SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THEMATIC REPORT 12 October 2020

Contents Executive Summary ...... 2

Key points ...... 3

Methodology ...... 4

Introduction ...... 4

Primary motivations ...... 5

Economic factors ...... 5

Security-related factors ...... 8

The recruitment process ...... 9

Enlistment ...... 9

Deployment ...... 10

Compensation ...... 11

National and regional impacts ...... 13

Conclusion ...... 14

MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA  1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As in Syria, the Libyan conflict has transformed from an armed rebellion to a complex civil and proxy war, with regional powers backing different sides. With the Libyan conflict in full-scale escalation by the end of 2019, major regional backers also active in Syria – namely Russia and Turkey – began recruiting young Syrian fighters inside Syria to fight in Libya. This paper will closely assess the push and pull factors of the recruitment of young Syrian men as mercenaries to fight in Libya, demonstrating how deteriorating socio-economic conditions and longstanding security fears within Syria have driven thousands of young Syrians to join a conflict thousands of kilometres away.

Although the consequences of the formation and continued deployment of Syrian mercenaries to neighboring countries is currently difficult to discern, those impacts could be significant in the long term, with Turkey and Russia both exhibiting political aspirations of their own in the region.

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KEY POINTS

 A lack of job opportunities, income and the decrease in purchasing power are among the main economic factors that motivate young Syrian men to sign up to fight in Libya.

 Young men, especially former opposition fighters who later reconciled with the Syrian government, view the chance of deployment to Libya as an escape from potential legal prosecution or arrest either for reasons related to security or military conscription.

 In both Syrian government and Turkish-administered areas, the recruitment of fighters is voluntary and not exclusive to a specific group.

 Recruitment of fighters is varied: In Syrian government-held areas, there are three main points of access; Russian military delegations, designated recruitment offices mostly located in Russian reconciliation centers and through Russian-backed local militias; in Turkish-administered areas, the process is limited to the use of field recruitment offices.

 Russian proxies transport recruits to Lattakia or Homs, where they are subjected to intensive military training before being deployed to Libya by air; Turkish proxies are transported directly from Gaziantep airport to Libya via plane without any additional training.

 Salaries for recruited fighters in government-held areas can be up to 200 times higher than for conscripts in the Syrian Arab Army, while in the northwest fighters can expect even higher salaries and other insurance benefits, including Turkish citizenship.

 The immediate consequences of the formation and continued deployment of Syrian mercenaries to Libya is not clear at present, but could be significant in the long term.

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ongoing, and political negotiations to bridge METHODOLOGY the gap were failing; then in April 2014 the Libyan National Army (de facto ruling The research for this paper is reliant on authority in the east) set a siege on Tripoli's qualitative data collected from both primary Government of National Accord (GNA) in and secondary sources. Primary data is order to overthrow the government and the collected via local sources located across forces backing it. The GNA later broke the both zones of control relevant to this study – siege with Turkish military assistance, forcing in government-held and Turkish- the LNA to retreat to Sirte in eastern Libya administered areas of Syria – as well as (approximately 400km away). interviews conducted with experts on the Libyan conflict. Secondary data relies on After reaching Sirte's outskirts, the GNA open-source research. The collected data stated that taking Sirte and Jafra cities in was then analyzed to identify recurring western and central Libya had become a themes and patterns highlighting the cause- "more urgent task than ever."1 effect relationship between the Syrian Consequently, the LNA sent thousands of context and the main factors behind fighters and mercenaries to reinforce Sirte recruitment. and prevent a GNA advance into eastern Libya. At the same time, the LNA’s Russian INTRODUCTION backers began ramping up recruitment in Syrian government territories to bolster its The Syrian and Libyan conflicts, both ongoing ranks in Libya.2 since 2011, started out as anti-government protests that soon turned into armed This sudden escalation in the Libyan conflict confrontations before morphing into full- has prompted Turkey and Russia, who have blown civil war/proxy conflicts. In Libya, the been significant power brokers in Syria, to power vacuum that followed former Libyan step up their engagement, again on opposing ruler Muammar Qaddafi's fall in October sides, in the Libyan conflict in a bid for 2011 has led to political turmoil across the increased regional and international power. country and a shift in power dynamics. In In Syria, Russia supports the Syrian 2014 the political divide in Libya resulted in government, while Turkey supports the the formation of two governments, one Syrian opposition largely located in the based out of western Libya and the other in northeast. In Libya, since 2015 Russia has the east. By 2019, this divide was still

