Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul¹

Giada Coppola Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul¹

The philosophical activity of Obadiah Sforno, who is primarilyknown for his exegetical interpretations of the HolyScriptures,has receivedlittle scholarlyattention. Nonetheless,the few scholars interested in Lightofthe Nations—Sforno’s(uniquely) philosophical work—wereparticularlycritical of the author’sposition in this exposition, showing asceptical attitude towards the uniqueness of the work. Obadiah Sforno’sphilosophical treatise reproduces the classical schema of the medieval quaestio disputata (“disputed question”), in which therewas no place for a “new” or “innovative” analysis characterisingsome of the most original inter- preters of the Renaissance period. He published the Hebrew version of Lightofthe Nations,entitled Or ʿAmmim,inBologna in 1537. In 1548,also in Bologna, he published the Latin version, with the title Lumen Gentium. The fact that Sforno himself translated his ownworkfrom Hebrew into Latin makes him particularlyexceptional.² The Hebrew and Latinversions do not appear to offer significant differencesin their overall view.The order of the questions and the general approachestoeach argument are identical (with very few exceptions), but nonetheless, we find several changes concerning the style and the breadth of topics,aswillbeclear from reading the passages presented in this paper. Although the structure of Lightofthe Nations reproduces the medieval format of the disputed question, it seems thatSforno exercises asceptical approach towards introducing the quaestio and establishing the solution. In Lumen Gentium, every question is precededbydubitatur utrum (“it is questionable”), and in the last part —namely,the solution—of bothversions, we read:

שנ בי םא ןכ הל ית סר קפ חה יק הר נה כז תר Ad dubium ergo respondetur To dispel anydoubt

Doubt does not onlyplayadialecticalfunctioninthis pamphlet.Sforno is following the Maimonidean tradition,³ and he introduces “doubtand perplexity,”⁴ which are

 Iwould like to thank Professor WarrenZev Harvey for his advice, his valuablecomments,and his suggestions on how to improvethis article.  Iwill employ the appellation Light of the Nations to refertoboth versions of the pamphlet in general terms;when appropriate,Iwill makeadistinction between the Hebrewand Latin editions.  Cf. Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment,Physics, and Doubt,” in Hazon Nahum: Studies in JewishLaw,Thought, and HistoryPresented to Dr.NormanLamm,ed. Yaakov Elman and JeffreyS.Gurock (New York: Michael Scharf Publication Trust of the Yeshiva University Press; Hobo- ken, NJ:Ktav, 1997), 149–62.

OpenAccess. ©2020Giada Coppola, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-008 102 Giada Coppola

inherent in the quest for knowledge.Nevertheless,Sforno introduces the term safeq to present the solutions to the questions, in which sense the doubt is asynonym of “objection” (with referencetothe previous arguments), following Gersonides, who was the first to use it in this manner. In the Renaissance, Isaac Abravanel employed safeq to translate obiectio in his Roš Amanah,confirmingits double function, as did David Messer Leon in his Tehillah le-Dawid. Forthis reason, the relationship to Jew- ish scepticism cannot be ruled out,asisalsohighlighted by GiuseppeVeltri in his book Alienated Wisdom.⁵ Twoarticles by Robert Bonfil on Sforno’s Lightofthe Nations appeared in 1976 and 1995 respectively.⁶ Both focused on the interpretation of the idea of the soul (the crucial points of which Iwill analyse in detail later). Bonfil highlights the lack of originality in the author’sapproach to philosophy; he considers Sfornonot onlya“terrible” philosopher—in comparison with his contemporaries, taking into account the brilliant work of Leone Ebreo—but also awoeful interpreter of the classical philosophical tradition.⁷ As Warren Zev Harvey has emphasised, acomparison between Leone Ebreo and Sforno turnsout to be inappropriate,asthe first was a great philosopher,while Sforno was an eruditescholar. Nevertheless, Bonfil recog- nises a “modern approach” represented by the relevance of the topic of the soul in Sforno’swork, as the question of the immortality of the soul was one of the most common issuesdiscussed in philosophical treatises duringthe Renaissance period.⁸

 Harvey,161.  Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: EnquiryintoJewishPhilosophy and Scepticism (Berlin and Bos- ton: De Gruyter, 2018), 143–44: “The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries arefoundational for several aspects connectedboth with the Jewish consciousness of and attitudes towards scepticism. At the end of the Humanist period and the Renaissance, we can observethe first changesinthe perception and formulation of philosophical questions.After some seminal beginnings,mirrored by ‘Ovadya Sforno, therecould be no hesitation in recognising that the use of dubitatur/dubium and quaestiones dubitatae is morethan arhetorical tool. They became adialecticalstrategythat playedanimportant roleinthe Late Renaissance (Accademia dei Dubbiosi)and earlymodern period (Accademia degli In- cogniti,Simone Luzzatto). The ‘doubts’ (dubitationes)are not primarilyaliterary instrument to intro- duce the dogmatic opinion of teachers,masters, or opponents, but adialecticalstrategytointroduce very delicatequestions that could have dangerousresults for the majority.The topics handled involve the usual themes of sceptic origins and tradition: authority,morality,theodicy, collective society and individuality,immortality of the soul as asocial and moral problem (doctrine of remunerations), etc.”  Robert Bonfil, “The Doctrine of the Soul and Holiness in the Teachings of Obadia Sforno” [Hebrew], Eshel Beer Sheva 1(1976): 200–257; Bonfil “Il Rinascimento:laproduzione esegetica di ‘O. Servadio Sforno,” in La letturaebraica delle Scritture,ed. Sergio J. Sierra (Bologna: EDB, 1995), 261–67.  Bonfil, 270: “Non dovrebbe far meraviglia che non lo si sia presosul serio eche, come filosofo, a lungoandareegli sia statocondannatoaldimenticatoio.”  Bonfil, 271: “Eppure,anche nella forma nella quale si presentava, il Lumen Gentium offriva un cu- rioso esempio di elementidecisamente innovatore innestati sulla struttura essenzialmente medie- vale.Se, infatti, al di là dell’elencodelle quaestionesdisputate, riflettiamo sulla quantitàdienergia discorsiva econseguentementesulla quantità di spazio dedicata ad ognuna di quelle questioni,cisi accorge subito che l’interesseera decisamente spostatosuquantoera di attualitá nel Rinascimento, e in particolaresulla questione dell‘anima umana etc.” Obadiah Sforno and the IndividualHuman Soul 103

Apparently, Sforno’sintention, as the author himself announces in the prologue of both treatises, was to refute some of the Aristotelian positions which wereentirely at odds with the principles of the Jewish faith. Hence, the subtitle of Lumen Gentium is worthyofnote: in it,Sforno expresslyasserts that the book was written “against some opinionsofAristotle,” and thatit“demonstrates the doctrines of the creation of the universe from nothing,the providenceGod has for human beings,and the immortality of human soul, which they [i.e., Aristotelian philosophers] shamefullyre- ject,deriding religion.”⁹ Charles Manekinfollows the pattern established by Professor Bonfil, albeit with aless critical approach: “Yetitisalso an attack on those principles of Aristotelianism that conflict with religious dogma,placing Sforno in the intellectuallyawkward position of appealing to Aristotle in order to undermine his own philosophy!”¹⁰ In fact,itmay be better to state “appealing to the authority of Aristotle and Averroes in order to undermine their own philosophy.” However,inmyopinion, Sforno’spar- ticular approach represents acomponent of modernity,consistingofquoting asen- tencenot onlyfor the argument,but also for the counterargument,which is the con- futationofthe topic presented in the first part of the quaestio. It is necessary to note that most of the quotations from Aristotle and Averroes in Lightofthe Nations are favourable and not critical, despite what was announced by the author himself. Sfor- no does not care about the principle of contradiction, accordingtowhich it is not possiblethat p and -p maybepresented by the sameauthority;inthis sense, he is not anchored in the classical medieval system. Sforno was defined by the late Mauro Zonta as the lastrepresentativeofwhat maybecalled “Hebrew Scholasticism,”¹¹ but also as an “anti-philosopher,” as he characterised him in his contribution to the first international symposium on Oba- diah Sforno.¹² Taking into account the latest discoveries of the DFG-funded Sforno

