The Strategic Chain Linking Pakistan, India, China, and the United States
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The Strategic Chain Linking Pakistan, India, China, and the United States Robert Einhorn Project Co-Chair W.P.S. Sidhu Project Co-Chair Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series T HE S T RAT EGIC C HAIN : Linking Pakistan, India, China, and the United States Paper 14 • March 2017FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A RM S C ON T ROL AND N ON -P ROLIFERAT ION S ERIES i Acknowledgments We would like to express our deep gratitude to all project and Rachel Slattery for her assistance in the the Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, and American par- editing and production of the report. ticipants in the “Strategic Chain” project, who gen- erously gave their time to participate in our three Support for this project was generously provided by workshops and to work with us closely to final- the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced ize this report. We would like to thank Brookings Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD via As- scholars Michael O’Hanlon and Steven Pifer for re- sistance Grant/Agreement No. N00244-15-l-0038 viewing the report. We would like to extend special awarded by NAVSUP FLC San Diego. The views thanks to Research Assistant and Project Coordina- expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the tor James Tyson for helping manage the project and official policies of NPS. We would also like to ex- for drafting the two Brookings background papers press our gratitude to the John D. and Catherine T. that appear in the annex. We also wish to thank Re- MacArthur Foundation for its generous support for search Assistants Caitlyn E. Davis and Alicia Sand- the project. ers-Zakre for their assistance in the final stage of the The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to indepen- dent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The con- clusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides is in its absolute commit- ment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment. Table of Contents About the Project ..................................................................... 1 Rationale and Goals of the Project ..................................................... 1 Review of the Project Proceedings..................................................... 2 Summary of National Strategic Perspectives................................................. 3 China............................................................................ 3 India ............................................................................ 5 Pakistan .......................................................................... 7 United States ...................................................................... 9 Areas of Convergence and Divergence .................................................... 11 Areas of Convergence .............................................................. 11 Areas of Divergence................................................................ 11 Proposals for Strengthening Stability ..................................................... 12 Quadripartite U.S.-China-India-Pakistan Measures ....................................... 12 Bilateral U.S.-China Measures ....................................................... 13 Bilateral China-India Measures ....................................................... 13 Bilateral India-Pakistan Measures ..................................................... 13 Conclusions: Value of the “Strategic Chain” Concept ........................................ 14 Participants......................................................................... 15 Annexes A. China’s Strategic Environment and Doctrine ......................................... 17 by Zhao Tong, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for International Policy, Beijing B. India’s Strategic Environment and Doctrine .......................................... 25 by Rajesh Rajagopalan, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi C. Pakistan’s Strategic Environment and Doctrine........................................ 33 by Syed Muhammad Ali, Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad D. United States’ Strategic Environment and Doctrine .................................... 42 by Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. E. Backgrounder: Nuclear Forces of China, India, Pakistan and the United States ............... 48 by James Tyson, Strategic Chain Project Coordinator, Brookings Institution F. Backgrounder: Existing Measures to Promote Stability in the “Strategic Chain” .............. 59 by James Tyson, Strategic Chain Project Coordinator, Brookings Institution The Strategic Chain Linking Pakistan, India, China, and the United States Robert Einhorn, Project Co-Chair W.P.S. Sidhu, Project Co-Chair About the Project States. But the strategic dynamics among these four nuclear powers cannot be understood or effectively he 15-month Brookings Institution project fo- addressed on a strictly bilateral basis. While Pakistan Tcused on the “strategic chain” linking Pakistan, responds strategically to India, India responds both India, China, and the United States—a series of re- to Pakistan and China, which in turn responds both lationships that are resulting in some of the most to India and the United States. active nuclear weapons, missile, and missile defense programs anywhere in the world today. The project’s There are many reasons for the lack of success in pro- main goal was to identify policies and measures that moting strategic restraint among these four nucle- could promote stability and reduce incentives for ar-armed states, whether on a unilateral, bilateral, or arms build-ups between key pairs of protagonists, plurilateral basis. Among the reasons are long-stand- regionally, and globally, while also contributing to ing conflicts, varying conceptions of the national a better understanding of the various strategic in- interest and its requirements, widespread mistrust terconnections among these four nuclear-armed among the key powers, domestic pressures, and re- powers. sentment toward foreign interference (primarily di- rected at the United States). But one factor that has The study was based on research conducted by not been adequately examined is the strategic chain Brookings and foreign experts and drew on the re- linking Pakistan to India, India to China, and China sults of consultations with former senior officials to the United States. Without Indian restraint, Pa- and scholars from each of the four countries in the kistan is unlikely to constrain its programs unilat- strategic chain. The contributions of participants in erally. Without Chinese restraint, India will be very these consultations reflected their personal views and reluctant to limit its programs unilaterally or engage not necessarily the positions of their governments. in bilateral controls with Pakistan that, according to This report provides analysis of the “strategic chain,” India, would limit its options vis-à-vis China. And and recommendations for promoting stability and without U.S. constraints on capabilities of concern moderating competition, whether between pairs of to China, Beijing may continue to resist curbing its “strategic chain” countries, on a region-wide basis, strategic modernization efforts. and even globally. Moreover, India and the United States have ex- pressed concern about longstanding China-Pakistan Rationale and Goals of the Project cooperation in important areas, and Pakistan has Considerable policy analysis has been devoted to bi- expressed concern about Indian-U.S. cooperation lateral strategic relationships between Pakistan and in important areas, especially in the wake of the India, India and China, and China and the United U.S.-India civil nuclear deal. T HE S T RAT EGIC C HAIN : Linking Pakistan, India, China, and the United States FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A RM S C ON T ROL AND N ON -P ROLIFERAT ION S ERIES 1 The project’s focus on these four countries is not meant factors having little to do with linkages to third to suggest that their strategic links to other nuclear countries? powers are not consequential. Russia, in particular, might well have been included as an additional link Given linkages of bilateral strategic relationships in the chain. However, for reasons of manageability, to third countries, must those third countries as well as the desire to avoid complicating the proj- be involved in some fashion in any bilateral re- ect by bringing into it the difficult issues surrounding straint arrangements? If so, how? Should those the current U.S.-Russia relationship, the decision was third countries adopt the same constraints as made to confine the effort to the four. the other two parties or can they better partici- pate by adopting supportive collateral or confi- The project aimed to identify policies and measures dence-building measures? that could promote stability and reduce incentives for arms build-ups between key protagonists, among Are there areas where the strategic interests of these four nuclear powers more generally, and even Pakistan, India, China, and the United States globally, while also contributing to a better under- coincide, and where the four countries might be standing of the various strategic interconnections