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Introduction to the book

The Second World War is probably one of the most famous conflicts in human history, and it is probably one of the most covered by historical books. It shall be noted however that most of the publications cover, mainly, the European Theatre of Operations (ETO), that included the campaigns in North Africa, in Italy and in Western Europe. There are plentiful of publications also on the Eastern Front, where the two titans (Nazi Germany and Soviet Union) fought some of the bloodiest battles in history. Regarding the Pacific Theatre of Operations there are less documentations, except for “famous battles” like Pearl Harbour, Midway or the Philippines. In honour of all those who, regardless of the side, lost something or someone in some remote places of the Planet Earth, we have decided to dedicate our efforts in studying on one of those “almost forgotten” (at least in non-Australian literature) campaigns: The Kokoda Track Campaign (1942- 1943).

This book is the result of the various researches that our team, of The Modern Warfare Historian (TMWH) channel, have done since March 2020. All the information included into this publication are, however, to be taken with a grain of salt. This is because, since no one of our team was personally on the battlefield, we must have to rely on other sources and sometimes, sadly, we have had to try and understand what was the reality when there were conflicting information. This is especially true in the Kokoda Track Campaign, as it was composed of a series of battles deep in the Jungle in one of the most inhospitable terrain of our planet, therefore there are instances in which we were not sure where the specific dispositions of units were. There have also been cases of “problems” with units organizations and, sometimes, even ship organizations or technical data.

We tried our best in indicating all the possible conflict of sources, either in the text or in the footnotes. We also tried our best in creating detailed Maps and Organization Charts in order to give the reader as much information as possible, for a better understanding of the topic.

Our choice for the topic fell on the Kokoda Track campaign for various reasons: First, we do have personal connections with Australians, to whom we also dedicate our publication. Second, as already indicated before, it is one of the various “almost forgotten” campaigns of the Second World War, and we honestly wanted a challenge in trying to research something with very little information around. Third, the campaign was physically “linear” (on a single track, the Kokoda Track), thus is has been almost easy, for us, to research the various battles as they had a linear time connection with one another. This gave us the possibility to have a linear timetable, with just some notable exceptions for very important battles in the area. This is because, if we had just focused on the Kokoda Track, the title of the book would have probably been “The Struggle for the Kokoda Track”. However, in order to give the reader a better strategical situation, the focus of this publication have been “enlarged” to other zones of the South Pacific area. This book will, in fact, cover the following topics: - The initial situation in the Pacific in late 1941 and the reasons on why the war started in the first place. - The Japanese drive towards the South Pacific, with the invasion of New Britain and New Ireland (Operation R). - The Japanese sea offensives to cut off Australia from the supply lines with the United States (Operation MO and FS) and the fighting in and around Guadalcanal (Operation Ka and SE). - The Japanese offensive on the Kokoda Track. - The fighting in the Milne Bay area (Operation RE).

- The Allied counter-offensive on the Kokoda Track. - The Japanese last ditch offensives (Battle of Wau, Battle of the Bismarck Sea and Operation I-Go). The campaigns that took place after Operation I-Go in the Papua New Guinea area, such as the Lae and Salamaua Campaign or the New Britain Campaign, will not be covered, as when they took place, the “Japanese threat” was not on Port Moresby anymore. The Japanese invasions of Rabaul, Kavieng, Lae and Salamaua are, however, covered in this publications, in order to give a better strategical view to the reader.

Chapters list:

The Japanese on the Offensive ...... 1 Sources ...... 34 Infographics and Maps ...... 35

The Japanese on the offensive:

From regional power to a world power

7th of December 1941. Probably one of the most famous dates of the entire Second World War. The day in which the Empire of the Rising Sun shocked the world, when it attacked the United States’ naval base of Pearl Harbour, in the Hawaii Islands. In order to understand the reasons of why this attack was done, it is necessary to slightly go back in time. For almost all of its existence, Japan had been an isolated nation, a sleeping giant that woke up just towards the second half of the 1800s. The first major action in which the soon-to-be Japanese empire would found itself would be the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895). During this brief yet important conflict, both the Japanese Army and Japanese Navy came out victorious against the Chinese counterpart under the Qing dynasty. Thanks to a very rapid modernization of the Navy, based on the British Royal Navy, the Japanese sea forces were able to defeat the Beiyang Fleet (China) at the Battle of the Yalu River (17th September 1894) and at the Battle of Weihaiwei (Late January & Early February 1895). The speed of the Japanese victories not only won the war for Japan, it also surprised foreign observers, and the Japanese Navy had started to become a force to be reckoned with. After victory in the First Sino-Japanese war, Japan won Formosa (modern day Taiwan), the islands of Penghu (in the Taiwan Strait) and the Liaodong Peninsula. During the Boxer Rebellion (June 1900), Japan joined the European forces during the attack on the Taku Forts, and this prompted Great Britain in signing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902). This would later be

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fundamental during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) as it kept France (that signed a treaty with the Russian Empire to counter-balance the Anglo- Japanese Alliance) out of the conflict, giving the Japanese the possibility to concentrate their forces against the Russian ones. The Japanese wanted to control Korea and Manchuria and, when the Tzar’s forces occupied Manchuria (1904), Japan occupied Korea and the war started.

This was the first conflict in Japanese history against a European Empire. Here, the Japanese Navy fought some minor battles against the Russian 1st Pacific Squadron, mainly through activities of mine warfare, while the Army sieged and conquered Port Arthur (2nd January 1905), and the Russians lost the entire fleet stationed there. The Russian Baltic Fleet was sent to the area in order to regain momentum, but were defeated in the Battle of Tsushima (27-28th May 1905), in which almost the entire Russian Fleet was destroyed, while the Japanese Navy suffered minor losses (only three torpedo boats were sunk). The Russians had lost, and this was the first time in which a non-European nation was able to defeat at sea an European Empire. On the 5th of September 1905, with the treaty of Portsmouth, the Japanese acquired control over Korea and part of Sakhalin Island. The Empire of the Rising Sun was now a force to be reckoned with. In 1914 the Japanese joined the Entente and occupied the German bases of Rabaul (New Britain), the Caroline Islands and the Marshall Islands. The Japanese navy was also used to keep under pressure the German East Asia Squadron and helping, indirectly, towards the victory at the Battle of the Falkland Islands (8th December 1914). In November 1914 Japan took control of the Tsingtao base (Bay of Kiautschou, China) and at the Versailles Treaty (1919) they were rewarded control over the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands and the Mariana Islands, except the Island of that was a United States territory since 1899. By the end of the war, the Japanese navy was probably the third in the world, after the British and the American ones.

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In the aftermath of the First World War, the international players decided to limit the naval expansion, with the stipulation of the Washington Naval Treaty (1922). The Treaty imposed limits in the construction of ships, with the suspension of all Battleship and Battlecruiser construction projects, and the limit for Heavy cruisers tonnage to 10’000 ton, with a maximum armament of 8-inch guns (203mm). This Treaty indirectly pushed the signatory nations towards the conversion of capital ships into aircraft carriers, and Japan would become the main beneficiary of this. Also, the eastern Empire was helped by Article XIX of the Treaty, that indicated that no new fortifications should be built in the Singapore- Philippines-Hawaii area. This created an advantage as a fortified enemy (either British, American or both combined) would be harder to dislodge, and this Article was fundamental in convincing Japan to sign the Treaty. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, and established Manchukuo as a puppet state. At first the members of the League of Nations protested, but as their attention was more focused on Germany and Italy, they did nothing. To add fuel to the fire of international tensions, in 1934 Japan denounced the Washington Naval Treaty and, in 1936, signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany.