 Obadiah Sforno, Lumen Gentium (Bologna, 1548); frontispiece: “Opusculum nuper editum contra nonnullas Peripateticorum opiniones demonstratiue docens presertim circacreationem et vniuersi nouitatem et diuinam de mortalibus curam et humanarumanimarum immortalitatem, quas ipsi tur- piter respuunt religionis penitus irridentes quareillud meritoLumen Gentium appello.”  Charles Manekin,inTheJewishPhilosophyReader,ed. Daniel H. Frank, OliverLeaman, and Charles H. Manekin (New York: Routledge,2000), 284.  Mauro Zonta, “The Autumn of Medieval Jewish Philosophy: Latin Scholasticism in 15th-Century Hebrew Philosophical Literature,” in Herbst des Mittelalters? Fragen zurBewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts,ed. JanAertsen and Martin Pickavé(Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2004), 475: “In Italy, thereisevidenceofthe persistenceofaninterest in Latin Scholasticism by some Jewish phi- losophersactive in the 16th century,e.g.Obadiah Sforno”;Zonta, HebrewScholasticism in the Fif- teenth Century. AHistoryand Source Book (Dordrecht: Springer,2006), 30.  This symposium,entitled “Lost and Found in Translation—Ovadiah Sforno and His World,” took placeinHamburgon18and 19 January 2017.Inhis paper entitled “Or ‘Ammim/Lumen Gentium and the quaestio disputata,” Zonta stated: “Ovadiah Sforno is thereforenot seen todayasasimple ‘philosopher’ but rather as an ‘anti-Aristotelian’ thinker, and so, consideringthe keyroleplayedbyAris- totle in the thinkingofthat time, almost as asort of ‘anti-philosopher.’” Zonta was probably follow- 104 Giada Coppola

Project at HamburgUniversity,aswell as the studies of Giuseppe Veltri¹³ and Warren Zev Harvey,¹⁴ it is now possible to newlyplace Sforno in the history of Jewish thought: he maybedefined not onlyasthe last interpreter of Scholasticism, but also as the last Averroist.AsVeltri phrased it,Sforno is “an Averroist malgré lui.” Har- vey, during his fellowship at MCAS, proposed an enlighteningexplanation: that Light of the Nations is the resultofSforno having taught classes in Latin on Averroist philosophy. Sforno was presumably hired to teach this class by the professors at Bolo- gna University,orperhaps by Christian theologians.Inthis sense, Averroes represents not onlyan“authority” in Sforno’streatise, but alsothe subjectmatter of his teaching. As Harvey suggests, Sforno could have been movedtoteach the Christian scholars in Bologna about Averroes for the same reason he chose to teach Reuchlin Hebrew in Rome. This general overview pavesthe wayfor new perspectives: Elijah del Medigo (1458–93)—who was most active in Padua and Venice—would no longer be held as the last “Averroist”¹⁵ of the Jewishtradition, since Averroes would have continued to have been studied in Jewish communities into the sixteenth century.AsMontada noted, this tendencypersisted in the Latin world—with its ups and downs—until the Renaissance period. Asimilar phenomenon maybeobserved in Jewishthought: “JewishAverroism” is aconcept thatusually refers to Jewish philosopherswho phil- osophised within the context of Averroes’sinterpretation of Aristotelian philosophy. Forthis reason, Sfornoshould be considered as aJewishAverroist; chronologically speaking, as the last one. The fact thatSforno does not conform to all of Averroes’s philosophyisnot an indication of an anti-Averroistic attitude. Even though Bonfil and Manekin note the influenceofAverroes throughout Sfor- no’swork, they do not stress the importance of this aspect,not remotelyconsidering the general overviewofthe Italian setting.¹⁶ On the contrary,for them,the impor-

ing the interpretation of Cecil Roth in his TheJews in the Renaissance (Philadelphia: Jewish Publica- tion Society,1959), 80–81.  Veltri, Alienated Wisdom,162–67.  The second international symposiumonObadiah Sforno and his world, entitled “The Philosoph- ical Canon of Obadiah Sforno and His Contemporaries,” took placeinHamburgon5and 6November 2018.  Josep PuigMontada, “Eliahu del Medigo,the Last Averroist,” in Exchangeand Transmission across Cultural Boundaries: Philosophy,Mysticism and Science in the Mediterranean World,ed. Haggai Ben-Shammai, Shaul Shaked, and Sarah Stroumsa (Jerusalem: Israel AcademyofSciences and Hu- manities,2013), 155–86.  Bonfil, “Il Rinascimento,” 266: “Il metododel ragionamentoello Sforno resta dunque ancorato alla pesantedotta struttura accademica che ci si accorge poi subitoesserecostruita tutta di “mattoni” di auctoritates phylosophorum,prima traiquali naturalmenteAristotele eAvveroè. Insomma, dichiar- ando in cima all’opera latina, che l’intento eradisputarecon nonnullas Peripateticorum opiniones,lo Sforno non intendevaaffattorespingere il discorso peripatetico, bensì precisamenteinserirsi organ- icamenteinesso, prendereparteinuna discussione considerata attualmenteincorso, semprevali- da”;269: “Questo sistema aristotelico-averroistico […]costituiva la struttura di riferimentodel pen- sieromedievale di tutti, ebrei ecristianiEsso era ancora al centro della discussione filosifica nelle Obadiah Sforno and the IndividualHuman Soul 105

tance accorded to Averroes corroborates the idea that Sforno was anchored to an out- dated medieval tradition. In the Italian universities and in academic environments, Averroes was still being studied and commented on by scholars and members of the intellectual community.Since the lack of new elements in Sforno’streatise, such as (Neo‐)Platonism and Kabbalah, has been considered anegative factor up until now,inview of recent studies, is it possibletosuppose that Sforno’sintention was to become a “full” member of an élite and to be accepted by the Italian university milieu? It is likelythat Lightofthe Nations was written for aparticular audience (Chris- tian and academic) and this could also explain Sforno’s modus operandi,according to which onlyAristotle and Averroes are quoted, since they are still considered the major “authorities” for systematic philosophical thought.Sforno’sinterpretation and exposition of Aristotelian philosophyishighlycomplex and sophisticated; it is not onlybasedonmedieval Scholastic sources, such as Aquinas, Grosseteste, and Jandun, but also on contemporary ones, among them Paul of Venice, Gaetano da Thiene, and Augustine Nifo;namely, the representative figures of the “strong” Averroeian tradition. This is the tradition accordingtowhich Giglioni identifies the Averroistic tendencyinEuropean culture.¹⁷ Sforno belongstothis trend, all the more so giventhat he decided to write his work in bothlanguages for two different audiences. This point also characterises Sforno’sgeneral attitude towards philosophy, which is embedded in his deliberate choice to referonlytoAverroes throughout the entire Lightofthe Nations,with the exception of Maimonides, who is mentioned twice in Or ʿAmmim.¹⁸ Moreover,another particularaspect—which has been neglected by scholars—is the use of Latinsources in the Hebrew version as well: Sforno does not employ the Hebrew translations of Averroes, but onlythe Latin editions,¹⁹ and this is very surprising since all the texts wereavailable in Hebrew translation.

universitá d’Italia durante il Quattrocento egranparte del Cinquecento. Sennonché in questoperiodo operavanosul sistema medesimo le tendenze caratteristiche dell’umanesimo edel rinascimento, ren- dendo possibile l’introduzioone in esso di componenti eclettiche,soprattutto platoniche, che finirono per trasformarlo più omeno radicalmente. Orbene,contrariamente aquantosipuó tuttoraleggere qua elàneo manuali di storia degli ebrei nel Rinascimento, il Lumen Gentium restófondamental- mentefedele al sistema aristotelico-averrostico.”  Cf. Guido Giglioni, “Introduction,” in Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe,ed. Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni (Dordrecht: Springer,2013), 2. “‘Aver- roistic’ refers to the generic culturallabel denotingapronounced rationalistic attitude, of avaguely Aristotelian ilk, towards questions of philosophical psychology (in particular,the natureofthe human mind and its survivalafter the death of the body), natural determinism and, aboveall, the relationships between philosophical freedom and dogmatic truths,often of areligious kind.”  Obadiah Sforno, Or ‘Ammim (Bologna, 1537), 8, 10. to( גנ גד רא וקי ) ” Aclear example is givenbythe employmentofthe expression “contraGaricone indicatethe Megarians in book Theta of Metaphysics,amisunderstandingwhich is onlyfound in the Michael Scotusedition, which was published in Venicein1473. 106 Giada Coppola

