UNCLASSIFIED

A project of the Combat Studies Institute, the Operational Leadership Experiences interview collection archives firsthand, multi-service accounts from military personnel who planned, participated in and supported operations in the Global War on Terrorism.

Interview with LTC Wayne Sylvester

Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas UNCLASSIFIED

Abstract

In charge of the 439th Military Police Detachment and deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from November 2003 to January 2005, Army Reserve LTC Wayne Sylvester, while in country, ran the Baghdad-area detention facility known as Camp Cropper. In this capacity, he was responsible for all the former top Iraqi regime officials in U.S. custody, the so-called Deck of 55 people that included Chemical Ali, Tariq Aziz, Doctor Germ, as well as Saddam Hussein himself. The principal challenge with guarding such High-Value Detainees, Sylvester said, was the “non-doctrinal nature of it.” Army doctrine, he observed, “does not adequately cover what you do with former regime members when you go into a country. Because of that, there were a lot of unique tasks and requirements.” Special security measures, accommodating interrogators and other agencies that needed access to detainees, dealing with the International Committee of the Red Cross and with prisoner complaints and protests were but some of these. In this interview, Sylvester also discusses the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib Prison, what he feels went wrong, and what measures he took to ensure that Camp Cropper remained a model detention facility. “There is no question in my mind,” he said, “that the adversary can’t hold a candle to us over there.” What’s paramount, though, is “the information side of things and our ability to present our side of the picture so that it’s believable to the people we’re trying to help.”

Turabian: Sylvester, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne. 2005. Interview by Operational Leadership Experiences Project team with Combat Studies Institute, digital recording, 20 October. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. [Digital recording stored on CD-ROM at Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.]

MLA: Sylvester, Wayne. Personal recorded interview. 20 October 2005. [Digital recording done by Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, in possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS].

APA: Sylvester, Wayne. (2005). Personal interview with the author on October 20, 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. [Digital recording done by Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, in possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS].

Government Printing Office: Transcript. Interview of Wayne Sylvester, Oct. 20, 2005; Operational Leadership Experiences Project/Combat Studies Institute; Records of the Combat Arms Research Library; Fort Leavenworth, KS. [Online version on MONTH DATE, YEAR, at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/contentdm/home.htm]. UNCLASSIFIED

Interview with LTC Wayne Sylvester 20 October 2005

JM: My name is John McCool [JM] and I’m with the Operational Leadership Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I’m interviewing Lieutenant Colonel [Vernon] Wayne Sylvester on his experiences during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The time is approximately 1100 hours, today’s date is 20 October 2005 and this is an unclassified interview. Before we begin, sir, I’d like to say that if you feel, at any time, we’re entering classified territory, please couch your response in terms that avoid revealing any classified information. And if classification requirements prevent you from responding, simply say you’re not able to answer. Could you please start out by saying what unit you were serving with during your OIF deployment?

WS: I transferred into and took command of the 439th Military Police Detachment in Omaha, Nebraska, a Reserve unit that was identified to support OIF II operations. That occurred in November of 2003 and we subsequently mobilized through Fort Riley and deployed to the Iraqi theater.

JM: What was the time period that you were deployed?

WS: We were mobilized in November of 2003, deployed through 2004, returned to the mobilization station in January 2005. The unit was demobilized in February and returned to Reserve status at that point.

JM: Could you tell me about the 439th MP Detachment – its equipment, its size, its capabilities, its chain of command?

WS: The 439th is one of the six – now eight as two more were added to the force starting in FY 05 – camp liaison detachments in the Army inventory. The wartime mission of those units is actually for liaison with the [South] Korean Army, to coordinate with established prisoner of war camps in that theater of operations. The METL [Mission Essential Task List] tasks, if you will, were – or still are focused – on that wartime mission. The organization and structure, it’s a 12-man Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee detachment, primarily focused on checks and inspections of detention operations for compliance with Army regulations, the Geneva Conventions and other international policies or guidance. As such it’s fairly lightly armed; it is lightly armed, with individual weapons only. Two Humvees for transportation and it derives most of its support from the unit to which it’s attached, whether it is an MP brigade or some other organization at corps-level.

JM: Maybe we could proceed from generally a chronological perspective. Could you describe the circumstances surrounding your mobilization order: where you were located at the time, when it was received?

WS: Personally or as a unit?

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JM: Personally and then as a unit.

WS: I had just left the 89th RSC [Regional Support Command] provost marshal’s office and transferred up to the 530th MP Detachment in Omaha, which was a new CLD [Camp Liaison Detachment] being organized. The area support group commander, under which we were organized, which was our higher headquarters, gave me a phone call one night and said, “Hey, your sister unit, the 439th, has been activated to support OIF II and is short on people. Will you go?” I agreed and as a result, I transferred into the unit at the end of November along with seven other personnel from around the 89th RSC, from around the region, to fill out the unit and prepare for deployment. Fortunately, a lot of the soldiers that transferred in, I’d worked with previously as part of the provost marshal’s activity in the 89th. I knew them personally and had a pretty good working relationship with them. Transferring seven of 12 people to a detachment while trying to prepare for movement, going through the personnel records and getting all the checks done – it was a pretty hectic time. As far as the Unit goes, we were mobilized in November of 2003 at our home station in Omaha, Nebraska. We conducted approximately two weeks of training and preparation in Omaha before we moved to mobilization station at Fort Riley in December. We conducted pre-deployment training and validation for deployment at Fort Riley from mid-December to mid-January. The 439th deployed from Fort Riley in mid- January 2004 via Forbes Field in Topeka to Kuwait. We conducted additional training and preparation for movement for 10 days in Kuwait while at Camp Udairi. Once validated for forward movement by the III Corps Deputy Commanding General, the unit divided. Sergeant Major Carpenter, Major Napier and I flew to Baghdad on a C-130 and arrived at Baghdad International Airport around 2100 on 17 January 2004. Major Kuhlenengel, the Executive Officer, and the rest of the unit moved north in the Unit’s two Humvees in a consolidated convoy. The main body arrived without incident at Camp Cropper, our FOB [Forward Operating Base], at 1100 on 20 January 2004. The unit conducted its assigned mission at this location until 1000 on 13 January 2005 when all unit members flew back to Kuwait for redeployment. The 346th CLD arrived 4 January 2005 to conduct mission training and transfer of authority prior to our departure. We departed Kuwait on 17 January and returned to Fort Riley to complete demobilization training and processing prior to returning to home station in Omaha on 21 January.

JM: Was there any particular training you received before you deployed?

WS: We went through the theater-specific training requirements identified by CFLCC [Coalition Forces Land Component Command] as necessary for units to deploy into theater, as well as the mandatory weapons qualification, NBC [Nuclear, Biological and Chemical] certification, etc. We went through that whole regimen of training both at home station and then at the mobilization station. We did a larger percentage of the theater-specific training at the mobilization station at Fort Riley: convoy movement, FOB security, FOB force protection and things like that were done there.