Tensions rising

In 1937 the Japanese Empire declared war on China, thus starting the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Japanese forces advanced rapidly at the start of the conflict, and managed to quickly conquer most of the coastline of the Chinese states. Hostilities were rising against the Soviet Union (the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics that was born after the 1917 Russian Revolution and the Russian Civil War, 1917-1923), that gave birth to two big battles.

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The first of this was the Battle for Lake Khasan (29th July – 11th August 1938), that ended in a ceasefire agreement. The second, the most famous of the two, was the Nomonhan Incident, also known as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (11th May – 16th September 1939). This battle would become the foundation of the worst fear in the Japanese Army, the fear of an all-out war against the Soviet Union. The Japanese army was found to be inadequate, both in tactics and equipment, and major restructures were initiated. This would later also shape the Japanese doctrine in both the Hokushin-Ron (Northern Strike) and the Nanshin-Ron (Southern Strike). The Japanese were able to confront, both in the Second Sino-Japanese War and in the border conflicts against the Soviet Union, their forces against both an inferior enemy (China) and a superior one (Soviet Union). The war against China would become fundamental for the Empire of the Rising Sun. In fact, even if the war was costly, both in terms of manpower and resources, this conflict gave the possibility to both aircrews and ground units, to gain actual combat experience, and this experience would later become important in the battles against the Allied. One of the Achilles’ heel of Japan was, however, the amount of natural resources available to, literally, fuel its war machine. Emperor Hirohito’s nation was heavily dependent on imports from the United States, mostly of metals (Iron and Steel) and Petroleum, fundamental for the Japanese war machine.

In order to put pressure on Japan, in July 1940 the United States Congress voted to diminish the exports of these strategic resources, and the Japanese empire was left in a difficult position. Luckily for the eastern empire, the rapid German advance in Europe (1939- 1940) left a power vacuum in the western pacific, as colonial nations like Holland, Belgium and France were conquered. On the 27th of September 1940, Japan obtained from the Vichy government (that was installed in France by the Germans after their conquest in 1940) the permission to establish bases in northern French Indochina (modern

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day Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam). These gave the Japanese the possibility to attack the Chinese positions from the south, and also gave them the possibility to project power in the area. The Japanese could now start using the resources in the ex-French Indochina, but they still needed to guard against the Soviet Bear to the North, and this meant keeping a lot of military resources “locked” in Manchuria. On the 27th of September, Japan entered the Tokyo-Berlin-Rome Axis and, in April 1941, they signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, that gave them the possibility to free up some forces and either use them in the conflict against the Chinese, or keep them as a reserve for other operations. However, while the military situation was improving for Japan, the diplomatic and economical ones were becoming worse. The Japanese wanted to control the whole of the French Indochina, mainly to have bases in the South China Sea and in the Gulf of Thailand, while the United States, after having used for too long an appeasement tactic, wanted to stop the Japanese advance in the area. In July 1941 the Japanese signed an agreement with Vichy France that granted the Empire of the Rising Sun with the permission to use some strategic bases in Indochina, and as a response, the United States froze Japanese assets (26th July 1941) and established an Oil and Gasoline embargo on Japan (1st August). The Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe (1891-1945) tried to restore diplomatic and economic relations with the US, unsuccessfully. His government was then replaced in October by General Hideki Tōjō (1884- 1948), who was more prone to a war against the United States. The Japanese war machine (and civilian economy as well) needed Oil. And, if Japan could not get it with trade, they would have to get it by force.

The Japanese plans

In June 1941 however, the Japanese had another big problem to deal with, namely, Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union,

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that started on the 22nd. The Germans asked the Japanese to break the non-aggression pact with the Soviets and attack the Russian bear from the east. The Japanese however refused, as that would have created more international tensions (possibly even drawing the United States or Great Britain to declare war against the Japanese) without giving them more resources. Instead, a similar plan would have drawn away even more resources! It should also be kept in mind that the eastern part of the Soviet Union (especially Siberia) were not suitable for mass offensives, for obvious logistical problems. And the war would probably have not been a quick one, and Japan supposed that they had less than two year worth of fuel before their war machine would stop. So, as for the time being, the Japanese would not attack the Soviet Union. Instead, the Japanese were planning an attack south, towards the South Pacific Area. The Japanese plan, for the Army, was simple as the Nanshu hokushin (Defence in the South, Advance in the North)1 and would be divided in two phases: - Phase One was to invade, with around 400’000 troops, all the main objectives in the south, in order to create a fortress that would prove to be too costly, both in terms of manpower, resources and time to break in. This concept could be described as one of an “unsinkable ”. - Phase Two, that was to be completed by spring 19422, was the removal of around half of the troops assigned before in order to send them back to the border with the Soviet Union and as reinforcements for the China Campaign. It is not clear what type of operations were planned against the Soviet Union. However, two options could be defined as “possible”: Option number One, would be the strike towards Lake Baikal. Option number Two, would be a simple build-up of forces to discourage a Soviet attack.

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The Japanese Army was worried, in fact, that the Soviet Union would mobilize its forces or, more possibly, that the Soviet Union and the United States could stipulate an agreement that would give the possibility, to the United States forces, to use bases in the Far East of the Soviet Union. The Japanese Army was not worried about the possible United States offensive in the Pacific Area, as the job of defeating the US forces would fall on the Japanese Navy. This defeat would come from a decisive naval victory against the United States, as this was the core of the Kentai Kessen Doctrine (Naval Fleet Decisive Battle).

The Kentai Kessen Doctrine was, at its core, the idea that a war could be won, either in its entirety by defeating the enemy in such a big way that the enemy would be forced to make peace as it would be unable to continue their military campaign (similar to what happened after the Battle of Tsushima) or either by “freeing up” the seas in the zone of interest of Japan in such a way that future ground and naval operation could be done without the worry of enemy naval activities (similar to what happened in the First Sino-Japanese War). For the Empire of the Rising Sun, this decisive battle should have been a surprise attack against their enemy (in this case, the United States), in order to negate the disadvantages of inferior (quantitively speaking) forces and inferior industrial output, that is translated in the number of ships that could be built and maintained. In case a surprise first strike could not be achieved, or after it had been achieved in case it was not the wanted success (note: with “wanted success” we now indicate a victory that would force the enemy to the negotiation table), the Navy should do its best to create in the enemy ranks “attritional losses”, with small engagements (especially at night and with small fleets) in order to “level the fight”, and to give the Navy the possibility to take the enemy fleet in a decisive battle head on. This doctrine shaped the development of the Japanese Navy at first with the focus on fast ships (especially cruisers), torpedo attacks (at first from and cruisers, later also with planes) and night fighting.