Sforno’serudition is nevertheless evidentthroughout,displayedinhis use of Jewish, Arabic and Scholastic sources, which he cleverlydisguises, as thereisno mention of them in his treatise. His philosophicalknowledge is quite clear when we compare the pamphlet with the exegetical and biblical commentary.Anevident example is represented by his interpretation of Numbers 7:89,²⁰ in which he inter- -vocalised middabber)asGod speaking to Himself, which is clearlyaref) דמ רב prets erencetothe theory of the intellect in Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed 1:68. However,Sforno does not mention this biblical verse in his Lightofthe Nations, even if he presents asimilar argument in the sixth question, “On the Creation,” according to Maimonidean principles. As Rabbi Kravetz supposes, the commentaries are chronologicallylater than Or ʿAmmim. Sforno considers the relation between reason and revelation as an essential point in order to understand the ultimategoal of human beings, which is naturally the higher knowledge of God. His attitude towards philosophyfollows the classical Jewishtradition, according to which it is possible to find astandpoint to reconcile the claims of reason and revelation. Sforno criticises the Aristotelianprinciples that are contrary to the Torah. Nonetheless,heaccepts twenty-seven “philosophical propositions” as being in accordance with the Torah’steachings.²¹ However,ashis starting point for Lightofthe Nations,Sforno assumes that the root of every philosophicaland scientific thought is founded in the Torah: Moses, duringthe revelation on Sinai, receivedthe Torahthatisnot onlythe Law, but also the original wisdom. LightoftheNations sticks to this principle: in order to re- solve the philosophical issues, the “final” solution Sforno presents is always characterised by the exegetical interpretation of abiblical passage.

Sforno’sArgumentsregarding De Anima

The problem of the human soul and its perfection occupies the third part of Lightof the Nations,²² and, as mentioned above, it represents the most importantsection of

 “And when Moses was gone into the tabernacle of the congregation to speak with Him, then he heardthe voice of one speakinguntoHim from off the mercyseat that was upon the ark of testimony, from between the twocherubims:and he spakeunto Him” (King James Version).  Cf. Or ʿAmmim,12–14,and Lumen Gentium,9–11.  Summarising the topics of Light of the Nations,wecan divide the workinto three different sec- tions.Inthe first part of the book—chapters 1–7—Sforno analyses the physical cosmos, denying anypossibilityofthe pre-eternity of the sublunary and superlunary worlds with particular attention to some topics such as the movement of coming-to-be and passingaway, the elements,prime matter, the heavens, and motion. In the second part—chapters 8–10—he analysesthe metaphysical and on- tological aspects,the nature of God, unicity,corporeality,knowledge,and God’swill. In chapters 11– 14,the author approaches some questions on the soul, the natureofthe soul, the morality of man, and providence. Chapter 15 could be consideredasort of “outsider” on accountofits principal argu- Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 107

Sforno’senquiry.Sforno demonstratesthe immortality of the human soul and its in- corruptibility by refutingfour arguments, which are founded upon Averroes’sLong Commentaries on Aristotle and the Incoherence of the Incoherence.²³ Bonfil specificallycriticises Sforno’sapproach to the question of the soul, which he considered to be an obsolete approach commonlyfound in the classical medieval Judeo-Christian tradition that was closed to the new influences typical of this era.²⁴ Sforno “saves” some principles of the Averroeian/Aristotelian system (the twenty- seven propositions presented at the beginning of Lightofthe Nations)which are in accordancewith Jewish religious dogmas.Hence, Bonfil asserts that Sforno may be compared with “some thinkers [who are] supposedtobeparadigmatic followers of Averroes withoutbelievinginthe Averroeian doctrines,” as Pomponazzi phrased it.²⁵ At the beginning of chapter 12,the reader is faced with the first problem, which constitutes the heart of the question:

םא נה שפ אה ונ יש הת כש יל את רש הב יה הה דא מם רבד Utrum intellectiva hominis anima םצעב יה בא תל ני ספ תד םא יא ן qua substantialiter dicitur rationalis sit quidimmortale velnon. Whether the intellectual human Whether theintellectualhuman soul,bywhich soul, by which man it is essentially manisessentially rational,isincorruptibleor called rational, is immortal or not. not.

ment,which includes and embraces all those three aspects—physics, metaphysics, and providence— with particular focus on the relationships between deity,essence, and humankind.  The primarilysources arethe Long Commentaries on On the Soul 3.5, Book Lambda of Metaphy- sics,and On the Heavens,aswellasthe Incoherence of the Incoherence. As aforementioned, Sforno probablyuses the Scot’sversion for the commentaries and for the original Averroes’ works, he uses the Nifo’sedition.  Bonfil, “Il Rinascimento,” 269–70: “Lo sforzo precipuo del nostroviene quindi rivoltoacorreg- gere il sistema aristotelico-averroisticodal di dentro,asalvarlo dai propri errori equindi anche dalle critiche che si sarebberopotutemuovere ad esso. Non diversamente da consimili tentativi di pensatori cristiani, come per esempio PietroPomponazzi, lo Sforno intese salvare il principio averroistico dell’intelletto separato eeterno comune atuttoilgenereumano senza perórinunciarealla esigenza religiosa di credere nell’esestinza di un’anima individuale forma dell’uomo, sostanza sepa- rata eeterna, non pura potenzialità. Come Averroé, lo Sforno sostenevache l’intellettomateriale non è neque corpus neque virtus in corpore. Secondo lui, però, l’anima umana è sostanza individuale,eter- na, emanante da una non meglio definita essenza superiore.”  Bonfil, 270: “Con questa posizione di apertura, lo Sforno si allineava decisamente conquei pensatori che adetta di Pomponazzi si credevano di essereaverroisti senza peraltroesserlo davvero.” Cf. Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence: Le Monnier,1965), 18–19: “Ideoteneoquod orrupt Averrois devitat maiores difficultates quam alia; nec me pudet amoreorruptio me ipsum retractare. Unde qui dicunt me aliis orruptio ut contradicam,mentiuntur.Oportet enim in philosophiahaereti- cum esse, qui veritatem invenirecupit.” 108 Giada Coppola

In Or ʿAmmim,the statement of the problem focuses on the concept of the corruptibility of the soul (nifsad). In Lumen Gentium,wefind the word “immortality” (immortale). The two ideas are naturallyequivalent,because the notionofincorruptibility logicallyembraces the idea of immortality.Sforno usesthe Hebrew term niṣḥi to translate the Latin immortale,evenifitliterallysignifies “eternal.” Nevertheless, the author himself explains that nifsad and niṣḥi and immortale and incorruptibile are synonyms. This kind of distinctionisalso presented by Thomas Aquinas,who, when alludingtoAugustine in the Summa Theologiae,shows that some substances are incorruptible (incorruptibilis)and immortal (immortalis).²⁶ In this example, it is interesting to note that the Hebrew ʿeṣem nivdal—literally, “separate substance”—is translated as abstractum from matter,which normallyindicates the pure form .( בנ לד ןמ חה רמו )

כש על םצ בנ לד וה נא חצ י Quodlibet abstractum est immortale ² ⁸ sive incorruptibile.²⁷ Every abstract substance is immortal Every separate substance is incorruptible. or incorruptible.

Sforno, in defenceofthe immortality of the soul, points out four essential arguments accordingtowhich he explains the nature of the (human) soul, from the general definition of the faculty to the particularcharacterisation of the intellectual human soul: ‒ The (in)corruptibility of the soul (in Or ʿAmmim)²⁹/(im)mortality of the soul (in Lumen Gentium)³⁰

 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1.97.1: “Respondeodicendumquod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter.Uno modo, ex partemateriae, eo scilicet quod velnon habet materiam, sicut Angelus; velhabetmateriam quae non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut corpus caeleste. Et hoc dicitur secundum naturam incorruptibile.Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex partefor- mae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam, inhaeret aliqua dispositio per quam totaliter acorrup- tione prohibetur.Ethoc dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Dioscorum, tam potenti naturaDeus fecit animam, ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plen- itudo sanitatis,idest incorruptionis vigor.Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex partecausae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo in statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilisetimmortalis.Quia, ut Au- gustinus dicit in libro de quaest.Vet.EtNov.Test., Deus hominem fecit,qui quandiu non peccaret, immortalitate vigeret, ut ipse sibi auctor esset autadvitam autadmortem. Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poteratcorpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliterfactum est.Quia enim anima rationalis excedit pro- portionem corporalis materiae, ut supra dictum est.Conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservareposset supra naturam corporalis materiae.”  Lumen Gentium,57v.  Or ʿAmmim,89. כש צל רו נת ספ הד אי מא םנ פנ דס ות הנה נה שפ אה ונ יש הת כש יל הת אי וצ תר פנ דס םא ןכ יה נא ספ תד . : Or ʿAmmin, 84 Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 109

‒ The natureofthe intellectual human soul; i.e., whether each individual has their own soul or wherethereexists onlyone common soul for the entire human species.³¹ ‒ The potentiality of the intellectual human soul;³² namely, whether the intellect is apower of the soul. ‒ The perfectionofthe intellectual soul as the actualisation of the material intellect/the fallacy of the intellectual human soul.

