Profit and Power: the Revolutionary Forces Behind American Middle Class Ideology

Profit and Power: The Revolutionary Forces Behind American Middle Class Ideology

Senior Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University

Undergraduate Program in History Winston Bowman, Advisor

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts

by Noah Alexander Sackton Coolidge

May 2016

Committee Members:

Name: Winston Bowman Signature: ______

Name: Mark Hulliung Signature: ______

Name: George Hall Signature: ______

Table of Contents Acknowledgements ii

Introduction: War and Opportunity 1

Financing the Revolution 5

Historiography 11

Outsiders: Abraham Yates and the Middle Class Politicians 18

The Military Bureaucracy 33

Hugh Hughes: The Mechanic as Supply Officer 44

Begging for Supplies: Ephraim Blaine’s Story 47

Military Proto-Industrial Complex: The Case of the Iron Industry 51

Constitutional Politics: Evaluating the Universal Ideology 62

Conclusion: Middle Class Nationalism 71

Works Cited 78

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of many wonderful people and institutions. The Brandeis University Library was where much of this thesis was written and provided most of the books and papers cited. I also visited the Massachusetts Historical Society, the New York Public Library, and the New-York Historical Society to conduct research. Professor Michael Willrich was a useful sounding board for early ideas and generously took the time to give advice and feedback, despite being on sabbatical. The entire faculty and staff of the History Department were all incredibly helpful and supportive. I also owe a great deal of thanks to my fellow History thesis writers. Together we have become an excellent group, working together to help with each other’s papers and to work to improve the Department in the long term. We have learned so much from each other about the study of history. I owe my committee a great deal of thanks: my advisor, Professor Winston Bowman, for reading several drafts, commenting extensively, and helping me to bring my ideas to paper. Professor George Hall, for engaging me in this topic originally, getting me to learn Python, and giving me access to transcribed data. While the data does not feature prominently in the final product, it is what led me to most of my subjects in the first place. Professor Mark Hulliung, for serving as a remarkable committee member and for giving helpful guidance. Last but not least, my heartfelt thanks to my friends and family for being so incredibly supportive. Ilana Kruger and Mitchell Mankin both read drafts and were extremely helpful throughout the process, mainly for forgiving me when I couldn’t hang out and had to go to the library. Elisabeth Sackton, Elizabeth Coolidge, and Emma Coolidge all provided loving support, without which I would not be completing college, much less completing a senior thesis.

ii Introduction: War and Opportunity

In order to be properly deemed a “revolution,” a war must bring about dramatic social or extreme change to society.1 Few historians have argued that the American War for Independence was not a revolution, yet there is a debate as to the nature of the change that the war, and subsequently independence, brought. John Adams referred to it as “a change in their [the peoples’] religious sentiments of their duties and obligations.”2 As historian Gordon Wood wrote in his classic on The Radicalism of the American Revolution, “Most importantly, it made the interests and prosperity of ordinary people—their pursuit of happiness—the goal of society and government. The Revolution… released powerful popular entrepreneurial and commercial energies that few realized existed and transformed the economic landscape of the country.”3

Significantly, Wood implicates the “ordinary people” at the heart of the revolution. Overlooked by too many historians, the non-elites developed values of economic independence, social improvement, and political power directly as a result of the Revolution. This thesis looks to the origins and impacts of that development.

The “middle class,” or “middling sorts” as it was more commonly called at the time, requires some definition. I include in this term the small artisans, independent merchants, yeoman farmers, and other working people who despite their lack of inherited wealth and social status were able to live reasonably comfortably. In particular, my focus is on the great

“American Dream” of the middle class that they have the ability to advance in social standing.

While the term “American Dream” itself would not have been used in the Revolutionary era or for several decades after, this ideological myth, I argue, originated in the way that the war effort

1 “Definition of REVOLUTION,” accessed April 21, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/revolution. 2 John Adams, The Works of John Adams, vol. 10 (Boston: Little, Brown and company etc, 1850), 282. 3 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 8.

was organized and paid for.4 Its greatest impacts are the expansion of the ability of Americans born to poor or immigrant parents to obtain political, social, and economic power. The logistics of financing the war and supplying the Continental Army influenced a broader transformation in

American culture during the war by contributing to the emergence of republican beliefs that the views of the “middling sort” should be heard at least as loudly as the views of the old elite. As these beliefs began to influence policy and change informal barriers, those with little family background or inherited wealth began to enter political life at higher rates. Joyce Appleby argues that this change in worldview marked a dramatic departure from the traditional narrative that held that birth implied social status.5

The immense spending of the military bureaucracy transformed American industry by promoting domestic manufacturing, especially of iron. Finally, the national debt was highly influential on the Federalist and Antifederalist sides of the debate over the ratification of the

Constitution and had a substantial influence over the document’s development. The Constitution effectively solidified many of the socioeconomic gains made by the middle classes during the war, yet also created barriers to prevent lower class groups from overtaking the authority of traditional elites. These seemingly contradictory notions can be explained by the fear, held by some, of falling back to the bottom and being replaced by someone else from below, an idea at the core of what I term “American middle class ideology.” While not strictly universal, the

American Dream’s huge influence on most American middle class ideologies is apparent. In an era when original intent of the “Founding Fathers” has become an important part of

4 For a good discussion of the origins and history of the idea of the American Dream and a good definition as well, see Jim Cullen, The American Dream: A Short History of an Idea That Shaped a Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 5 Joyce Appleby, “The Social Consequences of American Revolutionary Ideals in the Early Republic,” in The Middling Sorts: Explorations in the History of the American Middle Class, ed. Burton J. Bledstein and Robert D. Johnston, Kindle (Routledge, 2013), 1.

contemporary legal debates, understanding the diversity of their perspectives and their political context has critical impact on the present.6

The long-term impact of the century-long war between Great Britain and France, culminating in the Seven Years’ War (also known as the French and Indian War) was the development of further republican and anti-aristocratic tendencies among the colonists of British

North America. The war itself brought initial military experience to many who would go on to fight in the American Revolution, including Major Generals George Washington and Horatio

Gates. The British victory created the possibility of expanding colonial land, but the

Proclamation of 1763 blocked colonists from moving westward. It also led to Parliament establishing taxes on it colonial subjects, who, in turn, resisted because their liberties as

Englishmen were not respected. Continued taxation of sugar, paper products, and most famously tea let to more protests, which resulted in the Coercive/Intolerable Acts and further deprivation of liberties.

