Paper prepared for ICPP Conference Milan, 1-4/7/2015 T02P07 - Comparing Horizontal Coordination of Policy Sectors

Beyond a logic of effectiveness: Horizontal coordination, democratic legitimacy and accountability

Eva Lieberherr Institute for Environmental Decisions Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) and Department of Environmental Social Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology Universitätstrasse 22 8092 Zurich, +41 44 632 93 36 [email protected]

Karin Ingold Institute of Political Science and Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Berne and Department of Environmental Social Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology; [email protected]

Abstract Horizontal coordination, where actors join together to accomplish a common task, has been applauded for its output legitimacy. However, such processes often face challenges due to opposition from local actors who raise concerns about democratic legitimacy and accountability. Moving beyond a logic of effectiveness, we aim to show how and why other forms of legitimacy such as input and throughput dimensions also affect horizontal coordination, in addition to output criteria. Beyond the assumed positive relationship between coordination and effectiveness, we additionally expect horizontal coordination to be (a) impeded by local actors’ fear of losing democratic legitimacy; and (b) fostered by accountability in terms of the steering capacity of the state. A comparative case study analysis of water supply structures at the regional level in Switzerland shows, in contrast to our expectation, that effectiveness has mixed impacts on horizontal coordination. Rather than being solely a positive factor for horizontal coordination, certain output criteria such as financial redistribution are found to be a key hindrance. We also find that democratic legitimacy may, indeed, impede horizontal coordination whereas increased accountability positively affects such coordination.

1 INTRODUCTION Following political philosophy, collective goals such as universal service provision of basic goods can be better achieved by “enlarging the scale of government [… as this enables capitalizing on] larger action space and resources of larger units” (Scharpf 1988, p. 239). This logic of effectiveness or output legitimacy (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Mayntz, 2003) can stand at odds with democratic forms of legitimacy, which “[…] would favour smaller units of government in which a great homogeneity of preferences would allow collective choices to approximate aggregate individual choices” (Scharpf 1988, p. 239). This tension between output and input legitimacy lies at the heart of coordination reforms, where decentralized actors join together to accomplish a common task, also termed as horizontal coordination (Kübler et al., 2003; Scharpf, 1999).

A logic of effectiveness typically drives horizontal coordination (Schedler, 2003). However, we set forth the argument that key factors affecting such processes are not only input but also throughput oriented. Firstly, horizontal coordination faces major challenges due to opposition at the local level, often because of participation concerns (Kübler et al., 2003). This relates to input legitimacy, which holds that direct and representative democratic elements such as citizens’ influence on decision-making is key for acceptable policies (cf. Schmidt, 2013). The challenge is that with horizontal coordination, which can involve the delegation of local tasks to new, politically (semi) autonomous inter-municipal organizations, input legitimacy may be weakened. Secondly, horizontal coordination can also lead to questions of throughput legitimacy, which relates to issues of traditional accountability mechanisms, such as answerability to parliament, which may be eroded (Michels and Meijer, 2008). However, even in the context of horizontal coordination, the vertical dimension does not disappear in a federal system, where the actors continue to interact under the shadow of the constituent-state. Hence, the constituent-state may play a key role in the accountability constellation.

The question of how and why differing legitimacy dimensions affect the development of horizontal coordination arises. Moving beyond a logic of effectiveness, we aim to show how and why democratic legitimacy and accountability also affect horizontal coordination, in addition to output criteria. The paper thus aims to contribute to the debate of output versus input and throughput legitimacy (Scharpf 1988, 1997, 1999, 2007; Schmidt 2013), by explicitly addressing how and why the latter affect coordination processes, which have primarily been related to effectiveness criteria of output legitimacy.

Empirically, we address the water supply sector in Switzerland, which provides an interesting case to study horizontal coordination in a federal system. Switzerland’s key peculiarities of direct

2 democracy make it an extreme case to study democratic legitimacy and accountability issues. To specifically shed light onto the role of democratic legitimacy for horizontal coordination in a key public sector, we analyze water service provision in a constituent state of Basel-Land, where structures have historically evolved as small-scale, decentralized forms. In recent years, the constituent state has begun to pursue horizontal coordination pathways with mixed success.

The paper proceeds in five parts. We first delineate our analytical framework relating horizontal coordination and legitimacy, developing expectations about their relationship. Next we specify our case selection of and methods for comparatively analyzing drinking water structures. In the empirical component we first identify perceived horizontal coordination in the three regions and try to draw the broader network constellation within which such processes can occur, using Social Network Analysis (SNA). This then provides a point of departure for assessing the role of not only effectiveness but also democratic legitimacy and accountability in these network constellations using qualitative interviews. After discussing these results comparatively, we finally conclude with some suggestions for future research trajectories.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Horizontal coordination The coordination of policy actors and processes can be understood as actors joining together in the planning and delivery of goods and services (Peters, 1998, 2008). Michels and Meijer (2008) define horizontal coordination, or rather the horizontalization of government, as the “shift from a more vertical ideal-typical model of government to a more horizontal model: more coordinance than subordinance since the actors are on equal footing, more negotiation than command since instructions and decisions cannot be imposed” (p. 4). Taking an actor-centered approach, we draw on conceptualizations of interlocking policy processes (Scharpf et al. 1976). This refers to the interweaving of governmental tasks between formally separate state actors, e.g., national, constituent state and the municipal (Scharpf et al. 1976).

Horizontal coordination thus involves a rescaling in terms of partner-like interaction between multiple actors (Rhodes 2007). This new structure enjoys increased administrative discretion due to less direct political control (Benz 2001). As such, it “exercise[s] certain public functions at a distance from the government […] initially fragmenting them but leading to renewed efforts to design collaborative mechanisms that differ from traditional hierarchical command and control systems” (Michels and Meijer, 2008, p. 6). Such collaborative mechanisms might be characterized by the empowerment of local actors such as communities or municipalities. Delegating decisional and implementation power to local, public or private actors makes sense in natural resources

3 management where particularly local communities are affected by resources degradation, directly depend upon ecosystem goods and services, or are addressed by policy instruments they implement or practices they adopt (Knoepfel et al., 2009; Newig et al., 2010; Khailaniand Perera, 2013). Horizontal coordination goes, however, beyond mere local actors’ involvement. It comes much closer to what Ostrom (2014) has called a “polycentric approach” where power is distributed among several levels and where interactions between low- to medium-scale government units are enforced.

