brief 7 The New Field of Micro- Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light

september 96 brief 7

Contents

Zusammenfassung German Summary 4

Abstract 5 About the Authors Background and Purpose 6

History, Definition and Evolution of Edward J. Laurance is Professor the Concept of Micro-Disarmament 7 of International Studies at the Monterey Institute of Typology of Light Weapons 10 International Studies in California. He has a Ph.D. in Internaional Production and Methods of Relations from the University of Accumulating Light Weapons 14 Pennsylvania. He has been consultant to the United Nations Negative Effects of Small Arms and Centre for Disarmament Affairs Light Weapons 16 since 1991, working on the UN Register of Conventional Arms Micro-Disarmament in Practice: and with the current UN Experts Situation and Scenarios 19 Panel on Small Arms.

Policies, Tools and Instruments 24 Sarah Meek is program manager at the Program for Arms Control, Multilateral Action for Disarmament and Conversion, Micro-Disarmament 29 Monterey.

An earlier version of this study Appendices was prepared by the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and I. Current Projects on Light Weapons 31 Conversion, Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the II. Excerpt from Supplement to Bonn International Center for An Agenda for Peace 35 Conversion on behalf of the Foreign Office of the Federal III. Guidelines for Republic of . International Arms Transfers in the Context of General Assembly Appendix I is based on BASIC's Resolution 46/36 H of listing of projects of light December 1991 37 weapons. Appendix VII is reproduced from Michael Klare IV. Reports of the (see note 13). International Commission on Rwanda (Excerpts) 46 Appendix II, III and IV are excerpted from UN documents. V. Case Study - 60

VI. An Introduction to Anti-Personnel Landmines and Their Effects 61 Cover photo: dpa, Deutsche Presseagentur VII. National Military Inventories of Nicaraguan guerrillas handing Selected Weapons 67 over their guns.

VIII. Voluntary Weapons Collection Efforts and Buy-Back Programs in the of America, Haiti and 81

IX. Selected Bibliography of Works Relating to Micro-Disarmament 87 2 B·I·C·C brief 7 The New Field of Micro- Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons

A study prepared initially for the German Foreign Office

by Edward J. Laurance, assisted by Sarah Meek septemberB·I·C·C 3 96 brief 7

Zusammen- am mangelnden Willen einzelner Kriegsparteien, wie in Kambodscha fassung und 1992 in Angola, oder an Geld- German Summary mangel, wie in El Salvador und Mozambik. Positivere Fälle betref- fen Haiti und Nikaragua, wo es mit der Androhung von Strafen, aber Kleinwaffen - wie Gewehre, Maschi- des ersten Weltkrieges hergestellte auch dem Angebot von Gegenlei- nenpistolen, leichte Artillerie und Gewehre in Kriegen in der Dritten stungen bei Ablieferung von Waffen Minen - werden zunehmend zu Welt verwendet. Weder die Verein- gelang, große Zahlen von Klein- einem sicherheits- und entwicklungs- ten Nationen, noch unabhängige waffen einzusammeln. politischen Risikofaktor, insbeson- Institutionen verfügen derzeit über Ein weiteres Feld der Mikroab- dere in Regionen, in denen militäri- genaue Statistiken über den Umfang rüstung ist die Minenräumung. sche Konflikte beendet wurden. des Handels mit Kleinwaffen. Obwohl in jüngster Zeit Vereinba- Zurückgelassene Landminen und Bekannt ist allerdings, daß ein hoher rungen über das Verbot einiger nicht explodierte Munition bedro- Anteil des Handels illegal erfolgt. Typen von Landminen getroffen hen Leben und Gesundheit der Die große Bedeutung des schwarzen wurden, muß damit gerechnet Bevölkerung und behindern die Marktes unterstreicht nicht nur die werden, daß die Zahl der in derzeiti- wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in einer Notwendigkeit verbesserter Kon- gen und ehemaligen Kriegsregionen Vielzahl von Ländern, wie beispiels- trollen des legalen Exportes aus den verlegten Landminen, die gegenwär- weise Kambodscha und Angola. In Industrieländern, sondern weist tig auf ca. 100 Millionen geschätzt einer Reihe von Ländern, wie El ebenso auf das Erfordernis zusätzli- wird, steigen wird. Der von den Salvador, ist die bewaffnete Krimina- cher Maßnahmen der Eindämmung Vereinten Nationen eingerichtete lität nach dem Ende von Kriegen hin. Fonds für Minenräumung ist stark angestiegen. Nach einem Gute Möglichkeiten zur Abschöp- finanziell schwach ausgestattet. Friedensschluß nicht mehr benötigte fung und Vernichtung von Klein- Waffen werden in andere Kriegs- waffen eröffnen sich unmittelbar In der Studie wird gefordert, dem gebiete weiterverkauft, zum Beispiel nach der Beendigung von bewaffne- Thema Mikroabrüstung mehr von Äthiopien in den Sudan. ten Konflikten. Kampfparteien sind Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken. Als dann häufig bereit zu vereinbaren, kurzfristig umsetzbare Maßnahmen „Mikroabrüstung“ - dieser Begriff ihre Waffen abzuliefern und vernich- werden Erhöhung der Transparenz wurde im Januar 1995 vom UN- ten zu lassen. Allerdings muß, etwa im Handel mit Kleinwaffen, verbes- Generalsekretär geprägt - wird durch „Blauhelme“ der Vereinten serte nationale Exportkontrollen, zunehmend als Problembereich Nationen, gesichert sein, daß der höhere Priorität für Mikroabrüstung erkannt, aber nur unzureichend Abrüstunsprozeß gleichgewichtig im Rahmen von Blauhelm-Missio- umgesetzt. stattfindet. Einzelne demobilisierte nen und die Bereitstellung von mehr Erstmalig wird in der vorliegenden Kämpfer können zur Abgabe von finanziellen Mittel für die Abschöp- Studie eine umfassende Bestandsauf- Waffen motiviert werden, wenn fung und Vernichtung von Klein- nahme der Probleme und Möglich- ihnen dafür Gegenleistungen angebo- waffen und zur Minenräumung keiten der Entwaffnung von Kriegs- ten werden, etwa Saatgut oder genannt. Die Anstrengungen zur parteien nach dem Ende von Kon- Hausbaumaterial. In den USA liegen Kontrolle des internationalen flikten und der internationalen umfangreiche Erfahrungen über den Handels mit Kleinwaffen müssen Bemühungen zur Vorbeugung „Handfeuerwaffen-Tausch“ vor, die verstärkt werden. Insbesondere destabilisierender Transfers von auch international lehrreich sind. sollten die Bemühungen zur Ein- Kleinwaffen vorgenommen. Der Mit wirtschaftlichen und sozialen sammlung und Vernichtung von Fokus liegt dabei auf Aktivitäten im Anreizen werden in solchen Aktio- Waffen nach der Beendigung von Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen. nen Kleinwaffenbesitzer zur Abgabe bewaffneten Konflikten erhöht ihrer Waffen bewogen. werden. Kriege und Konflikte, vor allem in der Dritten Welt, haben dazu Die Möglichkeiten der Mikroab- Die Studie wurde vom Auswärtigen geführt, daß auch in den 90er Jahren, rüstung nach dem Ende von Kon- Amt der Bundesrepublik Deutsch- in denen der Handel mit schweren flikten sind in der Vergangenheit nur land Auftrag gegeben und dient Waffen stark zurückging, der unzureichend genutzt worden. Im unter anderem als Arbeitsgrundlage Kleinwaffenhandel florierte. Diese Rahmen von UN-Blauhelm- für eine Expertenstudie der Verein- Waffen und ihre Munition sind vor missionen, etwa in El Salvador und ten Nationen zur Kontrolle der allem in den Industriestaaten herge- Mozambik, hatte der Aspekt der Verbreitung von Kleinwaffen. Die stellt worden. Ihre Nutzungsdauer Mikroabrüstung nur einen geringen Studie gibt die Ansichten der ist häufig sehr hoch, so werden Stellenwert. Aktivitäten scheiterten Autoren und nicht unbedingt die der immer noch regelmäßig, während Bundesregierung wieder.

4 B·I·C·C abstract

Abstract turn-in or gun buy-back programs. In January 1995, the Secretary- indigenous production, legitimate At the multinational level, tools General of the United Nations trade, and illicit trade including theft include support for capacity published the Supplement to An and black market transfers. Policy building, transparency mechanisms, Agenda for Peace. After noting the development in controlling the embargoes, the use of force, bans on ”considerable progress” made in effects of this class of weapons will certain types of weapons, dealing with weapons of mass be more problematic than in other demobilization, and the destruction, he focused his attention classes, since the large surplus development of multilateral on the urgent need for ”micro- available has made linking the consultative mechanisms to enhance disarmament,” defined as ”practical with its actual producer a cooperative approach to dealing disarmament in the context of the more difficult. with these problems. In using these conflicts the United Nations is tools, policy-makers should place actually dealing with and of the Critical to micro-disarmament equal attention on devising weapons, most of them light policy development is clarifying and approaches that lower the demand weapons, that are actually killing developing a consensus on the for as well as the supply of these people in the hundreds of negative effects of buildups of this types of weapons. thousands.” As a new field of action class of weapons. The dominant and research, work has only just type of warfare in the post-Cold The study concludes with a set of begun to operationally define the War era is defined by insurgency, recommended operating principles concept of micro-disarmament and terrorism and a heavy emphasis on for UN and other multilateral how policy is to be fashioned at the the psychological aspects of warfare, involvement in micro-disarmament. national and multilateral levels to leading to a preference for light deal with the negative effects of the weapons. Buildups of light weapons This report was prepared by the proliferation and buildup of this can impact the outbreak of conflict Program for Arms Control, class of weapons. (e.g., Rwanda). The conduct of Disarmament and Conversion, conflict can also be affected, as seen Monterey Insitute of International This study provides an overview of in the cases of anti-personnel Studies, and the Bonn International the various components of the issue, landmines and man-portable surface- Center for Conversion on behalf of including its history and evolution, to-air . Availability and the Foreign Office of the Federal the types of small arms and light lethality of light weapons increases Republic of Germany. Principal weapons of concern, the various the number of casualties, especially author was Edward J. Laurance, types of effects of the accumulation to civilians, and contributes to the assisted by Sarah Meek. Research of these weapons, the scenarios and proliferation of centers of violence was conducted by Kevin Kenney, situations in which micro- within states. All of these effects Rachel Stohl, Tim Myers, Arturo disarmament is applicable, and the make the resolution and termination Beeche, and Neil O'Connor. array of policy instruments and of the conflict more difficult. In Michael Brzoska and Herbert Wulf tools that might be employed in those cases in which a buildup has contributed to text revisions. The addressing problems created by these enhanced criminal violence, study benefited from comments by weapons. Particular attention is paid economic, social and political officials from the Foreign Office, to the urban US-american development can be seriously especially Cornelius Zimmermann. experience, where the various policy affected. The study reflects the views of the approaches to reducing excessive gun authors and not necessarily those of violence may have applicability in Micro-disarmament policies can be the German Federal government. the broader global context. and have been used in preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping operations A typology of light weapons is and post-conflict peace-building. developed, using the work of Particularly relevant is the effective researchers in the field, the methods use of micro-disarmament in the applicable to open publications process of demobilizing soldiers. A devoted to light weapons, and the typology of policy tools and empirical approach of recording the instruments is developed in the weapons actually being used in the study. At the national level these conflicts in which the UN is include improved policing and involved. A second typology of the weapons seizure tactics, controls on various methods used by the manufacture, export and import governments and sub-national actors of this type of weapons and to acquire these weapons is corresponding types of , presented with basic categories of and the use of voluntary weapons

B·I·C·C 5 brief 7

Background network for such efforts. At last count their publication Current and Purpose Projects on Light Weapons listed 41 organizations and researchers working on this issue.2

In response to a request from the example Argentina, Ecuador, So far, no comprehensive study on members of the Security Council, in and South Africa put forward a draft micro-disarmament and the role of June of 1992 the Secretary-General resolution focused on the small arms in international conflict of the United Nations published detrimental role of small arms, has been done. In fact, there is a ”An Agenda for Peace”. It consisted during the fiftieth session of the great deal of conceptual ambiguity of an analysis and recommendations First Committee. This resolution surrounding the term micro- on ways of strengthening and was approved and requests that the disarmament. Even more making more efficient the capacity Secretary-General prepare a report, problematic is the lack of reliable of the United Nations for preventive with the assistance of a panel of statistics and information on the diplomacy, peacemaking and peace- qualified governmental experts, on volume of small arms, their illicit keeping. Less than three years later, the nature and causes of the trade and their role in regional quantitative and qualitative changes excessive and destabilizing conflict. This study will therefore in the nature of conflict and the UN accumulation and transfer of these serve as a preparatory study on response demanded that the small arms, and the possible role the micro-disarmament that will be a Secretary-General revisit this United Nations can play in this useful background for the document. He did so on 3 January field. The panel's first session took deliberations of the UN 1995 in his ”Supplement to An place in late June 1996. Additionally ”1 Disarmament Commission in 1996, Agenda for Peace, a document the UN Disarmament Commission the UN panel group on small arms, which highlighted "certain areas has discussed but not acted on the and Member States addressing these where unforeseen, or only partly possibility of putting micro- issues individually or as part of foreseen, difficulties have arisen" disarmament on its agenda. The UN either of these forums. The basic which require "hard decisions" by also hosted a Review Conference of text of the study provides an Member States. the UN Convention on the Use of overview of the various components Certain Conventional Weapons, of the issue, including the history In Part III "Instruments for Peace often referred to as the Inhumane and evolution of the issue, the types and Security," the Secretary-General Weapons Convention (IWC) or of small arms and light weapons of summarized the experience of the simply CCW, in response to the concern, the negative effects of the past three years in preventive growing problem of casualties to accumulation of these weapons, the diplomacy and peacemaking, peace- civilians from anti-personnel mines. scenarios and situations in which keeping, post-conflict peace- At the request of Mali the United micro-disarmament is applicable, building, disarmament, sanctions, Nations has sent two advisory and the array of policy instruments and enforcement actions. In the area missions to the region to review the and tools that might be employed in of disarmament, after quickly stating situation of the proliferation of light addressing problems created by these the "considerable progress" in weapons. It is also assisting in the weapons. To enhance the utility of dealing with weapons of mass collection and destruction of small the study, a series of appendices destruction, he focused his attention arms and light weapons as one contain more in-depth treatment of on the urgent need for "micro- approach to the armed conflict selected topics to aid policy-makers disarmament," defined as "practical within that country. During March in discerning and developing disarmament in the context of the 1996 2,642 , machine guns, appropriate micro-disarmament conflicts the United Nations is grenade launchers and pistols, all in policies. actually dealing with and of the good working order, were weapons, most of them light destroyed. weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of Within the NGO community many thousands" (para. 60). had already taken up the question of anti-personnel mines. But in In response to the coining of this addition they began to more phrase in January 1995, the United formally address other types of light Nations, Member States and non- weapons. The British American governmental organizations (NGOs) Security Information Council 1 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. A/50/ began to address the issue. For (BASIC) commenced a Project on 60-S/1995/1. Light Weapons, developing a 2 A summary of these organizations is included as Appendix I.

6 B·I·C·C history and evolution

History, The Secretary-General's statement sets forth the challenge and in some Definition and cases he provides concrete guidelines for the work ahead, particularly in pinpointing the causes of the Evolution of the proliferation, which should shape approaches to their control and elimination. However, the statement Concept of Micro- was a call for action and was not intended to provide an agenda for action. For example, there is little in the statement regarding exactly how Disarmament this class of weapons can be destabilizing. At one point he specifically mentions that such proliferation "creates a legitimate In the remaining six paragraphs the Supplement to An reason for ordinary citizens to 3 Secretary-General called for "parallel acquire weapons for their own Agenda for Peace progress in conventional arms, defense," indicating that mere particularly with respect to light In the first three paragraphs of the possession of these types of weapons weapons." In paragraph 60 he disarmament of this will not be the only focal point of introduces the concept of micro- policies designed to solve the document (nine paragraphs in all), disarmament, referring to the light the Secretary-General observed that problem. In pointing out the weapons actually being used in the difficulties of implementing considerable progress had been made conflicts with which the UN is sanctions and embargoes on this since the 31 January 1992 Summit of dealing. He went on to refer to the the Security Council in several areas class of weapons, he also points out "enormous proliferation of that new types of solutions must be of arms control, disarmament, and automatic assault weapons, anti- found, without specifying what non-proliferation. In the area of personnel mines (APM) and the weapons of mass destruction he these solutions might be. He like." He also identified the negative concludes with a challenge to the specifically noted the forthcoming consequences of such proliferation, conclusion of the extension of the international community, a including the economic costs of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, challenge addressed in the remainder acquiring such weapons, the of this study. "It will take a long the decision by the Conference on dissipation of resources that could be Disarmament in Geneva to begin time to find effective solutions. I used for development, and the seriously negotiating a believe strongly that the search human cost in casualties. In regard should begin now." comprehensive test-ban treaty, the to small arms other than APMs, he signing by 159 countries of the noted that the "world is awash with Chemical Weapons Convention, and them and traffic in them is very UN activities and the effort to develop verification difficult to monitor, let alone involvement mechanisms for the Biological intercept." He identified four causes Weapons Convention. He alluded to for such proliferation—the earlier The UN does not start from a clean the UN Register of Conventional supply during the Cold War, slate in dealing with this problem. Arms, a transparency and internal conflicts, competition for Several important and related confidence-building mechanism commercial markets, and criminal initiatives have been taken and need designed to prevent the excessive and activity exacerbated by the collapse to be noted, especially given this destabilizing buildups of major of governmental law and order. body's antipathy for the conventional weapons such as tanks, development of new institutions and aircraft and missiles. He concluded mechanisms in the current fiscal this section by noting that while the crisis. A brief summary of these problems surrounding these activities is summarized below. categories of weapons have not been resolved, the international General Assembly Resolution community has devised modalities 40/151H (1985) provides the to deal with their eventual opportunity for the UN to resolution. provide advisory services to Member States, on request, in the 3 Appropriate excerpts of this document are field of disarmament and security. included as Appendix II.

B·I·C·C 7 brief 7

General Assembly Resolution Security Council Resolution transnational illicit trafficking in 46/36 H (1991) concerns the 1013 (September 1995) established firearms illicit trade in small arms and the an International Commission of (b) national legislation and role of the UN. It requests the Inquiry to collect information regulations relevant to firearms Secretary-General to assist in the and investigate reports relating to regulations provision of advice, on request, the sale or supply of arms and (c) relevant initiatives for firearms on the recommended measures related material to former regulation at the regional and for enforcement of relevant rules Rwandan government forces in interregional levels. and administrative procedures.4 violation of the previously The Congress resolution was established UN arms embargo, subsequently forwarded to the The United Nations and to recommend measures to Fourth Session of the Disarmament Commission end the illegal flow of arms in the Commission on Crime (UNDC) was established to subregion. The Commission Prevention and Criminal Justice consider and make arrived in the subregion in (Vienna, 30 May - 9 June 1995) recommendations on various November 1995, and issued an from whence it was forwarded to problems in the field of interim report in January 1996 the Economic and Social Council disarmament identified in and a final report in March 1996. (ECOSOC). A subsequent resolutions of the General Both reports are attached as resolution of the ECOSOC (doc Assembly. During the UNDC's Appendix IV. E/1995, chapter II, paras 9-20) 1995 substantive session, a provides the legal mandate for a Working Group was entrusted In November 1995 the UN United Nations International with the mandate of "internatio- Center for Disarmament Affairs Study on Firearm Regulation to nal arms transfers, with particular (UNCDA) held a one-day be conducted by the Crime reference to General Assembly workshop in New York designed Prevention and Criminal Justice resolution 46/36H of 6 December to develop the concept of micro- Division at the United Nations 1991." The UNDC completed disarmament. Entitled "Micro- Office at Vienna. this work at its 1996 substantive Disarmament: A New Agenda for session.5 These guidelines Disarmament and Arms General Assembly Resolution developed by the UNDC focused Control," the opening remarks by A/RES/50/70 B (1995) requested in particular on the illicit arms Under-Secretary-General for that the Secretary-General trade. While not specifically Political Affairs Marrack establish a panel group of experts addressing light weapons, the fact Goulding underscored the origins to prepare a report on small arms that most of the illicit trade is in and importance of this new issue. for submission to the General this class of weapons indicates Papers and presentations were Assembly in the fall of 1997. It is that this work will serve as then given by UNCDA staff and the most developed initiative to important preliminary work for consultants on "Light Weapons date by the UN to deal with the larger question of micro- and Current Conflicts," "Control micro-disarmament issues. First, disarmament. and Collection of Light Weapons the introductory paragraphs take in the Sahel-Sahara Subregion of note of all of the UN activities General Assembly Resolution Africa," "Disarmament and cited above in this study. Second, 49/75 G (1994) welcomed the Conflict Resolution," ”Disarming it lists three questions for study initiative taken by Mali and De-Mobilizing of Ex- which are at the heart of the concerning the question of the Combatants," and "Surplus micro-disarmament issue: illicit circulation of small arms Weapons and the Micro- (a) The types of small arms and their collection in the affected Disarmament Process and light weapons actually being states of the Sahelo-Saharan (El Salvador)." used in conflicts being dealt with subregion, as well as the action by the United Nations taken by the Secretary-General in At the Ninth United Nations (b) The nature and causes of the implementation of this Congress on the Prevention of the excessive and destabilizing initiative. Crime and the Treatment of accumulation and transfer of Offenders (Cairo, 29 April - 8 small arms and light weapons, 4 Both of these resolutions were the basis for May 1995) a resolution was including their illicit production the Secretary-General sending a mission to unanimously adopted and trade Mali in 1994 to investigate and make recommendations regarding the significant recommending, among other (c) The ways and means to problem that country was having in regard to small arms related issues, a regular prevent and reduce the excessive armed conflict related to excessive quantities exchange of information among and destabilizing accumulation of small arms; see Appendix IV. 5 governments on and transfer of small arms and The final report is included as (a) the situation with regard to light weapons, in particular as Appendix III. they cause or exacerbate conflict.

