Afghan Narcotrafficking The State of Afghanistan’s Borders Afghan Narcotrafficking The State of Afghanistan’s Borders

Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking

April 2015

Principal Author:

George Gavrilis Visiting Scholar, Institute for Religion, Culture and Public Life (IRCPL), Columbia University Author of The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries

Contributors:

Vladimir Ivanov Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute

Marlene Laruelle Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University Director, Central Asia Program, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University

Austin Long Assistant Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

David Mansfield Independent Consultant

Ivan Safranchuk Associate Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) Editor in Chief, Great Game: Politics, Business, Security in Central Asia

Konstantin Sorokin Adviser, Department of Education and Science, International Training and Methodology Centre for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM) Adviser, State Civil Service of the Russian Federation, Third Class

Ekaterina Stepanova Head, Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)

Project Director:

David Firestein Perot Fellow and Vice President, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative and Track 2 Diplomacy, EastWest Institute

Expert Group Coordinators:

Vladimir Ivanov Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute

Euhwa Tran Program Associate, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, EastWest Institute _

This publication was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author and contributors. THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 5

Affairs Cory Welt on our work. David Johnson David Ilnur Batyrshin Georgy Zazulin Georgy Kimberly Marten Acknowledgements to sustain the entire project. project. the entire sustain to publication process for this report. this report. for process publication Russian Representative, European Cities Against Drugs Drugs Against Cities European Representative, Russian New York, whose generous support enabled this report and continues and continues support enabled this report generous whose York, New Associate Professor at the Chair of Conflictology, St. Petersburg University University Petersburg St. Conflictology, at the Chair of Professor Associate stakeholders who took the time to share with us their thoughts and feedback and feedback us their thoughts with share the time to took who stakeholders group who generously offered his/her expertise to this project and to the many many to the and to this project expertise his/her offered who generously group We would especially like to thank the following working group members for their their for members group working thank the following to like especially would We Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University Washington The George Affairs, International of Elliott School Studies, Building Initiative, for his indispensable assistance in managing the research and in managing the research assistance his indispensable for Building Initiative, Response Fund and the Kathryn Davis Peace Initiative for their sponsorship of this of their sponsorship for Initiative Peace Davis and the Kathryn Fund Response We would also like to express our profound gratitude to the following individuals at the following to gratitude our profound express to like also would We Nell Crumbley, Hadi Khan, Nadia Mansoor, Jessica Meredith, Caitlin Vaka, Erilia Wu Wu Erilia Vaka, Caitlin Meredith, Jessica Nadia Mansoor, Khan, Hadi Nell Crumbley, Finally, we wish to convey our deep thanks to our financial sponsors who made this our financial sponsors to our deep thanks convey wish to we Finally, invaluable early input during the process of conceptualizing and drafting this report: this report: and drafting conceptualizing of input during the process early invaluable and Cathy Zhu. In particular, special thanks go to Andi Zhou, of EWI’s Strategic Trust- Strategic EWI’s of Zhou, Andi to go special thanks In particular, Zhu. and Cathy experts and officials in Russia, the United States, Afghanistan and other key regional key and other Afghanistan States, the United Russia, and officials in experts EWI who provided critical note-taking, editorial and research support: Joel Alexander, Alexander, Joel support: and research editorial note-taking, critical who provided EWI Ann Whitney Olin Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University Columbia College, Barnard Science, Political of Olin Professor Whitney Ann Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Enforcement and Law Narcotics International for State of Secretary Assistant Former report. Above all else, our most heartfelt gratitude goes to the Carnegie Corporation of of the Carnegie Corporation to goes gratitude heartfelt our most all else, Above report. Head, Research Center, Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN) Federation the Russian of Service Control Drug Federal Center, Research Head, report and project possible. Our sincere appreciation goes to the John B. Hurford Rapid Rapid Hurford John B. the to goes appreciation sincere Our possible. and project report We at the EastWest Institute (EWI) are deeply indebted to every member of the working the working member of every to indebted deeply are (EWI) Institute at the EastWest We Associate Director and Research Professor, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian and Eurasian Russian European, for Institute Professor, and Research Director Associate THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE

6 THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 7 8 14 21 16 18 10 37 25 23 26 20 30 CONTENTS Uzbekistan’s Border with Afghanistan with Border Uzbekistan’s Afghanistan with Border Turkmenistan’s Tajikistan’s Border with Afghanistan with Border Tajikistan’s Acronyms Conclusion and Recommendations Conclusion Endnotes Afghanistan’s Central Asian Neighbors and the Drug Trade: Trade: and the Drug Neighbors Asian Central Afghanistan’s Approaches Three Three Countries, Iran and the Border with Afghanistan: Going at It Alone at It Going Afghanistan: with and the Border Iran Line with the Durand The Problem Afghanistan: with Border Pakistan’s U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Counternarcotics and Afghan Border Management Border Afghan and on Counternarcotics Cooperation U.S.-Russia Introduction Borders Afghanistan’s of Architecture The Shaky Introduction

Regional ef- forts to assist Afghanistan are flounder- ing, and the international number of ministers, ambassadors lateral efforts against the cultivation of poppy community and special representatives from Af- and trafficking of Afghan opiates and heroin. A ghanistan and its neighboring countries The members of the working group recognize still struggles gathered to discuss how to enhance regional that much remains to be done if Afghanistan’s to fight the cooperation at an informal ministerial-level borders are to be strengthened on all sides to meeting on the outskirts of Paris in Decem- better respond to the trafficking of narcotics. growing ber 2008. Kai Eide, then the United Nations cultivation and secretary general’s special representative on In Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Afghanistan, said that regional cooperation Assessment, the working group compre- trafficking of had been slow to materialize and that there hensively outlined the threats Afghan heroin opium. was a great need to identify initiatives that poses to Russia, the United States and the were attainable and of a “win-win” nature. broader international community. Among Officials from the Central Asian Republics, other findings, the report noted that efforts Iran, Pakistan, Russia, the United States and to interdict narcotics along Afghanistan’s other countries shared their thoughts on how borders have fallen far below their potential. to better cooperate at the regional level and In Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Sce- agreed to follow up on a number of critical narios, working group members presented issues. Headlining the list was the desire to future scenarios for the security, economic work more closely to strengthen border po- and political environment in Afghanistan lice and counternarcotics efforts. and the consequences for the fight against Afghan opiates and heroin. Concurrent with Over six years after the Paris meeting, re- these efforts, members of the working group gional efforts to assist Afghanistan are floun- held multiple discussions on the state of bor- dering, and the international community still der management along Afghanistan’s fron- struggles to fight the growing cultivation and tiers and outlined cooperative efforts Russia trafficking of opium. As David Mansfield, a and the United States can undertake to assist leading development expert on Afghanistan, counternarcotics initiatives at Afghanistan’s explains, “Policymakers seem to have lost borders. all appetite for talking about the production and trade of opium in Afghanistan. While This follow-up report has two aims. First, it the discussion has thankfully moved past assesses the state of border management the lengthy communiques of earlier inter- along Afghanistan’s boundaries. It focuses on national conferences on Afghanistan, where the border control efforts of Afghanistan and issues were laid out like a shopping list with its neighbors—Iran, Pakistan, and three Cen- THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE little sense of priority, little has emerged in its tral Asian countries to the north.2 Although place.”1 the problem of Afghan opiates and heroin ul- 8 timately requires a comprehensive approach, Since 2011, the EastWest Institute (EWI) has the working group recognizes that border convened a number of meetings of the Joint management is an important dimension of U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Nar- counternarcotics strategy and is one that has cotrafficking to discuss ways to construc- not received its fair share of attention and tively and jointly enhance bilateral and multi- resources. The second aim of this report is - -

THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 9 limited form of of form limited security cooperation in at least alive principle. It may be It may for possible and Russian to officials U.S. channels keep communica of tion open over Afghanistan, their insulate on-the-ground working on relationship counternarcot a keep and ics, ------The work 10 pursue different interests. A concluding sec concluding A interests. different pursue and cautions out these lays tion in this report on what Russia recommendations makes do cooperatively can States and the United narcotrafficking of meet the challenges to Afghanistan’s on points exit along the various boundaries. was supposed to be one of the key issues on issues the key be one of to supposed was G8 Sum Sochi the cancelled of the agenda in the opposition great remains and there mit, Defense of Department U.S. to Congress U.S. on behalf helicopters Russian of purchases provide that would armed forces Afghan of in assist potentially and support air tactical traffic. illicit cross-border fighting U.S.- future that expect not does group ing will Afghanistan over cooperation Russian relations; bruised mend otherwise somehow modest a more in believes group the rather, and Russian for be possible It may approach. communica of keep channels to officials U.S. on- their insulate Afghanistan, over open tion on counter relationship working the-ground security of form a limited and keep narcotics, in principle. at least alive cooperation that requires cooperation this modest Even and carefully tread efforts joint U.S.-Russian sensitivities. geopolitical other’s each avoid important than in Cen is this more Nowhere Tajikistan, like in states particularly Asia, tral maintain States and the United Russia where and at times diplomatic presence a sizeable the working group has weathered the broad the has weathered group the working rela Moscow-Washington in deterioration er crisis has brought as the Ukraine even tions, Indeed, an all-time low. to relations bilateral policies and U.S. Russian over the rupture the willingness has affected Ukraine towards Afghanistan Afghanistan. to over cooperate 6 ------, Afghani , The ability of of The ability 5 Afghanistan’s Border Afghanistan’s 4 Progress also remains insuf remains also Progress 3 8 The spirit of cooperation within cooperation The spirit of 9 World Drug Report 2014 and Russia loses 3 to 5 percent of its its of percent 5 to 3 loses Russia and 7 and beyond.” “There is … a clear and compelling interest on interest and compelling is … a clear “There up stepping in sides U.S. and Russian the both Afghanistan in on drug control cooperation Since the inception of the EWI working group group working EWI the of inception the Since that, determined have members its in 2011, in Russia is estimated to be a staggering $6 be a staggering to is estimated in Russia billion, the national to equivalent narcotics, to GDP budget. health 1.7 million opiate users in Russia, making up making in Russia, users million opiate 1.7 drug addicts. the country’s of 68 percent circulating heroin Afghan of value The market holders pledge sustained border and security and security border sustained pledge holders Russia’s a result, As 2014. beyond assistance are there Currently, crisis will intensify. heroin sors seized by Afghan forces. Afghan by seized sors traffickers deter to authorities border Afghan stake international unless decline further will Police (ABP) does not live up to its interdic its up to not live does (ABP) Police a for accounted and in 2013 tion potential and precur drugs the total of 4 percent mere to process opium into heroin, despite note despite heroin, opium into process to authorities Afghanistan’s by seizures worthy frontier along the country’s years in recent with Pakistan. regions of the country. of of precursor the importing prevent to ficient used that are anhydride, acetic like chemicals, production and 74 percent of global illicit illicit global of percent and 74 production opiates of 90 percent over opium production; out trafficked are Afghanistan in produced United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Drugs on Nations Office United (UNODC) opium global of percent 80 for accounts stan trafficking of narcotics along the borders of along the borders of narcotics trafficking Afghanistan. the to According The task at hand is urgent. to propose attainable measures that Russia that Russia attainable measures propose to the combat to take can States and the United The Shaky Architecture of Afghanistan’s Borders

Afghanistan’s border guards are stretched very thin, par- ticularly along or much of its history, the Afghan state the lead in training border police and cus- the borders of had a border guard in name only. War- toms authorities at Afghanistan’s ports of en- Central Asian Flords and authorities in frontier areas set try. In 2007, the UNODC launched the Rain- up their own modes of border control, collect- bow Initiative, a series of strategies designed states to the ing customs duties and policing stretches of to deal with growing trafficking problems that north. frontier as they saw fit.11 The flexible and lo- Afghanistan and its neighbors faced along cal approach to border control in the country their mutual borders.13 The Rainbow Initiative was largely a function of its political geogra- built upon UNODC’s much older legacy of en- phy; Afghanistan’s various regions and fron- gagement and assistance to Afghanistan and tier territories had stronger links historically the region, bringing much-needed interna- to the territories of neighboring states than tional attention to Afghanistan’s anemic bor- to one another. Their economic activity and der controls. By 2009, aid to Afghanistan’s social exchange depended on relatively un- borders increased markedly as the United hindered cross-border exchange, a factor States took a lead role in training Afghan that contributed to the weakness of the cen- Border Police and in funding state-of-the-art, tral state in Afghanistan and impeded the de- well-equipped border crossings along the velopment of a well-functioning border guard border with Pakistan and the Central Asian at the national level. Republics.14