Legitimacy Legitimacy serves as a meta-principle for setting standards justifying the state and its actions (Scharpf 2007). This relates to the extent to which citizens regard the state and its policies as acceptable (Schmidt 2013). This form of legitimacy rests upon the pillars of liberal democracies, assuming that this can be derived through democratic institutions (cf. Lieberherr, 2015). Moving beyond the overall subject of legitimacy and toward its analytical dimensions, we employ the concepts of input, throughput and output legitimacy. The analytical heuristics of input-output legitimacy originate from David Easton’s (1965) systems theory model of a political process. Arguably the most well-known re- interpretation of Easton’s conception is Fritz Scharpf’s input-output oriented legitimacy in relation to Abraham Lincoln’s famous statement: government of the people, by the people and for the people (Scharpf, 1999). Government by the people relates to input legitimacy in terms of citizens’ influence. And government for the people relates to output legitimacy in terms of effectiveness. The intermediary dimension of throughput legitimacy, relating to the quality of the process, has arguably been under theorized in the input-output debate (Schmidt, 2010; Lieberherr, 2015). In relation to Lincoln’s words, Schmidt (2006) has termed this dimension government with the people.

Input legitimacy, typically associated with democratic legitimacy, is based on citizen participation and representation through elections and delegation (Scharpf, 1999, pp. 7-21). The focus is on citizen consent (Mair, 2009). Following from this, public actors, either voted directly into office or through delegation, have the competences to make decisions and accomplish tasks, as specified in the law. Key here is that this competence is linked to citizen votes.

Throughput legitimacy “[…] is based on both democratic procedures of liberal democracy (e.g., accountability) as well as on a consequentialist logic of utility (e.g., efficacy) (cf. Schmidt, 2013). For the purposes of this paper, we focus only on the former aspect, which relates to accountability in terms of institutionalized means of account-giving (Bovens, 2005), or the capacity to steer. Within public administrative ordering, a higher institutional level is formally responsible to hold an actor at a lower level to account. Even in federal systems, where municipalities have a high degree of autonomy, the local actors are still held accountable to the constituent state (account-holding forum)

4 at the end of the day. Here the focus is not on direct decision-making, but rather on the tools that the account-holding forum has to influence action at the lower level (Scharpf 1997).

Finally, and in contrast to the above dimensions, output legitimacy rests less on democratic theory and more on utilitarian thought in terms of results rather than on a process; focusing on the ‘what to obtain’ and following the logic of effectiveness. In other words, this dimension is based on the “utilitarian/welfare-economics-oriented criterion of the best possible attempt to achieve a particular political goal” (Wolf, 2002, p. 39). Rather than focusing on the process, the focus here is on acceptable outcomes, where effectiveness comes to the forefront. Effectiveness relates to achieving goals to solve a policy problem (cf. Scharpf, 1999).

Table 1 summarizes the three legitimacy dimensions and relates them to our research dimensions – democratic legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness – as well operationalizes them.

Table 1: Three Legitimacy Dimensions

Legitimacy Input Throughput Output Dimension Research Democratic Legitimacy Accountability Effectiveness Dimensions Operationaliz Citizen input Capacity to steer Performance: ation Direct influence on policymaking Tools such as Achieving policy and practices as well as electing planning, legal goals politicians into office mandates, sanctions, financial subsidies, funds Source: Own representation based on text above.

Linking horizontal coordination and legitimacy: Expectations The literature typically assumes that effectiveness or output legitimacy is a key driver for horizontal coordination (Schedler, 2003). Assuming that a service provider can benefit from “larger action space and resources of larger units” (Scharpf, 1988 p. 239), horizontal coordination has been promoted by following a logic of effectiveness and the assumption that it will promote performance. Indeed, compartmentalized authorities have been found to lead to redundancies and contradictions across departments and organizations (Peters, 1998). Hence, more coordination has been called for to ensure consistency and coherence (Peters, 1998) as well as to ensure effective implementation of goals and hence increase the long-term acceptance of policy (Benz, 2001).

Expectation 1: Strong effectiveness, where local actors perceive reforms as leading to the achievement of policy goals, promotes horizontal coordination.

Moving beyond the traditionally expected causality of output legitimacy, we also address input and throughput legitimacy as potentially affecting horizontal coordination. Indeed, horizontal coordination has been perceived as undermining existing democratic legitimacy and accountability.

5 For instance, citizens and local councils have historically enjoyed a high degree of decision-making competencies in federal systems (Agranoff, 2004). As such, local public service provision has been democratically legitimated through high citizen influence and competences at the municipal level. With horizontal coordination, the concern emerges that decision-making may no longer match democratic principles (Papadopoulos, 2003). This concern is based on a structural shift away from direct democratic and towards delegated input through representatives in the context of horizontal coordination (Schedler, 2003). With a decoupling from direct democratic input, horizontal coordination processes can lead to questions of democratic legitimacy, particularly at the local level. Indeed, this democratic legitimacy deficit at the local level has been found as leading to opposition towards horizontal coordination (Kübler et al., 2003).

Expectation 2: A high degree of democratic legitimacy, and thus local actors’ fear of losing decision- making power in service provision, impedes horizontal coordination.

Horizontal coordination also leads to questions of accountability, as horizontalization erodes traditional accountability mechanisms, such as answerability to parliament (Michels and Meijer, 2008). However, a degree of steering from above remains with horizontal coordination, as Rhodes (2007 p. 1253) argues, the “constitutional superior (central government) […] can unilaterally change the rules of the game [for a constitutional subordinate].” In federalist systems, typically the constituent state plays a key role as account-holding forum, where the municipalities must account for their actions. As such, the constituent state may also be able to positively affect horizontal coordination particularly in terms of its capacity to steer. Indeed, research has indicated that for coordination processes to occur, steering from a higher institutional level is often required (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010). Moreover, as noted above, “[…] greater policy coordination does often require political leadership from above” (Nilsson et al., 2007, p. 145).

Expectation 3: Accountability affects horizontal coordination differently than democratic legitimacy. Due to the nature of this legitimacy source, which is more removed from citizen influence, we expect that a strong capacity to steer can foster horizontal coordination.

METHODS

Case selection Following a theoretical sampling logic, we have chosen a case that is representative of a fragmented federalist structure (Switzerland). Here the principle of subsidiarity within a constituent state and a key public service (water) provide fruitful grounds for analyzing both democratic legitimacy and accountability in horizontal coordination processes. More specifically, we have purposively selected the constituent state of Basel-Land to conduct a case study analysis of the water supply sector

6 because it has highly small-scale structures: each municipality typically runs its own waterworks. Increasing water quality and quantity demands as well as climatic variations have led to growing challenges for the small water supply organizations to meet policy goals. In an effort to improve the performance of water supply operators, processes of horizontal coordination have been driven by the constituent state, but have faced resistance by local actors.

