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Undersea Dragons Lyle Goldstein and William Murray China's Maturing

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Undersea Dragons Lyle Goldstein and William Murray China's Maturing Undersea Dragons Undersea Dragons Lyle Goldstein and William Murray China’s Maturing Submarine Force Despite new tensions surrounding the March 2004 presidential elections on Taiwan, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have witnessed over the last two years an impressive and unexpected warming of relations. Since the ter- rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there have been a series of high-level meetings between U.S. and Chinese leaders. China backed U.S. military inter- vention in Afghanistan and actively supports the new regime of Hamid Karzai in Kabul.1 The past year has seen substantial U.S.-Chinese cooperation in the sphere of counterterrorism, including the sharing of intelligence and the arrest of several suspected terrorists.2 Surprising many, Beijing has supported the United States on all major United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the 2003 Iraq war. Even more signiªcant, China’s quiet efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula have profoundly impressed Ameri- can observers.3 Many experts are convinced that a major corner has been turned in the United States–China relationship, with Beijing embracing a much more pro- American foreign policy. An alternative explanation, however, holds that Chi- nese leaders have instead opted for a pause in the evolving Sino-American strategic rivalry. Diplomatic gestures support the optimistic view of United States–China relations, but close inspection of ongoing Chinese military devel- opments provides ample evidence for both caution and concern. Indeed, while the U.S. military remains focused on the Middle East, the Ko- rean Peninsula, and Central Asia, China continues its rapid military modern- Lyle Goldstein is Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department, and William Murray, a retired submarine ofªcer, is Associate Professor in the War Gaming Department at the U.S. Naval War College. The authors wish to acknowledge Bernard Cole, Alberto Coll, James Giblin, Comdr. Jeffrey Goldman, U.S. Naval Reserve, Comdr. James Lewis, U.S. Navy, Thomas Mahnken, Rear Adm. Mi- chael McDevitt, U.S. Navy (ret.), Rear Adm. Eric P. McVadon, U.S. Navy (ret.), Jonathan Pollack, Andrew Ross, Robert Rubel, Kenneth Watman, and the anonymous reviewers at International Secu- rity for their support and suggestions. 1. See “Jiang Zemin Announces PRC Aid to Afghanistan,” Xinhua news agency, December 20, 2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) CPP20011220000178. 2. Keith Bradsher, “3 in Hong Kong Agree to Face Charges in U.S.,” New York Times, January 7, 2003, p. A11. 3. See, for example, Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Af- fairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), pp. 22–35. International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161–196 © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 161 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288041588304 by guest on 26 September 2021 International Security 28:4 162 ization. As part of an increasing maritime focus, signiªcant aircraft and destroyer purchases indicate a broad effort to improve combat capabilities. There is little evidence, however, that China will endeavor to ªeld carrier battle groups.4 Moreover, Chinese airpower is constrained by weak aerial refueling capabilities, and its surface ºeet lacks adequate air defense.5 Alternatively, pre- liminary indications suggest that submarines will lead China’s new maritime strategic orientation.6 This development is demonstrated most clearly by China’s unprecedented signing of a contract with Russia for eight new Kilo-class diesel submarines in May 2002. Contrary to Western forecasts, China’s conªdence in imported Kilos has not halted domestic production of the new Song-class diesel submarine.7 In addition, China’s nuclear propulsion program will soon ªeld the ªrst of its second-generation vessels, which will include both attack submarines and strategic missile boats. Finally, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is undertaking an overhaul of the submarine force’s weaponry, training, recruit- ment, and doctrine. A Chinese appraisal of future naval warfare concludes, “The prospect for using submarines is good, because of their covertness and power....Submarines are menaces existing anywhere at any time.”8 Accord- ing to another Chinese analyst, “Submarines are the maritime weapons posing the greatest threat to an aircraft carrier formation. Submarines are also our Navy’s core force.”9 In an unprecedented November 2003 demonstration of 4. Despite the 2001 purchase of the aircraft carrier Varyag from Ukraine, most naval analysts are skeptical regarding China’s intentions to use this platform to develop carrier aviation because of the tremendous cost that would be necessary to make the vessel combat ready. For insight into the Chinese debate on aircraft carriers, see “Zhongguo Xuyao Hangkong Mujian? Haishi Qianting?” [Does China need aircraft carriers? Or submarines?], Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and Merchant Ships], No. 247 (April 2000), p. 9. 