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Later, the development of technology gave life to new possible additions to the attritional side of the Doctrine, such as submarines at first and, later, airplanes and aircraft carriers. This Doctrine therefore, was the result of the combination of the previous naval experiences of Japan with its industrial capabilities and the enemy’s ones. The organizational structure of the Japanese Navy was also tailored for this Doctrine. The main force of the Navy was the Combined Fleet that had, in its subordinated units, almost all major Fleets of the IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy). The most famous of these fleets was the 1st Air Fleet, also known as the Kidō Butai (“Mobile Force”). This Fleet was composed by Carrier Divisions (each usually composed of two aircraft carriers) and by their escort units. The Kidō Butai would play a major role in the Second World War, being engaged in all the major naval battles of the first part of the conflict. While the Kidō Butai and other major Fleets (those were composed by Battleships and Battlecruisers) would try to engage the enemy navy in a decisive battle, the job to create attritional losses felt on three groups of units: First, on small Cruisers and Destroyers formations. Second, on Submarines. Japanese underwater vessels were designed to be “Fleet Submarines” and had the role to move with the main Fleets (hence the name “Fleet Submarine”) and reduce the enemy formations before the fight. Third, on airplanes. It should be interesting to note that these three groups had one element in common, torpedoes. And since the Japanese Doctrine put a lot of emphasis on the reduction of enemy forces before the major engagement, it comes to no surprise that the Japanese employed a lot of resources in upgrading their torpedoes. The Japanese main torpedo for surface forces, the 610mm Sanso gyorai (Oxygen torpedo), better known as the Type 93 torpedo, that could be considered the best in the world at its time.

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The Japanese torpedoes were superior in range, speed, warhead size and, at least in the first part of the war, reliability compared to American torpedoes. These all come down, again, to the requirement of a weapon capable of giving a small unit (such as Destroyers and Cruisers) the capability of crippling, if not even sinking, enemy major units. The Japanese Submarines were equipped with a smaller version of that torpedo, the Type 95 (533mm), that was the fastest torpedo in the world and had the second largest warhead of any torpedo of that time, second only to its “bigger brother”, the Type 93. The Japanese planes used the Type 91 torpedo, and it too was very advanced compared to foreign counterparts. The objective of these attritional losses (from planes and submarines) were to disable or sink around 1/5th of the enemy fleet. Before the decisive battle would take place, in order to give the main force better chances against a superior (in terms of quantity and, in some field, quality) enemy, the small forces (Cruisers and Destroyers) would have to do their job in reducing the enemy ranks in order to, if possible, even give the Japanese a quantitative superiority in the fight.

The American plans

The American Navy in the meantime, had a similar plan, War Plan Orange. It was divided in three phases: Phase One was about the first part of the conflict, and the focus was on how to defend the United States and its territories. Phase Two was about defeating the Japanese in a major battle. Phase Three was about how to convince the Japanese to surrender. The first of these problems (Phase One) was solved around 1912. As the Pacific ocean is the biggest in the world, it would pose a major obstacle to both navies, the Japanese and the American ones. No ships at that time had the range to reach, literally, the other side of the ocean, and there was the chance that the element of surprise would be lost

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as ships would travel at slow speeds (both to conserve fuel and to keep in formation with slower ships, like Fleet Oilers) and therefore would run the risk of being spotted. Phase Three was basically understood by 1929. It called for a naval blockade to starve the Japanese economy and, thanks to technological developments in airplane designs, it now became possible to have aerial bombardment of Japan’s territories, that could damage the industrial capacity of the enemy nation. It should be noted that the 1920’s were also the period in which the theory of Strategic Bombing was starting to take ground with the idea that aerial power could, alone, win wars. And, in case that aerial power could not win the war alone, it could surely shorten it. The problem for the Americans was understanding what to do in Phase Two. The main school of thought about Phase Two were, mainly, the “thrusters” and the “cautionaries”. The “thrusters” were advocating for a rush towards the Japanese waters (most probably to defend the Philippines, in case of Japanese aggression) in order to have a decisive battle there. The “cautionaries” on the other hand, were advocating for a campaign of island-hopping, in which the war would be done slowly by small advances from island to island, consolidating the gains after every successful invasion, and building up logistical capabilities for further operations. There was, at first (from 1906 up until 1922) another school of thought, the one of the “western arsenal”, that advocated for the construction of forward bases, with the idea of copying the British model of having territories that projected power abroad, like Gibraltar, Hong-Kong or Singapore. In fact, the other name of this school of thought was, unsurprisingly, “Pacific Gibraltar”. The American Navy wargaming of plans against Japan started in 1906, after the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated that the Empire of the Rising Sun was a capable foe, and after some issues regarding immigration around the

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1906-1907 period. At first, the two main school of thoughts were the “thrusters” and the “western arsenal” ones. The “cautionaries” idea was not popular, in the Navy’s High Command, because there were no Japanese possessions available to conquer, so there was no possibility of doing island-hopping campaigns. This of course changed after the First World War, as Japan took control over the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands and the Mariana Islands (except Guam). At the same time, the Washington Naval Treaty sank the “Western Arsenal” idea, because it forbid the upgrading of fortresses in the Pacific. So, after 1922, only the “thrusters” and the “cautionaries” remained. The problem for the “thrusters” was, unsurprisingly, logistics. The fleets would have to carry with them their own supplies and, in case supplying the fleets from bases was not possible, they had to have, in the formations, supply ships as they had to cross the entire Pacific Ocean. And, the Americans had the problem of where the refuelling points would be. At first the idea fell on the Philippines, but soon it was acknowledged that those were in range of Japanese planes, so the refuelling points were moved elsewhere. As time moved on, and as airplanes become more advanced, the idea of a big thrust towards Japan slowly started to fell out of support in the Navy. In fact, the American wargames were showing, as the years went forward, an increase in attritional losses caused by enemy submarines, airplanes and small fleets. In the end, the main problem for the “thruster” school of thought were attritional losses, rather than logistics, as technological advancements (such as oil firing engines) improved the logistical side of the plan (such as the creation of Fleet Oilers). In the end, the Unites States would go with an island hopping campaign, also in order to defeat the various “unsinkable carriers” islands that the Japanese would create in the first months of the conflict. Between 1919 and 1941, the conducted 318 war games, mainly against Great Britain (War Plan Red), Japan (War Plan Orange) and

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Germany (War Plan Black). Most of the war games against Great Britain and Germany were tactical wargames (such as “convoy problems”, “defence against aircrafts” or “mine employment”), while most of the strategic wargames were fought against Japan. The high number of wargames may impress someone, but it should be noted that the activity of “playing warfare” was done as a training exercise for future officers, and was part of curriculum activities.

The path of war

In September 1939, the Second World War started in Europe, when Germany invaded Poland. The United States started gradually getting involved in helping the Allied nations, especially after France was defeated in May and June 1940. In spring 1940, the Americans brought forward their main naval base from mainland USA to the Hawaii. The Americans were also restarting the to re-arm themselves, as the United States sleeping giant was awakening. Also, the USA started to rebuild and upgrade fortifications their Pacific territories, after Japan had denounced the Washington Naval Treaty. On the Naval Side, the Americans had started getting involved in the supply of the British Empire of war material, with the Lend-Lease Act, and some of the US Navy assets would be occupied in escort duties, while the US Merchant Marine was involved in the transportation of material. On the 2nd of September 1940, the United States signed the Destroyers for Bases deal, in which the US gave to the British Empire fifty destroyers in exchange of land rights in some British possessions. While these ships were all outdated, being all of them WW1-era ships, those vessels were badly needed by the Royal Navy (that received forty- three ships) and the Royal Canadian Navy (that received seven ships) in order to escort the convoys against the U-Boot (submarine) threat from Germany.