To assess how democratic legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness affect horizontal coordination, we have selected three different regions where horizontal coordination processes have been pursued in the constituent state, without success thus far. These three regions are interesting to compare, because they differ in terms of the degree of horizontal reform processes:

 Region 1 currently has four small inter-municipal organizations where the municipalities have retained a high degree of control along with several municipalities that operate their own waterworks. These actors have been involved in a process to integrate further, to join together in a new organizational form, which has not occurred thus far.  Region 2 is marked by “water poor” hillside municipalities and “water rich” valley municipalities, where there is currently a joint-stock corporation (multiple municipalities are stockholders) that serves as a water distributor between the municipalities. However, each municipality also operates their own water supply system.  Region 3 has three inter-municipal waterworks along with multiple municipalities operating their own waterworks. Again, there has been a process of horizontal coordination, which has failed thus far.

Operationalization of horizontal coordination and legitimacy The focus of this article is to explain the effect of different legitimacy dimensions (output as well as input and throughput) on horizontal coordination (see also Sandström et al., 2014). Horizontal coordination is defined here as the organization of public service delivery involving actors representing different institutional levels, and the public but also the private sphere (see also Shiroyama et al., 2012). It immediately raises the question about whom to include in horizontal coordination: In this context, natural resources management and network scholars prominently refer to the issue of boundary definition (Hering and Ingold 2012; Bodin and Prell, 2011; Munoz-Erickson et al., 2010). For horizontal coordination, not the size of collaborative networks seems to matter (see also Lienert et al., 2013), but it is rather a question of proportionality and intensity. With proportionality, we mean that the processes of horizontal coordination should not be dominated by constituent state and public actors only, but that municipalities, other local actors such as waterworks, or private entities should also be considerably involved (typically and at least 50%) in public service delivery. Then, the intensity of horizontal coordination refers to the degree that actors

7 are involved in the process. As earlier studies have illustrated, the type of involvement (e.g. one-way information flow versus mutual collaboration) matters for output delivery and successful implementation of local or regional policies (Ingold et al., 2010; Ingold and Balsiger, 2015). Besides the share of local and private actor inclusion, the second indicator of horizontal coordination applied here is thus connectivity (Munoz-Erickson et al., 2010): In line with other studies (see Ingold and Leifeld, 2014; Bodin and Prell, 2011; Crona and Bodin, 2010), we thus rely on actors’ perception of coordination in the respective processes and assess the intensity and degree of horizontal coordination asking involved stakeholders whom they perceive as powerful in the network and important for regional water supply structures (see also data and methods below).

We can measure democratic (input) legitimacy in terms citizen input, which relates to citizens’ access to decision-making through democratic institutions, that is, participation in elections and citizen representation (cf. Mair, 2009; Scharpf, 1999). If citizens have direct access to decision- making and can vote on substantive topics, this would be a strong degree of democratic legitimacy. Conversely, citizens’ indirect influence by voting the decision-makers into office would be weaker. If citizens lack means to influence a service provider altogether this would be weak. This can be derived via the local laws as well as service providers’ statutes.

Given the plethora of means to operationalize accountability (throughput legitimacy), we employ a very narrow definition, that is, by assessing the degree of the state’s capacity to steer. This relates to the policy tools that the account-holding forum has to hold actors to account (Scharpf, 1997). In our case, this refers to the type of steering tools that the constituent state has. Planning processes and making recommendations would be a weak form of steering, while granting concessions and issuing fines or using incentives would be a stronger form. This can also be derived from legal texts, which formally delineate the tools that the account-holding actor has to hold another actor to account.

Output legitimacy in terms of effectiveness can be operationalized as achieving the substantive policy goals. In the context of horizontal coordination, such goals relate to improvement of, for example, quality and security of service delivery as well as financial conditions. The logic is that by pooling resources both in terms of finances as well as of the actual good (e.g., water, which is especially vital for municipalities that are resource dependent, that is, if there is functional interdependency), economies of scale and so effectiveness can be achieved (Fürst, 2007). We assess the degree of effectiveness in terms of actors’ perceived achievement of policy goals; or rather how they perceive certain reforms to lead to the attainment of goals. High effectiveness would be if actors perceive reforms (e.g., the pooling of resources) to lead to sound financial conditions as well

8 as equitable financial and resource redistribution through. Low effectiveness would be if actors perceive reforms to lead to uncertain or unfavorable financial conditions and resource redistribution.

Beyond the above formal means, all three dimensions can be assessed in terms of actors’ perceptions and values. Indeed, legitimacy rests on the extent to which local actors regard actions and procedures as acceptable, i.e., in coherence with their values (Schmidt, 2013), we also take the actors’ perceptions of the legitimacy dimensions into account to assess our expectations.

Data and methods Our data comprise of archival and documentary information (laws and regulations) on the one hand, and 23 semi-structured, in-person interviews, on the other hand (see Appendix 1 for a list of the interviewees). The interviews were conducted between June 2013 and February 2014.

A two-step design was conducted to identify interview partners. First, and studying the respective horizontal coordination processes in all three regions, we identified the leading agency at the constituent state level, as well as one project leader at the local level as the two starting points for our snowball sampling. Through scoping interviews with those two actors per region, we then identified what we call “core” of the respective coordination processes in water supply (cf. Appendix 1). More concretely, we asked the two leading entities whom they considered as most important actors and key players for regional water supply. This then resulted in a total list of 8 actors for region 1 and 9 actors in both regions 2 and 3 (including the two leading entities) (see Tables 6-8). Those actors were then interviewed.

The interview questions were semi-structured and addressed the perceived potential to pursue horizontal coordination processes; inquiring how and why citizen input, local competence and the state’s capacity to steer can affect such developments. The interviews were analyzed using the process-tracing method, i.e., analyzing “the observable implications of putative causal mechanisms in operation in a case” (Bennett 2004 p. 30). This approach enabled making a causal link between horizontal coordination and the democratic legitimacy dimensions.

