EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

National security is a sensitive subject. A country’s survival, growth and development depend on a well crafted and consciously implemented national security policy. By nature, national security implementation should always be at a competitive edge relative to internal and external security threats. As a result, the state cannot easily disclose or expose its national security policies and plans without sufficient cause. ’s national security implementation is guided and instructed by the Public Order and Security Act, the Official Secrets Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. These acts complement one another and are applied flexibly enough to suit the prevailing circumstances

The Acts ensure that order, peace and stability prevail, and that the state’s secrets are protected from those who are not entitled to them. State secrets are the preserve of responsible authorities who implement them to control the variables that affect the survival, growth and development of the state. While the call for the right to access to information may sound cogent, it is important to note that it cannot be guaranteed that the information will not be used against the interests of the state and private individuals. In the Zimbabwean context, the phenomenon of the public demanding access to security information is not significant. The public is aware of the sensitivity of state secrets and security information, and it is not common to identify ordinary people craving for security information. Those who demand the information are political malcontents bent on finding a pretext for fomenting anarchy.

Public order is maintained by the Zimbabwe Republic , and national defence is guaranteed by the Zimbabwe , but for effective protection of the nation, security information is the preserve of those entitled to access it and use it, and not just anybody who might use it against the interests of the state. Peace prevails in Zimbabwe, and all the citizens enjoy unfettered participation in the socio-economic activities of the country. Sadly, however, sporadic occurrences of negative and unsubstantiated information against the state are witnessed, and these tend to polarize societal groups and attract the participation of external forces which find it as an opportunity to meddle in the affairs of a peace loving country, especially when it invokes legal instruments to normalize unstable situations. When this happens, detractors call it bad governance and yet no state, including those detractors, can afford the luxury to sit and watch the security of the state and the people deteriorating.

Against this background, this paper is poised to give an analysis of Zimbabwe’s national security policies and their implementation in maintaining the peace and tranquillity we so much cherish and enjoy.

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INTRODUCTION

An adequate analysis of national security and access to information requires a fundamental understanding of the two concepts. National security refers to the protection of a nation from attack or any other danger by holding adequate armed forces and guarding state secrets (http://definitions./uslegal.com) The term is understood to encompass economic security, monetary security, energy security, environmental security, military security, political security and security of energy and mineral resources. A national security policy is a document prepared periodically by the executive branch of the government. The right of the public to access information alludes to disclosing state information to the public and it is the brainchild of human rights activists, whose rationale for the quest is that it induces transparency, accountability and non-partisan behaviour in government authorities.

Zimbabwe has a relatively conservative view of national security. Such a conception emanates from the realist view point that national security is inevitable and that any information that might jeopardize the security of the state must be withheld from public scrutiny. Realist assumptions are entrenched in the nature of the international anarchic system which they argue does not allow for careless publication of state secrets or permitting easy access to state information. Realists believe that access to state information is not practical. They argue that most nations are reluctant to divulge confidential information to the public especially in an atmosphere in which trust of their adversaries is lacking, and such trust is unlikely to be fostered as long as those adversaries do not disclose their own confidential information. Booth (1991) and Morgan (2007) point out that realists see states as preoccupied with their own physical safety and autonomy, in an international system defined by anarchy.

Morgan (1991) further argues that states are in constant competition to increase their power relative to other states, and these international interactions are more important than states’ domestic cultures, leaders or political systems in determining behaviour. Realists like Waltz (2008) posit that the international system requires states to operate competitively lest they be eliminated, like corporations within a free market. It is only when national security is assured that states seek such other goals which include access to information by its citizens. The paper focuses on the current Zimbabwean situation, and frequent references to national security and access to information are necessary to analyze the context in which some of the legislation was enacted. In wrapping up the discussion, an attempt will be made to strike a balance between the security of the state and the rights of the citizens.