5. Concerning Chinese aerial refueling, see Liu Jiafeng and Sha Zhiliang, “Haitian Duijie: Haijun Kongjun Bing Kongzhong Jiashouyou Shuenlian Jishi” [Connecting over the ocean: A record of the naval air force’s aerial refueling exercise], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 258 (March 2001), p. 5. 6. Certainly, land-based aircraft and surface vessels can be an effective complement to the subma- rine force. On China’s new maritime strategic orientation, see, for example, Tang Fuquan, Huang Jinsheng, and Zhang Yonggang, “Shin Shiji Haiyang Zhanlue Xingshi Zhanwang” [Prospects for a maritime strategy in the twenty-ªrst century], Junshi Kexue [Military Science], Vol. 15, No. 1 (2002), pp. 88–97; and Hou Songling and Chi Diantang, “Zhongguo Zhoubian Haiyu de Zhanlue Diwei he Dilu Zhanlue Jiazhi Chutan” [China’s near seas: Strategic position and geostrategic importance,” Dangdai Yazhou [Contemporary Asia-Paciªc Studies], No. 10 (2003), pp. 47–52. 7. An example of a forecast that recently predicted the demise of the Song submarine program is Nikolai Novichkov, “China’s Russian Kilo Buy May Put Song Submarine Future In Doubt,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 12, 2002, p. 3. 8. Capt. Shen Zhongchang, Lt. Comdr. Zhang Haiyin, and Lt. Zhou Xinsheng, “The Military Revo- lution in Naval Warfare,” in Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 277–278. 9. Wang Jiasuo, “Aircraft Carriers: Suggest You Keep Out of the Taiwan Strait,” Junshi Wenzhai [Military Digest], April 1, 2001, FBIS CPP20020326000218. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288041588304 by guest on 26 September 2021 Undersea Dragons 163 this evolving strength, a Chinese diesel submarine intentionally surfaced and revealed itself only 25 miles off the southwest coast of Japan. Unclassiªed studies of Beijing’s ability to conduct undersea warfare are rare. Unfortunately, the analyses that have been available to the wider academic community are also misleading, built on highly problematic assumptions. In particular, an article by Michael O’Hanlon in International Security, although relatively accurate concerning the prospects for an amphibious invasion, peril- ously simpliªes the challenge posed by China’s submarine force.10 This san- guine approach reºects a broader inclination within the American strategic studies community. Indeed, few in the U.S. national security establishment view Chinese military modernization as a potential menace,11 especially given the immediate nature of other threats such as terrorism and proliferation. Many analysts make the all-too-frequent mistake of extrapolating from de- cades of peace in the Taiwan Strait. A deeper understanding of Chinese secu- rity policy, however, suggests that peace in the strait from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War was the consequence of the virulent Sino-Soviet conºict that focused Beijing’s attention elsewhere, rather than the product of a stable politi- cal reality. With Soviet tanks poised to drive on Beijing, Taiwan was not a pri- mary consideration for China’s leaders. Since the end of the Cold War, the East Asian strategic landscape has fundamentally changed, and growing Chinese power and nationalism make the status quo in the Taiwan Strait especially precarious. Given the persistence of this troubling scenario, together with China’s in- creasing maritime strategic focus, this article seeks to assess China’s evolving submarine force and its likely impact on international security. The ªrst section describes the PLAN submarine force’s emerging order of battle, consisting of both conventionally powered and nuclear-powered vessels. The second sec- tion focuses on the all-important human and institutional dimensions that will support the major undersea platforms. The third section places the analysis into a political context: the crucial Taiwan scenario. The ªnal section develops 10. See Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51–86. 11. See, for example, the discussion of China’s maritime potential in Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,” International Secu- rity, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 67, 80. Other examples include Bates Gill and Michael O’Hanlon, “China’s Hollow Military,” National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999), pp.
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