In June of 1775, the Continental Congress began the task of creating an army with which to defend America. One of the most immediate tasks facing Congress and the Commander-in-

Chief of the Continental Army, Washington, was the task of financing the rebellion. Congress formed a committee to work out the details of a financial plan, but it could scarcely proceed before other details were worked out. Congress paid great attention to this issue because many members of Congress, including Massachusetts delegate John Adams, were adherents of

“Commonwealth ideology,” a popular Whigish mindset from the late seventeenth to the mid- eighteenth century which believed that centralized government and a standing military indicated

6 Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (Vintage Books, 1997), 5.

an unhealthy democracy, and led to corruption.7 This ideological context shaped the way that

Congress would manage the Continental Army. Initially regarded as radical by landed seventeenth century elites only because it relied upon property in a property-scarce system, this ideology would morph into a republican spirit and ultimately provide the basis not just for the

Jeffersonian political tradition but for an ideology insistent upon democratic ideals.8

Beyond simply administering an army, Congress needed to foster an economy that could support it. The domestic manufacturing system had been hampered by British mercantilist policies, with many industrial trades such as iron production being highly restricted. The

“military proto-industrial complex,” or the industries who were patronized primarily by the

Continental Army, existed only at the artisan level: small gunsmiths made guns serviceable for hunting, but no one could produce guns or gunpowder on the scale necessary for the Continental

Army.9 There was very little demand for cannons prior to the war itself, and very few people were capable of producing them. Congress also needed to recruit and retain soldiers for the

Continental Army, and needed to ensure that they were prepared for battle. Paying the soldiers would be a significant expense, but clothing, supplying, and feeding them required not only financial resources, but also organizational support. The Continental Army would build a

“military supply bureaucracy” prepared for the near-impossible task of supplying the soldiers with provisions and supplies, but in order to do so, Congress needed to figure out a financial solution.

7 E. Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure : Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 6; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, ed. Institute of Early American History and Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 16–17. 8 Anthony Gronowicz, “Political ‘Radicalism’ in New York City’s Revolutionary and Constitutional Eras,” in New York in the Age of the Constitution, 1775-1800, by Paul A. Gilje and William Pencak (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ; London, 1992), 98. 9 Lucille E. Horgan, Forged in War : The Continental Congress and the Origin of Military Supply and Acquisition Policy, Contributions in Military Studies, No. 219 (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2002), 1.

Financing the Revolution

Little hard money, or specie, existed in the colonies due to a ban on the private export of

British coins.10 In its place, colonists used a wide array of currencies prior to the Revolution, ranging from “soft” money printed by colonies to foreign specie, primarily Spanish dollars and gold coins.11 The little hard money that did exist was concentrated generally in the old

“aristocratic” families, who were more likely to harbor British sympathies. The hard money was of a variegated provenance, coming as it did from Spain, France, Holland, and other European powers.12 Hard money was essential to foreign trade in this period, and the limited supply of money in the colonies reflected settlers’ duty to trade primarily with Britain and its other colonies. While British pounds sterling were the currency of account, and most inter-colonial trade was calculated based on pounds, “American pounds” issued by each colony varied widely in their exchange rates with each other and with British currency.13 A departure from European tradition, many viewed this soft money with great skepticism. Ultimately, the warnings of imperial regulators about depreciation and its dangers led to the withdrawal of much of this soft currency in New England by the 1750s.14 Colonial governments created a system of “land banks” as a means of creating liquidity. Through these banks, colonial governments used their land wealth to finance themselves, issuing loans and creating a sort of paper currency out of real property.15 A variation in the system, as implemented in New Jersey, was the colonial loan office (not to be confused with the revolutionary loan offices, discussed later). Colonial loan

10 E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1961), 4. Soft money, also known as “fiat money” by its critics, is paper currency that is not redeemable for gold. 11 Edwin J. Perkins, American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700-1815, Historical Perspectives on Business Enterprise Series (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1994), 13. 12 Robert Garson, “Counting Money: The US Dollar and American Nationhood, 1781-1820,” Journal of American Studies 35, no. 1 (April 1, 2001): 23–24. 13 Ibid., 23. 14 Perkins, American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700-1815, 4. 15 Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790, 5–7.

offices acted like modern banks, issuing money with the land to be financed as a collateral.16

Until the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, which consolidated the power of coinage in the

Federal government, the states remained actively involved in printing and issuing their own currencies.17 This meant that there were a wide variety of currencies and printing practices, creating a confusing and intricate system.

Public attitudes toward taxation were very negative, given the popular origins of the

Revolution in protests against British taxes. Even if Congress had the political will and the authority to levy taxes, no countrywide government bureaucracy for tax collection existed, and the Congress would have been unable to establish such a network given the wartime situation.

Congress relied on the states for any revenue, and because they were focused on financing their own militias, they were not particularly forthcoming. The inability to tax limited the ability to borrow, and so Congress turned to printing money as the only alternative for financing for the war effort.18

The issue of currency was critical to Congress’ ability to finance the war.19 As Robert

Garson argues, the creation of the Continental dollar as a national currency was a significant step toward a cohesive national identity.20 On June 23, 1775, Congress inaugurated the first printing of the Continental dollar, ordering two million dollars’ worth to be printed.21 Because of this quantity, and rapid increases in the amounts needed, inflation became a significant problem, and the value of the Continental dollar depreciated rapidly. In 1777 alone, the Continental lost 70%

16 Donald L. Kemmerer, “The Colonial Loan-Office System in New Jersey,” Journal of Political Economy 47, no. 6 (1939): 867–74. 17 Perkins, American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700-1815, 3. 18 Ben Baack, “Forging a Nation State: The Continental Congress and the Financing of the War of American Independence,” The Economic History Review, New Series, 54, no. 4 (November 1, 2001): 641. 19 “Currency” is defined here as a system of money designed for general use and to be commonly traded in exchange for goods and services. 20 Garson, “Counting Money,” 22. 21 Worthington C. Ford, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Online, 1904, 2:105.

of its value.22 The total number of Continental dollars issued was around 200 million.23 Various explanations are possible for this massive devaluation. Congress certainly deserves much of the blame for repeatedly issuing more currency, despite knowing its dangerous economic impact.

Charges of corruption, incompetence, and inefficiency have all been leveled at the Continental

Congress and other Confederation officials, both by historians and contemporaries. Another culprit is the states themselves. When states received money in taxes, they were forced to spend it because their expenditures were so high, rather than withdrawing it from circulation as would have been required to preserve the currency’s value.24

Earlier controversies over currency in England shed some light on what Congress may have been thinking about when it considered its financial situation. Lockean ideals stated that money should follow the flow of the market. In the late seventeenth century, English currency was depreciated to the point that a silver shilling was worth less than the silver from which it was made. The government had historically prescribed the value of silver currency, regulating it intensely. Silver shaved from coins was being sold in other countries for gold bullion, which had universally recognized intrinsic value.25 In 1696, England debated melting down its silver shillings and reissuing them at a corrected weight, closer to their market value. The widespread practice of whittling down silver coins and the flight of silver bullion combined with new military demands for money due to conflict with France.

The debate ultimately became one about whether the government should engage in regulating the value of its currency. Locke, in his Further Considerations concerning Raising the

22 Baack, “Forging a Nation State,” 643. 23 Farley Grubb, “The Continental Dollar: How Much Was Really Issued?,” The Journal of Economic History 68, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 283–91. 24 Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790, 31. 25 Joyce Oldham Appleby, “Locke, Liberalism and the Natural Law of Money,” Past & Present, no. 71 (1976): 43– 69.