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ZIMBABWE’S EXPERIENCE WITH NATIONAL SECURITY

Historical Overview

Current regulations and practices on national security and access to information in Zimbabwe constitute a mixture of state security and human security. National security is seen by almost all states in the international system as the most important component of a state which involves the actions and policies taken by a nation against all internal and external threats to its borders, economy, and stability. Much of the literature on national security in Zimbabwe focuses on the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Official Secrets Act. These acts are applied synergistically, and were developed from the inherited Rhodesian Law and Order Maintenance Act, which was enacted in 1960. Over the years, some amendments were effected to suit the dynamics of the times and situations, and this gave birth to the three acts above. The overarching consideration was, and still is, national security, as no public freedoms can be enjoyed when the state is under threat of instability, or war. Traditionally, the right to access to information, particularly security information, was not an issue, and time will tell whether our people will really commit themselves to the issue, and adjustments to our legal instruments will be continuously made to adapt to the changing times.

LEGISLATION CONCERNING ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE GROUNDS OF NATIONAL SECURITY GROUNDS

The Official Secrets Act (2001) (Chapter 11:09)

The Official Secrets Act contains norms about access to information and restrictions on national security grounds. The secret documents are those directly related by content to state security, national defence, internal public order or the security of persons. The head of a public body shall not disclose to any applicant information whose disclosure will prejudice the defence and national security of the country, and the safety or interests of the country. A pertinent example is the divulging of information deemed prejudicial to the security of the country to some countries, which was committed by Zimbabwean businessman Philip Chiyangwa and Ambassador Dzvairo. The two breached the Official Secrets Act and were arrested, tried and convicted.

Public Order and Security Act (2002) (Chapter.11:17)

In 1980, the newly elected Zimbabwean government inherited from the colonial regime, the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) that had been gazetted in 1960. It was used by the Smith regime to prosecute any journalists and individuals who made statements that had the potential to cause “fear, alarm or despondency” in the country. In the 1990s, the Zimbabwean government announced its intention to replace LOMA with the Public Order and Security Bill, and it sailed through parliament in 1998, though it was not signed into law. POSA was enacted into law in 2002, following the publication of falsehoods in the media, as

3 well as violent demonstrations by civic groups and opposition political parties, which disrupted the smooth flow of business. These demonstrations were characterized by looting, vandalism of public infrastructure, stoning and torching of public and private transport. Contrary to what scholars like Makumbe (2002), Bond and Manyanya (2004) said about the repressiveness of the Act, peace and tranquility prevailed when this law became effective. It can easily be said that national security was guaranteed as the police monitored all political gatherings.

Article 15, Subsection 1 of POSA states that:

Any person who, whether inside or outside Zimbabwe, publishes or communicates to any other person, a statement which is wholly or materially false with the intention or realizing that there is a risk or possibility of inciting or promoting public disorder, or public violence, or endangering public safety … shall be guilty of an offence … or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.

The implication is that the right to access to information and civil liberties bears individual and collective responsibilities and obligations. Information that is transmitted from one person to another must be credit worthy, appropriate to the situation and purposeful. The sender needs to convey the right information and the recipient is obliged to use that information responsibly and appropriately. This averts the crises indicated above, and extends the frontiers of the right to access to information.

In the late 1990s, information that a deceased uniformed member’s body had been interred without the head made rounds, and this bizarre story hit the media headlines, leading to the state ordering an exhumation of the body. Contrary to what many expected, the soldier’s head was in place, and far from the speculations that the soldier had died from battle inflicted injury, it was confirmed that he had succumbed to malaria. The false information had the potential to ignite commotion and disorder, with the likelihood of inciting Zimbabweans to demonstrate against the state for deploying troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and constituting a serious national security threat. Section 15, Subsection (1) of POSA makes it an offence for a person inside or outside the country to communicate a statement that is wholly or materially false, and which:

Promotes public disorder or endangers public safety. Adversely affects the defence or economic interests of Zimbabwe. Undermines public confidence in the security forces. Disrupts any essential services.

