The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2019, 99－120
The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development: Moving Toward “Winning the Informationized War Globally”?
Yuan-Chou Jing*
National Defense University, Taoyuan City, Taiwan
China’s military strategy has evolved across different leaders’ eras. Even though China’s military strategic guideline always stays on the track of “active defense,” the essence has been shifting from tradition to informationization. Since satellites are able to provide space information support so as to fulfill informationization, once informationization becomes the focus of military strategy, it is supposed to bring momentum to the research and development of satellites. Therefore, satellite development can be considered as an index to check whether the military strategy is being implemented or not. China is continuously making progress in satellite development. Especially since the informationization was included in the guideline in the Hu Jintao era, satellites started to be able to conduct space information support missions. In conclusion, China is sincerely fulfilling its military strategy through consistent satellite development. On the other hand, “local war” is another focus of strategic guidelines, it implies that China considers its national interests mainly concentrated on this region so far. However, while China’s interests are expanding globally, China will need to cultivate its global dominance based on rapid satellite development to safeguard the global interest; “Winning the informationized war globally” might be the next focus.
Keywords: China’s military strategy, strategic guideline, satellite, informationization, space
Preface
Liddell Hart defines military strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”1 Generally, the ends, ways and means constitute the framework of military strategy, once the ends is determined, the ways and means
* E-mail: [email protected]
ISSN 1016-3271 print, ISSN 1941-4641 online © 2019 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses http://www.kida.re.kr/kjda 100 Yuan-Chou Jing are used to fulfill the ends. The ends, ways and means need to work together perfectly to make military strategy successful, in other words, the implementation of military strategy can be figured out by checking if the military means exactly fulfills the ends. In the modern age, “winning information warfare” is always at the core of military strategy. There is no doubt that satellites play a critical role winning information warfare, therefore, satellite development can be considered as an index to check whether the military strategy is being implemented or not. Chairman Mao was the founding father of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which was established in 1949. China’s military strategy in this period was largely shaped by Mao’s military theory of people’s war. He advocated “active defense” as a military strategic principle,2 and emphasized to fight “an early, large and nuclear war” under the context of a people’s war. Meanwhile, China’s space program was also developed during this period. In the second plenary session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in 1958, Mao said, “We (China) also want to develop artificial satellites.”3 After all, China’s first satellite Dongfanghong-1 (DFH-1) was sent into space with a Long March-1 on April 24, 1970, which opened China’s era of space exploration.4 The third plenary session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, which was held in 1978, is a turning point of China’s military strategy. In the session, Deng Xiaoping required that “according to the new situation of development, a series of new ideas for adapting to national defense and army building and operational guidance requirements in the new era have to be proposed.”5 Furthermore, after the Central Military Committee (CMC) enlarged session in 1985, Deng transformed the focus of the state from “prepare the war” into “peaceful development.”6 Accordingly, even though Mao’s military strategy still remains unchanged, the focus has shifted to economic development. In terms of the space program, Mao intended to demonstrate the state’s sense of glory and safeguard national security. On the contrary, Deng shifted his focus from military to civilian and business so as to cut the space budget.7 Learning from the experiences of major campaigns such as the Persian Gulf War, the Kosovo War and the U.S.–Iraq War, China was shocked by the wide gap between China and the U.S. Army on information warfare capabilities, such as C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance),8 long-range precision strikes, and joint force integration. C4ISR plays a crucial role in informationized warfare, while the space information system consisting of various types of satellites, such as remote sensing, communication, navigation and positioning, can support or enhance the function of C4ISR. In short, satellites can be considered as the center of gravity of C4ISR. In this case, China’s desire for achieving the goal of winning wars under informationized circumstances should be satisfied by leveraging satellites to improve C4ISR and joint operation capabilities. China has regularly issued its defense white paper China’s National Defense since 1998. China’s National Defense in 2000, issued in the Jiang Zemin era, indicated the work to modernize PLA’s weapon and equipment would focus on the realization of informationization.9 Consequently, informationization became the focus of China’s military strategy, as it was supposed to bring momentum to the research and The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 101 development of satellites. China’s first space white paper China’s Space Activities in 2000 said that China had not launched 47 various types of artificial satellites until October 2000. The launch success rate reached 90 percent, which was as good as that of the United States and Europe.10 This outcome shows that along with the shift in focus of military strategy to informationization, those efforts to improve satellites aim to realize informationization is ongoing too. Once again, in China’s National Defense in 2004, issued in the Hu Jintao era, the strategic guideline was further substantiated, and the basic point for making preparation for military struggle (PMS) was modified to winning local wars under conditions of informationization,11 which shows that informationization was included in the guideline. In the Xi Jinping era, the defense white paper China’s Military Strategy (2015) said that China regarded space capabilities as a power of critical security domains, and considered “space as the international strategic competition, outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition.”12 In other words, China views space as playing a critical role in the struggle of gaining and maintaining information dominance,13 which is supposed to further move satellite development forward. Thus, first of all, since the strategic guideline issued by a Chinese leader was seen as the characteristic of military strategy in that period, this paper tries to display the evolution of China’s military strategy since Mao to Xi by way of linking those guidelines. Secondly, the technical level of satellites is seen as a decisive factor for winning the informationized war, so this paper tries to analyze the trend and focus of space development to check if the demand of the military strategy guideline was met. Finally, it explores the possible influence on China’s military strategy under the assumption that space capabilities will continue to develop.