To assess horizontal coordination, we systematically asked interview partners, and thus those who we identified as the core of the coordination processes, whom they perceived as important actors for water supply and service delivery in the respective region. In such a way, we compiled a list of collective actors and organizations, coding them by the institutional level (local, regional, national) and sector (private or public) they represent. This allowed us to calculate the simple share of local actors such as municipalities and waterworks as well as those from the private sphere in comparison to other actor types (first indication of horizontal coordination). To assess horizontal coordination further, we then based our analysis on concepts and measures borrowed from Social Network

9 Analysis (SNA). As discussed above, and in contrast to state-centric and top-down perspectives on decision-making, the network approach assumes that formal and informal arrangements and the involvement of a variety of actors are crucial aspects (Adam and Kriesi 2007). In this context, size would be assessed as a network boundary definition. But actually, it is not the network size or an interview partner’s network horizon that counts for horizontal coordination. Two other indicators are crucial for this analysis: The first one is the density measure and thus the share of observed relations compared to all possible relations in one network. But density is very sensitive to response rates in a network and to node number per network. This is why we predominantly concentrated on the densities within our core networks, as we have full data on these, i.e., all interview partners. Furthermore, densities of the core indicate whether what we preliminarily identified as the most important actors in the regions are also perceived as such by the concerned actors themselves. And finally, a high density is then also an indicator for a high degree of horizontal coordination among those core actors.

In-degree centrality, and the number of times the same actors is mentioned several times by various interview partners (see also Freeman, 1979), is then the last indicator for horizontal coordination. The more the same set of actors are mentioned as being important (having high in- degree centrality), the more they are thus tightly linked to the core of the network and playing a crucial role in the regional consolidation of horizontal water supply structures. Network densities and in-degree centralities were calculated using UCINET 6.0 software.

FINDINGS We first present our findings about horizontal coordination based on selected actors’ perception and borrowing certain measures from SNA. We then present evidence about the differing legitimacy dimensions in the three regions.

Horizontal coordination, network boundaries and centralities By asking core actors at the local and constituent state level about whom they perceive as important for coordination in the water supply of Basel-Land it becomes clear that national actors do not play a prominent role. The constituent state, municipalities and inter-municipal waterworks are the key actors for horizontal coordination. Private actors such as consultancies, also play a role, as both the constituent state and the municipalities contract them to accomplish tasks. All the actors are summarized in Tables 3-5 in Appendix 2 and Figures 1-3 in Appendix 3.

Tables 6-8 first summarize data about the core actors in each region that were interviewed. Each actor was identified through a combination of document analysis, two scoping interviews, and consecutive snowball sampling. More important, these tables show the number of actors that were

10 identified as being important for horizontal cooperation in the water supply sector in Basel-Land (see number of actors in the whole network). The share of local, regional, national and private actors is mentioned as well as two network measures, in-degree centrality and densities. Density is an interesting and appropriate measure for the core (first line of tables 6-8): potentially, all interview partners comprising this core have the opportunity to mention all other interview partners as important actors. A density of 1 would thus mean that the core actors all perceive each other as relevant1. For horizontal coordination across an entire region however, in-degree centrality seems crucial: this measure shows how many times local actors such as municipalities or waterworks were mentioned to be important and are thus connected to the core of the network.

Table 6 Horizontal coordination in Region 1

Number of actors Share of actors Avg in- Density local regional national private degree local Core 8 6 (75%) 2 (25%) 0 0 5.5 0.80

Whole network 52 26 (50%) 10 (23%) 6 (14%) 7 (16%) 2.4 0.30 Source: Own representation.

Region 1 is the biggest network compared to the others and 50% of the actors perceived as important for horizontal coordination are local and 23% regional actors. But local actors are only loosely connected to the core (average in-degree centrality of 2.4, Table 6; see also Table 3 in Appendix 2). Interestingly, the core seems to prominently perceive constituent state entities (Table 3; and black nodes in Figure 1, Appendix 3) as important players for horizontal coordination in region 1.

1 But one word of caution concerning the density measure of the whole network: these are not complete networks, meaning that only one fifth of the actors in the network actually gave their judgments about whom they perceive as important (but we controlled for this when calculating densities, see also notes in figures 1-3, Appendix 3). This picture could look very different if at least 50% of all actors in these networks would have answered the question about whom they perceive as important. However, these network constellations provide us with insight regarding who the relevant actors are for horizontal coordination processes. 11 Similar to region 1, also in region 2 almost half of the actors that were mentioned as being important for horizontal coordination are local and 27% regional actors (Table 7). But in contrast and importantly, in region 2 the municipal actors are well connected to the core (average in-degree centrality of 3.1, Table 7; see also dark-grey nodes at the center of Figure 2) whereas constituent state actors (black nodes; Figure 2) are not considered very important.

Table 7 Horizontal Coordination in Region 2

Number of actors Share of actors Avg in- Density local regional national private degree local Core 9 8 (88%) 1 (11%) 0 0 4.5 0.60

Whole network 44 21 (48%) (27%) (10%) (13%) 3.1 0.31 Source: Own representation.

Like the other two regions, mainly municipal actors are named as important for horizontal coordination (51%; Table 8) in region 3. In contrast to the other two regions, there is a separation into two clusters (Figure 3): One consisting of municipal actors and the other consisting of constituent state actors. This cluster structure is driven by the core, and thus by the interview partners: only 0.41 of density across core actors (Table 8) stems from the fact that regional and local actors do not seem to perceive each other as important for horizontal coordination.

Table 8 Horizontal Coordination in Region 3

Number of actors Share of actors Avg in- Density local regional national private degree local Core 9 7 (78%) 2 (22%) 0 0 3 0.41

Whole network 39 20 (51%) 11 (28%) 5 (13%) 3 (8%) 2.6 0.29 Source: Own representation.

While all regions have a considerable overall density, it is important to note that this is not yet an indication for high horizontal coordination (see also Footnote 1). Only in region 2, we find that a variety of municipalities are regarded as important and connect to the core of the network. In region 1, the core is predominantly connected to constituent state actors; and in region 3 we have two clusters of actors opposing each other (municipal versus constituent state actors).

Effectiveness In all three regions we find effectiveness to affect horizontal integration, but in different ways and due to differing goals and perceptions.