8 B·I·C·C history and evolution

Resolution A/RES/50/70 B also The Disarmament and Conflict Treatment of micro- mentions the "complementary role Resolution Project being of regional organizations (emphasis conducted by the United Nations disarmament by added)." As this study was written Institute for Disarmament academia and NGOs little if any attention has been Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva is paid by regional organizations to generating evidence, data and Appendix I to this study lists the the problem of micro- conclusions directly related to major work being done by NGOs disarmament. A recent exception micro-disarmament. UNIDIR's and researchers related to micro- is the Organization of American basic premise is that "the disarmament. This activity is States (OAS), whose Committee combination of internal conflicts focused on several important on Hemispheric Security on 13 with the proliferation of light functions. First, an epistemic March 1996 discussed a proposed weapons has marked (UN) peace community is being developed draft resolution to ban the operations since 1990." While around the issue of small arms, light production and use of anti- recognizing that social and weapons and micro-disarmament. personnel landmines. The small political development issues are This includes the use of the Internet, arms resolution also calls for the critical sources of violence, they the exchange of papers and views of Member States, have as a mandate a focus on the documents, workshops and (emphasis added) which may material vehicles for violence, in conferences, and the publication of provide a source of ideas particular the elimination of two major books on the subject. regarding solutions related to excess weapons and munitions.6 Second, information from public micro-disarmament. Related to Their focus on the establishment sources on types of light weapons is the micro-disarmament issue is of disarmament programs as part being published. Third, national that of the United Nations of peace operations that continue capabilities to produce such weapons Register of Conventional Arms. into the post-conflict are becoming transparent, to include Some progress has been made reconstruction phase is revealing rudimentary information on their with respect to regional forums important lessons for micro- export. Fourth, case studies are and a possible creation of regional disarmament. UNIDIR will being written by regional specialists transfer registers, for instance in complete its work on this project who have witnessed directly the the frameworks of the Asian by the fall of 1996. impact of small arms and light Regional Forum and the OAS. weapons on conflict. These case The regional approach may be studies are particularly useful as a more promising with respect to source of answers to the two main the integration of small arms and questions of micro-disarmament— light weapons in registers than a the negative consequences of global approach (see below). excessive accumulations of these Regional organizations such as weapons, and the various policies the Organization of African being developed to deal with these Unity (OAU), the OAS and the consequences. Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are already actively involved in conflict-prevention activities and the prospects for expanding their activities to post-conflict peace- building are promising. They can, for instance, cooperate in controlling illicit transborder flows of light weapons and in the establishment of police forces. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the OSCE is assisting re- establishment of the legal order with police officers from member 6 The Disarming of Warring Parties as an countries. Integral Part of the Settlement of Conflicts. January 1996. Progress Report. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

B·I·C·C 9 brief 7

Typology of conventional weapons, the task is even more daunting for light Light Weapons weapons. Generally it takes major quantities of light weapons to have an impact. Given the international availability of these arms, a recipient Introduction conflicts do not need the high state or non-state actor has the technology weapons so dominant in option of multiple sources, The "micro" in micro-disarmament the Cold War arms trade. While eliminating dependence on one is intended to draw attention to some of the more repugnant supplier or a national government. It small arms and light weapons, and atrocities were committed by tanks should also be noted that the lighter the unique set of problems created and heavy mortars (e.g., Bosnia), and smaller the weapon, the more by the proliferation and most were promulgated using lighter likely it is that there are provisions accumulation of this class of weapons that went undetected both for legitimate use by citizens for weapons in the post-Cold War era. by governments and the news media personal security. It will not be easy Before describing the characteristics covering these conflicts. Finally, the to outlaw all light weapons if they of these weapons, a brief overview is world economic system is are needed by the majority of the needed as to how these transforming into one characterized citizens for personal safety/defense characteristics affect conflict and by both more legitimate free trade in intra-state conflict locales. In possible resolutions. A pre-condition and the development of illicit addition, small arms are part of the for the current situation is the networks that foster the trade in local culture in a number of increase in the trade in and light weapons as well as drugs and societies, for instance in the Afghan/ production of these weapons in the laundered money. Pakistani border area or in the Horn post-Cold War era, as opposed to a of Africa. decline in major conventional arms The increasing quantity of the trade trade and production. This has in light weapons, as indicated above, occurred for some well known creates significant challenges to the reasons. First, the disintegration of control of its negative consequences. the Soviet Union has resulted in the But equally important in devising sudden availability of large amounts solutions for problems created by of new and surplus light weapons. light weapons are qualitative factors This is due to the military nature of related to the nature of the weapons the Soviet industrial base, the involved. First, light means small collapse of export control systems in and less visible, meaning that the former Soviet Union (FSU), and satellites will not help much in a need for hard currency. Second, detection and verification. This also countries of the FSU are not the means that monitoring and control only countries finding themselves efforts by national governmental with surplus stocks of light officials, from desk officers to weapons. Europe, China and many customs officials, are inherently developing countries find these more demanding. This creates a weapons surplus, given the end of situation in which, even if states do the Cold War and the resolution of begin to practice cooperative several major conflicts in Central security in the post-Cold War era, America and Africa. the implementation phase of their arms control policies may be Additionally, the breakup of seriously hampered by an inherent Yugoslavia and the rise in intra-state inability to verify the trade, even on conflicts in many parts of the world the part of national governments. In are indicative of a relative loss of addition these weapons are not very control by major powers over these expensive, meaning that many more conflicts. The surplus of light types of participants and channels weapons, whose export is much can be and are available for their more susceptible to the control of trade and acquisition. and covert supply by private parties, has had little difficulty finding its If it is difficult to develop a way into these zones of ethnic and consensus around the negative intra-state conflict. Also, these consequences of major advanced

10 B·I·C·C types

Definitions and More empirical work is needed to determine which are the "weapons categories of light that actually kill" in ongoing weapons conflicts. The UN has kept records of each of the conflicts in which it The increased attention paid to small was involved in the post-Cold War arms and light weapons by NGOs era, especially where disarmament and researchers in the past year has was a part of the operation. produced several approaches to Therefore this exercise can be defining this class of weapons. repeated for each conflict and an Several general definitions are cited empirical definition of small arms below. and light weapons can be developed that is directly relevant to the micro- "Manufactured small arms, also disarmament work of the United described as light weapons, are all Nations. conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual combatant or Cumulatively, definitions such as a light vehicle. These are weapons the mentioned ones contain four which do not require an extensive major elements: logistical and maintenance (a) the focus is on weapons and capability."7 ammunition, that is lethal "..such arms can be defined as all those equipment generally used by conventional munitions that can be military and paramilitary forces, carried by an individual combatant or excluding those lethal items by a light vehicle operating on back- generally in private use such as country roads...The distinction knives or hunting rifles and non- between light and heavy weapons can lethal support equipment also be made in operational and user (b) emphasis is on the "man terms. Heavy weapons typically portability" and "crew portability", require an elaborate logistical and that is weight and size of the maintenance capability that can only equipment be provided by professional military (c) weapons should be easy to organizations with sufficient technical maintain and require little training experience—in other words, by the and be serviceable without much armed forces of established states." 8 logistical backup (d) items should have been in A good way to define the weapons frequent use in recent conflicts, by of concern is to analyze ongoing regular and/or irregular forces, that conflicts. Such surveys may reveal is, should be among the "weapons that major conventional weapons that really kill". can play a role in these conflicts (e.g., the use of tanks and heavy mortars in Bosnia). But such surveys will also make clear the type and in many cases the source of the light weapons in use. 7 Rana, Swadesh. 1995. Small Arms and Intra- The following box lists the weapons State Conflicts. Research Paper 34. Geneva: used during the civil war in El United Nations Institute for Disarmament Salvador from 1980-1992.9 The list Research. 8 was compiled from UN Klare, Michael T. 1995. "The Global Trade documentation of the FMLN in Light Weapons and the International System in the Post-Cold War Era." In Jeffrey weapons collection effort and the Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. demobilization of the Salvadoran Reed, eds. Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade armed forces, both part of the peace in Small Arms and Light Weapons. Cam- process. bridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, p. 33. 9 A case study of El Salvador appears in Appendix V.

B·I·C·C 11 brief 7

Weapons collected during the disarmament process in El Salvador

Rifles Cannons Grenades M-16 (USA) M-56 (Yugoslavia) RPG-2 portable launcher G-3 (Germany) 20 mm (DP) (unknown) (USSR) Dragonov precision (USSR) 75 mm unretractable (unknown) RPG-7 portable AK-47 (USSR) 57 mm unretractable (unknown) (USSR) M-14 (USA) M-79 (USA) FAL (Argentina) Pistols M72 LAW grenade launcher (USA) Mauser 98-k (Germany) Colt .45 (USA) RPG-18 light anti-armor weapon AR-15 (USA) Star 9mm () (USSR) SKS Simonov self-loading rifle (USSR) Stechkin 9mm (USSR) F-1 hand grenade (USSR) AKM-47 (USSR) Browning () M-67 hand grenade (USA) FAMAS rifle () F-1 (France) M-26 grenade launcher (USA) HK-9 (Germany) .357 magnum (unknown) GME-FMK2-MO (Argentina) .38 special (unknown) RGD-5 (USSR) Machine Guns M-60 (USA) M-16 light (USA) Mortars RPK (USSR) 82 mm Surface-to-Air Missiles/ Sterling patchett MKS L34AI (UK) 81 mm SAM-7B (USSR) Steyr () 60 mm C-2M (China) Ingram M-16 submachine gun (USA) C-3M (China) Thompson .45 submachine gun (unknown) SAM-14 (USSR) Madsen 9mm submachine gun () SAM-16 (USSR) PA3-DM 9mm submachine gun (Argentina) () Ingram M-10 submachine gun (USA) HK-5 MPS (Germany) Sources: List of weapons: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador; Country of manufacture: Jane’s Weapons

In our view, all four elements must Small arms: It is with these definitions in mind be addressed in any definition of Pistols that we continue the analysis in this small arms and light weapons. The Rifles paper. We are fully aware that there difference between the two terms is Sub-machine guns is much further room for in the rigor of the four criteria. Machine guns definitional discussion and clarity. In Small arms are those items meeting Ammunition for the above the end, practical consideration, strict criteria on all counts. Light which may even differ in individual weapons, the broader term, includes Light weapons (in addition to small cases, are decisive. But definitional some weapons on the fringe, such as arms): problems should not detract from shoulder-fired surface-to-air Small- cannons the search for policies in the field of systems, which are not easy to Light support weapons micro-disarmament. maintain and which require extensi- Combat grenades ve training, and landmines, which Anti-personnel mines are not generally carried around. In Mortars addition to the weapons as such, Anti-tank weapons their ammunition must be included Anti-tank mines in any useful definition since Shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles weapons cannot function without Ammunition for the above ammunition.

Unfortunately, these four elements are not directly operational. For practical purposes we therefore 10 Partly based on the categorization by one propose the following of the leading authorities on weapons systems, categorization10 : Jane's Information Systems. See the annual editions of Jane's Infantry Weapons.

12 B·I·C·C types

Light weapons of Ammunition standard sources, such as Jane´s Information Service are able to specific concern Increased attention is being paid to provide much data on ammunition the idea that the focus of micro- production. Also, the methods that Anti-Personnel landmines disarmament work should also have been employed in acquiring include the ammunition for these information about light weapons There are over 300 models of weapons. First, one of the more supply in some case studies (see landmines in use today, which can lethal and popular weapons in intra- below) have been much less be grouped into four basic state conflicts is the automatic successful in the case of ammunition. categories, depending on function assault rifle (e.g., AK-47, M-16). Improved transparency is especially and intent. Their composition Many of the combatants in these needed in this area, both for the ranges from wood to metal, plastic conflicts who use these weapons are purpose of acquiring more and concrete, and their prices range not well-trained members of natio- knowledge about flows and because from US $3 to US $40. These four nal armed forces. As a result fire of the promise of ammunition types of anti-personnel landmines— discipline is often lacking, resulting transfer controls in stopping or at blast, fragmentation, directional in an emphasis on volume and high least reducing fighting in ongoing fragmentation, and bounding—are rates of fire, not accuracy. This leads conflicts. described in detail in Appendix VI. to a chronic shortage of ammunition, or at a minimum In addition to the four types of constant attention being paid to its mines described above, there is re-supply. This then becomes a currently debate regarding the choke point that can be exploited in emergence of a new class of „smart“ devising solutions to the conflict mines, so named because of their that focus on the weapons self-destruct or self-deactivation themselves. capability. The rationale is that these „smart“ mines will reduce the A second point to be made regarding incidence of innocents (refugees, ammunition is that often the farmers, women and children) technology required for its stepping on mines left over from a manufacture is more difficult to conflict. While this would improve acquire and maintain than the the situation, there exists a 5% to technology for the manufacture of 10% failure rate on the self- the weapon itself. Research in South detonating mechanisms and even Asia reveals that locally-produced additional self-deactivation AK-47s are everywhere, but those mechanisms cannot assure total that were manufactured in national safety. A major component of the arsenals (, China, East landmine crisis is how the lives of Germany, etc.) still fetch a higher local populations are affected by price. In the case of ammunition this landmine presence if local phenomenon is even more populations cannot be certain that prevalent, since users of AK-47s all of the mines in a particular area demand reliable ammunition, not have detonated. the home-made variety which can and does cause the weapon to explode in the hands of the user.11

A third point relevant to transfer control measures is that ammunition is bulky and heavy and thus much less easy to transfer clandestinely. Supply of ammunition to conflict areas should be noticeable and thus be more amenable to transparency measures. Currently, information about production and flows of ammunition is scant. Not even 11 Smith, Chris. 1995. "Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia." In Boutwell, Klare and Reed (note 8), pp. 77-78.

B·I·C·C 13 brief 7

Production and cited Jane's Infantry Weapons is a thorough compendium of every weapon now produced, and also an Methods of inventory of the light weapons now in use in the armed forces of every country in the world. Several Accumulating summaries of these data have been compiled and are included in Light Weapons Appendix VII. Methods of Light weapons and of the former Rwandan government accumulating forces in violation of the embargo their producers imposed by the Security Council in light weapons May 1994. This information came In those cases where problematic Those charged with making micro- mainly from the NGO Human 12 disarmament policies must first accumulations developed through Rights Watch Arms Project." importing arms and technology address how an excessive Armed with this information the from outside the zone of conflict, accumulation of small arms and light Commission began the process of weapons occurred. The answer will the source of supply becomes a verification. They found the critical question to be answered. In be found in part in how governments involved reluctant to the case of major conventional governments and sub-national respond to official inquiries, but groups acquired such weapons, the weapons such as tanks and aircraft, eventually France and Zaire denied the high technology, maintenance methods used. In assessing conflicts knowledge of involvement. There using these weapons, several and logistics required for successful are several lessons here. First, with typologies have been proposed with operation of the equipment has Africa awash with a light weapons normally meant that industrialized consensus beginning to emerge that surplus from previous conflicts (e.g., a complex model is necessary to countries can be identified as Mozambique) governments who guide policy development. Three suppliers. In the conflicts of the originally manufactured these post-Cold War era, however, this models of the global spread of small weapons may have a built-in plausi- arms and light weapons have been assumption is less valid. Essentially, ble denial. Second, NGOs and their it is becoming more difficult to link proposed: the proliferation model, flexible methods of research (e.g., an arms import to a specific the circulation model and the using investigative reporters) are diffusion model. 13 producer. A significant amount of better equipped to assess sources of surplus in major conventional supply and methods of accumulation weapons has been generated. Third than official bodies such as the parties less linked to national Commission. They said as much in governments are now engaged in the their interim report. In contrast, in transfer of even these sophisticated its first study of the Rwandan weapons. More importantly, as conflict, Human Rights Watch previously mentioned, these clearly documented the arms conflicts use light weapons that are buildups that led to the outbreak of even more readily available through conflict in Rwanda, citing and a variety of sources. While the publishing bills of lading and bank temptation in assessing a conflict is statements that implicated France to find the source and build a and in this supply. restrictive policy accordingly, this is 12 proving difficult. Excerpt from the interim report of the Having made the point that International Commission of Inquiry, transmitted in a letter to the Security Council An example of this problem has producers are harder to trace in this from the Secretary-General (S/1996/67) dated occurred in the case of the UN new environment, it remains true 29 January 1996. International Commission of that the arms trade in light weapons 13 Pioneering this conceptual work has been Inquiry in Rwanda. The that is controlled by governments is Michael Klare. The following discussion on Commission was created due to the significant and any micro- models is based on his latest work, "Light disarmament work must be Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in development of "detailed and the Post-Cold War Era.” In Jasjit Singh, ed. voluminous information suggesting informed by a knowledge of such 1995. Light Weapons and International that arms deliveries had been made weapons and where they originally Security. Delhi and Washington: Indian to Goma airport in Zaire for the use were manufactured. The previously Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, pp. 1-40.

14 B·I·C·C methods

The proliferation model transfers. In practice, policies Data problems in corresponds to the familiar pattern addressing the proliferation of light of the trade in major conventional weapons have to be multifaceted and formulating micro- weapons: there are a handful of fit specific goals and circumstances. disarmament policy major producers that export The diffusion model attempts to weapons to a large number of combine the proliferation and the This brief discussion of the types of recipients. Policies therefore focus circulation model from a policy weapons now of concern to the on stemming the flow (on the perspective. It gives a typology of international community and the supply or recipient side). The the methods in which weapons are ways in which they reach conflict circulation model posits that the acquired by parties to a conflict: areas highlights the importance of number of light weapons, and generating reliable and valid data and especially small arms, already 1. Indigenous production information in the making of policy transferred to volatile areas around a. Pure domestic in this issue area. First, it can be seen the world is so large, that trade- b. Imported technology and that micro-disarmament gets to the oriented approaches must fail. licensed production core interests of states. It should be Reports from individual conflicts 2. Legitimate import expected that states reluctant to indicate that government stores are a. Government grants engage in micro-disarmament will often the major source of weapons b. Government sales often use unreliable data in their and ammunition for insurgent c. Commercial sales arguments. Second, the nature of groups. Governments on the other 3. Illicit import light weapons and the methods by hand, have often seized large caches a. Covert arms exports from which they are accumulated are by of small arms and given them to foreign governments definition murky. Small and often friendly states or irregular groups. In b. Foreign government gifts undetectable weapons, often traded addition, weapons are circulated to allied paramilitary groups by third and fourth parties, are the from one conflict area to the next, c. Black market arms imports rule and not the exception. either within a region or beyond. d. Imports from allied foreign Third, if it is the United Nations Often these transfers are not part of insurgent group which will deal with developing regular legal foreign trade but rather 4. In-country circulation micro-disarmament policies, the of networks of ”black market” trade a. Theft from government issue of open or public sources that also include trade in narcotics arsenals versus government sources is an and raw materials exploited by b. Seizure of equipment from important one. During the Cold insurgent groups.14 Within this opponents War very little action on model, policies to stem the flow c. Exchanges between conventional weapons took place in should concentrate on those areas domestic insurgent the United Nations. It was also true where conflict has just ended, trying organizations that the role of NGOs and their to prevent out-flows of weapon d. Exchanges between public sources of information on systems, and on those areas where domestic insurgents and weapons rarely entered into a conflict is threatening, trying to criminal organizations debate. This may be changing and prevent the in-flow, in addition to may affect the deliberations of the trying to clamp down on illegal Unfortunately, it is not possible at UN on micro-disarmament issues, if trade. This also means that the current stage of research, which the International Commission's disarmament policies must be is reviewed in the next section, to work in Africa is any indication. devised which focus on lowering the even begin to estimate quantities for While conforming to the norm of demand for weapons already in the methods mentioned above not relying on NGO information circulation. beyond a few well-researched case for policy formation, their interim Case studies from the many conflict- studies, such as Rwanda. Much report is extraordinary in its regions indicate that both models empirical work needs to be done. constant reference to the reports of have some merits, but do not However, from a small arms control NGOs. It may be that this issue area capture the full picture. For one, perspective it is important to know of micro-disarmament, in which there are cases, such as Rwanda, in any specific case what the major information on light weapons where exports from major suppliers source of the supply. through official governmental had an important role. And there are channels is difficult to acquire, may other cases, such as the Horn of require a more open approach to the Africa, where small arms circulate in role of NGOs and independent great numbers. In addition, there are researchers. It should be noted that other forms of transfers, not covered the international attention and by these models, such as clandestine, 14 Examples include diamond sales by action on anti-personnel landmines but government- sponsored UNITA in Angola and timberwood sales by was generated in large part by the the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. International Red Cross and other influential NGOs. B·I·C·C 15 brief 7

Negative Effects of Uganda, via Egypt and other suppliers. Such conclusions are Small Arms and always controversial, for several reasons. First, there are always a host of contextual factors which Light Weapons explain the outbreak of conflict, as indicated by the literature on the causes of war. Isolating any one With diligent research the challenges the negative consequences be clear factor will always be difficult. noted above can be overcome and and agreed on by the Member States Second, prior to the outbreak of an assessments can be produced that can and the UN. To that end, the armed conflict there may be no legal tell policy-makers a great deal about following typology identifies those mechanisms in place to prevent the the accumulation of small arms and situations in which the accumulation legitimate acquisition of such arms. light weapons in a particular region, of small arms and light weapons can It is important to note that the sub-region, state or region of a contribute to or exacerbate the International Commission was state—what types, by whom are outbreak, conduct and termination charged with investigating reports they held, how they are acquired, of conflict. from Human Rights Watch of etc. But this type of information is violations of an officially only the first step in the larger promulgated arms embargo, not the challenge of micro-disarmament. A Nature of conflict previous accusations by Human second and much more controversial Rights Watch of Tutsi acquisitions step is the determination of the The first point to make is that the prior to the start of the war, when effects of these accumulations. A dominant type of warfare in the no sanctions were in place.16 comparison with weapons of mass post-Cold War era is defined by destruction (WMD) and major insurgency, terrorism and a heavy conventional weapons is useful. In emphasis on the psychological Impacts on the the case of WMD, international legal aspects of warfare. This leads to a conduct of conflict and political norms have evolved preference for light weapons so that which make the negative combatants can rely on being The first impact can be seen in the consequences of their accumulation aggressive and mobile. "We are case of the massive proliferation of very clear. Although WMD compelled to relate to the (light) anti-personnel landmines (APMs). accumulation is not without weapons as exploitable by a non- They are designed to deny territory controversy, it is certainly clearer military and a non-state actor and this has certainly occurred. The than the situation with major (insurgent, terrorist, etc.), equally current experience of the NATO conventional weapons. While the worthy of armed combat, versatile, troops deployed in Bosnia is only cunning and unencumbered by international community reached a 15 the latest example of military consensus that the arms buildup in conventional inhibitions." operations being shaped by the that resulted in the indiscriminate use of APMs. But it is was excessive and destabilizing, Outbreak of conflict also true that the military in many efforts since this event to codify states still argues that these weapons "excessive and destabilizing" have While it is true that people bent on have important military functions, proven difficult, despite the killing each other will do so development of the UN Register of regardless of the weapons they Conventional Arms. When one is possess, it is also true that a critical attempting to discern excessive and mass of weapons can be the impetus destabilizing accumulations of small for starting a major conflict. This is arms and light weapons, the task is best seen in the case of the war in 15 Dikshit, Prashant. "Internal Conflict and even more daunting. First, there is Rwanda. For example, there were the Role of Light Weapons." In Jasjit Singh the well-publicized massacres of (note 13), p. 42. the data problem referred to above. 16 Second, these weapons are used in civilians with machetes, once the Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and war was on in earnest. On the other Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda. 1994. intra-state conflicts, where issues Washington, DC: The Arms Project, Human related to sovereignty and Article 51 hand a great deal of evidence has Rights Watch. This excellent case study of of the UN Charter are even more been produced that shows that the how the accumulation of light weapons can sensitive than with WMD and major entire conflict was greatly influenced lead to and exacerbate conflict also appeared conventional weapons. But there is a by the accumulation of armaments as an article: Goose, Stephen D. and Frank Smyth. 1994.“Arming Genocide in Rwanda,“ third challenge, which we now by the rebel Tutsi forces based in Foreign Affairs. September/October. The address: given the sensitivities of Arms Project has also produced case studies micro-disarmament, it is crucial that on small arms and conflict in India and Zaire.