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The British Empire, on its part, also started reinforcing the soon-to-become Pacific Front, with the HMS Prince of Wales (Battleship) and the HMS Repulse (Battlecruiser). The Americans knew that, in case of war, they would be involved. They recognized that the Japanese were aiming at the resource-rich South China Sea area and the Siam Gulf. And they also recognized that, if Japan attacked south, they would also attack the Philippines in order to secure their flank against the risk of American airpower hitting Japanese supply lines of badly needed natural resources. On the 27th of November 1941, the United States sent a note to all its Pacific bases that war was likely. This was not a mobilization, but rather an invitation to remain on alert, and this notification was primarily directed to the Philippines. Could the war, that now was looming above the head of millions of Americans, Japanese and all of those who lived in the Pacific Area, have been avoided?

Diplomacy fails

Both nations knew that war was near and, through diplomacy, they tried to settle down the disputes that caused the tensions to rise in the first place. Japan proposed to remove its troops from part of French Indochina in exchange of the unfreezing of their credits, that would give them the possibility to acquire Oil and other resources. Japan also asked the Americans to stop aiding the Chinese, as the USA was giving them resources to continue the fight against the Japanese. Japanese Admiral Saburo Nomura gave this note on the 21st of November, to the American Secretary of State Cordell . The American response on the 26th, however, was negative. The USA wanted that Japan would leave completely French Indochina, and would stop their attack against China. This was the reason for the memorandum, on the 27th, to all US bases in the

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Far East and, generally, in the Pacific. The Americans, having captured the Japanese cipher code in May 1940 from a dead Naval Captain after his ship sunk, were able to decipher that the Japanese ambassadors were on the verge of closing relations with the US. The Japanese ambassadors received instructions to give the declaration of war on the 7th of December at 13:00, as this would be 7:30 AM at Hawaii. This timing was deliberate, as this was twenty minutes before the Japanese planes of the 1st Air Fleet would attack Pearl Harbour. Because of a delay however, the declaration was delivered at 14:20.

The 1st Air Fleet on the move

As seen before, the Japanese doctrine required that the enemy fleets had to be reduced before the decisive engagement. What better chance of doing this, then when the enemy is in port? If the enemy is at sea, they are probably on alert, while if they are in port, there is a chance to caught them off guard. Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was the master mind behind the idea of the attack. The plan was to send the 1st Air Fleet, escorted by other ships and preceded by submarines with the role of scouts, to attack the American bases in Hawaii. The main objective was the destruction of the enemy fleet, especially its carriers, while the secondary target were the American airfields and the port facilities. The Japanese forces, grouped in the Bay of Tankan on the 22nd of November. That Bay was chosen as it was not much populated, especially it was not populated by foreigners, so the risk of someone discovering the Fleet was small. This was also minimalized by the fact that the radio operators of every ship were left at the base in Kure, to give the impression that the Fleet was still

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there. The Japanese had thirty-one ships, of which: - Six aircraft carriers (with 392 planes). - Two battleships. - Two heavy cruisers. - One . - Eleven destroyers. - Eight supply ships. In addition, the force was also composed of 31 submarines. At 6:00 AM on the 26th, the fleet departed towards its objective. The submarines, who had departed hours before, were kept as a screen of the fleet and as a forward recon unit. As some Japanese vessels (especially the escorts) had not the range required for the operation, in the eight supply ships, some were fleet tankers, with the task of refuelling at sea. Because of the rough seas, the refuelling operation on the 28th was aborted, and was retried, with better results, on the 30th. On the 2nd of December, the Fleet received the Japanese coded message that indicated that diplomacy had failed and that the attack of Pearl Harbour had green light: Niitaka Yama Nobore (Climb Mount Niitaka). Japanese aircrews, most of whom were at the obscure of their target, immediately went to work in training on the enemy targets and checking their objectives. On the 5th and 6th of December, the Fleet refuelled for the last time, and the tankers were sent home. The Empire had, on Hawaii, a big net of spies, who could inform the nation of the enemy activities. While the reports were mainly positive, as those indicated that the enemy was probably not expecting anything, as there were no anti-raid precautions taken, there was also a bad news. The main target for the operation, the Americans aircraft carriers, were not there. However, the attack would still be done. At 6:00 AM on the 7th of December, from a position 230 north-east of

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Oahu, the first planes departed from their floating home.

The Japanese Katana

Before talking about the Raid on Pearl Harbour, it is worth to discuss on the Japanese aircrafts, as this topic contains relevant information that are useful to keep in mind during the fight near Papua New Guinea. By the late autumn of 1941, the Japanese naval air arm constituted the most potent offensive force of any of the three major navies. At this point, the navy's combat aircraft were among the world's finest and, with important exceptions, could generally fly faster and farther and could outperform their American counterparts.3 The Japanese naval air arm was composed of three main aircraft, those being the Mitsubishi A6M “Zero”, the “Kate” and the “Val”.1A The fighter role was fulfilled by the A6M, probably one of the very best naval planes in the world in 1941. The A6M was introduced in 1940 and would serve Imperial Japan for the whole war, with more than ten thousand planes produced of the various variants combined. This plane has, as advantages, its great range (around one thousand nautical miles, or 1870 km), its great manoeuvrability and a good climb rate (around 15.7 m/s). It was armed with two 20mm Type 99-1 Mk.3 cannons and two 7.7mm Type 97 aircraft machine guns. While the aircraft armament was good, as the two 20mm were able to inflict a lot of damage to enemy air and ground targets, it had a huge problem, and that was the low ammo count, with just a total of 120 rounds for the 20mm and 1000 rounds for the 7.7, in the version A6M2. This gave the plane just under seven second of cannon fire and around fifty second of fire (being the guns synchronized with the propeller, there is no exact data). Later versions, such as the A6M3 gave the Zero more cannon ammunition,

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200 in total for the A6M3 for example. In contrast, the American F4F Wildcat (used by the US Navy), that had four 12.7mm Machine Guns, had around 30/36 seconds of fire. Another prominent American-built fighter, the P-40E Warhawk, had six 12.7mm Machine Guns with 1410 rounds of ammunition each, that gave the P-40E around 18 seconds of fire. The P-40E had also a modification that gave the pilot a total of 1686 rounds, divided in 312, 291 and 240 rounds for each couple of guns, from outer to inner. This gave the pilot around 22 seconds of fire. As the Japanese 7.7mm machine guns soon become almost useless in air- to-air combat, as the damage from a rifle calibre bullet is not big, the “only” weapon of the A6M soon became the 20mm cannons, and the Japanese plane had a very limited amount of ammunition for those. It is important to note that the A6M was developed from actual combat experience in China. To give an example, the A6M extreme range was required as, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japanese bombers would usually be escorted for a small part of the trip, and when the escorting planes left the bombers, those would be attacked by Chinese planes and, later, by pilots from the First American Volunteer Group (AVG, also known as the Flying Tigers). The A6M had great advantages, these could be achieved only by accepting heavy disadvantages. The main problem of the Zero was the lack of armour. While almost all the planes had a very thin skin, some had some armour protecting the engine and the pilot (the two most important component of the plane), with some planes even having reinforced glass to protect the cockpit, the Japanese machines had no armour whatsoever. The A6Ms also lacked self-sealing fuel tanks, that are fuel tanks designed with layers that, upon contact with the fuel (as that indicates that the tank has been pierced), they expand, thus closing the damaged point. The lack of self-sealing fuel tanks was not a problem that could be found only on the A6M, but also on other Japanese planes, and this made them very vulnerable to enemy fire.