The problem of the soul is presented together with another question intrinsicallyre- lated to the last part of the argument Sforno presents in this chapter; namely,the perfectionofthe (human) soul. In this case as well, the Hebrew and Latin editions present some differences. The influenceofThomas Aquinas³³ is manifest in Lumen Gentium:Sforno’sinterpretation is easy to understand, as he translates the expres- -with actum secundum,atermthat Aquinas uses in his commenta שה מל תו שה ינ sion ries.

Sforno’sSolution: The Human Soul Is Emanated from aSpiritualNature

Sforno proposes asolution, in line with the classicalJewish tradition: the intellectual human soul is immortal (incorruptible and eternal) and individual. It is interesting to focus on his analysis, which is naturallyfoundedupon the Aristotelian and Aver- roeian system, but alsocharacterised by some original elements, especiallyinthe Latin version:

נה שפ אה ונ יש הת כש יל את רש הב אנ רמ הש םדא Intellectiva hominis animaqua scilicet וה בא צע חם מי בד הר או צע נם חצ וי פי לו לע וי homo dicitur substantialiter rationalis יר וב כי סמ רפ יא יש מה ןי אה ונ יש מו וק ור טמ עב -est quid immortale, ad individuorum nu

 Lumen Gentium, 55v: “Nulla mortalium forma est immortalis,intellectus hominisanima est huiusmodi, ergo non est immortalis.”  Cf. Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed,trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago:Chicago University Press, 1963–78), 1:74 (seventh method).  Cf. Giovanni Picodella Mirandola, Conclusiones siveTheses DCCCC: Romae anno 1486 publice Dis- putandae, sed non admissae,ed. Bohdan Kieszkowski (Geneva: Droz, 1973), Conclusiones paradoxe numeroLXXI.secundum opinionem propriam noua in philosophia dogmatainducentes: “Cuilibet seriei animarum unus correspondet purus intellectus.”  Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De Anima II, lectio 4, 12, 14,16; III, lectio 1, 2, 5–9, 11. Thomas Aquinas, Ar- istotle’sDeAnima in the Version of William of Moerbekeand the CommentaryofSt. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Kenelm Foster and SylvesterHumphries,repr.ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).  Lumen Gentium,58v.  Or ʿAmmim, 92. 110 Giada Coppola

וכ יח מי וש ףת כל הל ימ הן נא שו שי פו מע בנ לד םי -merum dinumerabile, et hoc quia pro לע וי ינ בם מא ור ענ הש דא בם לצ נמ וו מא ור -ducitur aquadam spirituali naturaasu בר תו ני זו " בל למ כא הי רש נת למ כך ול רמ נש ןת -peris, sive abstractis intelligentiis ema הל כם חו זל תא הה פש הע לו הז וא יל תה וע רר ,nante, quibus ipsapotentialiter inest רא סי וט ' פכ מי שה יב רא בא רן דש שב ומ סב רפ qui scilicet naturaest humano generi המ אש רח מאמ זר ' רפ לק '' בא מא ור הש חוכ communis prout videtur Aven R. de שה לכ יי הת הו המ בנ לד םי כו בן אי בר פס הר זנ רכ -mente Philosophi inferred Metaphysico אמ ירמ '' פב יקר '' בח םש פא טל ןו אב רמ ו -rum VII,  quodscilicet virtus intellecti הש פנ הש נא שו תי אנ לצ מת הן לא יה הם נש םיי -va tanquam quid abstractus habet ab ab הו הנ חי זס הה בט הע וש עפ וה אא הל וצ תור stractioquodammodo produci. Et idem אה ונ יש וי הת יא יש וי כת חי הס וח רמ רה שא ןו לא -Platonis auctoritate infert Metaphysico יא ניש שו יא מה חו וש הת מנ אצ םי פב לעו rum XII,  ubi dicit: “Animam intellec- ³ ⁵ tivam fieri aDeis secundis” huiusmodi ergo nature proportio ad actualeshomi- num individuorum formas, talis est qualis est proportio materie prime ad ac- tuales hominum individuorum subiecta.³⁴ The intellectual human soul, by which The intellectual human soul, by which it man is essentiallycalled rational, is im- is said that man is essentiallyarational mortal, and its plurality corresponds to living being, is an immortal substance the number of individuals because [the and multiplicity is applicable to it,asis intellectual human soul] is produced by the number of the individuals of the aspiritual natureemanating from the human species. And [the intellectual higher—namely, the separate intellects, soul] has its origin in the potential na- in which it [the intellectual human ture shared by the whole human species, soul] is found in potency, meaning that which emanates from the higher sepa- the nature [of the intellectual human rate [intellects], as it says [Genesis

 Cf. Long CommentaryonMetaphysics [1494and 1497]; Averroes, Ibn Rushd’sMetaphysics:A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’sCommentaryonAristotle’sMetaphysics, Book Lām,ed. Charles Genequand (Leiden: Brill 1984), 106: “This shows that these proportions aresomehow in- spired by acause nobler,worthier and higher in rank than themselves, i.e. the world soul which Platothought had been produced by the secondary gods and Aristotle by the sun and the ecliptic”; 108: “He also explained it here, sayingthat this soul is that postulated by Platoasbeingproduced by the secondary gods and by Aristotle by the sun and the ecliptic. This question is extremelydifficult and obscureand we shall explain it to the best of our abilities and according to the premises and principles which have been established, in our sciencebythe doctrine of the man whose doctrine, in the wordsofAlexander,isthe least subject to doubts,the most adequatetobeing, the most adapt- ed and suitedtoitand the most free of contradictions.”  Cf. Themistius, On Aristotle On the Soul,trans. Robert B. Todd (London: Bloomsbury,2014), 20,19 paraphrasingAristotle’s On the Soul 407a2–11;p.36; Plato, Timaeus 41a. Cf. Genequand, Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics,106 n. 87. Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 111

soul] is common to the whole human :]: “We made man in our image.” species, Averroes seems to explain in And our Masters, of good memory, said the name of the Philosopher in Metaphy- [Genesis Rabba :]: “He consulted the sics .,saying that since the intellectu- ministeringangels,” that is to saythat al power of the soul is aseparate sub- He provided them with the power for stance, therefore it is produced by a this emanation. And this, perhaps,Aris- separate intellect.This is similar to totle recognised, accordingtowhat Aver- what Plato says in Metaphysics .,³⁶ roes explains quoting him in Metaphy- in which he states: “The intellectual sics .,that the intellectual power soul comes from the secondary gods.”³⁷ came to be from the separate [intellects]. And therefore, the relationship of this And he also explains in the aforemen- nature to the form of the individual tioned book ,par. ,quoting Plato, human being existinginact is like the that the lofty human soul is emanated relationship of the prime matter to the from the secondary gods and [that] the substrate of the individual human relation of this emanating nature to the being existinginact. human individual souls waslikethe relation of primematter to the individuals of the substrates of the sensible which exist in act.