Value of Money, argued that like interest rates, the value of specie was set by nature though the market, and thus could not be regulated by government.26 He argued that melting down and combining clipped shillings would not stop the devaluing the currency because it was based in the market value of the underlying specie, rather than the artificial value placed on it by law.

Appleby argued that Locke was reacting against arbitrary and unlimited power in a move that linked economic and political liberalism.27 This context was troubling for the Continental

Congress, which did not have time to acquire the necessary gold and silver to build a financial market, and would therefore have to depart from its liberal values out of necessity.

As the war progressed, the falling value of the Continental dollar meant that the military had to resort to alternative means to pay for what it needed. Loans from France helped, but ultimately the loan office certificate system was born. On October 3, 1776, Congress resolved

“That five millions of continental dollars be immediately borrowed for the use of the United

States of America, at the annual interest of four percent [per annum].”28 Issued on the “faith of the United States,” certificates could be purchased at a continental loan office by individuals or groups of individuals. Each state was asked to establish such an office and appoint a commissioner of loans, who would be responsible for issuing the certificates and paying the interest owed. The loan offices were to be given certificates from the Continental Board of

Treasury, in denominations greater than $200. Commissioners were to be paid one eighth of one percent of all income, which was also expected to finance the office’s needs. By February 1777, the interest on loan office certificates was increased to six percent.29 Between September 1777 and March 1778, Congress decided to issue interest on loan office certificates in the form of bills

26 Ibid., 48. 27 Ibid., 69. 28 Ford, JCC, 5:845–846. 29 Ibid., 7:103; Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790, 35.

of exchange, which could be redeemed in France for specie and which traded at near-face value in many American ports, effectively increasing the yield of the certificates to 30 percent interest given the level of inflation.30 This made the loan office certificates much more valuable because they could be purchased with Continental dollars at face value and were repaid in specie. In the simplest terms, certificates that were intended to assist with the financing of the war effort and reducing inflation became a secondary currency for military purchasers and merchants.

There is significant reason to believe loan office certificates were used as a form of currency. As inflation on the Continental dollar, as well as wartime demand, pushed prices upward, the need for larger, more liquid assets grew, and loan office certificates offered a solution. Woody Holton argues that while “some Americans lodged money in the Loan Office out of a sense of patriotic duty… Loan Office certificates owed most of their popularity to the declining fortunes of Continental paper money.”31 He claims that creditors seeking to get something in specie from Continental dollars purchased them en masse, and that these creditors were able to get the certificates paid at a remarkably favorable rate. Merchants, and anyone dealing in foreign trade, would have been particularly interested in them because they could be easily cancelled with the issuing loan officer if the certificate was stolen or lost. Various newspaper advertisements show that this occurred, with owners often offering a reward in exchange for the loan office certificates and issuing a warning that the loan office would not recognize the certificates for anyone other than the lawful owner.32

Another obvious benefit was that the certificates garnered interest because they were a loan, which meant that they kept value more easily. This was probably to the dismay of

30 Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790, 36. 31 Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 78. 32 “Two Hundred Dollars Reward,” Connecticut Courant, May 26, 1778; “Certificates Stolen in Amsterdam,” Pennsylvania Packet, April 29, 1780; “STOLEN,” New-York Gazetteer, November 18, 1782.

Congress, because interest-bearing currency is extremely expensive.33 As E. James Ferguson notes, “Loan office certificates taken out after March 1, 1778 had a different character,” largely because they bore only paper money in interest, yet they remained a popular merchant currency, and held their value better than the continental dollar.

An interesting use of loan office certificates after this point was as a sort of negotiable instrument (something close to a “check”) given to supply officers. Loan offices not only sold certificates, but also received and disbursed public money, paying out the “drafts” (essentially checks) ordered by Congress.34 These drafts appear to have sometimes been paid in cash and sometimes in certificates. Merchants preferred to accept loan certificates because of the depreciation of the Continental and because they paid interest, and also because they probably feared goods being taken forcibly (a practice known as “forage”) if they refused to sell.

Therefore, many of the largest purchasers of loan office certificates were members of what I term the “military supply bureaucracy.” These men were involved in the Quartermaster General’s department, responsible for supplying the troops, and for the Commissary General’s department, responsible for feeding them.35

Foreign loans also represented an important source of Congressional revenue, which was largely spent in Europe on goods. While critically important to the success of the war, they are outside of the scope of this paper. Additionally, I only reviewed loans made as “loan office certificates” and to some limited extent, “liquidated debt certificates,” which were essentially further certificates issued as interest payment on “loan office certificates” following the end of the practice of issuing “bills of exchange.” There were also several other kinds of certificates and

33 Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790, 39–40. 34 Ibid., 35. 35 Ford, JCC, 15:1392.

currency issued that are perhaps relevant to my inquiry that were excluded. Quartermaster’s

Certificates, issued by Quartermaster and Commissary agents promising payment, were not as directly examined because the data available about their quantity issued is minimal, and few scholars have focused extensively on them.

Historiography

A full literature review of the economic and political history of the Revolutionary period would be impossibly long to write, but some mention must be made of the many great historians who shaped this field of scholarship. The Progressive Historians viewed the Revolution as something of a class conflict along economic and social lines, rather than a political conflict. In his 1909 book on New York politics, Carl Becker famously proposed that there were two simultaneous American Revolutions: “the first was the question of home rule; the second was the question, if we may so put it, of who should rule at home.”36 Becker, a student of Frederick

Jackson Turner, believed that unlike in New England, where Puritan tendencies had created a large class of yeoman farmers, colonial New York was shaped by elitism. As New York was first settled, it was the Dutch landowning magnates and English aristocrats that shaped the social structure of the state and dominated its politics. In the first revolution, part of this elite class supported the British, and part of it became the “established Whig” element, which cautiously supported republicanism. The “radical Whigs,” who in addition to opposing British rule wanted to overturn the governing political system entirely, joined the established Whigs in some respects, but opposed them in others. The Revolution stirred up democratic tendencies and republicanism within the wider populous. As this democratic spirit grew, so did support for the war.

36 Carl Lotus Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776., Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin. No. 286. History Series. v. 2, No. 1 (Madison, Wis, 1909), 22.

Charles Beard focused on the economic motivations of the founders and little else, in a view that has been generally rejected by modern historians. Ever since Beard published An

Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States in 1913, historians have considered class as an important factor in American political, economic, and social development.

Beard focused his analysis on economic history and ascribed a great deal of importance to the economic factors that influenced American political and social development. It was Beard who first directly addressed the role of the debt in the debate over the adoption of the United States

Constitution. His focus was primarily on the “consolidation” of the “old debt,” as it was known, into a new, “consolidated debt,” held by the federal government rather than the states. Beard’s argument was that the financial interests of individuals, based on the debt that they owned and the property that they owned, influenced their position on the Constitutional debate. Beard wrote that if the full records could be compiled of this consolidation, which occurred at the federal loan offices in each state, it “would form a veritable Domesday [Doomsday] Book of the politics during the first years of the new government.”37 Fortunately for the contemporary historian, the

National Archives has complied and published many of these records on microfilm.38 New

England, New York, and Pennsylvania have particularly complete records, although the task of combing through them and analyzing them is an arduous one requiring intense investigation.

