBLICATION INSTITUTE OF CURRENT VORLD AFFAIRS DB- 8 Plockstrasse 8 Security versus Unity: Gie ssen, Germany Germany' s Dilemma II April l, 19G8 Mr. Walter S. Rogers Institute of Current World Affairs 522 Fifth Avenue ew York 36, Eew York Dear Mr. Rogers: A few months before the -arch Bundestag debate on atomic weapons I Islted a local civil defense meeting. The group leader enthusiastically painted a hideous picture of atomic devastation; the audience remained dumb arid expressionless. Film and magazine reports on hydrogen bombs, fall-out, radiation effects they all seeme to fall on plugged ears in Germany. "at can one do?"'asked Kurt Odrig, who sells me vegetables. "Yhen it comes, we're all goers anyway." The Germans were not uique in that attitude. Along with this nuclear numbness there was the dazed resignation towards the question of reunification. Everybody was for it like the fiv cent clgar. Any West German politlclan who wanted to make the rade had to master the sacred roeunification phase: "Let us not forget our seventeen-million German brothe.,,_s over there..." Uttered ith solen reverence, it had an effect tho same as ,'poor starving rmenlans" ,once had paralysis. The Test Germans felt, rightly so, that there ,sn't much they could do about uifying their country. But since the arch debate their ,reaction to atoms and reunificatoa has changed from palsy to St. Vitus Dance. Germany's basic dilemma has not changed since 1949 security could not be had without sending reunifi- cation a begging; reunification could not be had without sacrificing security. -
Selling the Economic Miracle Economic Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957 Monograph Mark E
MONOGRAPHS IN GERMAN HISTORY VOLUME 18 MONOGRAPHS Selling the Economic Miracle Economic the Selling IN GERMAN HISTORY Selling The Economic Miracle VOLUME 18 Economic Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957 Mark E. Spicka The origins and nature of the “economic miracle” in Germany in the 1950s continue to attract great interest from historians, economists, and political scientists. Examining election campaign propaganda and various public relations campaigns during this period, the author explores ways that conservative political and economic groups sought to construct and Selling the sell a political meaning of the Social Market Economy and the Economic Miracle, which contributed to conservative electoral success, constructed a Economic new understanding of economics by West German society, and provided legitimacy for the new Federal Republic Germany. In particular, the Miracle author focuses on the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union’s (CDU/CSU) approach to electoral politics, which represented the creation of a more “Americanized” political culture reflected in the Economic Reconstruction borrowing of many techniques in electioneering from the United States, and Politics in West such as public opinion polling and advertising techniques. Germany, 1949-1957 Mark E. Spicka is Associate Professor of History at Shippensburg University in Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. from the Ohio State University in 2000 and was a Fulbright Scholar in Germany in 1996/1997. He has published a number of articles that have appeared in German Politics and Society, German Studies Review, and The Historian. Spicka E. Mark Cover Image: “Erhard keeps his promises: Prosperity for all through the social market economy” 1957 Bundestag election poster by Die Waage, Plakatsammlung, BA Koblenz.