JM: How would you assess that training? Was it adequate?

WS: At the time, not having a frame of reference, it seemed good. It definitely allowed us to form as a unit. With only 12 guys trying to do everything to get ready to ship out, as well as get trained and get certified, validated for deployment, we met ourselves coming and going often.

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A lot of the training, looking back on it, was more refresher-type training. Close-quarters combat, individual movement techniques and a lot of those type basic-level training events, as opposed to the more – if you want to call it “collective tasks” that we would end up doing in Iraq. We really didn’t train towards what you would call the METL or the mission. As a matter of fact, we didn’t find out specifically what the mission was going to be until we hit the ground in Iraq and only partially received the information while we were about a week out at the mobilization station.

JM: Can you talk about what effect the mobilization had on you as a reservist?

WS: Well, obviously the family impact, trying to make sure everything was covered, that the family was taken care of. They were sort of prepared for me being gone for a year. And not just the immediate family: my parents and brothers and sisters and all that. It was sort of an unexpected situation for them. I was within two years of reaching my mandatory retirement date, had deployed to Honduras once before while I was on Active Duty, but that was really the only deployment away from family and this was sort of an adjustment phase for everybody.

JM: Picking up with your arrival in theater, can you talk about the RSOI [Reception, Staging, Onward-movement and Integration] process? How was this transition conducted? Was there a unit you took over from?

WS: Yes. As I mentioned, we arrived in Kuwait early in the morning at approximately 0200 where we off-loaded our equipment from the C-5A and then moved to a holding area to wait for buses to take us to Camp Udairi. After departing Kuwait International Airport we moved by bus convoy north into the Kuwait desert. As we moved further and further north there were fewer and fewer roads until we were finally driving through the desert with the bus drivers avoiding large pools of standing water. Our arrival in Kuwait was during the rainy season and there was a heavy period of rain just prior to our arrival. Rain water in Kuwait doesn’t seem to run off or soak into the sand and it just sits on the surface creating a very muddy mess. Upon our arrival at Camp Udairi, the unit was assigned to a 60-man tent and we began the training and preparation process required before we would be validated for onward movement to Baghdad. During our stay at Camp Udairi we continued to try and contact the 89th MP Brigade which was to be our higher headquarters in Baghdad. Before we were able to link up with them they departed Camp Virginia and moved up to Baghdad. We did contact the 800th MP Brigade and finally received some information on our mission, but until the 89th MP Brigade replaced the 800th it was unsure just exactly what our final mission would be. We finally located all of our equipment palettes and coordinated their move to Camp Udairi along with access to a 40-foot shipping container. All the unit equipment on the six air palettes we deployed with was trans- loaded by hand into the shipping container so that it could be moved by truck from Kuwait to Baghdad. Once the container was loaded and shipped we coordinated air transport for part of the unit and ground movement for the main body. The 800th MP Brigade told us that we were slated to take over from the 744th MP Battalion, which is an internment and resettlement battalion, that had the mission of the detention facility as well as overseeing the prisons, five of the prisons that were located in and around Baghdad. They had liaison teams, training teams, etc., deployed at those sites from the various companies that were task organized under them. As part of that decision and mission assignment process, the 89th MP Brigade was coming in at that same time. They looked at our capability and the continuing requirement for training the

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 5 UNCLASSIFIED

Iraqi police and security forces and split the mission, basically assigning the 439th the detention facility portion and tasked to provide technical assistance to the Iraqi prisons as necessary. We picked up the detention operation and the prison assistance mission went to a battalion that was basically covering – they split the two battalions that were covering Baghdad east and west and they covered their respective prisons as a result. So we ended up, initially at least, with just the internal, day-to-day operations of the detention facility itself.

JM: Which facility is this?

WS: The high-value detention facility at Camp Cropper.

JM: Camp Cropper. What command was your unit subordinated under?

WS: At the start of the mission we were task organized under the 744th MP Battalion which was scheduled to be replaced by the 112th MP Battalion. After “left seat/right seat” training and transfer of authority with the 744th, we were initially task organized under the 112th MP Battalion, which was a National Guard battalion that was coming into theater to replace some of the OIF I forces. We were task organized under them for about a month, maybe a little longer. At which point they were redeployed or re-task organized under the Marines to support Fallujah I. At that point, we assumed control of not only the detention facility, but also the FOB and the operations of the camp overall and reported directly to the 89th Brigade.

JM: How did your particular responsibilities change when this expanded mission was given to you?

WS: Whereas before we were concentrating specifically on the prison population and dealing with them and the requirements of access to them, after the mission change, we became responsible for the life support for all the soldiers on the base and also all FOB force protection requirements. And in addition to that, we were given the responsibility of organizing their support to the detention operation itself. Whereas before, the battalion had basically allocated manpower for a guard force from its subordinate units, we became responsible for that as well. We were required to identify detention facility manpower requirements, shifts, guard posts along with FOB guard posts, force protection procedures, traffic control and soldier life support functions. The mission expanded from just controlling the prisoners on the inside of the prison to planning and coordinating all life support functions such as water, electrical power, sewage and trash removal and anything else associated with running a camp. It was very much like what I’d assume it takes to run a small city.

JM: What did you see as the major challenges to this mission?

WS: By and large, the non-doctrinal nature of it. Personal opinion here, but Army doctrine does not adequately cover what you do with former regime members (political leaders and dictator) when you go into a country. The EPW [Enemy Prisoner of War] doctrine discusses military personnel, you have IR [Internment/Resettlement] civilian-returnee doctrine that discusses civilians, but the former political heads of the country are a little bit of a gray area. Because of that, there were a lot of unique tasks and requirements.

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 6 UNCLASSIFIED

JM: What were some of those?

WS: Well, you had a large number of intelligence organizations that wanted access to them day and night. They would request access at 0200 and expect the staff and guards to roust the detainee out of bed, get him dressed and moved to the interview site. They would conduct the interviews for hours on end and then return the detainee for movement back to their cell usually early in the morning. The compound consisted of several separate buildings with open yards between them. The problem that this created was that we had to lock the whole facility down while we were moving the detainee. The rational was that the intelligence teams didn’t want the other prisoners seeing which detainees were being interviewed and how long they talked to intelligence teams. Of course the normal activity of the facility such as distributing meals, latrine breaks or exercise periods was disrupted by these moves. Intelligence units were also able to request that a particular detainee be released to their custody for a period of time. The interrogators would come into the facility and sign for the detainee, then transport them to some other site to conduct interviews and once those were complete, return them to our facility. In most cases we had no idea when they would return the detainee and exactly how much baggage they would bring with them. We had several instances when the detainee was returned that they had huge amounts of perishable food with them. The detainees were allowed to visit with their families who provided them with a large feast to celebrate. Because the family wanted them to keep the leftover food, the intelligence personnel would allow them to bring the food back to the detention facility. This placed us in the position of telling the detainee that there was no place to store the food and subsequently throwing it out. As you can imagine, it created a large amount of animosity between our personnel and some of the prisoners. We were also responsible for processing appeals by the detainees and seeing that they were passed up the chain of command. We had detainees making daily appeals of their condition or protesting their detention to the Interim Iraqi Government, our government officials such as [Paul] Bremer, [Donald] Rumsfeld, and President [George W.] Bush. We duly processed each of these written appeals, had them translated and passed them up the chain of command for action. In each case the prisoner expected an immediate response to his appeal because of who he or she had been in the former Iraqi regime and they became very upset when that didn’t happen. While detainee health care is a primary task for any detention facility staff, the population of our camp also presented unique challenges and problems. As most of the detainee population was older, between 50 and 70, they had a wide variety of chronic health conditions. In one instance we had Abu Abbas, the Achille Lauro terrorist, die of a heart attack during a visit by the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]. Needless to say, the attention and investigation into the circumstances was lengthy and detailed. So again, tasked with the safety, security and accountability of prisoners, and this also going on at the same time as the Abu – in my mind it’s a disaster; I’m sure it’s not to others. The Abu problem came to light.

