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Rejoinder of Greece INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ________________________________________________________ CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERIM ACCORD OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1995 (THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA v. GREECE) REJOINDER OF GREECE VOLUME I ________________________________________________________ 27 OCTOBER 2010 2 VOLUME I 3 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 11 A. The Subject-Matter of the Dispute ........................................................................................ 11 B. The Overall Character of the Case ......................................................................................... 14 C. Structure of this Rejoinder ..................................................................................................... 18 CHAPTER 2: THE INTERIM ACCORD ......................................................................... 21 A. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 21 B. The Interim Accord as a ―synallagmatic agreement‖ ............................................................ 21 1. The FYROM‟s bald denial of the synallagmatic character of the Interim Accord ........... 22 2. The contention that Article 11(1) is a self-contained provision ........................................ 23 3. The claim that the obligations allegedly violated by the FYROM are not synallagmatic . 24 C. The Interim Accord as a Provisional Protective Framework ................................................. 31 D. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 33 CHAPTER 3: JURISDICTION ............................................................................................ 35 A. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 35 B. The Dispute Concerns the Difference Referred to in Article 5(1) and is Therefore Excluded by Article 21(2) from the Jurisdiction of the Court ............................................................... 44 C. The Dispute is Excluded from the Court‘s Jurisdiction by Article 22 ................................... 50 D. Because the Dispute Concerns Conduct Attributable to NATO, the Court Cannot Exercise Jurisdiction ............................................................................................................................ 55 E. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 61 CHAPTER 4: INHERENT LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF THE COURT‘S JUDICIAL FUNCTION .................................................................................... 63 A. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 63 B. The Court‘s Judgment Would Be Incapable of Effective Application .................................. 65 1. The Judgment cannot have an effect upon the Applicant‟s admission to NATO ............... 65 2. Any extension of the Request to cover membership in other international institutions is inadmissible ...................................................................................................................... 71 C. Interference with On-Going Diplomatic Negotiations Mandated by the Security Council would be Incompatible with the Court‘s Judicial Function ................................................... 73 D. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 76 CHAPTER 5: THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 11, PARAGRAPH 1 .... 77 A. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 77 5 B. The Relation Between Article 11, paragraph 1 and Article 22 .............................................. 78 1. The FYROM‟s denial that Article 22 is an effective provision of the treaty ..................... 79 2. The FYROM‟s denial of the correlative character of rights and obligations ................... 82 3. The FYROM‟s misleading interpretation of the European Union clauses in Articles 14 and 19 .. ………………………………………………………………………………... 83 4. The FYROM‟s interpretation of Article 22 is inconsistent with the Admissions Opinion 85 C. The Content of the Obligation ―not to object‖ ....................................................................... 88 1. The FYROM‟s attempt to expand the plain meaning of “not to object” ........................... 89 2. The practice of other organizations does not expand the meaning of “not to object” ..... 90 3. The FYROM‟s rejection of other evidence confirming the plain meaning of the text ....... 92 4. Conclusion as to the FYROM‟s Reply on the phrase “not to object” ............................... 96 D. The Safeguard Clause ............................................................................................................ 97 1. The FYROM ignores the syntax of the safeguard clause .................................................. 98 2. The future tense of the safeguard clause condition ......................................................... 102 3. Greece‟s margin of appreciation to consider relevant factors when judging whether the FYROM “is to be referred to in” NATO differently than as stipulated .......................... 103 E. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 105 CHAPTER 6: GREECE DID NOT BREACH ITS OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 11, PARAGRAPH 1 .......................................................................................... 107 A. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 107 B. Greece participated in the NATO decision of 3 April 2008 in accordance with its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty ........................................................................................... 107 1. NATO was clear as to the requirements which the FYROM had to meet to be eligible for an invitation to accede to the organization ..................................................................... 108 (a) NATO statements on the need for a settlement ............................................................ 110 (b) The act of settling the difference is not for NATO to perform ..................................... 114 (c) The FYROM‘s denial that the name difference presents any regional security concern . 115 2. Greece‟s participation in NATO decision-making is not predetermined by a third party agreement ........................................................................................................................ 119 3. The NATO member States, including Greece, applied NATO‟s accession criteria when they reached consensus on the FYROM‟s candidacy ...................................................... 121 C. The Safeguard Clause Condition was met at all Relevant Times ........................................ 123 6 1. Factors had been present for some time indicating that the safeguard clause condition were met .......................................................................................................................... 123 2. The relevance of the FYROM‟s persistent failure to use the stipulated name ................ 128 3. The FYROM‟s institutional and bilateral diplomacy since 1995 supports the conclusion that the FYROM “is to be referred to in” NATO differently than stipulated .................. 129 4. Greece‟s prior statements identified that the safeguard clause condition was met ........ 133 D. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 134 CHAPTER 7: THE FYROM‘S BREACHES OF THE INTERIM ACCORD ..... 136 A. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 136 B. Remarks on the Admissibility of the Evidence ................................................................... 138 C. The FYROM‘s Violations of Article 11 .............................................................................. 141 1. Article 11, paragraph 1, Imposes Obligations upon the Applicant as to the Use of the Provisional Name ......................................................................................................... 142 2. Repeated Efforts by the FYROM to Impose the Use of its Claimed Name ................... 150 3. Greece Has Protested against the Use by the FYROM of the Claimed Name ............. 160 D. The FYROM‘s Breaches of Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Interim Accord and of the Principle of Good Faith Negotiations ................................................................................................. 166 1. The FYROM‟s Unilateral Attempts to Redefine the Scope of the Ongoing Negotiations 167 2. The FYROM‟s Strategy to Deprive the Negotiations of their Object and Purpose ......... 170 3. The Violation of an Obligation of Result under the Interim Accord ............................... 175 E. Material Breaches by the FYROM of Other Articles of the Interim Accord ....................... 177 F. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................
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