George Brown Den Britiske Utenrikspolitikkens Dr. Jekyll Og Mr

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George Brown Den Britiske Utenrikspolitikkens Dr. Jekyll Og Mr Linn Sagøy Varmdal Linn Sagøy Varmdal George Brown Den britiske utenrikspolitikkens Dr. Jekyll og Mr. Hyde Et innblikk i George Browns tid som utenriksminister, med fokus på hans diplomatiske innsats i Egypt Masteroppgave George Brown, den britiske politikkens Dr. Jekyll og Mr. Hyde Jekyll og Mr. Dr. politikkens den britiske Brown, George Masteroppgave i Historie Veileder: Tore T. Petersen NTNU Trondheim, juni 2017 Det humanistiske fakultet Det humanistiske Institutt for historiske studier historiske for Institutt Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet teknisk-naturvitenskapelige Norges Forord Veien til en masteroppgave ble litt mer kronglete enn hva jeg først hadde tenkt. Med en bacheloroppgave om allianser i middelalderens Skottland, var det ingen som ble mer overrasket enn meg selv da jeg tok en «fast-forward» 650 år frem i tid og forkastet alle ambisjoner om å bli en middelalderhistoriker. Geografisk er øya den samme og temaet er fortsatt av politisk omfang, men samfunn og holdninger er blitt betydelig endret. Jeg tiltrekkes fortsatt av individets plass i historien og kunne i dag aldri tenkt meg å ikke kunne fått lov til å formidle George Browns forsøk på storhet. Vestens påvirkning i Midtøsten har aldri vært så aktuell som den er i dag, og denne oppgaven har gitt meg en helt annen forståelse for konfliktforholdet som eksisterer i dette området nøyaktig 50 år etter Seksdagerskrigen. Som seg hør og bør er det mange som skal takkes, bukkes og neies for, som har bidratt til at de siste to årene har vært mulig å gjennomføre. Kjære Tore Petersen, du har vært fantastisk tålmodig som veileder. Det finnes mange flotte ordtak om hvordan tålmodighet lønner seg i lengden, men siden vi har hatt flere runder med den faktiske betydningen av ulike metaforer, så velger jeg å frastå bruken av billedspråklige framstillinger denne gang. Mine forsømte bestevenner på campus. I alfabetisk rekkefølge for ordens skyld; Annbjørg, Odd Ivar og Silje. Dere er ekstraordinære og absolutt fantastiske. Silje, nå har vi tid til å drikke kaffe uten å kaldsvette! Mine fantastiske gutter (les; klovner) på lesesalen, Håvard og Simen. Herregud som jeg har ledd de to siste årene av deres minimale akademiske diskusjoner. Jeg har bilder brent på netthinnen som jeg aldri blir kvitt, på godt og vondt. Mine kjære bokstavbarn (les; ADHD ut til fingerspissene) jeg digger dere. Dere er min motivasjon og inspirasjon. Mamma elsker dere! Til slutt; som farmor så raust påpekte for kort tid siden, hadde ikke denne masteroppgaven sett hverken dagens lys eller siste punktum, hadde det ikke vært for min evig støttende og tålmodige ektemann, Terje. Selv om feministen i meg skriker av full hals når noen prøver å gi menn kreditten for noe kvinnen har skapt, har farmor rett. Du har latt meg bruke dyrebar tid på å følge min store lidenskap her i livet, og det elsker jeg deg utrolig høyt for og er deg evig takknemlig. INNHOLD Introduksjon……………………………………………………………….. 5 Tidligere forskning………………………………………………… 7 Faglig vinkling og relevans………………………………………. 14 Funn………………………………………………………………. 16 Teori og Metode………………………………………………….. 16 Struktur…………………………………………………………… 18 Bakgrunn…………………………………………………………………. 20 Fra tilnærming til krig……………………………………………………. 25 Seksdagerskrigen………………………………………………...………. 38 Fra triumf til nederlag…………………………………………...……….. 48 Midtøsten: George Browns politiske endeholdeplass…………..………... 60 Epilog…………………………………………………………...……...… 73 Kilder…………………………………………………………...………... 76 Litteratur………………………………………………………...……….. 80 Kart over Midtøsten……………………………………………………….83 2 Forkortelser BBC- British Broadcasting Corporation DEA- Department of Economic Affairs FN- Forente Nasjoner FO- Foreign Office FCO- Foreign and Commonwealth Office FROSY- Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen MP- Member of Parliament NLF- National Liberation Front NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization PREM- Primeministers Office PPS- Private Parlamentary Secretary PL 480- Public Law 480 242- FNs Resolusjon 242 TGWU- Transport and General Workers Union TUC- Transport Workers Union UNEF- United Nations Emergency Force/FNs fredsstyrker UNTSO- United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 3 Man is not the creature of circumstances, circumstances are the creatures of men. We are free agents, and man is more powerful than matter. Benjamin Disraeli 4 Kapittel 1 INTRODUKSJON He is intellectually gifted, forceful, courageous, able, indefatigable, mercurial in temperament, unpredictable in behaviour, frank, salty, voluble, entertaining, gregarious, a curiouse mixture of humility and vanity. Of a loving nature, he considers that most males merit being called «brother».1 Historien har blitt påvirket av mennesker som med et brennende engasjement har drevet