JM: Abu Ghraib [prisoner abuse scandal]?

WS: Abu Ghraib, yes. As a result, we were very sensitive to any indication of abuse, misuse or mistreatment of the prisoners, simply because of the intense scrutiny by a wide variety of Army, DOD [Department of Defense] and U.S. Government inspection teams – not simply because of that – but that became a large part of the mission. Our Camp was subject to a constant flow of inspection teams from the CJTF-7 IG [Combined Joint Task Force – 7 Inspector General], MNF-I [Multi-National Forces – Iraq] Provost Marshal, DOD IG, State Department

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 7 UNCLASSIFIED ambassadors, and teams from coalition partners. In addition, once Iraqi sovereignty was declared in June there were visits by their ministers to view the conditions in the detention facility. So there was a monitoring process that was going on with a large and diverse number of intelligence organizations, U.S. military units, and government agencies. Initially when we took over, the battalion, 744th, had been pretty much fielding those screening issues themselves. Over time, I think, we got it back into appropriate command channels to the brigade and on up the line, to corps and above. Basically screened a lot of that and made sure that before someone showed up at our front gate wanting access, we had validation and verification that they had a reason to be there.

JM: Could you tell me a little bit about Camp Cropper itself, the physical layout – is that something you can go into?

WS: Not really, because it’s still an active base. In general, it’s located within Baghdad. It’s approximately a kilometer and a half square. The buildings and the structures themselves are an old Iraqi military installation, as much of the installations are in and around Baghdad. It’s not really unique in that nature. The buildings and supporting infrastructure were used by the Iraqi military prior to their defeat by U.S. forces and were bombed during the attack into Baghdad. Even with the bomb damage, the Camp was in better shape than most of the homes that normal Iraqis live in. The best aspect of the Camp was that all of the buildings still standing were reinforced concrete which afforded good protection from shrapnel caused by indirect fire attacks. As the number of units on the Camp decreased, we were able to move all the soldiers into the hardened structures and provide them with better and relatively safer living conditions. The number of units on the Camp while the 744th was in control required some soldiers to live in tents. Because of blowing dust, heat and water leaks, the tents were very difficult to live in, on top of the constant threat of the indirect fire attacks.

JM: Can you tell me how many prisoners were there – the range of numbers?

WS: We were set up to handle a maximum of 126 detainees.

JM: How many were actually there?

WS: We were set up to handle a maximum of 126.

JM: Understood.

WS: It varied.

JM: There were some issues about overcrowding if I remember correctly.

WS: Well, when Camp Cropper was the corps holding area, there were really two separate areas. The Camp had separate compounds for normal detainees and for the High-Value Detainees [HVD]. By the time we arrived, the corps holding area for the normal status detainees had been disbanded and removed. That wasn’t on site when we arrived. That’s where a majority of the overcrowding issues were really brought to light. We had no overcrowding problem in the HVD compound.

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JM: Another question – and maybe you can answer it, maybe you can’t: Can you describe what a typical day was like for a prisoner?

WS: In general, when we started, because of a myriad of factors – some of them intelligence related, some of them security related – the detainees spent the vast majority of their days in their detention cells. When we first arrived, there were complaints from the ICRC that the detainees were getting only one hour of fresh air outside of their cells. That, because of security issues, etc., was true to a degree. There were instances in their latrine moves, for example, when a detainee was taken from their cell for a latrine break or for a shower. Those times really weren’t counted as exercise time by the ICRC. So, over time, we re-engineered some of the schedule and were able to get their fresh air access up to about four hours a day. The rest of the time, basically, they’re pretty much isolated in a room by themselves. There were groups that were identified that could be together as a group. Those designations were defined by the intelligence-handling organizations and we pretty much worked with them to maintain that. They’d wake up, lights on at 0700. Get rotated through for a latrine break, an MRE [Meals, Ready to Eat] breakfast. Depending on what section of the day their recreation time was scheduled, they’d be pulled out into the yard where they could be out in the open air for a while. Then they’d be back in the cell. Lunch was an MRE, another latrine break. Dinner was an MRE, and then lights out about 2200-2300 depending on what was going on with the interrogations at the time.

JM: Were all the prisoners treated the same way or had the same schedule? Or was it like priority status, some people got different treatment than others?

WS: Only from the sense of when the interrogations happened. As far as our schedule for handling the detainees, they were all treated the same way. They all got the same food, the same medical care, the same exercise right on down the line. What would interrupt that would be an intelligence organization wanting to talk to a particular person at 2 o’clock in the morning. They’d set that up, ask us for access at that time, they’d come in and we’d log them in. The guard would bring the detainee up to the interrogation trailer, standby until that was finished and then take them back. Sometimes those interrogations lasted four, six, eight hours depending on what they were after.

JM: So how would you characterize the relationship between the MPs and the interrogators? Were they just providing access to the prisoners?

WS: Yeah, pretty much. We had a very hands-off – made it real clear right up front with the intelligence organizations that we were not in the interrogation business. We were in the securing and accounting for people business. We had a few bits of friction with their chain of command about what their interrogators were allowed to bring into the facility and what they weren’t. One of the techniques was to allow detainees certain privileges if they were complying or going along with the interrogation. Basically they were bringing them a Coke or a candy bar, something like that. They weren’t advising us, so we put a stop to that because they’d be leaving them with a metal can in their cell without the guard’s knowledge. We put a lot more control over that. There was some friction initially, but by and large, I think we had a good working relationship.

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JM: Did they want the MPs to get into the interrogation business?

WS: Not while we were there at all. We were never part of that process and we were only, again, into the accountability and control of the prisoners, and not into the interrogation part. The level of interrogation was at the strategic level in some cases. Even if we’d wanted to assist, I doubt that we’d have been of any service at all, simply because of the type and the methods they were using.

JM: What status and treatment standard was determined for the detainees in your custody? And how was the standard expressed as well?