The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy
The term strategy has numerous definitions in the military,14 and the complexity of the definition sometimes makes it difficult to complete a comparative analysis on an equal footing and maintain coherence in the discourse as well, so the definition of strategy has to be defined at the beginning. In order to achieve the coherence of the definition of strategy, this paper only adopted the one that was defined in The Science of Military Strategy, which was published by the National Defense University of China in 2015, to explore the evolution of China’s military strategy. The Science of Military Strategy proposed the principle and content of strategy, saying that making a strategic judgment, which is based on the national security situation, is the initial phase of strategy. Drawing up a strategic plan based on a strategic judgment should come next, and lastly, carrying out the strategic plan should follow after. In other words, the strategic judgment is to build up the strategic goal to manifest into “what should be done” according to the perception of the strategic environment of the decision-maker himself. Secondly, the decision-maker issues the strategic guideline based on the strategic judgment to manifest into “how to do it.” Finally, the decision- 102 Yuan-Chou Jing maker proposes a strategic means to show “what will be used to do it.” The three steps constitute a comprehensive and complete military thinking logic.15 Accordingly, the strategy is basically composed of “strategic goal, strategic guideline, strategic means.”16 The basic concept of this paper is to study the relationship between strategic guideline and strategic means in China’s military strategy under the context of informationization.
Chairman Mao’s Era (1945–1976)
Mao’s military thinking has been the core of the military strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) since before China was established in 1949. In “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (December 1936), Selected Works of Mao, he introduced the term “active defense” as the military guideline, which uses “lure the enemy troops in deep” as the strategic means to wipe out the enemy’s effective strength.17 In the 1960s, the lessons learned from the Sino Soviet split and the Vietnam War pushed China to make an enormous adjustment to its strategic judgment. China believed that the next world war was inevitable, so China’s military preparation needed to meet the requirement of “prepare for war.”18 Therefore, China transformed the strategic guideline of “active defense” into “active defense to lure the enemy troops in deep.”19 This implies that the center of “active defense” had shifted to “lure the enemy troops in deep” under the consideration of the imminent world war.
Deng Xiaoping Era (1976–1989)
In the CMC enlarged session in 1985, Deng Xiaoping, the chairman of the military commission of the CPC central committee, proposed a statement of “Two Important Changes.”20 Deng believed that large-scale war was not inevitable, so the strategic goal should be transformed from “prepare for war” into “peaceful development.” Although the strategic guideline of “active defense” still remained unchanged, its essence had shifted from “lure the enemy troops in deep” to “prepare for the local war,” while military modernization became the priority in the military strategy instead of military readiness.21 Turning “prepare for war” into “peaceful development” was the biggest difference between Deng and Mao. Although Mao also viewed military modernization as one of the military goals, only when Deng gave priority to economic development and changes to military thinking, did China make remarkable progress in science and technology development, which gave enormous momentum to military modernization.22
Jiang Zemin Era (1989–2002)
In the CMC enlarged session in 1993, the committee manifested that the military strategic guideline of the new era was “winning local wars in conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology,”23 and advocated the military thinking including “Two Basic Changes” and “build a strong army through science and technology.”24 Jiang’s strategic judgment remained the same as Deng’s, believing that The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 103 large-scale war could be avoided. However, the essence of the strategic guideline had been transformed from “prepare for local war” into “winning local wars in conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology.”25 In order to put the strategic guideline into practice, Jiang demanded: “The modernization of PLA’s weapons and equipment will be devoted to the transformation from semi-mechanization, mechanization to automation and informationization,”26 so that informationization became the ultimate goal of military modernization.
Hu Jintao Era (2002–2012)
The transformation of military guidelines was still ongoing. The guideline was further substantiated in this stage. China’s National Defense in 2004 said: “the basic point for PMS was modified to winning local wars under conditions of informationization.”27 Since China believed informationization was the background for modern war, the informationization became the core of both the military buildup and military thinking of the PLA. Nevertheless, in the CMC enlarged session in 2007, Hu advocated a statement of “Two Incompatibles.”28 It implied that China had honestly recognized that his capabilities of informationization of military power had not met the requirement of “winning local wars under conditions of informationization” yet.
