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Actas Agora 2016 La diferencia antropológica : humano, animal, cyborg : Actas de las XVI Jornadas Nacionales Agora Philosophica / Nahir Fernández ... [et al.] ; compilado por Andrés Creiler ; Nahir Fernández. - 1a ed . - Mar del Plata : Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, 2017. Libro digital, PDF Archivo Digital: descarga y online ISBN 978-987-544-770-7 1. Filosofía. 2. Antropología. 3. Investigación. I. Fernández, Nahir II. Creiler, Andrés, comp. III. Fernández, Nahir, comp. CDD 128 2 Índice Palabras preliminares …………………………………………………….....……5 ASSALONE Eduardo (CONICET-AAdIE(BA)-UNMdP) ……….……………..6-17 La vida animal como modelo del organicismo político hegeliano BARSOTTI María Soledad (UNGS) ………………………………...….…….…18-27 “Kein Mensch muss müssen ”: Sobre algunas ideas en Kant y en Schiller BASSO MONTEVERDE Leticia (CONICET-CCT MdP/UNMdP)...................28-36 Cuerpo, subjetividad y diferencia. Un abordaje fenomenológico del sentir BLANCO Javier (UNC) ……………………………………..……..………..……..37-49 Reflexiones sobre la reflexión BRANDO Juan (UNMdP) …………………………………………..……….……..50-58 Una nota sobre el comportamiento de agresión en los chimpancés CABREJAS Gabriel (GIE/ IECE/ UNMdP) …………………….………....…….59-75 Distopía y poshumanismo. Del zombie al cyborg a través del cine CAVALLI Ayelén (UNMdP)…………………………………….….….….…....…76-84 El lugar de la naturaleza en la perspectiva cyborg de D. Haraway CRELIER Andrés (UNMdP / CONICET) ……………………….……..…….…..85-93 La diferencia antropológica en las capacidades conceptuales: variedades de gradualismo. D’ANDREA Aldana (UNRC)…………………………………..……….…..……...94-102 El análisis de Turing sobre la computación: redefiniendo lo humano y lo mecánico DIP Patricia C. (CONICET / UNGS / UBA) …………………..………….……..103-112 Ética y Antropología en Kierkegaard DOMÍNGUEZ Gustavo Adolfo (UBA-UCES)……………………..……...........113-128 La indiferencia antropológica: el debate naturaleza-cultura y la reinserción del hombre en la naturaleza y de la naturaleza en el hombre FERNÁNDEZ Nahir L. (UNMdP) ……………………………………..……..…..129-135 La crítica de Glock a la noción de los conceptos como herramientas 3 GIMÉNEZ Ariel (UNSAM) ……………………………………….…..…..……136-144 Libertad y mal radical innato de la naturaleza humana en la filosofía de Kant LEÓN Malena (UNC)…………………………………………….………..…….145-160 Discusiones naturalistas en torno a la identidad personal: La propuesta narrativista de Daniel Dennett MISSERI Lucas E. (CIJS-UNC/CONICET) …………………….…..…..……161-172 Transhumanismo y política: un argumento en favor del tecnoprogresismo ORENSANZ Martín (CONICET / UNMdP)…………………….……………..173-181 Implicaciones de la parasitología para la antropología filosófica RIPA Luisa (UNQ) ……………………………………………….…….………182-192 Perplejidades y borradores SABINO Juan Pablo (FFyL-UBA) ……………………………….…….……..193-201 Ecce Animot y la deconstrucción del humanismo en la filosofía derridiana SCOTTO Carolina (UNC-IDH-CONICET) …………………………….……...202-227 ¿Qué nos hace únicos? La hipótesis de la “intencionalidad compartida” SILENZI María Inés (IIESS / UNS / CONICET)………………….……………228-236 Divergencias entre seres humanos y agentes artificiales al resolver el problema de marco: racionalidad y razonamiento de sentido común SUÁREZ Ernesto Joaquín (UNLP/CIN) y ANZOÁTEGUI Micaela (UNLP) …………………………………….…….…237-249 ¿Primatología filosófica? Sobre el problema de la definición disciplinar a partir del ejemplo del Proyecto Gran Simio 4 Palabras preliminares Los trabajos aquí reunidos fueron presentados en la XVI edición de las Jornadas Nacionales Ágora Filosófica . Las mismas se desarrollaron en la ciudad de Mar del Plata durante los días 17 y 18 de noviembre de 2016 y fueron organizadas por la Asociación Argentina de Investigaciones Éticas, Regional Buenos Aires . La temática propuesta para el encuentro giró en torno a la diferencia antropológica, de la mano de tres conceptos que operaron como organizadores: humano, animal y cyborg. Tales nociones permiten dar cuenta de las numerosas aristas desde las cuales abordar la cuestión de la diferencia antropológica, abriendo la posibilidad a perspectivas diversas pero que permiten, sin embargo, una confluencia. Algunos de los temas que aparecen desglosados en la compilación que aquí ofrecemos son problemas correspondientes a la antropología filosófica pero también a otras áreas como la filosofía de la técnica y de la mente. La cuestión del cuerpo se presenta abordada por varios trabajos, de igual manera que nociones pertenecientes al campo de la ética, la política y la estética. Otro tópico es el de la animalidad, puesto en relación con aspectos que atañen al mundo y al lenguaje. Vemos entonces que se trata de un abanico de temas fuertemente relacionados, que permite lograr una mirada compleja y crítica acerca de la diferencia antropológica. Los trabajos posibilitan un acercamiento a debates recientes no sólo de la filosofía sino también de otras áreas del conocimiento, dando lugar a un diálogo entre disciplinas tendiente a una mirada más amplia acerca de lo que significa ser humanos. Los compiladores. 