16 B·I·C·C negative effects

and are reluctant to support a total A third effect of large accumulations Termination of ban on their use. For example, in of light weapons, especially assault defending a point position, mines rifles and hand grenades, is their conflict can be a cost-effective way of increased lethality leading to greater warning of approaching enemy numbers of casualties, which in turn Several consequences of large accumulations of light weapons can troops. These states also argue that exacerbates the disruption of the be noted in this phase of conflict. such deployments comply with the economic and social system. This CCW and the laws of war, especially often increases relative deprivation, First, the higher the lethality of the weapons, the greater the casualties. if the minefields are marked and the especially if the state has promised The history of intra-state conflicts mines are picked up when the its citizens security. Warring forces deployment is completed. From a gain more support from the citizens reveals that at some point the revenge motive begins to take over purely military perspective, the in their geographic regions who from the original and more objective effects of APMs are mixed and serve increasingly count on them for as the focal point for much debate in security, making conflict resolution goals of both government forces and insurgent groups. This leads to a the current efforts to reduce the all the more difficult. second effect: negotiated solutions negative consequences of this type of weapon. Fourth, the availability of arms become less likely. A third impact concerns disarmament efforts that enhances the proliferation of centers often accompany UN operations. The effects on the conduct of war of violence, thereby increasing the were also evident in several conflicts instability and intractability of An imperfect disarmament effort can easily lead to the conflict in which man-portable surface-to-air violence. This has been the case in missiles (SAMs) were used by Liberia, and Cambodia. recommencing if the weapons are combatants. In , for "Modern light weapons can change not taken in as planned, as can be seen in Cambodia and Angola. If the example, Soviet forces had to avoid the balance of power between the areas and adjust bombing and state and sub-state groups, such as weapons are not taken in, they remain available for disgruntled helicopter tactics due to the insurgents and drug traffickers and 17 groups and criminals, should the possession by insurgent forces of US other criminals." Stinger SAMs. The FMLN in El economic, social and political situation deteriorate in the post- Salvador also had SAMs, SA-7s Finally, the availability of light conflict phase. supplied from Nicaragua. The weapons may cause what has been conflict could also be affected by the termed a "domestic arms race." 18 In threat to use such weapons against this situation rival groups within a Effects on political, civilian airliners, which occurred state race with each other to economic and social during the civil war leading up to maintain an inventory of equally development the creation of the state of Zimbab- capable equipment, partly for we. This type of weapon clearly fits prestige purposes but also to insure In addition to the above effects on into the man-portable definition and that one side does not prevail due to armed conflict, large accumulations there is a clear consensus that its superior military capability. Often and ready availability of small arms extensive proliferation has serious this race is less qualitative than it is and light weapons can have negative consequences for the conduct of a quantitative, keeping in mind that consequences in the absence of what conflict. For this reason states predominance in this type of governments might term armed producing such weapons tend to conflict takes a lot of light weapons. conflict. First, the increase in control their exports of these availability of highly lethal light weapons and rumors of black weapons increases the market activity in this commodity destructiveness of the conflict and receive a lot of attention. In the case adds to the refugee problem. In this of the supply of US Stingers to Afghanistan in the 1980s, there is a 17 Smith, Chris. 1995. "The Impact of Light lot of evidence that the United States Weapons On Security: A Case Study of South was reluctant to do so, mainly due Asia." In SIPRI Yearbook 1995. Oxford: to the well-founded fear that they Oxford University Press, p. 583. could not be controlled once in 18 Jaramillo, Daniel Garcia-Pena. "Light Afghanistan. Weapons and Internal Conflict in ." In Boutwell, Klare and Reed, eds. note 13), pp. 98-116. For a report on this phenomenon in Afghanistan, see Dikshit (note 15).

B·I·C·C 17 brief 7

case the population may be fleeing The increased availability of small from a situation in which it is not arms and light weapons has also safe to reside or conduct a normal coincided with an increase in life. Second, the post-Cold War massacres of civilians. An automatic period has found many countries weapon or a hand grenade makes experiencing an increase in common such actions easier and more crimes that can be directly traced to impersonal to accomplish. Finally, the availability of weapons. A these conflict situations find more typical case is El Salvador where and more child soldiers gangs have formed, armed with M- participating. To the extent that this 16 and AK-47 assault weapons left class of weapons is easier to use and over from the civil war. They also requires little in the way of logistics, use hand grenades. As a result the it only compounds the problems economy has been seriously resulting from using children as disrupted, just as the peace process soldiers. had promised economic and social development. Crime does not occur in a vacuum, and the poverty and relative deprivation of the population explains a great deal of this crime wave. However, the use of military-style weapons has emboldened the disaffected and has added to the level of damage and insecurity in the communities involved. The increase in violence could also mean that eventually the move toward democratic political development could reverse itself. If a political party official was killed in an ordinary robbery, in a climate of increasing distrust the opposing party may well interpret this as a political attack masked by the prominence of crime.

The impact on economic development is real. In those countries in which weapons are a problem, it has become more difficult to conduct development projects and programs, leading to a decline in economic aid from donors who are questioning how their funds can achieve goals in a violent environment. Also, the increase in crime and violence means that the government must use more scarce resources to provide security, at a time when the donor states and international organizations are calling for less emphasis on security and military programs.

18 B·I·C·C in practice

Micro- soldiers had turned in their weapons). During this sensitive Disarmament in period, both FMLN commanders and the UN observers at the container site had the keys to the Practice: container. Had the peace process broken down, and it almost did several times, the FMLN could have Situations and retrieved their weapons with no opposition. The assumption, however, was that they would be reluctant to do so unless they were Scenarios certain that the war had recommenced. 20 Having briefly outlined some of the enforcing gun control laws, and The previously cited UNIDIR negative effects of an excessive planning and implementing Disarmament and Conflict Resoluti- accumulation of this class of voluntary light weapons collection on project has focused on lessons weapons, we now more formally programs. The role of the United learned from such operations, link these effects to those situations Nations would be technical and lessons that should be integrated and scenarios in which micro- advisory. into the operation plans of current disarmament is applicable. and future peace-keeping operations. Peace-keeping In one example, the UNIDIR study Preventive diplomacy operations on Somalia concludes that:

In his Supplement to An Agenda for The role of micro-disarmament in Peace, the Secretary-General stated peace-keeping operations is well- that it "is evidently better to prevent known. Weapons collection, for conflicts through early warning, example, has been commonly used quiet diplomacy and, in some cases, in such operations. preventive deployment than to have to undertake major politico-military In the case of El Salvador, the UN efforts to resolve them after they "19 observer mission initiated new have broken out. Micro- techniques for peacekeeping disarmament could play a role in operations that have been utilized by preventive diplomacy in several other missions whenever applicable. ways. First, multilateral and For example, when the FMLN cooperative monitoring of the insurgents and the proliferation and build-up of small concluded that they could no longer arms and light weapons in a achieve military victory, they agreed particular region or subregion could to a peace process brokered and provide early warning of the monitored by the UN. potential negative effects outlined in Disarmament was a large part of this the previous section. Variants of the process. The FMLN agreed to turn UN Arms Register are one example in their weapons (about 10,000 light of how such monitoring could weapons) for destruction and the prevent and perhaps decrease arms army agreed to withdraw from the buildups. Second, should such countryside and demobilize and monitoring reveal a potentially disarm 20,000 soldiers. The problem destabilizing buildup, the State came in how this would occur. The involved could ask the UN UN devised a plan whereby Secretary-General to send a small unarmed observers would receive field mission experienced in customs and destroy FMLN weapons, but procedures that might impede illicit only after a waiting period in which transfers of weapons, developing and the arms would remain locked in a 19 container until the UN verified that Supplement (note 1), p. 7. the army was keeping its end of the 20 Interviews with ONUSAL officials in El agreement (e.g., that the demobilized Salvador, March 1995.

. B·I·C·C 19 brief 7

"In Somalia, the disarmament pro- source the program, shows little regard Post-conflict peace- gram became a casualty of the for those who surrender their indecision of competing political weapons. "21 building authorities and Force The lesson learned was that Commanders...The general "disarmament need not be initiated Micro-disarmament can and does play a role in post-conflict peace- consequence of embarking on in a mission unless there is a will to 22 building, especially in the disarmament in fits and starts was that see it through." 23 the entire program had the effect of demobilization process. The punishing those compliant segments of following table of recent the population, some of whom fell demobilization in Africa and Central victim to gangs because they had been America illustrates that about one dispossessed of their weapons...To million soldiers and guerrilla forces abandon a program of disarmament have been demobilized during the mid-way because humanitarian 1990s in these regions, and more agencies run out of wheat flour- an demobilization is planned. In other incentive offered to the local countries in Asia and Latin America population in exchange for their guns- large numbers of ex-combatants have or renege on their earlier promise to also been demobilized.

Recent demobilization in Africa and Central America

Chad 15,000 Soldiers 1992-94 Eritrea 48,000 Ex-fighters 1991-94; 12,000 more planned Ethiopia 500,000 Defeated Mengistu army 1991; 22,000 OLF 1992-94 Mozambique 90,000 70,000 government and 20,000 of the Renamo forces 1992-94 Namibia 43,000 Including people fighting for South Africa 1989 Uganda 32,200 Soldiers 1992-94; 12,500 more planned Angola 70,000 Planned after unifying 160,000 FAA and UNITA forces South Africa 40,000 Planned after formation of the new SANDF Cuba 120,000 In early 1990s El Salvador 38,000 Government and FMLN 1992-93 Haiti 7,000 All regular forces in 1994 Nicaragua 88,000 65,000 Sandinista soldiers and 23,000 ‘Contras’ end of 1980s-1992

Source: Bonn International Center for Conversion. 1996. Conversion Survey 1996. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 151-152

21 Adibe, Clement. 1995. Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, pp. 104- 105. 22 Ibid 23 This section is based on a paper presented by Herbert Wulf to the U.N. workshop "Micro-Disarmament: A New Agenda for Disarmament and Arms Control," sponsored by the U.N. Center for Disarmament Affairs in November 1995.

20 B·I·C·C in practice

An essential prerequisite of successful post-conflict Conditions for successful post-conflict demobilization is careful demobilization disarmament of the ex-combatants. If they are not properly disarmed * Demobilization and disarmament require a cessation of hostilities. and armories not well protected, Demobilization and disarmament have little chance if one of the banditry might be fueled or arms fighting parties is not fully supportive. might end up in the wrong hands. * Demobilization and disarmament are facilitated by regional security Often, these ex-combatants have and stability. learned little else besides using lethal * Demobilization rests on a credible central authority. force to solve problems as they * Early planning is important. Armies might start to disintegrate perceive them. Disarming them is before formal demobilization is organized. complicated since they may own * Demobilization is fostered by bringing all the combatants into a more than one weapon. If they turn unified national force prior to demobilization. in one weapon, another might be * Central assembly points are useful for disarming ex-combatants. hidden elsewhere. It has happened * If the living conditions in the encampments prior to demobilization that former guerrillas picked up are poor, desertion of soldiers (with their weapons) might occur. these weapons when reintegration * If the encampment takes too long and the demobilized are left failed or when political problems without information about their prospects, violent activities and emerged again. Political conflicts and rebellion could undermine the demobilization and disarmament the inability of the government to process. fulfill commitments made to the * Failures to demobilize and disarm might endanger peace-keeping demobilized ex-combatants have operations. caused the flare-up of conflict or * Transparency with regard to arms collected is vital. Weapons should have led to rebellions. preferably be guarded by an external military presence. * The disarmament must go beyond disarming individual soldiers and units to include national or regional disarmament. * Appropriate ways of dealing with ‘surplus weapons’ should be applied to avoid their transfer into areas of conflict. * Financial support is essential. * Reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life helps to avoid a return to picking up the arms again. * The post-conflict demobilization itself is a complex and sensitive logistical exercise and usually conducted in a rather short period of time. The reintegration phase is a long-term process.

B·I·C·C 21 brief 7

Proliferation and landmines.26 By early 1996, more restricted by the Protocol—mines than twenty-five states have declared without self-destruction and self- deployment of anti- export moratoria on APMs. Others deactivation mechanism—are personnel landmines followed since, with some also discouraged. Fourth, the agreement stopping production and applies to internal conflicts as well as The case of clearing anti-personnel stockpiling. A number of states to international conflicts. Fifth, mines (APMs) and efforts to control continue to export.27 states promise each other technical and outlaw their use is a micro- support for mine clearance. Sixth, disarmament situation that is well The third major micro-disarmament annual reports and exchanges of known. It is perhaps the area of instrument was the Review information were agreed upon. Also, micro-disarmament that has the Conference of the Convention on violators of the agreement are most support from the international Prohibitions or Restrictions on the personally liable and must be community. The reasons for this Use of Certain Conventional persecuted. should be briefly mentioned, in that Weapons Which May be Deemed to the uniqueness of this weapon and Be Excessively Injourious or to Have its effects may not transfer directly Indiscriminate Effects, often referred to micro-disarmament efforts to as the Inhumane Weapons involving other types of light Convention (IWC) or simply CCW, weapons. First, the problems related which ended with the agreement on to the proliferation of APMs are the text of a revised protocol II on well established. There are an mines. Six areas were under estimated 100 million, or possibly negotiation, which form a typology even more, of these weapons of focal points for the CCW and scattered across the world, tens of micro-disarmament in general. These thousands of innocent civilians are were: 1) rules governing the use of killed and maimed each year from APMs; 2) the scope of conflicts to these mines, clearing the mines is a which the CCW applies (internal very slow and expensive process, and versus international conflict); 3) their presence in mainly developing transfers of APMs; 4) verification, countries has cut the amount of land compliance and transparency; 5) available for agriculture in half. technical measures to assist mine Additionally irrigation systems, clearance; and 6) review procedures. dams, electrical power stations and transportation systems are Despite major obstacles to frequently mined, disrupting the agreement on the revision of normal and economic and social protocol II of the CCW, formulae fabric of a country. All of this for greater restrictions in the trade creates a significant economic and deployment were finally found. burden on the international 24 First, non-detectable anti-personnel community. mines will be completely forbidden after entry into force. However, The micro-disarmament response by states that can not immediately the international community has comply can defer compliance after had several dimensions. First, the declaring so for a period not to UN has raised money for and exceed nine years. Second, APMs conducted mine clearance. In 1994 have to have a self-destructing and a the UN was able to clear 100,000 25 self-deactivating mechanism unless mines at a cost of $70 million. 24 they are hand-laid in fenced-in areas. Literature on the mine issue is extensive. However, by far more mines are laid However, the same escape clause as This summary of problems is taken from annually than are cleared, so the Terrence Taylor. Landmines: Prospects for for non-detectable APMs applies. overall problem continues to grow. Effective Legal Controls. February 1996. Paper Third, exports of all mines to any Second, for the past three years the presented to the United Nations Conference recipient other than a State or State on the Current Disarmament Agenda. General Assembly has passed agency are forbidden. Exports of Kathmandu, Nepal. resolutions calling for a moratorium 25 non-detectable mines are forbidden. Assistance in Mine Clearance. Report of the on the export of anti-personnel Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Exports of mines the use of which is A/49/357, 1994. 26 General Assembly resolution A/RES/50/70. 27 Taylor (note 24).

22 B·I·C·C in practice

Many problems remain and some Crime and violence governments and NGOs who had pushed for more stringent using military-style regulations were disappointed. Some light weapons governments, for instance, had declared that they would destroy The last scenario or situation in their stocks of APMs in order to which micro-disarmament has a show their earnesty in this matter. It place is the prevalence of violent and remains to be seen to what extent common crime—that is, acts of the provisions will be followed, violence that are both apolitical and especially in cases of internal conflict generally unrelated to internal in poor countries. The number of conflicts among organized groups. states party to the CCW is below 60. Gangs fall into this category because Possibly, the selective export they are often apolitical. Drug restrictions will draw more trafficking can be very political but countries into the CCW. On the gangs employed for this purpose other hand, the emphasis on more operate more as criminals in the expensive mines with self- business for economic gain. In this destruction and self-deactivation case we turn more to the experience devices is viewed in a number of of police forces and other bodies states as unbalanced and favoring the employed to keep the public order. richer countries. Verification and The micro-disarmament tools and compliance measures remain weak. policies employed in these situations include building confidence in the There are many lessons to be learned police force, law enforcement from this micro-disarmament effort. techniques, and innovative weapons But there are also unique aspects of collection efforts such as seizure this effort that may not apply to tactics and voluntary weapons negative consequences from buildups collection efforts, commonly called of other types of small arms and gun buy-back programs. light weapons. For example, it is easy to make the case for the humanitarian effects of APMs, but much harder for assault rifles. The casualties from the latter often include civilians, but more often the casualties are members of organized groups fighting each other. Assault rifles are also in the possession of people who feel they are needed for personal safety. Second, and stemming from the first, it is more difficult to draw attention to the negative effects. APMs are inexpensive and can be scattered quickly across a wide area. For assault rifles to have such an impact they would have to be employed in large numbers in an organized fashion. Given that a prerequisite for micro-disarmament policies is a consensus on the negative effects from the weapons, the relative ease of establishing the negative consequences of landmines may hide the difficulties of the same task for other types of light weapons.