In region 1, data show that an aspect of effectiveness, in terms of financial concerns, plays a key role in impeding horizontal coordination (Interview 3, 4, 5, 6). Here the actors perceive financial redistribution as a key challenge of horizontal coordination and thus a major impediment for such

12 reforms (Interview 3, 4, 5, 6, 8). Data indicate that this perceived low degree of effectiveness in terms of finances is strongest in this region as compared with the other two regions

Recall that in region 2 we find a split between “water poor” hillside municipalities and “water rich” valley municipalities, which has led to water shortages during drought in the hillside municipalities. This distinctive regional feature is found to have a key effect on horizontal integration due to perceptions of output legitimacy. Due to the resource dependence of the water poor hillside municipalities on the valley municipalities they perceive that pooling resources will help them to achieve their policy goals of security of supply and hence hillside municipalities strive for horizontal coordination. Hence we find effectiveness criteria to play an important and positive role in part of the core of the horizontal coordination process. However, similar to region 1, we find other effectiveness aspects, such as the financial issues, to be another, negatively, influencing factor: valley interviewees argue that delivering water to the hillsides is far more expensive than providing the service in the valley, due to longer pipes and pumping the water uphill (Interviews 11, 13, 15). These municipalities have mandated that the hillside municipalities pay more for the water than the valley municipalities, if they join into one organizational form. While the hillside municipalities want to join together, they have disputed having to pay more than the valley municipalities (Interview 14, 15, 16). This financial effectiveness criterion thus serves as an impeding factor for coordination processes.

In region 3 certain municipalities do not want to pool resources with others because they want to use their own water, which they perceive to be “better” than that of their neighbors or than that of waterworks that are further away (Interview 19, 22). Moreover, following the logic of effectiveness, the actors in this region argue that smaller structures are more pragmatic and efficient than larger ones. For example, municipalities with their own waterworks and technicians are said to be able to provide a better service to a smaller network of water consumers than to a larger one (Interview 19 and 21). In comparison to the other two regions, here we find differing aspects of effectiveness as impeding horizontal coordination.

Democratic legitimacy All three regions have historically had strong democratic legitimacy. While the constituent state has the formal decision-making power and discretion to intervene at the municipal level to safeguard water supply in its territory (Water Supply Law of Basel-Land; 455, § 2, paragraph 1), it has delegated the service provision competence to the municipal level. Hence, operational decisions about water supply have been controlled by local councils when the municipality provides water supply, which remains the predominant structure in all three regions. Citizens have thus had a high degree of influence on the current structures, as they can vote directly on substantive issues. Given this general

13 background of democratic anchoring, we now address the different values placed on democratic input and competence in each of the three regions.

In region 1, interview data indicate that the values of democratic legitimacy are the weakest, compared to the other two regions. Interviewees state that it is not per se the fear of citizens’ losing access to decision-making, which leads to opposition to horizontal coordination (Interview 3, 4, 5, 8). Instead, interviewees note that on the one hand it is the difficulty to decide which competences the individual municipalities should give up and on the other hand the need to clarify the financial redistribution that created barriers for coordination. This former concern links to the issue of competences, as there is fear of losing local decision-making rights and responsibilities.

In region 2 we find democratic legitimacy values to be stronger than in region 1, albeit weaker than in region 3. We also find a more differentiated perception of democratic legitimacy here than in the other two regions. The values of citizen input and local competences remain strong in the water rich valley municipalities, as interviewees from the valleys express strong concern of losing their direct control over decision-making (Interviews 9, 11, 13, 15). Conversely, the hillside municipalities prioritize engaging in an inter-municipal organization with the valley municipalities, so as to safeguard their water supply over direct democratic control (Interviews 10, 12, 14; see above).

In region 3 values of citizen input and local competences are particularly strong in comparison to the other two regions. Here the municipalities want their individual sovereignty over local water supplies. Indeed, democratic decision-making in terms of citizens’ ability to influence their local water supplier is considered a very high priority in this region (Interviews 19, 21, 22, 23). One actor in region 3 explains that citizens’ ability to directly influence their local water supply is fundamental, as this water is a key public service (Interview 21).

Accountability Our analysis of accountability focuses narrowly on the constituent state’s capacity to steer. The constituent state (hereafter referred to as the state) has a palette of steering tools: the ability to grant or deny concessions for water use, issue mandates and fines, and create Regional Water Supply Plans. However, a state interviewee says that “the state lacks strong policy instruments to put pressure on the municipalities […]” (Interview 3) and hence cannot effectively steer. Moreover, instead of using mandates and denying concessions, the state has employed rather weak steering tools, such as funding planning processes. Comparatively its capacity to steer has been the strongest in region 2, where it has been more active in convening the local actors in planning processes than in the other two regions (Interview 1.2) and weakest in region 3.

14 The local actors in all three regions also regard the state as taking a rather weak steering role; they say that the state does not fully make use of its legal competences (Interviews 18, 19). Hence, interviewees argue that the state should take a stronger role (Interviews 5, 18, 19). This view is particularly strong in regions 1 and 2. In the latter it is primarily the hillside municipalities who hold this view. However, interestingly, the valley municipalities in region 2 also favor increased state steering, although not to the same extent (Interview 3-8). In region 3, actors voiced the least desire for stronger state steering. However, even they would like the state to take a stronger role in implementing planning processes.

Interviewees in all three regions have indicated that the state lacks incentive-based steering tools. They argue that strong financial carrots could serve as an important means for the state to steer. All local actors, but especially those in region 3, do not want to be told by the state what they have to do, they rather be encouraged via incentives and want the state to serve as a facilitator for coordination processes (Interviews 3-23).

DISCUSSION Through scoping interviews, and later snowball sampling, we identified what we call the core of the horizontal coordination processes, operationalized here as networks. In all three regions, this core seems largely dominated by local actors and in particular by municipalities. Furthermore, these core actors, and thus interview partners, are found to be the key players in horizontal coordination for water supply in the canton of Basel-Land. They also strongly perceive each other as important, which is highlighted by the high in-degree centralities and core densities.

When asking the core about whom they perceive as important for horizontal coordination in their respective region, the network boundaries are drawn very differently: With 52 actors being perceived as important by the eight core actors, region 1 is the largest network, followed by region 2 (44 actors), and finally region 3 (39 actors). The share of local actors such as municipalities and regional waterworks, however, is very similar across all three regions and is approximately 50%. Does this mean that all three regions display a similar degree of horizontal coordination? When looking at connectivity, and thus the power connections local and constituent state actors hold in relation to the core, we find very divergent results per region (cf. Table 2).

In region 1, not all municipalities seem well integrated in horizontal coordination processes, as mostly the constituent state actors are perceived as important by the core and thus the structure remains hierarchical (cf. Table 2 and Figure 1). A key finding in region one is that effectiveness criteria such as financial issues override democratic concerns. This is interesting because rather than being a positive factor for horizontal coordination, financial redistribution in such reforms is found to be a

15 hindrance, due to its perceived uncertainty (low effectiveness). The results support our first expectation, as we posited that high effectiveness would foster horizontal coordination and conversely low effectiveness might impede this. In contrast with our second expectation, the rather weak coordination of some municipalities in this region does not seem to be the result of citizens’ fear to loose democratic legitimacy. Conversely, we find evidence for our third expectation, as (1) the constituent-state has some degree of steering in region 1, which might explain its strong role in the core of the network (cf. Table 2). And (2) local actors see a need for a stronger steering role of the constituent state for horizontal coordination.

