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Political Instability in Ukraine Ukraine Lies in a Strategic Position Between Political Instability in Ukraine Ukraine lies in a strategic position between Europe and Asia. To its west holds a strong European pull, while its east experiences a large Russian influence. Since the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine has struggled to form its own identity. Russian influence is constantly looming in their country due to its close proximity between Western and Eastern policies and cultures. As a result, Ukraine had developed an identity crisis through “the West’s desire [for] a ‘stable, democratic government,’ and adher[ance] to the Westphalian commitment to the sanctity of borders…,”1 while the eastern regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, as well as the Crimean Peninsula hold very strong political, ethnic, and national ties to Russia. Circa 10th and 11th centuries, Kiev Ukraine (then known as Kyivan Rus) was the political and cultural epicenter and first established Slavic state of all of Eastern Europe; moreover, it stood out as one of the most significant powers in all of Europe. This political power was soon brought to an end as Mongols began to invade and establish what is known as the Golden Horde in the mid 13th century and overtook much of the territory. Midway through the 14th century and on until the 15th, the Polish and Lithuanian commonwealth descended southeast to overtake much of the northern and western parts of Ukraine, and soon after, the Crimean Khanate disbanded from the Golden Horde in order to take over the southern territory. This effectively created one of the more important Turkic states within the Ottoman Empire and the Horde was able to hold its ground up until the late 18th century when Imperialist Russia annexed the land. Over the course of the next century, Russia made several attempts to Russify the now-absorbed colonies and join the cultures, unite policy measures, and combine economic efforts to strengthen the foundation of the empire, while simultaneously imposing bans on Ukrainian language within the confines of its country.2 While Russia was certainly attempting to establish its dominance through expansion both physically, politically, and culturally, the people of Ukraine experienced 1 Alan Smithee, “Ukraine: The Legacy Of Colonialism” Center for a Stateless Society, March 2, 2004 ​ ​ ​ c4ss.org/content/25055. 2 “Ukraine Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ 1 extensive development within the realms of “literature, education, and historical research,”3 which subsequently brought to light more of a national consciousness. The very presence of Russia looming overhead seemed to act as a catalyst for increased nationalism and a strive for a free society not subjugated to foreign influence or rule. Imperialist Russia dissolved in 1917, leading to the Bolshevik Revolution and the rise in power of Vladimir Lenin in Russia, and also to the independence of Ukraine for a mere 5 years before the Soviet Union gave them no other option than to join in 1922. Ukraine soon suffered a massive blow to the country with the genocide known as Holodomor, a man-made famine during the years of 1932-33 which “at [it’s] height, people [died] at the rate of 30,000 a day, nearly a third of them [were] children under 10.”4 This was a retaliation from Stalin due to the rural farmers reluctance in Ukraine to take up agricultural collectivization measures, so he imposed unrealistic quotas on the farmers to grow as much crop as they could so that he could in turn export it. Afterward, he denied them any right to their product of their work and further employed several measures to enforce his decisions, consequently leading to widespread famine. The implications of the famine are even more severe when one takes into account Ukraine’s historical reliance on the agricultural sector as a means to provide both physically and financially for oneself and one’s family. This was clearly a direct attack to all of the hard working Ukrainians and a means to display control and subjugate an entire cultural group. Ukraine regained independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but is still a developing nation. First elected into office was Leonid Kravchuk. Kravchuk implemented a foreign policy centered around strengthening formal sovereignty and developing further ties with the west. This policy included the refusal of the commonwealth currency and armed forces. His ideology was focused not 3 Oleksa Eliseyovich Zasenko and Ihor Stebelsky, “Ukraine under Direct Imperial Russian Rule” ​ Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., ​ www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Ukraine-under-direct-imperial-Russian-rule. 4 “Holodomor Facts and History: Chronology of Events Surrounding the Famine.” Holodomor 1932-33, ​ ​ ​ holodomorct.org/holodomor-facts-and-history/. 