In the 1970s and 1980s during the Soviet The increase in border management assis- intervention, Afghan officials set up a mili- tance was an admission on two counts: first, tary-style border guard with Moscow’s help. the country was woefully unprepared to man- Afghanistan’s Soviet-style border control age its borders; and second, international do- appeared centralized, orderly and functional nors had previously approached the issue in on the surface, but in reality it thinly papered a scattershot way. One International Security over the system of security, tolls and regula- Assistance Force (ISAF) official working in a tions that local strongmen and warlords had Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-e put in place, and these practices were revived Sharif explained that there was little point in during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s.12 training Afghan Border Police on how to inter- cept drugs because they had no training in THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE After the ouster of the Taliban, the multilater- arrest methods or firearms use, and the con- al state-building effort in the country neglect- sequences would be disastrous if smugglers 10 ed border assistance, preferring to focus on started shooting at them.15 building up state authority and infrastructure in core territories. Border aid arrived belat- The aid that has come since 2009 was thus edly, only as the security situation in Afghani- an attempt to provide a full gamut of training stan deteriorated. EU-member countries, and infrastructure to improve border man- particularly Germany and Italy, initially took agement. The United States and the Europe- THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 11 21 Center Center Source: Source: for Naval Naval for Analyses 20 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.0 4.5 2.9 sq. km sq. ABP per 50 per 50 ABP ------700 3,700 4,000 15,500 23,900 150 1,150 1,700 1,600 4,600 10,900 15,500 Number of forces of Number authorized ABP authorized Current number of of number Current 137 744 923 1,206 3,023 2,430 5,453 Length of of Length border (km) border 19 their counterparts at Joint Border Command Command Joint Border at their counterparts with Paki along the border (JBCCs) Centers in this report. later which is discussed stan, that, made it clear the assessment However, and ISAF U.S. of the drawdown of on the eve were police border Afghanistan’s forces, ABP The factors. key lacking in many greatly when even little with the army, cooperated border where Afghanistan’s border guards guards border Afghanistan’s where border fall numbers their supply, ample in more are Afghani their counterparts; to short relative than do Pakistan, guards fewer stations stan bor along their common and Uzbekistan Iran ders. in re assistance of the abundance Despite U.S. the by assessment a 2013 years, cent General Inspector Defense of Department lim very had achieved ABP that the found The capacity. in building up its progress ited had be ABP that the notes assessment with their work at coordinating better come and that the Afghanistan in forces coalition had recruits of development professional bor of stretches along particular improved discovered It also the north). der (especially to services border of in the capacity progress with work and people and to goods process - - 17 As Figure 2 shows, 2 shows, Figure As 18 Tajikistan Turkmenistan Iran Uzbekistan They have also built border crossings crossings border built also have They Total "Green" Afghan Border Police Border Afghan "Green" Total Pakistan Other borders “Green” Afghan Border Police (see breakdown below) breakdown (see Police Border Afghan “Green” police customs and border Total Type of border security force security border of Type staff headquarters ABP points crossing and border at airports ABP Police Customs Afghan Figure 2: “Green” Afghan Border Police by adjacent country adjacent by Police Border Afghan “Green” 2: Figure Figure 1: Current Afghan National Security Forces border and customs security forces, by type by forces, security customs and border Forces National Security Afghan 1: Current Figure 16 kilometer of border. Even along stretches of of stretches along Even border. of kilometer Central Asian states to the north. Along the the north. to states Asian Central number of the average Tajikistan, with border every one for is just on patrol police border generally not permitted. generally stretched are guards border Afghanistan’s of borders the along particularly thin, very Approximately 15,500 are posted to positions positions to posted are 15,500 Approximately border—sections “green” the so-called along ports official in between that fall the border of and people is goods of crossing entry where of Security Forces (ANSF). Current estimates estimates Current (ANSF). Forces Security located are police border that 4,000 indicate border. the from away well headquarters, at under-resourced. The country currently has currently The country under-resourced. of a small proportion police, border 23,900 National Afghan number of total the 382,000 Despite the international assistance, the assistance, the international Despite and be understaffed to considered are ABP faced. who staff authorities Afghan for and barracks funding ample with particularly the borders, border. Afghan-Tajik the for that have increased the professionalism and the professionalism increased that have au border number of a large of functionality they obstacles the logistical despite thorities, an Union have both funded more comprehen both funded more an Union have Police Border Afghan for modules training sive Drug Metric Tons Kilograms Opium 77.45 77,449.83 Heroin 5.31 5,310.25 Morphine 8.36 8,360.03 Hash 63.66 63,662.06 Chemicals 69.11 69,107.44 Alcohol 29.85 29,845.88 Amphetamine 0.02 15.69 Total 253.75 253,751.18

Figure 3: Drug Seizures by Afghan Forces in 2013 Figure 4: Seizures by Afghan Forces in 2013 by Drug Type

Source: dealing with major cross-border threats such In the face of this highly volatile and discour- Government as armed insurgents or traffickers. They aging situation, the United States and a num- of the Islamic Republic of faced funding and procurement shortfalls, ber of other international actors continue to Afghanistan23 and some remote border posts had gone up sponsor training and infrastructure for Af- to five months without resupply. Many re- ghan Border Police to enhance their capacity cruits had not undergone formal intelligence and professionalism.27 training, which is essential to dealing with clandestine cross-border threats and orga- Targeting capacity gaps is only part of the nized crime.22 Given these shortfalls, it is not problem. Even if Afghanistan’s border man- surprising that ABP accounted for only 4 agement institutions improve their ability to percent of drug seizures by Afghan security interdict, it is not clear that Afghan authori- forces in 2013. (See Figures 3 and 4.) ties have the willingness to do so. Provincial officials and warlords have been implicated Presently, Afghanistan’s border authorities in the drug trade. Key posts in the police and remain highly fragmented, and their ability to customs services along export routes have manage the border depends on the quality of traditionally been bought and sold for im- provincial leadership rather than the author- mense sums, and some border commanders ity of officials at the Ministry of Interior in Ka- are multimillionaires. Corruption within the bul. Thanks to strong provincial leadership, Afghan Border Police and Afghan Customs Herat and Kunar provinces—respectively Police (ACP) remains a huge problem with no adjoining Iran and Pakistan—have borders solution in sight.28 As one recent investigative that are relatively well run and stable. By con- report found: trast, Farah province’s border authorities are struggling and are outgunned by well-armed In many border provinces government of- drug convoys that tear across the border into ficials and their networks have facilitated Iran.24 The international borders of Badghis the trafficking of narcotic drugs from -Af and Faryab provinces with Turkmenistan are ghanistan. Many claim that the involve-

THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE in particularly poor shape; dwindling num- ment of senior government officials in the bers of border police were unable to deter drugs is more serious than the Taliban’s 12 attackers who burned down their posts.25 In own connection with drug cultivation Kandahar, border and security services play and production. Many respondents con- up their counterinsurgency efforts while tak- firmed that most of the officials who are ing active part in illicit cross-border trade.26 deeply involved in illicit drugs in key bor- (See Figure 5.) der provinces are attached to the Afghan- istan Border Police, Afghanistan Customs Drug Metric Tons Kilograms Opium 77.45 77,449.83 Heroin 5.31 5,310.25 Morphine 8.36 8,360.03 Hash 63.66 63,662.06 Chemicals 69.11 69,107.44 Alcohol 29.85 29,845.88 Amphetamine 0.02 15.69 Total 253.75 253,751.18 THE STATE BORDERS OF AFGHANISTAN’S

Figure 5: Map of Afghanistan’s Provinces

Department and provincial police head- member David Mansfield notes that along Source: quarters.29 some of Afghanistan’s borders, illicit trade University of Texas Libraries has become more fragmented and less con- A UNODC official admitted on the eve of -Af trolled by large-scale traffickers, as locals find ghanistan’s 2014 presidential elections that it lucrative to engage in smaller-scale smug- “political will for anti-drug initiatives is weak gling across the country’s borders. among members of the Afghan elite, many of whom have become increasingly dependent President Ashraf Ghani faces a tough task on the proceeds of drugs as foreign funding ahead in suppressing narcotrafficking along dries up.”30 Official collusion with drug traf- Afghanistan’s borders. His administration fickers, however, is but one factor enabling the will have to tackle the lagging capacity and drug trade. Another key driver is the role that pernicious corruption affecting the country’s drugs play in the country’s political economy. border management officials and those who 13 The cultivation, processing and export of opi- oversee them; it will also have to develop a ates help monetize the Afghan economy and strategy of border management that takes provide livelihood for a significant segment into account the constantly changing nature of the population. Local, frontier populations of smuggling and the illicit economy. and civilians from various walks of life can also be part of this illicit trade. Working group U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Counternarcotics Although Rus- and Afghan Border sia is happy to share intel- ligence and Management lend its drug control experts and officials to outside operations, it draws the line at military involvement in efore the onset of the crisis in their re- eration Samshit, as it was known, was mostly security lations in 2014, Russia and the United a Russian-Afghan endeavor but was backed operations. BStates had increasingly cooperated to up by intelligence from U.S. sources.33 confront the narcotics problem in Afghani- stan. For example, Russia has trained Afghan Such cooperation had been slow in getting off security officers and counternarcotics police the ground and did not reach its full potential, as part of a multilateral initiative that also in- even before the onset of the deeper crisis in volves the United States, NATO, Central Asian U.S.-Russia relations. First, the operations states and Pakistan, and it has donated small were slow to develop because of a deep-seat- arms and munitions to Afghan law enforce- ed disagreement that took place in 2008 and ment. In October 2010, Russian drug police 2009 between the United States and Russia officers took part in an operation alongside on how to tackle the drugs problem. Russia the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration favored a more intensive approach—a com- (DEA) that involved raids on four laboratories bination of opium eradication in conjunction near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, result- with interdiction efforts inside Afghanistan ing in the seizure of approximately $60 mil- and the destruction of laboratories. The Unit- lion of opium and heroin.31 ed States wanted to focus on interdiction of drugs—a lighter-touch approach that was in- According to official data from the Federal tended to reserve manpower and resources Drug Control Service of the Russian Federa- to fight the insurgency without aggravating tion (FSKN), such cooperative operations segments of the Afghan population who were continued through 2012, yielding a total of profiting from the cultivation of opium. seven FSKN-DEA operations in the country.

THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE These operations resulted in seizures of 2.5 The October 2010 raids were the product of tons of opiates, 3.5 tons of hashish, 1.5 tons of a compromise that involved a degree of lim- 14 morphine and 5.5 tons of precursors—along ited intervention inside Afghanistan, target- with the destruction of 10 drug laboratories.32 ing drug smugglers and processing labora- In May 2013, more drug laboratories were tories, without going after Afghan peasants destroyed in the northern province of Bada- or international criminal networks. This was khshan, a key transit point for drugs headed the first operational instance where Russia into Central Asia and onwards to Russia. Op- and the United States made gestures of com- -

THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 15 - on matters of of on matters counternarcot border and ics management in Afghanistan. Given Russia’s Russia’s Given CSTO’s and the to reluctance a secu have presence rity on the Afghan the side of the border, States United to will have ways find other expand to cooperation with Russia ------37