Originally, I intended this thesis to be an attempt at linking the “old debt” purchasers with the redeemers of the certificates, as Beard proposed, to identify the winners and losers in the

37 Charles Austin Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States with New Introduction. (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 21. 38 For example, National Archives Microfilm Publications, “Records of the New Jersey and New York Continental Loan Offices, 1777-1790.” (Microfilm, 1976), Records of the Bureau of the Public Debt, RG 53, National Archives. The Records of the Bureau of the Public Debt are largely of the states that had not yet paid off their debt by the creation of the Federal Government, and most of their records are from after the assumption occurred. Prof. George Hall has shared his transcribed versions of these records with me.

constitutional debate.39 The advances of computer technology have made the data much more easy to analyze and, indeed, I began to look at the largest original purchasers, primarily in

Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, significant parts of the purchaser data no longer exist, which made this project infeasible, at least in the timeframe allowable for an undergraduate thesis. Yet given my discovery that many of these certificates acted more like checks than debt, the implications of such a work would not necessarily be as broad as Beard suggested, because it would not have influenced the political positions of the holders as much as he assumes if they were given the certificates instead of purchasing them.

Additionally, extensive examination into exactly who the largest purchasers were reveals that they were a part of a burgeoning middle class. Many of these largest purchasers were quartermaster officers or commissary agents in the Continental Army. Their middling backgrounds suggest that they were given the funds with which the purchase the loan office certificates which led me to them, rather than purchasing them directly as themselves. This intrigued me, and I began researching the financing of the supply departments of the Continental

Army. I discovered that it contributed significantly to the development of the American state and military. The political and economic egalitarianism that radical Whigs embraced during the

Revolution even resembled early American nationalism. Tracing the loans also led me to look at those who sold the loans, in particular Abraham Yates, Jr. of New York and to a lesser extent,

Nathaniel Appleton of Massachusetts. Yates, like many of his purchasers, became highly involved in politics during the years immediately preceding the war.

The field of history has, of course, grown substantially in the last hundred years since An

Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States was published, and a number of

39 The data being substantially incomplete, the task that Beard proposes remains difficult, although much more possible than it was in his time. Thus, I have focused on a case study of a selection of major purchasers.

others have weighed in on the importance of the domestic war debt, and in particular the importance of social, political, and economic egalitarianism in the American Revolution and

American political development. Wood, already quoted above, argued that the radicalism of the

American Revolution inhered in the “transformations in the relationships that bound people to each other,” and that it was the rejection of corrupt monarchical authority in favor of republican ideals that dramatically transformed these relationships.40 This focus on corruption, described earlier as a part of “Commonwealth ideology” and sometimes also known as “Old Whig” or

“Country” ideology, can be seen in many of the middle class radicals (and later, Antifederalists) that I discuss herein. Wood’s analysis has influenced my work greatly, and while I focus on more economic and political motivations, I come to similar conclusions to his. Bernard Baylin’s

Ideological Origins of the American Revolution argued, in part, that the colonists expected to be treated under the same social constitutional system as the British, but that they lacked the nobility, a group standing between the monarch and the commoners, to complete their system of government. Wood and Baylin have never been universally loved, J. G. A. Pocock’s The

Machiavellian Moment argues that it was not the rejection of corruption but rather older

Machiavellian ideas that shaped American political and social culture in the Revolutionary and

Constitutional periods.41 Robert E. Brown was another critic of Wood’s, who argued that democracy in Massachusetts, at least, pre-dated the Revolution, and that the Revolution was essentially the overthrow of British Imperialism.42 The examples presented herein, and most modern scholarship, suggest otherwise.

40 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 5. 41 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton University Press, 1975), 462–552. 42 Robert E. Brown, Middle Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1780 (New York: Joanna Cotler Books, 1969).

Woody Holton’s Unruly Americans argued that the framers were fundamentally conservative and that they were concerned with preventing what Alexander Hamilton called the

“excesses of democracy.”43 He argued that to the extent that they were unsuccessful, it is due to the critical reaction to the Constitution from the majority of the people, rather than the framers themselves. While Holton’s explanation is perhaps simplistic in that it elides the wealthier opponents of the Constitution who nearly blocked it in states like New York, his fundamental point on this concept is sound. In a similar vein, Jennifer Nedelsky focused on the clash between the populists and the aristocrats in the immediate post-war era, and argues that the fear that democratic reforms would challenge private property was integral to the concerns of the framers.44

Joyce Appleby has undertaken the study of the members of the “middling sort,” that I argue used the war to enable themselves to participate in the post-war political environment.

“The protracted battles between the Federalists and their Jeffersonian challengers had thoroughly politicized the very notion of social superiority… It is difficult to taxonimize the American social structure of the early nineteenth century using the stock categories of class analysis.”45 In defining class in America,

With varying degrees of intensity, champions of an open society battled the defenders of old ways. At risk were the old markers of wealth, style and family now attacked as irrelevant to a democratic ethic founded upon equality of respect and appreciation of individual merit. Distinctions, whether linked to the economic notion of class or left to float as shared preferences in attitudes and behavior, only work when most men and women recognize them and seek to perpetuate them in their public performances through the lessons they pass on to their children. The well-defined ranks of gentry, middling folk, and poor increasingly lost credibility

43 Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution, 5. 44 Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1994), 2. 45 Appleby, “The Social Consequences of American Revolutionary Ideals in the Early Republic,” 3–4.

in a world with few strongholds for the gentry to command, and new opportunities to stir ambitions throughout the “fermenting mass.”46

The “fermenting mass” and the “middling sorts” are most simply defined as those who were not among the elite group of families or extremely wealthy individuals that controlled the politics and economy of colonial America, and above the slaves and paupers who did not have political or economic rights. The “mechanics,” defined then as someone who worked with his hands, were the artisans who formed the vanguard of the Revolution in the northern cities, forming groups like the Sons of Liberty.47 Mechanics represent a critical swath of the middle class, particularly in the urban centers of the North. The “middling sorts,” or “middle class” to use the modern parlance, also included the yeoman farmers, rural artisans, and merchant traders. Unlanded laborers of modest means and potentially even indentured servants could arguably be included as

“middling sorts,” although I do not focus on them in any significant detail here. While interconnected and in similar positions, each of these groups had differing interests. Their common experiences as well as their differences led to the evolution of what I term American middle class ideologies. I use the plural intentionally because the social differences between these distinctive groups, as well as the economic and political positions of individuals, caused variations in their core beliefs. Yet I argue that a central core remained, ultimately developing into the core beliefs of American nationalism, the American Dream of economic mobility and legal equality. “Nationalism,” in this sense, is not a specific political ideology, but rather the core belief underpinning an idea of national unity and identity common amongst these ideologies.