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002) (Chapter 10:27)

The objective of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), as highlighted in its preamble, is to provide members of the public with the right of access to records and information held by public bodies; to make public bodies accountable by giving the public a right to request correction of misrepresented personal information. Article 19 subsection 1(b) provides that the head of a public body shall not disclose to any applicant, information whose disclosure will prejudice the defence and national security of the country. The independent media in Zimbabwe has over the years been publishing what could be called fictitious reports on various political issues, which in a way have caused

4 polarization in the Zimbabwean society, and threatened national security. In 2001, Blandina Tadyanemhandu from Gokwe was alleged to have been decapitated in front of her eight children by alleged ‘ZANU PF thugs.’ The story stunned the public, until it was later learnt that it was a contemptible fabrication. Basildon Peta, a journalist working for the Standard newspaper, claimed that he had been detained and severely beaten by the police at Central Police Station, but, on investigation it was revealed that he had never been arrested, and this is another instance of irresponsible behaviour that contributed to the crafting and passing of AIPPA in 2002.

CURRENT POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION DYNAMICS

Access to information is a key component of the individual’s freedoms. However, basing on the realist perspective of national security, it may be argued that the citizens’ right to access information has actually been replaced by the authorities’ need to maintain security of the state. While it is advocated that the public should be accorded a right to access information, the Open Society Justice Initiative national principles, and the Right to Information Draft Copy (2012) provide that in order to safeguard national security, information falling in the following categories should not be disclosed to the general public: a) the rights and reputation of others, including life, health, safety, privacy and other legitimate private interests; b) legitimate commercial and other economic interests, including patents, copyrights and trade secrets, (where consistent with the public interest); c) public health or morals; d) environment; e) public order, public safety and , including the prevention, investigation, apprehension and prosecution of criminal activities; f) the effective administration of justice, and the equality of parties in court proceedings; g) national security, defence and international relations; h) future provision of free and open advice within and among public authorities, or the effective formulation or development of policy ;

j) the economic, monetary and exchange rate policies of the State; or the legitimate financial interest of a public authority; k) inspection, control and supervision by public authorities, and disciplinary investigations; l) legal privilege; and m) academic or professional examination and recruitment processes.

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If the public is to be able to monitor the conduct of the government, and to participate fully in a democratic society, it should have access to information held by public authorities, including information that relates to national security. Enabling public scrutiny of government action, not only guards against abuse by government officials, but also permits the public to play a role in determining the policies of the government, and thereby forms a crucial component of genuine national security and democratic participation. However, it must be noted that national security is a pre-condition for the full enjoyment of all human rights, including the right to information, and some degree of secrecy is appropriate in specific circumstances. National security is a necessary evil in this context. It should be based on legal and genuine state interests, which if disclosed, will pose a threat to state stability.

Legitimate national security interest refers to an interest with the genuine purpose and primary impact of protecting the specific categories of information that are highlighted above. AIPPA and POSA have various sections which outline legitimate and genuine reasons for withholding disclosure of some information to the public. National security interest is therefore not legitimate if its genuine purpose or primary impact is to protect an interest unrelated to national security, such as protection of government, or officials from embarrassment or exposure when wrongdoing, concealment of information about the functioning of public institutions, entrenchment of a particular ideology, or suppression of peaceful protests are endemic. In Zimbabwe, national security and the public’s right to know are often viewed negatively, as both the state and the public seem to be in conflict over state and human security. While there is at times tension between a government’s desire to keep information secret on national security grounds, and the public’s right to information held by public authorities, some national security interests can actually best be protected when the public is fully informed about the government’s activities, including those undertaken to protect national security.

The whole debate on access to information should create restrictions on the types of information that can be classified and controlled, and setting out limits on the periods for which information can be classified. Information needs to be classified and controlled, especially that which deals with sensitive areas of state security, such as information that prejudices national defence and security. The Official Secrets Act, POSA and AIPPA, are quite clear on the measures that will be taken by the state if there is any danger or threat posed to national security by individuals or groups. Classification and control of information safeguards state institutions from unnecessary scrutiny by the public which might result in anarchy or despondency if such confidential information regarding state secrets gets into the wrong hands. Such matters should become classified when their disclosure would actually or potentially harm the State, either within the country or abroad. There’s a genuine reason to protect certain information because the wrong people can get it and use it to their advantage, and cause chaos or anarchy within a political system. Wikileaks exposed American diplomatic missions all over the world, and created mistrust, hostility and suspicion between the US government and its close allies and foes alike.