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Another important plane of the Imperial Japanese Navy air arm was the Aichi D3A “Val”. This was a fixed-gear, dive bomber, that could be equipped with a 250 kg bomb under the fuselage and two 60 kg bombs under the wings. It was a good plane, but it also had major flaws, especially about survivability. The Val had also the problem of its light bomb load, that was inferior to the American counterpart (the SBD Dauntless, that could carry one 454 kg bomb under the fuselage and two 45 kg bombs under the wings). The last major plane of the Empire of the Rising Sun was the Nakajima B5N “Kate”. The Kate had the similar problems of the other Japanese planes (no armour), but at the same time it had an ace card on its side, the torpedo. As seen before, the Type 91 torpedo was superior to the Allied counterparts. At the same time, the very nature of torpedo attacks, meant that the plane would fly very low at (relative) low speeds, making it vulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft fire. The B5N could also be utilized in level bombing attacks, as it could carry one 800 kg bombs or two 250 kg bombs or six 60 kg bombs. It should be noted that, while the Imperial Japanese Navy air arm was very successful (in the first part of the war) because of its planes, this was also because of very talented (and experienced) pilots and also because of solid tactics. Regarding training, Japanese pilots and observers had not only high flight hours rate (around 800 hours of flight each), but also combat experience in China against inferior Soviet-built planes. This created a sort of “safe environment” in which Japanese pilots could be trained with real combat sorties. From summer 1937, in fact, pilots were rotated to China in order to have actual combat experience as part of their education. By 1941, in training and experience, Japan's naval aviators, were undoubtedly the best among the world's three carrier forces. For the first six months of the Pacific War Japan ese naval pilots fought and flew

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supremely, jinking about the skies over Southeast Asia and the western Pacific and using their Zeros like rapiers against less experienced Allied airmen flying inferior aircraft4. It should also be noted that not only Allied pilots had, in general, less flight hours compared to the Japanese (around 200-300 hours for the Americans, brought up in late 1941 to 350/400 hours, compared to the 600-800 of the Japanese, of which around half were combat flight hours) and no combat experience (except the pilots of the AVG), but the American pilots were trained in all planes and not only on fighters. This would mean that the already relative low number of flight hours were partially spent on dive and torpedo bombers, making them a sort of “jack- of-all-trades” type of pilots5. This procedure was abolished in September 1941, just before the US entered the war. The Japanese however had a major flow in their pilot school training system, as it had requirements too high, as they focused only on quality and not quantity. The result was that pilots in the early part of the war were excellent, yet when attrition started to arrive, and losses started to rise, the quality was highly impacted, as the Japnese recruits would have less flight time than the American counterparts. Also, the Americans frequently rotated their pilots to training duties, as trainers, after some time at the front, something the Japanese did not do. This meant that the Japanese had problems replacing their aces as losses rose due to air attrition. One major problem in Japanese air craft manufacture as a whole was the failure of Japanese industry to keep up with the West in the development of aircraft engines, a consequence of the inaccessibility of strategic alloys, an insufficient research and development base in Japan, and the pressures of wartime replacement needs. Japan's failure to keep up was, at all events, a major reason for the increasing losses of Japanese naval aircraft in combat with American air forces as the Pacific War progressed. Another major problem in the design of Japanese naval aircraft was the imbalance between offensive and defensive considerations. Essentially, of course,

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naval aviation is an offensive force. But the design and construction of most Japanese naval aircraft were so shaped by offensive considerations-speed, manoeuvrability, and range-that they lacked all but the most minimal defensive protection. Their deficiencies of armour, defensive armament, self-sealing gas tanks, and the like, became apparent as they met their sturdier American competitors in the Pacific. The result was that air crews began to suffer huge losses. If the Japanese navy had been able to draw upon a sizable manpower pool, this would have been a manageable wartime problem. But Japanese naval air officials sharply limited the number of personnel by enforcing high admission standards for air crews, particularly for pilots. In combination, the vulnerability of Japanese naval aircraft and the limited number of trained air crews had fatal consequences during the Pacific War6. The Japanese basic formation, the Shōtai (“Section”), that was composed of three planes. The formation immediately above was the Chūtai (“Division”), that was composed of two or three Shōtai, thus being composed of six to nine planes. The planes in a Shōtai would fly, as standard practice, at different heights in order to have better field of view and, therefore, more situational awareness. The Japanese attack aircraft (either bombers or torpedo-bombers) would also use the Shōtai-Chūtai organization. In order to hit enemy sea targets, the Japanese had three possibilities, level bombing, torpedo strikes or dive bombing. The first two would be done by the B5Ns. Level bombing could be done at high altitude (at around 3’000 meters, or 10’000 feet) or at low altitude (at around 600 meters, or 2’000 feet). Torpedo strikes would be done at an altitude of 5-50 meters (16 – 160 feet) and the enemy vessel would be targeted by different angles. For example, one Shōtai could attack from starboard, one from port and one from the front. In a similar attack, any evasive manoeuvre from the enemy vessel would, technically, make them susceptible to the other angle of attacks, thus (in theory) securing at least one hit.

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The distance at which the torpedo would be drop was around 800-1’200 meters, or 2’600-4’000 feet. Dive bombers attack would be done by the D3As, and were composed of two phases. First phase, the approach to target, would start at 3’600-3’000 meters (12’000-10’000 feet) and would be a shallow dive, from 20° to 30°. At approximately 1’500 meters (4’900 feet), almost over the enemy ship, the planes would start the attack run and dive down at around 60° to hit the enemy ship. The dive bombers would, like the torpedo bombers, attack from different angles in order to maximise their chances of hitting the enemy ship, as well as diverting enemy anti-aircraft fire. The bombs would be dropped at around 600 meters (2’000 feet)7. Dive bombers had two main type of bombs, either a semi-AP (Armour Piercing) or an high explosive bomb. The high explosive bomb (Type 99 No.25 bomb) would be used to supress the enemy anti-aircraft defences, by inflicting casualties to the personnel manning the anti-aircraft guns and by starting fires. The fires would have the additional benefit of rendering difficult, if not even impossible, the “air operations” in case the enemy ship hit was a carrier, as it could then not launch and not recover airplanes. As the suppression of the enemy anti-aircraft guns was a very important objective to achieve in order to render the enemy ship less capable to defend herself, the planes that, in theory, would attack first would be equipped with this bomb. The Semi-Armour Piercing bomb (Type 98 No.25 bomb) would then be used to hit the enemy ships and sink them. This bomb was, in fact, able to penetrate trough the enemy decks and could cause, during the explosion, internal fires, flooding and even magazine explosions. The Japanese Navy air service had also a major advantage against the United States Navy, namely, coordination. While the US main force was a “Task Force” centred around a single carrier, the Japanese has their carriers work in pairs (two carriers composed a