Xi Jinping Era (2012–Present)
In the speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Xi said, “With a view to realizing the Chinese Dream and the dream of building a powerful military, we have developed a strategy for the military under new circumstances, and have made every effort to modernize national defense and the armed forces.”29 The “strategy for the military under new circumstances” in Xi’s speech is exactly the one that was mentioned in China’s Military Strategy: “To implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, the basic point for PMS will be placed on winning informationized local wars.” Even though Xi’s military guideline was not much different from Hu’s, China started to view space capabilities as a power of critical security domains. More importantly, the idea of “outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition” emerged,30 so it was reasonable to assume China would keep its momentum on the development of space power in order to meet the demand of “winning informationized local wars.” In summary, even though China’s strategic guideline has always stayed on the track of “active defense,” the essence of the strategic guideline has adjusted with the changing era. The essence is evolving from “lure the enemy troops in deep” to “prepare for the local war,” and eventually to “winning the informationized local war.” It is clear that the essence has been shifting from tradition to informationization during the evolution. Because of the ability to provide space information support, the capability of satellites is a symbol of the determination to realize informationization. Therefore, the efforts on satellite development is an index to check if China is implementing their strategy guideline. 104 Yuan-Chou Jing Analysis of China’s Satellite Development
Quantitative Analysis of Launched Satellites
According to the quantitative analysis, the number of launched satellites per year was less than five before 1989, however, there was a slight growth in the number since 1990 and a sharp increase since 200431 (see Figure 1). China’s National Defense in 2004 manifested that the basic point for making PMS was modified to winning local wars under conditions of informationization. Meanwhile, a tendency of growth in the number of launched satellites showed up since then. Furthermore, the number has gone up to above 15 since 2010, and reached an all-time high of 44 in 2015. The changing number suggests that China has recognized the vital role that satellites play in “winning local wars under conditions of informationization.”
Type Analysis of Launched Satellites
According to the result of type analysis, China has launched 338 satellites from 1970, the year that the first satellite DFH-1 was launched, to 2017. It is composed of 233 application satellites, 94 technology development satellites and 11 science satellites.32 Obviously, the application satellites played a leading role in China’s satellite development.
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Figure 1. Quantitative Analysis of Launched Satellites by Year The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 105
China’s National Defense in 2000 implies that informationization is to be set as the goal for China’s military modernization. It means that the year 2000 can be seen as the turning point of informationization. Based on this assumption, this paper tries to analyze the number and type of the launched satellites before and after 2000 and figure out the difference.
Before 2000
From the DFH-1 in April 24, 1970 to CBERS-1 in October 14, 1999, the number of launched satellites was 58, among which included 46 application satellites (25 earth observation satellites (EOS) and 21 communication satellites (CS)), nine technology development satellites, and three science satellites. Obviously, the leading one was EOS, which was 43 percent, and the next was CS, which was 36 percent (see Figure 2).
After 2000
From the ChinaSat 22 launched on January 26, 2000 to the Yaogan 30J on December 26, 2017, the number of launched satellites was 280, among which included 187 application satellites (116 EOS, 42 CS, 29 NS), 85 technology development satellites, eight science satellites, the leading one was still earth observation satellites, which was 42 percent, and the next was technology development satellites at 30 percent (see Figure 3).
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Figure 2. Types of Launched Satellites (1970–1999) 106 Yuan-Chou Jing
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Figure 3. Types of Launched Satellites (2000–2017)
The outcomes of the comparison before and after 2000 are: even though the application satellites is always the leading type of all the launched satellites, the proportion declined after 2000 (from 79 percent to 67 percent) because of a decrease of communication satellites. On the other hand, the proportion of technology development satellites reached nearly double after 2000. This represents that technology development satellites had won the attention of China since then. Among the application satellites, the EOS is always the main-stream and the proportion is stable no matter if it was before or after 2000. On the other hand, there is a dramatic increase in the proportion of navigation satellites after 2000. This implies the establishment of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) turns into the focus during this period (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Comparison of Launched Satellites by Type Before and After 2000 The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 107
Analysis on the Characteristics of Satellites before Informationization
This section tries to further explore the characteristics of the application satellites (including EOS, CS) and technology development satellites before 2000.
Earth Observation Satellites (EOS)
From 1970 to 1999, China launched 25 EOS, consisting of optical satellites, signals intelligence satellites and meteorological satellites (see Figure 5). The development of EOS started from the Ji Shu Shiyan Weixing series (技術試驗衛星) in 1973, which was considered a signals intelligence satellite.33 China launched six satellites of this series into orbit during the period 1973 to 1976. However, half of the missions failed and the series was abandoned in the end. Meanwhile, the most successful series was the Fanhui Shi Weixing series (recoverable satellite, 返回式衛星), which was a leading product of optical satellites used for national geo-information surveys and photogrammetry. This series was composed of 17 satellites of three types,34 the cameras in this series having a resolution of 10M and a length of 2,000M of film. However, the principal drawback of the system was that no data could be examined until the cabin returned. It reduced its value in following a rapidly evolving military situation.35 Not until October 1999 was the China–Brazil Earth Resources Satellite 1 (CBERS-1) launched, which was equipped with a Charge coupled Device,36 and China had real-time data transmission capabilities. In terms of meteorological satellites, the Fengyun Series had been developed since 1988, and it owned two types of satellite constellations including polar orbiting and geostationary orbiting since 1997.
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Figure 5. Proportion of Earth Observation Satellites (1970–1999) 108 Yuan-Chou Jing Communication satellites
Twenty-one communication satellites were launched during this period, among which the ChinaSat series, which belonged to China Satellite Communications Co., comprised of the highest proportion at 33 percent, and the secondary being DFH series at 24 percent (see Figure 6). On the other hand, of the 76 percent of the communication satellites (including ChinaSat series, Apstar series, Asiasat series, Zhongwei series and Sinosat series) manipulated by civilian enterprises, however, 75 percent of them were procured from foreign companies, which implies that China’s capabilities on communication satellites were still immature in this period.37
Technology Development Satellites
Nine technology development satellites were launched in this period, most of which belonged to the ShiJian series (meaning “practice” or “experimental”). The ShiJian series is a scientific as well as a technology demonstration mini-satellite series of CAST (Chinese Academy of Space Technology) that started in the early 1970s, used for space environment probing, etc. (see Figure 7).
