Horizontal Coordination, Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability
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Paper prepared for ICPP Conference Milan, 1-4/7/2015 T02P07 - Comparing Horizontal Coordination of Policy Sectors Beyond a logic of effectiveness: Horizontal coordination, democratic legitimacy and accountability Eva Lieberherr Institute for Environmental Decisions Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) and Department of Environmental Social Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology Universitätstrasse 22 8092 Zurich, Switzerland +41 44 632 93 36 [email protected] Karin Ingold Institute of Political Science and Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Berne and Department of Environmental Social Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology; [email protected] Abstract Horizontal coordination, where actors join together to accomplish a common task, has been applauded for its output legitimacy. However, such processes often face challenges due to opposition from local actors who raise concerns about democratic legitimacy and accountability. Moving beyond a logic of effectiveness, we aim to show how and why other forms of legitimacy such as input and throughput dimensions also affect horizontal coordination, in addition to output criteria. Beyond the assumed positive relationship between coordination and effectiveness, we additionally expect horizontal coordination to be (a) impeded by local actors’ fear of losing democratic legitimacy; and (b) fostered by accountability in terms of the steering capacity of the state. A comparative case study analysis of water supply structures at the regional level in Switzerland shows, in contrast to our expectation, that effectiveness has mixed impacts on horizontal coordination. Rather than being solely a positive factor for horizontal coordination, certain output criteria such as financial redistribution are found to be a key hindrance. We also find that democratic legitimacy may, indeed, impede horizontal coordination whereas increased accountability positively affects such coordination. 1 INTRODUCTION Following political philosophy, collective goals such as universal service provision of basic goods can be better achieved by “enlarging the scale of government [… as this enables capitalizing on] larger action space and resources of larger units” (Scharpf 1988, p. 239). This logic of effectiveness or output legitimacy (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Mayntz, 2003) can stand at odds with democratic forms of legitimacy, which “[…] would favour smaller units of government in which a great homogeneity of preferences would allow collective choices to approximate aggregate individual choices” (Scharpf 1988, p. 239). This tension between output and input legitimacy lies at the heart of coordination reforms, where decentralized actors join together to accomplish a common task, also termed as horizontal coordination (Kübler et al., 2003; Scharpf, 1999). A logic of effectiveness typically drives horizontal coordination (Schedler, 2003). However, we set forth the argument that key factors affecting such processes are not only input but also throughput oriented. Firstly, horizontal coordination faces major challenges due to opposition at the local level, often because of participation concerns (Kübler et al., 2003). This relates to input legitimacy, which holds that direct and representative democratic elements such as citizens’ influence on decision-making is key for acceptable policies (cf. Schmidt, 2013). The challenge is that with horizontal coordination, which can involve the delegation of local tasks to new, politically (semi) autonomous inter-municipal organizations, input legitimacy may be weakened. Secondly, horizontal coordination can also lead to questions of throughput legitimacy, which relates to issues of traditional accountability mechanisms, such as answerability to parliament, which may be eroded (Michels and Meijer, 2008). However, even in the context of horizontal coordination, the vertical dimension does not disappear in a federal system, where the actors continue to interact under the shadow of the constituent-state. Hence, the constituent-state may play a key role in the accountability constellation. The question of how and why differing legitimacy dimensions affect the development of horizontal coordination arises. Moving beyond a logic of effectiveness, we aim to show how and why democratic legitimacy and accountability also affect horizontal coordination, in addition to output criteria. The paper thus aims to contribute to the debate of output versus input and throughput legitimacy (Scharpf 1988, 1997, 1999, 2007; Schmidt 2013), by explicitly addressing how and why the latter affect coordination processes, which have primarily been related to effectiveness criteria of output legitimacy. Empirically, we address the water supply sector in Switzerland, which provides an interesting case to study horizontal coordination in a federal system. Switzerland’s key peculiarities of direct 2 democracy make it an extreme case to study democratic legitimacy and accountability issues. To specifically shed light onto the role of democratic legitimacy for horizontal coordination in a key public sector, we analyze water service provision in a constituent state of Basel-Land, where structures have historically evolved as small-scale, decentralized forms. In recent years, the constituent state has begun to pursue horizontal coordination pathways with mixed success. The paper proceeds in five parts. We first delineate our analytical framework relating horizontal coordination and legitimacy, developing expectations about their relationship. Next we specify our case selection of and methods for comparatively analyzing drinking water structures. In the empirical component we first identify perceived horizontal coordination in the three regions and try to draw the broader network constellation within which such processes can occur, using Social Network Analysis (SNA). This then provides a point of departure for assessing the role of not only effectiveness but also democratic legitimacy and accountability in these network constellations using qualitative interviews. After discussing these results comparatively, we finally conclude with some suggestions for future research trajectories. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK Horizontal coordination The coordination of policy actors and processes can be understood as actors joining together in the planning and delivery of goods and services (Peters, 1998, 2008). Michels and Meijer (2008) define horizontal coordination, or rather the horizontalization of government, as the “shift from a more vertical ideal-typical model of government to a more horizontal model: more coordinance than subordinance since the actors are on equal footing, more negotiation than command since instructions and decisions cannot be imposed” (p. 4). Taking an actor-centered approach, we draw on conceptualizations of interlocking policy processes (Scharpf et al. 1976). This refers to the interweaving of governmental tasks between formally separate state actors, e.g., national, constituent state and the municipal (Scharpf et al. 1976). Horizontal coordination thus involves a rescaling in terms of partner-like interaction between multiple actors (Rhodes 2007). This new structure enjoys increased administrative discretion due to less direct political control (Benz 2001). As such, it “exercise[s] certain public functions at a distance from the government […] initially fragmenting them but leading to renewed efforts to design collaborative mechanisms that differ from traditional hierarchical command and control systems” (Michels and Meijer, 2008, p. 6). Such collaborative mechanisms might be characterized by the empowerment of local actors such as communities or municipalities. Delegating decisional and implementation power to local, public or private actors makes sense in natural resources 3 management where particularly local communities are affected by resources degradation, directly depend upon ecosystem goods and services, or are addressed by policy instruments they implement or practices they adopt (Knoepfel et al., 2009; Newig et al., 2010; Khailaniand Perera, 2013). Horizontal coordination goes, however, beyond mere local actors’ involvement. It comes much closer to what Ostrom (2014) has called a “polycentric approach” where power is distributed among several levels and where interactions between low- to medium-scale government units are enforced. Legitimacy Legitimacy serves as a meta-principle for setting standards justifying the state and its actions (Scharpf 2007). This relates to the extent to which citizens regard the state and its policies as acceptable (Schmidt 2013). This form of legitimacy rests upon the pillars of liberal democracies, assuming that this can be derived through democratic institutions (cf. Lieberherr, 2015). Moving beyond the overall subject of legitimacy and toward its analytical dimensions, we employ the concepts of input, throughput and output legitimacy. The analytical heuristics of input-output legitimacy originate from David Easton’s (1965) systems theory model of a political process. Arguably the most well-known re- interpretation of Easton’s conception is Fritz Scharpf’s input-output oriented legitimacy in relation to Abraham Lincoln’s famous statement: government of the people, by the people and for the people (Scharpf, 1999). Government by the people relates to input legitimacy in terms of citizens’ influence. And government for the people relates to output legitimacy in terms