SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA THEMATIC REPORT 12 October 2020 Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... 2 Key points ......................................................................................................................................... 3 Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4 Primary motivations ...................................................................................................................... 5 Economic factors ........................................................................................................................ 5 Security-related factors ........................................................................................................... 8 The recruitment process .............................................................................................................. 9 Enlistment ..................................................................................................................................... 9 Deployment ............................................................................................................................... 10 Compensation .......................................................................................................................... 11 National and regional impacts ................................................................................................. 13 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 14 MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY As in Syria, the Libyan conflict has transformed from an armed rebellion to a complex civil and proxy war, with regional powers backing different sides. With the Libyan conflict in full-scale escalation by the end of 2019, major regional backers also active in Syria – namely Russia and Turkey – began recruiting young Syrian fighters inside Syria to fight in Libya. This paper will closely assess the push and pull factors of the recruitment of young Syrian men as mercenaries to fight in Libya, demonstrating how deteriorating socio-economic conditions and longstanding security fears within Syria have driven thousands of young Syrians to join a conflict thousands of kilometres away. Although the consequences of the formation and continued deployment of Syrian mercenaries to neighboring countries is currently difficult to discern, those impacts could be significant in the long term, with Turkey and Russia both exhibiting political aspirations of their own in the region. MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA 2 KEY POINTS A lack of job opportunities, income and the decrease in purchasing power are among the main economic factors that motivate young Syrian men to sign up to fight in Libya. Young men, especially former opposition fighters who later reconciled with the Syrian government, view the chance of deployment to Libya as an escape from potential legal prosecution or arrest either for reasons related to security or military conscription. In both Syrian government and Turkish-administered areas, the recruitment of fighters is voluntary and not exclusive to a specific group. Recruitment of fighters is varied: In Syrian government-held areas, there are three main points of access; Russian military delegations, designated recruitment offices mostly located in Russian reconciliation centers and through Russian-backed local militias; in Turkish-administered areas, the process is limited to the use of field recruitment offices. Russian proxies transport recruits to Lattakia or Homs, where they are subjected to intensive military training before being deployed to Libya by air; Turkish proxies are transported directly from Gaziantep airport to Libya via plane without any additional training. Salaries for recruited fighters in government-held areas can be up to 200 times higher than for conscripts in the Syrian Arab Army, while in the northwest fighters can expect even higher salaries and other insurance benefits, including Turkish citizenship. The immediate consequences of the formation and continued deployment of Syrian mercenaries to Libya is not clear at present, but could be significant in the long term. MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA 3 ongoing, and political negotiations to bridge METHODOLOGY the gap were failing; then in April 2014 the Libyan National Army (de facto ruling The research for this paper is reliant on authority in the east) set a siege on Tripoli's qualitative data collected from both primary Government of National Accord (GNA) in and secondary sources. Primary data is order to overthrow the government and the collected via local sources located across forces backing it. The GNA later broke the both zones of control relevant to this study – siege with Turkish military assistance, forcing in government-held and Turkish- the LNA to retreat to Sirte in eastern Libya administered areas of Syria – as well as (approximately 400km away). interviews conducted with experts on the Libyan conflict. Secondary data relies on After reaching Sirte's outskirts, the GNA open-source research. The collected data stated that taking Sirte and Jafra cities in was then analyzed to identify recurring western and central Libya had become a themes and patterns highlighting the cause- "more urgent task than ever."1 effect relationship between the Syrian Consequently, the LNA sent thousands of context and the main factors behind fighters and mercenaries to reinforce Sirte recruitment. and prevent a GNA advance into eastern Libya. At the same time, the LNA’s Russian INTRODUCTION backers began ramping up recruitment in Syrian government territories to bolster its The Syrian and Libyan conflicts, both ongoing ranks in Libya.2 since 2011, started out as anti-government protests that soon turned into armed This sudden escalation in the Libyan conflict confrontations before morphing into full- has prompted Turkey and Russia, who have blown civil war/proxy conflicts. In Libya, the been significant power brokers in Syria, to power vacuum that followed former Libyan step up their engagement, again on opposing ruler Muammar Qaddafi's fall in October sides, in the Libyan conflict in a bid for 2011 has led to political turmoil across the increased regional and international power. country and a shift in power dynamics. In In Syria, Russia supports the Syrian 2014 the political divide in Libya resulted in government, while Turkey supports the the formation of two governments, one Syrian opposition largely located in the based out of western Libya and the other in northeast. In Libya, since 2015 Russia has the east. By 2019, this divide was still 1 Al Jazeera English, ‘Libya’s GNA: ‘Liberation’ of Sirt\ Jufra “More Urgent than Ever”’, 28 June 2020. 2 Al Jazeera English, ‘Libya: Haftar’s Forces Mobilise Mercenaries for Sirte Battle’, 29 June 2020. MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIA SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN LIBYA 4 provided support for the LNA under its from legal pursuit or potential arrest either leader Khalifa Haftar, while Turkey has for security or conscription-related reasons. supports the GNA in one form or another since the beginning of the conflict. Soon after, ECONOMIC FACTORS around the end of 2019, rumors began Syria’s economy has been in some form of circulating that this support had translated collapse since the outbreak of the 2011 into increased recruitment of Syrian uprising and ensuing conflict. However, mercenaries. several more recent factors have contributed From early 2020, the Turkish government to the acceleration of the Syrian economy's has been recruiting Turkish-backed Syrian deterioration. These factors include, but are opposition fighters from northern Aleppo to not limited to: pre-existing structural issues, fight alongside the GNA in Libya, while Russia the Lebanese financial crisis, the COVID-19 has recruited and deployed pro-government pandemic and its economic repercussions, as and reconciled former opposition fighters to well as international sanctions that, some fight alongside the LNA. observers claim, have further crippled both Syria's formal and informal economies and PRIMARY widened the trade deficit.3 This economic decline has consequently led to rampant MOTIVATIONS unemployment, coupled with decreasing purchasing power among a broad cross- The Syrian conflict, and ensuing economic section of Syrian society. With little crisis have destroyed economic opportunity opportunity for work, and rapidly devaluing while increasing security concerns, salaries, young men are taking the engendering young Syrian men residing in the opportunity to become foreign fighters in country to fight in Libya. Economically, Libya in exchange for relatively high regular unemployment is estimated to be at 40–50%, wages, often paid in US dollars. and jobs providing a stable and sufficient income are scarce. Purchasing power is 1. LACK OF JOB significantly decreased due to the OPPORTUNITIES depreciation of the Syrian pound, while external and internal crises continue to The unemployment