36 that end, the remainder of this report outlines outlines this report of the remainder that end, coun and management border of the state of borders along the initiatives ternarcotics Ta Pakistan, on Iran, focusing Afghanistan, It con Turkmenistan. and Uzbekistan jikistan, and what Russia of with a discussion cludes the fight improve do to can States the United borders. at these narcotics against ment or security operations in Afghanistan Afghanistan in operations ment or security 2014. after so ruled out—and will remain are Security the Collective to The taboo extends se a Russia-led (CSTO), Organization Treaty Nikolai Secretary-General bloc…CSTO curity such any excluded has formally Bordyuzha has not ‘this option noting that involvement, will nev and hopefully, been discussed, even er be.’” ex this position, has reiterated Bordyuzha its reinforce to prefers plaining that CSTO “it as the border side of Tajik on the presence that they our member states of is a position held in the operations involved should not get Afghanistan.” of on the territory to reluctance and the CSTO’s Russia’s Given side Afghan on the presence a security have to will have States the United the border, of with cooperation expand to ways find other and counternarcotics of on matters Russia Towards border management in Afghanistan. ------Such opposi 35 34 side operations, it draws the line at military it draws side operations, work As operations. in security involvement ex Stepanova member Ekaterina ing group involve military Russian direct “Any plains, the Soviet experience there. Although Rus there. experience the Soviet lend and intelligence share to happy is sia to out officials and experts control drug its Last, Russia places certain limits on its direct direct on its limits certain places Russia Last, virtue of by Afghanistan with engagement and U.S. officials had to engage in time-con to engage officials had and U.S. Kar to and concessions suming discussions proceeding. before zai counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. in operations counternarcotics he operation, 2010 the October Following public. made his opposition as Russian the operations down tion slowed Afghanistan’s ruling elite. Afghanistan’s for Afghanistan’s elite. ruling Afghanistan’s had not been Hamid Karzai mer president U.S.-Russian of supporter an enthusiastic A second factor that slowed the development the development that slowed factor second A of on the part opposition was cooperation of operation was substantively a DEA-Afghan DEA-Afghan a substantively was operation observ FSKN sent Russia which to operation ers. have been easier to facilitate given the lim given facilitate to been easier have some as participation; Russian of scale ited the noted, members group working Russian promise towards their respective approaches approaches their respective towards promise may compromise This counternarcotics. to Iran and the Border Iran spends nearly one with Afghanistan: billion dollars annually on counternarcot- Going at It Alone ics efforts, and 3,000 troops of Iran’s conscript army n comparison to Afghanistan’s other neigh- Notwithstanding the country’s tendencies bors, Iran’s counternarcotics efforts are towards unilateral border control efforts, Ira- are deployed Ithe most intensive by far. According to the nian officials have a history of cooperation to assist UNODC’s latest available data, Iran account- with UNODC. Iran was one of the first states ed for 68 percent of the opium and heroin to raise the alarm several years ago when border guards seized by Afghanistan and its six bordering counternarcotics efforts stumbled in Af- in counter- states in 2012.38 By comparison, Afghanistan ghanistan. Although Iranian authorities were and Pakistan respectively seized 23 percent quick to fault NATO and the U.S. presence in trafficking and 7 percent.39 (See Figure 6.) Afghanistan for failing to stop the opium tide, work along the they also reserved plenty of blame for Af- These results come with a steep price. Iran ghanistan’s political class. In past years, Ira- frontier with spends nearly one billion dollars annually on nian officials frequently complained to United Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts, and 3,000 troops Nations representatives that Afghan officials of Iran’s conscript army are deployed to as- failed to follow up when they proposed coop- and Pakistan. sist border guards in counter-trafficking work erative border control and counternarcotics along the frontier with Afghanistan and Paki- efforts.45 stan. In addition to the sizeable police and military power deployed to the border, Iran In 2007 under the auspices of UNODC, Teh- has constructed substantial physical impedi- ran agreed to take part in a counternarcotics ments to prevent smugglers from crossing action plan that was dedicated to fostering the border. The 936-kilometer-long Afghan- more intense cooperation across Iran, Af- istan-Iran boundary is lined with 400 kilo- ghanistan and Pakistan. The plan included meters of embankments, 800 kilometers of joint training, the adoption of compatible deep canals, 39 kilometers of concrete walls telecommunications equipment, intelligence and barriers and 140 kilometers of barbed cooperation and the creation of pilot liaison wire fencing.41 In February 2014, a senior offices at key border crossings.46 Iranian diplomat speaking at the EastWest Institute explained that the country has lost In 2014, the UNODC’s sub-program on Illicit nearly 4,000 law enforcement officers in the Trafficking and Border Control for Iran enu- drug war in over three decades.42 merated key developments along the coun- try’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Heroin is defined as a major security threat These included putting drug-detecting dogs in Iran. It is estimated that 31 percent of Af- into service and training customs officials in ghanistan’s exported heroin crosses the bor- interdiction practices. Under the auspices THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE der into Iran, and growing proportions of the of the Trilateral Initiative with Pakistan and trade remain in the country for domestic con- Afghanistan, two border liaison offices were 16 sumption. Iran’s response has been to imple- established in the Iranian sites of Taybad and ment intensive and heavy-handed counter- Mirjaveh near the Islam Qala-Zaranj crossing narcotics efforts,43 and these have changed along the Afghanistan-Iran border as well as the calculus of criminal transnational net- on the Taftan crossing with Pakistan.47 works who find it easier to ship drugs across the Afghan-Pakistani border.44 THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 17 40 Online on Drugs and on Drugs Nations Office Nations Office Source: United United Source: Crime Statistics Crime Statistics ------If 49 opium, heroin and other psychotropic drugs, drugs, and other psychotropic heroin opium, in the country executions of and 81 percent offenses. drug-related for were in 2011 counternarcotics of decades the country’s gov the Rouhani an indication, are policies the prosecuting continue to ernment is likely and traffick narcotics against war country’s way. in much the same ers To explore the possibility of U.S.-Russia-Iran U.S.-Russia-Iran of the possibility explore To is holding EWI cooperation, counternarcotics cooperation Such 2015. in workshops expert and Russian means. any by will not be easy cooperate to are motivated officials Iranian public health and serious their common by and heroin. opiates Afghan to due problem its will harness that Russia But it is unlikely in Tehran with diplomatic relations amicable the United for act as a go-between to order the idea Moreover, time. at the present States on counternarcot with Iran cooperating of aside—does and other disputes ics—nuclear the United unanimous support in not enjoy States. ex group the working of one member As co counternarcotics “international pressed, it sanc since is complex with Iran operation judicial system and corrupt tions an unjust Ahmadinejad’s during which deteriorated out the dishes routinely Iran presidency.” manu individuals caught to penalty death trading or possessing trafficking, facturing, Figure 6: Opium and Heroin Seizures, 2012 Seizures, and Heroin 6: Opium Figure with the U.S.” together work can ------This coopera 48 we’ve been working directly with Afghani with directly been working we’ve so with NATO, which has been working stan, with NATO indirectly been working have we we where this is one issue I think on this…. there has not been any official U.S.-Iran co U.S.-Iran official has not been any there to and no coalition on the matter, operation However, with this has been created. deal tion may be welcomed cautiously by Iranian Iranian by cautiously welcomed be may tion stated Iranian diplomat senior a As officials. far, “So meeting, at an EWI 2014 in February san Rouhani affords the United States the op the States United the affords Rouhani san with Iran directly more cooperate to portunity efforts. on counternarcotics East. communication channels of The opening of Has President and the election of with Iran of Afghan licit goods across its borders and borders its across licit goods Afghan of export for the port at Chabahar to onwards in India and the Middle markets lucrative to alternatives to the cultivation and process the cultivation to alternatives a major transit is already Iran opium. ing of the transit facilitating exports, Afghan hub for may be more confident in allowing ever-larg allowing in confident more be may and licit trade exports, Afghan of er volumes and promote economy Afghan the will boost year may be helpful for enhanced counter enhanced for be helpful may year If level. at the bilateral cooperation narcotics Iran between cooperation counternarcotics officials Iranian increases, Afghanistan and ghan opiates and heroin for the foreseeable the foreseeable for and heroin ghan opiates Comprehensive The Iran-Afghanistan future. signed last Agreement Cooperation Security It is worth mentioning that Iran will continue will continue mentioning that Iran It is worth Af in the fight against role an active play to Pakistan’s Border with Afghanistan: The Problem

The unsettled with the Durand Line status of the Afghanistan- Pakistan boundary, or the Durand he 2,430-kilometer-long Afghanistan- The border’s difficult geography is one of Line, as it is Pakistan border poses particularly several factors that make it difficult for -Af Tdifficult obstacles in the fight against ghanistan’s and Pakistan’s border and coun- commonly drug trafficking. In the north, the bound- ternarcotics officials to stem the flow of illicit called, im- ary is mountainous and riddled with unoffi- substances. Compounding factors include cial crossings that number in the hundreds the unsettled status of the boundary, lin- pedes deeper when the winter snows melt; in the south, the gering mistrust between Afghanistan’s and counternarcot- boundary stretches across remote arid terri- Pakistan’s political elite and military forces tory and abuts some of Afghanistan’s most and the much greater priority that Pakistan ics cooperation active poppy-growing provinces. places on counterinsurgency operations over across the two counternarcotics. A 2014 report on the state of Afghanistan’s countries. national security forces by the Center for Na- The unsettled status of the Afghanistan- val Analyses underscores the constraints this Pakistan boundary, or the Durand Line, as it geography places on interdiction: is commonly called, impedes deeper coun- ternarcotics cooperation across the two Afghan and Pakistani forces [respective- countries: “When Pakistan became an inde- ly] man hundreds of posts spread across pendent state in 1947, it declared the line its more than 1,500 miles of border, many international border with Afghanistan. Suc- of them in remote and isolated locations cessive Afghan governments over the next in the mountains. Simply manning, pro- sixty years rejected this position, even though tecting, and resupplying these positions some of Afghanistan’s actions have consti- puts an enormous burden on both secu- tuted de facto recognition of the line.”51 rity forces….Most illicit men and mate- rial are interdicted far from the border on The frontier-like qualities of the Durand Line their way to central locations. Pakistan’s are usually blamed for enabling the insur- Frontier Corps conducts some mobile gency and allowing the Taliban to move unim- operations close to the border, yet forces peded across both states. These very same on both sides remain fixed largely in static qualities have allowed the opium and heroin positions. Most of these posts lie along trade to flourish.52 UNODC reports that Paki- recognized crossing points, yet there are stan is the destination and transit country hundreds of other small roads and don- for approximately 40 percent of Afghan opi- key trails that bypass these positions. ates and that opiate processing takes place THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE When passing within the line of sight of in small, mobile laboratories on both sides 53 18 border posts, especially on the Afghan of the border. And despite its long history side, it is common for insurgents and of participation with UNODC initiatives, Paki- smugglers to put harassing fire on these stan is the world’s highest volume transit cor- positions in order to fix border forces in ridor for opiates and cannabis and, along with their positions. Intimidation and bribery India, is the main source of acetic anhydride, are also common methods for limiting in- a precursor necessary to process opium into terdiction.50 heroin.54 -

THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 19 - and Africa and Africa the south from and towards the China from north. The lagging The lagging interdiction along efforts the Afghani stan-Pakistan al have border greater lowed of quantities travel to drugs Pakistan into and onwards Middle the to Europe East,

