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458908 Vol1.Pdf This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ British Submarine Development and Policy 1918 - 1939. Henry, D The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 04. Oct. 2021 i BRITISH SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY 1918 - 1959 DAVID HENRY M. A. PH. D WAR STUDIES KING'S COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON I1^ý '4 ý" -1- ABSTRACT Demobilization and retrenchment inevitably followed the close of the First World War. They threatened not only to remove the additions to British military strength provided by the war but also reduce the armed forces below their pre-war establishments. British submarine policy, which had been tentative and uncertain before 1914, was not only subordinated to political and financial factors but suffered from a reluctance to develop a weapon which in enemy hands could be a grave threat to Britain's maritime interests. The Royal Navy's submarine strength was severely reduced in the immediate post-war years. Moreover, the successes of the German wartime submarine campaigns influ- enced successive British Governments to press for the abolition of the submarine, and the initial attitude of the Admiralty was that Britain stood to gain more from the abolition of the submarine than from its retention. Gradual recognition of the impracticality of securing inter- national acceptance for this policy led to proposals to limit the offensive power of the submarine by restrictions on size and performance. The development of the Submarine Service was limited by domestic economic policies and international arms agreements which placed constraints on construction and improvement. The Submarine Service had to fight initially for its survival and later for sufficient numbers of submarines to enable it to make a significant contribution to British naval strategy. The weakness of the British submarine force in September 1939 lay princip- ally in the numbers of hulls available. This reflected a belief in the continuing value of major surface units which were regarded as the final arbiters of naval warfare. Naval planning was based on the view that the submarine fulfilled no more than a subsidiary role in British naval tactics; this led to the threat and potential of submarine -2- warfare being dovmgraded and contributed to any Admiralty reluctance to resist Government pressure to curtail submarine development and constr- uction. Internationally as well as domestically, economic policy and a persistent belief in disarmament agreements kept the Submarine Service to a level which, only belatedly, was recognised as inadequate. -5- C0NTENTS PAGE 4 Acknowledgement .... .... .... .... 5 Abbreviations .... .... .... .... 7 Introduction .... .... .... .... Chapter 1 The Growth, Development and Acceptance of the Submarine. 1900-1918. 10 British .... Section A- Development. 2 Submarine 56 Chapter Patrol . .... .... 5 92 Chapter Cruiser Submarine . .... .... Chapter 4 Fleet Submarine 106 .... .... .. 5 Seaplane Carrying Submarine 140 Chapter . .... Chapter 6 Minelayer Submarine 155 .... .... 181 Conclusion. .... .... .... .... Section B-P olicy. Chapter 7 Versailles and Washington Conferences. 1918-1922. 186 .... .... .... Chapter 8 Domestic Submarine Policy and the 1927 Tripartite Naval Conference at Geneva. 1922-1927. .... .... .... 235 Chapter 9 Anglo-French Discussions and 1930 London Naval Conference. 1928-1931. of .. 272 Chapter 10 Domestic Submarine and A/S Policy. 1931-1934. 315 Chapter 11 Anglo-German Naval Agreement and Preparations for the 1935 London Naval Conference. 1954-1955. .... .... .... 548 Chapter 12 1935 London Naval Conference and Rearmament. 1955-1959. .... .. 575 Conclusion. 415 .... .... .... .... Appendices. A Office Holders 433 .... .... .... .. B British Submarine Building Programmes. 1920-1939. 441 C British Navy Estimates and Expenditure. 1919-1939. 444 D British Submarine Classes, 1900-1939. 'Holland' to 'U' Class. .... .... .... .. 445 E Prelimi nary Design Proposals for Certain Submarine models Classes. 482 and .... .... .... F Various Proposals Submarine 491 on Types. .... G Tables of Fleet Strengths, Wartime Losses and Future Construction. 493 .... .... .... H Resolut ions, Definitions, Agreements and Treaties. 514 1 British 1938-1939. Submarine Dispositions, .. 522 J Bibliography. .... .... .... .. 527 -4- ACKNOWLEDGE1dEN`P I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Brian Ranft who, as supervisor, has tendered valuable advice and. displayed immense patience over the completion of this thesis. I am also grateful to the staffs of the Public Record Office; the Ministry of Defence Library (Naval); the National maritime Museum; the Royal Naval College, Greenwich; Submarine Museum, H. M. S. 