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“Carrier Division”). During Multi-Divisional Carrier attacks (such as Pearl Harbour), each Division would launch a single type of bomber (one division torpedo bomber, with torpedoes or bombs, while the other would launch dive bombers) and, if following attacks would be done, the divisions would swap up the planes launched, as those who launched dive bombers would launch torpedo/level bombers and vice versa. Fighters would be provided by both divisions. This coordination gave the Japanese a clear advantage when conducting operations as they would engage single task-Forces or, if the enemy had more carriers, they would face strikes that would, probably, not be very coordinated. It should be noted that the high altitude level bombers were almost useless against moving targets, so those were used in port strikes (most famously, in the Pearl Harbour raid). The B5Ns used in the attack on Pearl Harbour were armed with a special designed bomb, the 744 kg (1’640 lb) Type 99 No.80 Armour Piercing bomb. This was a converted 40cm projectile that enabled the bomb to penetrate around 150mm of armour. The composition of the first wave during the attack on Pearl Harbour was as follows: - 50 B5N for level bombing (of which, one failed to launch) - 40 B5N for torpedo attacks - 54 D3A for dive bombing (of which, three failed to launch) - 45 A6M for escort and strafing runs (of which, two failed to launch) In the first wave, the B5Ns were launched by the First Carrier Division (Akagi, Kaga) and Second Carrier Division (Sōryū, Hiryū), while the D3As were launched by the Fifth Carrier Division (Shōkaku, Zuikaku). All six carriers contributed with A6Ms.

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The Katana beheads the American Fleet

A short time after the first planes had departed, 183 planes were flying towards Pearl Harbour. At the same time, five Japanese Midget Submarines, that had detached from their “mother submarine”, were going towards their attack positions. However, at 3:42 AM a young officer on board of the USS Condor (AMc-14) spotted the reflection of something in the waves, and upon investigation, he deduced it was the periscope of a submarine. At 3:58 AM the USS Condor informed the USS Ward (DD-139), commanded by Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) William W. Outerbridge. The USS Ward rushed to the area but was unable to make contact with the submarine and, at 4:43 AM, it stopped searching. In the meantime, the defensive nets were opened to allow the USS Crossbill (AMc-9) to enter the port area, as it had ended its turn and, at 5:52 AM, the USS Condor returned to port as well. As the fleet tug USS Keosanqua (AT- 38) was on route and had to cross the nets at 6:15 AM, the nets were left open, and this would prove to be a mistake. The tug had been sent to help the “general stores issue ship” (miscellaneous auxiliary) USS Antares (AG-10) as it was towing a barge and the tug would have undertook the towing operation freeing up the Antares to dock at Pearl. At 6:33 AM the crew of a flying boat PBY Catalina, while on patrol, spotted something in the water and started dropping smoke flares, as they thought it was an American submarine having problems, and those flares would make the rescue effort easier. Suddenly, also the look-outs on board of the Antares, while searching for the tug, spotted a suspicious object at around 1’400 meters to the starboard, and the auxiliary notified the USS Ward at around 6:40. The USS Ward’s crew identified the conning tower of a small submarine near the Antares. At 6:45 AM the USS Ward opened fire with one of her deck gun and started dropping depth charges. In the meantime, the crew on the Catalina started dropping depth charges

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as well. At 6:53 AM the USS Ward sent a coded message indicating was happening, and a minute later the enemy submarine was sunk. The two crew members of the submarine were the first Japanese casualties caused by Americans in the second world war. At 7:00 AM a Catalina reported that it had sunk a submarine 1 off the entrance of Pearl Harbour. Due to communication delays, something that would haunt Allied operations for a good part of the early war period, the message from USS Ward was received by Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch (commander of the 14th Naval District, Territory of Hawaii) only at 7:12 AM. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (commander of the US Pacific Fleet) was informed at around 7:51, as the destroyer USS Monaghan (DD-354) was ordered to join the USS Ward in the operation. Minutes later, the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbour commenced. It should be said that the events concerning the USS Condor, USS Ward and USS Monaghan were not the only ones that indicated that something was, probably, happening. At 6:45 AM a radar station on the northern part of Oahu, at Opana Point, spotted that unknown planes were advancing towards the island. The radar operators (Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard) tried to inform their superior (Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler), however they were told that it was probably nothing, as the officer presumed that those contact were a flight of twelve B-17s scheduled to arrive from . At 7:06 they phoned again, but with the same result, so the two privates understood that it was useless to insist. In the meantime, the unknown “blip” on the radar screen was getting closer. At 7:35 the Japanese pilots break radio silence. “TO! TO! TO!” (Abbreviation of totsugekiseyo, “Charge!”). At 7:40 AM, the commander of the Japanese air group (Captain Mitsuo Fuchida) gave the order to start the attack. At 7:53, Captain Fuchida gave the famous order “Tora! Tora! Tora!” (Tora could be translated in “Tiger”).

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In that exact moment, all the planes on the various formation broke off and started their attack runs. The Japanese were now attacking. Not only the harbour, but also airfields and military installations. At 7:55 AM, on the American battleships, the crews were getting ready for the rising of the flag with the band playing the hymn. Nobody on board the ships was expecting what was coming. Bomb start to fall on Pearl Harbour, Ford Island, Wheeler Airfield, Ewa, Kaneohe and Hickam. The American planes aligned on the runways, placed there, all near each other, in order to avoid sabotages (deemed the highest threat to the US Bases due to the high percentage of Japanese immigrants on the island), were shattered in an instant. Confusion starts to rise in both military personnel and civilians, as the air raid sirens start to make their very distinct sound. The Japanese had chosen to attack on Sunday morning also for this reason, as they knew that the crews would be resting and, some of the American personnel, had spent the night in the various clubs on the island. In “Cruiser Row” (a place just north-west of Ford Island, in Pearl Harbour), the light cruiser USS Raleigh (CL-7) is the first one to be attacked, and she is hit by a torpedo. Most of the American ships go in General Quarters mode (that indicated that the crew must go to their combat stations), but the reaction is slow, because of the general layout of the American style of “General Quarters” and because some of the ammunition supplies are locked. In the meantime, the Japanese planes (especially fighters) are strafing the ships, killing and wounding a lot of soldiers on deck, as the crews are trying to man the various anti-aircraft guns and those could be a threat to the Japanese bombers. The minesweeper USS Avocet (AVP-4), the cruiser- USS Oglala (CM-4) and the destroyer USS Tucker (DD-374) were probably the first ships to open fire against the Japanese attackers. The Battleship USS Utah (BB-31), that had been converted to a target ship (taking the designation AG-16) was hit by two torpedoes and started