------60 Such 59 western province of Xinjiang, which borders which borders Xinjiang, of province western Any counternarcot successful Asia. Central northern bor Afghanistan’s along efforts ics future if vain in be may Asia Central with der Asia and Central access to are able traffickers circuitous via more Federation the Russian and China. Pakistan through routes beyond increasing border management ca management border increasing beyond along differences political and settling pacity harmonizing pri requires It also the border. along the Du priority chief Pakistan’s orities. but counter Line is not counternarcotics rand extremism. and fighting violent insurgency is and precursors heroin opiates, Intercepting fight the to compared when task a secondary mem group working As insurgents. against Pakistan’s notes, Stepanova ber Ekaterina the from is not all that different approach Af towards took States the United approach terrorists and insurgents ghanistan—fighting narcotics. the fight against over priority took along the efforts The lagging interdiction allowed have border Afghanistan-Pakistan Paki into travel to drugs of quantities greater Europe the Middle East, to and onwards stan China and towards the south from Africa and these of transit Although the the north. from a direct not pose may and heroin opiates it is important to currently, Russia to threat Afghan in the future. do so that it may note Chinese the permeate to beginning is heroin including in the Pakistan, of way by market May 2013, a conflict over a disputed border border disputed a over a conflict 2013, May in open resulting control, out of spiraled post au border Pakistani and Afghan across fire casualties. taking ABP with thorities ISAF by ended with mediation often incidents the cur if and it is unclear military officials, the border along prevailing calm of state rent with force coalition long after for will remain drawal. described and history the atmosphere Given and Afghanistan how see to hard is it above, across cooperate meaningfully can Pakistan in the future. narcotics interdict to the border effort great expanded officials Although U.S. crossings border the equipping and funding in and encour Wesh-Chaman and Torkham at to services border and Pakistani Afghan aged Cen Command Joint Border these interact, the border along locations the only are ters regularly. interact sides the two where goes cooperation durable time, the same At ------In 58 These These dy 57 56 Despite major up Despite 55 sary equipment to check cargo for drugs drugs for cargo check to equipment sary has been trained the staff and none of Although a such inspections. conduct to by kit has been provided drug detection not it is at the crossing, use UNODC for use. to being put apparently UNODC experts observed that customs that customs observed experts UNODC cargo stamped and signed often officials and contain trucks and allowed receipts with Pakistan to the border cross to ers the Moreover, checks. any out conducting is not equipped with the neces crossing marily a “Trade Facilitation Centre” that that Centre” Facilitation “Trade a marily Afghani between trade monitors merely smug drug Therefore, and Pakistan. stan at the is not a priority gling prevention or vehicles trucks Containers, crossing. through Afghanistan or from to traveling searched. not thoroughly are Torkham Torkham Station border crossing is pri crossing Station border Torkham ghan territory, causing civilian casualties. causing ghan territory, escalated into skirmishes that have caused caused that have skirmishes into escalated accused officials Afghan In 2012, casualties. Af into rockets of firing hundreds of Pakistan government accepts the right of the other the right of accepts government over and smugglers insurgents pursue to have incidents border many and border, the At the military level, the present state of the of state the present the military level, At the unreal of Line is emblematic Durand Neither relations. bilateral of potential ized namics fuel the smuggling economy and dis and economy smuggling the fuel namics stop to working harder from officials courage it. cials along the border and breed feelings of of feelings breed and cials along the border among injustice and economic dependency and officials. exporters Afghan nomic level, Afghanistan’s landlocked status status landlocked Afghanistan’s nomic level, encourage high tariff policies and Pakistan’s among offi corruption promote smuggling, diction along the border is the deep distrust is the deep distrust diction along the border Af between decades for that has prevailed officials and pervades ghan and Pakistani the eco At issues. and strategic economic Making matters more difficult for drug inter difficult more Making matters customs authorities have not improved inter not improved have authorities customs a UNODC report: to According diction rates. grades funded by the United States at the States the United by funded grades Wesh-Chaman border Torkham and official of entry official ports three of crossings—two and Afghanistan—border from Pakistan into ings—estimated at over 100,000—which 100,000—which at over ings—estimated Line at official Durand the across place take crossings. and unofficial Narcotics and precursors are difficult to in difficult are precursors and Narcotics cross daily of number the huge given terdict Afghanistan’s Central Asian Neighbors and Given recent spikes in the Drug Trade: Three Afghan opium production, the volume of Countries, Three drugs is likely to grow, with Approaches traffickers making use of upgrades in the road, rail and air sys- pproximately 25 percent of Afghani- responding enhancement in the law enforce- stan’s exported heroin is trafficked ment capacity to combat the illegal trade in tems of the across the borders of its three Central narcotics at dry ports, seaports and border A 62 Central Asian Asian neighbors—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and control points.” Even licit economic and Turkmenistan.61 This minority share punches development initiatives can work to the ben- Republics. above its weight when it comes to economic efit of narcotics smuggling. The U.S.-funded and geopolitical impact. Traffickers made an bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj on the Afghan-Tajik estimated $1.4 billion in net profit from heroin border has expanded trade links between in Central Asia in 2009, a staggering amount Afghanistan and Tajikistan, but it has also be- relative to the region’s economy and more come a vehicle for traffickers to move larger so for smaller states like Tajikistan, whose quantities of drugs. The Russia-led Customs GDP since 2009 has ranged from $7 billion to Union, intended to facilitate trade between $8.5 billion. Among the many negative con- the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and sequences of trafficking across Central Asia Belarus by decreasing border controls and is corruption, as the scale of drug profits en- simplifying customs procedures, will also tices Central Asian officials at many levels— complicate the fight against the drug trade. including law enforcement, customs officials With Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan gearing up for and border guards who are tempted by lucra- entry to the Customs Union in the short- to tive bribes to look the other way—to enable medium-term, the importance of interdicting and protect the drug trade. Moreover, the drugs at Afghanistan’s borders will only grow vast majority of northbound heroin winds up more critical.63 in Russia, where it severely strains the federa- tion’s public health system and law enforce- This section focuses on the three Central ment resources. Asian states that share a border Afghani- stan—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmeni- THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE Given recent spikes in Afghan opium produc- stan. As will be seen, the borders are more tion, the volume of drugs is likely to grow, different than they are similar. The states take 20 with traffickers making use of upgrades in different approaches to guarding their bor- the road, rail and air systems of the Central ders, display different levels of participation Asian Republics. A UNODC report notes that in multilateral border control and counternar- the volume of trade between Afghanistan and cotics initiatives and have varying degrees of Central Asia has risen substantially over the political will to fight the drug trade. The one past decade but that “there has been no cor- key similarity is that all three of Afghanistan’s THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 21 65 Online on Drugs and on Drugs Nations Office Nations Office Source: United United Source: Crime Statistics Crime Statistics ------These These 68 but its remoteness remoteness but its 66 67 kilograms.” traf narcotics observers, some to According most country’s of the one ficking has become as much as to equivalent resources, lucrative and involv GDP the country’s of 30 percent collusion official amount of ing a substantial in the and authorities elites government by services. and police customs border, bound for destinations in the Russian Fed in the Russian destinations bound for described is often region The border eration. and monitor to difficult remote, ruggedly as lacking in infrastructure, international of decade A be overstated. may has the border of both sides to assistance Afghani with licit and illicit trade increased bridge- and road- of flurry a by enabled stan along bazaars and common building projects the nature consequence, By River. the Pyanj evolving. is constantly trade cross-border of particu a about explains Mansfield David As “The pri in Badakhshan, border of lar stretch bor the across smuggled being goods mary and cigarettes charas heroin, opium, der are and ‘wine’ and Tajikistan to Afghanistan from Much Afghanistan. to Tajikistan from weapons at night and in place the smuggling takes of across people smuggling goods local volves is It tubes. inner and boats small via river the much as as take can that small boat reported transporting those drugs, of kilograms 100 10 up to a truck) (from inner tube by goods

------64 Figure 7: Opium and Heroin Seizures in Afghanistan’s Central Asian Border States, 2007-2012 States, Border Asian Central Afghanistan’s in Seizures and Heroin Opium 7: Figure Afghanistan is the primary conduit of opiates opiates of the primary conduit is Afghanistan with Afghanistan with border 1,207-kilometer-long Tajikistan’s Tajikistan’s Border Tajikistan’s sensitivities in Central and South Asia and Asia and South in Central sensitivities main con Tajikistan—the in especially most via Russia to onwards headed drugs duit for the Northern Route. three republics that border Afghanistan. At At Afghanistan. border that republics three will Washington and Moscow time, the same geopolitical other’s each of be wary to have do so, they will have to address capacity gaps, gaps, capacity address to will have they do so, as de will problems, and political corruption the of on each below in the sections scribed to work together to strengthen the borders the borders strengthen to together work to Afghani that face states Asian the Central of To rates. their interdiction and improve stan in Afghanistan’s Central Asian border states.) border Asian Central Afghanistan’s in placed well are States and the United Russia seizures by Central Asian authorities at and authorities Asian Central by seizures kilo 5,291 from dropped within their borders in 2011. kilograms 1,810 to in 2008 grams trends seizure drug overall for 7 Figure (See es in seizures by some states in particular in particular states some by in seizures es in drug is a reduction trend the overall years, heroin reported that UNODC notes seizures. northern neighbors are operating below their below operating are northern neighbors traffick deterring to when it comes potential increas modest Despite ing at their borders. trafficking dynamics are sobering and persist equipment, renovates facilities for use by despite more than two decades of border DCA mobile units, and funds a DCA liaison security assistance from Russia, the United office in northern Afghanistan that conducts States and the broader international com- joint operations with Afghans.”70 This fund- Unfortunately, munity. ing has improved the quality of infrastructure the coopera- and training at key facilities, such as the DCA In the wake of its independence in 1992, Tajik- district office at Ishkashim on the Afghan-Ta- tive spirit that istan agreed to maintain Russian troop con- jik border, which interacts with a liaison office prevailed in tingents along its border with Afghanistan. that the U.S. DEA and Tajik DCA jointly oper- These border guards played a key role in seal- ate in Taloqan in Afghanistan. previous years ing off the border when Afghanistan’s civil may increas- war heated up in the 1990s, and they main- Russia and the Russian-led CSTO play an im- tained and expanded facilities such as border portant role in matters of border security and ingly be barracks. As multilateral and western assis- counternarcotics in Tajikistan. At the 2013 coming under tance to Tajikistan increased over the years, CSTO summit in Sochi, officials promised to the final Russian operational guards left the deliver aid to help Tajikistan reinforce its bor- strain as the country in 2005. In the absence of their Rus- der with Afghanistan. This aid includes sur- United States sian counterparts, Tajikistan’s border ser- veillance and signaling equipment as well as vices soon struggled to maintain infrastruc- the construction of new border posts. Russia and Russia are ture and equipment and to adequately staff is also involved in training Tajik border officers at loggerheads the more difficult stretches of border. For the and hosts Central Asian cadets at the border next 10 years, western donors and multilat- college in Moscow. over how to eral institutions tried to pick up the slack. reinforce the Most importantly, Russia is an essential Tajikistan is now the biggest recipient of bor- member of a coordinating body that in- Afghan-Tajik der aid in Central Asia, with Russia, the Unit- cludes all border-aid donors to Tajikistan. border. ed States, European Union, United Nations The Borders International Group (BIG), as Development Program (UNDP), Organiza- the coordination mechanism is known, al- tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe lows border management stakeholders to (OSCE) and International Organization on Mi- meet approximately 10 times a year in order gration (IOM) playing important roles.69 Along to present projects and monitor progress. the Tajik side of the border with Afghanistan, The BIG mechanism prevents the countries the United States has bankrolled the cre- and international organizations that dole out ation of border crossings, customs facilities border aid from needlessly duplicating their and barracks for border services. The United efforts. BIG also plays a critical role ensuring States, in coordination with the EU-funded that Russia’s geopolitical sensitivities in Tajik- Border Management Program for Central istan are taken into consideration. As a result Asia (BOMCA), funded the construction and of their participation in BIG, Russian repre- overhaul of 15 outposts on Tajikistan’s border sentatives have been supportive of interna- with Afghanistan, and it is estimated that an- tional border assistance to Tajikistan, includ- other 20 may be needed to adequately house ing aid sponsored by the United States. As a guards. In recent years, border aid sponsors former EU ambassador who was part of BIG turned their attention to the training needs explained, “Russia always gave consistent of Tajik border and customs officials, and -Du support and, at our meetings, the secretary shanbe now hosts several training facilities would often just cut and paste the Russian funded and supported by the international statement from the prior meeting.”71 community. Before the Ukraine crisis, Rus- sian and U.S. officials had worked together to Unfortunately, the cooperative spirit that pre- craft a curriculum at one of the training cen- vailed in previous years may increasingly be ters. coming under strain as the United States and THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE Russia are at loggerheads over how to rein- Tajikistan also hosts the largest U.S. Depart- force the Afghan-Tajik border. Russia desires 22 ment of State Bureau of International Nar- expanded bilateral military cooperation with cotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Tajikistan, and this has included an offer to program in Central Asia, which supports Ta- once again dispatch Russian guards to Ta- jikistan’s Drug Control Agency (DCA). The jikistan.72 This offer was opposed in 2012 and INL project in Tajikistan “supplements sala- 2013 by U.S. officials who pressed instead ries for DCA personnel, provides training and for a continued multilateral approach that - - - THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS - 23 - Uzbek authori Uzbek consider ties an exclusive national secu purview. rity Despite its its Despite coun resolute ternarcotics stance, is Uzbekistan on lukewarm international counternarcot initiatives, ics particularly when they training require and institution that al reforms ------76