46 Ibid., 6. 47 Linda Grant De Pauw, The Eleventh Pillar; New York State and the Federal Constitution. (Ithaca, NY, Published for the American Historical Association by Cornell University Press, 1966), 22; Staughton Lynd and Alfred F Young, “After Carl Becker: The Mechanics and New York City Politics 1774-1801,” Labor History. 5, no. 3 (1964): 217.

Throughout this thesis, I will tease out the sources of this ideology, focusing on the core of the American Dream, and ultimately what they meant for American political and social development. Chapter 1 focuses on the new middle class politicians who began winning public office and influencing the debate during the early Revolutionary period and became highly influential on the shaping of a middle class political identity. Chapter 2 introduces the idea of the

“military supply bureaucracy” charged with feeding, arming, and housing the Continental Army.

This bureaucracy was the subject of numerous controversies during the war about corruption, which perpetuated an ideology of opposition to centralization. The bureaucracy also shows the distain with which the upper classes viewed the mechanics and artificers who worked with their hands. Chapter 3 is a case study of John Jacob Faesch and the Revolutionary iron industry, a key part of the “military proto-industrial complex” and an example of the “rags-to-riches” American

Dream. Chapter 4 looks at the Constitutional ratification debate and examines how middle class ideology shaped the document and the debate over ratification. The conclusion brings all of these threads together, and considers whether this amounts to a cohesive ideology and if so, whether that ideology was nationalistic in nature.

17 Chapter 1

Outsiders: Abraham Yates and the Middle Class Politicians

The political transformation that occurred around the Revolutionary War was a democratizing force. These transformations were perhaps most clear in New York, where middle class men challenged a long-ruling elite for political power. In addition to expanded economic opportunities, members of the middle class broke down political barriers and pursued political offices they had been unable to attain previously. The breaking of social and political barriers in the late colonial period meant that a new group of middle class leaders was ready to emerge and take the opportunity that the Revolution provided. The growth of the middle class in the mid- eighteenth century and its concomitant rise in economic and social status, were challenges to the socioeconomic status quo ante. The ideological impact of this change was crucial because it enabled the belief that anyone, with enough hard work, could join the elite. Upstate New York, particularly Albany, was an important site for the evolution of this democratic political culture and the accompanying political revolution. Perhaps no character was as representative of the phenomenon of the middle class entering politics and finance than Abraham Yates, Junior. Yates left a prolific historical record, and yet only a few significant secondary source focus on his personal story.

By the early eighteenth century, Dutch merchants dominated Albany’s political and economic system, monopolizing processing operations and investing in western lands.1 Albany’s waterfront on the Hudson meant that lumber, wheat, and grain were easily exported south to

New York and thence across the ocean to Europe.2 To support this early industrial economy,

1 Stefan Bielinski, “A Middling Sort: Artisans and Tradesmen in Colonial Albany,” New York History 73, no. 3 (July 1, 1992): 268. 2 Ibid., 266.

artisans and craftsmen began to set up shop producing, repairing, and selling goods made of wood, metal, leather, and cloth. This “middle class” (to use the contemporary term) grew rapidly as immigrants poured into the city throughout the eighteenth century, both from Europe and other colonial areas, as Englishmen joined the Dutch in building a diverse economy.3

In this section, I will examine Yates as a politician because he represents the dramatic political and ideological transformation of New York, from aristocratic plutocracy to populist democracy. A descendent of Joseph Yates, who served in the British force that captured New

Amsterdam and turned it into New York, yeoman politician and Revolutionary financier

Abraham Yates, Jr. grew up in Albany, where his family had integrated into the Dutch merchant community previously established there, for a while even changing the family name to ‘Yetts”.4

Yates ultimately held a number of important roles in New York politics, but most importantly for the purposes of this essay, he served as the Continental Loan Officer for the state from 1779 to

1782, the heart of the loan office sales during the war. Governor George Clinton, a political ally and close friend of Yates, has a similar and better-known story, but he lacks the radicalism of

Yates, particularly later in his career.5 Clinton was unquestionably a part of the same political revolution, and he is emblematic of the changes that characterize the era in New York politics.

Born in 1724, Yates was the fourth son and ninth child of a modest yeoman. Young Yates was apprenticed to a cobbler, but left to take a clerkship with Peter Silvester, lawyer for the great

3 Ibid., 275. 4 For biographical details on Yates, see Stefan Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York (Albany: New York State American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, 1975), 3. Bielinski’s is one of the few books dedicated to Yates. Yates’ personal papers, at the New York Public Library, were in the process of being digitized throughout the research phase of this thesis. Luckily, the papers from his time as Continental Loan Officer were available on microfilm, and are cited in other chapters. Yates’ “Rough Hewer” piece is discussed later, as is his “History of the Constitution.” 5 De Pauw, The Eleventh Pillar; New York State and the Federal Constitution., 1966, 18–19.

Van Rensselaer family, the wealthiest manor holders in the area.6 Wealthy land-grant recipients under both the Dutch and the English formed an aristocratic class, which dominated Albany and the upper Hudson Valley. Land ownership and immense wealth defined social status. These principal families saw themselves as the natural aristocracy of the “new world,” and grew accustomed to dominating provincial politics, holding most major offices in the colony.7 As Carl

L. Becker wrote in his classic book on pre-Revolutionary New York politics, “that small coterie of closely related families of wealth, commonly known as the aristocracy… was able in large measure to control provincial politics.”8 These families generally had Dutch roots, and held large tracts of land in the region. The most prominent of these aristocratic families included the Van

Rensselaers, the Livingstons, and the De Lanceys, and together they wielded near-total control in the colonial political system. They relied on tenant farmers to run the land. While the King was the source of official legal authority, English common law tradition dictated that Englishmen were entitled to certain rights.9 Such was the political and economic situation when Abraham

Yates was coming of age. Yates, whose Whiggish philosophy opposed the idea of a central ruling authority, would ultimately become an enemy of this powerful class.

Massive population growth in New England meant that settlers went westward to Albany and its surrounding manors.10 While this middle class dominated in terms of population, the city maintained its aristocratic political culture and members of the middle class did not take part in

6 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 4. 7 Bernard Friedman, “The Shaping of the Radical Consciousness in Provincial New York,” The Journal of American History 56, no. 4 (1970): 798. 8 Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776., 5. Becker, like his contemporary Charles Beard and professor, Frederick Jackson Turner, has many critics, but his general thesis is rather more accepted than Beard’s is today. 9 Daniel Joseph Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire : New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830, Studies in Legal History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 19. 10 Joyce Appleby, “Liberalism and the American Revolution,” The New England Quarterly 49, no. 1 (1976): 10–11.

the Common Council or other positions of status.11 As the population boomed, opportunities for sons to leave their father’s land decreased by the mid-eighteenth century, as territorial limits on expansion and increasingly competitive local economies meant that the opportunity to own land or control an occupation decreased. The very manor holders who were harmed by the enhanced economic and political rights of yeoman farmers controlled the opportunities for land ownership for landless sons.12 This meant that opportunities for personal advancement decreased, especially in the areas around Albany where the landholders were so powerful.