5 La vida animal como modelo del organicismo político hegeliano ASSALONE Eduardo (CONICET-AAdIE(BA)-UNMdP) Introducción La comprensión hegeliana de la eticidad y, en particular, del Estado, puede considerarse “organicista”, en la medida en que piensa al Estado como un organismo. 1 Este organicismo político supone una cierta concepción de la naturaleza orgánica. Dicha concepción no se encuentra en los Principios de la Filosofía del Derecho (en adelante: PhR ), 2 ni en las lecciones sobre Filosofía del Derecho publicadas en las últimas décadas, sino primariamente en la sección sobre Filosofía de la Naturaleza de la Enciclopedia de las ciencias filosóficas en compendio (en adelante: Enz. ), 3 así como también en las lecciones sobre esta temática que fueron apareciendo recientemente. 4 Este vínculo entre la Filosofía del Derecho y la Filosofía de la Naturaleza, basado en la centralidad que le otorga Hegel al organismo en su principal escrito sobre filosofía política, ha sido tradicionalmente descuidado por los estudiosos de la PhR . Si se trataba de establecer alguna conexión entre la Filosofía del Derecho y el resto del sistema hegeliano –lo cual parece pertinente en relación con un filósofo tan claramente sistemático–, entonces se buscaba mostrar cierta presencia de la Lógica en el método y la estructura de la PhR .5 Esta conexión entre la Lógica y la Filosofía del Derecho es previsible, en la medida en que las categorías expuestas en la Ciencia de la Lógica constituyen el “vocabulario” de las distintas exposiciones y demostraciones que Hegel realiza sobre las temáticas más diversas, entre ellas las 1 Véase: Wolff 1984; Becchi 1994. Véase también nuestro trabajo: Assalone 2014. 2 Hegel 1821. En adelante: PhR . 3 Hegel 1830. En adelante: Enz ., II. 4 Hegel dictó seis cursos sobre Filosofía de la Naturaleza en Berlín en los años 1819-20, 1821-22, 1823-24, 1825-26, 1828 y 1830. Véase por ejemplo: Hegel 1819-20. 5 Véase, por ejemplo: Schnädelbach 1970; De Vos 1981; Ottmann 1982; Dotti 1983; Fulda 1992; Ilting 2006; Giusti 2013. 6 correspondientes al derecho y a la naturaleza. Sin embargo, la demostrada relación entre la Filosofía del Derecho y la Lógica no implica exclusividad: es posible encontrar otros puntos de enlace con el sistema filosófico, a saber, los que conectan la Filosofía del Derecho con la Filosofía de la Naturaleza. En esta dirección se orienta el presente trabajo. Asumimos aquí que la Filosofía del Derecho es un caso de organicismo político; asumimos también que todo organicismo político supone una concepción determinada de la naturaleza orgánica; y asumimos, finalmente, que el análisis de la exposición de la naturaleza orgánica realizada en la Enz. puede iluminar el tipo de estructura política defendido por Hegel en la PhR . A partir de estos supuestos, cuya demostración excede las posibilidades del presente trabajo, nos interesa determinar aquí, antes bien, a qué clase de naturaleza orgánica podría hacer referencia el organismo político del Estado hegeliano. Específicamente, ¿al organismo animal o al vegetal? Esta cuestión aparentemente menor puede ser útil, a nuestro entender, porque nos ayuda a entender ciertos aspectos de la eticidad hegeliana que quizás no hayan sido suficientemente atendidos, especialmente el tipo de relación que vincula a los ciudadanos con el Estado y, a partir de ello, la particular dialéctica de dependencia e independencia que se produce entre ellos. De acuerdo con los lineamientos anteriores, en el presente trabajo analizamos en primer lugar las diferencias entre el organismo animal y el organismo vegetal según la Filosofía de la Naturaleza de la Enz . En segundo lugar evaluamos las consecuencias políticas que pueden tener, o bien la adopción del organismo animal como modelo para la filosofía política, o bien la adopción del organismo vegetal para la misma finalidad. 1. El organismo animal y el organismo vegetal Nos interesa determinar en este apartado el tipo de naturaleza orgánica que tiene en mente Hegel. Las opciones son el organismo vegetal o el animal. Generalmente esta distinción no parece ser relevante. Tendemos a pensar lo orgánico indistintamente como animal y como planta. Sin embargo, Hegel se ha ocupado de diferenciar, en su Filosofía de la Naturaleza, estos dos tipos de naturaleza orgánica que se suman a la “naturaleza geológica” ( Enz. , II, §§ 337-376), el primer organismo “determinado 7 como inmediato o como siendo en sí ” ( ibid ., § 338, p. 342 [403]). 6 Este organismo, el “cuerpo terrestre como sistema universal de los cuerpos individuales”
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