B·I·C·C 23 brief 7

Policies, Tools and problems. To counter them, it might make sense to concentrate on Instruments just a few types of light weapons, such as automatic rifles, submachine guns and machine guns which are fairly easy to define. Another Approaches to micro- Multinational level possible group of light weapons are landmines, for which definitions disarmament 1. Support for capacity-building at were discussed in the framework of the national level. The UN and the extension of the Convention on Once it can be established that a other multinational organizations, Prohibitions or Restrictions on the buildup (qualitative or quantitative) governmental and non- Use of Certain Conventional has or will have negative effects, governmental, could do much to Weapons (CCW). Ammunition there are a variety of micro- enhance the capabilities of states to would be especially interesting to disarmament approaches available to deal with this problem. For cover in a register for reasons deal with the problem. Some of example, the UN has offered outlined above Ammunition does these emerged in the previous assistance to states experiencing not present large definition discussion on the agenda of the violence from small arms and light, problems as such but circumvention CCW. In this section we briefly and has sent fact finding missions to would be easy. There is little summarize each of these approaches, several African countries. In El difference between civilian (hunting) some national and some multilateral. Salvador the UN Development and military ammunition and Program has been very active in casings and explosives can be sold National level developing the new police force. separately. However, such programs become 1. Improved policing, for example problematic in the case of a state Another argument often raised in seizing weapons. Experience in that is repressing a minority or against the inclusion of light the US has shown that tactics can be otherwise behaving in a manner at weapons in the UN Register is that developed to improve the success of odds with international norms. acceptance of the Register as a whole weapons seizure programs, resulting may suffer. Already, participation is in lower armed violence. It is 2. Transparency. Much more could not universal and some countries particular important to lower the be done if more information could may be disinclined to continue to visibility of weapons—i.e., get be supplied on the flows and cooperate if additional, often weapons off the streets. Both in the accumulations of these weapons. cumbersome demands are made. US and in Haiti this has lowered the The experience of the UN Register Many countries do have licensing incidents of armed violence and is useful to investigate.28 Two types procedures for the production and made the environment more of knowledge are important: possession of small arms for their conducive for conflict resolution and knowledge of the accumulations own internal security interests. economic and social development themselves, and knowledge of the However, the experience to date of programs. negative consequences of such the UN Register shows that some accumulations. The latter knowledge countries failed to report, or 2. Manufacture, export and import will be crucial in changing norms, reported inadequately, due to controls. The range of options here which in many cases reinforce the inadequately developed includes legislation and laws acquisition of excessive and bureaucracies for monitoring arms restricting the possession, destabilizing amounts of weapons. production and exports. For these, manufacture or export of certain and perhaps additional countries, types of weapons, restricting exports It has been proposed to add small this problem would be more severe by type or recipient, and enhancing arms or light weapons to the UN for light weapons. In addition, it the bureaucracy tasked with the Register. There are two major becomes more difficult for a country implementation of these laws. obstacles: one is definitions, the without adequate arms export other is acceptance. Even though procedures to cooperate in UN 3. Weapons turn-in programs. The earlier definitional work for the mandated arms export embargoes if experience in American cities is very Conventional Forces in Europe they have no oversight over export relevant for the type of ethnic and (CFE) Treaty was available to the of weapons. Thus the argument intra-state conflict currently on the architects of the UN Register, it still about decreased acceptance has both rise. This approach has also been proved difficult to define the a political and technical dimension. attempted in Haiti, Panama and categories for heavy weapons. Light Nicaragua (see below and Appendix weapons would present 28 See e.g. Laurance, Edward, Siemon VII). unprecedented definitional Wezeman and Herbert Wulf. 1994. Arms Watch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

24 B·I·C·C policies

Furthermore, the question might be large caliber machine guns seen as a OECD. Emphasis has shifted from raised when small arms are added to symbol of power in that conflict. negative sanctions of governments the seven categories of major Much of what can be learned has with large military sectors to conventional weapon systems in the been collected within a UNIDIR positive measures of support of UN Register why other weapons project, led by Virginia Gamba (see demobilization, demilitarization and remain excluded. This would be the Appendix 1). One practical lesson is disarmament. While a number of case for ships below a certain that the priority of disarmament donors have put substantial tonnage, medium and small caliber within peace-keeping missions has to resources into this field, artillery, certain types of armored be raised - now it often comes late in coordination among them remains personnel carriers, certain types of the planning and is not given much rudimentary. Also, it might be missiles and a whole range of resources. Another is that peace- useful, both for conceptual issues conflict relevant military equipment keepers would benefit from more and for specific cases, to include such as electronic guidance systems, knowledge about disarmament developing countries in the air-refueling aircraft and non-combat efforts in earlier operations. It would discussion, for instance in the helicopters. help to integrate disarmament framework of UNDP. methods and experiences into peace- A possible way to overcome these keeping training. 7. Demobilization, problems may lie in combining demilitarization and disarmament. regional registers with expansion to 5. Ban on certain types of In a few cases, such as El Salvador, include light arms and ammunition. weapons. Member states to the weapons were turned in and Convention on Certain Weapons destroyed, and forces on both sides 3. Embargo. Very few case studies (CCW) have recently decided on a demobilized. What were the have been done on arms embargoes partial ban on the export and use of conditions and policies that in the post-Cold War era.29 The anti-personnel landmines (see above) promoted such an outcome? A set of number of embargoes has increased as well as on a new protocol IV to lessons has already been learned and while their effectiveness seems to the CCW for the total ban of can be applied to other conflicts.30 have decreased. There is a consensus, blinding lasers. NGOs such as for example, that Croatia was able to Human Rights Watch and the 8. Multilateral consultative break the embargo and use such International Committee of the Red mechanisms. Assuming that an weapons in its recent attacks on the Cross as well as a number of assessment uncovers some Bosnian Serbs. Similarly, weapons governments worked hard for more information that a buildup of small reached Rwanda even after a UN stringent control of mines. They are arms and light weapons has arms embargo. How did this not content with the outcome of the increased the likelihood for conflict, happen? Obviously, political issues recent negotiations and will how will the information be used? are important: supplier states do not continue to pursue the issue. They One of the weaknesses of the UN necessarily follow international might also turn their attention to Register of Conventional Arms on consensus. The increase in sources of other weapons that can be this point is the lack of a global weapons, including illegal considered to fall under the heading mechanism to address the objective transactions, has made arms transfer of especially cruel, for instance of the Register, the prevention of control more difficult. There are equipment used for internal excessive and destabilizing also technical problems, e.g. a lack repression, such as electrocuting accumulation of arms. Lighter of common guidelines of which batons or very dangerous chemical weapons present even more goods all under what types of agents. obstacles, especially given their embargoes. In this respect, the importance in providing personal European Union is exemplary: it has 6. Conditionality. Donor states and security for citizens in areas of established common commodity international development aid deadly conflict. Action at the lists for a variety embargoes of organizations can link their aid to multilateral level will be difficult differing intensity. This is one way action by recipient states to better without the use or development of to improve the usefulness of this control the manufacture or consultative mechanisms to develop tool of micro-disarmament. importing of light weapons so as to and implement micro-disarmament avoid excessive accumulations that programs. 4. Use of force. Can military force could become destabilizing. be used against particular types and Discussion on linking development 29 Some relevant discussion can be found in accumulations of weapons deemed aid with measures of Brzoska, Michael and Frederic Pearson. 1994. destabilizing? The Bosnian case is ”overmilitarization” have occurred Armaments and Warfare. Columbus, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. instructive, as is Somalia and the in a number of donor forums, 30 failed attempt to seize the including the Development See Bonn International Center for Conversion. 1996. Conversion Survey 1996. ‘technicals,’ trucks with mounted Assistance Committee of the Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 4.

B·I·C·C 25 brief 7

Differentiating payoff in the demand approach is These programs, known as buy-back that policies on the supply side, such programs, provide incentives for between supply and as stricter law enforcement and gun those possessing weapons (legal or demand strategies seizure programs, may become more illegal) to turn them in for money or acceptable. in-kind benefits. They also involve The Member States of the UN that amnesty for those turning in the are experiencing buildups and Some micro-disarmament strategies weapons, focusing on getting the accumulations of small arms and operate to affect both supply and weapons off the street and out of light weapons, and the demand. For example, enhanced homes. The goals of such programs accompanying negative effects, can transparency can pinpoint buildups are to publicize the connection be usefully divided into two to be addressed by law enforcement between weapons and violence, categories. In a country such as Mali, and security officials. On the other develop norms against such use, and it is clear that controlling weapons hand, increased transparency about lower the number of weapons flows into the country is critical to the negative effects stemming from available for crime and violence. establishing stability. It is a fluid buildups of this type of weapon can Normally hardened criminals do not situation in which border controls also enhance the norm against their turn in their weapons, so these may be helpful. This type of possession and use. programs are seen more as leading to situation demands some action on changing attitudes and norms. As a the supply side. In El Salvador, result, they rely critically on the however, the accumulation is Weapons collection participation of the community and already there, in the form of can have the spin-off effect of 200,000-300,000 weapons circulating and reduction enhancing community-police in a black market situation. For this strategies relations and social development type of situation the weapons are programs. already present and, while border The approaches selected for micro- Voluntary weapons collection controls will prevent further disarmament must take into account programs have been conducted accumulations if they are successful, the well-established limitations of extensively in American cities for micro-disarmament policies must be the UN and other regional the past five years, and continue to developed to deal with the current organizations in the area of security, be a popular approach to both weapons in the hands of individual arms control and disarmament. The collecting guns and addressing gun criminals and gangs. In this latter experience of UN-sponsored violence by emphasizing the negati- situation innovative demand side policing—for example, in Haiti and ve consequences of gun possession policies are needed. So the typology Bosnia—shows that despite a high and use. of tools and instruments in the level of expertise and experience, the section above must be further sovereignty of the Member State In the final report of the UN delineated as supply or demand. must be respected. For example, mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) while a particular gun seizure tactic in April 1995, the Secretary-General The demand side of the problem may work in the United States or stated the following: involves tactics and strategies for South Africa when employed by lowering the need for weapons on national police forces, the UN "12. During this last mandate, the part of citizens. Instruments cannot simply adopt and implement ONUSAL’s remaining military have been utilized in US cities in this such tactics in the name of the observers have closely monitored the regard, including educating citizens United Nations. Rather, any UN adoption and implementation of about the dangers of possessing a police contingent may be limited to legislative and administrative gun, creating a norm in youth that advice and conflict resolution, if measures taken to collect military gun violence is counter-productive, requested. In this regard, weapons weapons in the hands of civilians or and employing voluntary weapon seizure programs would have to be State institutions. While a limited collection programs as a device to carefully crafted. However, the use number of registered arms are still to change attitudes towards gun of voluntary weapons collection be collected, the main problem lies possession and use, as well as programs, planned and implemented with the unknown but large number of promoting other programs that can by the Member States concerned, weapons of which there are no record. alleviate more basic causes of appears to be a tool that fits the UN The Government has reported the violence. The demand approach mode of operation when it comes to seizing of approximately 2,000 such seeks to change the culture of gun micro-disarmament programs. weapons since the beginning of 1995, possession and gun violence—not an but voluntary surrender has thus far easy task unless the body been negligible. This is a matter for implementing such policies can also concern which should be addressed decrease the insecurity that created promptly. Buy-back programmes the problem in the first place. The

26 B·I·C·C policies

such as those used in Nicaragua and The urban US- experience with voluntary firearm Haiti might be considered." collection that has been made in the (emphasis added). american experience United States and that might be as a source of applicable to other countries where The staff of the Program for Arms micro-disarmament voluntary firearm collection is Control, Disarmament and experience considered. In addition, the question Conversion (PACDC) at the of the objectives of gun control has Monterey Institute of International While not directly related to current been extensively discussed and Studies has conducted a field micro-disarmament cases, an lessons may be drawn for the assessment of the weapons collection ongoing investigation by PACDC of question of how far gun control programs in Haiti and Nicaragua. A the problems of gun violence could and should go, that is who brief summary of the two reports experienced in the cities of the might be allowed to own what kind are also included as part of Appendix United States has resulted in the of small arms. VIII. conclusion that the international effort in micro-disarmament could While it is true that as a country the learn a great deal from this US would appear to have little in experience. This is so for two common with El Salvador, Mali and reasons: One is that direct

Varieties of firearms control

Target Theory Examples Major Problems

Dangerous Uses Some types of carrying Prohibition on carrying guns Inability to detect and and use of concealed on person or in cars; prevent high-risk uses. guns are more prohibition of firearms in urban likely to produce violence public places; prohibition on than others; keeping guns discharge of firearms in urban from such settings areas. will reduce gun violence.

Dangerous Users Some categories of citizens are Prohibition of acquisition by Prohibited classes obtain more likely to convicted felons, minors, and weapons in unregulated misuse guns than others. persons with histories of mental channels; false negatives; Forbidding these groups guns illness confinement. false positive. will reduce total firearms violence and its costs.

Dangerous Guns Some firearms are more likely Prohibition of automatic firearms Displacement to other to be misused than others. and sawed-off ; weapons; illicit market in Removing these will reduce bans on ”Saturday night specials”; prohibited weapons. total firearms violence. assault weapons restrictions; restrictive licensing.

Source: Franklin Zimring, University of California, Berkeley

B·I·C·C 27 brief 7

other developing countries The research on guns and violence in experiencing violence from small the United States is extensive, and is arms and light weapons, sections of beyond the scope of this study. The US cities share many characteristics major point is that it is an with these potential targets of micro- experience worth looking at by disarmament. First, the poverty those setting out to practice micro- levels and other indicators of low disarmament. The matrix printed social development are clearly above, developed by Frank Zimring, present. Second, no country can a professor at the University of claim as many guns per capita as the California at Berkeley, one of the United States, with this figure leading experts in the US on probably higher when concentrated firearms and violence, for instance, in the cities. It is also clear that clarifies the linkages between despite well developed laws and objectives and instruments of small police forces, illegal gun possession arms control that are also relevant and gun violence is rampant. Third, for decision makers in post-conflict like many developing countries, the situations. They have to decide what supply in the US is unlimited. Many they see as the problems, what their efforts are being made on the supply objectives are and then may benefit side, such as the Brady Bill of 1985 from the corresponding experience which calls for a five-day waiting in the United States, both with period before purchasing a gun, so respect to the legal situation and the that a background check can practicalities of the problem of determine if the buyer has a criminal ”getting the guns back in” (see also record. But it is also acknowledged appendix VIII). that this and other approaches do little to stem the ever increasing production and acquisition of small arms.

28 B·I·C·C multilateral action

Multilateral Action for Micro- Operative measures The following activities and policy instruments are discussed in the sections above. They partly are Disarmament already practiced and might be improved and partly need further thought before implementation In summary, efforts in the field of 1. It must be clear to all parties that could be considered or attempted. micro-disarmament must take into the accumulation of small arms and account a wide variety of concepts, light weapons in the society is a 1. Capacity building. Many states, issues and factors not normally major factor in the armed violence especially after the end of conflict considered part of the disarmament and the casualties that are occurring. are in need of improvements of mandate. Some issues are familiar, various government agencies, such as such as the need to closely examine 2. The weapons causing these customs services, arms export the weapons of concern, their problems should be military-style control agencies and police forces. capabilities and effects. But new weapons not needed by law-abiding They are often also in need of advice efforts should be made to engage a citizens for their personal security. on demobilization, demilitarization, wider group of government officials demining and destruction of surplus and an epistemic community 3. The internal security forces of the weapons. A related field is that of beyond those normally involved in country concerned are unable to legal advice on small arms issues. arms control and disarmament collect these weapons or otherwise Various bodies of the UN already work. The United Nations System disarm those using these weapons to do offer some of these services, such has a large role in micro- destabilize the country on their as UNDP on demobilization, as do disarmament because of the global own. national governments, and inter- nature of the small arms governmental organizations. Much predicament and because of its 4. The internal security forces of the of this is ad hoc and haphazard. demonstrated importance in conflict country must be developed enough, More coordination at the level of the prevention and post-conflict peace- in terms of capacity and adherence UN would add value to ongoing building. Regional organizations can to international norms, so that the activities. supplement and partly substitute the UN can provide that marginal UN´s role in concrete cases. The assistance which will allow these 2. Field missions and early importance of action by forces to conduct a disarmament warning. Current methods of governments and even non- campaign.. making the international governmental organizations has been community aware of impending pointed out above. Purely for 5. The community and social conflicts and ongoing man-made practical purposes, the following structure of the country must have disasters are not sufficient. Informa- points focus on the United Nations. the potential to organize so as to tion on accumulations of light play a major role in working with weapons are an important element Principles for UN internal security forces to combat of such early warning. Better micro-disarmament the weapons and violence problem. channels of information, including governments as well as NGOs are actions 6. The initiative for UN warranted, as well as more effective involvement in micro-disarmament collection and assessment procedures To conclude this study, a proposed actions lies with the Member States, at the UN. In some cases, national set of operating principles is put which are best suited to ascertain governments may not be capable, or forward for consideration as a guide that the above criteria exist. not the best suited, actor to find out to UN action in this new field. It about what is going on with respect takes into account the issues and to the accumulation of small arms. concepts presented, as well as the UN expert mission such as the one illustrative examples of the landmine to Mali, or to the Great Lakes Area, campaign and the current situation can provide important input to the in El Salvador. assessment of the situation before it evolves into wide-spread conflict.

B·I·C·C 29 brief 7

3. Ban on certain types of 6. Post-conflict disarmament weapons. After the conclusion of measures. UNIDIR has begun to the review conference of the CCW, systematically collect experiences activities for the ban of certain types with disarmament measures during of landmines are likely to go on. A peace-keeping operations. The major good number of governments and lessons of their study, many NGOs will continue to push complemented with the results of for improvements. A different other studies, for instance on the follow-up of the CCW discussion case of Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador may have a better chance of and of firearms exchange programs acceptance. Also, more should in industrialized countries, can be continue on applying the lessons of applied in a good number of cases of the landmine and blinding-lasers post-conflict peace-building. campaigns to other types of Unfortunately that is not the case so weapons. far. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, small and light weapons 4. Transparency. It makes sense to have not received much attention a consider the question of the potential danger both for internal inclusion of certain types of small security and the peace process as a arms, and ammunition, at the 1997 whole. review of the UN Arms Register. Regional registers, for which there is some interest, could be set up including certain types of small arms. Another aspect of transparency concerns embargoes. The UN has agreed on a good number of arms embargoes in the post-Cold War period but there does not appear to be sufficient common understanding of what kind of goods embargoes should cover.

5. Positive measures for disarmament. The international aid community has for some time discussed issues of conditionality, for instance within the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. The outcome has been to favor positive measures, that is support for demobilization, disarmament, demining and destruction of old equipment, over negative measures, such as reduction in aid to certain states. In certain cases, the later approach may be the only one available to decrease conflict levels. These discussion should be intensified and broadened to include the view of recipient countries.

30 B·I·C·C About the Center

As an independent non-profit orga- to non-military purposes (base closu- nization, the Bonn International Cen- res). ter for Conversion (BICC) supports Alternative use, disposal or scrap- and promotes the processes by which ping of surplus weaponry with the people, skills, technology, equipment, purpose of avoiding indiscriminate financial and economic resources are exports. shifted from the mili-tary or defense sector towards alternative, civilian BICC's publication series such as purposes.The estab-lishment of BICC BICC report, BICC brief and BICC in April 1994 resulted from the initia- paper analyze the background of the tive of the German state government international conversion process, re- of North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), in port on conversion projects and expe- coop-eration with the Investitions- rience, and offer scientific as well as Bank and the Landesentwicklungsge- practical know-how in the various sellschaft (both of NRW), the state of fields of conversion. The BICC year- Brandenburg, Germany, and the assi- book 'Conversion survey 1996' provi- stance of the United Nations. des detailed information, facts and discussion on all topics related to the Working as a worldwide clearinghouse conversion process worldwide. on practical conversion experiences and projects, BICC Information on BICC's work and provides documentation, research, activities can also be obtained on line information and consulting services via the Center's Internet and facilities for governmental and service 'ConverNet' at non-governmental organizations, com- http://bicc.uni-bonn.de panies, and individuals involved in conversion.

BICC's activities focus primarily on the following six areas of conversion: Published by Analysis of the means and © BICC, Bonn 1996 methods of reallocating the financial Bonn International Center for Conversion resources of the military sector to Director: Dr. Herbert Wulf Publishing management: Corinna Hauswedell non-military purposes. An der Elisabethkirche 25 Reorientation of military research D-53113 Bonn Germany and development (R&D) facilities and Phone +49-228-911960 provision of this R&D knowledge and Fax +49-228-241215 creativity for non-military purposes. E-mail: [email protected] Opportunities for and barriers to ISSN 0947-7322 conversion of the arms industry in down-sizing its overcapacities and in Layout: Svenja Görgens Printed in Germany reducing its dependence on arms pro- All rights reserved duction. Programs for the demobilization of military personnel and civilian person- nel employed by the armed forces and their reintegration into non-military employment. Reallocation of military facilities and installations and their conver-sion appendix 1

Appendix I.

An area of activity of the Current Projects Commission is on crime prevention strategies, in particular as related to crime in urban areas and juvenile on Light Weapons and violent criminality, including the question of victims. The continued study of the effects of criminality in urban areas, and the development of preventive measures, United Nations Disarmament The 1996 Working Group could using a multidisciplinary approach, Commission built on earlier work done in the and considering recent framework of the Commission. (A/ developments, inter alia, in In the Final Document of its tenth CN/1995/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.2). sociology, psychology, health, Special Session, res. S-10/2 para.118, criminology and technology. Special the General Assembly decided to Commission on Crime Prevention attention was focused on firearms establish a Disarmament and Criminal Justice regulation for purposes of crime Commission composed of all UN Crime Prevention and Criminal prevention and public safety, in members. It also decided that the Justice Branch view of the correlation between easy Commission should be a deliberative United Nations Office in Vienna access to firearms and the high body, required to consider and make Vienna International Centre incidence of crimes, suicides and recommendations on various Wagramerstrasse 5 accidents. The Commission, at its problems in the field of PO Box 500 next session, was to consider disarmament and to follow up the A-1400 Vienna measures to regulate firearms relevant decisions and Austria commonly applicable to Member recommendations of the tenth States, such as the prevention of Special Session. Contact: transnational illicit trafficking in Phone: 43-1-21131-4272 firearms, to suppress their use in The Commission directs its Fax: 43-1-209-2599 criminal activities, and to ensure the attention at each substantive session proper regulation of firearms at both to specific subjects from among The Commission on Crime the national and transnational levels. those which have been and will be Prevention and Criminal Justice was under its consideration, taking into established by ECOSOC res. 1992/1 account the relevant resolutions of Disarmament and Conflict the Assembly, and to make concrete 1. Its main functions are: Resolution Project recommendations on such subjects United Nations Institute for to the subsequent session of the Provide policy guidance to United Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Assembly. Nations Member States in the Room A218, Palais des Nations field of crime prevention and CH-1211 Geneva 10 During the Commission’s 1996 criminal justice Switzerland substantive session, Working Group I was entrusted with the mandate of Develop, monitor and review the Phone: 41-22-917-4254 ”International arms transfers, with implementation of the United Fax: 41-22-917-0176 particular reference to General Nations crime prevention E-mail: [email protected] Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 programme December 1991”. Guidelines for In recognizing that almost no international arms transfers were Facilitate and help to coordinate attention had been exclusively given unanimously adopted by the the activities of the interregional to the issue of arms control in peace Working Group (A/CN.10/1996/ and regional institutes on the processes and that little public CRP.3). The substantial annex is prevention of crime and the information is available in this reproduced below as appendix III. treatment of offenders respect, special efforts will be made The document pertains to arms to assure the widest possible transfers in general, but the focus is Mobilize the support of Member dissemination of this project’s on the illicit arms trade. States findings. It began with the Disarmament and Conflict Resolut- Prepare the United Nations ions Project’s (DCR) first Congress on the Prevention of publication in October 1995 and Crime and the Treatment of will cover the complete series of Offenders

