Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Behaviour (1950S
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Understanding Pakistan’s Nuclear Behaviour (1950s–2010): Assessing the State Motivation and its International Ramifications (a Three Models Approach) Rizwana Karim Abbasi Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Social Sciences Department of Politics and International Relations July 2010 STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY The accompanying thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Social Sciences, entitled: Understanding Pakistan’s Nuclear Behaviour (1950s–2010): Assessing the State Motivation and its International Ramifications (a Three Models Approach) is based on work conducted by the author in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Leicester mainly during the period between 2005 and 2010. Approximate number of words: 80,000 All the work recorded in this thesis is original unless otherwise acknowledged in the text or by references. None of the work has been submitted for another degree in this or any other University Signed: .............................................................................. Date: ........................................... Name: Rizwana Karim Abbasi Understanding Pakistan’s Nuclear Behaviour (1950s–2010): Assessing the State Motivation and its International Ramifications (a Three Models Approach) Rizwana Abbasi Abstract The aim of this study is to understand the motivation behind Pakistan’s nuclear behaviour and its ramifications for the global non-proliferation system. Pakistan is an extremely important case because of its status as a non-signatory state to the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a country from which proliferation has occurred (to Iran, North Korea and Libya). The central interest in this study is the extent to which Pakistan’s security interests and its nuclear behaviour were factored into the global non- proliferation regime and why that regime failed to constrain Pakistan’s nuclear behaviour so that it first developed nuclear weapons and then proliferated them to states which are a matter of concern to the international community. The thesis seeks to explain Pakistan’s nuclear behaviour through the prism of regime theory and a three-models approach (neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism). The thesis also provides an in-depth analytical account of whether or how far international institutions and regimes can succeed in influencing the behaviour of states through cooperation, a theme suggested by regime theory. The three schools of thought offer useful arguments to help explain why it was that Pakistan did not choose to join the non-proliferation regime and the constraints which international institutions face with regard to non-signatory states. Drawing lessons from the case of Pakistan, the thesis suggests ways in which global non- proliferation institutions might be strengthened in the future, which would also help in linking Pakistan more firmly to the non-proliferation regime. These changes would also help to align other non-NPT states, such as India and Israel, with the non-proliferation regime and offer a firmer challenge to other states to change their conduct – states such as North Korea and Iran, which remain a cause of concern to the international community. i Table of Contents Abstract i Contents ii-iv Acknowledgements v-vi Abbreviations vii-ix Introduction 1 Aims and Objectives 1 Theoretical Perspective and Historical Literature 9 Structure of the Thesis 15 Methodology 18 Chapter One: Regime Theory, theories of IR and International Institutions 22 Part I Regime Theory and theories of IR 22 A three Model Approach 28 Part II The International non-proliferation order: the NPT and relevance of Regime Theory 39 Part III The NPT and Nuclear Behaviour in South Asia (before 1998) 53 The Status of the NPT: Regime theory and the three models approach 59 Chapter Two: Identifying Pakistan’s Nuclear Behaviour (1950s-1986) 63 Part I Chapter Introduction 63 Strategic Culture 65 From independence to 1965: Comparison of Indo–Pakistan Nuclear capacities 67 The 1965 War and Policy shifts in Pakistan: Elite Decisions and a Changing Threat Perception 77 The Security Factor (1970–75) 82 ii Part II Pakistan Achieves Nuclear Capability: the role of the scientific elite, 1975–87 92 Chapter Three: Pakistan’s Nuclear Behaviour in Crisis Situations: 112 From Non-Weaponized Deterrence to Weaponized Deterrence (1986–1999) Chapter Introduction 112 Understanding a Regional Environment in Crisis Situations 113 Pakistan’s actual nuclear behaviour in crisis situations 116 Pakistan’s behaviour from 1990 onwards: developments in non-proliferation 128 Towards the 1998 tests 134 The Kargil War: Pakistan’s behaviour and the perception of security paradox 141 