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Figure 6. Proportion of Communication Satellites (1970–1999) The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 109
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Figure 7. Proportion of Technology Development Satellites (1970–1999)
Analysis of the Characteristics of Satellites after Informationization
This section tries to further explore the characteristics of application satellites (including EOS, CS, NS) and technology development satellites from 2000 to 2017.
Earth Observation Satellites (EOS)
In this period, China launched 116 EOS, consisting of optical satellites, synthetic aperture radar satellites, signals intelligence satellites, meteorological satellites, ocean satellites and Lunar exploration satellites.38 The optical satellites and the signals intelligence satellites were still the leading and secondary components of EOS in this period (see Figure 8). 110 Yuan-Chou Jing
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Figure 8. Proportion of Earth Observation Satellites (2000–2017)
The Yaogan series, including optical, synthetic aperture radar and electronic satellites, is the most significant series in EOS, with the proportion at 42 percent. Although the officials claimed that the Yaogan series was a civilian satellite conducting the missions of science experiments, national geoinformation surveys, agriculture surveys and even disaster relief, owing to the officials keeping confidential most of the Yaogan’s information, it was speculated that the Yaogan was mainly used for the military.39 On the other hand, the civilian satellite series, including the Ziyuan, Tianhui, Gaofen, HuanJing, Fengyun, Haiyang, had a proportion of 34 percent in EOS. One point worth noting was the commercial satellite had played an active role since 2015, and its proportion had sharply risen to 17 percent in 2017 (see Figure 9). Compared to before 2000, obviously, China made remarkable progress in satellite development, especially on military satellites. Besides the Yaogan series, the military 40 satellite Ludikancha series (陸地勘查系列) had been developed since 2017. Meanwhile, the technologies of hyper-spectral imaging, spatial resolution, and time resolution have continued to improve. Those facts imply that to achieve the goal of informationization, China is attempting to build up an all-weather and real-time information gathering system by way of multiplying the series of satellites and improving the performance of those satellites as well. The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 111
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2WKHU &RPPHUFLDO 6DWHOOLWHV +DL\DQJ /XGLNDQFKD =L\XDQ +XDQ-LQJ *DRIHQ 7LDQKXL Figure 9. Proportion of Series in Earth Observation Satellites (2000–2017) Communication Satellites Forty-two communication satellites were launched in this period, among which the ChinaSat series got the leading proportion at 26 percent, with the second place being military communication series, including both the Shentong and Fenghuo series, at 19 percent (see Figure 10). Fifty-four percent of the communication satellites were owned by civilian enterprises (including ChinaSat series, Apstar series, Asiasat series, Tiantong series, Automatic Identification System). In fact, the major shareholders of those enterprises were state-owned enterprises. According to the Emergency Response Law of the People’s Republic of China (中華人民共和國突發事件應對法), if necessary, the government may requisition equipment, facilities and so on from entities and individuals.41 Therefore, it is believed that those civilian communication satellites can be the backup of the military system in peace time or be requisitioned to support military operations in war time. China developed military communication satellites of the first generation in this period, including the Fenghuo Series, ChinaSat 22 (Fenghuo 1) and ChinaSat 1, for the tactical level and Shentong Series, ChinaSat 20 and ChinaSat 2, for the strategic level.42 ChinaSat 22 is the first military communication satellite, which was launched in 2000, followed by the ChinaSat 20A launched in 2010. There were four military communication satellites were deployed in this decade. At the tactical level, they are capable of providing necessary communication for mobile commanders and troops.43 At the strategic level, they are capable of providing large capacity communication for 112 Yuan-Chou Jing 7UDFNLQJDQG 'DWD5HOD\ 0LOLWDU\ &RPPXQLFDWLRQ $PDWHXU5DGLR &RPPXQLFDWLRQ 7LDQWRQJ6HULHV &KLQD6DW6HULHV 6DWHOOLWH$,6 $VLDVDW6HULHV $SVWDU 6HULHV Figure 10. Proportion of China’s Communication Satellites (2000–2017) theater commands and commanding posts.44 It can also be said that China started to own the fundamental C4ISR capability since 2010. Furthermore, the ChinaSat 1A, the second generation of the Fenghuo Series, launched in 2011, followed by the ChinaSat 2A, the second generation of the Shentong Series, launched in 2012, and lastly, the ChinaSat 1C launched in 2015. In the end, there were four satellites sent into space in the period of five years. The deployment of the second generation satellite aims to replace the former one, and it is supposed to further enhance China’s C4ISR capability. Although the detail remains unknown, it is believed the signal coverage area includes the Western Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Africa and west and central Europe based on satellite orbits.45 Navigation Satellites Twenty-seven navigation satellites launched in this period. In fact, China had started the navigation satellite project early since the 1960s. It was terminated in the 1980’s due to technology and budget constraints. The lesson learned from the Gulf War in 1990 made that project regain attention. Therefore, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System was included in the 9th Five-Year Plan.46 China took a three-step strategy for developing the BeiDou System, which is capable of providing positioning, velocity measurements, timing, wide-area differential and short message communication services.47 In the first