WS: The Geneva Conventions, Army Regulation 190-8, those were the guidelines.

JM: What were the parameters you were following?

WS: As far as – I’m not sure of your question.

JM: How did they have to be treated, as following the Geneva Conventions?

WS: Basically, humane treatment, providing life-sustaining support to the best of our ability. There was really no special or other guidance beyond that. The Geneva Conventions say they get two blankets and a cot and certain comfort items and that was basically our guideline. As required by Army regulations we also posted, in Arabic, the procedures for detainees to lodge complaints about mistreatment. When we in-processed a new detainee, one of our linguists would explain the rules of the Camp, the schedule, required prisoner conduct, the actions that could result in our using deadly force, and other basic information. We gave them as much information as possible, considering security requirements, to allow them to stay out of trouble and comply with Camp requirements.

JM: All the people there were treated with the same guideline, under the same guidelines?

WS: Yes. I made a point of ensuring that the 439th officers and NCOs constantly reinforced the equal treatment requirements with the guards and the administrative staff. We did our best to maintain equal treatment to prevent detainees from developing animosity against the guards or other prisoners because of perceived inequities.

JM: Can you say who were some of the HVDs in your custody?

WS: As I’ve said, basically they were the leadership of the former Iraqi regime, from Saddam Hussein on down. So we held any members of the “Deck of 55” who were identified by CFLCC or MNF-I as “persons of interest.” As the mission progressed we also became the facility of choice to hold high level insurgent leaders or persons that posed a unique security threat to the new Iraqi government.

JM: So at one point or another, all the Deck of 55 guys were going through Camp Cropper?

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WS: Well, no. Some of them we hadn’t captured. One, I believe, was held at Abu [Ghraib]. But by and large, if they were in custody, most were kept at our facility.

JM: So Chemical Ali was there [Ali Hassan al-Majid], Tariq Aziz, those kind of guys?

WS: Yes.

JM: Were there also HVCs [High-Value Criminals] there as well?

WS: Not initially, as there were no HVCs until around the time Iraqi sovereignty was declared in June. As sovereignty hadn’t been declared when we first arrived, basically they were all detainees identified as EPWs or CIs in those categories. When sovereignty was declared in June, as part of that process, the Interim Iraqi Government [IIG] leveled charges against 12 of the detainees. At which point, because of that change of authority, we designated those 12 individuals as High-Value Criminals, because they’d been charged by the Interim Iraqi Government, and segregated them in a different part of the camp. Even though the HVCs were moved to their own compound, we continued to operate that area under the same rules and guidelines. When the IIG Ministers began to make their visits to the facility, their first comments were that the HVCs were treated too well and that they had better living conditions than the average Iraqi citizen.

JM: What were they charged with?

WS: Basically crimes against humanity, crimes against the Iraqi people.

JM: Were these foreigners? Were these Iraqi criminals?

WS: These were the former regime members, Ba’ath Party officials and Saddam’s hand picked leaders.

JM: Were there any special challenges with guarding the worst of the worst?

WS: Some, in the sense that they were still convinced of their place, their position in the government. We had difficulties in explaining to them that they were, in fact, only detainees and that they would comply with the rules and requirements of the camp. Screening of their care packages was a particular headache. Family members would ship huge amounts of food, perishable food primarily. Of course, any medical issue immediately created an immediate skyrocket up the chain of command. I would say, for instance, if a prisoner decided that he was going to go on a hunger strike for whatever reason, in a lot of cases, while you’d make notification up the chain of command that that was going on, the reaction to it probably wasn’t as strong with a regular criminal detainee as it was with one of these guys. We got into monitoring how many milliliters of water they were drinking a day, etc., to compensate for some of that and deal with the interest level from the chain of command and higher headquarters. As well as their medical issues – because Iraq doesn’t have what we’d consider a modern medical care capability, even though these guys were the cream, or the higher level, of the former government, they had a lot of medical problems that required a lot of intense care.

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Tuberculosis exposure, diabetes, glaucoma, you name it, when it comes to a geriatric disease these guys had it.

JM: Was it some of your soldiers we saw on TV talking about Saddam, how he loved Doritos and hated Fruit Loops and some of his rather antiquated views on male-female relations?

WS: Those were soldiers from one of the companies detailed to support us.

JM: Would you be able to offer any deeper insights into Saddam himself? Did you have any interactions with him?

WS: As far as sitting down and talking with him, no. I approached him strictly from a professional aspect in that he was a detainee, I was the camp commandant. He was required to comply with the rules and requirements. One of the compliance issues caused an early run-in between us. He decided he wasn’t going to take his food as the rest of the prisoners received theirs, through a hatch in the door. And decided he was going to go on a hunger strike as a result, as long as we were going to deliver the food through the door. I went in there two or three times and explained to him that the rules applied to him like everyone else. He tried to play games with the guards by asking for a latrine break about the time the meals were delivered and then picking up the meal on his way back to the cell so that he could have his way and not take the MRE, etc., through the door. I instructed the guards not to let him control the situation and ensure that the required meal procedure was followed. After about three days, he saw our side of things.

JM: He got hungry?

WS: He got hungry.

JM: What about just his physical presence?

WS: Physical presence, yes. That one I can’t talk about. I’ll let it just stay at that. Let’s just say that my perceptions of him were not so much from my dealing with him, but what I saw that really stuck in my mind was the relationship between the new Iraqi government, their dealings with him, and his still-perceived belief, in his mind, that he was still the president, still the leader, still the ruler. His presence, I mean, he immediately intimidates a room full of Iraqi officials. If you go into a room with Iraqi citizens, with Iraqi government officials in it, they still haven’t shaken off the intimidation factor that he held over them for all those years. In their first meetings to prefer criminal charges against Saddam, after sovereignty was declared, they were very intimidated by him. In most meetings he was very abrupt with them and frequently got to the point of calling them names and dismissing their actions. Over time, the investigating judge and other officials became more certain of their authority and they were not intimidated by him. The end result was some very short meetings between the Iraqi officials and Saddam.

JM: Were there any of the other high profile guys you interacted with on a personal or professional basis?

WS: Listening to Tariq Aziz’s complaints until I was probably sick of them.

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JM: What were some of his complaints?

WS: We obviously weren’t treating him according to his station. He wanted cigars. He wanted a large number of things. He was constantly coming up with problems and issues that we should see to and trying to order the guards and the staff around. A good portion of the detainees had claims that, when they were captured, they had hundreds of thousands of dollars in their possession, along with all kinds of valuable property, taken from them that were never to be seen again. Tariq also had numerous claims, none of which could be substantiated by anyone. Basically they were just playing the system as much as they could. He also claimed that we were holding mail and packages from his family and not delivering them. He complained to the ICRC about the intolerable situation and we ended up showing them the documentation that anything we received was processed and delivered to the detainees after security screening. As the ICRC was the only means for the detainees to send or receive messages and packages, it was pretty easy for us to prove our point. That was mostly the day-to-day tasks: a lot of babysitting and listening to their complaints.