Chapter Four: Pakistan’s Transition from Vertical proliferation to Horizontal Proliferation 147 Chapter Introduction 147 Khan’s Behaviour from the 1990s 149 The case of Iran 152 The case of North Korea 163 The Case of Libya 169 Khan’s behaviour and the responsibility of the state 173 The Responsibility of Institutions: How a State’s Behaviour may also reflect the Weakness of Global Institutions 176 Chapter Five: Pakistan’s Behaviour after the Khan Revelations (2004 – 2009) 181 Part I Chapter Introduction 181 Global Initiatives towards non-proliferation (cooperation-based approach) 183 Part II Pakistan establishes a new nuclear taboo 194 iii Chapter six: Pakistan as part of the Non-proliferation Challenges – Presenting Solutions 217 Part I Chapter Introduction 217 Pakistan as a part of Non-Proliferation Policies and global problems 219 Part II Solutions drawn from Regime Theory 231 Reviewing the NPT framework in ways which may help to change the behaviour of state 233 Regulating Non-NPT states’ behaviour – preventing risk and crisis spreading from the South Asian region 238 An old debate in a new context – Regime Theory, neoliberals and constructivists 252 Conclusion: Pakistan’s Nuclear Behaviour: Regime Theory and the Non-proliferation Regime 255 Pakistan’s Behaviour: the three models approach 256 Why the NPT failed in the case of Pakistan and why Pakistan continues to remain outside the treaty 260 Pakistan establishes the new nuclear taboo – the Role of International Institutions following the A. Q. Khan Revelations 263 How institutional counter-proliferation cooperation might evolve 266 What does the case study suggest about the strengths and limits of the three models approach? 271 The adequacy and limits of regime theory 273 Appendix 275 Bibliography 277 iv Acknowledgements Writing a dissertation is a time of immense paradoxes for international students in the United Kingdom. At times life may be enveloped by remarkably active social circles and yet at others the loneliness and isolation one feels in conducting a sensitive project of this magnitude for the first time can be overwhelming. It has been my God-gifted fortune through these years to have been surrounded by highly expert supervisors, professional mentors, loyal friends – and most of all, my parents and siblings who have supported me while living thousands of miles away to an extent that only someone who has also gone through this experience can appreciate. My first supervisor, Professor Adrian Hyde-Price, with an extensive and significant academic record in the field, and an ability to communicate his vision, was of immeasurable inspiration to my approach to political science and my desire to become an expert on my subject. Sincere and deep gratitude then goes to Professor Mark Phythian, who succeeded Professor Hyde-Price and encouraged me at all stages with his professionalism, his scholarship and his regular, prompted and detailed supervision. His support and cooperation throughout greatly facilitated the completion of this dissertation within the required time limit. There are two people who have touched my life in such a way that words can scarcely express, to each of whom this dissertation is humbly dedicated. Beyond the realm of non-proliferation issues, Professor Richard Bonney, with his immense academic record, has been a great friend and mentor and has come to understand me like few others. I give him thanks from the core of my heart for his valuable time, support and encouragement over the last five years. Another great, humble and kind person came into my life when I was at the initial stages of research and he has been a v great source of encouragement and guide in enhancing my self-confidence: Professor Richard Johnson will be remembered for my entire life for his skilled guidance in my study of international regimes. I have benefited enormously from each of these experts’ individual expertise. My sincere thanks also go to Dr. Hans Blix, Former Director-General of the IAEA, Dr. Olli Heinenon, Deputy Director of the IAEA and Director-General of international safeguards and Dr. Stephen P. Cohen for their precious time so that I could conduct interviews with them. I am deeply grateful to the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management for giving me the opportunity to speak at its 50th annual meeting in Tucson, Arizona which was a great learning experience in my doctoral research. I greatly benefited from this conference and interviews which I conducted during my visit to the US in 2009. I owe an especial gratitude to General (rtd) Ehsan, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Director-General ISI, Pakistan for his precious time for interview, and also Mr. Asif Durrani, Deputy High Commissioner, High Commissioner of Pakistan again for his precious time and generous advice in several interviews.