1 Al Jazeera English, ‘Libya’s GNA: ‘Liberation’ of Sirt\ Jufra “More Urgent than Ever”’, 28 June 2020. 2 Al Jazeera English, ‘Libya: Haftar’s Forces Mobilise Mercenaries for Sirte Battle’, 29 June 2020.

MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA  4 provided support for the LNA under its from legal pursuit or potential arrest either leader Khalifa Haftar, while Turkey has for security or conscription-related reasons. supports the GNA in one form or another since the beginning of the conflict. Soon after, ECONOMIC FACTORS around the end of 2019, rumors began Syria’s economy has been in some form of circulating that this support had translated collapse since the outbreak of the 2011 into increased recruitment of Syrian uprising and ensuing conflict. However, mercenaries. several more recent factors have contributed From early 2020, the Turkish government to the acceleration of the Syrian economy's has been recruiting Turkish-backed Syrian deterioration. These factors include, but are opposition fighters from northern to not limited to: pre-existing structural issues, fight alongside the GNA in Libya, while Russia the Lebanese financial crisis, the COVID-19 has recruited and deployed pro-government pandemic and its economic repercussions, as and reconciled former opposition fighters to well as international sanctions that, some fight alongside the LNA. observers claim, have further crippled both Syria's formal and informal economies and PRIMARY widened the trade deficit.3 This economic decline has consequently led to rampant MOTIVATIONS unemployment, coupled with decreasing purchasing power among a broad cross- The Syrian conflict, and ensuing economic section of Syrian society. With little crisis have destroyed economic opportunity opportunity for work, and rapidly devaluing while increasing security concerns, salaries, young men are taking the engendering young Syrian men residing in the opportunity to become foreign fighters in country to fight in Libya. Economically, Libya in exchange for relatively high regular unemployment is estimated to be at 40–50%, wages, often paid in US dollars. and jobs providing a stable and sufficient income are scarce. Purchasing power is 1. LACK OF JOB significantly decreased due to the OPPORTUNITIES depreciation of the Syrian pound, while external and internal crises continue to The unemployment rate in Syria rose destabilize the currency and economy. In exponentially between 2011 and early 2019. terms of security, many young Syrian men While unemployment rates are difficult to view the chance to fight in Libya as an escape verify, the Syrian Centre for Policy Research

3 The Syria Report, ‘Syria's Trade Deficit Widens’, 23 October 2019.

MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA  5 estimates real unemployment rates in 2019 fighters – represent significant potential at 42.6% (slightly down from 51.6% in 2016, sites of recruitment of fighters for the Libyan but considerably more than 2011 levels of conflict. 14.9%).,4 The cessation of military activities has also Data for unemployment in 2020 is as yet encouraged the Syrian government to unavailable, however several factors are demobilize forces from its military and its expected to contribute to increasing levels of National Defense Forces (NDF). This youth unemployment. External factors demobilization has flooded the already include a recent economic downturn crippled employment market with thousands exacerbated by regional oil and financial of young men including those unable to crises in Saudi Arabia and receive an education and others unqualified respectively, increased sanctions and the to undertake non-military professions. COVID-19 pandemic, which combined could lead to the loss of job opportunities through 2. DECREASING PURCHASING increased instability and a lack of business POWER investment by the international and diaspora communities. Internally, a combination of Even for those who are employed, the several interrelated factors have led to continued collapse of the Syrian currency has increased unemployment. While the capture caused many Syrians' salaries to drastically of large swathes of territory by Syrian decrease in value. In 2020 alone, prices of government forces since 2016 may have essential food items increased on average by provided more stability for local residents 56% between April and July while the real accustomed to war, the Syrian government wage value decreased by 45% between has since played a minimal role in public February and June due to the rapid service and infrastructure restoration, depreciation of the Syrian pound. Partly in response, the government removed leaving the captured areas in disrepair with minimal investment. subsidies (as part of wider measures aimed at cutting spending) of several basic food items Former opposition-held communities are such as rice and sugar, leading their prices to characterized by high unemployment, skyrocket by more than 120% (Tables 1 & 2). restrictions on freedom of movement, low- This decreasing purchasing power led many level service provision and a host of other locals to seek additional sources of income or endemic socio-economic challenges. As such, they – with their thousands of reconciled