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sinking. The ship would roll over at 8:12, and with her, 58 officers and men died. USS Arizona (BB-39) is hit by several torpedoes, but the ship’s crew is able to shoot down a Japanese plane. USS Oklahoma (BB-37) is struck by three torpedoes on the port side and starts to list. USS West Virginia (BB-48) is hit by two torpedoes and then by a third, as the ship starts to list and the scout plane on the ship (an OS2U Kingfisher floatplane) gets damaged and catches fire, as the ship suffers some explosions. At 8:00 AM Admiral Kimmel transmitted the famous message “Air Raid on Pearl Harbour, this is not a drill”. The cruiser Raleigh took such a list to port that it appeared she might capsize and the crew jettisoned topside weight to keep her upright, as the gunners start to fight back. USS Oglala and USS Helena (CL-50) are hit simultaneously by a torpedo each. The destroyer USS Helm (DD-388), that had just departed her docking position as the attack started, was slightly damaged by two near bomb miss, and she was strafed. The DD was able to shoot down at least one enemy plane. USS Nevada (BB-36) is also able to shoot down an torpedo bomber, but its “fish” was already in the water and was able to hit the battleship. At 8:04 AM the level bombers dropped their bombs. USS California (BB-44) was hit simultaneously by two torpedoes, and the damage was enormous, also because many of the portholes and exterior doors had been left open for an inspection, and this eased the entry of water. As the Japanese torpedo attack is coming to an end, the level bombers are almost on target. USS West Virginia takes two bomb hits and starts to suffer from internal explosions as one of the bombs have set up the ammunition of the secondary guns of the ship. The USS Vestal (AR-4) takes two bombs, one set the forward

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magazine on fire (and this required flooding to stop the fires and, as the temperature of the fires was very high, to avoid the structure from rapturing) and the other exited the hull from the bottom, after passing through the fuel and oil tanks. The fuel and oil from Vestal leaks into the sea, and it catches fire, as did the oil from other ships (such as the oil for the seaplanes), making the sea near the battleship a burning inferno. Then, amidst the dozen of bombs falling on “” (a place just south-east of Ford Island, in Pearl Harbour, where the battleships were at anchor), one penetrates USS Arizona near number two turret. Seconds later, it explodes, and with it, the ammunition magazine of the turret. The ship is literally cut in half and the superstructure collapses, while most of the interior of forward part the ship is destroyed. The fires caused by the explosion would burn for two entire days, and more than a thousand men die in an instant. The concussion literally cleared Vestal’s deck and some of the crew, including Captain Cassin Young, are thrown into the water. At the same time, the explosion on the Arizona had ruptured the battleship fuel tanks, and fires started on the Vestal. The Captain of the repair ship is able to get his ship underway (as his crew was already getting ready to have the ship moving, thanks to an order of one of his subordinates), and the ship would later beach itself in Aiea Bay. The fleet oiler USS Neosho (AO-23) starts to move away from the area, as it was parked just south-west of Battleship Row, near the fuel depots in Ford Island, and the ship was full of fuel. USS California was hit by another torpedo, that ruptured the forward fuel tanks, and the power system was contaminated, and the ship had now no chance of moving away. USS Oklahoma’s list is getting worst by the minute, and minutes past 8:10 it capsizes, with more than four hundred of her crew trapped inside, in pitch black rooms that are starting to fill with water. At 8:12, USS Utah rolls over on her side. At 8:17 AM, the destroyer USS Helm (DD-388) spots a Japanese midget

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submarine and shoots at hit but misses. The Battleship USS Tennessee (BB-43) is hit by two bombs by level bombers, one hits turret No.3 but fails to explode, while the other exploded as it hit the central gun barrel in turret number two, and the debris caused by the explosion fly everywhere, and one of these kills the captain of the West Virginia (Captain Mervyn S. Bennion) who was on his ship’s bridge. Two P-40s take off from Haleiwa Airfield, even if some of their guns are not working properly. In the meantime, some planes of the carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) were attacked by Japanese planes. The American carrier, that was scheduled to arrive at Pearl Harbour at 7:30 AM but was delayed by bad weather, had launched 18 of her SBDs to scout near the ship and then land at Ford Island. As those planes were near Pearl Harbour, they found themselves under attack by Japanese fighters and by American anti-aircraft guns. Seven of those planes were shot down, with the loss of eight airmen killed and two wounded. At 8:17 Admiral Kimmel gives the order to find and destroy the enemy’s fleet, wherever it may be. The B-17s scheduled to arrive from California start to arrive in piecemeal order (they were not flying in formation) and they find Hickam Field’s runway and facilities filled with debris and burning. Wheeler field (airbase) is devastated, as well as Ewa Marine Air Station, that loses 33 of the 51 planes there (including nine of the eleven F4F fighters). The Japanese lose on Ewa just one dive bomber and three Zeroes. Kanehoe Bay Naval Air Station (where the flying boats PBY Catalina were stationed) loses a lot of planes as well. One B-17 is under attack as it tries to land at Hickam field, but it is able to land safely. The two P-40s that took off from Haleiwa Airfield, piloted by K.M. Taylor and G.S. Welch arrive over Ewa and intercept a dozen Japanese planes and are able to shoot down one Val each on the first pass (although it is reported that the plane claimed by Welch would later land on its carrier).

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USS Maryland (BB-46), that was now defended by both her crew and some survivors from Oklahoma, that managed to climb on the Maryland to assist with AA gunnery, is hit by two bombs, that caused flooding. After the attack, the Maryland’s fire-fighting parties would sent to help the other battleships, and would be especially used to try and save survivors trapped in USS Oklahoma. As time moves on however, the number of Japanese planes in the sky starts to diminish, having those expended their ammunition and released their payloads. All the battleships have been at least damaged, and most of the airfields have been incapacitated, for the loss of just nine planes (3x A6Ms, 1x D3A, 5x B5Ns). But this is not the end, as the Japanese have prepared and already launched a second wave at 7:25 AM, composed of 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As and 36 A6Ms. 3x D3As and 1x A6M failed to launch and had to abort their flight.. The Americans have the feeling that the Japanese would come with another wave, and they frantically work to free the airfields from debris and prepare the anti-aircraft defences that were not yet activated. The two P-40s pilots (Taylor and Welch) land at Wheeler in order to replenish ammunitions, especially for the 12.7mm machine guns (the P-40B had two 12.7mm machine guns in the nose and four 7.62 machine guns in the wings), as when they took off, they had only 7.62mm ammo. At 8:36 the USS Curtiss (AV-4) spotted a Japanese submarine and opened fire. The midget submarine answered with a torpedo, but missed. Four minutes later the submarine would be sank by the destroyer USS Monaghan that, because of the explosion from the drop charges, she was lifted partially out of the water, losing control and crashing into a barge. As the first wave’s planes were returning to their carriers, the planes of the second wave (led by Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki) started to arrive. The plane of the first wave’s commander (Captain Mitsuo Fuchida) remained over the area to give instructions to their colleagues of the second wave.