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Of interest in the discourse on national security in Zimbabwe is the Zimbabwe Initiative for Freedom of Expression’s (ZIFFE’s) (2007) claim that few Zimbabweans working for various Western funded civil society organizations are at the forefront of criticizing POSA and AIPPA as draconian instruments of state repression yet most Zimbabwean citizens have not been affected by these pieces of legislation. The major culprits are donor funded civic groups, whose motives and interests are a genuine cause for concern to Zimbabwe’s national security. The United States of America’s enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 2001, and the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by the European Union were precipitated by fabricated and deliberately distorted information coming from civic groups and opposition political parties. Hodzi and Chikakano (2012) acknowledge in their research paper that civil society that supposedly focuses on civic education has often neglected this area and favoured focusing on other aspects of civil and political rights that can easily attract funding. Mbanje and Mahuku (2011) also point out in their research paper that from 2000 onwards, a major shift in the EU`s aid policy was observed, as more funds were diverted towards democracy, rule of law and governance issues. In other words, this new paradigm shift witnessed aid being used as a weapon to change governments through EU sponsored civil society groups and NGOs. It can therefore be argued that no state will ever tolerate a situation where non-state actors are allowed to eclipse the power of the state and threaten its national security. This therefore calls for enactment of legislation such as AIPPA, the Official Secrets Act and POSA. It will safeguard the state’s core interests.

The practice of valuing national security more than the right to access information is not confined to Zimbabwe alone; it is possible to argue that access to information measures in the Western countries like the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and Germany also involve a conflict between the security of the nation and the liberty of individuals within that nation. Articles published by the World Socialist Web Site in 2012-13 show that, since the Wikileaks disclosures, individuals like Bradley Manning have been convicted of a range of criminal offences, including that of disclosing information which poses a danger to national security. Spencer at WSWS.org.com on19 January 2013 points out that:

Manning faces life in military prison under the Espionage Act. Prosecutors for the Obama administration argue that he is guilty of “aiding the enemy” by leaking information that was subsequently made available on the Internet to anyone, including enemies of the United States.

The US government also wants Julian Assange, the brains behind Wikileaks, to stand trial over the leaking of information regarded as a threat to the US Government’s national security. This appears to suggest that the measures legitimized under the clause on national security have undermined civil liberties such as the right to access information in such a way that it has resulted in the conviction of those who disclose or attempt to disclose information deemed confidential by the state. This in a way suggests that legislation on access to information does not have precedence over issues to do with national security. No state restrains itself from punishing violation of state security norms. Auken in WSWS.org as accessed on 11 February 2013) notes that:

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The Obama administration has gone to enormous lengths to keep documents relating to the drone killing program from the American public. Lawsuits brought by the New York Times and the American Civil Liberties Union under the Freedom of Information Act to force the release of these documents were dismissed last month by a federal judge in Manhattan, who complained in her ruling, that laws and legal precedents dealing with national security and state secrets effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly, lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a secret.

Bettleheim and Koczsvk, as cited in Baker (2003) identify what they dub ‘limiting the flow of information’ in the United States of America. The limits include escalated control of the flow of information to an unprecedented degree, stripping government departments’ websites of information, safeguarding information that could be misused and harm the security of the nation and the safety of the people, withholding the disclosure of unclassified but sensitive information, and resistance by the country’s Attorney General to provide Congress with information on the implementation of the Patriot Act. This scenario speaks volumes about the challenge of fulfilling the public’s demand for the right to access national security information, and of safeguarding state security interests simultaneously.

In Zimbabwe, civil liberties campaigners have been at the forefront in criticizing laws related to maintaining national security. Any state’s definition of national security is different from that of another. The definition is so broad that the right of citizens to access information as supported by various pieces of human rights legislation will always be at risk in any state, especially when the state feels that its core values or interests are under threat.

ZIMBABWE’S EXPERIENCE: ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Historical overview

Access to information is vital, for it enables effective participation of citizens in the day to day running of their country’s affairs. It is therefore the lifeblood of a country’s existence. According to Ronning and Kupe (1999), the African Media carry contradictions which have roots in the colonial period. First and foremost, it must be pointed out that Zimbabwe’s experience with access to information is inextricably linked to the country’s history. Before Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, the print and electronic media served the needs of the colonial administrators, where the public sphere was starved of a balanced information menu. Mukasa (2003) concurs with Ronning and Kupe by observing that the colonialists protected their interests through suppression of free speech and a free press. The Rhodesian Smith regime did not tolerate any dissenting voices, hence it is not surprising that the Herald, the Chronicle and its sister papers were aligned with the ideology and interests of the white ruling elite.