B·I·C·C 31 brief 7

DCR publications: the first of these Human Rights Watch works mainly Project on Light Weapons will involve 10 case studies, covering on light weapons, especially UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, landmines. They have been closely During the two-year initial period of Rhodesia (1979), Bosnia/Croatia, involved in the CCW Review the project (1995-1996), BASIC Central America (ONUCA/ Conference. HRW has also taken on intends to: ONUSAL), Cambodia, Angola, blinding laser weapons and have Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia and issued two reports about it. They create the framework necessary to Haiti. The second set of publications have also conducted a research develop a joint plan of research will include eight issue papers, mission to to investigate the and advocacy on the light addressing topics such as Security use of arms in the conflict in weapons trade, Council procedures, mandate southeast Turkey against the PKK, specificity, doctrine, rules of and a mission to Colombia to construct a network of people engagement, coercive versus investigate arms flows to the working on light weapons to consensual arms control and Colombian government and to the decrease the isolation of those demobilization processes, consensus, paramilitaries. They are updating working on these issues, intelligence and media, and training. past research into arms flows in the A third set of publications will Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Zaire, create mechanisms to share involve three papers (in one volume) and Burundi). The Arms Project information and strategies more on the relationship between arms continues to conduct field mission effectively, and conflict in the region of research into arms transfers and Southern Africa. The last of the violations of the laws of war, as well determine whether there is Project’s published works will be an as research and advocacy on certain sufficient support to pursue more over-arching paper summarizing weapon systems such as landmines, extensive research and analysis of research conclusions and providing blinding lasers, and cluster bombs. these issues, and recommendations. British American Security help place the issue of the trade in The principal products of the Information Council (BASIC) light weapons on the agenda of Project include over 20 publications national and international (case studies, policy papers, manuals, Carrara House institutions by increasing public and final policy recommendation 20 Embankment Place and elite attention to the papers). Secondary products include London WC2N 6NN problem. the creation of a peace-keeping and disarmament database and an To bring attention to the problem institutionalized network of 1900 L Street, NW of the light weapons trade, project collaborating institutes and Suite 401 participants are writing several short individuals who exchange input and Washington, D.C. 20036 studies and research papers, which collaborate with UNIDIR on peace- USA are published under the series title, keeping and disarmament policy ”Project on Light Weapons Working research. Contact: Papers”. Natalie J. Goldring Susannah L. Dyer Centre for International and The Arms Project Joel Johnston Strategic Studies Human Rights Watch Phone: 1-202-785-1266 York University 1522 K Street, NW, #910 Fax: 1-202-387-6298 York Lanes, 3rd Floor Washington, D.C. 20005 E-Mail: [email protected] 4700 Keele Street USA North York, Ontario M3J IP3 Bronwyn Brady Contact: Phone: 44-171-925-0862 Steve Goose Fax: 44-171-925-0861 Contact: phone: (202) 371-6592 E-Mail: [email protected] Andrew Latham Fax: (202) 371-0124 Phone: 1-416-736-5156 E-mail: [email protected] Fax: 1-416-736-5752 E-Mail: [email protected] Kathleen Bleakley Phone: (202) 371-6592 Fax: (202) 371-0124 E-mail: [email protected]

32 B·I·C·C appendix 1

Mr. Latham is currently working on conflict: case studies conflicts with special focus on the six major research papers to infantry weapons. eventually develop into the chapters Previous attempts to control this of a book tentatively entitled: trade Activities include the continuous Canadian Perspectives on the Light updating of a country-by-country, Weapons Proliferation Problem. The Possible approaches to worldwide database of small caliber chapter outline would be as follows: controlling the trade weapons inventories which has been published as Small Arms Today. Data 1. Defining the problem: ”Light Professor Klare has been conducting includes 5.56 mm to 40 mm Weapons” as a Proliferation Issue this research and is also interested in and mortars with local designation 2. Address the Problem I: Moving methodology: how researchers of the weapon, manufacturer, and, Beyond Existing Proliferation better collect and process to the extent possible, source of Paradigms information on the light weapons supply. This listing includes 3. Canadian Interests with Respect to trade. He is very interested in information on government and Light Weapons Proliferation sharing information and insights anti-government forces when 4. The Proliferation of Light Weapons: with others in the field. applicable. Causes and Consequences 5. Addressing the Problem III: He will also be working with the North-South Defence and Security Canada’s Role in Constraining the American Academy of Arts and Programme Proliferation of Light Weapons Sciences to plan a fall 1996 Centre for Defence Studies (CDS) conference on strategies for King’s College, London Five College Program in Peace controlling the international trade in Strand and World Security Studies small arms and light weapons. London WC2R 2LS Hampshire College UK Box SS The Institute for Research on Amherst, MA 01002 Small Arms in International Contact: USA Security (IRSAIS) Chris Smith 424 S. Washington Street Phone: 44-1273-385-714; 44-171-873- Contact: Alexandria, VA 22314 2859 Michael T. Klare USA Fax: 44-1273-385-713; 44-171-873- Phone: 1-413-582-5563 2748 Fax: 1-413-582-5620 Contact: E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: Virginia Ezell, Chris Riggs [email protected] Phone: 1-703-549-7353 Africa Fax: 1-703-549-7354 Last year, Professor Klare conducted Research on arms trafficking in research for a book on the interna- The Institute for Research on Small southern Africa has been written up tional trade in small arms and light Arms in International Security was and will be published by the United weapons. Essentially, he is interested incorporated in 1989 to promote the Nations Institute for Disarmament in all aspects of the trade, including: study of several aspects of infantry Research early next year. A weapons: research and development, conference in Mozambique is Global production of small arms including the history of the planned for next year. CDS and light weapons technology of small arms; uses of contributed major input into the small arms, (i.e. the tactical BBC ”Human Rights, Human Overt commercial and application of infantry weapons); Wrongs” programme, screened in governmental sales and small arms transfers. December 1995. Other BBC reports to which CDS contributed, involve Covert governmental sales The Institute’s quarterly journal, filming the uncovering of an arms Small Arms World Report, features cache in Mozambique. Black-market sales articles on the latest technical developments and the history of The impact of small arms and small arms. Regular developments light weapons on contemporary include news about the small arms industry, a multi-lingual bibliography of recent publications, and developments in low-intensity

B·I·C·C 33 brief 7

A book on arms trafficking in number of case studies to include the from tanks and fighter aircraft to southern Africa is being prepared by United States, additional European light weapons such as anti-personnel Chris Smith and Charles Alao. The countries () and a number of land mines and hand grenades - project to set up a weapons recycling developing countries (South Africa, which can be destabilizing and plant at Rundu, northern Namibia is China, India/Pakistan, Israel, etc.). contribute to inter- and intrastate still possible. Funding for a The final stage will look at the use of violence. PACDC’s major activities feasibility study is being sought by landmines by irregular forces. and products include a world wide Co-Operation for Development. web site containing updated information on the acquisition and South Asia Program for Arms Control, disposal of conventional armaments, Disarmament and Conversion published studies and policy Currently, there are plans to return Monterey Institute of Internatio- analysis, workshops and to undertake further research in this nal Studies conferences, and consultation to area, perhaps in co-operation with 425 Van Buren Street non-governmental organizations south Asian colleagues. There has Monterey, CA 93940 (NGOs), national governments and been a significant increase in interest USA the United Nations. The overall goal in light weapons proliferation in the of the program is to promote human region. A large number of students Contact: security by lessening the likelihood in the region are pursuing the light Edward J. Laurance of conflict and freeing up resources weapons issue for Ph.D. and M.Phil Phone: 1-408-647-4142 to enhance economic and social dissertations. Fax: 1-408-647-4199 development. E-mail: [email protected] MIIS graduate students are European working group on extensively involved in the work of firearms control Sarah Meek PACDC, contributing to the Phone: 1-408-647-3589 important program goal of When time permits, Chris Smith Fax: 1-408-647-4199 developing the new generation of will be traveling to several European E-mail: [email protected] policy analysts and experts in arms centres to locate potential colleagues. control, disarmament and Excellent contacts have been The primary mission of the Program conversion policy. PACDC established with INTERPOL and its for Arms Control, Disarmament, cooperates with internationally cooperation is anticipated. CDS and and Conversion (PACDC) is to known institutions engaged in the International Security Informati- monitor current developments and similar work through joint projects, on Service will host a House of conduct research on the acquisition, the establishment of internships, and Commons seminar with the IN- export and buildup of conventional the exchange of researchers and TERPOL secretary-general early armaments. This research is designed scholars. These institutions include next year. to generate and promote practical the Arias Foundation in Costa Rica, policy alternatives which address the the Bonn International Center for Landmines negative consequences of the Conversion, the Council for excessive accumulation of Security Cooperation in the Asia We have recently started a project conventional military weapons - Pacific, the Arms Project of Human based upon the military utility of Rights Watch, the Stockholm landmines. The project is planned in International Peace Research Institu- three stages. The first is looking at te, and the United Nations Centre the landmines policies of Germany, for Disarmament Affairs. Sweden, , the , Austria and the United Kingdom. The report was ready for the April meeting in Geneva of the Inhumane Weapons Convention. The second stage will expand the

34 B·I·C·C appendix 2

Appendix II. Excerpt from Supplement to An Agenda for Peace

A/50/60 S/1995/1

3 January 1995

Disarmament

57. At their Summit on 31 January 1992, the members of the Security Council underscored their interest in and concern for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, with special reference to weapons of mass destruction. They committed themselves to taking concrete steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in those areas.

58. Considerable progress has been made since January 1992. The moratorium on nuclear testing continues to be largely observed. The Conference on Disarmament has finally decided to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The General Assembly has recommended the negotiation of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material. Efforts are under way to strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex), ratified by 131 countries, through development of verification mechanisms. The Convention on the Prohi- bition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, has been signed by 159 countries, but has not yet entered into force, pending ratification by the required 65 signatories. There have been some important accessions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

59. I attach special importance to a successful conclusion of the forthcoming conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is also of great importance that the Chemical Weapons Convention enter into force as soon as possible. The momentum in all these areas needs to be maintained. Ways have to be found for reconciling transfer of technology with measures necessary to prevent its misuse for military purposes.

60. These issues are of paramount importance both to the security of humankind and to the release of economic, scientific and technological resources for peace and human progress. In the present paper, however, devoted as it is to the Organization’s recent experience in handling specific conflicts, I wish to concentrate on what might be called „micro-disarmament“. By this I mean practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.

61. The contemporary significance of micro-disarmament is demonstrated by the enormous proliferation of automatic assault weapons, anti-personnel mines and the like. Competent authorities have estimated that billions of dollars are being spent yearly on light weapons, representing nearly one third of the world’s total arms trade. Many of those weapons are being bought, from developed countries, by developing countries that can least afford to dissipate their precious and finite assets for such purposes, and the volume of the trade in light weapons is far more alarming than the monetary cost might lead one to suspect.

B·I·C·C 35 brief 7

62. Micro-disarmament plays an important part in conjunction with all the other techniques discussed in the present paper. The assembly, control and disposal of weapons has been a central feature of most of the comprehensive peace settlements in which the United Nations has played a peace-keeping role. As a result, the Organization has an unrivalled experience in this field. Micro-disarmament is equally relevant to post- conflict peace-building: Nicaragua has shown what can be achieved through imaginative programmes to mop up large numbers of small arms circulating in a country emerging from a long civil war. Disarmament can also follow enforcement action, as has been demonstrated in Iraq, where the United Nations Special Commission has played a pioneering role in practical disarmament, in this case involving weapons of mass destruction. All the sanctions regimes include an arms embargo and experience has confirmed the difficulty of monitoring cross-border arms flows into countries at war with their neighbours or within their own borders.

63. There are two categories of light weapons that merit special attention. The first is small arms, which are probably responsible for most of the deaths in current conflicts. The world is awash with them and traffic in them is very difficult to monitor, let alone intercept. The causes are many: the earlier supply of weapons to client States by the parties to the cold war, internal conflicts, competition for commercial markets, criminal activity and the collapse of governmental law and order functions (which both gives free rein to the criminals and creates a legitimate reason for ordinary citizens to acquire weapons for their own defence). A pilot advisory mission I dispatched to Mali in August 1994 at the request of that country’s Government has confirmed the exceptional difficulty of controlling the illicit flow of small arms, a problem that can be effectively tackled only on a regional basis. It will take a long time to find effective solutions. I believe strongly that the search should begin now.

64. Secondly, there is the proliferation of anti-personnel mines. One of the positive developments in recent years has been the attention this problem has attracted. The in- ternational community has begun to address it. Current efforts in the context of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects are giving priority to anti-personnel mines and the General Assembly’s call for a moratorium on their export has won much support from manufacturing countries. In addition, the In- ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is developing new protocols to the Convention. Meanwhile work continues to try to deal with the approximately 110 million land-mines that have already been laid. This is an issue that must continue to receive priority attention. The Register of Conventional Arms is important in these endeavours. It is essential that the Register be developed into a universal and non-discriminatory mechanism.

65. Progress since 1992 in the area of weapons of mass destruction and major weapons systems must be followed by parallel progress in conventional arms, particularly with respect to light weapons. It will take a long time to find effective solutions. I believe strongly that the search should begin now, and I intend to play my full part in this effort.

36 B·I·C·C appendix 3

Appendix III. Guidelines for International Arms Transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of December 1991

B·I·C·C 37 brief 7

38 B·I·C·C appendix 3

B·I·C·C 39 brief 7

40 B·I·C·C appendix 3

B·I·C·C 41 brief 7

42 B·I·C·C appendix 3

B·I·C·C 43 brief 7

44 B·I·C·C appendix 3

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Appendix IV. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) (Excerpts)

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council Distr. GENERAL

S/1996/195 14 March 1996 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

LETTER DATED 13 MARCH 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to resolution 1013 (1995), by which the Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate, inter alia, reports relating to the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region in violation of Council resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995).

By paragraph 4 of that resolution, the Security Council requested me to submit, within three months of the establishment of the Commission, an interim report on the conclusions of the Commission. That report was submitted to the Council on 26 January 1996 (S/1996/67). By a letter dated 13 February 1996 (S/ 1996/104), the President of the Security Council indicated that members looked forward to receiving the Commission’s final report in due course.

The purpose of the present letter is to transmit to the Council the final report of the International Commission of Inquiry. As requested by the Council, the report contains the Commission’s conclusions, as well as its recommendations regarding possible measures to curb the illegal flow of arms in the Great Lakes region.

In the light of these recommendations, the Security Council may wish to decide whether the Commission should continue its investigations or whether

46 B·I·C·C appendix 4

other measures should be put in place to promote compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Council.

Should the Council decide that the Commission is to pursue its investigation, it would be my intention to review, in consultation with the Chairman, the composition and modus operandi of the Commission, taking into account the need for maximum cost-effectiveness, especially at a time when the Organization is facing an acute financial crisis.

I should like in this connection to emphasize that, in the absence of voluntary contributions to the budget of the Commission as called for in paragraph 8 of resolution 1013 (1995), the Commission would continue to be financed as an expense of the Organization. The necessary additional appropriations would therefore have to be made in the context of the regular budget of the Organization.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Excerpts

Annex

Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 1 of its resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations that former Rwandan government forces were being supplied with arms in violation of the embargo imposed by the Council in resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995). The Commission was also charged with investigating allegations that such forces were receiving military training in order to destabilize Rwanda, and with identifying parties aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition of arms by those forces, contrary to the Council’s resolutions.

2. By paragraph 4 of resolution 1013 (1995), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit, within three months from its establishment, an interim report on the conclusions of the Commission and, as soon as possible thereafter, to submit a final report containing its recommendations.

3. In a letter dated 16 October 1995 (S/1995/879), the Secretary-General notified the President of the Security Council that he had appointed the following persons as members of the International Commission:

B·I·C·C 47 brief 7

Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt), Chairman Inspector Jean-Michel Hanssens (Canada) Colonel Jürgen G. H. Almeling (Germany) Lt. Colonel Jan Meijvogel () Brigadier Mujahid Alam (Pakistan) Colonel Lameck Mutanda (Zimbabwe).

4. By a letter dated 20 October 1995 (S/1995/880), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council welcomed his decision and took note of the information contained in his letter.

5. The Commission completed its interim report three months after the nomination by the Secretary-General of its Chairman and members and submitted it to the Council on 26 January 1996 (S/1996/67, annex). In response to the letter of transmittal of the Secretary-General, the President of the Security Council stated (S/1996/104) that the Council members looked forward to receiving the final report of the Commission in due course.

6. The Commission herewith submits its final report, which contains additional information it has discovered since the submission of its interim report. In accordance with paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 1013 (1995), by which the Commission was requested to recommend measures to end the illegal flow of arms in the subregion in violation of the Council resolutions referred to above, the Commission also submits recommendations for the Council’s consideration.

...

V. INFORMATION SOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING THE ALLEGED SALE OR SUPPLY OF ARMS AND MATÉRIEL TO THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES IN VIOLATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

52. The mandate of the International Commission of Inquiry involved the investigation of reports relating to alleged violations of the Security Council arms embargo imposed on the former Rwandan government forces. In its interim report, the Commission noted that it had been obliged in the first instance to use non-United Nations sources of information until it was able to investigate the allegations at first hand (S/1996/67, annex, para. 9).

53. The reports immediately available to the Commission included the Human Rights Watch Arms Project report referred to above (see para. 21), a subsequent report by Amnesty International confirming the Human Rights Watch study and a number of British and French media accounts, including at least three television documentaries: “The Gun Runners” of 17 November 1994, “Merchants of death” of 13 June 1995, both broadcast by Carlton UK Television, and a BBC “Newsnight” production of March 1995 on training.

54. Though it used these and other reports as provisional sources of information in the early stages of its investigation the Commission, as it made clear in its interim report, was careful to substantiate all facts reported to it as far as possible. This was done by interviewing eye-witnesses and

48 B·I·C·C appendix 4

inspecting documents, as well as by verifying allegations with the Governments concerned.

55. By paragraph 14 of its resolution 918 (1994), the Security Council decided to establish a Committee to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

“(a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 [of the resolution];

“(b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

“(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo ... and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States”.

56. As noted in its interim report (para. 41), the Commission requested the Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) to supply it with any information it had that might pertain to the Commission’s mandate. The Commission was informed that the Government of Rwanda had submitted to the Committee the Human Rights Watch report, and that in response to questions arising therefrom the Governments of China and France had issued denials of any involvement in the alleged activities.

57. Shortly after the submission of its interim report, the Commission again wrote to the Committee requesting information on any measures the latter might have recommended in response to violations of the embargo, as called for in paragraph 14 (c) of resolution 918 (1994). The Chairman of the Committee replied that the Committee had no additional information and invited the Commission to share with the Committee any relevant information it might have.

58. The International Commission of Inquiry has received some assistance from United Nations agencies and programmes, including the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The Commission also obtained useful background information from some of the diplomats accredited to the States of the Great Lakes region, as well as from numerous individual sources. The report produced by Human Rights Watch Arms Project, subsequently endorsed by Amnesty International, was a primary source of detailed information, much of which the Commission was subsequently able to confirm for itself. Individual journalists and documentary film makers also produced detailed accounts of arms flows and training in eastern Zaire which were very carefully reviewed by the Commission. The French newspaper Libération pursued the matter doggedly, and press reports in the Seychelles newspaper Regar and the Paris-based Indian Ocean Newsletter contained information of great value, which the Commission was able substantially to verify. There can be no doubt that these various reports not only provided the Commission with strong leads to follow, but also kept the matter in the public eye and, in the view of the Commission, contributed substantially towards deterring violations of the United Nations embargo.

B·I·C·C 49 brief 7

59. By contrast, however, the Commission could not fail to note the absence of an effective, proactive mechanism to monitor or implement the arms embargo the Security Council had imposed on Rwanda. Had such a mechanism been functioning properly, the task of gathering information and investigating reports concerning alleged violations of the embargo that was subsequently entrusted to the Commission would undoubtedly have been facilitated. Indeed, the alleged violations might not have occurred if such a proactive mechanism had been functioning and been seen to be doing so. The Special Commission established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991), concerning the disarmament of Iraq, might serve as a useful model in this context.

60. The Commission is well aware of the practical, political and budgetary obstacles confronting the United Nations in its efforts to deal with sudden crises such as that which engulfed Rwanda in 1994. But such difficulties need not prevent the Security Council from establishing the machinery required for the full implementation of its resolutions, and the Commission proposes in paragraphs 77 to 81 below what form this machinery might take. It should be made clear that if the Security Council were to adopt these recommendations, ways would have to be found of providing the necessary additional resources for these activities, so as to reinforce the Organization’s preventive diplomacy efforts, particularly in the fields of fact-finding and the development of early-warning systems. As noted in the report of the Secretary-General entitled “An Agenda for Peace” (S/24111), the specialized agencies and regional arrangements and organizations have an important role to play in this activity.

VI. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF RWANDANS IN ZAIRE IN ORDER TO DESTABILIZE RWANDA

61. In its interim report, the Commission found that Rwandan men were receiving military training to conduct destabilizing raids into Rwanda. In examining the larger question of the sources of destabilization, the Commission agreed with the view often expressed that the presence of hundreds of thousands of refugees outside the borders of their own country was in itself a destabilizing factor.

VII. CURBING THE FLOW OF ILLICIT ARMS IN THE SUBREGION: NEED FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

62. The Commission proposes below a number of specific measures designed to deter possible attempts to sell or supply arms to the former Rwandan government forces in the future, and to encourage further investigation of violations it believes to have taken place in the past. In addition, the Commission would like briefly to address the broader issue of illicit arms flows in the Great Lakes region in violation of Security Council resolutions already adopted, and in the light of the Council’s recent adoption of resolution 1040 (1996), taking into account the fact that embargo-related measures will probably not be effective unless they are applied throughout the subregion.

63. To supplement its recommendations, therefore, the Commission also suggests the adoption of confidence-building measures by the international community and some of the Governments of the subregion which the Security Council may wish to consider endorsing (paras. 82-83).

50 B·I·C·C appendix 4

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

64. On the basis of the evidence it has discovered in Zaire and Seychelles, the Commission is satisfied that the Government of Seychelles, acting on the basis of an end-user certificate apparently issued by the Government of Zaire, authorized a sale of weapons in its possession in mid-June 1994. The arms, which included AK-47 rifles, 82-mm and 60-mm shells and 37-mm and 14.5-mm ammunition, were transported from Seychelles to Goma on 17 and 19 June 1994 by an Air Zaïre DC-8 cargo aircraft, registration number 9QCLV, in two consignments of about 40 tons each. The transaction was negotiated by Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, then a high-ranking officer of the Rwandan government forces, with the participation of Mr. Willem Ehlers, a South African national, who described himself as director of a company called Delta Aero.