Themostobvious difference is related to thebiblicaland Talmudic references,which do notappearinthe Latinversion.While in Or ‘Ammin,the higher andseparateintel- lectsmay be identified with theangels, accordingtoSforno’sinterpretation of Genesis Rabba, in LumenGentium,the separateintellects areemanatedfrom “indeterminate” naturescalledthe “higher spiritualnatures.” Moreover,inthe Jewish philosophicaltra- dition,the connection betweenthe separate intellects—whichare also intelligences— andthe angels hadalreadybeennoted by Maimonides³⁸ andGersonides.³⁹ Adetailed explanation of the nature of the spiritual “substance” is giveninthe second counterargument,i.e., against the idea of the multiplicityofthe soul. In that case, Sforno clearlystates thatthe spiritual natures maybeidentified with Plato’s secondary gods, mentioned by Averroes in his commentary on Metaphysics Lamb- da.⁴⁰ This tradition is adirect referencetoThemistius’sinterpretationofthe Aristo-

 Cf. Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed 2:4–6.  Cf. Gersonides, TheWarsofthe Lord,trans. Seymour Feldman (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society,1999), 5:2: “Themistius,OnAristotle On the Soul which according to Plato is generated from the movers of the heavenlybodies,whereas according to Aristotle it is generated from the sun and the inclined sphere[i.e., the ecliptic]. Hence,the soul performs its operations accomplishingthe [intend- ed] goal, although not knowingthe goal.” P. 87,  Cf.YoavMeyrav, “SpontaneousGenerationand ItsMetaphysics in Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aris- totle’s Metaphysics 12,” in AristotleRe-Interpreted. NewFindingsonSeven HundredYears of theAncient Commentators,ed. RichardSorabji (Londonand NewYork: BloomsburyAcademic, 2016), 195–210. 112 Giada Coppola

telian text.Sfornodid not read Greek, and the Latin edition of Themistius’scommen- taries was printed after his death. We cannot rule out the possibility that he read the Hebrew translation of Themistius, but the most plausible sourceisNifo, who uses Themistius and the other Greek commentators in his commentaries.⁴¹

מא םנ םע יה תו הז טה עב מנ אצ וק םד יש פש עע ל -Et tamen de ipsaspirituali naturaquam יא יש מה ןי אל תת יח בי וא הת סה ית הר שא הר התי -vis antequam humano individuo copule חתמ ביי את הם הי חה מו הר אר וש נן צמ קא םדו tur habeat quodammodo esse scilicet תש וח על יל צו הרו . זו כה אי נמ הם וח רמ רה שא ןו -potentiale, non tamen sequitur illa con הב וי מת יצ וא ות כה חו יי לב ית וש עפ מנמ אצ tradictionis implicatio, que sequitur ad וז תל הו הנ םא היה מנ אצ וק םד תש וח על יל ו sermonem dicentium ut detur materia וצ הר יה מה חת יי מב הז הש הי ול צמ אי תו פב ו לע . -prima existens aqualibet forma denuda עו זם בה יה תו צמ אי בותו חכ לב דב וה מא דצ ta, quia in quantum materia tantum est צע ומ לב ית מנ אצ פב לעו . יו דצ וק לע וי נש חי קל י quid potentiale tantum, et pro quanto סה תו אר רש אל תי ןכ מכ שו יב רא בא רן דש actu existeret esse quid actu ens quod סב רפ שה ימ מם מא גר ' רפ כק '' אט לב הז .implicat contradictionem sicut Aven R טה עב שה לכ הי וש עפ ןמ שה לכ םי אר יו יש היה ,docet in commentolibro De Caelo III ול צמ אי תו וכ יח בי שמ יפ קע דו שם שי עפ פב לעו . - et quia ipsa intellectiva sive spiritua לו יא פש בע ופ לע וז תל בי מה אצ ונ אש ימ דחו lis naturaasuperis sive Deis secundis לא וי מו כו לן בק ול . יו יה אה מז יצ וא ות וצ הר emanans, ut supra, non influitur ab eis פב עו לל וא ות ונ אש . יכ מכ שו קי הר גל םש actu nisi dato subiecto sibi proportionato מה יא שר אל גי חי וא ור וז תל בי שג סם יפ יר מי ןכו ,et eiusdem capaci cuius sit actu forma קל לב את רו כו ומ ןכ אל שי עפ הז טה עב שה לכ י sicut accidit de lucido aquo non emanat וז תל עי אל שי המ ימ שן היהי ומ ןכ קל לב בו וא ןפ actualis lux nisi datodiaphano eidem יש יה זה הה בט הע כש יל וצ הר פב עו לל שיא -luci proportionate. Quare huiusmodi spi נה רכז . בו ןכ תי בר זה הה בט הע זנ רכ רפסמכ ritualis naturahabet suum potentiale אה שי םי שא יר פש עע יל םה esse in his secundis Deis antequam in- ⁴ ³ fluant.Suumvero actuale esse acquirit postquam ab eis in subiecto sibi disposi- to influxa fuerit cum fiat actualis illius forma et per consequens plurificatur ad individuorum numerum ad quos ema- nare contingit.⁴² Andalthoughthisspiritual nature,before However,although this nature exists be- beinginconjunction with thehuman fore it emanatesonthe individuals of the individuals, is somethinginpotency,it species, this does not have to mean that [thisidea]doesnot involve acontradic- the contradictory exists which would tion.And by this discussion,itfollows be necessary if the first matter existed

 Cf. Agostino Nifo, Commentationes in librum Averrois de Substantia Orbis (Venice,1508), f. 2.  Lumen Gentium,60r.  Or ʿAmmim,95. Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 113

that thereisprime matter devoid of form, prior to the initiation of aform on it.And becausethismatterisinpotencyonly, this is so because the first matter,since it andifexistinginact is beinginact, exists in potencyonly, does not emanate andthisimplies acontradiction,asAver- from another existent.Ifthis existent ex- roes explains in thecommentary On the isted priortothe initiationofform on it, Heavens ..And this is becausethe in- it would have to be the case therefore tellectual or spiritualnature is emanated that it had areality in act.And since from higher andsecondary gods,asmen- its essence is in potencyonly, it—with re- tioned above. Anditwillonlybeemanat- gardtoits substance—does not exist in ed in actwiththe subjectspecifiedfor it act.And two parts of this contradiction anddisposedfor it,and itsformisin would be proven for it,which is not pos- actbecause it will happen that alumi- sible, as Averroes explains in On the nous body will emanatelight in actonly Heavens ..But this intellectual na- if thereisatransparent body whichis ture which emanates from the intellects proportioned to itslight. Likewise thein- is suited for apotential existenceinthe tellectual nature,ifitisinpotency, will emanator before it emanates in act. emanatebefore throughthe secondary And it will onlyemanate in act (together) gods;ifitisinact it will receivethings with the forth-bringingofasubstrate whichhavebeenemanatedbythe subject specifiedfor it and disposed for its re- specified foritand it will produceaform ception, and then the reality and the in actand consequentially itsplurality is form will be in act for that substrate. Be- thesameasthe number of individualson cause, just as it is the case that luminous whichitwillemanate. bodywill not emit his light except through atransparent bodywhich is disposed for the reception of his light,likewise this intellectual nature willonly emanate on an individual of the species which is disposed for its reception in such away that this intellectual nature will be aform in act for the aforementioned individual. Andtherefore, the aforementioned nature will become a plurality which matches the number of the individuals on which it will emanate.

However,the author clarifies in this passagethat the expression spiritualisnatura The term belongstoclassicalphilosophical .( שה לכ הי עבט ) means intellectivanatura terminology; in the Italian Renaissance Jewish context,asimilar phrase is presented 114 Giada Coppola

by Leone Ebreo in Dialoghi d’amore,⁴⁴ in which we also encounter the metaphor of the light and the transparent body.⁴⁵ In Lumen Gentium,the correspondence between intellectual natures/secondary gods and angels is givenafew lines later. Likewise, in the Platonic tradition, God or- ders the angels to createmortal beings:

“Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem “God makes man in our image, etc.” Per- suam etc.” et fortasse hoc voluit Plato di- haps this is what Platowants to attest