4 Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR), ‘Justice to Transcend Conflict’, 27 May 2020.

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seek assistance from local civil society food aid and coupons, along with any other organizations (CSOs) and NGOs providing form of stipend distributed by local councils.

Table 1: Price changes in Syrian government-held areas

Product April 2020 (SYP) July 2020 (SYP) Change

Wheat Flour (1 kg) 600 675 11%

Short grain rice (1kg) 625 1650 62%

Bread (8 pieces) 250 600 58%

Red lentils (1 kg) 450 975 54%

Laundry Soap (1kg) 500 1500 67%

Toothpaste (100 g) 500 1350 63%

Milk (1L) 350 750 53%

Table 2: Price changes in Turkish-administered areas (Afrin and Azaz average)

Product April 2020 (SYP) July 2020 (SYP) Change

Wheat Flour (1 kg) 588 1040 77%

Short grain rice (1kg) 1049 1580 51%

Bread (8 pieces) 69 69 0%

Red lentils (1 kg) 1006 1130 11%

Laundry Soap (1kg) 1660 3160 90%

Toothpaste (100 g) 930 1875 102%

Milk (1L) 485 775 60%

MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA  7

SECURITY-RELATED defunded and demobilized by the Syrian 6 FACTORS government in September 2018. The majority of NDF fighters have ignored the Several factors have led young Syrian men to government's request to demobilize, and, seek protection under Russia and Turkey without alternative funding, have resorted to outside Syria, and to agree to fight as criminal activities to secure alternative mercenaries in Libya. Reconciled young men sources of income. 7 (previous opposition fighters who signed a These two groups are expected to find reconciliation agreement with the Russian offers of employment particularly government) and previous pro-government attractive because, along with the high militia fighters are seen as a security threat salaries, recruitment provides an escape by the Syrian government, and to some route from arrest and legal suits, crucially extent have been targeted for arrest and ensuring their removal from the prosecution. Some have also faced forcible government’s wanted lists. conscription into the Syrian Arab Army. In the Turkish-administered areas further 1. FEAR OF ARREST north, local sources report that a significant Aside from the deteriorating socio-economic portion of recruits are former or current conditions across Syria, young men, and members of armed groups facing legal particularly former opposition fighters, have prosecution by local administrations, an come to see deployment to Libya as an example of which are fighters from the Ahrar opportunity to escape legal prosecution and al-Sharqia Brigade.8 Ahrar al-Sharqia, which potential arrest by authorities. In Syrian reportedly has deployed more than 500 government areas, Russia has capitalized on members to Libya out of a total of between this and focused on targeting two Syrian 2,500–3,500 fighters, has a history of youth categories for recruitment: reconciled violations throughout the conflict: former opposition fighters who previously particularly violations against civilians in the participated in anti-government activities;5 areas they controlled during the Turkish-led and National Defense Force (NDF) fighters Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace

5 According to local sources, more than 40 military-age males and former opposition fighters were arrested in Southern in the first week of July 2020, on security-related charges. 6 The National Defence Forces (NDF) are a pro-government militia that was formed on 1 November 2012 and organized by the Syrian government during the Syrian conflict as a part-time volunteer reserve component of the Syrian Arab Army. The NDF is made of units across Syrian provinces, each of them consisting of local volunteers willing to fight against opposition forces. 7 In early July, Military Intelligence clashed with NDF fighters involved in criminal activities present in Al Zohour neighborhood in Damascus city, in order to force their demobilization. 8 Mercenary groups in Libya include the Sulaiman Shah Brigade (Al-Aamchat brigade), headed by Mohammad Al-Jasem (Abu Aamsha).

MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA  8

Spring operations. Additionally, local Russia and its local proxies have capitalized communities have demonstrated for the on the fear of conscription and specifically removal of the groups’ members from the targeted deserters and military-age males towns, accusing them of robbery, extortion, wanted for conscription who do not wish to arrests, and kidnappings of civilians for re-integrate and join the Syrian army. ransom. This includes violations against the Kurdish population in Olive Branch areas, THE RECRUITMENT and kidnappings of Yezidi women and children, as well as reported torture in their PROCESS prisons.9 In order to avoid both In both Syrian government-held and Turkish- administrative and local prosecution, administered areas, recruitment of foreign deployment to Libya under Turkish fighters is voluntary and not exclusive to a protection could appear a viable option. specific group. However, there is a clear 2. FEAR OF CONSCRIPTION pattern of recruiting former opposition fighters who later reconciled with the Syrian Throughout the nine years of conflict, young government, or former opposition fighters Syrian men have used various means to avoid with fears of legal prosecution at the hands of 10 military service. The government's security the authorities, both of whom already have and military agencies continue to carry out the necessary combat experience to fight in conscription campaigns across the country, Libya. Unconfirmed reports also point to the successfully arresting military-age (18–42) recruitment of underage fighters who have males who, in some cases, have already gone on to join the ranks of Syrian completed their mandatory military service mercenaries sent to Libya, however it was not or had been legally exempted from it. possible for HAT to independently verify these claims. Reports indicate that the Syrian government’s campaigns have focused on conscripting reconciled fighters, arresting ENLISTMENT deserters and deploying them on the In Syrian government-held areas, frontlines against remaining opposition recruitment is done through three main fighters in the opposition-held northwest. methods. The first is through Russian military

9 There were also videos published of IDPs from the IDP camp of Tarhin (A’rima subdistrict in northern Aleppo) calling on Ahrar Al-Sharqiyah to halt shooting in and around the IDP camp. There have also been many cases of inter-AOG clashes between Ahrar Al-Shariqyah and other armed groups in Turkish-administered areas. 10 Young Syrian men have resorted to extending university enrollment, traveling outside the country, illicitly crossing the Mediterranean to Europe on boats, or joining the NDF to avoid enrollment in the Syrian Arab Army.

MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA  9 delegations visiting a specific city or town to Suran, (Suran subdistrict), Afrin (Afrin find new recruits. In this case, Russian subdistrict), and Mare’ (Mare’ subdistrict), representatives reportedly hold meetings and function under the Ministry of Defense with local community leaders to explain the affiliated with the opposition’s Syrian Interim recruitment process, contracts and Government (SIG). Would-be recruits can incentives, before collecting the names of voluntarily inquire about signing up and those who wish to sign up. Russian delegates register their names for deployment. If later return to the site with contracts for the civilians not belonging to an armed group are new recruits to sign. recruited, they undergo military training for 14 days before being deployed. The second method is through designated recruitment offices located in Russian- While it is difficult to determine how the affiliated reconciliation and political offices, process goes from here, it is believed that the where young Syrian men can voluntarily registered names are submitted to the SIG's inquire about recruitment and sign Ministry of Defense, which then submits the employment contracts.11,12 names to Turkish Intelligence officers who determine the final deployment list. The third method is through pro-Russian militias operating on the ground, such as DEPLOYMENT Ahmad al-Oudeh’s Eighth Brigade in Dar‘a and Ismail a-Shamout’s 5th Corps in Following enlistment in Syrian government Southern Damascus. Generally, Russia areas, local sources reported that young men reaches out to its local proxies in a given area are transported by bus to Lattakia, Palmyra, who then discreetly promote recruitment or Homs, where they are subjected to an opportunities to young men with specific intensive 20-day military training. Upon profiles, usually former opposition fighters.13 completing the training, they are deployed to Libya through two main routes: via Russian In Turkish-administered areas, the process is military aircraft and ‘Cham Wings’ airlines limited to four recruitment offices either from Hmeimim airbase in Lattakia or established across the northern Aleppo Damascus International Airport either countryside. Local sources reported that these offices are located in Kafr Ghan and