At independence, the media were then linked to either the inheritance of an authoritarian state or to a liberation movement with a political agenda that often implied a contradictory attitude to democratic principles. Ronning and Kupe (1999) opine that the media policies that were adopted by the liberation movements are a reflection of this discrepancy between a democratic and an authoritarian impetus. What mainly changed was the

8 personnel and policies. The organisational forms and structures that had been established during colonialism remained intact. The Zimbabwean mass media is not very different from that of other countries on the African continent. It has the same post-colonial institutional characteristics as those of other African countries. Saunders (1999) views media policies and their operational environment in Zimbabwe as more complex than those of other countries in Southern Africa. The Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) was instituted to give the local media an indigenous aura and relevance. The print media is an outgrowth of dissatisfaction with a national press that was an appendage of the South African Argus Company’s group of newspapers, which served colonial interests.

The new ZANU-PF led government undertook to make the press freer, mass oriented and responsible to the national interest. The press had to complement the government’s efforts in its endeavour to develop the new nation, and also had to be accessible to the majority of the Zimbabwean populace, and had to be non-partisan. One top ZANU-PF official, the late Minister Witness Mangwende, pointed out that the new press was part of the structural component of the society whose interest it had to reflect, promote and indeed defend (Mukasa 2003). From the outset, the Zimbabwean government was clear on the type of human resources that they desired in the media institution that was being established. Mukasa (2003) cites one other senior government official as saying that for people who had won their independence through sweat and blood, it was imperative that they thought and acted like Africans, as a reflection of their hard won independence from colonial rule. The mass media had to play an effective unifying role, and for this to happen, the editors and senior staff had to be acceptable and loyal to the government. It must be pointed out that at its inception, the ZMMT and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) were an expression of ZANU-PF’s resolve to decolonise, nationalise and democratise the media. By the 1990s, the Zimbabwean press had developed into three main groups, as the main stream press was owned by Zimpapers, rural newspapers by the ZMMT, and the independent press by the private sector. Since then, newspaper circulation in Zimbabwe has continued to grow.

It is very crucial at this juncture to note that in this contemporary world, many governments realise the importance of controlled access to information for security purposes. It is important to reflect on why the Zimbabwean government saw it very crucial to control the dissemination of information in Zimbabwe. As early as the 1990s, most government ministers felt that there was need to control the media. The independent media, particularly the Financial Gazette and the Standard, adopted more of a watchdog role. In this self- allocated role, they criticized government for what they perceived as insensitivity to the plight of the war veterans, who were living in abject poverty fundamentally because of the government’s adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. Their criticism extended to cover alleged police brutality on student demonstrators against alleged corrupt activities by senior government officials, which resulted in the appointment of a Commission of enquiry that was headed by Justice Sandura.

There was sustained exchange of criticism between the government and the Civil Society Organisations. The government noted that the independent media was becoming a loose cannon mainly because of foreign funding, and this had the potential of destabilising political order, and furthering opposition political agendas. Chen Chimutengwende, the then

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Minister of Information, observed that the Financial Gazette’s criticism was destructive, negative and even subversive, for it incited the Zimbabwean people to demonise and criticise the Police, Army, other security organizations and the government. Ronning and Kupe (1999) confirmed the minister’s observation by highlighting articles by The Standard Newspaper, which claimed that there had been an attempted coup by ZNA soldiers because of their disgruntlement over their involvement in the DRC, that the soldiers had mutinied, and also that 23 officers had been arrested for planning a coup, all which was false and intended to damage the reputation of the ZNA and cause despondency.