Region 2 seems the most horizontally integrated where a variety of municipalities are regarded as important; there are many connections between the municipalities and the core. Conversely, constituent state actors are not well integrated in this network. But there is variance in the coordination degree, as not all municipalities seem to be perceived as equally important (see also Table 4 in Appendix 2). This might be the direct result of differences in effectiveness and democratic legitimacy perceptions: whereas resource dependence of the hill-side municipalities gives incentives for them to cede autonomy and integrate, the valley municipalities are rather independent and thus place more weight on maintaining direct democratic inputs. Importantly, in the case of the hill-side municipalities, democratic legitimacy does not seem to have a direct effect on the potential of horizontal coordination: it is rather the effectiveness aspect of resource issues that causes these municipalities to enhance their willingness to share competences. Here there is support for expectation 1 but no evidence for expectation 2. Yet regarding effectiveness, we also find that financial uncertainty – regarding who pays how much – impedes horizontal integration, which weakens the evidence for our first expectation. In addition, we find evidence in support of our second expectation, as the valley municipalities’ high value of democratic legitimacy has led to opposition to coordination. Finally, in line with our third expectation, we find that the state has the strongest capacity to steer in this region and that there is a perceived need for stronger steering in order to foster coordination; the impetus is stronger on the part of the water poor hillside municipalities than of the water rich valley communities. Again here we see the interplay with the effectiveness criterion of resource dependency that affects this process. This finding is interesting, as comparatively the state actors are not well integrated into the network and yet they have the strongest perceived steering capacity.

In region 3, horizontal coordination is impeded by the presence of two well-connected clusters that fail to coordinate much with each other: municipal actors perceive each other as important and constituent state actors perceive each other as important; but across cluster relations are rare. The rather weak horizontal coordination in this region goes hand in hand with the strongest concern about loss in democratic legitimacy (support for expectation 2). Related to effectiveness,

16 actors have also noted the value of utilizing water in their territory, where they regard neighbors’ water resources as less preferable. Hence, the low effectiveness, in terms of actors’ negative perception of output results, supports expectation 1. The actors here place the least amount of emphasis on the value of the state’s steering capacity. However, actors in this region would like more state involvement for implementing the Regional Water Plans (evidence for expectation 3).

Table 2: Comparison of expectations in the three regions Expectation 1: Effectiveness Expectation 2: Expectation 3: Horizontal coordination - output legitimacy Democratic legitimacy Accountability - throughput – input legitimacy legitimacy Region 1 Low effectiveness: Weakest democratic Medium capacity to steer Medium horizontal Perceived uncertainty about anchorage Rather strong constituent coordination The core of the financial redistribution in Low fear of the citizens state intervention in this network perceives mainly case of horizontal to lose control over region. Local actors still see constituent state actors as coordination water supply a need for a stronger important, who are already capacity of the constituent within the state public state to steer administration, hence the structure remains rather hierarchical Region 2 Mixed effectiveness: Medium democratic Strongest capacity to steer Strongest horizontal Positive role of resource anchorage Strongest intervention of coordination dependency (of hillside Differentiated the constituent state in this Mainly local actors are related municipalities) for perceptions between region and perception that to the core and perceived as horizontal coordination, but citizens’ from water constituent state should most important. This structure negative perception of poor hillside and water take strong steering role; comes closest to non- financial aspects rich valley again different between hierarchical interaction for valley and hillside water services provision municipalities Region 3 Low effectiveness: Strongest democratic Weakest capacity to steer Weakest horizontal Negative perceptions of anchorage Weakest constituent state coordination output (neighbour resources Strong values of intervention so far. Least Core actors perceive either as less preferable than own, citizens’ input and perceived need for further municipal or constituent state smaller structures perceived democratic control constituent state steering actors as important what as better than larger ones) role results in two separate clusters. This comes close to a very fragmented structure of horizontal coordination in water supply. Source: Own representation based on results presented above. Note: indications in italic show confirmation for expectations

Our comparative analysis of the differing regions provides key insight about how values and perceptions of effectiveness, democratic legitimacy and accountability across regions may converge as well as diverge. Our analysis has shown that effectiveness factors affect horizontal coordination in key ways, which differ (to a degree) across the three regions: in region 1, a negative perception of fiscal redistribution strongly impedes horizontal coordination across municipalities. Fiscal concerns exacerbate the resource dependency issue in region 2 as well. In region 3, the perception that smaller structures are more efficient than larger ones impedes horizontal coordination, but democratic deficits clearly seem to be the most central driving factor. Moving beyond a logic of

17 effectiveness, we find that input and throughput legitimacy also affect horizontal coordination. Interestingly, we find that the democratic (input) legitimacy affects horizontal coordination reforms differently (negatively) than accountability (throughput legitimacy) in terms of the capacity to steer does in all three regions.

CONCLUSIONS This paper has set forth the question of how and why differing legitimacy dimensions affect the development of horizontal coordination. The latter process has often been promoted based on a logic of effectiveness or output legitimacy, i.e., that larger structures for providing public services lead to improved performance (Scharpf 1999; Schedler, 2003). However, horizontal coordination may be impeded due to democratic legitimacy and accountability deficits (Kübler et al. 2003). We thus have moved beyond the typical effectiveness arguments by also assessing the role of democratic legitimacy and accountability for coordination processes, in addition to output criteria. Accordingly, following the mainstream arguments in the literature, we firstly expected that output legitimacy would foster horizontal coordination. We also posited that when democratic legitimacy is historically high and local actors fear losing this, then horizontal coordination processes are difficult to realize. In contrast, we expected strong accountability in terms of state capacity to steer to have a positive effect on such coordination. We assessed these expectations based on network and qualitative data stemming from documents and interviews with local and regional actors in three water supply areas in the Swiss constituent state of Basel-Land.

