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Electoral Institutions, Party Organizations, and Political Instability

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Electoral Institutions, Party Organizations, and Political Instability Electoral Institutions, Party Organizations, and Political Instability by Daniel M. Kselman Department of Political Science Duke University Date: March 30, 2009 Approved: ___________________________ Herbert Kitschelt, Supervisor ___________________________ Emerson Niou ___________________________ Timur Kuran ___________________________ Pablo Beramendi ___________________________ Judith Kelley Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2009 ABSTRACT Electoral Institutions, Party Organizations, and Political Instability by Daniel M. Kselman Department of Political Science Duke University Date: March 30, 2009 Approved: ___________________________ Herbert Kitschelt, Supervisor ___________________________ Emerson Niou ___________________________ Timur Kuran ___________________________ Pablo Beramendi ___________________________ Judith Kelley An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2009 Copyright by Daniel M. Kselman 2009 ABSTRACT A majority of formal theoretic research in political science treats political parties as unitary actors, and endows them with decision-making powers not unlike those of strategic individuals. In contrast, my dissertation examines strategic equilibria which arise when competition takes place simultaneously within parties over organizational control and between parties over political office. I first distinguish between three intra- organizational elements: a party’s parliamentary group , its activist cadre , and its executive leaders . Chapters 2-4 develop a set of foundational game theoretic models which identify the equilibrium balance of power among these 3 organizational elements as a function of a country’s electoral institutions and voters’ relative responsiveness to marginal policy changes. In turn, this more complete understanding of intra-party competition sheds light on a number of important questions in comparative politics and comparative political-economy. For example, it helps to identify conditions under which Duverger’s argument that proportional representation (PR) should tend to generate multi-party competition may not apply; and, in contrast to Lijphart’s famous argument, conditions under which PR may instigate rather than mediate social conflict. Ten months of intensive field research conducted in Turkey provide both the quantitative and the qualitative data which constitute the dissertation’s most basic empirical material, including a data set of over 3,000 observations on party-switching in the Turkish Parliament (1983-2007). iv Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iv List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... vii List of Figures ............................................................................................................................ viii Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... ix 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Duverger, Lijphart, and Turkey .................................................................................... 1 1.2. The Macro-Theoretical Framework ............................................................................ 11 1.3. The Micro-Level Argument ......................................................................................... 18 1.4. Empirical Implementation ........................................................................................... 28 2. Legislative Equilibirum and Political Corruption under Alternative Electoal Rules .... 33 2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 33 2.2. Legislators, Voters, and Utility Functions .................................................................. 35 2.3. Legislative Equilibrium under Proportional Electoral Rules .................................. 44 2.4. Electoral Rules and Mechanisms of Democratic Accountability ............................ 60 2.5. Corruption and Intra-Party Choice ............................................................................. 69 3. Party Leaders, Party Activists, and Party Choice ............................................................... 83 3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 83 3.2. Party Primaries and Party Activists in Spatial Political Theory ............................. 89 3.3. Party Leaders, Party Activists, and Voters ................................................................ 93 3.4. Median Activist Theorems ......................................................................................... 103 v 3.5. Nash Equilibrium in Two-Party Elections ............................................................... 111 3.6. Nash Equilibrium in Multi-Party Systems ............................................................... 123 3.7. Summary ....................................................................................................................... 130 4. Legislative Defection in Centralized Parties ..................................................................... 132 4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 132 4.2 Organizational Centralization in Low Partisanship Electorates ............................ 135 4.3 Candidate Selection in Parliamentary Regimes ....................................................... 141 4.4 Legislative Defection and Party Entry in Centralized Party Systems ................... 146 5. Easy Come, Easy Go: Party Switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly ...... 169 5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 169 5.2 Party Swtiching in Comparative Perspective ........................................................... 172 5.3 Party Switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly .................................... 188 5.4 Operationalization and Measurement ....................................................................... 183 5.5 District Magnitudes, Electoral Lists, and Party Swtiches ....................................... 195 6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 214 A1. Chapter 2 Appendices ....................................................................................................... 227 A2. Chapter 3 Appendices ....................................................................................................... 236 References .................................................................................................................................. 240 Biography ................................................................................................................................... 248 vi List of Tables Table 1.1: Electoral Systems and Voter Responsiveness. ...................................................... 13 Table 2.1: Varieties of Electoral Systems. ................................................................................. 71 Table 2.2: Aggregate Data .......................................................................................................... 73 Table 2.3: Electoral Rules and Corruption ............................................................................... 75 Table 2.4: Controlled Regression Analysis. ............................................................................. 78 Table 2.5: Conditional Hypotheses ........................................................................................... 81 Table 3.1: Partisanship, Dispersion, and SPNE. .................................................................... 122 Table 5.1: Political Parties in Turkey ...................................................................................... 175 Table 5.2: A Typoloigy of Switching Behaviors. ................................................................... 179 Table 5.3: U-Shaped Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 205 Table 5.4: ‘Open’ Party Switches ............................................................................................. 209 Table 5.5: ‘Occupied’ Party Switches. .................................................................................... 210 vii List of Figures Figure 1.1: Cycles of Instability in Turkey. ................................................................................ 6 Figure 1.2: The Macro-Argument. ............................................................................................ 16 Figure 2.1: Party Choice in a District Whose Represenative is from Party A ..................... 42 Figure 2.2: MARNE under OLPR Competition .....................................................................
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