 Leone Ebreo, Dialoghi d’amorediMaestroLeone Medico Hebreo (Roma: per Antonio Blado d’As- sola, 1535), 169r: “Et tu non m’hai mostrato che l’intellettohumano qualche vota mene in tanta per- fettione, che si puo sollevareacopularsi con l’intellettodivino, overo angelicoseparato da materia, e finirlo in attovedendolo direttamente, enon per discorso potenztiale, ne mezzo corporeo.” On the light cf. also 196v: “Ma questoècomevedereillucido corpo del Sole in acqua, oinaltro diafano; perchè la debile vista non può vedere de diretto in se stesso: che cosi il nostrointelletto humano nelle corporee vede l’incorporee.” Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa contraGentiles 3.43 and Scriptum super Sententiis,lib. 2, d. 13,q.1,a.3.  This kind of metaphor was alreadyfamiliar in the Scholastic milieu: cf. Robert Grosseteste, De Luce and Hexameron;Thomas Aquinas, Summa contraGentiles 3.65.  Lumen Gentium,62v,and cf. 62r–62v: “Et hec sapienter docet Sacrum Genesis documentum1cum dicit: ‘Deum creasse hominemadeiusdem imaginem quasi ad eius similitudinem’ ubi per divinam imaginem intelligit intellectum quo intelligibilia imaginamur,quem dicit esse divine nature et per consequens est quid immortale, et cum hoc docet quod per eiusdem intellective naturecognitionem quam per suam propriam actionem percipimus,nonnullam de Deo nedumdereliquis abstractis possumus habere cognitionem, cum scilicet huiusmodi naturam Dei imaginem appellet,inferens quod sit quodammododivine nature,adquod sequitur ut per eiusdem intellective naturecognitionem ad aliqualem de Deo cognitionem pervenire possumus.QuareAvenR.in commento libro De Anima I, 2 ait: ‘et debes scireque iuvamentum scientie de anima ad alias scientias invenitur tribus modis etc.’ subdit ibidem dicens: ‘divinus autem sive metaphysicum suscipit ab ea substantiam subiectisui, hinc enim declaratur quoniam forme abstractesunt intelligentes, et alia multa de cognitione dispositio- num consequentium intelligentiam in eo quod est intelligentia et intellectus etc.’ Et idem videtur in- ferre ibidem III, 5ubi dicit: ‘et nisi esset hoc genus entium quod scimus per scientiam anime non possemus intelligere multitudinem in rebusabstractis quemadmodum nisi sciremus naturam intellectus non possemus intelligere quod virtutes moventesdebeant esse intellectus etc.’ cumque prefa- tus Genesis textus ibidem scilicet circahumanam productionem tamen non autem circareliquas dicat: ‘et dixit Deus faciamus’ quibus videbatur quodammodo angelos alloqui, docet quidem huiusmodi intellectivamnaturam ab eisdem angelis Dei iussu emanareutsupra, et hoc quia tunc Deus dedit eis potentiam influendi huiusmodi naturam quam Dei imaginem appellat ab eodem Deo tunc creatam, quaresequitur dicens ‘et creavit Deus hominemadimaginem suam etc’ et fortasse hoc voluit Platodicens quod Deus iussit angelis ut crearent mortalia prout Aven R. refertincommen- to Metaphysicorum XII, 44.Cumque idem Genesis documentum ibidem dicat ‘quasi ad similitudinem nostram’ videtur inferrearbitrariam voluntatem, qua fit quodammodoDeo similis et angelis per quantoest agens cum cognitione,cuius oppositum accidit naturali agenti, similitudo enim per formam formam vero per actiones consideramus.Meritotamen ponitur ly quasi inferens quod non est omnimodasimilitudo, ab angelis enim differt in suis actionibus quoad arbitrium, aDeo vero quo ad arbitrii nobilitatem. Quibus demonstrative docet eiusdem Dei imaginis immortalitatem, et hoc quia cum sit quid divine nature et per consequens presit corporeis etiam celestibus licetsint Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 115

cens quod Deus iussit angelis ut crearent when he says that God ordered the an- mortalia prout Aven R. refert in commen- gels to createthe mortal beings, as Aver- to Metaphysicorum XII, .⁴⁶ roes reports in the commentary on Meta- physics ..

In the Hebrew edition, Sforno quotes verbatim the passagefrom the LongCommetary on Metaphysics⁴⁷ in which Averroes mentionsPlato’sopinion accordingtowhich the creator created the angels himself. As Harvey also notes,this agood example of Sfor- no’sskill as abiblical commentator.Hegives new meaning to Genesis 1:26 by reading it in light of the Platonic text.Healso givesanew monotheistic interpretation to the Platonic text:

או כם גן מם דצ וצ תר או רש הב הת יי הנ וא ןת And if so, also with regard to the form פה וע ול ית תו נר בכ מד לכ אש הר מנ אצ םי which it contains,those activities will טה עב יי עם הם וי קת תצ נם חצ יי כם ומ שה םימ be nobler than all the rest of the natural כו צל אב כם מא ור ןה הל ' לא יה הך מש םי שו ימ existents,although some of them are שה ימ הם רא וץ לכ שא בר רה בק בא תו ךי קשח permanent,like the heavens and all ה ' מא םנ אב רמ נו שע אה םד נכ למ בך מפ ילי אי their hosts, as it says [Deuteronomy לש כו בד יר בר תו ני זו " נל אר שה וה הר גש רז זא ,:–]: “They belong to ha-Šem אה יל בת ךר תש יה בה יר תא הז כה חו שה לכ י your God: the heavens, and the highest שו עפ בו דא מם תא שמ תר וי נה דב יל אם מו דחא heavens, the earth, and everything המ ום תנ אן בז בנ לד וכ לח שה יפ וע מכ ו which is in it.Onlytoyour fathersdid הש בת רא מל לע וה הז וא יל צר אה לפ וט בן מאמ ור ha-Shem have affection.” Indeed, it שא הר יב אא ןב שר בד יב וא סר רפ המ אש רח says: “Let us make man,” as though He מאמ יר '' פב מקר '' בד מא ור הש לא רב אא ת was consulting His “familia,” as [in the מה אל יכ בם די וו וצ שה בי אר או הת פנ דס םי ,.case of]the “words of our fathers” [i.e נו אש הר או מב ונ הח the Rabbanan] of good memory.It ⁴⁸ seems that it teaches [us] that God— mayHebepraised—decrees then that there will be the creation of this intellectual potencyand its emanationonman quid immortaleafortiori quidem sequitur ut ipsa Dei imago his prestantior,habeat esse quid immortale.”  Cf. LongCommentary on Metaphysics,1653: “This has been explained by Nicolaos the Peripatetic in his book on the Metaphysics. This is whywesee that the man who has attained this science has achieved the most perfect state of existence, and that it is the best of his actions because it is the action in which the best beingshares. What is said on the authority of Plato’smyth, namelythat the creator created the angels himself and then entrusted them with the creation of mortal animals and remained himself idle and inactive is amyth which it is wrongtotake as truth. It maybethat such an imputation on the creator is the cause of the obligation of the Sabbath in the religion of the Jews.”  Or ʿAmmim, 101. 116 Giada Coppola

from His separate servants or from one of them,and He gave [it] then in aseparate potencytoemanate it,ashas become clear above. And this is perhaps what Platowanted [to say] in his statement which Averroes mentioned in the commentary on Metaphysics , par. : “God created the angels by His hand and commanded that they create the corruptible things. And He stayed at rest.”

The samepassageofthe commentary on Metaphysics 12.44isalso presented in the eighth chapter of Lightofthe Nations, “On the Divine Unity”:⁴⁹

או לו זי רה הצ פא טל ןו מב מא ור שא הר יב אא ןב Et fortasse id voluit Plato in sermone ab שר בד יב וא סר רפ המ אש רח אמ ירמ '' פב קר -Aven R. allegatoincommento Metaphy מ '' בד מא ור מא םנ הז אש רמ פא טל ןו מב מא יר ו sicorum XII,  ubi dicit : “Hoc autem סה ות ימ שם בה רו בא אר תא מה אל יכ בם די וי ,quod Platodixit in suis verbis obscuris או רח יצ הו הל שם בי אר הו וה יו ום פנ דס םי נו אש ר -quod Creatorcreavitangelos manu, de וה בא נמ חו אה ןי אר יו הל יב ונ פכ וש וט כע " ל . inde precepit eis crearealia mortalia et או לו הי יב אא את לפ וט לן שח בו הז בס תר תצק remansit ipse in quiete sine labore, non חא ור ינ שם מא ור רש וא שי עה םצ רה שא ןו הי הי est intelligendus ad litterametc.” Et שפ טו תב לכ תי פה יש וט ות מש הן חא הד שפ טו hoc fortasse putavit Plato ductum illa אל תי וה כה אי אם דח מא םנ יכ אז הת בס אר modernorum ratione ab Aven R. ibidem םע יה תו בה תל מי פו תית לא שא יה דא תע relata, qua scilicet dicitur quod: “Prima וא צי ני וא וז תל מו אה רח נו םי substantia habet esse una et simplex in ⁵ ¹ fine, quoque ab uno et simplici non pro- venit nisiunum.”⁵⁰ And this is probablywhat Plato wanted And perhaps this is what Platowanted [to explain] in the speech which Averroes [to explain] in his statement which Aver- quoted in the commentary on Metaphy- roes mentions in the commentary on sics .,inwhich he says: “This is Metaphysics ,: “This is what Plato what Plato said in his obscure words: said in his obscure statements:the crea- the creator created the angels by his tor created the angels with His hands hands, and afterwards he ordered them and afterwards He gave them the order to create the mortal beingsand he re- that they should createthe generable

 Or ʿAmmim,59–64; Lumen Gentium,45r[49]–47v [53].  Lumen Gentium,46r[51].  Or ʿAmmim,62. Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 117

mainedatrest without working. It is not and corruptible [things], and he re- appropriate to understand this literally.” mainedatrest.Itisnot appropriate to And this is probablywhat Plato thought, understand this literally.” Andperhaps accordingtowhat Averroes explains con- this brought Plato to consider the opin- sidering the position of some later phi- ion of some later[philosophers] who losophers saying thatthe first substance said that it is appropriate that the first will be one and absolutelysimple, be- substance is absolutelysimple, the sim- cause from one comes forth the one plicity,and thatfrom asimple being and the simple. nothing willbegenerated except [another] one. Yetthis opinion is not demonstrative,but onlythe opinionofAvicen- na, and,besides him, of otherlater [philosophers].