JM: What were the guidelines that you put down governing your soldiers’ behavior around these HVDs? What could they do, what couldn’t they do?

WS: Basically the guidelines were to treat them with respect and make sure that they understand that the soldiers were in control of the situation. That the detainees do what the guards tell them regardless of their station, former station, or rank. That under no circumstances – physical, verbal or any type of abuse was unacceptable. Not only because these were high-profile prisoners, but that’s just the way the American Army does things, or should do things. As much as possible, we worked to ensure that neither the detainees nor the guards were ever in a position that placed either one in danger. Guards always had overwhelming manpower anytime they dealt with a group or an individual. Anytime the detainees were moved, we moved them in a manner so they were handcuffed and secure. These control procedures protected the detainees from not only trying to do something to the guard, but also from trying to escape. A lot of those procedural issues were focused basically on maintaining control and ensuring that the guards were never placed in the position where it was their word against the detainees, simply because of all the media attention, etc. With the immediate chain of command present, they, the soldiers, had the protection of NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officers] and other soldiers so that could say, in fact, there was no abuse going on. There were always several observers of any guard and detainee interaction so that the true situation could be verified from multiple sources.

JM: Could you tell me about your interactions with the ICRC? Did they live at Camp Cropper or did they just show up periodically?

WS: The schedule called for them to come around about every six to eight weeks to visit Camp Cropper to see the conditions and see how things were going. The reality was that about the time we arrived in country, they had just had the ICRC headquarters bombing and they evacuated everybody from country. So any time they came in to check a detention facility, they flew in from Jordan to the Baghdad Airport and would move by ground to that facility. So if there was a security situation – if the route wasn’t secured under their own means or resources – they wouldn’t accept any security or escort from U.S. forces, no helicopter flights, nothing, just

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 13 UNCLASSIFIED to maintain their impartiality. They wouldn’t go to those facilities. So, trips to Abu or [Camp] Bucca or any of the other prison facilities around the country, in a lot of cases were called off at the last minute. As Baghdad was a central location and their main entry point into the country, they seemed to be in our backyard a lot. Any time there was another tour called off, they more than likely would come up on our doorstep and stay for two or three days. They would come into our facility and stay in the FOB itself. We provided them with rooms and a place to work. They had unrestricted – I shouldn’t say unrestricted – they had access to the detainees to conduct interviews with each individual. The guard remained in the proximity, but out of earshot to allow them an opportunity for an unmonitored discussion.

JM: What were some of the complaints that they had with your operation, with how the detainees were treated?

WS: Initially, the biggest complaint was the amount of access to fresh air, due to the two hours outside, hour or two outside, after being in a single room, or an 8-by-10 room, for 23 hours or 22 hours, whatever it was. That was a major complaint. They saw that as a health issue. The food was also a major concern. When we arrived the detainees were receiving three MREs a day that had been field-stripped to remove the hazardous items. Recreation, food, adequate shower facilities were some of the constant issues, including adequate hot water. As the facility was a former Iraqi military facility, everything was in disrepair. Plumbing, power, pretty much you name it; it just didn’t work very well. So we spent a lot of time working with, dealing with their complaints, about the infrastructure. And then the biggest issue I would say that developed with them, at the June timeframe, when sovereignty was declared, their question became, “Why are U.S. forces still holding these enemy prisoners of war or civilian internees? The Iraqis are now in control and they should be turned over or release them, period.” Fortunately, by that time, that was one I was able to pass up the chain to legal experts.

JM: What was the justification or explanation?

WS: They were still a security threat to the sovereignty of the country of Iraq.

JM: Their continued confinement couldn’t be guaranteed?

WS: Under the Iraqi regime, they didn’t have control of the facilities to care for them or hold them at the time and, as such, they were deemed a continuing security threat to the new Iraqi government.

JM: Did you feel that these ICRC complaints were justified?

WS: Probably not as strongly as they proposed or presented them in a lot of cases. One of the comments we got from the Interim Iraqi Government officials was that the majority of the conditions for the detainees were better than the average Iraqi had in their homes. Power, consistent power, light, clean water, daily medical care, exercise, and so a lot of those conditions were unexpected – they were really surprised. The Interim Iraqi Government, after June, when they started visiting the facilities, they were surprised at the condition the detainees were being held in. They thought they were too good especially in light of the conditions found in Saddam’s prisons and jails.

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JM: What complaints did you resolve and for what did you say, “We’re not going to do that”?

WS: I’ll start with the biggest issue we refused – well, that we were not allowed, refused to do, couch it in whatever terms, was family visits, on-site. One, the sensitive nature of the detainees we held. OPSEC [Operational Security] was a very critical issue for us. We basically did our best to make sure that the actual location of the detainees, this group of detainees, was still a question and wasn’t generally known by the populace. A very real threat existed of factions that wanted to free the detainees and those that wanted to kill them in retaliation for past abuses. In any case, family visits were something that the ICRC hit every time they came. And basically we said the security situation would not allow us to meet that requirement. On the other hand, the material conditions of the camp, I think over time, we were able to improve. We switched from three MREs a day, to two hot meals and an MRE. Ensured they had adequate bottled water and bulk water as well to wash their own clothes and take care of those type things. Increase the capacity of the shower facilities to make sure that everybody had two showers a week, at a minimum. In the case of the females, they received three. More recreation time. We were able to work with the intelligence organizations. Part of the restrictions, early on, for the recreation part, was due to the intelligence collection. We didn’t want different groups of the detainees talking to each other and getting their stories together. So they were held apart. Because of that, the rotation for recreation was limited. Over time, we were able to work out which groups could be close or in proximity to each other. So we improved that. Medical care over time improved. We got to the point that we weren’t just caring for the basic needs, but also providing them with optometry and audiology. We had detainees that received hernia operations with which they had been living for a lot of years before the war. We improved their medical condition. By the time we rotated out, we had also got to the point that we were allowing them to make family phone calls, so they could at least talk to their families without actual physical visits.

JM: You mentioned that you had some female detainees there. How many?

WS: Two.

JM: One of them was “Doctor Germ”, the nickname [Dr. Rihab Taha]?

WS: Doctor Germ, yes.

JM: What were the challenges with female detainees?