11 The Syrian Youth Party in As-Sweida governorate, founded in 2011 with the support Syrian government security agencies has been recruiting young Syrian men from the governorate to fight in Libya 12 Suwayda24, [Ar] ‘A licensed political party works to recruit mercenaries in Syria to fight in Libya with the support of Russia’, 15 February 2020. 13 Ahmad al-Oudeh is the former opposition commander of “Quwwat Shabab al-Sunna” who later joined the 5th Corps following the July 2018 reconciliation agreement and forming the Eight Brigade. Ismail al-Shamout is the former opposition leader of Jaysh Ababil before reconciling with the Syrian government and becoming a local 5th Corps commander in Southern Damascus.

MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA  10 directly to Libya,14 or to Cairo International state that fighters are also transported to Airport in Egypt, and then transported into Mitiga Airport and airport using Libya by land.15 Istanbul International Airport. (Figure 1).

In Turkish-administered areas, fighters are COMPENSATION gathered in Hawar Kilis near the Turkish border to be transported to Gaziantep In Syrian government areas, Russian proxies airport. Reports indicate that groups of 250 offer a three-month or six-month to one year fighters were then transported from contract. Fighters who sign a three-month Gaziantep airport to Libya’s Mitiga airport in contract receive a monthly salary of between Tripoli and Misrata airport in Misrata via (US) $800–$1,000, 200 times higher than a Turkish military aircraft. Local sources also Syrian army conscript ($4–5 per month) and

Figure 1: Syrian fighter transportation routes to Libya. Source HAT Syria

14 Specifically, to Benina International Airport, Al Jufra airbase, or Al Khadim airbase. 15 Media sources state that UN reports have recorded 338 military flights by the Russian Wagner group from Syria to Libya between November 2019 and July 2020. , ‘UN report: Russia extends its support to private military contractor Wagner in Libya’ (Ar), 2 September 2020.

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33 times higher than a Syrian army soldier receives compensation of $1,000 for those ($24–$30 per month). contracted for three months and $2,000 for those contracted for six-months or one-year. Additionally, fighters who sign a six-month or one-year contract receive a monthly salary of Similarly, in opposition-held Syria, Turkey has $1,000, with $500 for one-month rest and offered Syrian fighters from Turkish- 16 recuperation (R&R) periods (Table 3). The administered northern Aleppo high salaries fighters reportedly receive one-third of their and attractive benefits in exchange for salaries in US dollars in Libya, while a combat service in Libya. Local sources report designated individual in Syria receives the that a single fighter's monthly salary could be rest in Syrian pounds at black market rates. as high as $2,200–$3,000, however other reports point to that number being lower, at Additional sources indicate that in the event around $1,200–$1,500 (Table 4). Local of the fighter’s death, a designated individual

Table 3: Salaries of combat-related jobs in Syrian government- held areas

Employer Salary in Syria (USD) Salary in Libya (USD)

Pro-Iranian militias 150 - 300 800 - 1,000

Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 5 - 30 800 - 1,000

Syrian Intelligence Agencies 100 800 - 1,000

5th Corps 200 800 - 1,000

Table 4: Salaries of combat-related jobs in Turkish administered areas (excluding benefits such as food allowance for inside Syria, and excluding rewards for inside Libya)

Employer Salary in Syria (USD) Salary in Libya (USD)

