Giada Coppola Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul¹ The philosophical activity of Obadiah Sforno, who is primarilyknown for his exeget- ical interpretations of the HolyScriptures,has receivedlittle scholarlyattention. Nonetheless,the few scholars interested in Lightofthe Nations—Sforno’s(uniquely) philosophical work—wereparticularlycritical of the author’sposition in this exposi- tion, showing asceptical attitude towards the uniqueness of the work. Obadiah Sforno’sphilosophical treatise reproduces the classical schema of the medieval quaestio disputata (“disputed question”), in which therewas no place for a “new” or “innovative” analysis characterisingsome of the most original inter- preters of the Renaissance period. He published the Hebrew version of Lightofthe Nations,entitled Or ʿAmmim,inBologna in 1537. In 1548,also in Bologna, he pub- lished the Latin version, with the title Lumen Gentium. The fact that Sforno himself translated his ownworkfrom Hebrew into Latin makes him particularlyexceptional.² The Hebrew and Latinversions do not appear to offer significant differencesin their overall view.The order of the questions and the general approachestoeach ar- gument are identical (with very few exceptions), but nonetheless, we find several changes concerning the style and the breadth of topics,aswillbeclear from reading the passages presented in this paper. Although the structure of Lightofthe Nations reproduces the medieval format of the disputed question, it seems thatSforno exercises asceptical approach towards introducing the quaestio and establishing the solution. In Lumen Gentium, every question is precededbydubitatur utrum (“it is questionable”), and in the last part —namely,the solution—of bothversions, we read: שנ בי םא ןכ הל ית סר קפ חה יק הר נה כז תר Ad dubium ergo respondetur To dispel anydoubt Doubt does not onlyplayadialecticalfunctioninthis pamphlet.Sforno is following the Maimonidean tradition,³ and he introduces “doubtand perplexity,”⁴ which are Iwould like to thank Professor WarrenZev Harvey for his advice, his valuablecomments,and his suggestions on how to improvethis article. Iwill employ the appellation Light of the Nations to refertoboth versions of the pamphlet in gen- eral terms;when appropriate,Iwill makeadistinction between the Hebrewand Latin editions. Cf. Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment,Physics, and Doubt,” in Hazon Nahum: Studies in JewishLaw,Thought, and HistoryPresented to Dr.NormanLamm,ed. Yaakov Elman and JeffreyS.Gurock (New York: Michael Scharf Publication Trust of the Yeshiva University Press; Hobo- ken, NJ:Ktav, 1997), 149–62. OpenAccess. ©2020Giada Coppola, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-008 102 Giada Coppola inherent in the quest for knowledge.Nevertheless,Sforno introduces the term safeq to present the solutions to the questions, in which sense the doubt is asynonym of “objection” (with referencetothe previous arguments), following Gersonides, who was the first to use it in this manner. In the Renaissance, Isaac Abravanel employed safeq to translate obiectio in his Roš Amanah,confirmingits double function, as did David Messer Leon in his Tehillah le-Dawid. Forthis reason, the relationship to Jew- ish scepticism cannot be ruled out,asisalsohighlighted by GiuseppeVeltri in his book Alienated Wisdom.⁵ Twoarticles by Robert Bonfil on Sforno’s Lightofthe Nations appeared in 1976 and 1995 respectively.⁶ Both focused on the interpretation of the idea of the soul (the crucial points of which Iwill analyse in detail later). Bonfil highlights the lack of originality in the author’sapproach to philosophy; he considers Sfornonot onlya“terrible” philosopher—in comparison with his contemporaries, taking into ac- count the brilliant work of Leone Ebreo—but also awoeful interpreter of the classical philosophical tradition.⁷ As Warren Zev Harvey has emphasised, acomparison be- tween Leone Ebreo and Sforno turnsout to be inappropriate,asthe first was a great philosopher,while Sforno was an eruditescholar. Nevertheless, Bonfil recog- nises a “modern approach” represented by the relevance of the topic of the soul in Sforno’swork, as the question of the immortality of the soul was one of the most common issuesdiscussed in philosophical treatises duringthe Renaissance period.⁸ Harvey,161. Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: EnquiryintoJewishPhilosophy and Scepticism (Berlin and Bos- ton: De Gruyter, 2018), 143–44: “The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries arefoundational for several aspects connectedboth with the Jewish consciousness of and attitudes towards scepticism. At the end of the Humanist period and the Renaissance, we can observethe first changesinthe perception and formulation of philosophical questions.After some seminal beginnings,mirrored by ‘Ovadya Sforno, therecould be no hesitation in recognising that the use of dubitatur/dubium and quaestiones dubitatae is morethan arhetorical tool. They became adialecticalstrategythat playedanimportant roleinthe Late Renaissance (Accademia dei Dubbiosi)and earlymodern period (Accademia degli In- cogniti,Simone Luzzatto). The ‘doubts’ (dubitationes)are not primarilyaliterary instrument to intro- duce the dogmatic opinion of teachers,masters, or opponents, but adialecticalstrategytointroduce very delicatequestions that could have dangerousresults for the majority.The topics handled involve the usual themes of sceptic origins and tradition: authority,morality,theodicy, collective society and individuality,immortality of the soul as asocial and moral problem (doctrine of remunerations), etc.” Robert Bonfil, “The Doctrine of the Soul and Holiness in the Teachings of Obadia Sforno” [Hebrew], Eshel Beer Sheva 1(1976): 200–257; Bonfil “Il Rinascimento:laproduzione esegetica di ‘O. Servadio Sforno,” in La letturaebraica delle Scritture,ed. Sergio J. Sierra (Bologna: EDB, 1995), 261–67. Bonfil, 270: “Non dovrebbe far meraviglia che non lo si sia presosul serio eche, come filosofo, a lungoandareegli sia statocondannatoaldimenticatoio.” Bonfil, 271: “Eppure,anche nella forma nella quale si presentava, il Lumen Gentium offriva un cu- rioso esempio di elementidecisamente innovatore innestati sulla struttura essenzialmente medie- vale.Se, infatti, al di là dell’elencodelle quaestionesdisputate, riflettiamo sulla quantitàdienergia discorsiva econseguentementesulla quantità di spazio dedicata ad ognuna di quelle questioni,cisi accorge subito che l’interesseera decisamente spostatosuquantoera di attualitá nel Rinascimento, e in particolaresulla questione dell‘anima umana etc.” Obadiah Sforno and the IndividualHuman Soul 103 Apparently, Sforno’sintention, as the author himself announces in the prologue of both treatises, was to refute some of the Aristotelian positions which wereentirely at odds with the principles of the Jewish faith. Hence, the subtitle of Lumen Gentium is worthyofnote: in it,Sforno expresslyasserts that the book was written “against some opinionsofAristotle,” and thatit“demonstrates the doctrines of the creation of the universe from nothing,the providenceGod has for human beings,and the im- mortality of human soul, which they [i.e., Aristotelian philosophers] shamefullyre- ject,deriding religion.”⁹ Charles Manekinfollows the pattern established by Professor Bonfil, albeit with aless critical approach: “Yetitisalso an attack on those principles of Aristotelianism that conflict with religious dogma,placing Sforno in the intellectuallyawkward position of appealing to Aristotle in order to undermine his own philosophy!”¹⁰ In fact,itmay be better to state “appealing to the authority of Aristotle and Averroes in order to undermine their own philosophy.” However,inmyopinion, Sforno’spar- ticular approach represents acomponent of modernity,consistingofquoting asen- tencenot onlyfor the argument,but also for the counterargument,which is the con- futationofthe topic presented in the first part of the quaestio. It is necessary to note that most of the quotations from Aristotle and Averroes in Lightofthe Nations are favourable and not critical, despite what was announced by the author himself. Sfor- no does not care about the principle of contradiction, accordingtowhich it is not possiblethat p and -p maybepresented by the sameauthority;inthis sense, he is not anchored in the classical medieval system. Sforno was defined by the late Mauro Zonta as the lastrepresentativeofwhat maybecalled “Hebrew Scholasticism,”¹¹ but also as an “anti-philosopher,” as he characterised him in his contribution to the first international symposium on Oba- diah Sforno.¹² Taking into account the latest discoveries of the DFG-funded Sforno Obadiah Sforno, Lumen Gentium (Bologna, 1548); frontispiece: “Opusculum nuper editum contra nonnullas Peripateticorum opiniones demonstratiue docens presertim circacreationem et vniuersi nouitatem et diuinam de mortalibus curam et humanarumanimarum immortalitatem, quas ipsi tur- piter respuunt religionis penitus irridentes quareillud meritoLumen Gentium appello.” Charles Manekin,inTheJewishPhilosophyReader,ed. Daniel H. Frank, OliverLeaman, and Charles H. Manekin (New York: Routledge,2000), 284. Mauro Zonta, “The Autumn of Medieval Jewish Philosophy: Latin Scholasticism in 15th-Century Hebrew Philosophical Literature,” in Herbst des Mittelalters? Fragen zurBewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts,ed. JanAertsen and Martin Pickavé(Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2004), 475: “In Italy,