WS: Initially, the problem was the fact that our guard force was composed of National Guard units that came out of combat arms, two armored units that were all men. The detachment, my detachment, was all male. So we had the situation where we had an all-male guard force and an administrative force and no female guards. So we went back to the brigade and had to basically identify personnel within the brigade that could be transferred and work as guards at the facility to provide some privacy and some level of – I don’t know what you’d call that – equality. In the case of Taha, we also had the complication of having her husband as a detainee. I think she was wife number three. Her husband made constant requests that they be allowed to live together in the compound and for security reasons that was something I would not permit. Also the intelligence teams didn’t want them talking together during the initial interrogation

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 15 UNCLASSIFIED phases. Over time, as the interrogations progressed, their separation became less of a necessity and we worked it out with the intelligence teams to allow them to spend their exercise time together in the yard. The other female detainee, Huda Ammash – Dr. Anthrax – suffered from claustrophobia and had what amounted to seizures when held in a normal size cell. Because of her condition she was held by herself in a group size room meant to hold 10-12 detainees. When we first took over the mission she was very reluctant to leave her room unless all the other detainees were locked down. Over time she grew more comfortable with the situation and we were able to get her to exercise at the same time as other groups. She took a particular liking to one of my sergeant majors as he is a Missouri State graduate and that is where she did her doctoral work. As the sergeant major was determined to fly the Missouri State University flag in the compound, she took it as a point of pride to care for the flag and wash it whenever it looked dusty.

JM: When did you first hear about the abuses, or did you hear rumors of the abuses, at Abu Ghraib?

WS: We arrived in country the end of January and I talked with the 744th commander who we were replacing. He told me that there were concerns about detainee treatment and the incidents that had occurred when the Corps Holding Area was located at Camp Cropper but nothing else. Really there was nothing initially when we came in country that was circulating about abuse or suspected abuse or anything like that. Early in February, the news media hit about General [Antonio] Taguba’s investigation, the [Article] 15-6, a lot of that information. Really, I think, we learned about it about the same time as the rest of the world.

JM: This was about late-April 2004?

WS: Pretty much, yeah. We were taking people to and from Abu, continuing to conduct the mission. But, by and large, it was a pretty rare occurrence that information about the circumstances at Abu filtered out. At one point, the operation at Camp Cropper was scheduled to move to Abu Ghraib and we conducted several terrain walks to check conditions at their FOB. They were subjected to numerous insurgent indirect fire attacks and several detainees were injured or killed during those attacks. We were very concerned about moving our detainee population to Abu for that reason and not because of the revelations about the abuse.

JM: About how far apart were the two camps?

WS: About 18 miles.

JM: What did you think when you first heard this?

WS: Well, I really didn’t believe it. It sounded hardly credible that U.S. soldiers would do something like that, or do what was alleged, and that it was MPs in particular. That’s one of the missions – EPW/CI detainee operations – that we train for as military police. The fact that they were at the root of it, it was just really hard to believe.

JM: In your estimation, what went wrong?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 16 UNCLASSIFIED

WS: Personally, not knowing exactly the situation and all the details, but I think it was a failure of leadership. One of the things that I stressed and required was that the NCOs and the officers be in with their soldiers, checking on them, making sure they’re doing okay, making sure that if they’ve got issues or problems, if anything’s going on out of the ordinary, that it’s coming to the chain of command; that the NCOs are not just checking on their soldiers, but caring for their soldiers. My impression is that there wasn’t much of that going on at Abu.

JM: Is that how you account for Camp Cropper not being, or not becoming, an Abu Ghraib, having adequate supervision?

WS: I would say supervision. The officers and NCOs from the supporting company were on-site in the compound as part of normal operations. Because of this, we had some real knockdown, drag-out fights with the NCOs and they were supervision fights, I’d say, arguments. Because we would get some of the interrogation, some of the intelligence folks, would come in and say, “Hey, my detainee is claiming he’s being abused.” That’s why I made the comment about never placing a guard in the position where he was one-on-one with a detainee, so he had that backup. The NCOs were sure of their guards and sure of the treatment that they were providing to the detainees, along with the officers, because they were there, they were on the spot, 24 hours a day. But because the allegation was leveled we were required to investigate the situation and the NCOs and officers vehemently defended their soldiers and viewed the investigation as a challenge to their credibility.

JM: Did you make any changes, in any event, at Camp Cropper after this scandal hit?

WS: One of the things we did, as detainees left our custody and returned to our custody, we started taking digital pictures of their physical condition. We documented and recorded that they weren’t leaving with any broken bones or bruises and were coming back the same way.

JM: Were there any significant instances of unrest at Camp Cropper? You mentioned that some guys went on hunger strikes, but did anything get more serious than that?

WS: Not really. The biggest issue that we came across was after the criminal detainees were segregated into their own part of the compound. There was a discussion between the Interim Iraqi Government and the ICRC about whether or not the ICRC was going to be allowed in to see them (HVCs) and interview them. The first iteration of that, after much discussion, they were allowed in. But the ICRC, because of their tendency to just drop by, they didn’t do a very good job of coordinating that request in advance. So we had one situation, one instance, where they were allowed in to see the HVDs (under our authority) but were not allowed to see the HVCs (under IIG authority). Of course, there are no secrets in a prison. The HVCs learned of that and immediately, as a group, decided they were going to go on a hunger strike. Again, that lasted three or four days. With negotiations between the ICRC and the Interim Iraqi Government, the ICRC was eventually allowed to come back in and go visit the HVCs at a later time. I think it was, like, two or three weeks later. But no attempts to escape, no assaults on the guards. We did have some verbal altercations between the detainees. Pretty serious in their culture: they took off their shoes and threw them at each other.

JM: Between the detainees themselves? What was the genesis?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 17 UNCLASSIFIED

WS: Yes, between some of the HVCs and HVDs. “You’re the reason I’m here; if you hadn’t done such-and-such I wouldn’t even be here. It’s your fault.”

JM: Were they able to communicate with each other?

WS: In small groups, in groups of seven, basically.

JM: You determined the complements?

WS: The intelligence groups identified who could associate with each other and who couldn’t. As time passed and the interrogations gathered as much intelligence as possible, it became less crucial to keep the detainees separated. As the conditions changed we allowed several of the seven-man groups into the exercise yards at the same time to get more fresh air. In those situations we brought out extra guards outside the wire armed with machineguns to maintain the ability to use overwhelming force if necessary.

JM: What did you find were the most effective techniques of ensuring compliance with the rules, making sure people didn’t get out of line or assault the guards?

WS: Overwhelming manpower. Any time they moved, the guards in the tower were up observing any movement. The guards on the ground – with seven people, we had a minimum of two guards for a group of seven, in addition to the NCOIC [Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge] for the overall compound and the NCOIC for each building. There was a lot of that. You have to remember that our population was nowhere near as large as those at Abu or Bucca. They were dealing with a much larger number of people per guard. Our population, by and large, was older. I think the average age was, at one time, I think the average age was 60 to 62. It decreased from that to 55 after there were some releases, some deaths, which changed the complexion of the population. They were pretty much an older group of folks who really weren’t too physically capable. Again, we had people with arthritis, broken arches, you name it.

JM: You mentioned there were some deaths. How did those occur? What was the cause of death?

WS: When we first arrived, the 744th was dealing with the death of a detainee at the CASH [Corps Area Support Hospital], as I remember, while he was there for tests. He’d gotten agitated and somehow flipped himself off the gurney. The gurney fell on him and he had a brainstem compression as a result. I wasn’t too involved with the investigation of that death. We had one detainee who was transferred to a hospice due to lung cancer. He was in his final days. There was Abbas, Abu Abbas. During an ICRC visit, he basically had a heart attack and died on us right there on the spot. And that’s it.