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The second attack would have a different composition and role than the first one, with no torpedo bombers and more dive bombers. This was because torpedo bombers were very vulnerable during their attack runs, because of the low speed and altitude at which they could launch their torpedoes. In fact, even if the torpedo-armed B5Ns were the first ones to attack in the first wave, they still suffered most of the losses of the first wave. At Battleship Row, USS Neosho and USS Nevada have enough steam to move out of their moorings, while firing AA guns in the process. The hospital ship USS Solace (AH-5) is moving, after she had launched her motor boats that had been sent to help the battleship’s crews. A member of her crew (Army medical doctor Eric Haakenson) was able to film the exact moment when Arizona exploded. The hospital ship would later be spared by the Japanese, that honoured the Geneva convention and did not shoot at the clearly red-cross-marked ship. In the meantime, the seaplane tender USS Tangier (AV-8) fired at a Japanese midget submarine that had entered the harbour, claiming at least one hit. Of the five Japanese midget submarine launched, four would later be sank and one (HA.19) would beach itself and one of his two-man crew (Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki) would be the first Japanese prisoner of war for the USA. Destroyers USS Farragut (DD-348) and USS Henley (DD-391) are starting to move, as well as the destroyer USS Mugford (DD-389), that was moored for repairs at berth B6. Japanese Fusata Lida, of the second wave, had been damaged by ground fire. Before taking off, he and his fellow fighter pilots had made a promise, that if hit, they would die hitting a worthy target rather than being captured. He would become the first pilot as he tried to hit a hangar at Kanehoe (he would miss the target and hit a nearby hill. He was later buried by the Americans with military honour). The destroyers USS Downes (DD-375) and USS Cassin (DD-372) were in drydock when a 250kg bomb landed between the two destroyers, ruptured some fuel tanks on both ships and started fires.

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The Japanese spot the USS Nevada trying to exit the port and have the idea that, if that ship would be sunk, it may block the entrance to the port entirely, as the access to Pearl Harbour could be done by a single channel. However, they do not know that the entrance is deep enough to be still navigable. The Nevada is hit by five 250kg bombs, and one causes heavy fires as it hits near the gasoline tank. California is hit by another bomb that causes extensive damage and starts internal fires. The two P-40s pilots manage to take off again as enemy dive bombers are coming down on them. They manage to get airborne (Taylor gets injured) and are able to destroy a couple of enemy planes before having to return to the airport to replenish their ammunition. USS Curtiss hits a Japanese Val, that then crashes on the Seaplane Tender, causing casualities and starting fires. Minutes later, another Val attacks her and the ship is hit by a bomb that sets the hangar and other rooms on fire, but she is also able to shoot down the Japanese plane. USS Oglala, having managed to get away from USS Helena as the minelayer (Oglala) was listing, and there was a risk of taking down with her also the cruiser, sinks. USS Pennsylvania (BB-38), that was in the drydock behind the destroyers Downes and Cassin, is hit by a bomb, causing casualties. Some American pilots (1st Lt. Lewis M. Sanders, 2nd Lt. Philip M. Rasmussen, and 2nd Lt. Gordon H. Sterling Jr. are able to get in the air and join in the fight above Wheeler Airfield. They fly in outdated P-36s, but are still able to destroy some Japanese planes. 2nd Lt. Gordon H. Sterling Jr. is lost at sea and presumed killed in action. Another group of American pilots (Lt. Bob Rogers , 2nd Lt. Harry W. Brown and 2nd Lt. Johnny Dains), that took off from Heleiwa and intercept Japanese planes, but are unable to destroy any enemy plane. Operators start to flood the drydocks in order to stop the fires (that now

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are also near USS Pennsylvania), but burning oil rises and soon, at around 9:15, a big explosion from USS Downes damages beyond repair the ship itself and the Cassin as well. 2nd Lt. Malcolm "Mike" Moore, having took of from Wheeler airfield, joins in the aerial fight. The pilots in the air are, in no particular order: Lt. Lewis Sanders, Lt. Harry Brown, Lt. Robert J. Rogers, Lt. John Dains, Lt. Malcom Moore, Lt. John J. Webster, Lt. Gordon Sterling (Later MIA). 2nd Lt. Kenneth Taylor, 2nd Lt. George Welch, 2nd John Thacker, 2nd Lt. Philip Rasmussen. Others tried to take off but were shot down. They have downed, all together, at least ten planes. John Dains would later be shot down and killed by a friendly fire incident from American Anti-Aircfraft fire at Wheeler. The aftermath is a disaster for the Americans: - 4x Battleship sunk (Oklahoma, Arizona, California, West Virginia) - 1x “Ex-Battleship” sunk (Utah) - 1x Harbour Tug sunk (Sotoyomo) - 4x Battleship damaged (Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Maryland) - 3x Cruiser damaged (Raleigh, Honolulu, Helena) - 4x Destroyer damaged (Cassin, Shaw, Downes, Helm) - 1x Seaplane Tender damaged (Curtiss) - 1x Minelayer damaged (Oglala) - 1x Repair Ship damaged (Vestal) - 1x Floating Dock damaged (YFD-2) - 188x Aircraft destroyed (more than 150 of those destroyed on the ground) - 159x Aircraft damaged - 3x Civilian Aircraft destroyed - 2’335x Military Personnel killed - 1’143x Military Personnel wounded - 68x Civilian killed - 35x Civilian wounded (some of the civilian killed or wounded were from falling anti-aircraft shells) The Japanese on the other hand, could come home with what is, de iure, a victory.

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The losses of the Empire of the Rising Sun were as follows: - 5x Midget Submarine destroyed - 29x Aircraft destroyed (First wave: 3x A6M, 1x D3A, 5x B5N; Second wave: 6x A6M, 14x D3A) - 74x Aircraft damaged - 64x Military Personnel killed (55x Airman, 9x Submariners) - 1x Military Personnel captured (1x Submariner) However, the Attack on Pearl Harbour could be described as a defeat for the Japanese, for mainly three reasons: They did not achieve the destruction of the American Aircraft Carriers, that were primary targets (the carriers were at sea and not in port during the attack). They did not destroy the port facilities (especially the fuel reserves), and that could have crippled the US Navy for longer than destroying individual ship, that were in some cases already almost outdated. It should be still noted that the fleet could have used the civilian infrastructure at Honolulu (the capital of Hawaii). Last but not least, the attack had the result that the American people were now eager for revenge, and thus Japan now faced an unlimited war that could only end with the complete defeat of either Japan or the US. The Japanese had planned and prepared for a third strike, that was then cancelled as it would probably not bring enough damage to the Americans (all the ships were now on alert and the various Anti-Aircraft batteries were manned, and the aircrews were on alert), and it would lead to bigger losses of hard-to-replace aircrews. The Attack on Pearl Harbour was finished. A new Front in the Second World War had just been created.

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Sources:

The Japanese on the offensive: 1) Nanshin: Budget- Maximising Behavior, The Imperial Japanese Navy And The Origins Of The Pacific War (Dollery et al.). University of New England School of Economics. No.2003-8. Introduction. 2) Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area: New Britain and Papua Campaigns 1942-1943 (translation from S. Bullard). Chapter 3. 3) Kaigun Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941 (Evans et Al.) US Naval Institute Press, 2012, Chapter To Strike From the Sky. 4) Kaigun Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941 (Evans et Al.) US Naval Institute Press, 2012, Chapter To Strike From the Sky. 5) The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbour to Midway (J.B. Lundstorm) US Naval Institute Press, 1985, Chapter The Making of Carrier Fighter Pilots. 6) Kaigun Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941 (Evans et Al.) US Naval Institute Press, 2012, Chapter To Strike From the Sky. 7) Kaigun Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941 (Evans et Al.) US Naval Institute Press, 2012, Chapter To Strike From the Sky.

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Infographics and Maps:

The Japanese on the offensive: 1A) Comparison between the main Allied and Japanese planes in the Pacific in 1941/1942.

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