65. The Commission accepts that the Government of Seychelles immediately cancelled the planned remaining consignment in the light of new information which led it to believe that there was a possibility that the final destination of the arms could be the Rwandan government forces and that this would therefore have constituted a violation of the United Nations arms embargo against Rwanda.

66. The Commission has considered in great depth the significance of its findings. The first conclusion it has reached is that the response by the Government of Zaire to the questions posed by the Commission to the Zairian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Kinshasa was, at best, highly misleading and inadequate. The Commission is satisfied that the Government of Zaire knew, or should have known, that one of the very few functioning aircraft in its national airline had engaged in the transportation of arms from Seychelles to Goma, apparently in violation of the Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization. If the Government was not aware of this, the publication of the allegations in the Human Rights Watch report and the questions posed by the Commission concerning those allegations should have induced the Government to investigate the matter rather than to prevaricate. Similarly, the Commission believes that the Zairian Government knew, or should have known, that a high- ranking Rwandan army officer, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, was acting or purporting to act on its behalf in arms negotiations in Seychelles on the basis of an end-user certificate apparently issued by the Zairian Ministry of Defence in Kinshasa. In spite of this, the Zairian Government informed the Commission that it had no knowledge of this affair, or of Colonel Bagosora.

67. The Commission was conscious that one possible explanation of the delivery of arms to Goma in mid- and late 1994 and 1995 could have been that the Zairian authorities had themselves been supplying their own troops there or, subsequently, the troops of the UNHCR Zairian Camp Security Contingent. However, as shown above, the Zairian Government made no such claim when asked to explain the Seychelles shipments.

68. The question remains whether or not there was a violation of the Security Council embargo, that is, whether or not the arms flown to Goma from Seychelles were subsequently handed over to the former Rwandan government forces. The Commission, for reasons made clear in its interim report, was effectively prevented while in Goma from seeking first-hand evidence of such a handover.

69. However, given the unsatisfactory response of the Government in Kinshasa to the Commission’s questions, particularly its specific question about the

B·I·C·C 51 brief 7

issuance of an end-user certificate in respect of the Seychelles arms; the participation of Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, a senior officer of the former Rwandan government forces, then under a United Nations arms embargo, in the negotiations for the arms in Seychelles; the fact that Colonel Bagosora himself accompanied the arms to Goma; the fact that he informed a person interviewed by the Commission that the arms were destined for and delivered to the Rwandan government forces; the denial by the Zairian Minister of Defence of any knowledge of Colonel Bagosora, despite the latter’s claim to have officially placed an Air Zaïre aircraft under military control and taken delivery of the Seychelles arms consignments on behalf of the Zairian Armed Forces; and the obstructive and uncooperative attitude of the Zairian Government officials assigned to assist the Commission in Goma, which made it impossible for the Commission to conduct its investigation there, the Commission concludes that it is highly probable that a violation of the United Nations embargo took place involving the supply of more than 80 tons of rifles, grenades and ammunition in two consignments flown to Goma airport on 17 and 19 June 1994 and subsequently transferred to the Rwandan government forces then in Gisenyi, Rwanda. If that is indeed the case, the Commission believes that the Government of Zaire or elements within it, in at least this one case, did aid and abet this violation.

70. The Commission accepts that the South African-made weapon found on Iwawa Island in the wake of the battle there in November 1995 was supplied to the then Rwandan Government some years before the embargo was imposed. However, the Commission does consider that further investigation is required into whether or not Mr. Willem Ehlers, a national of South Africa, also aided and abetted the sale or supply of arms to the Rwandan government forces in violation of the embargo, and whether the Delta or Delta Aero Company of which he identified himself as a director was also involved.

71. Finally, the Commission cannot fail to express regret at the difficulties it has experienced in obtaining information from some of the Governments of Member States of the United Nations. By paragraph 3 of resolution 1013 (1995), which contains the Commission’s mandate, the Security Council called upon States, relevant United Nations bodies, including the Committee established by resolution 918 (1994), and as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations, and non-governmental organizations, to collate information in their possession relating to the mandate of the Commission, and requested them to make this information available as soon as possible.

72. By paragraph 5 of that resolution, the Council called upon the Governments of the States concerned in which the Commission will carry out its mandate to cooperate fully with the Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate, including responding positively to requests from the Commission for security, assistance, and access in pursuing investigations, and listed a series of measures intended to assist the Commission in its work.

73. During the four months of its existence, the Commission addressed more than 40 letters to the Governments of Member States, and to international humanitarian organizations, non-governmental organizations and others, bringing these provisions, where appropriate, to their attention and requesting specific assistance (see appendix VII). As has already been observed in the interim report, the response was sometimes tardy and occasionally non-existent. In its numerous informal contacts, too, though it received extremely valuable cooperation from many sources, the Commission felt that some of its

52 B·I·C·C appendix 4

interlocutors might have been more helpful and informative. If they had been, the Commission might have been better able to address some of the questions that still remain unanswered. The Commission notes that its concerns in this matter were reflected in the letter dated 13 February 1996 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General (S/1996/104).

74. The Commission proposes (para. 91 below) measures to strengthen the sanctions regime currently existing in respect of the sale or supply of arms and matériel to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

75. The recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry are designed to be practical at low cost to the United Nations and to Member States. It has, however, been made very clear to the Commission that even these modest measures cannot be taken without the provision of the necessary additional resources. The Commission must therefore state plainly its view that if the Security Council’s resolutions are to be properly implemented, sufficient additional resources must be made available to put in place the measures proposed by the Commission, should the Council wish to adopt them.

76. Those measures take into account the efforts already made by the United Nations to resolve the situation in the Great Lakes region, and to deal with the economic, military and ethnic aspects of that situation. Concerns relating to national sovereignty were also taken into consideration. Against the background of the formidable constraints which confront the Organization, the Commission considers these measures to be the optimum practicable steps that can be taken towards achieving the aims embodied in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

A. Mechanisms to monitor, implement and enforce Security Council resolutions, to gather information and preserve evidence

77. The Commission recommends that the Security Council, when imposing an arms embargo on a State or part thereof under Chapter VII of the Charter, consider simultaneously urging neighbouring States to establish within their respective Governments an office with the necessary legal, political, military, police, customs and border-guard personnel. The tasks of this office would be to incorporate the United Nations embargo into national law, to monitor, implement and enforce the operation of the embargo on its own territory and to make regular reports to the Security Council or such other organ as the Council may designate for this purpose.

78. A further responsibility of these offices would be to gather information, collect and preserve evidence and assist such investigating bodies as might subsequently be dispatched by the Security Council to inquire into any allegations of violations, or itself to undertake investigations if so requested by the Council.

79. Where the States concerned cannot staff and equip such offices wholly from within their existing resources, consideration could be given to establishing an

B·I·C·C 53 brief 7

appropriate trust fund within the context of Article 50 of the Charter, and to seconding personnel to assist the requesting Government.

80. Given the need for promptitude in any investigation of allegations of violations of an embargo, the Commission recommends that the Security Council, when establishing an embargo, should consider simultaneously creating an organ analogous to its Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994), but with expanded functions. These would include the maintenance of liaison with the offices proposed above, the receipt, analysis and circulation to Member States of any reports submitted by those offices and the coordination with them of any investigation into alleged violations. The Commission further proposes that additional resources be found to provide adequate staff support for such a body.

81. This still leaves open the question of monitoring, implementing and enforcing the present embargo against the former Rwandan government forces following the completion of the work of the Commission. As proposed in paragraph 91 below, the Commission believes steps can and should be taken immediately to establish a monitoring unit in the subregion. Such a unit need not be large but should be mobile, and should be established and prepared to assume its duties at very short notice.

B. Measures designed to foster stability in the subregion

82. The Commission recommends that the Governments of the Great Lakes region, particularly that of Zaire, intensify their efforts:

(a) To ensure that their territory is not used for the recruitment or training of refugees and that it is not used as a base for armed groups to launch incursions or attacks against any other country;

(b) To prevent military training and the sale or supply of weapons to militia groups or other groups among the refugees.

83. The Commission is in complete agreement with the following conclusion of the summit meeting held at Cairo in November 1995, and recommends that the Security Council endorse it, that the Heads of State and delegation who participated in the meeting be invited to implement it without delay, and that the international community stand ready to provide technical assistance if so requested:

“The Heads of State and delegations viewed with deep concern the use of radio broadcasts to spread hate and fear in the region. The participants pledged to take all possible action to terminate the illegal and inflammatory radio broadcasts from one country into another. They called upon the international community to assist by providing technology to identify the location of mobile transmitters.”

54 B·I·C·C appendix 4

C. Confidence-building measures designed to reduce the flow of arms in the subregion

84. Many of the conflicts the Security Council seeks to address through the imposition of arms embargoes, including the situation in and around Rwanda and Burundi, are fuelled and exacerbated by small arms and land-mines. The Commission therefore recommends that, when an arms embargo is imposed, neighbouring States be encouraged to participate on a voluntary basis in maintaining a register or data bank of movements and acquisitions of small arms, ammunition and matériel. As a preliminary step, the Security Council may wish to encourage the States of the Great Lakes region to consider creating such a register.

85. Those States, if they have not already done so, should also be encouraged to adhere to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its Protocols, particularly those relating to the use of anti-personnel land-mines, as well as to the Moratorium on the Export of Anti-Personnel Land-Mines. In addition, supplier countries might be requested to ensure that they do not transfer such arms, including mines, to non-State entities or private businessmen.

D. Recommendations for the further investigation of violations which have or may have taken place

86. The Commission recommends that the Security Council consider inviting the Government of South Africa to investigate the participation of Mr. Willem Ehlers in the negotiations in Seychelles in June 1994 which led to the delivery of arms and ammunition to Goma, Zaire. This investigation should also extend to the activities of the Delta Company and related individuals and companies, if any, and its findings should be reported to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) for general distribution to Member States.

87. The Commission recommends that the Security Council consider calling on the Government of Bulgaria to make available to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) for general distribution to Member States the findings of the investigation conducted by the Interdepartmental Council on the Military Industrial Complex and Mobilization Readiness of the Government of Bulgaria into allegations that officials of the Kintex Company, Sofia, were apparently willing to sell arms in violation of Security Council resolutions.

88. The Commission recommends that the Security Council call on the Government of Zaire to investigate the apparent complicity of its own personnel and officials in the purchase of arms from Seychelles in June 1994. The Government should also be required to conduct a thorough and transparent inquiry into alleged Zairian complicity in other suspected violations of Security Council resolutions and to report its findings to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994), in accordance with a timetable set by the Security Council, for general distribution to Member States.

89. This investigation should resolve the serious discrepancies between the Government’s responses to the Commission’s written questions and the facts as

B·I·C·C 55 brief 7

subsequently established by the Commission. In particular, the investigation should explain why a high-ranking Rwandan officer of a force placed under a United Nations arms embargo, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, was apparently authorized to act for the Zairian Ministry of Defence in the purchase of arms from Seychelles in June 1994 and to take delivery of arms on behalf of the Zairian Armed Forces; how Colonel Bagosora came by the end-user certificate apparently issued by the Zairian Ministry of Defence; who authorized him to charter an Air Zaïre aircraft to transport the arms; and what became of those arms.

90. If the recommendations in section D above are adopted and the Member States concerned comply with the Council’s requests, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) may then wish, in accordance with paragraph 14 (b) of resolution 918 (1994), to consider this information and to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo.

E. Measures to deter further violations of the embargo

91. Finally, with specific reference to the situation concerning the former Rwandan government forces, the Commission recommends that:

(a) The Government of Zaire should again be invited to consider the stationing of United Nations observers on its territory to monitor the implementation of the embargo and deter the shipment of arms to the former Rwandan government forces in violation of the embargo;

(b) The Security Council may wish to consider extending the concept embodied in the UNHCR Zairian Camp Security Contingent, by which national troops are recruited, led and paid by the international community, and applying it to the monitoring of the embargo in Zaire, perhaps in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity under Chapter VIII of the Charter;

(c) As an interim measure, in order to maintain an element of deterrence and oversight until such longer-term solution can be found, the Security Council may wish to consider retaining the International Commission of Inquiry or creating a similar body with a very small number of members to maintain contacts with the Governments of the Great Lakes region, to follow up the investigations of the Commission, to respond to any further allegations of violations and to make periodic reports to the Secretary-General on the evolution of the situation with regard to compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

...

56 B·I·C·C appendix 4

Appendix VII

Correspondence between the International Commission of Inquiry and Governments and others, November 1995-February 1996

Outgoing Incoming No. Date Addressee Subject Date Remarks 1 12 Nov. Committee Request for 24 Nov. No information established information available pursuant to resolution 918 (1994)

2 24 Nov. Zaire Explanation of No reply, but Commission’s Commission visited mandate and purpose Kinshasa, 8-16 December

3 27 Nov. International Request for No reply, but Committee of information ICRC representative the Red Cross visited Commission on 1 December to discuss

4 27 Nov. China Request for 30 Jan. Allegations denied information concerning allegations

5 27 Nov. South Africa Request for 20 Feb. Minister for Foreign information Affairs replied concerning allegations

6 27 Nov. France Request for 2 Jan. Allegations denied information concerning allegations

7 29 Nov. South Africa Request for 20 Feb. Reply contained information about information requested weapons

8 29 Nov. Belgium Request for 10 Jan. Reply contained information about details requested weapons

9 29 Nov. UNAMIR Request for Partial review took review files place on 1 December

10 30 Nov. United Kingdom Request for No reply Customs information

11 1 Dec. Bulgaria Request for 14 Feb. Allegations denied information concerning allegations

B·I·C·C 57 brief 7

12 4 Dec. UNAMIR Request for No reply, but information contacts continued concerning arms handed over by Opération Turquoise

13 5 Dec. France Request for name of 2 Jan. Government designated designated official official

14 5 Dec. Belgium Request for name of 10 Jan. Reply received, but designated official no official designated

15 5 Dec. United Republic Request to visit No reply of Tanzania

16 5 Dec. Médecins sans Request for 11 Dec. Promise of assistance frontières information

17 7 Dec. Seychelles Request for No reply information concerning allegations

18 9 Dec. Zaire Request for 15 Dec. Reply provided orally information and in writing by concerning Minister for allegations Foreign Affairs

19 18 Dec. United Kingdom Follow-up to No reply, but meeting Customs earlier request took place on 10 January

20 18 Dec. UNHCR Request for 19 Jan. Information provided information

21 19 Dec. United Republic Request to visit No reply of Tanzania

22 19 Dec. Uganda Request to visit No reply

23 20 Dec. Burundi Request to visit 24 Jan. Visit took place, 26-29 January

24 20 Dec. Rwanda Request for No reply, but further information informal contacts have continued

25 5 Jan. ICAO Request for 8 Feb. Information provided information

26 18 Jan. Belgium Request for No reply as yet information

27 18 Jan. Seychelles Request to visit 23 Jan. Visit took place, 31 January-5 February

28 22 Jan. Kenya Request for meeting 29 Jan. Meeting took place on 29 January

58 B·I·C·C appendix 4

29 22 Jan. Burundi Request to visit 24 Jan. Visit took place, 26-29 January

30 23 Jan. United Republic Renewed request No reply of Tanzania to visit

31 25 Jan. France Request to meet 13 Feb. Reply offered meeting with French with officers, officers Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others

32 30 Jan. Kenya Note verbale 29 Feb. Reply proposed requesting contacts meetings on with officials Commission’s return

33 30 Jan. Committee Request for 8 Feb. No information established information available pursuant to resolution 918 (1994)

34 5 Feb. Federal Reserve Request for 27 Feb. Information provided Bank of information New York

35 6 Feb. Bulgaria Follow-up letter 14 Feb. Allegations denied

36 6 Feb. South Africa Follow-up letter 20 Feb. Reply from Minister for Foreign Affairs

37 8 Feb. Seychelles Further request 10 Feb. Information provided for assistance

38 12 Feb. ICAO Further request No reply as yet for assistance

39 14 Feb. Federal Reserve Follow-up letter 27 Feb. Information provided Bank of New York

40 15 Feb. Uganda Renewed request 8 March Response received to visit

41 16 Feb. Kenya Renewed request 29 Feb. Reply proposed for meetings meetings on Commission’s return

42 16 Feb. France Request to meet 23 Feb. Interview with with French officers arranged; officers meetings took place, 26-29 February

——

B·I·C·C 59 brief 7

Appendix V.

rifles are the weapon of choice for Case Study - robberies and robbing busses, making public transportation less and less safe for citizens. Bus routes El Salvador have been either shortened or eliminated

Monsignor Fernando Sáenz Lacalle, Archbishop of , the A brief discussion of the current Military weapons and poverty are government of El Salvador, through situation in El Salvador is presented proving to be a deadly combination. the Defense Ministry, human rights as an example of the prototypical Thousands have taken up arms and activists and community leaders all environment in which micro- formed criminal gangs responsible concur that the violence is the disarmament might be useful. In El for the violence threatening to country's most pressing problem. In Salvador, disarming the FMLN overwhelm El Salvador. Disgruntled a recent poll of Salvadorans, over insurgents and reducing the army youths have formed US-style 80% of the civilian population were stipulated by the peace treaty criminal gangs, well trained in the considered crime and violence the of 1992 which ended the twelve-year handling of military-style weapons, most serious threat to peace and civil war. Comprehensive such as M-16s, AK-47s, M-3 hand national security. The violence demobilization occurred under UN grenades and RPG-2 rocket committed with these military supervision, beginning with partial launchers. Their criminal activities weapons is apolitical and effects all disarmament. More than 11,000 include road blocks, bank robberies, sectors of the population of El guerrillas surrendered approximately bus robberies, street theft, Salvador. 10,000 hand guns, rifles and kidnappings, extortions and street automatic weapons such as M-16s violence. These activities, when and AK-47s, 74 missiles and over promulgated with military style 9,000 grenades. These weapons were weapons, also result in injuries and destroyed and a similar amount of death to innocent civilians. The weapons were collected from those authorities are extremely challenged, soldiers of the Salvadoran army who particularly the National Civilian were demobilized. Police (PNC), which expects to increase its ranks by 6,500 new But three years after the civil war recruits by July of 1996, doubling its ended, it is now known that despite present number. In addition, the successful peace process, not all communities have began forming of the weapons supplied to the neighborhood watch groups to FMLN and the Salvadoran army cooperate with the authorities in the during the civil war were collected. fight against crime. The government The Salvadoran Defense Ministry, as has had to divert development funds well as the UN mission to handle the security situation. (MINUSAL), estimate that 200,000- 300,000 military-style weapons Senseless acts of violence have remain in civilian hands and pose a become common-place. Hand serious threat to peace. Social and grenades are a particularly critical economic conditions also play a problem, given that they are so major role in producing the climate available. They are commonly of violence present in El Salvador carried by many citizens in their today. Close to 40,000 combatants pockets and on their belts, and were demobilized with the arrival of increasingly are used to settle peace, the large majority of whom personal arguments, with devastating have been unable to adapt effect on the targets as well as themselves to the new climate of innocent bystanders. Car theft using peace and reconstruction. The hand grenades is an every day unemployment rate oscillates occurrence. Children are hurt or around 50%. killed when playing with hand grenades. M-16 and AK-47 assault

60 B·I·C·C appendix 6

Appendix VI. Location of An Introduction landmines throughout the world (estimated from compiled sources; to Anti-Personnel numbers do not include other unexploded ordinance - mortar and Landmines and RPG rounds, etc.) Afghanistan Number: 10 million Their Effects Location: Military and civilian positions. Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Khost. Footpaths, tracks and roads and the surrounding areas, bridges, houses, Types of landmines mine and a fixed object, activates the wells and their access routes are mine(s) with as little as 1 kilogram of mined. Blast mines pull force, sending fragments into Worst affected provinces (largest the legs, stomachs and chests of the amount of total mines): victims. The most common type of APM, -Helmand - 26% these mines range from very small -Kandahar - 10.4% Directional fragmentation (several inches in diameter), to quite -Paktia - 9.6% mines large. The mine is deployed either -Logar - 8.6% directly on the ground and lightly -Herat - 7.25% A relative of the fragmentation mine camouflaged, or buried an inch or Dispersal of APMS by target area: is the directional fragmentation two below the surface. Upon -Grazing land - 70% mine. These mines are deployed in a activation by a very light step -Agricultural land - 20.2% like manner and contain pre-formed (usually 15 to 40 pounds of pressure -Irrigation systems - 6% fragments encased in front of a -Roads - 2.4% is enough), the mine detonates, charge. When activated, the sending fragments of the mine body, -Residential areas - 1.2% fragments are blasted in a 50 meter along with dirt, sand, gravel, arc, thus increasing the field of fire. vegetation, footwear and clothing Angola Like ordinary fragmentation mines, fragments, and bone fragments up Number: 10-15 million the target area is also the legs, the legs and groin of the victim (if Location: As a means of denying the stomach and chest. not causing death, then resulting in enemy land and resources, roads, amputation), and causing secondary waterways, rail lines, airports, ports, Bounding mines damage to the trunk, hands, and bridges, towns, schools, hospitals, face. markets and private dwellings were This type of mine, predictably, The appeal of blast mines is due to all mined. According to VVVAF, earned its name by the manner in the fact that they can be deployed in the status of the provinces is as which it functions. A mine with a follows: large numbers over a wide area in a bounding device is inserted into a very short period of time, through -Bie: Movement restricted by mines small tube with a wire affixed to the the use of aircraft. and booby-traps. fuse-pin, and buried with just the -Kuando Kubango: The Mavingo fuse visible. Through the means of Fragmentation mines Valley is abandoned due to mines. either direct pressure or a trip wire, -Lunda Norte: All roads, bridges and a primary explosion propels the riverbanks are considered mined. As the name suggests, these mines mine out of the tube approximately rely on a blast of fragments over a -Lunda Sul: 37 major bridges and 58 one meter (3 feet) in the air, at field of fire of about 20 meters. secondary bridges are destroyed, which point the fixed wire pulls the Fragmentation mines are deployed and surrounded by uncleared pin and the mine explodes, sending above ground (with the exception of minefields. fragments flying in all directions. those fixed with bounding devices, -Malanje: Power lines and the to be discussed below), and are airport are mined, as is hotel supported by stakes, or attached to access at the Kalandula Waterfalls. fixed structures with mounting Amputees in the population: 1 per brackets. A trip-wire, strung 470 between two mines or between one