JM: What were the particular challenges with respect to site security for the whole camp? Were there any changes implemented as a response to threats or anything like that?

WS: That gets into force protection. I don’t know how close we can come to that. As with every FOB in the Baghdad area, you were subject to indirect fire. That was probably our biggest threat. I know that there were exterior patrols controlled by MNC-I [Multinational Corps-Iraq]

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 18 UNCLASSIFIED at the corps-level and above that were, I think, in general done for force protection of the overall area and not this particular camp. Of course we had our own internal QRF [Quick Reaction Force] both for the compound and for the defense of the FOB. Our FOB was internal to a larger secure area with camps surrounding ours, each with its own perimeter security.

JM: Did you ever have to activate the QRF?

WS: On a couple occasions. One of the situations that developed over time was that the area around the camp was converted to other use or returned to control of the Iraqi government. As a result, we ended up with a lot more civilian Iraqi traffic than we had in the past. So there were some concerns with that. We never really had any incident or situation develop as a result of that. It was just a concern on our part. For the most part, our big issue was indirect fire. We had one incident of – it wasn’t our camp, so we’ll just leave it at that. As far as activating the QRF, there was a situation where an ice cooler was left next to our perimeter fence. The fence bordered a very active road and after areas around our Camp were turned over to the Iraqis, there was large volume of traffic on the road. To gain access to the area, vehicles still had to go through controlled checkpoints but they were operated by contractors working for the Iraqi government so we never really knew how effective they were. Because of that uncertainty we deployed our QRF to cordon off the area around the suspicious cooler in case it was an IED [Improvised Explosive Device].

JM: You’ve probably heard the allegation by Dr. Rob Barton who said that there were, in his opinion, some prisoners who were “softened up” – his words – before they arrived at Camp Cropper in an induction process that he, I believe, called “purgatory.” Did you see any evidence of this?

WS: Let me start by saying that there was no change in the number of detainees that were in the facility when we arrived, probably for the first three, maybe four, months – I’d have to go back and look at the records – we didn’t receive any intakes from anybody. We had a lot of situations where, because we looked like a prison camp, because we were – a lot of the brigades and division-level teams that were transporting prisoners, they’d show up with prisoners they wanted to drop off. We’d have to turn them away, basically, and say, “What you’re looking for is up the road or in a different location.” So when he says that, I have no experience with taking in anyone into the facility probably, I would say, as far into the rotation as June. And at that point, we instituted the picture-taking and the questioning about, “How were you treated when you were captured?” just to get a baseline. So I can’t really support or comment on anything he’s claimed.

JM: Do you know how the kind of embarrassing photos of Saddam in his underwear managed to get out?

WS: That’s an on-going investigation, which I cannot comment on.

JM: Very well. Did your soldiers undergo any additional training while they were stationed at Camp Cropper?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 19 UNCLASSIFIED

WS: Yes, we had a mobile training team from the MP school come in and basically conduct 31E detention operations training with the National Guard units that we had, for guards and tower guards, etc. And they ran my guys (439th) through the same training, which was mostly focused on running a prison in the United States. Not a whole lot of theater-specific focus, if you will. It was still valuable training, just wasn’t as focused as we would have liked. We also did some training with the other government agencies that came in to provide the guards with a perspective on what sort of detainees they were dealing with, what some of the things they had done in the past were and how they were capable of ruthless action. As a result of that training, we tried to convey to the guards that just because they were an older person, don’t get complacent. They could still shove a pencil up into your eye, so we were just trying to get them into the mindset that this wasn’t a secure and safe environment.

JM: This training, was this something that couldn’t be provided back at home station? Why did you need a mobile training team to do that?

WS: Well, initially, the theater-specific training that all Reserve component units – I can’t speak to the Active or what their training topics were – but as far as the Reserve component goes, you were looking at getting your basic combat skills reinforced, basic command and control, troop leading, etc. And that was the main focus of the pre-deployment type of training. As I mentioned, my detachment didn’t receive any mission information until we were just ready to leave the mobilization station. So really, in a lot of cases there wasn’t a lot of mission focused training prior to deployment. Matter of fact, it was the same situation for the National Guard unit that took over our guard force mission: they had a totally different expectation of what their mission was going to be up until the time they actually arrived in Iraq. So a lot of that training focus, you didn’t have the advanced information to know whether it was going to be needed. The MTT provided a focused training package on detention operations which served as a refresher for some and initial training for other soldiers.

JM: How would you rate the performance of the soldiers in your command?

WS: I’d say, by and large, with the extreme restrictions on resources and personnel, their performance was exceptional.

JM: What do you mean by extreme restrictions?

WS: The drawdown of MP forces over time, between OIF I and OIF II and OIF III, or I guess they’re not calling it III now – they’re calling it something different. Basically, you had an increasing mission with fewer resources. So, for instance, the 112th MP Battalion was re-tasked and sent to the Fallujah fight and they never came back. You’re looking at a 12-man detachment doing the job of an MP battalion headquarters, which has about 70 people. You’re looking at a National Guard combined company, of two different units, of about 180 people, doing a mission that was previously done by two MP companies. Because of that, you had long duty days, few days off, and a lot of stress as a result.

JM: What had the greatest impact, positive or negative, on your soldier’s morale? How did you manage that?

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WS: We were really fortunate, I think, to have a means for soldiers to contact their families. The 744th had managed to get an Internet tent that provided the soldiers with e-mail access, basically a direct conduit, as well as voiceover IP phones. So a soldier could come off shift and go into the tent and pick up the phone and talk to their family or send e-mail to maintain that contact. Over time we were able to improve the physical training facilities on the FOB. We contracted with an Iraqi business to refurbish one of the large warehouses on the FOB, to build a weight room and a basketball court, so there were some outlets for some of those frustrations. But, that took time. Initially that wasn’t there. Really, the family contact is the biggest thing I could point to. There was really no restriction as far as the ability to just go in and get on the e-mail or Internet chat and talk with family.

JM: Looking back, what would consider your most significant accomplishment?

WS: The HVDs all lived and the HVCs were returned to the control of the Interim Iraqi Government to stand trial. That’s probably number one. Number two is all the soldiers all came home. Some of us in worse shape than others, but we were all home.

JM: How was Camp Cropper different when you left it?