Our results show that effectiveness does indeed play a key role for the development of horizontal coordination, yet not necessarily always as typically expected. For instance, resource dependencies and financial concerns seem to have a strong effect on coordination processes; some negatively (financial) and others positively (resource dependency). Moreover, we found perceptions that smaller structures are more efficient than larger ones, which impede horizontal coordination processes. This finding is interesting, as it contradicts the typical effectiveness arguments that underlie such processes (Schedler, 2003). Furthermore, the expected negative link between democratic legitimacy and horizontal coordination cannot be clearly confirmed. In contrast, our results support the expected positive link between accountability and horizontal coordination: the stronger the constituent-state’s capacity to steer can be observed or is desired by actors, the stronger the horizontal coordination can be found. This coheres with previous studies that have found that steering from a higher institutional level is often required to foster coordination (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010).

18 From a methodological point of view, the use of interview and qualitative data, and thus actors’ perceptions to assess horizontal coordination and legitimacy aspects, has shown to be a fruitful approach. This has allowed us to take important context and region specific factors into account. Furthermore, the conceptualization of horizontal coordination as a network, and the application of descriptive Social Network Analysis (SNA) to operationalize perceived power relations, has given interesting insights in terms of the network boundary definition as well as the degree to which local actors, and municipalities in particular, are part of coordination processes. The SNA presented here was not based on full network data (e.g. results stemming from all actors involved in the process), but only stem from selected experts, identified as the core of coordination processes. Future research about the perception of relations of all actors potentially involved would be needed to obtain more robust data on horizontal coordination. Moreover, given the case study approach, the results cannot be generalized broadly.

However, by following a theoretical sampling logic, we have chosen a case that has enabled us to analyze effectiveness, democratic legitimacy and accountability in coordination processes. Hence, the empirical assessment of the validity of our expectations can contribute to knowledge regarding the relationship between horizontal coordination and different legitimacy dimensions in other federal systems, even if they do not have such a strong direct democracy like in Switzerland. Indeed, the findings from the Swiss case are relevant to other federal countries where local autonomy is juxtaposed with the clout of constituent states. Moreover, democratic legitimacy, and particularly citizens’ value of municipal control, is not only salient in Switzerland but also across the rest of Western Europe, where we have seen recent citizen-initiated waves of re-municipalization of previously outsourced or privatized public services (Wollmann et al., 2010).

In sum, this research has moved beyond arguments of effectiveness that underlie horizontal coordination processes to show how and why democratic legitimacy and accountability can affect such developments. Indeed, in order to effectively (or not) provide public services through horizontal coordination, such reforms first need to be realized, which often depends input and throughput legitimacy dimensions.

19 APPENDIX 1: Interviewee list No. Actor No. of Date people Constituent state 1.1 Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy Basel-Land Representatives * 2 Fall 2013 1.2 2 Bureau of Environment Solothurn Representative ** 1 Fall 2013 Region 1 3 City councilor of the city of Laufen 1 Summer 2013 4 President of water network „Gilgenberg“ 1 Fall 2013 5 President of joint-stock corporation regional water supply “Birstal-Thierstein” 1 Fall 2013 6 President of waterworks „Birstal“ 1 Fall 2013 7 Drinking water technician for the joint-stock corporation regional water supply 1 Fall 2013 “Birstal-Thierstein” and Waterworks „Birstal“ 8 President of water supply „Lüsseltal“ (Solothurn and Basel-Land) 1 Fall 2013 Region 2 9 President of joint-stock corporation water supply“ Waldenburgertal“ 2 Fall 2013 10 City councilor of municipality 1 Fall 2013 11 City councilor of Niederdorf municipality 1 Winter 2013 12 City councilor of Waldenburg municipality 1 Winter 2013 13 City councilor of Hölstein municipality 1 Fall 2013 14 City councilor of municipality 1 Winter 2014 15 City councilor of Oberdorf municipality 1 Fall 2013 16 City councilors of Ramlinsburg municipality 3 Winter 2013 Region 3 17 President of joint-stock company “Hardwasser AG” 1 Winter 2014 18 President of task-specific association Waterworks “Reinach” Region 1 Winter 2014 19 City councilor of municipality of Münchenstein 2 Winter 2014 20 President of task-specific association “Aesch, Dornach and ” (Basel- 1 Winter 2014 Land and Solothurn) 21 City councilors of municipality 2 Winter 2014 22 City councilors of municipality 3 Winter 2014 23 City councilors of municipality 2 Winter 2014 * Interviews for regions 1-3 ** Interviews for regions 1 and 3

20 APPENDIX 2: In-degree centralities Tables 3-5 below show in-degree centralities for regions 1-3 respectively.

In region 1, the maximum in-degree is eight, as interview partners representing eight organizations answered the question about importance. What is very interesting to see is, that mostly constituent state actors receive a high in-degree compared to other actor groups. In contrast to formal decision- makers such as the executive or legislative branches, the three most important actors (receiving a score of 6) are administrative entities.

In region 2, maximal in-degree centrality would be nine. Similar to region 1, mainly constituent state administrative entities received the highest in-degree centrality. On average however, municipalities and inter-municipal water suppliers seem to be perceived as most important. It is important to note that the highest score is received by one private actor (the consultancy Sutter).

In region 3 results confirm what can also be identified in figure 3. The highest in-degree is nine. The highest degree centralities are shared between some constituent state actors, again being administrative entities and the water supplier of Industrial Works Basel belonging to the constituent state of Basel-City, and local actors such as municipalities and regional water suppliers.

21 Table 3: In-degree centralities in region 1 Actor type Actor (total n=52) In-degree centrality (max. 8) Constituent Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy Basel-Land 6 state actors Drinking Water Inspector of the constituent state Basel-Land 6 N=14 Bureau of Environment Solothurn 6 Drinking Water Inspector of the constituent state Solothurn 3 Building Insurance Solothurn 3 University of Basel 3 Bureau for Military and Population Protection Basel-Land 2 Industrial Works Basel (IWB) 2 Government of the Constituent state Basel-Land 1 Fire Inspector and Building Insurance Basel-Land 1 Constituent state Basel-City 1 Government of the constituent state Solothurn 1 Building, Planning and Environmental Director Conference 1 Association of constituent state Chemists 1 National Swiss National Association for Gas and Water 6 actors Swiss Association of Drinking Water Technicians 2 N= 5 Federal Office of Food Security and Veterinary Issues 1 Federal Office of the Environment 1 Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology 1 Municipal Water network „Birstal“ 7 actors Drinking water technicians for the joint-stock corporation regional water supply “Birstal- 6 N=26 Thierstein” (RWV) and Water network „Birstal“ Joint-stock corporation regional water supply “Birstal-Thierstein” 6 Water supply „Lüsseltal“ (Solothurn and Basel-Land) 5 City of „Laufen” 5 Drinking water technicians City of “Laufen” 4 Water network „Gilgenberg“ 4 Drinking water technician Water supply „Lüsseltal“ 3 Municipality of Röschenz 3 Drinking water technician Water Supply „Gilgenberg“ 2 Municipality of 2 Municipality of 2 Municipality of 1 Municipality of 1 Municipality of Kleinlützel 1 Municipality of Blauen 1 Municipality of 1 Municipality of 1 Municipality of Breitenbach 1 Municipality of Büsserach 1 Municipality of 1 Municipality of 1 Municipality of 1 Municipality of 1 Municipality of 1 Municipality of 1 Private Consultancy „Sutter“ 5 actors Accountancy firm „BDO Visura“ (joint-stock corporation) 2 N= 7 Consultancy Holinger 2 Water technician joint-stock corporation „Heinis“ 1 Consultancy “Schmidlin und Partner” 1 Consultancy Lienhard 1 Industry and Chamber of Commerce 1

