Governance and Political Economy Constraints to World Bank CAS Priorities in Sierra Leone James A. Robinsony October 2008 I am greatly indebted to Mohamed Gibril Sesay without whose assistance and wisdom I would never have been able to undertake this research. Most of the ideas I discuss here formed during discussions with him. I am also particularly indebted to Ishac Diwan who suggested and facilitated this research and most important challenged me to make it ambitious. I would also like to thank Doug Addison, Juan Costain, Engilbert Gud- mundsson, and Nicola Smithers for their suggestions and all of the people who gave so generously of their time in Freetown, Bo and Koidu. The views expressed in this paper are my own and not those of the World Bank Group. yHarvard University, Department of Government, IQSS, 1737 Cambridge Street N309, Cambridge, MA 01238; e-mail:
[email protected]. Abstract In this paper I discuss the political economy of Sierra Leone and how it should in‡uence the World Bank’sCountry Assistance Strategy (CAS). The main focus of the research is to try to understand the extent to which the perverse political incentives which drove the country into poverty and civil war between 1961 and 1991 have re-asserted themselves since the return of peace in 2002. This question is made particularly compelling by the return to power in 2007 of the All People’sCongress Party, who presided over the decline of the country. My preliminary conclusion is that while there are some obvious changes in the political environment, appeal remains in the political strategies which were so costly to the nation and some new forces which have emerged have potentially perverse consequences.