B·I·C·C 61 brief 7

Bosnia -Koh Kong: 47 minefields with into the victim which escape Number: 3 million (figure very 240,663,204 sqm of mined area. detection by x-ray machines. uncertain). -Kompong Speu: Mines in 168 Location: There are no reliable data locations with 324,172 sqm of The responses from the technical available regarding the specific mined area. community to the problem of mine locations of APMs in Bosnia. -Kompong Chnang: Mines in 24 clearance have been both numerous locations with 32,480,626 sqm of and innovative. Methods of mine Cambodia mined area. detection range from manual Number: 10 million (still being Mine incidence rate: 10/day probing to destruction with explosi- deployed by both sides). Amputees in the population: 1 per ves, electromagnetic induction Location: Mines have been deployed 236 (EMI), thermal imagers, ground- in almost every conceivable area in penetrating radar (GPR), thermal Cambodia: roads, irrigation systems, Mozambique neutron activation (TNA), and paddy fields, water wells, schools, Number: 2 million mines biosensors. commerce routes and homes. Location: mines were placed in According to the Veterans defensive rings around villages and The fact remains, though, that the of America Foundation (VVAF), the other settlements. Also deployed single-most effective method for status of the provinces is as follows: offensively around potential enemy landmine clearance remains probing. soldier resting spots (i.e. around Probing is the only technique which -Battambang: Over 1/4 of the trees and structures which provide insures 100% clearance. Military province is declared as „no go“ shade). Power lines, roads, rail lines clearance techniques can only areas. airport tarmacs, schools factories provide 90 to 95% effectiveness, -Banteay Meanchy: The west and and livestock water troughs were all which (for reasons discussed southwest areas are severely mined extensively. previously), is unacceptable. mined. Major stretches of the According to ICRC data, the Xtrung Cop river are mined, as location frequency for APMs is as are the banks of the Kop river. follows: Route 69 is partially mined. -37% on bush paths -Siem Reap: 60% of all bridges -27% on roads destroyed. All primary, secondary -21% on rail tracks and tertiary roads and rail beds -16% in fields have been mined and north-south Worst affected provinces: Niassa, roads into Khmer Rouge territory Caba delgado, Nampula, Inhambane end with minefields. RN6 and and Maputo. RN68 also are mined. Siem Reap Mine incidence rate: 50/month. has minefields covering 9,399,353 sqm of minefields. Others -Pursat: Minefields ring hills, forests Nations with serious landmine and key forts. Bakan district has problems include: 79 minefields. Mines were also -El Salvador laid along rail lines, and RN5 -Nicaragua leading into Phnom Penh. -Somalia -Kampot: Heavily mined, under the - control of anti-government forces. Technical responses -Kompong Cham: Moderately mined, but boasts the highest Landmine technology is forging number of incidents ahead. Plastic landmines have involving children. become more popular due to their -Kompong Thom: RN12 is mined. ability to escape searches made with Bridges along RN6 are destroyed metal detectors. This has prompted a regularly. Due to lack of food whole new area of negotiation security, Kompong Thom has the centering on requiring a minimum most severe malnutrition content requirement of metal (8%) problem in the country. to be present in all landmines, to -Preah Vihear: The two main roads assist in the clearance operations. leading to the border are mined. Additionally, these plastic landmines can implant tiny plastic fragments

62 B·I·C·C appendix 6

States which have adhered to the 1980 CCW (as of 31 July 1996)

Argentina October 2, 1995 September 29, 1983 Austria March 14, 1983 Belarus June 23, 1982 Belgium February 7, 1995 Benin March 27, 1989 Bosnia-Herzegovina September 1, 1993 Brazil October 3, 1995 Bulgaria October 15, 1982 Canada June 24, 1994 China April 7, 1982 Croatia December 2, 1993 Cuba March 2, 1987 Cyprus December 12, 1988 Czech Republic February 22, 1993 Denmark July 7, 1982 Ecuador May 4, 1982 Finland May 8, 1992 France March 4, 1988 April 29, 1996 Germany November 25, 1992 January 28, 1992 Guatemala July 21, 1983 June 14, 1982 India March 1, 1984 Ireland March 13, 1995 Israel March 22, 1995 Italy January 20, 1995 Japan June 9, 1982 Jordan October 19, 1995 Lao People’s Democratic Republic January 3, 1983 Latvia January 4, 1993 Liechtenstein August 16, 1989 May 23, 1996 Malta June 26, 1995 Mauritius May 6, 1996 February 11, 1982 Mongolia June 8, 1982 Netherlands June 18, 1987 October 18, 1993

B·I·C·C 63 brief 7

Niger November 10, 1992 -All States accepted the three June 7, 1983 Protocols except the United Pakistan April 1, 198 States, Israel and France, which Poland June 2, 1983 accepted only Protocols I&II, and July 26, 1995 Benin and Jordan which accepted Russian Federation June 10, 1982 only Protocols I&III. Slovakia May 28, 1993 Slovenia July 6, 1992 -A State becomes Party to the South Africa September 13, 1995 Convention six months after it Spain December 29, 1993 deposits its instrument of Sweden July 7, 1982 ratification with the United Switzerland August 20, 1982 Nations. Togo December 4, 1995 Tunisia May 15, 1987 Uganda November 14, 1995 Ukraine June 23, 1982 United Kingdom February 13, 1995 United States March 24, 1995 Uruguay October 6, 1994 Yugoslavia May 24, 1983 Total: 57 Source: ICRC

States having a moratoria on exports of antipersonnel mines (as of March 1996

Comprehensive Moratoria Limited Moratoria

Argentina Netherlands Belarus Switzerland Belgium Austria Cambodia -(Moratorium on exports to Canada States which are not Party to Czech Republic Protocol II of the CCW) Ecuador France Germany United Kingdom Greece European Union Israel -(Indefinite moratorium on Italy the export of non-detectable Japan and non-self- destructing Korea, Republic of APMs, plus a ban on all Latvia exports to States not Party to Poland the CCW) Romania Slovak Republic Russian Federation South Africa -(Three year moratorium on Spain non-self destructing anti- Sweden personnel mines) Ukraine United States Source: ICRC

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Sources ICRC, Angola (http:// www.icrc.ch./icrcnews/3cf6.htm, Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1994. "The 7/11/95) Crisis: A Humanitarian Disaster". Foreign ICRC, Anti-Personnel Mines: Basic Affairs. (September) : 8-13. Facts (http://www.icrc.ch/ icrcnews/3fbe.htm, 9/1/95) Cahill, Kevin M., ed. 1995. Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Global Jane’s Intelligence Review. Special Land Mines Crisis (New York: Report No. 8. The Mine BasicBooks) Conundrum: The Threat to Mine- Clearance Operations. Hewish, Mark and Leland Ness. 1995. "Mine-Detection Jean, Barbara. 1996. "Clearing the Technologies". International Perilous Road to Peace". Interna- Defense Review (October) : 40-52. tional Defense Review (February) : 1-5. Human Rights Watch, The Arms Project, Physicians for Human OneWorld Online, Landmines Rights. 1993. Landmines: A Special Report (http:// Deadly Legacy (Washington, DC: www.oneworld.org/landmines/ Human Rights Watch and geneva_update2.html#upcoming) Physicians for Human Rights) Sloan, C.E.E. 1986. Mine Warfare on Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Land (Washington DC: Brassey’s Human Rights Watch/Africa. Defence Publishers) 1994. Landmines in Mozambique (Washington, DC: Human Rights United Nations, The United Nations Watch) Demining Database: Afghanistan (http://www.un.org/Depts/ ICRC (International Committee of Landmine/country/afghanis.htm) the Red Cross), Review Conference of the 1980 UN United Nations, The United Nations Convention on Certain Demining Database: Cambodia Conventional Weapons (http:// (http://www.un.org/Depts/ www.icrc.ch/icrcnews/465a.htm, Landmine/country/ 1/25/96) cambodia.htm)

ICRC, Moratoria on Exports of United Nations, The United Nations Antipersonnel Mines as of Demining Database: Angola December 1995 (http:// (http://www.un.org/Depts/ www.icrc.ch/icrcnews/3886.htm, Landmine/country/angola.htm) 6/12/95) United Nations, The United Nations ICRC, Convention on Prohibitions or Demining Database: Mozambique Restrictions on the Use of Certain (http://www.un.org/Depts/ Conventional Weapons Which May Landmine/country/ be Deemed to be Excessively mozambiq.htm) Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980 US Dept. of State, Bureau of (http://www.icrc.ch/icrcnews/ Political-Military Affairs, Office 3872.htm, 1/31/96) of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations. 1994. Hidden Killers: The Global Land- mine Crisis (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office)

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Anti-Personnel land mines in current world service

Reproduced from Jane’s Special Report: Trends in Land Mine Warfare, August 1995, pp.122-123. Note: The following abbreviations are used in this listing: PRC - Peoples Republic of China; CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States; UK - United Kingdom; USA - United States of America; FY - Former Yugoslavia.

FMK-1 Non-metalic Anti-personnel Mine - Argentina Anti-personnel Mine, Air-droppable, Maus-1 - Italy APM-1 Horizontal Anti-personnel Mine - Austria Tecnovar VAR/40 Anti-personnel Mine - Italy Hirtenberger APM-2 Anti-personnel Mine - Austria Tecnovar VAR/100 Anti-personnel Mine - Italy Anti-personnel Mine Min AP NM AE T1 - Brazil Tecnovar VAR/100/SP Anti-personnel Mine - Italy Anti-personnel Mine T-AB-1 - Brazil Tecnovar BM/S5 Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - Italy PM-79 Anti-personnel Mine - Bulgaria Valsella Anti-personnel Bounding Mine Valmara 69 - Italy PSM-1 Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - Bulgaria Valsella VS-JAP Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - Italy C3A2 Non-metallic Anti-personnel Mine (Elsic) - Canada Valsella VS-APFM 1 Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - Italy FAMAE Anti-personnel Mines - BPD P-25 Anti-personnel Mine - Italy Type 72 Anti-personnel Mine Series - PRC BPD-P-40 Anti-personnel Jumping Mine - Italy Anti-personnel Shrapnel Mine - PRC Valsella VS-SAPFM3 Scatterable Bounding Mine - Italy Type 69 Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - PRC Anti-personnel Mine Model 15 - Korea, North Portable bounding Anti-personnel Mine - PRC Anti-personnel Mine KM1SA1 - Korea, South PMN-4 Anti-personnel Mine - CIS Anti-personnel Mine K440 - Korea, South PMN Anti-personnel Mine - CIS Anti-personnel Mine Model 15 - Netherlands POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M Anti-personnel Stake Mines - CIS Anti-personnel Mine Model 22 - Netherlands PMD-6, PMD-7, PMD-7ts and PMD-S7 - CIS Pakistan Ordnance Factories Anti-personnel Mine - Pakistan MON-50 Directional Anti-personnel Mine - CIS Pakistan Ordnance factories Bounding Mine - Pakistan MON-90 Directional Anti-personnel Mine - CIS Anti-personnel Mine MGP-30 - Peru MON-100 and MON-200 Directional Mine - CIS Anti-personnel Mine m/966 - Portugal PFM-1 and PFM-15 Anti-personnel Mine/Bomblet - CIS Anti-personnel Bounding Mine M432 - Portugal OZM, OZM-3 and OZM-4 Bounding Mine - CIS Anti-personnel Fragmentation Mine m/966 - Portugal OZM-72 Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - CIS MAI-75 Anti-personnel Mine - Romania OZM-160 Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - CIS MAT-6S Anti-personnel Mine - Romania PP Mi-Na 1 Anti-personnel Mine - Czech/Slovakia Directional Anti-personnel Mine - Romania PP Mi-Ba Anti-personnel Mine - Czech/Slovakia Non-metallic Anti-personnel Mine - S. Africa PP Mi-D Anti-personnel Mine Czech/Slovakia High-explosive Anti-personnel Mine - S. Africa PP Mi-Sb and PP Mi-Sk Stake Mine - Czech/Slovakia High-explosive Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - S. Africa PP Mi-Sr Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - Czech/Slovakia Mini -MS S03 Directional Anti-personnel Mine - S. Africa Egyptian Anti-personnel Mines - Egypt Anti-personnel Mine Model FAMA - Spain T/7S Anti-personnel Mine - Egypt Anti-personnel Mine P-S-1 - Spain Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - Egypt LIAB Anti-personnel Mine Type LI-11 - Sweden ALSETEX Anti-personnel Mine MAPED F1 - France Anti-personnel Mine P59 - Switzerland ALSETEX Anti-personnel Stake Mines M61 & M63 - France Anti-personnel Mine Model 49 - Switzerland ALSETEX Anti-personnel Mine M59 - France Anti-personnel Mine M1SA1 - USA PPM-2 Anti-personnel Mine - Germany Anti-personnel mine M26 - USA Anti-personnel Mine DM 11 - Germany Anti-personnel Bounding Mines , M16A1 & Gyata-64 Anti-personnel Mine - Hungary M16A2 - USA M62 Anti-personnel Mine - Hungary Anti-personnel Mine M14 - USA M49 Wooden Anti-personnel Mine - Hungary Anti-personnel Mine M2A4 - USA Indian Anti-personnel Mines - India Anti-personnel Mine - Vietnam No 6 Anti-personnel Mine - Israel UDAR Fuel-Air Explosive Anti-personnel Mine - FY No 10 Anti-personnel Mine - Israel PMA-3 Anti-personnel Mine - FY No 12 (or M12A1) Anti-personnel Mine - Israel PMA-2 Anti-personnel Mine - FY Valsella VS-50 Scatter Drop Mine - Italy PMA-1 and PMA-1-A Anti-personnel Mines - FY Valsella VS-MK 2 Scatter Drop Mine - Italy PROM-1 bounding Anti-personnel Mine - FY Valsella VS-MK 2-EL Scatter Drop Mine - Italy PMR-2A Anti-personnel Mine - FY Tecnovar TS-50 Scatter Drop-Mine - Italy MRUD Anti-personnel Mine - FY BPD SB-33 Scatterable Anti-personnel Mine - Italy PMR-1 and PMR-2 Anti-personnel Stake Mines - FY

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Appendix VII. National Military Inventories of Selected Weapons

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Appendix VIII.

programs is that they incorporate Voluntary aspects of both the supply side and demand side approaches to gun violence. Those conducting gun buy- Weapons backs have expressed intent to both reduce the number of weapons in a community and educate those in the community on the tragic Collection Efforts consequences of readily available firearms amongst conditions of poverty, drug trafficking, youth and Buy-Back gangs, and feelings of overall insecurity. The uniqueness of these programs is their breadth and scope. Programs in the Their effectiveness, however, is a matter of debate.

There has been little research United States of conducted on gun buy-back programs to determine their effectiveness in reducing firearm America, Haiti violence. Case studies of the Seattle, WA and St. Louis, MO firearm exchange programs demonstrated and Nicaragua that these programs were not successful in reducing levels of homicide and other violent crimes involving firearms over the studied Firearm exchange control proponents, however, are time periods. However, as noted in programs in the met with an organized, well-funded, the latter study, there are possible United States and enthusiastic opposition, and benefits to the gun buy-back that efforts to further limit the number help explain its widespread and of firearms in circulation have met continued popularity. Such Introduction with frustration. Other policy programs are often implemented alternatives have appeared, such as with various goals in mind. While Firearms and their relationship to the police conducted gun seizures violent crime are now center stage at one such program may desire solely enacted in New York City and to reduce the number of guns in the local, state and federal level. Kansas City, Missouri. On the Crimes committed with highly lethal circulation and thus the number of demand side, recent efforts have violent crimes, another may hope to and widely accessible weapons are on been made towards extensive educate and bring the community’s the rise, especially among youths. It education about gun use and united attention to the problem of is also clear that public opinion is ownership, conflict resolution and now identifying the weapons firearm violence. If a firearm violence prevention. Youth exchange is implemented with this themselves as a major source of the programs have grown around the problem. As a result public policy goal in mind, its effectiveness must country, sponsored by community be judged by the extent to which it approaches increasingly target organizations, schools, religious satisfied the organizers’ goals of weapons as a critical factor in groups and groups of concerned education, awareness and ameliorating the social problem of public health professionals. violent crimes committed with cohesiveness and acts as a catalyst for programs which address the wide firearms. Efforts to stem this One policy approach that has been epidemic have concentrated on both variety of root causes of violence. extensively tried in recent years has An example of how a gun buy-back the supply side and the demand side been the firearm exchange, or gun program fits into an overall of firearm violence. On the supply buy-back as it is commonly referred side, recent legislative acts such as the framework of gun violence and to. These programs offer cash or in- efforts to reduce this violence is Brady Bill and the ban on assault kind benefits to those people willing weapons have attempted to control provided in Figure 1 at the end of to exchange their firearms under this report. to some extent the type of guns conditions of full amnesty. What is available to consumers and to whom different about firearm exchange these weapons are available. Gun

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A most recent development in the prosecution and incarceration. dealers who use the exchange of role of firearm exchange programs in While some programs have used city outdated and poor quality weapons reducing violence is the public and/ or county funds to partially to purchase newer and higher health approach. Organizations of support a gun buy-back, many have quality firearms. In order to further medical professionals and advocacy used asset forfeiture funds and control the exchange, program groups have joined to address how private donations to help diffuse organizers usually set prices for guns guns kill in accidents and suicides as opposition to the use of tax-payers’ based on their potential lethality and well as criminal activity. In gun buy- money. commonality in accidents and backs where the public health assaults. Since are more approach has been the focus, less The list of organizations and commonly involved in both firearm emphasis has been placed on taking individuals who cooperate in and related accidents and violence, their criminals’ guns off the street, and fund any gun buy-back is usually exchange price is typically higher more on the ”One Gun- One Life” long and diverse. Donations often than for weapons used more focus such as in the Boston, MA consist of either cash or certificates traditionally for sport, such as rifles exchange program. exchangeable for goods at local and shotguns (except those that are stores. Those programs with more sawed-off and used for criminal Regardless of the primary motives, funds are able to offer either higher activity). Even greater incentives research has shown that gun buy- incentives for exchanging guns, or have been offered for assault-type backs have components that allow are able to collect a larger number of rifles that are highly lethal but less evaluation to follow a consistent weapons. Large corporations such as commonly used in either accidents format. Each program has had to: Footlocker and Toys-R-Us have or acts of violence. 1) Solicit funding from sponsors and donated significant resources to gun donors; buy-backs across the country and as The range of incentives used in the 2) Provide incentives for the a result have received a tremendous over 80 known firearm exchange exchange of weapons; amount of publicity via local and programs in the U.S. has been 3) Choose a location for the national media. extensive. While most have used the exchange that coincides with the certificate and cash methods noted participants’ trust and the amnesty Incentives above, some (including the feature of the program; computer exchange) have tried 4) Create publicity through the Choosing the incentives for turning creative, if sometimes ineffective, media and other sources. The in firearms in a gun buy-back has choices of incentives. In San Francis- following sections will provide a proven to be a challenging task. It is co, doctors offered psychiatric brief overview of these factors, and a dependent on the type and quantity treatment in exchange for a firearm review of the research literature (i.e. of sponsorship and donations. If the of any kind. In the Bronx, New Seattle and St.Louis) will help donations provided are from a food York, a Catholic priest offered a free demonstrate how they interact and chain-store in the form of crucifix for each gun exchanged. can be evaluated. certificates, than the incentives are Unfortunately, he was unable to determined by the sponsor. If the collect any weapons for his efforts. Funding donations are made in cash, it The creativity and considerable broadens the options for providing effort put forth in choosing and Funding plays two very important unique incentives. In Oakland, negotiating the „correct“ incentive roles in a gun buy-back. First, California, the organizers of a 1995 for a firearm exchange, as well as the funding is obviously needed to meet gun buy-back used $10,000 in impact incentives have had on final the costs incurred by organizing and donations and an arrangement with outcomes, demonstrates their implementing a firearm exchange a local computer firm to offer significance in the overall planning program. Second, fund-raising itself rebuilt PC compatible computers and implementation of any gun buy- helps satisfy a major goal of many for each gun turned in at the back program. programs, in that it invites various exchange. community businesses, Location organizations and citizens to actively Several questions have been raised in participate in confronting the connection with using cash as the Because one of the fundamental problem of gun violence by primary incentive. First, experiences ideas of firearm exchanges is that of contributing the means to do so. from several buy-back programs amnesty, where a gun buy-back is One criticism of firearm exchange have shown that without stringent conducted can influence programs is that the money spent on requirements on the quality (i.e. participation in and thus outcomes their implementation could be more working condition) and quantity of of the program. Previously wisely spent on improved methods guns, funds can soon be depleted by conducted programs have used and facilities for enforcement, exploitative private gun owners and churches and other religious centers