80 Instead, Instead, 79 At the same time, there there time, the same At 77 78 technology and equipment transfers. technology strategy control border overall Uzbekistan’s follow. to the region not be a model for may focusing and selective, is costly The strategy while and interdiction on enforcement mostly and drug control of neglecting other aspects authorities While Uzbek counternarcotics. estimated of a much higher proportion seize is evidence that Uzbek authorities are col are authorities that Uzbek is evidence As not with trafficking. level luding at some in 2010, Tashkent in Embassy the U.S. ed by a sustained to obstacles the principal of “One of is the presence strategy counternarcotics the officials throughout corrupt numerous en law of Salaries system. counternarcotics and low, very generally are officers forcement and customs of accounts anecdotal are there officials supplementing their incomes border ship narcotics ignore to bribes accepting by of government some that likely is It ments. trafficking with narcotics involved ficials are organizations.” stance, counternarcotics resolute its Despite on international lukewarm is Uzbekistan particularly initiatives, counternarcotics and institutional training require when they an consider authorities that Uzbek reforms purview. security national exclusive in bilat engage to prefer authorities Uzbek the that allow arrangements cooperative eral obliga few and flexibility maximum country part take to likely more are and they tions, of in the form comes when the assistance fair share to guard the border and argue that argue and the border guard to share fair the bor police to Uzbekistan this compels deficit. the up for make to der aggressively include the in measures unilateral These border of official of a number closure definite society civil officials and Tajik and crossings, the point out that this impedes organizations off cut populations who are local of livelihood on the other and family jobs markets, from border. the side of use now increasingly networks Trafficking Asia’s Central from heroin smuggle to trains re More Russia. to onwards regions border changing tactics revealed have seizures cent it inside such as packaging heroin, move to on shipments aluminum and concrete cotton, through Tajikistan from moving trains cargo of eight kilograms June 2012, In Uzbekistan. Tash in discovered reportedly were heroin to Dushanbe from transiting train on a kent in a had been stashed the heroin Moscow; gas tank. liquefied ------74 Although crossings along Although crossings 73 Uzbek authorities complain complain authorities Uzbek 75 that Tajik border authorities do not do their authorities border Tajik that Uzbekistan’s heroin seizures along this bor seizures heroin Uzbekistan’s the along or near higher than those der are border. Afghan Traffickers bring Afghan opiates into Uzbeki into Afghan opiates bring Traffickers Tajik-Uzbek well-guarded along the less stan that indicate and UNODC reports border, deterrent to traffickers, but it also hampers hampers but it also traffickers, to deterrent to goods export to Afghanistan of the ability and beyond. Asia in Central markets sage of Afghan goods and people. As working working As and people. goods Afghan of sage this notes, Safranchuk member Ivan group is an effective regime border highly restrictive Distribution Network, which supplied U.S. which supplied U.S. Network, Distribution Afghanistan, in mission the ISAF and forces the pas to been closed generally have they electric fences, mines and heavily armed sol and heavily mines electric fences, watch. keep diers the Northern been open to have this border Uzbekistan’s border security measures are are measures security border Uzbekistan’s 137-kilometer along the intense at their most of a series where Afghanistan, with border Uzbekistan’s Border Uzbekistan’s with Afghanistan on exerting more direct influence over Tajiki over influence direct more on exerting Afghanistan. with border stan’s ary, then the results will be dire for the Rus for dire will be then the results ary, In this sce on drugs. war sian Federation’s insist to likely very are officials Russian nario, enters the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). If Union (EEU). Economic the Eurasian enters and capacity its not increase does Tajikistan its before fight the drug trade to willingness bound external the EEU’s become borders ficking networks that transit their borders their borders that transit ficking networks problem will only The trafficking and territory. Tajikistan once particularly in the future, grow of the generous border security and counter and security border the generous of and to receiving are they assistance narcotics the traf to approach permissive a less take comes to counternarcotics and border secu and border counternarcotics to comes will that prevails The tension Tajikistan. in rity more to make officials Tajik push do little to in Tajikistan. in Tajikistan. do States and the United Russia time, this At when it voice with a coordinated not speak will coordinate key issues of border security, security, border of issues key will coordinate future for well bode not does episode the but cooperation counternarcotics U.S.-Russian saw U.S. opposition as an attempt to limit to an attempt as opposition U.S. saw compro A Tajikistan. in influence Moscow’s that the OSCE reached eventually was mise would dilute Russia’s role. According to work to According role. Russia’s dilute would Russia Safranchuk, member Ivan ing group The United States and Russia may have an opportunity to work together trafficked narcotics than neighboring Tajiki- consequences of narcotrafficking along this to encourage stan and Turkmenistan, seizure statistics do border are currently greater for Iran and Eu- Uzbekistan not always provide a clear picture on the effi- rope than for the Russian Federation. Sec- cacy of Uzbek efforts. Although Uzbekistan’s ond, Turkmenistan’s border control policies to modify its heroin seizures rose an appreciable 25 per- are in line with its flexible and neutral ap- strategy of cent in 2010,81 these seizures dropped pre- proach to Afghanistan. Turkmen officials have cipitously in 2012.82 It remains unclear if the engaged with Afghanistan’s key political play- closure so decline in seizures is attributable to growing ers across the border—both incumbents and that its border collusion, more effective smuggling tactics or insurgents. Although this approach leads to a if it is a sign that border controls are dissuad- more flexible and open economic border, the management ing traffickers from smuggling across Uzbeki- downside is that the border has enabled the system stan’s borders. Furthermore, closed borders growth of trafficking via the Balkan Route. imply a lost opportunity for Afghan business increasingly and exports at a time of great fragility for Af- Between 1992 and 1999, Turkmenistan’s bor- incorporates ghanistan’s economy. ders with Iran and Afghanistan were jointly guarded by Turkmen and Russian border risk manage- The United States and Russia may have an guard contingents. This was not a unique ar- ment and opportunity to work together to encourage rangement; Russia maintained similar opera- Uzbekistan to modify its strategy of closure tional contingents along Uzbekistan’s and Ta- smart detec- so that its border management system in- jikistan’s borders with Afghanistan in order to tion principles. creasingly incorporates risk management protect what was until recently the external and smart detection principles. One way may border of the Soviet Union. Turkmen authori- be to offer a much more expanded array of ties—particularly then President Saparmurat technical and equipment assistance on the Niyazov and his circle of advisers—became condition that Uzbek authorities take part in confident that proximity to Afghanistan was more training and revamp their border con- as much an opportunity as it was a threat, trol strategy as necessary. However, if the and they pressured Moscow to reduce its security situation in Afghanistan continues to border guards. Russia incrementally reduced erode, Uzbekistan will double-down on what its 3,000-strong border guard force in Turk- it knows best—a policy of closure—and one menistan, and the final 200 guards were re- that seems to give better results in stemming moved in late 1999. Niyazov believed that the flow of drugs. while the USSR and Russia may have faced problems with Afghanistan, an independent Turkmenistan could safely do business with Turkmenistan’s Border any and all Afghan authorities.84 At the same with Afghanistan time, narcotrafficking across Turkmenistan had increased with indications that state offi- Turkmenistan is an exceptional case when cials were colluding to protect and profit from it comes to Afghanistan and the trafficking trafficking.85 of narcotics. First, it is a minor player in the

THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE Northern Route but a major hub for the so- Turkmenistan’s economic and political influ- called Balkan route. As EWI’s Joint Threat ence in Afghanistan grew during the Karzai 24 Assessment notes, “Thanks to its unique po- administration. As Sébastien Peyrouse notes, sition and sizeable borders with both Afghan- Turkmenistan became “an important part- istan and Iran, Turkmenistan has evolved as ner for the Afghan border regions of Herat, an important subsidiary branch of the major Badghis, Faryab and Jowzjan, and offers sub- westward trafficking corridor from Afghani- stantial financial and technical assistance stan to Iran and onwards [to Europe].”83 The to the Turkmen minorities in Afghanistan.”86 - THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 25 - pates only pates in cosmetically international programs. Despite Despite Turkmenistan’s public more counternarcot posture, ics international officials and aid border sponsors that complain Turkmenistan partici still ------92 The upside is The upside 93 UN officials have of have UN officials 91 90 border security policies and the first part of part and the first policies security border be may Turkmenistan that indicates 2015 not un closure, of a policy towards moving neighboring Uzbekistan. like find them may and Moscow Washington that assist to an opportunity of more having selves and security border improve to Turkmenistan along the border. efforts counternarcotics with U.S. military officials in 2010, the head head the 2010, military officials in with U.S. de Services Border State Turkmenistan’s of citing exercises, in joint participate to clined authorities. Afghan of weakness the appalling to deliver officials U.S. he pressed Instead, such as scanners equipment, high-tech more optics. and long-range continue authorities Turkmen that noted ten to respond to failing distance, their keep to program up at not showing official letters, with in meetings cancelling and even events representa management border ternational or warning. without reason tives Afghanistan towards policies Turkmenistan’s being currently are border and the common situation along security the 2013, By tested. officials Turkmen severely. eroded border the communication of channels their deployed insurgents administration, the Karzai with sta of a semblance restore to and warlords stumbled, have to appear efforts These bility. the reinforce to authorities Turkmen leading If the security with additional guards. border along the bound erode to situation continues its reevaluate to will have Turkmenistan ary, provinces do not achieve good results, I am results, good do not achieve provinces If consequences. face will they that warning meeting even action, decisive take do not you will not quotas harvest or grain cotton your you.” excuse public coun more Turkmenistan’s Despite officials international posture, ternarcotics Turk that complain sponsors aid border and only cosmetically participates still menistan authori Turkmen programs. in international take to reluctant been generally have ties with exercises training joint sustained in part meeting one extended In authorities. Afghan ------87 88 89 ing apprehended drug smugglers on news on news smugglers drug ing apprehended Berdimuhamedow and President programs, to improve officials on notice put provincial of governors “If the efforts: counternarcotics sistance. parad media was Turkmenistan’s 2010, By its operations in Turkmenistan and noted that and noted Turkmenistan in operations its Control Drug Turkmen established the newly as international more in need of was Agency ternarcotics capacity. In February 2010, the 2010, In February capacity. ternarcotics FSKN’s met with operations of chief DEA’s on FSKN brief to in Moscow director deputy menistan’s counternarcotics and border con border and counternarcotics menistan’s officials U.S. and Russian and agencies, trol enhance might they how discussed in 2010 coun Turkmenistan’s benefit to cooperation Russia and the United States had contribut had States United the and Russia Turk to assistance and technical ed training on Narcotic Drugs praised Turkmenistan in Turkmenistan praised Drugs on Narcotic a lead “has taken the country saying 2008, issue.” the in addressing ing role units along borders and strengthening inter and strengthening along borders units with cooperation and cross-border agency The UN Commission and Iran. Afghanistan ghanistan and Iran. The goals of the initiative the initiative of The goals and Iran. ghanistan agency, a drug control included establishing mobile through rates interception increasing latter’s death in 2006. In 2008, Turkmenistan Turkmenistan In 2008, in 2006. death latter’s Border Turkmen the to agreed UNODC and of the threat address to designed Initiative, Af with along the borders drug trafficking narcotics policies saw some nominal chang some saw policies narcotics Berdimu Gurbanguly under President es the after Niyazov who succeeded hamedow, creative form of border management. border of form creative and counter security border Turkmenistan’s of dialogue to offer the Taliban food, clothing food, Taliban the offer to dialogue of into further move to vehicles their for gas and the frontier—a from and away Afghanistan with both the government in Kabul and the Kabul in the government with both uncomfort got forces Taliban When Taliban. Turkmenistan with border the to ably close their lines used authorities Turkmen in 2007, Turkmenistan’s self-professed principle of principle of self-professed Turkmenistan’s engage it to allowed neutrality international Conclusion and Recommendations

Improving the fghanistan’s opium economy and ex- instability and militancy into Central Asia in ability of Af- ports are undoubtedly a source of the years ahead. As working group member ghanistan and Agrave and mutual concern for the Rus- Ekaterina Stepanova notes, the main impli- sian Federation and the United States. For cations of the withdrawal of U.S. forces for its neighbors Russia, Afghan heroin has created a domes- Russia “are not in Afghanistan, but in Central to interdict tic addiction crisis with worrying effects on Asia,”95 especially in states like Kyrgyzstan public health and law enforcement. For the and Tajikistan.96 Accordingly, Moscow strong- drugs at their United States, the growing drug trade threat- ly prefers a division of labor where Russia borders is of ens to upend more than a decade of costly in- takes the lead in Central Asia while the United vestment in Afghanistan’s state and society, States doubles up its counternarcotics ef- mutual benefit a concern that centrally features in a Decem- forts in Afghanistan, which Russia considers to Moscow and ber 2014 report of the U.S. Senate Caucus on geopolitically part of South Asia. International Narcotics Control.94 As such, Washington. improving the ability of Afghanistan and its The United States is unlikely to agree outright neighbors to interdict drugs at their borders to such a division of labor. Even as American is of mutual benefit to Moscow and Washing- foreign policy pivots to East Asia, the United ton. States has strategic interests in Central Asia, and policymakers in Washington will not limit Yet, cooperation between the United States their ability to respond to future global se- and Russia may not come easily even when curity threats that may emerge in or around confronting a common threat. Fallout from Afghanistan. As working group member Mar- the Ukraine crisis has damaged the bilateral lene Laruelle notes, the basis of U.S. foreign relationship to an extent that will take years policy in the region is to offer the Central to repair. The quality of communications be- Asian states enough room to maneuver and tween Russian and U.S. officials has deterio- maintain strategic autonomy from Moscow, rated sharply, making it difficult to cooperate autonomy that allows the United States to over common aversions such as Afghan opi- preserve its own influence.97 ates and heroin. Indeed, complicating any cooperation is the reality that the U.S. gov- These geopolitical considerations do not ernment’s list of sanctioned Russian citizens preclude cooperation over counternarcotics includes FSKN head Viktor Ivanov, a key offi- and border control. But any cooperation to cial in the fight against narcotrafficking. Any improve the functioning and interdiction ca- future cooperation over Afghanistan will take pacity of the borders around Afghanistan will place against a diplomatic backdrop that can- require taking such sensitivities into account. not be undone.