From his early days as a lawyer, Yates entered politics, serving on the Albany

Corporation Council.13 Yates was appointed Albany County Sheriff on October 29, 1754, just prior to the outbreak of the French and Indian War. As Sheriff, Yates clashed with local elites as well as British authority. In one instance, Robert Livingston Jr., who was probably responsible for his appointment, called upon him to remove New England squatters on his land. 14 This work was similar to Yates’ legal work for the Van Rensselaer family, who faced comparable problems.

Yates applied to the Governor for help, for which he and Livingston received a proclamation that

New York’s property laws should be upheld. Livingston grew angry when a tenant was released from jail and returned to his land after charges of murder were dropped. He complained, “Good

God what an affair is this… it is impossible for me to defend my Self against a Government bent

15 on my distruction[sic] …” This conflict shows that Yates was not a mere pawn of the powerful land barons, but his own man willing to stand up for popular interests.

11 Bielinski, “A Middling Sort,” 290. 12 Appleby, “Liberalism and the American Revolution,” 19. 13 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 5. 14 Ibid., 15. 15 Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire, 102.

The French and Indian war brought the King’s soldiers to Albany, where they were billeted in private homes. Several incidents occurred of troops looting and drunkenly causing damage to private property. These issues mounted, and the Sheriff decided to take action.

Following one incident of vandalism, Yates decided to arrest and charge several of the soldiers, only to have their commander break into the city jail and free them.16 After an exchange with the

Earl of Loudoun, the British Commander-in-Chief, Yates was unable to prosecute the soldiers.

By the end of the French and Indian War, Albany was growing rapidly, both in terms of population and economy, and a political revolution was underway in Albany. New migrants of

English and Scots-Irish heritage threatened the traditional Dutch establishment, which had been cemented in power by the aristocratic families that ruled the area. These new migrants meant that social rank dramatically decreased in importance as a political qualification, and popular democratic appeals became a new source of political power.17 They would fuel his rise to power, and also the rise of the man who would grow to be one of Yates’ closest political allies, George

Clinton, who grew up in neighboring Ulster County18.

The coming Revolution would present an opportunity for Yates to take action, but in the time between the wars, Yates faced significant challenges. As he embraced the “common sort,” the Livingstons, Schuylers, and Van Rensselaers, who had once patronized him, began to distrust his motives and oppose him at every opportunity.19 They went to great lengths to stop him from organizing his coalition and taking power. In the 1773 Common Council election, Yates and his

16 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 5–6. 17 David G. Hackett, “The Social Origins of Nationalism: Albany, New York 1754-1835,” Journal of Social History 21, no. 4 (July 1, 1988): 663. 18 John P. Kaminski, George Clinton : Yeoman Politician of the New Republic (Madison: Madison House, 1993), 11. 19 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 10–11.

allies were shut out of power by a coalition of two powerful Albany families.20 This crushing defeat showed Yates that the Dutch elite was a powerful enemy, and that he had to organize his supporters against them. Yates ultimately formed his own political organization, largely with the backing of middle class Albany Englishmen.21 Yates and his relations opposed British taxation policies not only because of the “oppression” that they felt, but because they wanted to rise above their prescribed social status. Yates’ repeated suppression by the British and loyalist interests was building up anger and a desire to break out of his position.

Now a radical Whig, Yates became active in Albany’s chapter of the Sons of Liberty, and was elected chairman of the city’s Committee of Correspondence. While cautious that conflict with England could leave New York in a worse position, Yates was clearly outraged by British actions, which seemingly mirrored his personal defeat at their hands during the prior war.22 This position of local leadership indicates that Yates was a capable organizer and administrator. In

April 1775, Yates attended a Provincial Convention, a predecessor to the State’s Provincial

Congress, to elect delegates to the Continental Congress after the assembly refused to do so.

Following this task, Yates stayed in New York and met with other patriot leaders. These leaders, who included George Clinton, would ultimately become crucial figures in New York politics.23

When they heard of violence at Lexington and Concord, the patriots were generally convinced of the need for greater military action. Rioters took to the streets, raiding British supply boats bound for Boston and stealing five hundred muskets and large quantities of gunpowder from the City

Hall. The patriot cause provided Yates with a political outlet and an opportunity to lead, which he took on. As the Loyalists rapidly lost control of New York, Yates and his fellow patriots took

20 Ibid., 11–12. 21 Ibid., 12. 22 Ibid., 18. 23 Ibid., 17.

over their social and political positions, and gained power at the grassroots level. At about this time, Committees of Correspondence reorganized into Committees of Safety, Protection and

Correspondence, and began taking on a significant role in governing, without any formal delegated authority.24 Yates was unquestionably the leader of the movement in Albany.25

While many were concerned about New York’s position in a hypothetical “union” of the states, Yates felt much more concerned about New York itself, at least until the events of April

19th at Lexington and Concord became known. Yates “approved of New York’s determination to remain sovereign in its internal government.”26 Like many other radical Whig leaders, Yates was concerned that the Continental Congress and other aristocratic leaders would take on

“oligarchical” power, foreshadowing Yates’ later Anti-federalism. Becker traces fears of plutocratic takeover to Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideologies as well.27

At New York’s first Provincial Congress in May 1775, Yates was one of the most active members, but he and his fellow radicals were ignored by the congressional leadership, which advocated the use of “responsible” lines of opposition to British policies.28 The “Livingston

Whig” faction, of which Clinton was a member, which could not give up on the ideal of living under British law, yet was horrified by the “Intolerable Acts,” and therefore supported the war while rejecting independence, dominated the convention.29 Both the Continental and Provincial

Congresses were still considering reconciliation with the British, including Lord North’s

24 Ibid., 19; Colin Jay Williams, “New York Transformed: Committees, Militias, and the Social Effects of Political Mobilization in Revolutionary New York” (Ph.D., The University of Alabama, 2013), 63. 25 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 18. 26 Ibid., 19. 27 Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776., 275. 28 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 19. 29 Roger J. Champagne, “New York’s Radicals and the Coming of Independence,” The Journal of American History 51, no. 1 (1964): 29. Champagne argues that a triumvirate of three Whig leaders directed the “Sons of Liberty” lower-class patriot movement in New York: Alexander McDougall, Isaac Sears, and John Lamb. He argues that their disunity and withdrawal from public life in favor of military service harmed lower-class representation in the patriot cause.

February 1775 proposal to exempt any colony from taxation if it provided funds for defense and supported “civil government.”30 Over the next year, the First Provincial Congresses attempted to take small steps toward preparing for war without giving up hope of reconciliation.31 Factional politics played out in this period as it traditionally had in New York politics. Yates, a member of both, was primarily focused on financing and supplying the ill-fated Canadian expedition from the summer of 1775 and into 1776. This was no easy task, as military supplies and finances were extremely scarce, recruitment was down, and the local committee had trouble purchasing the necessary supplies.32 Yates also became primarily responsible for prosecuting loyalists in

Albany, before being elected President pro tempore of the (brief) Second Provincial Congress in

November 1775.33

The prospect of war coming to New York was a scary one for many in the city itself.