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, fire stations, community centers firearm exchange, covering it in St. Louis, MO and police stations as sites where progress, and reporting on its weapons are exchanged. The successes and failures satisfies the Commonly noted as one of the most experience of several programs is chief goal of many organizers: successful firearm exchanges in that exchanges using police awareness of the epidemic growth of recent years, the 1991 St. Louis gun departments as drop-off sites may gun-violence and its tragic buy-back program collected over have frightened away some of the consequences for the communities in 7,500 weapons with $341,000 of customers at whom the program is which it occurs. city, county, corporate and privately aiming its attention (i.e. criminals donated funds. Richard Rosenfeld and those prone to violent activity). and Matthew Perkins, at the Additionally, sites for a firearm Review of the University of Missouri-St. Louis, exchange should be accessible and literature evaluated this buy-back as well as well-known to community the 1994 program also conducted in members, safe (i.e. easy access by the Seattle, WA St. Louis. Their findings on the police for protection), and visible for impact of the 1991 firearm exchange publicity reasons. In 1994, three medical doctors with on gun-related violence were similar masters’ degrees in public health to those of the Seattle program. Publicity conducted a study of the 1992 Seattle Aside from seasonal changes that gun buy-back program. This was the affect crime rates, such as weather Firearm exchange programs cannot first research attempted on the patterns and temperature, there was be successful without an extensive affects of a firearm exchange pro- no statistically significant change in publicity campaign. In order to gram on the incidents of firearm either homicide or gun assault. attract gun owners to the exchange, related violence, injury, and death. During the 1994 program, these every program has employed one or Included in the research was a public statistics actually increased.3 The more methods for alerting the opinion poll that tested community demographics of participants in the public. Newspaper, television and support for such an effort and a 1994 program were also nearly other information agencies have survey that determined the identical to those found by the both covered and sponsored gun- demographics of those who had Seattle study. buy back programs. In St. Louis, participated. The research attempted considered one of the most effective to answer the many questions In distinction from the Seattle programs to date, the St. Louis surrounding a gun buy-back that evaluation, Rosenfeld and Perkins Dispatch Newspaper co-sponsored had frequently been asked but not suggest that affects on crime rates the exchange, ensuring its coverage answered. may not be sufficient criteria for in the local news. Other programs, evaluating gun buy-back programs. such as those sponsored by the The mean age of the 500 surveyed They offer that such programs be BASS ticket agency which gave away participants was 51 years, 24% of evaluated with the goals of concert and sports event tickets for whom were women. The surveys implementation in mind. They note guns, have included the support of demonstrated that only 5% of the correctly, however, that these goals radio stations, using live publicity weapons turned in were exchanged often shift. In the context of gun campaigns at the site of the buy-back by minors, the target audience of buy-backs this can mean ”conscious to increase public visibility. many firearm exchange programs efforts of officials to replace goals due to their high risk of violence and they can not achieve with others Programs across the country have accidents. The city-wide phone they can achieve.”4 used all the mediums of the media, survey demonstrated that 86% of and enlisted the publicly respondents were aware of the Conclusion demonstrated support of highly program, a majority of whom visible community members and supported it and its use of public Firearm exchange programs have celebrities to enhance the image of funds. More goal oriented, however, enjoyed great popularity for a policy the buy-back as a community-wide the study showed that the buy-back, program that is widely questioned effort. As New York Times although having taken in 1,772 guns, for its ability to attack the issue it journalist Marc Lacy noted, ”The collected less than 1% of the guns in purports to attack. What is it then (firearm) exchanges attract huge Seattle homes. After comparing data that encourages its continued amounts of attention to the issue of over the observed time period, the existence? For all the reasons noted guns.”1 Of the programs conducted study concluded that firearm-related above, gun buy-backs are an thus far, those deemed ”successful” crime showed no ”statistically incremental and community-based by their sponsors have sought such significant change” and that the approach to fighting the spread of partnerships. Informing the numbers of both homicides and community of an approaching firearm-related deaths increased.2

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gun violence and the social suffering weapon deemed non-functional was by the Haitian police. Weapons with that accompanies it. The appeal confiscated without remuneration. historical value were set aside as draws in members of the police, Cash was paid for functional museum pieces. The remainder of city-hall, local schools, medical weapons. the weapons were inventoried, professionals and concerned parents boxed and shipped to Pennsylvania, to confront a community problem The program was run in phases, USA to be melted down at a that affects them all. each approximately two months in destruction facility. duration. During the period Septem- Rosenfeld and Perkins are correct in ber 1994 through January 1995, The goals of the program were to noting the existence of ”goal 3,684 weapons and 6,512 munitions reduce the number of weapons, substitution”. No doubt each of the were bought. 15,236 weapons were promote stability and provide more than 80 gun buy-backs have seized during this period. By March monetary incentives to Haitian been conducted with the 1995 the total numbers of weapons citizens who supported the program. overwhelming intention to reduce and munitions collected (both The U.S. Army stated that these gun violence in a given community. bought-back and seized) was over goals were achieved, and that the However, every policy program 33,000. As of January 1995 the total gun buy-back program helped to must defend itself on a cost-benefit paid for weapons collected through create a safe and secure environment basis. The ”One Gun-One Life” the buy-back program was to hand over to the United Nations approach to gun buy-backs is a way US$1,924,950. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in to assert the benefits of such a March 1995. program despite all the criticism that The mobile sites were discontinued the money and efforts ought be when turn-out began to wane. By better directed at more concrete September 1995 there was a single Nicaragua alternatives. The participation of the site still in operation, at the airport public health community has in the capital of Port-au-Prince. A gun buy-back was conducted in strengthened this approach by Nicaragua by the Special encouraging public awareness of the As of September 1995 the prices Disarmament Brigade (BED), which dangers of gun ownership. The being paid for weapons were: was created by the government of effects on suicides and accidental US$100 for handguns; US$200 for Nicaragua expressly for the purpose. deaths and injuries make every semi-automatic weapons and Following the demobilization, weapon turned in by law abiding grenades; US$400 for fully disarmament and reintegration of citizens as dangerous as the one not automatic weapons; and US$600 for guerrilla forces at the end of the war, exchanged by the criminal. heavy- and large-caliber weapons. some of the ex-combatants rearmed. These prices were revised during the The sources of the arms were caches Voluntary weapons course of the program. In January left from the war. The BED was collection programs 1995 the prices for the weapons had created in September 1991 to been double the September prices. develop and implement the buy- in Haiti and Arms caches have been discovered back program. It was made up of Nicaragua and confiscated: no remuneration government officials and ex- was offered. combatants from both sides of the conflict. Haiti Types of weapons collected include: machine guns, assault rifles, sub- The first buy-backs were conducted The conducted machine guns, rifles, shotguns, in January 1992. The BED would a gun buy-back program as a part of handguns, pistols, flare guns, approach groups known to have its mandate as a member of the mortars, howitzers, high explosives, rearmed and offer them several Multinational Force. The U.S. CS (tear-gas) grenades, and heavy incentives to hand-in their weapons. Army set up several fixed sites in weapons, including several tanks. First, cash was offered for individual Haiti, and initially operated several weapons. The average price was mobile sites. Each site was protected Many of the weapons collected were US$100. Approximately US$100 by U.S. troops. Weapons were in poor condition. Modern weapons worth of food was also offered in collected under conditions of in good condition were passed to the addition to the cash. Finally, the amnesty. Questions were asked only U.S. Department of Justice Interna- Italian government sponsored a to determine whether or not the tional Criminal Investigations micro-enterprise program that visitor had been to the collection Training Assistance Program for use offered $300-$500 to each participant point before and if the weapon for use as seed money for a belonged to the person turning it in. development project. Weapons were not tested, but were inspected for a firing pin. Any

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The approach used for the buy-back The weapons were destroyed by fire was flexible, and often if the BED in an open pit in a public space. This was negotiating with a large group, method was chosen both for its cost- the final settlement would be cash effectiveness and for the supposed for the weapons, food, and housing psychological value. or construction materials. The total cost of the program was In addition to purchasing weapons US$6,000,000, including funding from individuals, information on from the Italian government for the arms caches or other individuals and micro-enterprise project. groups that had rearmed was also exchanged for money and goods. There is general agreement that the program achieved its objectives to The operation ran from January remove weapons from individuals 1992 through the end of 1993. and find and collect weapons in arms During that time approximately caches. It was, however, one of the 142,000 weapons were either most expensive gun buy-backs ever bought-back or confiscated. 78,000 conducted. weapons were confiscated by police and Army personnel, 54,000 weapons were bought back in rural areas and 10,000 in Managua, in addition to the collection of over 250,000 pieces of munitions and ordnance. The buy-back process did not distinguish between functional and non-functional arms. Both were remunerated.

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86 B·I·C·C appendix 9

Appendix IX.

8. Dikshit, Prashant. „Internal Selected Conflict and Role of Light Weapons.“ In Light Weapons and International Security, ed. Jasjit Bibliography of Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Works Relating Council, December 1995. 9. Dyer, Susannah L. and Natalie Goldring. „Analysing Policy to Micro- Proposals to Limit Light Weapons Transfers.“ In Light Weapons and International Disarmament Security, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

10. Gonchar, Ksenia, and Peter 1. Adibe, Clement, and LtCol J.W. 5. Boutwell, Jeffrey, Michael T. Lock. „Small Arms and Light Potgieter. Managing Arms in Peace Klare and Laura W. Reed, eds. Weapons: Russia and the Former Processes: Somalia. Geneva: Lethal Commerce: The Global Soviet Union.“ In Lethal United Nations Institute for Trade in Small Arms and Light Commerce: The Global Trade in Disarmament Research, 1995. Weapons. Cambridge, MA: Small Arms and Light Weapons, Committee on International eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. 2. Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade Security Studies, American Klare, and Laura W. Reed. and Human Rights Abuses in Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA: Committee on Rwanda. Washington, D.C.: The 1995. International Security Studies, Arms Project, Human Rights American Academy of Arts and Watch, January 1994. 6.Brady, Bronwyn. „Collecting and Sciences, 1995. Organising Data on the 3. Biddle, Stephen D., Julia Klare, Manufacture of, and Trade In, 11. Husbands, Jo L. „Controlling and Jason Rosenfeld. The Military Light Weapons.“ In Light Transfers of Light Arms: Utility of Landmines: Implications Weapons and International Linkages to Conflict Processes for Arms Control. Washington Security, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, and Conflict Resolution D.C.: Institute for Defense India: Indian Pugwash Society Strategies.“ In Lethal Commerce: Analysis Document D-1559, June and British American Security The Global Trade in Small Arms 1994. IDA, Log No. HQ 94- Information Council, December and Light Weapons, eds. Jeffrey 45706. Prepared for the Office of 1995. Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and the Under Secretary of Defense Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: for Policy. 7. Cock, Jacklyn. „A Sociological Committee on International Account of Light Weapons Security Studies, American 4. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, Secretary- Proliferation in Southern Africa.“ Academy of Arts and Sciences, General. „General Assembly.“ In Light Weapons and 1995. Supplement to An Agenda for International Security, ed. Jasjit Peace: Position Paper of the Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Secretary-General on the Pugwash Society and British 12. Jaramillo, Daniel Garcia -Pena. Occasion of the Fiftieth American Security Information „Light Weapons and Internal Anniversary of the United Council, December 1995. Conflict in Colombia.“ In Lethal Nations, United Nations, 3 Commerce: The Global Trade in January 1995. A/50/60, S/1995/1. Small Arms and Light Weapons, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

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13. Karp, Aaron. „The Arms Trade 20. ______. „Light Weapons 25. Nelson, Daniel N. „Ancient Revolution: The Major Impact of Diffusion and Global Violence in Enmities, Modern Guns.“ Bulletin Small Arms.“ Washington the Post-Cold War Era.“ In Light of the Atomic Scientists vol. 49, no. Quarterly vol. 17, no. 4, 1994. Weapons and International 10, December 1993, pp. 21-27. Security, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, 14. ______. „Small Arms - The India: Indian Pugwash Society 26. Posen, Barry R. „The Security New Major Weapons.“ In Lethal and British American Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.“ Commerce: The Global Trade in Information Council, December Survival vol. 35, no. 1, March Small Arms and Light Weapons, 1995. 1993, pp. 27-47. eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed. 21. Laurance, Edward J. „Addressing 27. Project on Light Weapons. Cambridge, MA: Committee on the Negative Consequences of Current Projects on Light International Security Studies, Light Weapons Trafficking: Weapons,. Washington, D.C.: American Academy of Arts and Opportunities for Transparency BASIC, February 1996. Working Sciences, 1995. and Restraint.“ In Lethal Paper 1. Commerce: The Global Trade in 15. Kartha, Tara. „Southern Asia: Small Arms and Light Weapons, 28. ______. Light Weapons The Narcotics and Weapons eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Manufacture in the Public and Linkage.“ In Light Weapons and Klare and Laura W. Reed. Cam- Private Sectors. Washington, D.C.: International Security, ed. Jasjit bridge, MA: Committee on BASIC, February 1996. Working Singh. Delhi, India: Indian International Security Studies, Paper 2. Pugwash Society and British American Academy of Arts and American Security Information Sciences, 1995. 29. ______. „Summary of Council, December 1995. Workshop Discussions.“ British 22. ______. „“Surplus Light American Security Information 16. Klare, Michael. „Armed and Weapons as a Conversion Pro- Council. Washington, D.C., 27 Dangerous.“ In These Times (13 blem: Unique Characteristics and March 1995. June 1994, pp. 14-19. Solutions.“ In Coping With Surplus Weapons: A Priority for 30. Rana, Swadesh. Small Arms and 17. ______. „Awash in Conversion Research and Policy, Intra-State Conflicts. Geneva: Armaments: Implications of the eds. Edward J. Laurance, and United Nations Institute for Trade in Light Weapons.“ Har- Herbert Wulf. Bonn: Bonn Disarmament Research, 1995. vard International Review International Centre for December 1994, pp. 24- 26, 75-76. Conversion, June 1995. 31. Sayigh, Yezid. „Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing 18. ______. „Controlling the 23. Mathiak, Lucy. „Light Weapons Countries.“ Adelphi Papers 251, Global Trade in Small Arms and and Internal Conflict in Angola.“ June 1990. Light Weapons.“ Issues in Science In Lethal Commerce: The Global and Technology, September 1995. Trade in Small Arms and Light 32. Singh, Jasjit. „Controlling the Weapons, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Spread.“ In Light Weapons and 19. ______. „The Global Trade in Michael T. Klare and Laura W. International Security, ed. Jasjit Light Weapons and the Interna- Reed. Cambridge, MA: Singh. Delhi, India: Indian tional System in the Post-Cold Committee on International Pugwash Society and British War Era.“ In Lethal Commerce: Security Studies, American American Security Information The Global Trade in Small Arms Academy of Arts and Sciences, Council, December 1995. and Light Weapons, eds. Jeffrey 1995. Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and 33. ______. „Light Weapons and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: 24. Naylor, R. T. „The Structure Conflict in Southern Asia.“ In Committee on International and Operation of the Modern Light Weapons and International Security Studies, American Arms Black Market.“ In Lethal Security, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, Academy of Arts and Sciences, Commerce: The Global Trade in India: Indian Pugwash Society 1995. Small Arms and Light Weapons, and British American Security eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Information Council, December Klare and Laura W. Reed. Cam- 1995. bridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

88 B·I·C·C appendix 9

34. ______, ed. „Light Weapons Additionally, there are many sources and International Security.“ of information on light weapons and Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash small arms available on the World Society and British American Wide Web. A list of some of the Security Information Council, organizations follows: December 1995. Bonn International Centre for 35. ______. „Proliferation of Conversion Small Arms and Light Weapons.“ http://www.bicc.uni-bonn.de Paper presented at Eighth Regional Disarmament Meeting: British American Security Infor- Kathmandu, Nepal, February mation Council 1996. http://www.igc.apc.org/basic

36. Smith, Chris. „Light Weapons Federation of American Scientists and Ethnic Conflict in South http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/ Asia. In Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Multilaterals Project at the Light Weapons, eds. Jeffrey Fletcher School of Law and Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Diplomacy, Tufts University Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: http://www.tufts.edu/ Committee on International departments/fletches/multi/ Security Studies, American warfare.html Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995. Nonproliferation Resources http://infomanage.com/np 37. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. January Stockholm International Peace 1996 Progress Report, Research Institute Disarmament and Conflict http://www.sipri.se Resolution Project. Geneva: UNIDIR, January 1996. Center for Defense Information http://www.cdi.org/ 38. ______. „Disarmament and Conflict Resolution: The Disarming of Warring Parties as an Integral Part of the Settlement of Conflicts.“ Geneva: UNIDIR, January 1995.

B·I·C·C 89 brief 7

Publications

brief 5: Werner Voß and Michael Brzoska, BICC series such as brief, report and report 6: Eurofighter 2000: Consequences and paper are published either in English Petra Opitz, Die Konversion der Alternatives, February 1996 (with a German summary) or in russischen Rüstungsindustrie - Krisen- German (with an English management, Eine vergleichende summary). Studie der Regionen St. Petersburg und brief 6: Novosibirsk [Conversion of the Michael Renner, Cost of Disarmament: An Overview of the report 1: Russian Defense Industry—Crisis Economic Costs of the Dismantlement Edward J. Laurance and Management—A comparative Study of Weapons and the Disposal of Herbert Wulf, with the assistance of on the Regions of St. Petersburg and Joseph DiChiaro III, Conversion and Novosibirsk], October 1995 Military Surplus, March 1996. the Integration of Economic and Security Dimensions, January 1995 report 7: brief 7: Edward J. Laurance, The New Field Corinna Hauswedell, Paul Klemmer of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the report 2: and Herbert Wulf (eds.), Konversion Proliferation and Buildup of Small Nicola Mögel, Thomas Sachse und - Herausforderung für Wissenschaft Hans-Henning Schröder, Chancen und Forschung (Konferenz- Arms and Light Weapons, und Probleme der Rüstungskonversion dokumentation) [Conference September 1996 in der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger proceedings], December 1995 paper 1: Staaten: Konversionsprofile ausgewähl- Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and ter Regionen - Nizhnij Novgorod, brief 1: Herbert Wulf, Demilitarization and Republik Udmurtien, Ekaterinenburg, Ksenia Gonchar, Republik Belarus [Problems and Yevgeny Kuznetsov and Conversion, World Social Summit, Prospects of Defense Conversion in the Alexander Ozhegov, Copenhagen, March 1995 Commonwealth of Independent States: Conversion of the Post-Soviet Defense paper 2: Conversion Profiles of Selected Re- Industry: Implications for Russian Andreas Klemmer, United Nations gions—Nizhnii Novgorod, Udmurtiya, Economic Development, Publications Related to the Subject of Yekaterinburg, and Belarus], February 1995 March 1995 Conversion: An Annotated brief 2: Bibliography, April 1995 report 3: Anke Habich, Werner Voß und Joseph DiChiaro III, Conversion of Peter Wilke, Abhängigkeit der paper 3: Yevgeny Kuznetsov (ed.), Learning the Defense Industry in Russia and Werften im Ostseeraum von der to Restructure: Studies of Transforma- Eastern Europe, Proceedings of the Rüstungsproduktion [Dependence of BICC/CISAC Workshop on Shipyards in the Baltic Sea Region on tion in the Russian Defense Sector, Conversion, 10-13 August 1994, Defense Production], March 1995 June 1996 April 1995 brief 3: paper 4: Mersie Ejigu and Tekalign Gedamu, report 4: Edward J. Laurance and Conversion in Africa: Past Experience Keith Cunningham and Andreas Herbert Wulf (eds.), Coping with Klemmer, Restructuring the US Surplus Weapons: A Priority for and Future Outlook, Military Bases in Germany: Scope, Conversion Research and Policy, June 1996 Impacts and Opportunities, June 1995 June 1995 paper 5: Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. report 5: brief 4: Wezeman, Dutch Surplus Weapons, Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers, Herbert Wulf (eds.), Military Demobilization in the Horn of July 1996 Conversion for Social Development, Africa, Proceedings of the IRG July 1995 Workshop, Addis Ababa, 4-7 December 1994, June 1995

90 B·I·C·C publications

books: Michael Brzoska and Werner Voss (eds.), Auswirkungen und Alternati- ven des Eurofighter 2000 [Consequences and Alternatives of the Eurofighter 2000], Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, January 1996

BICC, Conversion Survey 1996, Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization, Oxford, April 1996

Forthcoming: report 8: Jorgen Klussmann und Ulrike Lindemann, Standortekonversion - Eine weltweite Herausforderung, Konferenzdokumentation [Base Closure—A Global Challenge, Conference proceedings], September 1996

B·I·C·C 91 About the Center

As an independent non-profit orga- Reallocation of military facilities nization, the Bonn International and installations and their conver- Center for Conversion (BICC) sup- sion to non-military purposes (base ports and promotes the processes by closures). which people, skills, technology, Alternative use, disposal or scrap- equipment, financial and economic ping of surplus weaponry with the resources are shifted from the mili- purpose of avoiding indiscriminate tary or defense sector towards alter- exports. native, civilian purposes.The estab- lishment of BICC in April 1994 BICC's publication series such as resulted from the initiative of the BICC report, BICC brief and BICC German state government of North- paper analyze the background of the Rhine Westphalia (NRW), in coop- international conversion process, eration with the Investitions-Bank report on conversion projects and and the Landesentwicklungsgesell- experience, and offer scientific as schaft (both of NRW), the state of well as practical know-how in the Brandenburg, Germany, and the various fields of conversion. The assistance of the United Nations. BICC yearbook 'Conversion survey 1996' provides detailed information, Working as a worldwide clearing- facts and discussion on all topics house on practical conversion related to the conversion process experiences and projects, BICC worldwide. provides documentation, research, information and consulting services Information on BICC's work and and facilities for governmental and activities can also be obtained on non-governmental organizations, line via the Center's Internet companies, and individuals involved service 'ConverNet' at in conversion. http://bicc.uni-bonn.de

BICC's activities focus primarily on the following six areas of conversion: Analysis of the means and methods of reallocating the financial Published by resources of the military sector to © BICC, Bonn 1996 non-military purposes. Bonn International Center for Conversion Reorientation of military research Director: Dr. Herbert Wulf Publishing management: Corinna Hauswedell and development (R&D) facilities An der Elisabethkirche 25 and provision of this R&D know- D-53113 Bonn ledge and creativity for non-military Germany Phone +49-228-911960 purposes. Fax +49-228-241215 Opportunities for and barriers to E-mail: [email protected] conversion of the arms industry in ISSN 0947-7322 down-sizing its overcapacities and in reducing its dependence on arms Layout: Svenja Görgens Printed in Germany production. All rights reserved Programs for the demobilization of military personnel and civilian personnel employed by the armed forces and their reintegration into non-military employment.