step, the BeiDou 1 system, mainly for users in China and neighboring regions, was completed and put into operation in 2000. The second step started in 2004, and the BeiDou 2 system expanded services to the Asia–Pacific region by the end of 2012. The third step is to build the BeiDou 3 system to provide global coverage services by 2020 with a total number of 35 satellites.48 The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 113 Table 1. Three-Step Strategy For Developing the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System Navigation System Service year Constellation Two satellites First Step Test System (BeiDou 1) 2000 and another spare 5 GEO BeiDou Navigation Satellite Regional Second Step 2012/12/27 5 IGSO Coverage Test System (BeiDou 2) 4 MEO 5 GEO BeiDou Navigation Satellite Global Coverage Third Step By 2020 3 IGSO Test System (BeiDou 3) 27 MEO GEO: Geosynchronous Satellite IGSO: Inclined Geostationary Orbit Satellite MEO: Medium Earth Orbit Satellite Technology Development Satellites Eighty-five technology development satellites launched in this period, most of which were the ShiJian satellites. The mass of those satellites could be speculated based on the rocket that carried it into space. Among the technology development satellites, the number of large satellite was 23; medium was 2; mini was 15; micro was 14; nano was 27, and undisclosed was 4,49 (See Figure 11) and the ShiJian series is believed to be the largest satellite except the ShiJian 9. On the other hand, along with the appearance of the first micro satellites-the Tsinghua-1 and the first nano satellite-ZDPS 1, the former was made by Tsinghua University in 2000, and the latter was made by Zhejiang University in 2007, the small scale satellites, especially the nano satellites, have been the main types of technology development satellites since 2015. This means a lot in the military. Meanwhile, one of the key points of China’s implementation of asymmetric warfare is the implementation of anti-satellite operations (ASAT). There are two types of ASAT that China is developing: anti-satellite satellites and ground-based anti-satellite weapons. The main function of those ASAT weapons is to destroy, blind or jam the enemy’s satellites. The anti-satellite satellites actually are categorized into technology development satellites, currently, the development of anti-satellite satellites mainly focus on the co-orbital anti-satellite system. For example, China conducted a test of a maneuvering satellite that captured another satellite in space in 2003 (the ShiJian-15 was identified in this case), and the Pentagon officials considered it a significant step forward for Beijing’s space warfare program.50 114 Yuan-Chou Jing 0WODGTQH 5CVGNNKVGU 1DQR 0LFUR 0LQL 0HGLXP /DUJH 8QGLVFORVHG ;GCT Figure 11. Type and Number of Technology Development Satellites by Year (2000–2017) Relationship between China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development Mao introduced “active defense” as the military strategic guideline, which uses “lure the enemy troops in deep” as a strategic means to cope with large scale invasions. Meanwhile, China decided to develop satellites on the basis of the “Two Bombs (atomic bomb and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)).”51 However, there are technical hurdles in satellite development, so the type is limited to the Ji Shu Shiyan Weixing and Fanhui Shi Weixing series, a technology development satellite and an optical satellite, respectively, and the number is also few. Consequently, the effects of political propaganda are more than those of the military. Deng transformed the strategic goal from “prepare for war” into “peaceful development” and took priority over military modernization. Therefore, the communication satellite ChinaSat 1 and meteorological satellite Fengyun 1A had been undergoing research in the 1980s. Moreover, the CBERS had been developed with Brazil since 1987.52 Even though there was no known breakthrough during this period, space technology has burgeoned and accordingly laid a foundation for further development. Jiang transformed the essence of strategic guideline into “winning local wars in conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology.” Therefore, informationization turned into the goal of military modernization. Even though China decided to develop satellite technology to make informationization come true, constrained by both Deng’s legacy “economic development has priority over the The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 115 national defense”53 and the budgetary limits due to the poor financial situation, there was only a slight growth in the number of launched satellites in the 1990s. On the other hand, China made remarkable progress in satellite technology before 2000. In EOS, the development of the Fanhui Shi Weixing series was continued; the CBERS 1 made China capable of conducting real-time transmission of information; the constellation of polar orbiting and geostationary satellites had been built for weather forecasting;54 the first military communication satellite ChinaSat 22 and the first micro technology development satellite Tzinghua-1 were developed. Although China could not achieve the goal of “winning local wars in conditions of high technology” with this progress only, it has paved the way for China to make further developments after 2000. Hu modified the military guideline to “winning local wars under conditions of informationization,” and it apparently speeded up satellite development. The number of launched satellites increased after 2002, the Yaogan series and ZDPS 1 were successfully developed, and the BeiDou 2 was completed in 2012 with the capability of providing a regional coverage service. Navigation systems were provided with dual-use functions. In military cases, it can not only provide precise positioning service to platform for even soldiers, but also precise guidance to missiles. So along with providing regional coverage service, the BeiDou 2 also endowed China with operational capabilities in the Asia- Pacific region. Coupled with