This period of heightened diplomatic and Recommendations geopolitical sensitivities makes U.S.-Rus-

THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE What can Russia and the United States do sian cooperation in Central Asia particularly cooperatively to fight narcotrafficking at- Af thorny. As several Russian members of the ghanistan’s borders? Mindful of the other- 26 working group pointed out, Russia is wary of wise difficult period in U.S.-Russia relations, any attempt by the United States to use coun- the working group proposes the following ternarcotics as a pretext for an expanded se- recommendations as a way for Russian and curity presence in Central Asia. This wariness U.S. policymakers to further cooperate jointly is on par with Russia’s desire to avoid an in- and durably to strengthen the borders around creased inflow of narcotics or a spill-over of Afghanistan against the drug trade. THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 27 - - - into the coun into emerging try’s control border strategy. Russian and Russian policy U.S. should makers encourage Afghanistan integrate to counternar and cotics anti-corruption aggressively

------99 Wash Central Asian states, like Ta like states, Asian Central Tajikistan, they should relentlessly pressure pressure should relentlessly they Tajikistan, stance concerted a more to take officials Tajik in fighting trafficking. of stretches to improve together Work that do not function well. borders to Tajikistan on call can and Moscow ington contribution a greater make to Russia allow of their side strengthen officials Tajik help to international stakeholders or material incen or material stakeholders international States and the United Russia Together, tives. to open a dialogue heft sufficient have may bor expand to pledge A resolution. towards further nudge can assistance der security dialogue. into and Pakistan Afghanistan improved greatly its use should also Russia the country cajole to with Pakistan relations front, on the counternarcotics more do to along the border. particularly in matters voice with a common Speak security border and counternarcotics of and demand Asia and South in Central up to the officials live Asian that Central and the counternarcotics of obligations that they assistance management border received. have assistance adeptly collected have jikistan, often and Russia, States the United from have they Yet the other. against one playing narcot of in the interdiction strides made few collusion along their or in fighting official ics should and Moscow Washington borders. lead Asian Central to their messages convey of In the case fashion. in a coordinated ers a source of dispute and escalation between between and escalation dispute of a source conducive This is not Islamabad. and Kabul joint and makes cooperation cross-border to the border at operations counternarcotics is a long-term settled boundary A difficult. Wash and Moscow but process, and difficult to opportunity any should not lose ington mutu to Pakistan and Afghanistan for call Previ frontier. affix their and recognize ally in failed resolution at political ous attempts enough involve not did they because part

------Although The Durand The Durand Line remains formally unrecognized and is unrecognized formally Line remains Push Afghanistan and Pakistan to final and Pakistan Afghanistan Push their frontier. of the status ize calls for enhanced Afghan-Iranian coopera Afghan-Iranian enhanced for calls Afghan in encouraging a long way go tion can pick up the slack. to istan play, a position that made it easier for Afghan Afghan for that made it easier a position play, counternarcot to neglect truly deep officials U.S.-Russian Joint with Iran. cooperation ics greater role in interdiction along the common along the common in interdiction role greater dis States the United years, many For border. partic cooperation, Afghan-Iranian couraged in were initiatives funds and U.S. ularly where do. Nonetheless, U.S. officials can encourage can encourage officials U.S. Nonetheless, do. cooperation their to deepen officials Afghan a and play counterparts with their Iranian does not have a relationship with the Iranian with the Iranian a relationship not have does counter enforcement or law government and FSKN Federation as the Russian parts across Iran towards Europe and across the the across and Europe towards Iran across In of the Commonwealth to Caspian Sea States United The (CIS). States dependent Iran has mounted an impressive fight against fight against an impressive has mounted Iran the stem it is not enough to counternarcotics, tide that moves opium and heroin massive Encourage Afghanistan to cooperate more more to cooperate Afghanistan Encourage interdiction improve to Iran with actively border. Afghan-Iranian along the ghanistan to integrate counternarcotics and counternarcotics integrate to ghanistan the coun into aggressively anti-corruption strategy. control border emerging try’s goes for future U.S. and Russian assistance assistance Russian and U.S. future for goes Russian specifically, More Afghanistan.98 to Af should encourage policymakers and U.S. tives, and no Afghan ministry should adopt a adopt should ministry Afghan no and tives, possible its out spelling first without program same The counternarcotics. for implications President Ghani revised his national priorities priorities national his revised Ghani President London the after counternarcotics include to Coun step. a first but this is only Conference, all initia into be infused must ternarcotics Push Afghanistan’s government to be government Afghanistan’s Push to comes it when reactive, not proactive, and initiatives. strategy counternarcotics the border with Uzbekistan, whether by pro- reality, the United States would have to be viding mentors for border guard contingents, invited to full membership. In previous years, ramping up training or simply providing more FSKN officials made statements of support technical and operational equipment. This in that regard, but in the current diplomatic may reduce drug trafficking along that bor- environment there is likely to be little politi- der and build on the cooperative spirit of the cal support in Moscow to upgrade the United Borders International Group in Dushanbe. States from its observer position. Russian and It would also benefit security along the Tajik side of the Uzbek border and allow the United Jointly expand multilateral training of U.S. officials States to ask Uzbekistan to reconsider its Central Asian and Afghan border police, should agree policy of closure and militarization. customs authorities and counternarcotics officers. Before the crisis in their relations, to not let the At the same time, U.S. and Russian officials Russia and the United States set a quiet prec- bilateral crisis must come up with common standards by edent of working together, albeit in a limited which to measure improvements in border fashion, to train Central Asian border officials. in their rela- management and interdiction rates along Joint U.S.-Russian training initiatives have tions affect key stretches of border, like the Afghan-Tajik reached limited numbers of border authori- border. Making the OSCE the key coordinat- ties and could be expanded extensively. While cooperation ing body for border control assistance in capacity and training gaps will not resolve the across their Tajikistan may have been an expedient com- political impediments identified in this report, promise, but the United States and Russia such training programs will send an impor- agencies in the should be open to changing the method and tant signal that the international community field in Cen- substance of security assistance if the coun- is not abandoning Afghanistan and its Central try does not achieve desired results against Asian neighbors to their own devices in mat- tral and South narcotics trafficking. This means that U.S. ters of border control and counternarcotics. Asia. officials should be, at least in principle, cau- tiously open to Russia playing a greater role Deepen formal and informal cooperation along Tajikistan’s borders in the future. across the FSKN and DEA field offices in Afghanistan and Central Asia. In order to Establish joint positions on counternar- mount a better counternarcotics fight along cotics and border control at international Afghanistan’s borders, FSKN and DEA must bodies where these issues are discussed, interact more with one another formally and such as the Central Asian Regional Informa- informally. Russian and U.S. officials should tion and Coordination Centre (CARICC), agree to not let the bilateral crisis in their re- whose purpose is to facilitate information lations affect cooperation across their agen- exchange and coordination of operational cies in the field in Central and South Asia, activities in Central Asia’s law enforcement even if such cooperation remains limited and agencies, including those in customs, border informal for the short term. services and drug control. For this to become THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE

28 THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 29 on the railway in Hairatan border border in Hairatan on the railway northern in Balkh province, town 2014. 4, Nov. Afghanistan, Afghan policemen keep watch watch keep policemen Afghan ENDNOTES

1 David Mansfield and Paul Fishstein, “Eyes Wide Shut: Counter-Narcotics in Transition” (Ka- bul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, September 2013), 2. 2 Although Afghanistan shares a 76-kilometer-long boundary with China, this report does not include an assessment of that border. The Afghanistan-China border is remote, mountainous and virtually impassable for much of the year. Small quantities of opiates are moved across the border during the short period when the snows are melting. Afghan opiates and heroin are trafficked in much larger quantities to China via Pakistan and Tajikistan, and Chinese precur- sor chemicals that are used to refine opium into heroin make their way into Afghanistan over the same routes. 3 This is an increase from the previous year when UNODC reported that Afghanistan ac- counted for 74 percent of global illicit opium production. See UNODC, World Drug Report 2013 (United Nations Publication, 2013). EWI’s Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment noted that as much as 92 percent of opiates were being trafficked out of the country. 4 Afghan authorities reported in 2012 and 2013 that over 10,000 liters of acetic anhydrate were seized in provinces adjoining the border with Pakistan and in Kabul. 5 By comparison, Afghanistan’s counternarcotics police accounted for 89 percent and na- tional police for 7 percent of total drug seizures in Afghanistan in 2013. These figures were provided to EWI by Afghan officials. 6 Ekaterina Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, Joint U.S.- Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking (New York: EastWest Institute, 2013), 13. 7 Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, 30. 8 This point was made by Nikolai Patrushev, the chief of Russia’s Security Council. See “Drug Use Losses Equal Health Budget,” RIA Novosti, February 25, 2013. 9 Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, 9. 10 The purchase has hit opposition in Congress despite its backing by the U.S. Pentagon. See “Dunford urges Congress to approve Russian helicopter deal for Afghan air force,” Stars and Stripes, July 17, 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/us/dunford-urges-congress-to-ap- prove-russian-helicopter-deal-for-afghan-air-force-1.293927. 11 On the role of warlords in the Afghan political economy—licit or otherwise—see Dipali Muk- hopadhyay, Warlords, Strongman Governors, and State Building in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Jonathan Goodhand, “Frontier Wars: The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” Journal of Agrarian Change 5 (2005): 191-216; Kimberly Marten, “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,” International Security 31 (2007): 41-73; and Barnett Rubin, “Sav- ing Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 57-78. 12 On Afghanistan’s provincial political and security dynamics in the Soviet and other periods, see Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (New York: Colum-

THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE bia University Press, 2009). 13 The Rainbow Initiative is rooted in the Paris Pact, a multilateral counternarcotics effort 30 initiated in 2003. 14 One example of this aid was the Focused Border Development Program, which was a train- ing operation for Afghan Border Police. This program was funded by the United States and run by the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The U.S. De- partment of Defense and Homeland Security also bankrolled Joint Border Command Centers (JBCCs) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to enable authorities and security officials THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 31 ------In The Assess Indepen (Alexandria: Center for Naval Naval for Center (Alexandria: , 27, 99-100. 27, , , 100-102. , , 100-102. , Independent Assessment Independent Assessment Independent Assessment , 106. , November 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/world/asia/pow 2014, 8, November , (Alexandria: Department of Defense Inspector General, 2013), 47. 2013), General, Inspector Defense of Department (Alexandria: tate cross-border cooperation that can generate increased trade flows in this region. Border Border region. this in flows trade increased generate can that cooperation cross-border tate infrastructure for being studied projects of not on the list presently are with Iran crossings improvements. “The Good and Gavrilis, George see along drug routes, and appointments corruption 28 On istan-Tajikistan border, the Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border, the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Afghanistan-Uzbekistan the border, Afghanistan-Turkmenistan the border, istan-Tajikistan Afghanistan-Pakistan along the crossings Wesh-Chaman and Torkham as the as well border facili to and how checkpoints border at these what is working understand better to border New York Timeserful-afghan-police-chief-puts-fear-in-taliban-and-their-enemies-.html?_r=0. Afghan along the checkpoints is looking at border State of Department States The United 27 25 According to an international development official who provided this information to a this information provided official who development an international to According 25 or both. or traffickers insurgents were if the attackers it is not clear member, group working Their Enemies,” and Taliban in Fear Puts Chief Police Afghan “Powerful Walsh, 26 Declan Police officials. Afghan by EWI to provided were figures These 23 suffered have agents drug control Iranian where the border of this is one area Reportedly, 24 heavy losses. the 450 officers and non-commissioned officers who comprise the ABP intelligence commu intelligence ABP the comprise who officers and non-commissioned the 450 officers General, Inspector Defense of Department U.S. See trained. properly been had nity ment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts toTrain, Equip, and Advise the Afghan Border 21 Schroden et al., et al., 21 Schroden United the of General Inspector the by conducted was ABP on the report An extensive 22 of that only 75 notes the report gaps, intelligence-training On Defense. of Department States dent Assessment the to adjacent zone in a 50-kilometer conducted are missions security border “Green” 20 et al., Schroden See border. 19 As the CNA report finds, “ISAF personnel examined satellite imagery of the Afghanistan- the of imagery satellite examined personnel “ISAF finds, report CNA the As 19 as 2 times 1.5 to side had approximately that the Pakistani and estimated border Pakistan et al., Schroden From at that time.” planning was Afghanistan as posts border many Congress and written by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA): Jonathan Schroden et al., et al., Jonathan Schroden (CNA): Analyses Naval for the Center by and written Congress dependent Assessment 100. 2014), Analyses, of the et al., 18 Schroden Afghan National Security Forces 17 To give another number for comparison, Afghanistan has more Kabul-based national se national Kabul-based has more Afghanistan comparison, another number for give To 17 See and 23,900). 26,000 (respectively country the entire for police than border forces curity the U.S. by (ANSF) mandated Forces Security National Afghanistan’s on report an extensive quality in border provinces deteriorated hand-in-hand with security, trainees had to be flown be flown had to trainees hand-in-hand with security, deteriorated provinces in border quality the sponsoring countries European and States the United required The flights Kabul. into costs. the transportation for pay and find aircrafts to training 15 The author George Gavrilis’s conversation with the Deputy Commander of the Provincial Provincial the of Commander Deputy the with conversation Gavrilis’s George author The 15 2009. March Sharif, Mazar-e Team, Reconstruction road As logistics. transportation concerned Police Border Afghan in training hurdle One 16 from both countries to manage migration and trade and filter out security threats like insur like threats security out filter and trade and migration manage to countries both from smugglers. narcotics and gents Bad News about Afghan Opium,” CFR Expert Brief, February 10, 2010. Comments about the Ministry of Interior and border commanders amassing great wealth were made to the author in February 2014 by a European official who served in close proximity to the ministry over a three-year period. On corruption among customs and border services, also see U.S. Depart- ment of Defense Inspector General, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts. The assessment notes that Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Interior have joint responsibility over the Afghan Customs Police (ACP), with Interior having key oversight responsibility. In reality, the division of labor does not function well. Many positions in the cus- toms services were filled with border police who have little requisite training and oversight. This has promoted corruption. According to the assessment, “An ACP customs officer at the Torkham customs yard was recently relieved of his duties for allegedly skimming more than $20,000 in customs revenue each week for himself and others.” From U.S. Department of De- fense Inspector General, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts, 27. 29 Najibullah Gulabzoi, “The Narco-State of Afghanistan: Deconstructing the Nexus between Drug Trafficking and National Security,”The Diplomat, February 12, 2015. 30 Ernesto Londoño, “As US Withdraws from Afghanistan, Poppy Trade It Spent Billions Fight- ing Flourishes,” The Washington Post, November 3, 2013. EWI’s Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment noted that—despite assertions to the contrary by journalists and some policymakers—the Taliban controls a minority share of the opiate and drug trade. A re- cent U.S. government-funded assessment is more open-ended on the matter, stating, “Some argue that the drug trade is a major driver of the insurgency, especially in the south. There is, however, no consensus on the degree to which this is the case, or on whether the ANSF could in any capacity significantly alter this dynamic.” From Schroden et al.,Independent Assess- ment, 44. 31 Also taking part in the raid was the U.S. Department of Defense, NATO and Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior. FSKN head Viktor Ivanov noted that “this is the first operation in Afghani- stan in which Russian drug police officers took part,” but stressed that Russian officers were there in agreement with Afghanistan and not as a military unit. Despite this, the participation of Russian agents in the high-profile raid hit raw nerves in Afghanistan. Afghan officials criti- cized their presence, alleging that they were unaware of Russian participation. From Matthew Chance and Paul Armstrong, “Russian Anti-Drug Chief Applauds Afghan Heroin Haul,” CNN. com, October 30, 2010; and Joshua Partlow, “Karzai Condemns Russian Involvement in Af- ghan Drug Bust,” The Washington Post, October 30, 2010. 32 “12-14 декабря 2012 года проходил визит председателя Государственного антинаркотического комитета, директора ФСКН России Виктора Иванова в США,” Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation, December 14, 2014, http://fskn.gov.ru/includes/periodics/events_ all/2012/1214/113521704/detail.shtml. 33 “Russia, US Help Destroy More Drug Laboratories in Afghanistan (part 3),” Interfax, May 30, 2013, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?pg=7&id=420089. 34 Working group member Ivan Safranchuk notes that it may be more accurate to call the October 2010 operation a U.S. operation with Russian/FSKN participation, rather than a fully joint one. 35 There were at least two reasons for Karzai’s opposition. First, the operations disrupted the drug laboratories and routes run by key Afghan players with political clout. Second, the operations did not sit well with large segments of the Afghan population who disliked seeing two powers with a legacy of invading and intervening in Afghanistan banding together to chase down Afghans—criminals or otherwise. 36 Ekaterina Stepanova, “Russia’s Concerns Relating to Afghanistan and the Broader Region in the Context of the US/NATO Withdrawal,” CIDOB Policy Research Project, June 2013, 6. 37 “CSTO Forces Deployed along Tajik-Afghan Border to Be Reinforced in 2014,” Voice of Rus- THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE sia, November 14, 2013. 38 It should be noted that Iran’s official statistics differentiate between seizures of opium, 32 heroin and morphine base. For the sake of streamlined illustration, opium and heroin seizure statistics are presented here in combined form. 39 Statistics show that Iran accounts for the highest rate of opium and heroin seizures glob- ally. According to the UNODC’s World Drug Report 2013, Iran accounted for 80 percent of global opium seizures and 30 percent of heroin seizures in 2011. See “Iran Deserving More Int’l Support in Anti-Drug Campaign,” UNODC (from Fars News Agency), December 1, 2014, THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 33 ------World , November 1, 2007. 1, November , , EastWest Institute, 2001. 2001. Institute, EastWest , , 211- 212. 211- , The American Interest indicates that Iran’s aggressive counternarcotics ef counternarcotics aggressive that Iran’s indicates Recognizing the Durand Line , (UNODC, 2012), 53. It is important to note that Iran’s border policing border that Iran’s note to It is important 53. 2012), (UNODC, , Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia: Independent Assessment , 33. It is also worth noting that although other countries in the region regis in the region although other countries noting that worth It is also 33. , World Drug Report 2013 54 “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” U.S. Department of State Bureau for In for Bureau State of Department U.S. Report,” Strategy Control Narcotics “International 54 52 Ronald Neumann, “Borderline Insanity,” Insanity,” “Borderline Neumann, 52 Ronald http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country-profile. UNODC, Profile,” Country “Pakistan 53 html. 51 On the history of the Durand Line, its political consequences and the need to resolve its its resolve and the need to consequences political its Line, the Durand of the history 51 On In for Center The Hollings and Future,” Consequences Line: History, “The Durand see status, see Also 2007. Dialogue, ternational offenses.” From “Iran: Donors Should Reassess Anti-Drug Funding,” Human Rights Watch, Watch, Human Rights Funding,” Anti-Drug Reassess Should Donors “Iran: From offenses.” http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/21/iran-donors-should-reassess-anti- 2012, 21, August drug-funding. et al., 50 Schroden ing for personal use. According to Amnesty International, in 2009, of the 389 executions re executions the 389 of in 2009, International, Amnesty to According use. personal ing for all execu of about 68 percent In 2010, drug-related. 43 percent—were 166—almost corded, drug-related for executions—were the 253 known of the organization—172 by tions recorded discussion by Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of Iran, New York, NY, September 26, 2013). 26, September NY, York, New Iran, of President Rouhani, Hassan Dr. by discussion second 600 people, at least executed Iran “In 2011, Watch: Human Rights to According 49 includ crimes, drug-related for were executions these of percent Eighty-one China. only to guards has always lose their lives and become martyrs and are killed as a result of fighting the of killed as a result and are martyrs and become their lives lose has always guards President Iran’s “Video: Rouhani, Hassan From illicit drugs.” of the transfer phenomenon of and remarks (presentation, Issue,” Nuclear in Resolving the Better’ ‘Sooner Society Asia Tells comes from inside Afghanistan itself. The governments that can, must, inside Afghanistan, Afghanistan, inside must, can, that governments The itself. Afghanistan inside from comes but area, this in program clear no is there therefore And drugs. illicit of production the halt countries with the different relationship cooperative in a continual are we time, at the same our border of a group Annually, us. for issue an internal also it’s know And you on this issue. the world. And we have been always cooperating with international organizations and regional and regional organizations with international cooperating been always have And we the world. If a gov curtail it. [trying] to on this issue countries of in the group and we’re organizations, help The first of helping in this process. ways different are there truly, help, to ernment wants 48 President Rouhani made remarks on the issue at an Asia Society event on September 26, 26, September on event Society Asia an at issue the on remarks made Rouhani President 48 the “The principle of stated, Rouhani Firestein, David EWI’s by a question to In response 2013. region and to the entire serious threat a is that it poses Afghanistan from that flow illicit drugs 46 “UNODC Rainbow Strategy: A Regional Solution to a National Challenge,” UNODC, 2007. UNODC, a National Challenge,” to Solution Regional A Strategy: “UNODC Rainbow 46 http://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublico UNODC, 2011-2014,” Program Country “UNODC 47 firan/en/country-programme-sub-prog1.html. tion rate have been far smaller than in Central Asia. See UNODC Statistics Online, https:// Online, UNODC Statistics See Asia. smaller than in Central been far have tion rate data.unodc.org. Nations. at the United experience member’s group on a working 45 Based 44 UNODC’s 44 UNODC’s See UNODC, using. been have they routes rethink the to traffickers causing are forts Drug Report in the interdic high and drops remain rates seizure Iran’s 2013 falls, interdiction substantial tered punishment is often carried out by hanging. In a recent instance, officials decided not to re to decided not officials instance, In a recent hanging. out by carried punishment is often Says No “Iran Minister See attempt. hanging first the who survived trafficker hang a convicted 2013. 23, October Jazeera, Al Convict,” Re-Hang Need to ary 29, 2014, http://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/drug-trafficking-and-border-con 2014, ary 29, trol.html. The to drug traffickers. sentences include doling out death efforts counternarcotics 43 Iran’s pharmaceuticals. nar against fight the in officials 3,700 lost has country the that indicate sources UNODC 42 Janu accessed UNODC, Analysis,” Situation Control And Border Trafficking “Drug See cotics. A Threat Assessment border perceived country’s The drug trade. the countering at solely directed not are efforts as as well banditry cross-border Afghanistan, from migration include illegal threats security into narcotics seized some converts Iran noting that worth also It is and terrorism. insurgency 40 UNODC Crime Statistics Online, https://data.unodc.org. https://data.unodc.org. Online, Crime Statistics 40 UNODC according Zaranj, and Qala Islam of area the in borders the fortified has particularly Iran 41 report: UNODC the http://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/en/iran-deserving-more-intl-support-in-anti- drug-campaign.html. ternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2014, http://www.state.gov/docu- ments/organization/222881.pdf. 55 According to the World Trade Organization, half of Afghanistan’s exports in 2012 moved across the Durand Line, destined for markets in Pakistan and other countries. This large vol- ume of trade also complicates narcotics and precursor interdiction, as illicit material can be smuggled inside shipments of otherwise licit goods. See UNODC, Misuse of Licit Trade, 28. 56 UNODC, Misuse of Licit Trade, 29. 57 Reports show that as much as 70 percent of potential border revenue may be lost due to corruption. Following a site visit to Torkham and Wesh-Chaman, a U.S. Department of Defense team of expert evaluators noted that “the two largest and busiest border crossings in Afghani- stan…generate the majority of the country’s approximately $1 billion in customs revenue. Co- alition advisors at Torkham and Wesh-Chaman agreed that two to three times the amount of customs revenue actually collected for the Afghan government was probably lost to corrup- tion.” From U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts, 26. 58 Hafizullah Gardesh, “Afghans Say Pakistan behind Cross-border Fire,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting-Afghanistan, July 11, 2012, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/afghans-say- pakistan-behind-cross-border-fire. 59 Schroden et al., Independent Assessment, 216. 60 According to Schroden et al., Independent Assessment, 209: “Pakistan has deployed an estimated 158,000 soldiers (including Frontier Corps forces and army) to the tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan. The army has conducted large-scale counterinsurgency opera- tions in the region since 2009, with smaller operations dating back to 2002. Before 2002, the Pakistani army had never deployed forces to the tribal areas. According to the Pakistani military, more than 5,000 soldiers have died in these operations and many more have been wounded.” 61 “Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia,” UNODC, May 2012, http:// www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_ web.pdf. 62 UNODC, Misuse of Licit Trade, 9. 63 The Customs Union promotes trade but may also inadvertently facilitate smuggling. Con- sider the case of Kazakhstan: under current procedures, goods entering Kazakhstan for on- wards transit to other countries undergo a single check at the external border of the Customs Union. They are generally checked again when they reach their final destination within the Customs Union and not, as was customarily the case, at the Russian border. The reduction of border checks makes it appealing to traffickers to hide drugs in licit cargo on Transports Inter- nationaux Routiers [International Road Transport] (TIR) trucks and other modes of transport. In the event that Tajikistan joins the Customs Union, Tajik authorities will become the main line of defense for member states against the narcotics trade. 64 UNODC, Misuse of Licit Trade, 14. 65 UNODC Statistics Online, https://data.unodc.org. 66 Some of Tajikistan’s border regions are well connected to Dushanbe, in particular the crossing at Nizhniy Pyanj, which is serviced by an upgraded road network. But much of the border of Tajikistan’s autonomous Gorno-Badakhshan region remains logistically and politi- cally distant from Dushanbe; indeed, much of Tajikistan’s and Afghanistan’s eastern border regions are better connected to one another than to their respective national capitals. 67 Statement based on working group member David Mansfield’s comments at the EWI March 2015 Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking meeting. In a debrief on Ishkeshem and Shignan, two border towns located in Badakhshan on the Afghan side of the border with Tajikistan, Mansfield explains that the common bazaar is said to have made it THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE easier for independent smugglers without links to officials on either side of the border to oper- ate, facilitating communication across the border. Consequently, narcotrafficking has become 34 a more populist activity and may be slipping out of the hands of large-scale narcotraffickers, at least along this particular stretch of border. 68 As a report on international border control assistance to Central Asia notes, “The transit of Afghan opiates across Tajikistan is a lucrative business….It monetizes the Tajik economy and rivals the economic impact of other sectors and industries….The Tajik border services are a crucial part of the equation and are, as a number of international and Tajik officials and experts THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 35 ------,” ] 39, ] 39, (New (New [Foreign [Foreign ФЕДЕРАЛЬНЫЙ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНЫЙ , 28. “Глава “Глава ФСКН одобрил The Dynamics of Interstate Большая Игра: политика, бизнес, Таджикистан Таджикистан и Россия: граница в , April 21, 2012. 21, April , ,” RIA Novosti, May 5, 2011, http://ria. 2011, 5, May Novosti, RIA ,” The Economist Great Game: politics, business, security in Central Asia [