Note: Bold actors = “core” of the respective coordination process, which were interviewed (cf. Appendix 1).

22 Table 4: In-degree centralities in region 2

Actor type Actor (total n=44) In-degree centrality Max. 10 Constituent state Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy Basel-Land 7 actors Constituent state Drinking Water Inspector Basel-Land 6 N=10 Government of the constituent state Basel-Land 3 Constituent state Basel-City 2 University of Basel 2 Bureau for Spatial Planning Basel-Land 1 Bureau of Industrial Services Basel-Land 1 Bureau for Military and Population Protection Basel-Land 1 Directorate of Finances and Church 1 Industrial Works Basel 1 National actors Swiss National Association for Gas and Water 4 N= 6 Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology 3 Federal Office of Food Security and Veterinary Issues 2 Federal Office of the Environment 2 Swiss Association of Drinking Water Technicians 2 “Aqua Viva” Swiss Action Group for the Protection of Rivers and Lakes 1 Municipal actors Joint-stock corporation water supply“ Waldenburgertal“ 5 N=21 Municipality of Arboldswil 5 Municipality of Niederdorf 5 Municipality of Waldenburg 5 Drinking water technician Joint-stock corporation water supply“ Waldenburgertal“ 4 Municipality of 4 Municipality of Hölstein 4 Municipality of Lampenberg 4 Municipality of Oberdorf 4 Municipality of Ramlinsburg 4 Association of Basel-Land Municipalities 3 Drinking water technician of Niederdorf 3 Drinking water technician of Oberdorf 3 Municipality of 3 Drinking water technician of Arboldswil 2 Drinking water technician of Hölstein 2 Drinking water technician of Bennwil 1 Drinking water technician of Lampenberg 1 Drinking water technician of Langenbruck 1 Drinking water technician of Ramlinsburg 1 Drinking water technician of Waldenburg 1 Private actors Consultancy “Sutter” 8 N=7 Consultancy “GRG” 4 Consultancy “Holinger” 2 Accountancy firm Schneeberger 2 Elektra Basel-Land (cooperative) 1 Aqua Plus (private partnership firm) 1 Industry and Chamber of Commerce 1

Note: Bold actors = “core” of the respective coordination process, which were interviewed (cf. Appendix 1).

23 Table 5: In-degree centralities in region 3

Actor type Actor (total n=39) In-degree centrality (max. 9) Constituent state Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy 8 l actors Industrial Works Basel 5 N=11 Constituent state Drinking Water Inspector Basel-Land 4 Government of the constituent state Basel-Land 2 Bureau for Military and Population Protection 2 Building Insurance Solothurn 2 University of Basel 2 Constituent state Basel-City 1 Bureau of Environment Solothurn 1 Constituent state Drinking Water Inspector Solothurn 1 Association of drinking water technicians Basel-Land 1 National actors Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology 3 N= 5 Swiss National Association for Gas and Water 2 Swiss Association of Drinking Water Technicians 2 Federal Office of Food Security and Veterinary Issues 1 Federal Office of the Environment 1 Joint-stock company “Hardwasser AG” 5 Task-specific association Waterworks “Reinach” Region 4 Municipal actors Municipality of Münchenstein 4 N=20 Municipality of Aesch 4 Municipality of Dornach Solothurn 4 Municipality of Pfeffingen 4 Municipality of 3 Drinking water technician of task-specific association “Aesch, Dornach and Pfeffingen” 2 (ZV ADP) (Basel-Land and Solothurn) Drinking water technician of Waterworks “Reinach” Region 2 Task-specific association “Aesch, Dornach and Pfeffingen” (Basel-Land and Solothurn) 2 Municipality of Arlesheim 2 Municipality of Muttenz 2 Municipality of Birsfelden 2 Municipality of 2 Municipality of Biel-Benken 2 Municipality of Oberwil 2 Municipality of 2 Municipality of Reinach 2 Drinking water technician of “Hardwasser AG” 1 Drinking water technician of Industrial Works Basel 1 Private actors Consultancy Holinger 6 N=3 Industry and Chamber of Commerce 2 Pharmaceuticals 1

Note: Bold actors = “core” of the respective coordination process, which were interviewed (cf. Appendix 1).

24 APPENDIX 3: Network figures

Figures 1-3 illustrate all actors named as being important for horizontal coordination. Ties thus show the link between actor A who named actor B as being important. For a depiction of who these entities are in each of the three regions see Appendix 2.

Figure 1 Network in Region 1

Legend: black nodes are constituent state, dark grey municipal, light grey national, and white private actors. Ties represent the perception of “being important” between interview partners and the rest of actors present in this network. Having 8 interview partners and 52 actors in this network, 408 connections are possible, and 124 were observed, what results in a density of 0.30. The overall density (considering all potential relations if all nodes would have been active) is 0.047.

25 Figure 2 Network in Region 2

Legend: black nodes are constituent state, dark grey municipal, light grey national, and white private actors. Ties represent the perception of “being important” between interview partners and the rest of actors present in this network. Having 9 interview partners and 44 actors in this network, 396 connections are possible, and 123 were observed, what results in a density of 0.31. The overall density (considering all potential relations if all nodes would have been active) is 0.065.

26 Figure 3 Network in Region 3

Legend: black nodes are constituent state, dark grey municipal, light grey national, and white private actors. Ties represent the perception of “being important” between interview partners and the rest of actors present in this network. Having 9 interview partners and 39 actors in this network, 342 connections are possible, and 99 were observed, what results in a density of 0.29. The overall density (considering all potential relations if all nodes would have been active) is 0.067.

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