Bombardment of the city, as well as the fear of growing Tory organization and militarization, meant that the city needed to organize to defend itself. Some suggested arresting the governor and holding him hostage in order to prevent the British from bombarding the city.34 While the feared attack never came to pass, perhaps because Tories would suffer as much as Whigs, the atmosphere of fear in the city grew. Rumors that, should the rebels arm themselves, the Navy was ordered to attack, meant that the Provincial Congress continued to drag its feet, and New

York was resistant to accepting the help of General Charles Lee, who had been sent by General

Washington to help defend the city.35 A lack of weapons in the city meant that the Provincial

Congress requisitioned all weapons, but Tories refused to give them. Rather than taking action,

30 Ibid., 27–28. 31 Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776., 224. 32 Champagne, “New York’s Radicals and the Coming of Independence,” 26. 33 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 21–23. 34 Bernard Mason, The Road to Independence: The Revolutionary Movement in New York, 1773--1777 (University Press of Kentucky, 1967), 104, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt130j5nt. 35 Ibid., 106.

the Congress ultimately backed down.36 The episode highlights the political nature of military operations in the early part of the war.

By April 1776, most New Yorkers37 had given up hope of reconciliation with the mother country, although many still thought that independence should be a decision made at the colony- level rather than the “continental” level.38 As the “Spirit of ‘76” swept the country, Yates and his

Albany radicals prepared for further fighting, read Common Sense by Thomas Paine, and gathered support for what they saw as the inevitability of independence if America was to preserve its liberties.39 Yet the Third Provincial Congress again vacillated, and in June Yates was elected to be the leader of the Albany delegation to the Fourth. The Fourth Provincial Congress technically lasted only one day. On July 9th, the Fourth New York Provincial Congress was gaveled into session at White Plains Courthouse. That afternoon, Yates served on a Committee that recommended that the Congress approve the Declaration of Independence. The following day, the Congress renamed itself “The Convention of Representatives of the STATE of New

York,” in effect declaring statehood.40 The Convention now took on a more radical tilt, putting itself in direct work with the Continental Army, finances, and military defenses. It also took on one of the more daunting tasks that a legislature could: the drafting of a Constitution. The committee to draft it was to be chaired by Abraham Yates, Jr.41

The Committee was supposed to report a draft in late August, but did not have a draft to present until March 12th, 1777.42 The drafting committee received a significant amount of criticism for this, including by Jeremiah Van Rensselaer, in remarks perhaps aimed at Yates, as

36 Ibid., 108. 37 Other than the loyalists, who remained prominent in Westchester County and on Long Island. 38 Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776., 270. 39 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 23–24. 40 Ibid., 26. 41 Ibid. 42 Mason, The Road to Independence, 224.

Albany representative. He said, “The public are impatient in the highest degree… Suspicions are daily increasing, the usual harmony is in a great measure rent in pieces, their faith in the

Representatives tottering.”43 Factors beyond the committee’s control, including the Convention’s decision to relocate due to imminent British attack, contributed, as did other obligations of committee members, such as military service and local government service. Delays allowed the committee members to read widely, including other emerging state constitutions. Yates supported the secret ballot, annual elections, and expanded suffrage, while Morris supported the manumission of slaves. However, these democratic ideals had to be compromised on eventually to get an agreement and establish a constitutional government, and ultimately Livingston,

Morris, and Jay made the document much more conservative on the convention floor.44 Yates fell ill during this debate, and his allies failed to be a significant opposition to conservative changes to the document, which became one of the most oligarchical in the new country.45

On April 20th, 1777, the new Constitution was proclaimed, and the new state government began shortly thereafter. The new state faced significant challenges, however, as the war was only just beginning. The summer campaign of 1777 in New York, as masterminded by

Lieutenant General Johnny Burgoyne, was to divide New York in three, thus cutting it off from

New England and separating the southern colonies, which were generally less rebellious. The three strands of attack, led by Burgoyne, General William Howe, and Colonel Barrimore St.

Leger, were to meet at Albany. Yates and the other patriot leaders did not know the details of this plan, but the advancing armies meant that the city needed to defend itself, and perhaps more

43 Ibid., 220. 44 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 30–32. 45 Ibid., 32–34.

importantly ensure adequate supplies for the Continental Army.46 Meanwhile, on the political front, the first gubernatorial election was underway. After initially supporting the aristocratic but highly qualified Jay, Yates and his followers switched their support to George Clinton, commander of the state militia and an assemblyman of modest background.47 Following

Clinton’s shocking electoral victory, Yates was chosen to serve as a Senator, and remained a loyal follower of Clinton, pushing his legislative agenda in the Senate. Yates had many political opponents, chief among whom were Major General Philip Schuyler and Alexander Hamilton.

Burgoyne’s defeat at Saratoga in October 1777 was a turning point in the war. It was also a turning point for Yates’s political career. Yates was focused on supplying the army, fighting loyalists, and reelecting the Governor, for whom a statewide “Clintonian” party was emerging.48

He was rumored to be a candidate for Lieutenant Governor in 1778, but when he realized the division that he would cause between landed interests and the populists, he withdrew his name from consideration, putting the Revolution’s success above politics.49 Yates faced criticism for other proposals of the Clintonians. The Governor considered commissioning him as a lieutenant general for the defense of Albany County, as part of a plan to appoint generals for each county.

The old elites, like Schuyler, criticized the plan as disdainful of the military.50 By early 1779, in addition to his duties in the State Senate, Yates was also serving as “a member of several legislative councils, the recorder, postmaster, and receiver of goods for the city of Albany, and the commissioner of the Continental Loan Office for New York State.”51 These many jobs show

46 Williams, “New York Transformed,” 196. 47 Bielinski, Abraham Yates, Jr., and the New Political Order in Revolutionary New York, 35–36. 48 Ibid., 37. 49 Ibid., 38. 50 Ibid., 39. 51 Ibid.

a substantial commitment to the Patriot cause, and perhaps more importantly a commitment to public service.

