Political Instability in Ukraine
Ukraine lies in a strategic position between Europe and Asia. To its west holds a strong European pull, while its east experiences a large Russian influence. Since the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine has struggled to form its own identity. Russian influence is constantly looming in their country due to its close proximity between Western and Eastern policies and cultures. As a result, Ukraine had developed an identity crisis through “the West’s desire [for] a ‘stable, democratic government,’ and adher[ance] to the
Westphalian commitment to the sanctity of borders…,”1 while the eastern regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, as well as the Crimean Peninsula hold very strong political, ethnic, and national ties to Russia.
Circa 10th and 11th centuries, Kiev Ukraine (then known as Kyivan Rus) was the political and cultural epicenter and first established Slavic state of all of Eastern Europe; moreover, it stood out as one of the most significant powers in all of Europe. This political power was soon brought to an end as
Mongols began to invade and establish what is known as the Golden Horde in the mid 13th century and overtook much of the territory. Midway through the 14th century and on until the 15th, the Polish and
Lithuanian commonwealth descended southeast to overtake much of the northern and western parts of
Ukraine, and soon after, the Crimean Khanate disbanded from the Golden Horde in order to take over the southern territory. This effectively created one of the more important Turkic states within the Ottoman
Empire and the Horde was able to hold its ground up until the late 18th century when Imperialist Russia annexed the land. Over the course of the next century, Russia made several attempts to Russify the now-absorbed colonies and join the cultures, unite policy measures, and combine economic efforts to strengthen the foundation of the empire, while simultaneously imposing bans on Ukrainian language within the confines of its country.2 While Russia was certainly attempting to establish its dominance through expansion both physically, politically, and culturally, the people of Ukraine experienced
1 Alan Smithee, “Ukraine: The Legacy Of Colonialism” Center for a Stateless Society, March 2, 2004 c4ss.org/content/25055. 2 “Ukraine Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123.
1 extensive development within the realms of “literature, education, and historical research,”3 which subsequently brought to light more of a national consciousness. The very presence of Russia looming overhead seemed to act as a catalyst for increased nationalism and a strive for a free society not subjugated to foreign influence or rule.
Imperialist Russia dissolved in 1917, leading to the Bolshevik Revolution and the rise in power of
Vladimir Lenin in Russia, and also to the independence of Ukraine for a mere 5 years before the Soviet
Union gave them no other option than to join in 1922. Ukraine soon suffered a massive blow to the country with the genocide known as Holodomor, a man-made famine during the years of 1932-33 which
“at [it’s] height, people [died] at the rate of 30,000 a day, nearly a third of them [were] children under
10.”4 This was a retaliation from Stalin due to the rural farmers reluctance in Ukraine to take up agricultural collectivization measures, so he imposed unrealistic quotas on the farmers to grow as much crop as they could so that he could in turn export it. Afterward, he denied them any right to their product of their work and further employed several measures to enforce his decisions, consequently leading to widespread famine. The implications of the famine are even more severe when one takes into account
Ukraine’s historical reliance on the agricultural sector as a means to provide both physically and financially for oneself and one’s family. This was clearly a direct attack to all of the hard working
Ukrainians and a means to display control and subjugate an entire cultural group.
Ukraine regained independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but is still a developing nation. First elected into office was Leonid Kravchuk. Kravchuk implemented a foreign policy centered around strengthening formal sovereignty and developing further ties with the west. This policy included the refusal of the commonwealth currency and armed forces. His ideology was focused not
3 Oleksa Eliseyovich Zasenko and Ihor Stebelsky, “Ukraine under Direct Imperial Russian Rule” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Ukraine-under-direct-imperial-Russian-rule. 4 “Holodomor Facts and History: Chronology of Events Surrounding the Famine.” Holodomor 1932-33, holodomorct.org/holodomor-facts-and-history/.