Sforno not onlyaffirms that angels maybeconsidered as the secondary gods (as in the Platonic tradition), but also that this vision is consistent with the account in Gen- esis. Hence, there is no contradiction between the Jewish tradition and the philosophical position, because the intellectual natures are emanated directlyfrom the Creator. Sforno uses the Platonic idea to interpret abiblical verse, since he quotesPlato (or better,the interpretation givenbyAverroes via Themistius) to clarify Genesis1:26. In Or ʿAmmim,Sforno quotes not onlyGenesis 1:26,but also Psalm 148:2–6, distin- guishing the activities of men from the Divine actions and additionallythe difference between men and angels:

בו מא ור דכ ומ נת הו דו עי יש יה פה עו בל ידי הע And when it says “like our likeness,” it הו רכ וה זב יה מד לה לא תי רב וך מל אל יכ וו אל ןכ makes known that there will be an קי הר של רא נה צמ וא הת ופ לע תו טב עב דבלב . יכ -agent [acting]byknowledge and con מא םנ הה מד תו הי הי צב רו וה צה רו תה וו עד -sciousness. Andtherefore, it will be sim פב וע ול הת מנ כש תו ממ הנ מא םנ מא כר מד תו ונ ilar to God—mayHebepraised—and His כםע '' הף מד וי לן וה ור שת הה מד תו וה בא תל י angels. And it is not right thatthis will םלש . זו כה הי דא הם או בנ לד פב וע ול ית בו דצ onlyhappen naturallytothe rest of the המ המ לא תי ' םע יה ותו וד המ לאל תי רב בך נע ןי acting existents, because the likening בה יח הר . זו כה בי יח תר אה יל בת ךר יה לא וע םל will be by form. Andthe form is known טל בו יכ מא םנ טה בו הי הי צמ הד כת תיל . הו הנ .by the activities which follow from it יא תן לכ תי וי רת כנ דב המ קפ רת וצ ונ תי רב אך לב But it says “like our likeness,” together אה םד םע יה תו בו יח יר לי עפ ימ ים יה תה לכ ותי with the [letter] “Kaf” of the resemblance לב ית וט וב הז נב וט ות המ צר ןו אה הל הי נ " ל . like”], to teach [us] that the likening is“] אכ רמ הו רד יכ אל תי נכ בו י ית רש לא אלה not [a] perfect [identity]. Andthis is so

 Or ʿAmmim,100. 118 Giada Coppola

רד כיכ לם יא כת ונ . בו דצ המ וה נא לדב -because man, by his activities, is sepa מהמ אל יכ בם עפ ולו ית ו םע יה ותו וד המ םהל rate in acertain wayfrom God—mayHe עב ינ הן וי ות ופ לע יב יד הע הו הרכ . יכ מא םנ be praised—although he is similar to עפ לו תו מה אל יכ עם הם וי םת יב יד הע הו רכ הה ם God—mayHebepraised—in the caseof לב ית חב רי מה םתא . זו כה בי יה תו שם לכ פב לעו free choice.And this is so because the על לו בם תל הי נת דג תו וכ מח את הו הת הי free choice of God—mayHebepraised עפ לו םת שי הר על לו ום אל קי הר הב הם אטח ,is always for the good, because indeed— קה רו בה עפ ולו הת דא לם יס תב מה את הו the good will be in accordancewith the הו רת לש תו שה לכ למ תה וק םמ במ תל הי וי ות goal. And see: thereisnonoblergoal כש בל ופ עללע לו כם ומ הש יע הד שמ רו בר מא ור than the bringingout of His will—may לה ול וה לכ למ כא וי וכ ' He be praised. But man, although he ⁵ ² also choses freely, sometimes has “a goal that is not good”.And this is so because of his inclinations [to deviate] from the above-mentioned divine will, as it says [Ezekiel :]: “Is my way not just, House of Israel?Isitnot your ways that are unjust?” And in acertain way, he is separate from the angels because of his activities, although he is similar to them because he is an agent in knowledge and consciousness, because indeed, the activities of the angels, although they have knowledge and consciousness, are not freelychosen by them. And this is so because they are an eternallyinact without the opposi- tion of an appetitive faculty.Their activities will forever be right and the sin which occurs in the activities of man as caused by the appetitive [faculty] and the intellect neglectingtostand against [the state of]not forever being an intellect in act will not happen to them, as the poet testifies [Psalms :, ]: “Praise Him all His angels, etc.”

On the one hand, the angels are the separate intellects⁵³ and the pure separate forms; on the other hand, men, who are similar to God and angels, sharing the intellectual

 Forthe exegetical interpretation in Genesis,see Norbert M. Samuelson, Judaism and the Doctrine Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 119

soul with them, are superior to the latter,because human beingspossess freewill, which givesthem asuperiornature.⁵⁴ In the Kitvei,Sforno shares the same ideas: God gave mananopening to acquire knowledge regardingentities that are separate from matter (i.e., angels) through the knowledge of our souls; for instance,the angels are substances separate from matter by definition:

צב מל ונ . הש או צע שם לכ וי צנ יח בו הז תפ הח לא תי ' -In our image. [Who shall be] asub תפ בח ות תר לו נק תו די עי בה צע ימ הם בנ לד םי יב יד תע stance that is everlasting [endowed פנ נש ו with] reason; and thus God, the ⁵⁵ BlessedOne, gave man an opening in His Torahtoacquire knowledge regardingthoseseparate from matter through the knowledge of our souls.

לה ול וה לכ מ־ אל יכ ו , לכ אש הר צע ימ הם בנ לד םי חמ רמו . -Praise Him, all His angels,all sub לכ צ־ אב וי , כה כו םיב . stances which are separate from עו כל םלו .matter מש וש חרי , פש וע תל ים תו מר ופ סר ותמ חא יר םה – לכ ־ All His hosts,the stars. Andboth וכ בכ אי רו Sun and moon,whose actions are מש הי מש םי , גה גל יל שם םה מש םי גב בו גה בם רע אך ל well-known, and afterthem of Creation (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1994), particularly142: “The classical Jewish phi- losophersidentify them with the separate intellects of the astronomyoftheir time. In the case of the sagesand Rashi, these substances, whoare second in power and perfection onlytoGod, turn out to be reified virtues.”  On the imago Dei,cf. the studies of WarrenZev Harvey,particularlyhis lectureatthe second international symposium.  Genesis 1:26.  Cf. Kitvei Rabbi Obadiah Sforno,ed. Ze’ev Gottlieb (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-RavKook, 1987), Gen- esis 1:6–7: הי רי יק בע ות הך םימ – הי טי עב תב ךו מה םי יה וס יד םי מכ גו גל בל ות םכ בס בי , במ יד בל וצ הר צק םת קמ םתצ , אב ןפו אש זי חה קל לע וי מן הן ימ לם דצ אה יו יר וש לב בט אע ידי י . הו הנ זב עה ול הב רכ אח אל זי גה וב בל וא רי יה וס יד י , קו לב אה ריו יא הז יע וס בי כה חר הל וי מת וק לם לח שק הנ ךפ אל די , הו פת טש לא קמ םו בר כה ומ מת קמ מו הו אר וש ן . “ Letthe nature of the elemental waters become as though the form of asphereisgirdlingit, separating one part from the other,insuch manner that aportion of the upper waters adjacent to the air mass change onceagaintothe natureofvapor,this air will now perforce somehow be made into aplacefor the portion of waterwhich changedtovapor.Itwill expand considerably into alargerareathan it was originally.” יו שע לא יה אם הת קר עי – בו יה תו כש שא סר ור צק הת ימ הם סי דו יי מם חת את תו הו לח מק םה נש פה לך בט אע די יי , מכ שו יה בה מא ור ” קי וו מה םי תחתמ שה םימ “ ( ספ טקו ‘ ,) יה רה וא שי רי אד הז לח הק יא יד אי אל תו מהו וק שם רס או םתו מה םי םשמ , עו הש אש ותו ” רה עיק “ מה דב לי הי הי וב חכ וע רצ מו נו אע הת לח הק יא יד שי אל דרי , הו או ” מה םי שא מר לע 120 Giada Coppola

רה יק הע קנ אר מש םי , הו ימ אם רש עמ הל מש םי , .all your stars of light אה יו הר ימ ימ אי רש םה מה םי שא מר לע רל עיק , Youheavens of the heavens,the יו מע די לם דע על םלו spheres which are the highest heav- ⁵⁶ הי לל או ־ת םש יה , יש יה אה הז םש םלש . יו לה ול מכ כו ן ens over the firmament are called יכ וה צא הו נו רב וא , אל דמ רב וק םד יו מע די לם דע על םלו heavens, and youwaters above יש יה נו חצ יי בם תל ני ספ יד לם וע םל the heavens,the air [portion] of ⁵⁷ the waters which are the water abovethe firmament, He also established them forever and ever. Let them praise the name of the Lord, which is the perfect Name. ForHecommanded and they were created, He did not speak before. He also established them forever and ever,which are eternal and incorruptible forever.