2 primarily on NATO expansion, but rather on Ukraine having an equal standing with central European countries. His presidency was followed by Leonid Kuchma in 1994 who was re-elected for a second term in 1999. Kuchma, much like Kravchuck, was intent on furthering relations with the west. He stated that Ukraine would sign an agreement with the EU that included a free trade policy, and by 2004, would meet all the necessary membership requirements. However, amidst many surrounding corruption scandals, Kuchma began to abandon his previous foreign policy and looked to Russia for aid. This was the first sign of the back and forth between ideologies regarding strengthening Western relations, and Russian ties. Kuchma then appointed Viktor Yushchenko as Prime Minister who served until 2004 when he and Viktor Yanukovych faced off for the presidential elections, the results of which sparked the Orange Revolution. The two competitors drew support from vastly different crowds. Yanukovych for one, “drew his main political support from oligarchs from the Donets[k] (Donbas) region of eastern Ukraine, which was also fairly pro-Russian,”5 and he was also very clearly seeking closer ties to Russia. These supports were mainly based in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, whereas Yushchenko was favored by Western Europe and other affiliated allies, as well as citizens from western Ukraine. While the election results indicated that it was Yanukovych who won the race, they were seen by many as fabricated and this ultimately lead to a series of peaceful protests which prompted re-elections and earned a victory for Yushchenko and those seeking western alliance. This administration held up until 2010 when Yanukovych won the seat in office due to “financial support from wealthy industrialists in eastern Ukraine, as well as promises to fight poverty.”6 Much like during his earlier attempt to run for presidency, ​ the support he gained was from predominantly pro-Russian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk within Ukraine. Later in 2013 Yanukovych would suspend any trade between Ukraine and the European Union, 5 “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy.” Every CRS Report, Congressional Research Service, January ​ ​ ​ ​ 3, 2017, www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33460.html. ​ ​ 6 Polina Ivanova and Gareth Jones, “Timeline: Events in Ukraine's Political History since 1991.” Reuters, ​ ​ ​ Thomson Reuters, March 29, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-election-timeline/timeline-events-in-ukraines-political-history-since- 1991-idUSKCN1RA2HX. ​ 3 in favor of economic ties with Moscow, rather. In addition to trade suspensions, negotiations on the association agreement which would bond the two parties, but also bond Ukraine to Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community) would be reversed. These two actions would lead to the Maidan Revolution of 2014 which, in short, lead to the downfall of Yanukovych who was driven from office by ​ violent protests in Kiev.7 Kremlin-backed forces then took advantage of the situation, taking control of the Crimean peninsula, which has a sizeable Russian-speaking majority and agreed to be absorbed by Russia in a referendum. The revolution also brought Petro Poroshenko to power who has remained in ​ office up until recently. Much of the history of Ukraine highlights the issue of securing and maintaining a sense of national identity in the face of looming foreign or regional interest, in particular, that of Russia, and more recently “Putin regime’s nakedly imperialistic desire to secure hegemony over more territory”.8 Anton Bebler states, in the Romanian Journal of European Affairs, the Crimean conflict consists of three main parties, all with mixed authority: the Republic of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. “The annexation of Crimea encouraged the Russian-speaking separatists in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, who apparently hoped that Moscow will repeat the same scenario. The mass unrest, anti-Kiev demonstrations, tearing down Ukrainian state symbols and hoisting up Russian national flags, breaking-in and occupying numerous official buildings took place in April 2014 in a number of Ukrainian cities.”9 Crimea has a large Russian-speaking majority. “According to the last census held by Ukraine in 2001, more than 58% of Crimea self-identifies as ethnically Russian, and 77% of Crimeans said their native language was Russian,” states Al Jazeera.10 7 “Crimea Profile.” BBC News, January 17, 2018 www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18287223. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ 8 Alan Smithee ​ ​ 9 Anton Bebler, “Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict” Romanian Journal of European Affairs, ​ ​ ​ 15:1 (2015): 35–54. 10 Hashem Said. “Map: Russian Language Dominant in Crimea.” Al Jazeera America, March 15, 2014, ​ ​ ​ http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/3/map-russian-the-dominantlanguageincrimea.html. ​ 4 Bebler states that Russian President Vladimir Putin and official Russian propaganda used the Crimean people’s secession vote as the primary reason to justify the annexation, along with Crimea’s strong historic ties to Russia. “As a consequence of the conflict, Ukraine lost about three percent of its state territory, about five percent of its population and about 3.6 percent of its GNP.
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