, 114. At the same time, the 2008 events were a sign that Presi were events the 2008 time, the same At 114. , ,” Avesta.tj, August 3, 2011, http://www.avesta.tj/9188-tadzhiki 2011, 3, August Avesta.tj, ,” , 113. Turkmenistan: Strategies of Power, Dilemmas of Development Внешняя политика Туркменистана: нейтралитет и афганский вызов афганский и нейтралитет Туркменистана: политика Внешняя Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment Turkmenistan Turkmenistan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chapter 5. chapter 2010), Press, University Cambridge York: (New , March/April 2014; and “Addicted,” “Addicted,” and 2014; March/April , 86 Peyrouse, 86 Peyrouse, From Peyrouse, Peyrouse, From drug the towards stance permissive taking a less was Berdimuhamedow dent Gurbanguly than his predecessor. trade ers were colluding with officials. The high-tech weapons and firepower at the disposal of the at the disposal firepower weapons and The high-tech with officials. colluding were ers much so accumulate to able been have not would “they that suggests traffickers embattled people in high places.” without the support of the capital of military equipment in the center sequence of alleged collusion with the drug trade at the very highest levels of politics. See See politics. of levels highest very at the with the drug trade collusion alleged of sequence Peyrouse, Sébastien Ashgabat in took place that the spectacular firefights Indeed, 113. 2011), Sharpe, M.E. York: drug traffick signs that cross-border were observers, some to according 2008, in September no. 6 (2014). no. presidency during Niyazov’s proactive been very have not to appear authorities Turkmen 85 con a possibly initiatives, counternarcotics international with substantively cooperating in 84 Ivan Safranchuk, “ Safranchuk, 84 Ivan challenge],” Afghan and the Neutrality Turkmenistan: of policy безопасность в Центральной Азии 82 Heroin seizures dropped from 1,004 kilograms in 2010, to 622 kilograms in 2011, and 262 in 2011, 622 kilograms to in 2010, kilograms 1,004 from dropped seizures 82 Heroin in 2012. kilograms et al., 83 Stepanova INL’s budget for Tajikistan was just over $8 million. $8 million. over just was Tajikistan for budget INL’s Woes.” Border Asia’s “Central 80 Gavrilis, 18, May Eurasianet.org, Smuggling – UNODC,” Heroin Afghanistan to Key Asia “Central 81 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65425. 2012, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 1, 2010, http://uzbeki 2010, 1, March Affairs, Enforcement and Law Narcotics International of Bureau stan.usembassy.gov/incsr_2010.html. In contrast, $743,000. approximately was Uzbekistan for request budget INL The 2013 79 77 Reported by AOTP/Paris Pact, Online Seizure Database, http://heroin2011.dbroca.uz/ Database, Seizure Online Pact, AOTP/Paris by 77 Reported map_ids. State of Department U.S. (INCSR),” Report Strategy Control Narcotics International “2010 78 uz/map_ids. crossings a number of close permanently to threatened authorities Uzbek example, For 76 Woes.” Border Asia’s “Central Gavrilis, See reasons. these for precisely border Tajik along the BoundariesUzbekistan. in research field member who conducted group one working by noted As 74 http://heroin2011.dbroca. Database, Seizure Online Pact, AOTP/Paris the see seizures, On 75 Garant, March 1, 2012, http://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/383992/. http://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/383992/. 2012, 1, March Garant, of and policies in the region, aggressive the most are practices control border Uzbekistan’s 73 the not just borders, Uzbekistan’s the rule along all of generally are and restrictiveness closure Gavrilis, George see dynamics, these On Afghanistan. with border then President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Tajikistan in September 2011), see “ see 2011), September in Tajikistan to visit Medvedev’s Dmitry President then ЗАКОН ВОПРОСАМ ОТ ПОГРАНИЧНЫМ ПО 28 ФЕВРАЛЯ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВЕ 2012 О Г. N ТАДЖИКИСТАН 12-ФЗ РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ И “О ФЕДЕРАЦИЕЙ РАТИФИКАЦИИ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ МЕЖДУ РОССИЙСКОЙ идею идею вернуть российских пограничников в Таджикистан on agreement on the Russian-Tajik information For ru/antidrugs/20110505/371118860.html. of (as a result guards border Russian of but without the return cooperation border extending cooperation and the return of Russian border guards, see “ see guards, border Russian of return and the cooperation обмен на миграцию трудовую and stan-i-rossiya-granica-v-obmen-na-trudovuyu-migraciyu.html; 70 “Program and Budget Guide: Fiscal Year 2013,” U.S. Department of State Bureau of Inter of Bureau State of Department U.S. 2013,” Year Guide: Fiscal and Budget “Program 70 187. Affairs, Enforcement and Law Narcotics national 38. Woes,” Border Asia’s “Central 71 Gavrilis, control border including cooperation, military Tajik-Russian extending on discussions For 72 sistance,” Open Society Foundations, May 2012, 38. Also see John Kucera, “The Narcostate,” Narcostate,” “The John Kucera, see Also 38. 2012, May Foundations, Society Open sistance,” Politico Woes.” Border Asia’s “Central Gavrilis, 69 maintain, part of the conduit that allows drugs access and protected passage into Tajik terri Tajik into passage and protected access drugs that allows the conduit of part maintain, As International of the Impact and Woes Border Asia’s “Central Gavrilis, George From tory.” 87 George Gavrilis, “Why Regional Solutions Won’t Help Afghanistan: The Myth of Neighborly Harmony,” Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2011. 88 UNODC, “Caspian Sea and Turkmen Border Initiatives” (work in progress), UNODC Re- gional Office for Central Asia, November 2008, 2. 89 Among the proposals put forward by U.S. officials was one calling for FSKN to provide as- sistance in joint NATO-Russian training for the Turkmen Drug Control Agency. See “Cablegate: Dea Chief of Operations Thomas Harrigan’s Meeting With [sic],” Scoop Independent News, February 10, 2010, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL1002/S00215.htm. 90 “Cablegate: Turkmenistan: Women Increasingly Involved In [sic],” Scoop Independent News, February 10, 2010, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL1002/S00531/cablegate-turk- menistan-women-increasingly-involved-in.htm. Later that year, a border commander was ar- rested for allegedly taking part in the drug trade. His colleagues maintained that he paid for equipment out of his own pocket and that his office looked like a five-star business office. This suggests that official collusion continued, although it is difficult to ascertain how high up in government circles the collusion runs. See “Cablegate: Turkmenistan: Commander Arrest- ed For [sic],” Scoop Independent News, August 13, 2009, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/ WL0908/S01659/cablegate-turkmenistan-commander-arrested-for.htm. 91 U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) counternarcotics program had already outfitted the State Border Services with radio equipment. 92 As explained to a working group member by a high-level UNDP official familiar with issues of border management in Central Asia. 93 Bruce Pannier, “Turkmenistan’s New Afghan Border Policy,” Radio Free Europe Radio Lib- erty, October 10, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/turkmenistan-afghanistan-border-poli- cy/26631200.html. 94 “Future U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” A Report by the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 113th Congress, 2nd session (December 2014). 95 Stepanova, “Russia’s Concerns,” 8. 96 Marlene Laruelle, a working group member, explains in a co-authored policy memo that “Russia seems to be abandoning its previous doctrine of exerting general regional influence in favor of pursuing more focused influence and integration with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.” From Alexander Cooley and Marlene Laruelle, “The Changing Logic of Russian Strategy in Central Asia: From Privileged Sphere to Divide and Rule,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 261, July 2013, 2. 97 On the broader dilemmas of Russian and U.S. geopolitical dynamics in the region, also see Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 98 The U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control has previously elaborated this recommendation to U.S. policymakers. It states: “Because of the drug trade’s significant im- pact on so many facets of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, all U.S. assistance should incorpo- rate a counternarcotics assessment. This assessment should consider how assistance will impact or can contribute to counterdrug efforts, thereby incorporating counternarcotics ef- forts into the overall U.S. strategy for Afghanistan.” 99 On this issue, the former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann wrote: “The U.S. government should therefore lead a new effort at political resolution. Only the United States can leverage the necessary influence and incentives to broker a solution that will nec- essarily involve major pain for each protagonist. It will not be easy, for shaping a stable solu- tion will require the participation of several parties beyond the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Iran and Russia, because each has interests in a solution and each can act to spoil one; and the European Union and the United Nations, to smooth U.S.-Russian-Iranian sensi- tivities, to underwrite the necessary guarantees, and to augment the financial incentives to THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS THE STATE induce compromise. Whatever the role of others, however, it is clear that the United States will have to make the most expensive and politically difficult commitments to get Afghanistan 36 and Pakistan to make their own difficult choices. All this will take years to accomplish, and still more years to protect.” From Neumann, “Borderline Insanity.” THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 37 ACRONYMS Group of Eight of Group Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan in Command Transition Security Combined Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Their Precursors Their and Substances Psychotropic Drugs, of Narcotic Trafficking North Atlantic Treaty Organization Treaty North Atlantic Drug Control Agency, Tajikistan Agency, Drug Control Union Economic Eurasian Collective Security Treaty Organization Treaty Security Collective Border Management Program for Central Asia Central for Program Management Border Afghan Border Police Border Afghan Police Customs Afghan Joint Border Command Center Command Joint Border Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Cooperation and Security for Organization U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law and Law Narcotics International of Bureau State of Department U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, USA Administration, Enforcement Drug Institute EastWest Center for Naval Analyses Naval for Center United Nations Development Program Nations Development United Transports Internationaux Routiers [International Road Transport] Road [International Routiers Internationaux Transports International Organization on Migration Organization International Afghanistan in Force Assistance Security International Federal Service for Control on Narcotics Circulation, Russian Federation Russian Circulation, on Narcotics Control for Service Federal Gross Domestic Product Domestic Gross Afghan National Security Forces National Security Afghan Borders International Group International Borders United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Drugs on Nations Office United Commonwealth of Independent States of Commonwealth United States Central Command Central States United International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Report Strategy Control Narcotics International Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for Combating for Centre and Coordination Information Regional Asian Central

UNDP UNODC TIR NATO OSCE ISAF JBCC Enforcement Affairs INL Enforcement IOM GDP INCSR FSKN G8 EWI DEA EEU CSTO DCA CNA CSTC-A CENTCOM CIS BOMCA CARICC BIG ACP ANSF ABP EWI Board of Directors

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Previous Reports

Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios

February 2015

http://www.ewi.info/idea/ post-2014-scenarios-afghan-narcotrafficking

ДокладAfghan 2013—1 Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment

April 2013

In English: http://www.ewi.info/idea/ afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment

In Russian: http://www.ewi.info/idea/ afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment-russian-edition THE STATE OF AFGHANISTAN’S BORDERS 41 Copyright © 2015 EastWest Institute ISBN: 978-0-9861751-2-1 On the cover: Afghan border policemen display 86 kilograms of hashish captured during an operation in Nangarhar province, east Afghanistan, March 26, 2015. Photos: Reporters/AP

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