On accessing such negative information, the public is bound to lose confidence in the security sector, which poses a threat to the state’s national security. In this regard, AIPPA seeks to control politicians’ and mass media institutions’ communication to the public on sensitive issues. The capacity of their influence to sway public opinion, and to incite violence is unlimited. In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, most of the Hutus who perpetrated crimes against humanity were influenced by the media, which encouraged them to kill the Tutsis. In Zimbabwe, POSA safeguards the public from such careless journalism. Subsections 1-2 of Article 15 provide that whoever publishes or communicates false statements prejudicial to the state is liable to a fine or imprisonment, depending on the gravity of the offence.

CURRENT POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION DYNAMICS

With the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change, the media became very reckless, and independent papers became the opposition’s mouthpiece, clamouring and campaigning for regime change. The situation has remained the same, where newspapers like the Daily News, News Day, Financial Gazette and New Zimbabwean have taken the side of the MDC-T party. The private media has been criticised by most Zimbabweans for lying, fabricating stories, and misrepresenting facts. Over the years, some media houses and journalists have been sued and arrested for publishing lies.

Mukasa (2003) reminds us that when Honourable Minister Comrade Munangagwa was Minister of Justice he indicated that unrestricted press freedom would lead to disorder and anarchy which would harm social and national interests. Ibid (2003) also said that the late Honourable Minister of Defence, Comrade warned that the independent media had a well calculated programme to destroy the country, and the ZANU-PF government, while His Excellency, the Head of State and Government, and Commander –in- Chief of the , Comrade , had stressed that the independent press was thriving on selling manufactured lies to the people in the name of freedom of the press or access to information. As the result of the independent papers’ irresponsible journalism, the country’s and government’s images were damaged both at home and abroad. The Zimbabwean government became greatly concerned about media reports that could lead to fear and despondency among the Zimbabwean public, and the sequel was the passing of the POSA and AIPPA in 2002, to help restore and maintain public order and national security in the country.

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The introduction of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and the Public Order and Security Act were aimed at addressing some of the above problems. The Zimbabwean government also enacted such laws because some journalists deliberately spread falsehoods with the intention to create fear and panic among the population, and in the process, discredit the government. The private media published unsubstantiated stories. As an interest group, the private media in Zimbabwe also seeks to influence the operations of government and individual politicians to act in accordance with their own interests. It is made up of a group of individuals who share the same political, economic and social goals. Unfortunately, many people tend to ignore the power that media houses wield, especially in setting political agendas.

Claude Mararike (2002) argues that owners of the media are in most cases interested in a political agenda. Their reasons for setting up newspapers are to promote their political agendas and those of their friends, or particular groups of people. The private media in Zimbabwe actually supports some candidates for political office, especially those they feel will represent their interests when they get into public office. It has to be accepted that the enactment of such pieces of legislation was not by accident, but that it was a deliberate response to the fabrication of information to the public with a calculated intention to cause mayhem and despondency. The USA would never have come up with the Patriot Act, had it not been attacked by terrorists on 11 September 2001. States always find it necessary to come up with laws that are aimed at safeguarding their national security and sovereignty.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH ZIMBABWE STRIKES A BALANCE BETWEEN LEGITIMATE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVES AND THE RIGHT TO AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Zimbabwe has gone a long way in trying to address the national security imperatives and the right to the public’s access to information. This is evident in the pledges made by the three principals in the Government of National Unity, among whose key tenets is the realisation that access to information enables the electorate to enhance its interaction with the government. This enables the electorate to make informed choices of its representatives. The principals recognize the importance of freedom of expression and the role of the media in a multi-party democracy. Positions have been taken to open up airwaves and liberalise the print and electronic media. The public media is also practising balanced reporting and fair coverage.

With all sincerity, Zimbabwe has respected several regional and international protocols that provide for the right of access to information. Zimbabwe has ratified Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights, and Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which entails that each individual shall enjoy the right to receive information, and the right to express and disseminate opinions within the law of that particular country. It must be pointed out that such receipt, expression and dissemination of information is subject to national legislation, and this varies from country to country.

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The discussion so far has stressed that access to information can be ignored or undermined by states, especially in periods where they feel that their national security is under threat. The Open Society Justice Initiative (2012) concurs that access to information may be undermined if:

Disclosure of the information poses a real and identifiable risk of [significant] harm to a legitimate national security interest. The risk of harm from disclosure must outweigh the overall public interest in disclosure. The restriction must be proportionate and must be the least restrictive means available to protect against the harm. The restriction must not impair the very essence of the right to information.