2 primarily on NATO expansion, but rather on Ukraine having an equal standing with central European countries. His presidency was followed by Leonid Kuchma in 1994 who was re-elected for a second term in 1999. Kuchma, much like Kravchuck, was intent on furthering relations with the west. He stated that
Ukraine would sign an agreement with the EU that included a free trade policy, and by 2004, would meet all the necessary membership requirements. However, amidst many surrounding corruption scandals,
Kuchma began to abandon his previous foreign policy and looked to Russia for aid. This was the first sign of the back and forth between ideologies regarding strengthening Western relations, and Russian ties.
Kuchma then appointed Viktor Yushchenko as Prime Minister who served until 2004 when he and Viktor
Yanukovych faced off for the presidential elections, the results of which sparked the Orange Revolution.
The two competitors drew support from vastly different crowds. Yanukovych for one, “drew his main political support from oligarchs from the Donets[k] (Donbas) region of eastern Ukraine, which was also fairly pro-Russian,”5 and he was also very clearly seeking closer ties to Russia. These supports were mainly based in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, whereas Yushchenko was favored by
Western Europe and other affiliated allies, as well as citizens from western Ukraine. While the election results indicated that it was Yanukovych who won the race, they were seen by many as fabricated and this ultimately lead to a series of peaceful protests which prompted re-elections and earned a victory for
Yushchenko and those seeking western alliance. This administration held up until 2010 when
Yanukovych won the seat in office due to “financial support from wealthy industrialists in eastern
Ukraine, as well as promises to fight poverty.”6 Much like during his earlier attempt to run for presidency, the support he gained was from predominantly pro-Russian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk within
Ukraine. Later in 2013 Yanukovych would suspend any trade between Ukraine and the European Union,
5 “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy.” Every CRS Report, Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2017, www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33460.html. 6 Polina Ivanova and Gareth Jones, “Timeline: Events in Ukraine's Political History since 1991.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, March 29, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-election-timeline/timeline-events-in-ukraines-political-history-since- 1991-idUSKCN1RA2HX.
3 in favor of economic ties with Moscow, rather. In addition to trade suspensions, negotiations on the association agreement which would bond the two parties, but also bond Ukraine to Euratom (the
European Atomic Energy Community) would be reversed. These two actions would lead to the Maidan
Revolution of 2014 which, in short, lead to the downfall of Yanukovych who was driven from office by violent protests in Kiev.7 Kremlin-backed forces then took advantage of the situation, taking control of the Crimean peninsula, which has a sizeable Russian-speaking majority and agreed to be absorbed by
Russia in a referendum. The revolution also brought Petro Poroshenko to power who has remained in office up until recently.
Much of the history of Ukraine highlights the issue of securing and maintaining a sense of national identity in the face of looming foreign or regional interest, in particular, that of Russia, and more recently “Putin regime’s nakedly imperialistic desire to secure hegemony over more territory”.8
Anton Bebler states, in the Romanian Journal of European Affairs, the Crimean conflict consists of three main parties, all with mixed authority: the Republic of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. “The annexation of Crimea encouraged the Russian-speaking separatists in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, who apparently hoped that Moscow will repeat the same scenario. The mass unrest, anti-Kiev demonstrations, tearing down Ukrainian state symbols and hoisting up Russian national flags, breaking-in and occupying numerous official buildings took place in April
2014 in a number of Ukrainian cities.”9 Crimea has a large Russian-speaking majority. “According to the last census held by Ukraine in 2001, more than 58% of Crimea self-identifies as ethnically Russian, and
77% of Crimeans said their native language was Russian,” states Al Jazeera.10
7 “Crimea Profile.” BBC News, January 17, 2018 www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18287223. 8 Alan Smithee 9 Anton Bebler, “Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict” Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 15:1 (2015): 35–54. 10 Hashem Said. “Map: Russian Language Dominant in Crimea.” Al Jazeera America, March 15, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/3/map-russian-the-dominantlanguageincrimea.html.