WS: Well, it wasn’t a bombed-out hulk any more. During OIF I, the Air Force had pretty liberally sprinkled it with JDAMs [Joint Direct Attack Munitions]. There was a lot of debris, a lot of destroyed buildings, infrastructure was basically non-existent. We were able to rebuild, reorganize the facility to provide a better living condition for the soldiers. We probably were one of the best-kept secrets as far as soldier living conditions in the Baghdad area: quite a bit of space, cleaned up debris, got a lot of trash out of the area. One of the constant headaches is that we were located in the area of a landfill and as a result, we really couldn’t dig much without finding trash and having some real environmental problems. We managed to alleviate all of that. While we had some close calls with indirect fire, and one or two IEDs for patrols that were out in the city, we had no real injuries. I take that back. We did have two incidents. One, where our supply folks were up at one of the local logistics support bases and were hit by mortar fire, and then the same thing on some of the guards in another instance. Pretty much we were able to improve the force protection so the soldiers were better protected – as they were sitting targets; couldn’t move for all intents and purposes – had the protection they needed and had as much security as possible.

JM: Can you talk a little bit about the hand-off? What unit replaced you and what advice did you have to your successor?

WS: We were replaced by another CLD. Their rank structure was different than ours; it more closely matched the baseline TOE [Table of Organization and Equipment]. Their rank structure pretty much complied with the TOE and they were able to fall-in on the equipment we deployed with and signed for during the mission.

JM: Was that the 346th MP Detachment?

WS: Yes. I had the benefit of having two majors, two command sergeants major, a master sergeant, a sergeant first class, two E-6s, two E-5s. I think I’m getting mixed up. I have one extra

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 21 UNCLASSIFIED in there. And I had one SP-4. Probably two grades higher than the TOE calls for across the board. We lost one of the majors back to the States because of a health issue. He was eventually replaced by another major. The experience level, if nothing else, of my NCOs and officers was higher than the 346th’s, and that was one of the issues that I passed to the incoming commander. The parade of people through the facility generally hovered around the two- and three-star [general] level, so a lot of the interaction was with a lot of high-level, higher-ranking military as well as with political personnel. So a lot of it (the mission) called for tact and a very reasoned approach to deal with a lot of these people. In a lot of cases, the high-level visitors would show up on the spur of the moment and the officer or NCO on site had to just make it up as they went along. That was probably the biggest challenge – that level of interest, that level of dignitary that came to visit the facility.

JM: Can you mention anybody by name or kind of tell what kinds of dignitaries you’re talking about?

WS: The Volker Commission conducted several interviews of the HVDs to gather information.

JM: The [United Nations] Oil-for-Food guys?

WS: Yes, the Oil-for-Food investigators spent a good deal of time interviewing the HVDs. In addition we hosted Lord Butler and his team as they conducted the inquiry into the British intelligence situation; also senior-level people from FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], ambassadors and then the Interim Iraqi Government ministers. Later in the mission, we spent a great deal of time and effort in providing security for the HVC lawyers as they met with their clients prior to the start of the criminal trials.

JM: Looking back on the period from when you first received your mobilization order until you processed out of theater, what were some of the major lessons learned that you had?

WS: Never skimp on safety. Everyone in the unit gets busy and there’s a tendency to try to cut corners. It always, always, always comes back to bite you. We had a situation where one of the sergeants was moving water into the compound with a rough-terrain forklift. Because all the other guards were busy, he was trying to get the job done by himself. He decided to move the water without a ground guide. He hit one of the water buffaloes and there was a detainee behind the water buffalo washing his clothes. The detainee was knocked down, got a few stitches. Fortunately that was all. But again, it points out the fact that you have to constantly reinforce and comply and apply safety procedures in everything you do. I obviously can’t talk to direct combat, because basically I never saw any. But every time we experienced an injury, it was from cutting corners with safety. Other lessons: Letting the NCOs and officers do their jobs. Not trying to micromanage what they’re doing. Give them a mission. Don’t tell them how to do the task, basically give them the mission and let them use their initiative and experience to get the mission done. That was one of the keys in my mind. There’s no way you can be everywhere all the time as a leader. You have to develop that relationship with everybody in the unit so that you know what their capabilities are and that you can trust them, give them a mission and let them run with it.

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 22 UNCLASSIFIED

JM: Are there any lessons in your mind that the U.S. military learned, or lessons you think perhaps they should learn, from your unit’s experience?

WS: Probably the biggest one is the information operations aspect. Knowing that there are strategic-level effects that are going to come out of the corporal on the corner doing something. The private at Abu abusing prisoners – that probably caused more U.S. casualties than the entirety of OIF I in my mind: the reaction by the Arab community to it as a result of that abuse becoming public caused significant problems operationally and strategically. Not that it shouldn’t have become public, but that the Army as a whole should have been aware of it in advance, had taken steps to deal with it and was able to present that along with the revelation that there was an incident, that we were dealing with the perpetrators and that we weren’t caught with our pants down, so to speak. That’s probably the biggest one. There is no question in my mind that the threat, the adversary, can’t hold a candle to us over there. It’s the information side of things and our ability to present our side of the picture so that it’s believable to the people we’re trying to help.

JM: What are your feelings generally with respect to the heavy Guard and Reserve presence in OIF? Do you feel as a reservist that you were you set up for success over there?

WS: I think like any other unit that’s mobilized and deployed, you’re going to have challenges. With the Reserve component you actually have some advantages. The soldiers in your unit are generally more mature, more experienced, so that when faced with a situation they’re pretty adaptable. Not saying that the Active guys aren’t; they just don’t have that level of experience and exposure to the diversity of areas. As an example, my XO is a power-line electrical engineer. He builds power lines as a part of what he does for a living. His expertise let us solve our power generation problems on the FOB and he provided a lot of assistance to people in other camps and FOBs around us. There’s a lot of that type of diverse capability in Reserve units. On the flip side, there’s probably not as much basic combat training and basic combat operations-type comfort with Reserve units. Proficiency and capability comes with training and experience, but it’s not there immediately. So it takes a little while to build that as you’re coming into a hostile situation.

JM: Maybe as a wrap-up, are there any personal lessons that you learned from your experience that you feel made you a better leader or contributed to your professional development in a positive way?

WS: Well, supporting and being part of the Battle Command Training Program for 13 years before I deployed helped me understand the situation a lot better. I think knowing how the relationships and the interaction between the higher headquarters were supposed to work and in some cases didn’t work was an advantage. Having a pretty diverse set of assignments both Active and Reserve, experiences, as part of my military background helped a lot – everything from troop-leading to division-level staff, etc. But that’s really nothing too unique. I don’t know. I’d have to think about that more.

JM: Are there any other questions that I didn’t bring up, other points you’d like to make or preserve for posterity here?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 23 UNCLASSIFIED

WS: I’m not too sure. I guess more than anything, my impression is that if you give an Army, give a soldier, a set of standards and convey to him that you expect him to comply with those standards, that they normally perform as required and they reinforce them with other soldiers. That’s why it’s so hard for me to understand the Abu situation and the abuses. I don’t know if it was uninvolved leadership or the soldiers were given no guidelines or rules, or what the conditions were that actually created that situation, but I just find it very hard to relate or understand that.

JM: This will conclude the interview. Thank you very much, sir, for your time.

END OF INTERVIEW

Transcribed by Christopher K. Ives, 17 November 2005

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 24