the successful operation of the military communication satellite ChinaSat 22 and ChinaSat 20, China has cultivated the fundamental space information support capabilities based on satellites. However, the “Two Incompatibles” proved that China recognized that the PLA is still not capable of meeting the demands of “winning local wars under conditions of informationization.” Yet at this time, it remains the target for them to achieve.55 Xi proposed the “winning informationized local wars” as a new military guideline. As a matter of fact, there is no marked difference with that of Hu’s. Informationization remains the core of China’s military buildup and, however, the momentum of developing space power is increasing. It is easy to see China’s great leap in every aspect of satellite technology. First of all, the number of launched satellites reached 44 in 2015, an all-time high, and the average number of launched satellites per year from 2015 to 2017 was 38, compared to the number before 2014 always being below 24. The huge difference is the hard evidence showing China’s ambition. Secondly, in EOS, from Yaogan 1 launched in 2006 to Yaogan 30 launched in 2018, the Yaogan series has been developing to be a comprehensive series consisting of optical, microwave and electronic satellites, along with the advanced Ludikancha series,56 this will give China an intact surveillance and reconnaissance capability. Thirdly, following the BeiDou 2, it is scheduled to complete the third generation of the BeiDou system, the BeiDou 3, so as to provide global service by 2020. At last, the second generation military communication satellite ChinaSat 1 and ChinaSat 2 is in operation at this stage. All of the achievements give China the potential to meet Xi’s demand of “winning informationized local wars.” 116 Yuan-Chou Jing Table 2. Relationship between China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development The Relationship between Military Strategic Characteristics of Satellite Leader Year China’s Military Strategy Guideline Development and Satellite Development Mao 1945– “active defense,” The EOS plays a leading role. The progress of satellite 1976 “lure the enemy development is limited; troops in deep” The effects of political propaganda are more than those of the military. Deng 1976– prepare for the A stage of space technology Space technology has 1989 local war germination; Starting to burgeoned and laid the develop meteorological and foundation for further communication satellites. development. Jiang 1989– winning local A slight growth in the number Although China could 2002 wars in conditions of launched satellites; not achieve the strategic of modern China made progress in guideline by this progress technology, satellite capability of EOS, only, it has paved the way particularly high meteorological, military for China to make further technology communication and micro developments. satellites. Hu 2002– winning local wars The number of launched Possesses the fundamental 2012 under conditions of satellites increases; The Yaogan information support informationization series and nano satellites are capabilities, however, successfully developed; BeiDou still could not meet the 2 can provide regional coverage demand of “winning local service. wars under conditions of informationization.” Xi 2012– winning The number of launched Being able to conduct Present informationized satellites increases dramatically; space information local wars The Yaogan and Ludikancha support mission; All series give an intact surveillance of the achievements in and reconnaissance capability; satellite development BeiDou 3 will provide a global give the potential to meet coverage service by 2020; the demand of “winning Military communication informationized local satellite ChinaSat 1 and wars.” ChinaSat 2 are in operation. Conclusion China pursued satellite development to demonstrate the state’s sense of glory and safeguard national security since Mao’s era. However, the progress was limited. In Deng’s and Jiang’s eras, military modernization became the focus of policy. Meanwhile, China made certain achievements in the development of earth observation and communication satellites, but they were still far from fully supporting military maneuvers. According to the strategic guideline in Hu’s and Xi’s eras: “winning local wars under conditions of informationization” and “winning informationized local wars,” respectively, it is fair to say that informationization has been the core of China’s military strategy after 2000. As a matter of fact, it was not only the number of satellites but also The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 117 the technical level that have been raised in this period. In other words, satellites will start to be able to conduct space information support and even space operations such as ASAT probably. In conclusion, China is sincerely fulfilling its military strategy through consistent satellite development. On the other hand, besides “informationization,” “local war” is another focus of the strategic guidelines. China’s land border and near seas are supposed to be the range defined by the word “local.” For example, the possible war in the Taiwan Strait is just the thing that “local wars” imply. The focus on “local wars” implies China considers its national interests mainly concentrated in this region so far. While China’s national interests are expanding globally, there is an urgent need for China to cultivate global dominance in order to safeguard its global interests such as the BRI (The Belt and Road Initiative). Meanwhile, China is pursuing global information dominance based on the rapid development of remote sensing, navigation and communication satellites. It is believed that C4ISR capabilities will be able to serve its traditional and nontraditional operations globally in the near future. To conclude, China’s military strategy has been used to lead satellite development. On the contrary, the cutting-edge satellites with globally operational capabilities will somehow change China’s military thinking and lead to the revision of its military strategy. The strategic guideline of “winning the informationized local war” will be abandoned sooner or later. “Winning the informationized war globally” might be the next focus. Notes 1. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1967), 335. 2. Arthur Ding, PLA’s Evolving Military Theory, 1978–1991 (Taipei: Tonsan Publisher, 1996), 28. [in Chinese]; The PLA doctrine of “active defense” calls for forward positioning, frontier defense, engagement of the enemy at or over the border and potential engagement in conflict beyond China’s immediate periphery. See S. Gopal and Nabeel A. Mancheri, Rise of China: Indian Perspective (Lancer Publishers LLC, 2012). 3. Ye Yonglie, All about Tsien Hsue-Shen (Sichuan: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, July 2016), 366. [in Chinese] 4. Li Qian, “Blasting into Space: Meet China’s Long March Family of Rockets,” CGTN.COM, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d516a4e34517a4d/share_p.html (accessed July 17, 2018). 5. Liu XianJi and Wang YiMin, eds., Deng Xiaoping Military Theory Course (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, May 2000), 15. [in Chinese] 6. Ibid., 21. 7. Liao ShuHsien, “Will China Become a Military Space Superpower ?,” Space Policy 21 (2005): 206–07. 8. National Research Council, C4ISR for Future Naval Strike Groups (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2006), 104–31. 9. Ministry of National Defense of PRC, “China’s National Defense in 2000,” http://www.mod. gov.cn/big5/regulatory/2011-01/07/content_4617805.htm (accessed August 10, 2018). [in Chinese] 10. “China’s Space Activities (2000),” www.gov.cn, November 2000, http://www.gov.cn/english/ official/2005-07/27/content_17656.htm (accessed February 23, 2019). 11. MND of PRC, “China’s National Defense in 2004,” http://www.mod.gov.cn/big5/ 118 Yuan-Chou Jing regulatory/2011-01/06/content_4617807.htm (accessed August 10, 2018). [in Chinese] 12. SCIO, “China’s Military Strategy (2015),” http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2015-05/26/ content_4588132.htm (accessed July 13, 2018). [in Chinese] 13. Rand Corporation, “The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2058.html (accessed July 13, 2018). 14. Eugen Siteanu, “The Military Strategy and Other Types of Strategies,” Annals: Series on Military Sciences 2, no. 1 (2010): 93–100. 15. Xiao Tianliang, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2015), 13–16. [in Chinese] 16. Ibid., 9–16. 17. Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao (Shanghai: China Xinhua Bookstore, June 1991), 168– 238. [in Chinese] 18. Liu and Wang, Deng Xiaoping Military Theory Course, 41. 19. Yuan Dejin, “Mao Zedong and the Establishment and Adjustment of the New China’s Military Strategic Policy,” Military History Research, no. 1 (2010): 26. [in Chinese] 20. Deng: “we have made two important changes in our assessment of the international situation and in our policy….The first change is in our understanding of the question of war and peace,… conclude that it is possible that there will be no large scale war for a fairy long time to come…; the second change is in our foreign policy. In view of the threat of Soviet hegemonism, over the years we formed a strategic line of defense…. Now we have altered our strategy and this represents a major change.” See Yang Yingying, The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, (Taipei: Earth Publishing House, 1994), 142–44. [in Chinese] 21. PLA Academy of Military Sciences, The Science of Military Strategy 2013 (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2013), 47. [in Chinese] 22. Liu XianJi and Wang YiMin, eds., Deng Xiaoping Military Theory Course, 21. 23. PLA Academy of Military Sciences, The Science of Military Strategy 2013, 47. 24. Xiao ZhiLin and Hu Jiangang, Research on Jiang Zemin’s Thinking of Military Innovation (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2004), 141–49. [in Chinese]; The Two Basic Changes: 1) Change from a model of quantity and scale to one of quality and effectiveness; 2) Change from a labor-intensive to a technology-intensive model. Ng Ka Po, Interpreting China’s Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness (London: Routledge, 2005), Appendix 4: Major Events in PLA Doctrinal Development. 25. PLA Academy of Military Sciences, The Science of Military Strategy 2013, 47. 26. MND of PRC, “China’s National Defense in 2000.” 27. MND of PRC, “China’s National Defense in 2004.” 28. Two Incompatibles: “the main contradiction in our army building is still that the level of our modernization is incompatible with the demands of winning a partial war under informationization conditions, and our military capability is incompatible with the demands of carrying out the army’s historic missions in the new century and new stage.” The editorial committee on party literature of the central committee of the CPC, The Selected Works of Hu Jintao, 3 vols. (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2016), 40. [in Chinese] 29. The State Council of The PRC, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” October 27, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/19thcpc/baogao. htm (accessed July 13, 2018). 30. SCIO, “China’s Military Strategy (2015).” 31. The sources of data regarding china’s satellite: NASA, NASA Space Science Date Coordinated Archive, https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/SpacecraftQuery.jsp (accessed May 2018); and N2YO. com, https://www.n2yo.com/ (accessed May 2018). 32. The Union of Concerned Scientists classifies satellites into three major categories on the basis of purpose, which this paper uses as a reference: 1) Application Satellites (including Earth Observation Satellites, Communications Satellites, Navigation Satellites); 2) Technology The Study of China’s Military Strategy and Satellite Development 119 Development Satellites; 3) Science Satellites (including Space Science and Earth Science). See The Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database,” https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear- weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.W2uL4ygzbIU (accessed May 18, 2018). 