'Dolphin', Gosport; Churchill College, Cambridge; the Royal United Services Institute Library; and the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London. -5- ABBREVIATIONS Alk Anti-Aircraft A. C. N.S. Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff A/S Anti-Submarine ASDIC Allied (or Anti-) Submarine Detection Investigation Committee B. E. D. British Empire Delegation B. H. P. Brake Horse Power C. I. D. Committee of Imperial Defence D. C. N. S. Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff D. E. E. Director of Electrical Engineering D. G. D. Director of Gunnery Division D. N. A. D. Director of Naval Air Division D. N. C. Director of Naval Construction D. N. E. Director of Naval Equipment D. N. I. Director of Naval Intelligence D. N. O. Director of Naval Ordnance D. O. D. Director of Operations Division D. of P. Director of Plans Division D. R. C. Defence Requirements Committee (Sub-Committee of C. I. D. ) D. S. D. Director of Signals Division D. S. R. Director of Scientific Research T. D. D. of Director of Tactical Division (amalgamated in 1928 with Torpedo Division) D. T. M. Director of Torpedoes & Mining D. T. S. Director of Tactical School D. T. S. D. Director of Training and Staff Duties Division 6 E. -in-C. Engineer in Chief E. W. P. C. Emergency War Programme Committee F. O. Foreign Office H. A. High-Angle H. of M. Head of Mining L. A. Low-Angle, N. P. C. C. Naval. Programme Committee of the Cabinet P. S. O. C. Principal Supply Officers Committee _ Q. F. Quick-Firing _ R. A. (S) Rear-Admiral (Submarines) R. N. Royal Navy S. H. P. Shaft Horse Power S. of M. Superintendent of },Lining S/ýS Submarine T. B. Torpedo Boat _ T. T. Torpedo Tube II Boat German submarine W/T Wireless Telegraphy,, -7- INTRODUCTION The early decades of the twentieth century saw the introduction of two major weapons, the submarine and the aeroplane. Both systems posed problems for the conventional naval establishment, altering the traditional concept of naval warfare. For this reason, the new weapons were unwelcome; they were indeed opposed, tacitly and instinctively rather than deliber- ately, and only gradually came to be accepted. The aeroplane was the easier to accept since it could both be seen and countered - by another aeroplane, and it offered some obvious advantages to land forces. The submarine was covert and a more difficult problem; it was made more so by Britain's reliance upon the sea for communication, supply, and defence. Other types of new warship had proved possible to counter merely by building similar units but the submarine possessed the ability to submerge and once below the surface could not be easily dealt with. This ability, in the early years, to escape retribution by submergence proved extremely frustrating to naval officers used to only surface engagements and this was expressed in the description of the submarine as 'unEnglish'. The torpedo was the submarine's main offensive weapon, capable of being launched either from the surface or underwater. In the latter case this added to the problems of defence against the submarine; until it was located the surface forces had no warning of an impending attack. However, the ability älso to submerge created problems for the submarine. Existing technology restricted underwater propulsive power to motors driven by battery cells. Endurance was limited as was the air supply, and speed was low. Thus, an early realisation was that if the submarine could be kept underwater the faster but more valuable capital ships could outrun their attacker and until the incentive of war brought the invention of a means both of -8- detecting and attacking the submarine this was the only major option open to surface naval forces. In this environment the Submarine Service had to struggle to survive; and then at the moment of acceptance found its existence threatened again. The First World War which was to facilitate the creation of the means of countering the submarine proved also to be the moment to demonstrate its extensive power, not against b attlefleets but rather against the merchant fleets on which Britain in particular depended for supplies and survival in wartime. The intrinsic reservations which had existed from the begin- ning about the dangers that submarines embodied to British security were reinforced rather than-reduced by these experiences.
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