Syrian National Army (SNA) 100-200 1,500 - 3,000

Sulaiman Shah (Al-Aamshat) 100-200 1,500 - 3,000

16 Fighters who sign a six-month to one-year contract are offered one month of R&R per every two months of service.

MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA  12 sources added that the contract ensures that Russian–Turkish competition in Libya could the fighter also receives a down-payment of therefore impact current and/or future $1,000 sent to the fighter’s family before agreements related to developments in Syria. departure from Syria. Changing fortunes on either side in Libya will likely have a knock-on effect in the Sources also claim that a separate contract is negotiating positions, and military signed between the recruiter and the movements, of Russia and Turkey in Syria, in recruited fighter's first-of-kin (father, particular in Idleb, and northwestern Syria as brother or son) which provides 63,000 TRY a whole.18 (approximately $8,500) to the family along with Turkish nationality and housing if the The consequences of the formation and fighter is killed in active service. continued deployment of Syrian mercenaries to neighboring countries could be significant NATIONAL AND in the long term. Turkey and Russia both have political aspirations of their own in the REGIONAL IMPACTS region, while an army of mercenaries can provide a range of benefits to a regional The impacts of the recruitment of Syrian power looking to expand control and youth to fight in Libya are not immediately influence in different regional conflicts and possible to discern. At the time of writing, the contexts. These include, but are not estimated number of Syrians deployed to restricted to, flexible fighting forces to be Libya has not exceeded 20,000 fighters, but deployed in other areas, as well as plausible this number is expected to increase as the deniability to avoid direct responsibility for economic situation continues to deteriorate war crimes or human rights violations. These at home.17 mercenaries are likely to enable both sides to The fact that the two main power brokers in establish a foothold throughout the region 19 the Syrian conflict are again on opposing and possibly across the world. To that sides in Libya means that the frontlines in extent, if the experiment proves successful in both contexts have become interconnected. the long-run, recruiting Syrian mercenaries

17 Media sources reported that between 6,000 to 15,000 Syrians are being sent to fight along the Turkish-backed GNA while 2,000 Syrian are fighting for the Russian-backed LNA in Libya. 18 Some reports have referred to undeclared Russian-Turkish negotiations regarding influence in the eastern and western Euphrates regions, taking place at the end of July before reaching a dead-end; reportedly, Turkey hoped to enter Ain al-Arab and Ein Issa in exchange for Russian control of additional areas in Idleb governorate. 19 Recent reports indicate that Russia has recruited Syrian mercenaries with three months of combat experience in Libya to be deployed to Venezuela to guard the country’s oil infrastructure. Other rumors suggest that Turkey sent groups from the National Army to Azerbaijan at the end of August, and is planning on sending Syrian mercenaries to Tripoli, Lebanon.

MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA  13 can prove to be a lucrative business; fighters employed find that the value of their salaries can then be deployed to other wars and has drastically decreased compared to the conflicts – both inside and outside the Middle soaring prices of several basic necessities and East and North Africa. goods.

The large salaries paid to Syrian fighters in CONCLUSION Libya, importantly paid in US dollars, can be considered as a step towards a ‘better life’ for The primary catalyst behind Syrian fighters many men given the opportunity to secure an volunteering to fight in Libya is deeply rooted adequate income for them and their in the years of conflict that led to an economic dependents. Furthermore, Turkish-backed crisis aggravating a lack of livelihood options, Syrian fighters’ decisions to enroll and fight in income generating alternatives, and the Libya is also in many instances fueled by decreased purchasing power with the rumors and promises of a better life. The depreciation of the Syrian pound. The Syrian possibility for many reconciled or former- economic decline caused by economic, opposition fighters of escaping either health-related, and political factors has led to conscription or arrest under the protection a lack of job opportunities for Syrian youth of Russia or Turkey can also be assumed to be looking for a sufficient and stable income to an attractive prospect. build their future. Syrian youth who are

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CONTACT Nicholas Bodanac

Humanitarian Access Team

[email protected]

The Humanitarian Access Team (HAT) was established in in March 2015 in response to the collective challenges facing the remote humanitarian response in Syria. Successful humanitarian and development interventions require a nuanced and objective understanding of the human ecosystems in which these interventions occur. To this end, the HAT’s most important function is to collect, triangulate, synthesize, analyze and operationalize disparate data and information. Since 2015, HAT analysis has provided a forward-looking template for international interventions in Syria, and facilitated an increasingly nimble, adaptive, integrated, and ultimately impactful international response to the Syrian conflict.