It could therefore be submitted that legislation on national security is enacted to maintain citizens’ freedoms, and if this is the case, then it is possible to argue that citizens’ freedom to access information is valued more than security. McSweeney (1999) concedes that state security can be identified as a moral judgment about human needs. While this statement could be linked to the realist argument that the primary need of a nation is to guarantee its very survival, it could also be argued that the security of a nation-state rests upon its ability to make certain that the rights of its citizens are not vitiated by any internal or external threat. It therefore means that, for any state to buttress its security, the leadership should respect the rights of the citizens to access information. When the state protects the rights and freedoms of its citizens, the security of the state is guaranteed. The security of the state and that of the people must be maintained at all times. While some might argue that the people defining national security are the same people who have more to gain by keeping it secret, it can be counter argued that disclosure of some information poses a real and identifiable risk to national security, which might in the end affect even the citizens of that state, especially when access to that information ends up causing violence within that state. As a function of the law, there should be no conflict between genuine national security concerns and the ability of the citizens to access information. Laws are made to safeguard the security of the citizens within any given state.

Developing this point further, one could, like Walzer (2006), argue that what we conventionally call inhumanity is simply humanity under pressure. This statement explains that in moments of extreme pressure, restrictions on the right to and access to information are justified in order to prevent mayhem or civil strife. Interpretively, there is no contradiction between national security and the right to information. It could be possible to argue that before the enactment of POSA and AIPPA, it was an attack on Zimbabwe’s right to privacy and maintenance of order and national security that motivated the state to institute the pieces of legislation, and it evinces that national security comes to the fore only when citizens’ rights to accurate information are under threat. This point is emphasized by Comrade Chiwewe’s observation in 1999 when he was the Secretary for Information that, one of the dominant social phenomena in Zimbabwe at that time was the existence of a well-orchestrated private media campaign to discredit the government of the day by the most vicious means at their disposal in order to cause mayhem and despondency.

In this sense, it is possible to argue that if the security of Zimbabwe had not come under threat through the publication of falsehoods and distorted information, there would have been a vastly reduced incentive to enact such legislation. Without dissemination of

12 fabricated and altered news by the private media (which in a way might have led to mass uprisings) there would not have been any need by the Zimbabwean government to heighten the national security threat level and place restrictions on the right to and access to information through POSA and AIPPA. To some critics it may appear in the short-term that the right to information has been diminished in order to maintain national security, but such pieces of legislation as POSA and AIPPA were enacted in order to protect the citizens’ privacy and rights in the long-term. Media groups and opposition political parties may argue that the rights to access information are being exchanged for an increase in national security but citizens themselves do not feel that their right to information has been eroded. These groups tend to over-exaggerate the extent to which the citizens’ right to information is diminished by the state in pursuit of national interests.

CONCLUSION

It can be argued that there is no explicit disagreement in Zimbabwe between national security and the right to information. Huysmans (2010) has observed that security policy is not simply a practice of protecting and/or limiting a pre-given freedom but rather, is an action of governmental practice attempting to mould an abstract concept (freedom) into a concrete and legitimate practice. It is therefore clear that the argument between national security and the right to and access to information is mainly between the state and the citizens affected by the implementation of that policy. Many governments the world over are facing a difficult task in balancing national security and the right to information. This in the end means that instead of exchanging one for the other, there is a willingness to ensure that neither enjoys a privileged status above the other. However, as has been noted above, although governmental bodies may wish to obtain a balance between national security and the right to information, it is not always possible for them to do so, and this results in tension between the security of the state and the freedom of the citizens.

There is always conflict between national security and the citizens’ right to information. This perception of incompatibility between national security and the right to information is particularly convincing when evidence from civil society groups is used to illustrate the argument. However, it should be noted that there are always two sides to every story, and it is possible to argue that any mutual exclusion between the right to information and national security in Zimbabwe is short-term and deceptive.

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Morgan, P. (2007), Security in international politics: Traditional approaches, in Collins, A. ed, Contemporary security studies, Oxford, Oxford University Press

Walzer, M. (2006), Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations, New York, Basic Books

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