4 Bebler states that Russian President Vladimir Putin and official Russian propaganda used the
Crimean people’s secession vote as the primary reason to justify the annexation, along with Crimea’s strong historic ties to Russia. “As a consequence of the conflict, Ukraine lost about three percent of its state territory, about five percent of its population and about 3.6 percent of its GNP. Also lost were a good part of Ukraine’s territorial waters and of its exclusive economic zone, which potentially contains rich oil and gas deposits, considerable civilian and military state property, most of its military personnel stationed on Crimea, and practically the entire Black Sea Fleet.”11 The Washington Post states, as of 2018, that conflict in Donbas and Eastern Ukraine is starting its fifth year, with a death toll of over 10,000 people,
2,800 of which were civilians. If people decide to remain in their homes, almost two million will be put at risk or internally displaced.12 Russian military involvement played a large role in the Crimean crisis. In
February of 2014, Russian soldiers occupied key regions and infrastructure within Crimea. These troops posed as an opposition to Euro-maidan movement and were able to establish control of the Crimean parliament, which played a role in the annexation of Crimea. Putin announced that in light of the annexation, he would establish a Russian task force, and increase its military presence in the region.
These said military entities then raised a renewed conflict in 2006 with NATO’s announcement that
Russia was deploying nuclear weapons into Crimea. On August 8th, Ukraine reported that Russia had increased its military presence within Crimea, and shortly after, Ukraine’s president Petro Poroshenko warned that Russia was preparing an invasion that Europe is unable to prevent. The US and NATO in light of this Russian presence provided aid to Ukraine in the form of money, economic resources, and Air
Force monitoring. Despite the clear Russian presence, they have since denied any knowledge of their organized presence in Ukraine and Crimea.
11 Anton Bebler. 12 Cynthia Buckley, et al. “The War in Ukraine Is More Devastating than You Know.” The Washington Post, WP Company, April 9, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/09/the-war-in-ukraine-is-more-devastating-th an-you-know/?utm_term=.7c8a33f10521.
5 Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe with fertile plains to its west and minerals and industries in its east, while southern Ukraine has the Crimea Peninsula with its coast-line of The Black
Sea. Crimea holds a particularly strategic location, serving as a connection between Europe, Russia, Asia, and the Middle East and is currently in Russian control (CIA.gov).
Ukraine’s reliance on Russia for natural resources makes it difficult for them to completely separate themselves. The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the ongoing tensions in eastern Ukraine can be traced back to the natural resources present in both regions. Through claiming Crimea, a peninsula in the Black Sea that is rich in natural resources, as its own, Russia also claimed the natural gas that is essential to both countries. Additionally, “Ukraine has extremely rich and complementary mineral resources in high concentrations and close proximity to each other.”13 One can draw the assumption that
Russia is interested in Ukraine because of these resources, especially the coal mines. Natural resources clearly play a part in Russia’s intentions in the region, therefore having an indirect role within the conflict.
This demonstrates the many factors that must be considered when analyzing the crisis in Ukraine. One may not expect natural resources to play such a large role, but the dependency Ukraine has toward Russia for natural gas has been “a key source of strife between the two nations for several years.”14 This just adds to the already mounting tension that has been happening between these two countries for the past five years.
Geographically, Ukraine lies in a strategic position between Europe and Asia. Its proximity to both leaves the country in an unusual position, culturally and politically. Its west holds a strong European pull, while its east experiences a large Russian influence. As a result, Ukraine’s geographic position as the
13 Encyclopedia Britannica, Online, s.c. “Ukraine Resources and Power.” https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Resources-and-power. 14 Kiley Kroh and Igor Volsky. “How A Fight Over Natural Resources Is Quietly Driving The World’s Response To Ukraine.” Thinkprogress. March 2014, thinkprogress.org.
6 crossroads between Eastern and Western policies and ideals leaves the country greatly divided on which foreign influence to embrace.15
Ukraine lacks a sense of national identity that transcends societal divisions. Citizens have been torn for decades on whether Ukraine should be pro-Russia or pro-Europe, and ever since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, there has been a struggle for a national identity that ties the citizens together.