רל עיק “ , אב פו שן רי הד לח הק וא רי הי עמ הסו , נו אש הר יא יד בי קמ מו הו אר וש ן . לו הז הב יג שע הם יא הד חל , תי בע וה וי דיל גה םש הו לש וג בה דר , בו תה בע תו ים דבכ וו רי וד , אכ רמ ו ” קל לו תת הו ומ מן םי שב םימ “ ( רי ימ יוה ‘ : י ‟ ג .) צר נו בו מא ור ” שה םימ “ , רה יק הע עמ הב תא חה קל אה יו יר , אכ רמ ו ” יו רק אא הל םי רל יק שע םימ “ ( ספ חקו ‘ .) בו גה עי םש אה די קה טי ירו נה הל יב לו די ער ום קרב , אכ רמ ו ” יו לע נה אש םי קמ הצ אה ץר רב יק לם טמ ער הש “ ( רי ימ וה םש .) בו יה תו צק הת סי דו מה מי יי כה דב מל לע מה אה יו הר לק שא אר לצ ונ גנ טד םעב , וי הר לע עפ לו פת עו רל וצ ינ מי וכ ןו לא כת יל בת יל קפס , אכ רמ ו ” מו השע ידי ו גמ די רה עיק “ ( הת יל ים ‟ ט : ב ‘ .) יו יה ןכ – שנ רא יק םי ןכ גנ טד עב ו . “ Now,sincethe rest of the foundation waters—which remained below those waters that vaporize —gathered together,asitsays, let the waters beneath the heavenbegathered, it should follow that the upper waters which became vapor would have filled the vacuum left by the departureofthe waters. However,Hemade the firmament which separated (the higher and lower waters), in such manner that it was giventhe power of restraint,preventingthe vapor portion—that is, the water which was abovethe firmament—from descending;inamanner that the fashionedatmospheredid fill the void while the vapor remained in its initial position. Now,whenthe moist vaporized water becomes dense, it bringsforth rain, snow and hail as it becomes laden heavily(with water)and de- scends (to the earth), as it is said, ‘at the sound of His placinganabundanceofwater in the heavens’ (Jeremiah 10:13). What is meant by the term ‘heavens’:isthe firmament which holds back the vapor portion, as it is said ‘And God called the firmament “heavens” (Genesis 1:8). And when the smoke- laden mist comesthere,itresults in thunder and lightning, as it is said: ‘He lifts up clouds fromthe ends of the earth, thunder fromthe rain He makes’ (Jeremiah 10:13). Sincethe elemental waters, which are denser,are abovethe light air,this condition is contrary to nature, indicating that is an act performed by God’sWill, directedwithout adoubt towardapurpose and end as it is said, ‘the work of His hands shall the firmament declare’ (Psalms 19:2).”  Psalm 148:1–2. Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 121

In the biblical verses, we find alternateexplanations of the samephilosophicalcon- cepts found in Lightofthe Nations. As in his philosophical work, Sforno considers the angels to be separate substances;theyshare theirspecific nature with the celes- tial bodies, similarlyseparate from matter.Inhis interpretation of the Psalm, Sforno focuses on the creation of the cosmos,i.e., the stars and the firmament,referring once again to Genesis 1:2and 1:7, but also to On the Heavens 2:42.Itisalso interesting to note that Sforno usesasimilar idea in Or ʿAmmim.⁵⁸

עו זל הה יב מא פו בת מא הר הו רא הץ התי ות בו וה -AndHeprovidesthe proofofthis[Gene לכ מו כר בי כה חר יה הת צה רו הה אר וש הנ חב רמו sis :]: “Andthe earthwas Tohu and רה שא ןו וצ הר ימ חו תד ול קנ אר מה רו בכ המ תם וה Bohu,” that is to say: becausethe first בו וה מו נמ נו הת הו הב תש ונ ות פב ינ מם חת פל םי form wasnecessarily in theprime matter בו לח יק מם חת פל םי ממ ונ שח שך וה אא יו נר רדע specialisedfor it,and thecomposition of אה רו לע נפ תי וח שם םה בה ' סי דו תו כה דב םי them wascalled “Tohu andBohu.” And שא אר לצ מה כר וז סוה ףי או רמ רו חו לא םיה from it, throughchangeindifferent רמ פח עת פל ינ מה םי הל יב ון הל רו תו וה יי הת שא -ways andindifferent partsofthem, dark יה וס יד שי יה בה נה תע צע נם דב מל ינ וע רמ ףח ,[.ness,which is airdeprivedoflight [ibid תא חה שו עך פל ינ מה םי יכ מא םנ עה מצ םי wasgenerated “abovethe abyss,” which נה דב יל ים רק וא ור אח הל םי אב רמ בו יס רופ is made up of thetwo heavyelements עמ הש רב שא תי וע הש למ כא וי ור תוח . וה יד אע ם i.e., earthand water],which arenextto] ןכ רש ףח הו ינ הע וא רי לע מה םי בו ןכ יה קה תצ ו thecentre. Andhecontinues: “Thespirit חל צמ קד בר ות לא מה םי קו תצ חו ום בי לש שבו of Godwas hovering on thesurface of וצ הר שא יי מת דצ וק בר ות לא גה גל ול נת עו ות ,thewater,” to convey elementary fire מכ שו יב רא רא סי וט ' סב בי הת שא יה וס יד י that it was[generated] by thepropulsion סב רפ שה ימ ום עה לו מם מא בר ' רפ מק '' ב . -of aseparate substance, moving andhov eringoverthe darkness on thesurface of thewater,because theseparatesubstan- cesare called “thespiritofGod,” as told in thestory of theworkofcreation [Psalms :]: “He makesHis angels spirits.” Andittestifies, if so,thatHehov- ered over theair andmoveitonthe water. Andtherefore,partofitbecame moistbyits proximitytothe water, and part of it (became) warm anddry,taking on afieryformbyits proximitytothe sphere andits movement,asAristotle explains thecause of elementary fire in On theHeavens ..

 Or ʿAmmim,32. 122 Giada Coppola

Sforno tries to harmonise philosophyand the Torahinadouble sense: from one side, in his Kitvei,hegives some philosophical doctrines belongingtothe Aristotelian tradition in order to explain the biblical verses.Onthe other,heconcludes each chapter of his philosophical enquirywith abiblical verse to show that onlywith the light of the Torah⁵⁹ is it possibletounderstand the ultimateend of the cosmos and of human beings:

ןה בר םי מא יר פש נר אצמ םי סב רפ קי שד ומ םיר But manybeautiful words are found in דמ תו הו הנ וג נת רו וא [ ת ] צב קד תל ןק לו רדס [the HolyScripture which teach [us נמ שפ עו בד רש הל וט םת דה ךר ךא וט לב רב י -great thingsabout righteousness in eth בבל ⁶⁰ על ור סך קפ תו אמ רז זי קי תו צמ קי תו ics and politics to improveand orderly מו יד וב נת שפ תב לח הת יע ןו לו כה יר אע כת םל arrangeboth soul and bodytoturn אב רמ תו הט רו תו םע אר וי בת ורור עת כל נל םלע them towards the [right] way. But it is לא לה יח עי לו לם מא ית צו אי מו פש יט פס לר ה ' good for those of clean hearts to present דל רו doubts, flamingarrowswhich disturb [us] and cause sorrow to the soul, at the beginning of the inquiryand to over- whelmthemall with pure words and with clear arguments about all that is mysterious. These [words] are for the life of the [future] world. They bring forth justiceintruth. This shall be told about ha-Shem to the [coming] generation.

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