samfunnet fremover, men også til tider bakover i tid. Brown selv skrev at makt er relativt, men når makt blir et redskap for mennesket til å endre samfunnet, blir mennesket også endret. George Browns tid i regjering var kort, men påvirket han nok til at han ble en skygge av seg selv på enden av livet. Jaget etter å oppnå den storheten han var på vei til å oppnå som utenriksminister, en mulighet som han først velvillig ga bort, for så å hevde ble tatt fra han, ble hans akilles i livet. Jaget etter en bedre verden, ble til jaget etter en bedret posisjon og Brown ble aldri den mannen han kunne bli, men den som jaget etter makt skapte. George Brown ble beskrevet av amerikanerne som en drivende kraft i den britiske politikken. En underholdende, forfengelig og uforutsigbar politiker som fra august 1966 til mars 1968 skydde ingen midler i å bedre den britiske innflytelsen i verden. Brown ble en kuriositet i britisk politikk, med sin ærlighet og direkte meningsutveksling. Den amerikanske fordelaktige beskrivelsen tyder på at han var mer amerikansk i holdning enn britisk. Browns høylytte personlighet banet vei for hans måte å føre diplomati, på tross av sosial rang eller nasjonalitet. Et økende alkoholproblem som påvirket hans humør og ikke minst evne til å føre politikk på et høyt intellektuelt nivå ble tilslutt hans ende. Dette bidro til å etablere Richard Crossmans2 definisjon av Browns personlighet ut til fingerspissene, med sin bekrivelse av den britiske utenriksministeren som dr. Jekyll og Mr. Hyde.3 Et politisk geni med en unik evne til nytenkning og samarbeid, for så kort tid etter opptre som en uhyggelig skygge av seg selv med frådende spydigheter og vulgære anklager etter å ha nådd bunnen i whisky-glasset. For selv om det var mange andre politikere som drakk tettere og tyngre enn Brown, var Brown kjent for å ha dårlig evne til å håndtere den minste mengde alkohol. 1 NLJ 88-47 Vol.13 From ambassador David Bruce to Wolf Rostow 26. september 1966, LBJL 2 Richard Crossman var britisk Labour politiker og leder i Underhuset da George Brown var utenriksminister 3 Dr. Jekyll og Mr. Hyde er hovedpersonene i romanen Strange case of dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde skrevet av Robert Louis Stevenson i 1886. 5 Før Browns politiske karriere forsvant i bunnen av en whiskyflaske i Tel Aviv i 1970, bestod hans karriere frem til 1968 av mange diplomatiske utfordringer, men og flere politiske seiere. På tross av Whitehalls ønske om å forlate alt ansvar i Midtøsten, jobbet Brown med å etablere og opprettholde gode relasjoner der det forelå britiske interesser.4 Browns manøvreringer i Midtøsten, blant stormakter som Sovjetunionen og USA gikk ikke uaktet hen og hans rolle som medforfatter av Resolusjon 242 (242), en avtale som i dag femti år etter står som den lengst levende avtalen mellom Egypt og Israel, skulle etablere hans posisjon som politiker av internasjonal størrelse.5 Allikevel er George Brown husket som en alkoholisert politiker med en rekke offentlige fadeser, framfor utenriksministeren som gjenetablerte britiske relasjoner med Egypt og president Gamal Nasser.6 Utfordringene George Brown møtte som politiker var mange, men utfordringene han møtte som person var flere. I sin korte tid som utenriksminister klarte han å gjenopprette relasjonene med Egypt, diktere en fredsavtale og stå som ansvarlig for den britiske tilbaketrekking fra Aden, før han i et forferdelig sinne leverte sin oppsigelse lenge før hans periode i regjeringen var over.7 Hva var det som var årsaken til at denne fremragende politikeren endte sine dager som den britiske politikkens dr. Jekyll og Mr. Hyde, fremfor å høste ære og nasjonal stolthet som den tidligere britiske statsministeren Winston Churchill hadde gjort, også han tungt alkoholisert og med et fryktelig sinne. De neste sidene er et forsøk på å nøytralisere alkoholikeren George Brown og heller se på situasjonene han stod ovenfor og personene han måtte argumentere med for å oppnå det beste utgangspunktet for de britiske interessene i Midtøsten. Vi skal se hvordan hans lidenskap etter å være den som kunne megle frem en fred mellom Israel og Egypt på grunnlag av sin utenrikspolitiske triumf i Egypt, bidro til at det gikk så fryktelig galt med Browns politiske karriere, utover hans forhold til alkohol. 4 Whitehall er en gate i London hvor regjeringens kontorer ligger. Brukes og som betegnelse på den britiske regjeringen. 5 Midtøsten er nord-østre del av Afrika og sør-vestlige del av Asia. I dag omfatter Midtøsten Libanon, De palestinske territoriene, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, De Forente Arabiske Emirater, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Syria, Irak, Jemen, Saudi-Arabia, Iran, Tyrkia og Egypt. 6 Gamal Abdel Nasser var egyptisk president, noen anser han som diktator, regjerte fra 1956 til 1970. 7 Aden var en britisk koloni fra 1937 til den ble Den sørarabiske
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