The question of whether or not Ukraine should integrate with the EU began the initial crisis in the country. The rejection of signing a trade agreement with the EU did not only lead to President
Yanukovych’s removal from office, it highlighted the lack of national identity within the country.
Because of this lack of unity, it is difficult for Ukraine to be a successful state. Additionally, the lack of an original identity of their own that can unify the entire nation stems from Ukraine being linked to Russia for so long. During the most recent presidential election, Volodymyr Zelenski “triumphed in every region, except for the area around the city of Lviv, a center of Ukrainian culture and nationalism in the west of the country.”16 This emphasized the debate between whether Ukraine should strive for a single national identity, with one unique culture and language, or should accept its multiculturalism and diversity.
Despite this debate, Russia’s attacks on Ukraine have started to help a national identity emerge in the country, “uniting diverse communities in the face of a common enemy and creating an overarching sense of identity that might otherwise have taken decades to emerge.”17 Because of this crisis, citizens have been banding together in the face of the hybrid war. Some Ukrainians feel a sense of loyalty towards
Russia, which makes this crisis all the more complicated. The current crisis is not only about the dispute with Russia, but about the dispute about Ukraine’s identity.
15 The United State of America, Central Intelligence Agency Library, “Europe: Ukraine” The World Factbook, April 23, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html. 16 Andrew Higgins and Iuliia Mendel, “Ukraine Election: Volodymyr Zelensky, TV Comedian Trounces President” The New York Times, April 2019, www.nytimes.com. 17 Peter Dickinson and Ivan Lozowy, “National Identity Debate: Should Kyiv embrace country's multicultural heritage or strive for a more Ukrainian Ukraine?” BUNews, March 2017 bunews.com.
7 Ukraine is dominated by foreign actors exhibiting both hard and soft power. The European
Union and NATO use a soft power using attraction, positive conditionality, financial assistance, and capacity building, while Russia rules with a hard power through negative externalities and coercion while capitalizing on existing energy and trade interdependencies. This resulted in two competing foreign policy visions being interchangeably practiced.
Foreign actors hold power of Ukraine through their ability to control their economy. According to the Index of Economic Freedom, Ukraine’s economy ranks last in Europe and is below global averages.
The Index of Economic Freedom also states that Ukraine lacks economic infrastructure and is poorly fighting corruption and has failed to create capital markets. Russian action in the region continues to destabilize the country and has increased the economic instability in the country. Russia has the ability to influence the country as their largest trade partner.18
With an unstable economy and low GDP per capita, citizens struggle to find and support a power that would help individual needs and grow the economy. According to the World Bank, Ukraine is one of the most economically equal countries in the world. While the country may be equal, they are equally poor. In 2018, Ukraine had a GDP of 112.2 Billion USD and a GDP per capita of 2,639.82 USD.19
Ukraine’s rank on the index is 52.3% making the country mostly unfree when talking about economic freedom. 64% of all Ukrainian adults have access to banking, yet due to Russian intervention trade and foreign investments are being undercut.20 The equally poor Ukrainian economy has hindered citizens from increasing wealth and creating a substantial middle class.
A prospective membership into the EU and NATO served as a primary pull towards Western foreign policy while implementing a multivector foreign policy that intended to balance the West and the
18 “Ukraine.” Ukraine Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption, Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/index/country/ukraine. 19 “Overview.” The World Bank, The World Bank Group, www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview. 20 Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/index/country/ukraine.
8 East without giving priority to either.21 From 1991-1994, Leonid Kravchuk’s presidency held a pro-Western foreign policy due to Ukraine’s possible membership into the EU and NATO. This integration into Western security coalitions would have ensured Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence.