33. “PRC 6,” NASA Space Science Data Coordinated Archive, https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/ spacecraft/display.action?id=1976-087A (accessed November 27, 2017). 34. Lin Huabao, Recoverable Satellite (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2002), 10–13. [in Chinese] 35. Brian Harvey, China in Space: The Great Leap Forward (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 105–06. 36. A Charge Coupled Device (CCD) is a highly sensitive photon detector. The CCD is divided up into a large number of small light-sensitive areas (known as pixels) which can be used to build up an image of the scene of interest. “An Introduction to CCD Operation,” http: //www.iisc. ernet.in/currsci/jun10/articles16.htm (accessed July 13, 2018). 37. Sun Weichun, “A Study of the China’s Capabilities for Space Information Support” (master’s thesis, FHK College, NDU, 2018), 45–48. [in Chinese] 38. Among these satellites, the information of Lishui 1 (麗水一號) and Ludikancha Weixing series (陸地勘查系列) is not released by the Chinese officials, so both satellites are categorized as undisclosed. 39. NASA Space Science Data Coordinated Archive, https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/ SpacecraftQuery.jsp (accessed July 29, 2018). For example, six of the satellites––the Yaogan 9 made up of three co-launched satellites (9 A, 9 B, 9 C), the Yaogan 16(16 A, 16 B 16 C), the Yaogan 17 (17 A, 17 B and 17 C), the Yaogan 20 (20A, 20B and 20 C), the Yaogan 25 (25A, 25B and 25C) and the most recently launched Yaogan 31 (31A, 31B and 31C)–– form an Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite cluster. These are the satellites that enable identification and coarse tracking of objects of interest such as an aircraft carrier strike force. See S. Chandrashekar and N. Ramani, “China’s Space Power & Military Strategy––The role of the Yaogan Satellites,” National Institute of Advanced Studies, 9, http://isssp.in/wp-content/ uploads/2018/07/Chinas-Space-Policy_July2018.pdf (accessed February 23, 2019). 40. “LKW 2,” NASA Space Science Data Coordinated Archive, https: //nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/ spacecraftDisplay.do?id=2017-084A (accessed July 29, 2018). 41. According to Article 12 of the Emergency Response Law of the People’s Republic of China, “To respond to an emergency, the relevant people’s government and its departments may expropriate the property of units and individuals.”; In Article 52, “… when necessary, expropriate from units or individuals equipment, facilities, premises, means of transportation and other materials needed for emergency rescue, …..” See http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/ content_1471589.htm (accessed July 30, 2018). 42. Ma Chenkun, China’s Security Strategy and Military Development (Taipei: Hwa Li Publishing Co., Ltd., 2008), 337–39. [in Chinese] ; “Chinasat 1C,” NASA Space Science Date Coordinated Archive, https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft/display.action?id=2015-073A (accessed July 9, 2018); and “Chinasat 2C,” NASA Space Science Date Coordinated Archive, https: // nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraftDisplay.do?id=2015-063A (accessed July 9, 2018). 43. You ZengLu, Military Satellite Communication System (Beijing: Chinese PLA Publishing House, 2010), 94. [in Chinese] 44. Ibid., 24. 45. Sun Weichun, “A Study of the China’s Capabilities for Space Information Support,” 197. 46. Editorial Board on the Philosophical Thoughts of China’s Aerospace Development, Philosophical Thoughts on the Development of China’s Space Industry, 2nd ed. (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2016), 155–60. 47. SCIO, “China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System,” June 2016, http://www.scio.gov.cn/ zfbps/ndhf/34120/Document/1480623/1480623.htm (accessed August 10, 2018). [in Chinese] 48. Ibid. 49. Satellites can be classified into Large: >1000 kg, Medium: 500 to 1000 kg, Mini: 100 to 500 kg, Micro: 10 to 100 kg, Nano: 1 to 10 kg, Pico: 0.1 to 1 kg, Femto: <0.1 kg. Normally, those 120 Yuan-Chou Jing satellites with masses below 10 kg will be categorized as Nano satellites. “Modern Small Satellites: Changing the Economics of Space,” Proceedings of the IEEE 106, no. 3 (March 2018): 344, https: //ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8303876 (accessed August 6, 2018). It is difficult to speculate the mass of satellites if the rocket carried more than one satellite, so that four of the 85 satellites, including the Tianyuan 1, Tiange 1 and 2 and Shiyan 5, are categorized as undisclosed. 50. Bill Gertz, “China Testing New Space Weapons,” The Washington Free Beacon, October 2, 2013, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-testing-new-space-weapons/ (accessed February 17, 2019). 51. Editorial Board on the Philosophical Thoughts of China’s Aerospace Development, Philosophical Thoughts on the Development of China’s Space Industry, 53–61. 52. Ibid., 139. 53. Liu and Wang, Deng Xiaoping Military Theory Course, 21. 54. Sun Weichun, “A Study of China’s Capabilities for Space Information Support,” 43. 55. The Selected Works of Hu Jintao, 40. 56. “LKW 1,” NASA Space Science Data Coordinated Archive, https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/ spacecraft/display.action?id=2017-077A (accessed July 9, 2018). Notes on Contributor Yuan-Chou Jing is an assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies (GICMAS), Fu Hsing Kang College, National Defense University, Taiwan, R.O.C. His research interests focus on China’s military affairs and Japan’s defense policy. Dr. Jing served as a Director of the Intelligence Division in Army Command Headquarters before coming to GICMAS. He was also a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council located in Washington, D.C. in 2005 and Defense Research Center, Tokyo, in 2014. Dr. Jing holds a master’s degree in political science from National Taiwan University and Ph.D. in political science from National Taiwan Normal University.