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State Responses to the Terrorism-Trafficking Nexus in Tajikistan: Short Term Advances, Long Term Risks1

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State Responses to the Terrorism-Trafficking Nexus in Tajikistan: Short Term Advances, Long Term Risks1 STATE RESPONSES TO THE TERRORISM-TRAFFICKING NEXUS IN TAJIKISTAN: SHORT TERM ADVANCES, LONG TERM RISKS1 Lawrence P. Markowitz is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Rowan University. [email protected] The links between terrorism and transnational organized crime pose an emerging challenge to international peace and security. Academics and policymakers alike recognize the multiple and complex ways in which terrorism and organized crime may intersect. There has been, however, inadequate attention to the opportunities and challenges in addressing the crime-terrorism nexus. As a step in this direction, this memo offers a conceptual framework for thinking systematically about national responses to terrorism-crime connections and applies that framework to Tajikistan. Burdened by the residual effects of state failure and a destructive civil war (1992- 1997), a 900-mile border with Afghanistan (the world’s largest opiates producer and the sanctuary of fragments of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS), and a weak central government control that still struggles to exercise full control over its regions, Tajikistan remains a critical intersection of organized criminal organizations, drug trafficking, and potential terrorist activity. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: ASSESSING STATE RESPONSES TO THE TERRORISM-TRAFFICKING NEXUS State capacity to respond to the terrorism-trafficking nexus can be analyzed across two dimensions – the capability and the willingness to address the terrorism/trafficking nexus. State capability answers the question: “Does the state have the institutional, human, financial, and other resources to address the nexus?” State willingness asks whether the government is sufficiently motivated to put formal policies and strategies into action as well as apply technical/financial/human resources effectively. Depending on the answers to these questions, we infer four types of state capacity (summarized in Table 1). States with high levels on both dimensions possess hegemonic state capacity (when state offices are able to effectively translate their high institutional, technical, financial, and human capabilities into preventing, monitoring, and dismantling the nexus). States with high capabilities but low levels of willingness to apply those capabilities possess captured state capacity (when state offices are used to protect and serve interests and activities within the trafficking/terrorism nexus that severely limits the effective use of national capabilities). States with low capabilities but high levels of willingness to apply their capabilities possess degraded state capacity (when state offices attempt but only partially succeed in preventing, monitoring, and dismantling the terrorism/trafficking nexus). States with low levels on both dimensions possess failed state capacity (when state offices cease to exercise any influence over the interests and activities within the trafficking/ terrorism nexus, which in turn challenges the authority of the state itself). Table 1. Outcomes of State Capacities High Willingness to Address Low Willingness to Address Nexus Nexus High Capability to Address Hegemonic State Capacity Captured State Capacity Nexus Low Capability to Address Degraded State Capacity Failed State Capacity Nexus ASSESSING THE STATE RESPONSE IN TAJIKISTAN The struggle for centralized control. Following its civil war, Tajikistan’s central government has struggled to reestablish control over many parts of the country. One regime strategy for stabilizing postwar Tajikistan was to cede control over key institutions (including parts of the security apparatus) to former commanders and prominent politicians. Unfortunately, this strategy did little to stabilize power within Tajikistan because the new leaders used their power to establish ties to organized criminal groups and the drug trade. As a result of their actions, Tajikistan has become the most prominent destination for opium trafficked from Afghanistan. As illustrated in Figure 1, most of the drugs trafficking in Tajikistan pass through the densely populated Hatlon Province which borders Afghanistan’s provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, and Kunduz. Opium poppy cultivation has been ongoing in Afghanistan’s Badakhstan Province, which also serves as the central point for drug trafficking networks in the region. Both Takhar and Kunduz serve as transit points for opium trafficking from other Afghan provinces. Gorno- Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in the east of Tajikistan has seen smaller drug trafficking volumes (in part because it has been economically depressed since independence and is less accessible than the rest of Tajikistan). Figure 1. Terrorism Events (2000 – 2014) and Average Drug Seizures (2009 – 2012) in Tajikistan Changes in Security Infrastructure. Over the past 20 years, however, Tajikistan’s security apparatus has markedly changed to meet the needs of an increasingly closed authoritarian state that is rife with corruption. Despite stark advancements in security capabilities in specific areas (i.e., CCTV monitoring throughout parts of Dushanbe, forensic resources, border infrastructure, technical equipment and training for special forces), these advancements have had mixed effects. On one hand, increased technical and human capabilities have improved Tajikistan’s overall security (i.e., more professionalized policing, lower crime rates, greater sense of security among the public), maintained monitoring and surveillance of religious activity, and reduced insurgent/terrorist attacks in the country. In particular, there has also been a significant decline in the number of terrorist attacks and episodes of instability. While several prominent ones are well known in 2010, 2012, and 2014 – indicative of weak state capacity in certain security areas – the number of these events has been reduced and no longer appears to many experts interviewed to be a significant issue. On the other hand, advancing Tajikistan’s security capabilities has enabled the government to consolidate drug trafficking under its control and has fostered a highly repressive state that targets regime opponents, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens. Moreover, these advancements have not led to coordination among security agencies or the anti- corruption efforts needed to effectively address the terrorism/trafficking nexus. It has, in short, produced tactical and technical skills useful in ensuring the regime’s longevity, but due to the fact that these efforts do not inculcate norms of accountability to the public nor enact important anti-corruption reforms – both critical to addressing ongoing and future intersections of trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime – it has failed to address the terrorism/trafficking nexus within its borders. Coordination and Capacity among Security Agencies. Interviewees identified the National Security Service’s (NSS) Council as the main coordinating agency. It holds monthly meetings involving educational institutions, the Prosecutor’s office, the Border Control Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), the Drug Control Agency (DCA), and the Anti-Corruption Agency, but it pursues a sectoral approach to security in which some agencies focus solely on drug trafficking and organized crime (DCA, Ministry of Defense) and others focus solely on religious extremism and instability (Parliament’s subcommittee on religion). Beyond the NSS’ Council, there have been fewer efforts at coordinating security agencies than reported by interviewees in Kyrgyzstan. As one Tajikistani law enforcement official noted, “each respective [security] agency functions as an individual silo that only protects its interests.” We might infer from this quote that security agencies within Tajikistan largely eschew information sharing and joint actions. Interviews also indicated that the NSS Council tends to focus on topical issues – such as extremists in Afghanistan or tracking Tajikistani migrants traveling to Syria as ISIS recruits – and less on long-term strategies in dealing with the nexus. Moreover, security agencies’ self-reporting shows that trends in their rates of drug seizures vary greatly, suggesting little inter-agency cooperation (see Figure 2). The DCA highlights the limits of uneven security capabilities. Under Director Rustam Nazarov (2004-2015), and as a recipient of considerable foreign assistance, the DCA was deemed fairly effective by criminologists and drug trafficking experts in the region. It had built up a strategic analysis section, staffed with approximately 50 analysts, to collect and analyze statistics on criminal activity and security threats – an institutional capability that far exceeded its counterparts elsewhere in the government. And it acquired special permission to pay its personnel high salaries, engendering greater professionalization. Yet, the DCA’s improved capacity was still limited by the fact that it was only one agency among several.2 In 2015, Nazarov was reportedly removed not long after a two-year investigation of corruption and drug trafficking led to 30-40 arrests (including some senior officials). The Collusion of State in the Drug Trade. Overall, the drug trade has become less visible, yet most interviewees were convinced this was because it had been effectively centralized under the control of the ruling elite (with many believing those ties extended to the presidential administration). All NGO and most law enforcement interviewees felt that drug trafficking is supported and protected by a range of officials, including
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