In 1994, pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma entered office and implemented a new type of foreign policy that interrogated a friendly relationship with both the West and the East, which became known as multivector foreign policy. Since then, Ukraine has bounced back-and-forth between the East and the West while still holding strong to its multivector policy. Ukraine’s independence has been spent searching for a balance between its “aspirations to integrate into the EU and transatlantic security structures and being a ‘good neighbor’ to Russia.”22
According to the World Bank, to secure economic prosperity, Ukraine needs to focus on
“stabilizing and restructuring the banking sector, adopting a health reform package, moving forward on pension reform, and establishing anti-corruption agencies and asset disclosure for public officials, all the while contending with powerful vested interests that continue to oppose reforms.”23 Geographically, Ukraine sits between the western world and Russia which constantly tears the country apart through military conflict and national identity crisis from past and present events. These foreign nations have strong influence on Ukraine’s political system and economy, this subsequently is forcing the country in several directions thus hindering efforts to promote national growth and stability.
Works Cited
21 Karina Shyrokykh, “The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine: External Actors and Domestic Factors”, Europe-Asia Studies, 70:5, (June 22, 2018): 832-850, https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.wwu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2018.1479734. 22 Karina Shyrokykh, 832-850. 23 World Bank, www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview.
9 Bebler, Anton. “Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict.” Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 15:1(2015), 35–54.
Buckley, Cynthia, et al. “The War in Ukraine Is More Devastating than You Know.” The Washington Post, WP Company, (April 9, 2018) www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/09/the-war-in-ukraine-is-more-devast ating-than-you-know/?utm_term=.7c8a33f10521.
“Crimea Profile.” BBC News, (January 17, 2018) www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18287223.
Dickinson, Peter and Ivan Lozowy, “National Identity Debate: Should Kyiv embrace country's multicultural heritage or strive for a more Ukrainian Ukraine?”, BUNews, (March 2017) bunews.com.
Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.c. “Ukraine Resources and Power.” https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Resources-and-power.
Graham, Darin. “Crimea Crisis: What Is Happening between Ukraine and Russia? | Euronews Answers.” Euronews, (November 30, 2018), www.euronews.com/2018/11/30/crimea-crisis-what-is-happening-between-ukraine-and-russia-eu ronews-answers.
Higgins, Andrew and Iuliia Mendel, “Ukraine Election: Volodymyr Zelensky, TV Comedian Trounces President”, The New York Times, (April, 2019) www.nytimes.com.
“Holodomor Facts and History: Chronology of Events Surrounding the Famine.” Holodomor 1932-33, holodomorct.org/holodomor-facts-and-history/.
Ivanova, Polina, and Gareth Jones. “Timeline: Events in Ukraine's Political History since 1991.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, (March 29, 2019) www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-election-timeline/timeline-events-in-ukraines-political-histor y-since-1991-idUSKCN1RA2HX.
Kim, Lucian. “Why The Crisis Between Ukraine And Russia Has Taken To The Sea.” NPR, (November 28, 2018), www.npr.org/2018/11/28/671615172/why-the-crisis-between-ukraine-and-russia-has-taken-to-the -sea.
Kroh, Kiley and Igor Volsky. “How A Fight Over Natural Resources Is Quietly Driving The World’s Response To Ukraine.” ThinkProgress, (March 2014) thinkprogress.org.
“Overview.” World Bank, The World Bank Group, www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview.
10 Said, Hashem, “Map: Russian Language Dominant in Crimea.” Al Jazeera America, (March 15, 2014)http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/3/map-russian-the-dominantlanguageincrime a.html
Shyrokykh, Karina ,“The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine: External Actors and Domestic Factors”, Europe-Asia Studies, 70:5, (June 22, 2018): 832-850, https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.wwu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2018.1479734 . Smithee, Alan. “Ukraine: The Legacy Of Colonialism.” Center for a Stateless Society, (March 2, 2004) c4ss.org/content/25055.
The United State of America, Central Intelligence Agency Library, “Europe: Ukraine” The World Factbook (April 23, 2019), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html.
“Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy.” EveryCRSReport.com, Congressional Research Service (3 January 3, 2017) www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33460.html.
“Ukraine Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC , www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123.
“Ukraine.” Ukraine Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption, Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/index/country/ukraine.
Zasenko, Oleksa Eliseyovich and Ihor Stebelsky. “Ukraine under Direct Imperial Russian Rule.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Ukraine-under-direct-imperial-Russian-rule.
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