For the remaining war years, Yates remained active in the Senate, closely supporting the

Clintonian agenda. In an August 1782 letter to Robert Morris, the Superintendent of Finance, describing members of the New York legislature, Alexander Hamilton described Yates as “a man whose ignorance and perverseness are only surpassed by his pertinacity and conceit. He hates all high-flyers, which is the appellation he gives to men of genius.” Most repugnant to Hamilton, however, was his appeal to the common people, who repeatedly re-elected him to the Senate and other positions. “He assures them, they are too poor to pay taxes. He is a staunch whig, that deserves to be pensioned by the British Ministry. He is commissioner of the loan office of this state.”52 This blatant desire to play to public opinion, combined with ignorance and lack of station, led Hamilton to judge Yates very poorly indeed. This highly unfavorable recommendation also probably influenced Morris to not appoint Yates as New York Receiver of

Taxes, a job that Yates felt he deserved because the statute indicated that it included many of the duties of the loan officer. Perhaps as a result of his unfavorable recommendation, Morris chose

Hamilton instead.53

52 Alexander Hamilton, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold Coffin Syrett, vol. 3 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1961), 139. 53 Yates wrote that “My expectations, Sir, were founded upon the resolve of Congress, of 2d November, 1781, recommending to the several states, among others, to pass acts directing the Collectors to pay the Commissioners of the Loan-Office, or such person as should be appointed by the Superintendent of Finance to receive the same, within the state.” Abraham Yates, “Resolutions and Extracts from the Journals of the Hon. the Congress : Relative to the Continental Loan-Offices in the Several States : And Certain Letters, Passed between Robert Morris, Esq., and Abraham Yates, Jun. Esq., Late Commissioner of the Continental Loan ... Office of the State of New-York.” (Albany, NY: Charles Webster, 1786), 16–17, Sabin Americana, http://goo.gl/l2hCT7; Staughton Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution,” The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1963): 224–225. Yates wrote that “My expectations, Sir, were founded upon the resolve of Congress, of 2d November, 1781, recommending to the several states, among others, to pass acts directing the Collectors to pay the Commissioners of the Loan-Office, or such person as should be appointed by the Superintendent of Finance to receive the same, within the state.” Yates, “Resolutions and Extracts,” 16–17; Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution,” 224–225.

Yates went on to be as critical of Morris as Hamilton was of Yates. He was critical of

Morris’s request to continue his private business while in office.54 Morris, he thought, used his state-level deputies, or “Receivers of Taxes,” as essentially lobbyists to the states on his behalf.

The need for Receivers of Taxes was a very new one, for in February 1781 Congress had insisted that the states create a federal impost tax, or tariff, on all imported goods.55 Yates disagreed that

Congress had any authority to impose any kind of tax, and did not believe that they had the authority to collect taxes directly, and moreover, the position, as well as various changes to the loan office system, made the position of Loan Officer essentially irrelevant.56 Thus, Yates had a personal interest in discrediting Morris and the position of Receiver of Taxes. To add insult to injury, Yates was given his minimal expenses out of revenue taken in as bills of credit (also know as Continental Dollars), which by the time of his appointment had been inflated to twenty- five dollars to one in specie, and shortly thereafter declared to be redeemable at forty dollars to one specie.57

Personal interest seems to have influenced his ideological position as well, for the disagreement of state versus federal power is what ultimately led to his removal as Continental

Loan Officer. His troubles began in the office when Congress required an oath of office and of loyalty for federal officials. According to the Board of Treasury, the oath required a clause of secrecy: “And that I will not disclose or reveal any thing that shall come to my knowledge, in the execution of the said office, or from the confidence I may thereby acquire, which in my

54 Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution,” 236. 55 Robin Einhorn points out that the impost was chosen because it did not have to deal with issues of apportionment, which were incredibly controversial due to largely Southern fears about slavery being taxed out of existence. Robin L. Einhorn, American Taxation, American Slavery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 118–119. 56 Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution,” 237–238. 57 Yates, “Resolutions and Extracts,” 8.

58 judgement[sic] or by the injunctions of my superiors, ought to be kept secret.” Yates told the

Board that, “if he took the oath, he apprehended it would render him a useless member [of the

New York State] senate and a useless member in society.”59 He felt that the oath was a violation of his rights and obligations as a legislator, because his duty as a Senator was to bring whatever he saw fit for debate before the Senate. Yates insisted that the oath was only required for the

Secretary of War, but this argument was rejected by the Board of Treasury. Ultimately, on May

1, 1786, Congress agreed with the Board of Treasury and fired Yates:

Whereas Abraham Yates, Junior, heretofore appointed Commissioner of the Continental Loan Office for the State of New York, hath refused to take the oath of office, in that behalf, prescribed by the United States in Congress assembled, Resolved, That Congress consider said office as vacant, and that Wednesday next be assigned for the election of a Commissioner to that office.60

Only the delegates from New York voted against the resolution, and offered their own in its place. They pointed out that Yates had posted a $26,000 bond as required, and that he had sworn the oath of office except for the secrecy clause.

As Governor Clinton’s top deputy in the Senate, Yates was the leader of the fight against the tariff in New York, proposed to the states by Congress in 1783.61 In his “Political Papers,

Addressed to the Advocates for a Congressional Revenue in the State of New York,” Yates cast a dire warning about the expansion of federal authority. Yates was particularly concerned about the power of Congress to impose taxes, in particular a tariff. “My life and my dignity have been engaged to support the constitutional power and real dignity of Congress [emphasis from

58 Ibid., 22. 59 Ibid., 23. 60 Ford, JCC, 30:222. 61 Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 324.

original],” he wrote.62 “Congress already hold the sword, they ought not hold the purse too: the

King of England commands his armies, but he looks to parliament to pay them.”63 Ironically, this argument meant by Yates to be against federal power generally would ultimately be adopted in the Constitution, with the idea of separation of powers. Ultimately the tariff failed to pass because one state, Rhode Island, refused to approve it, and New York passed a significantly watered-down version, for instance allowing state paper currency to be used and requiring that

New York’s custom officials, rather than federal bureaucrats, be the collectors of the tariff.64

The rejection of the tariff was ultimately one of the factors leading to the decision to propose a federal Constitution. Yates’ role in the opposition to document will be discussed more in Chapter 4. But from his origins and his political experiences during and prior to the war years, it is clear that Yates developed himself to be a staunch opponent of aristocracy and the political insiders. His blunt manner of dismissing the “high-flyers” and pattern of conspiracy theories about the patrician class, and particular hated for Hamilton, showed a strong and capable man who ideologically rejected aristocracy.65

62 A Rough Hewer and Abraham Jr. Yates, “Political Papers, Addressed to the Advocates for a Congressional Revenue of the State of New-York.” (Shepard Kollock, 1786), 7, http://goo.gl/YrDPZc. By “constitutional,” Yates did not mean of the American Constitution, for he was writing in 1786. Instead, he meant a combination of the British unwritten constitution and the principles of republicanism. 63 Ibid. 64 Maier, Ratification, 324. 65 Linda Grant De Pauw, The Eleventh Pillar; New York State and the Federal Constitution. (Ithaca, NY, Published for the American Historical Association by Cornell University Press, 1966), 30.

32 Chapter 2

The Military Bureaucracy

The middle class played a crucial role in organizing and implementing Washington’s military supply chain. Many of the same people who purchased loan office certificates filled crucial roles in the Commissary and Quartermaster departments. The level of organization in this military supply bureaucracy, or the logistics bureaucracy, proved instrumental in the Continental

Army’s ultimate victory, but getting to this point of organization took significant trial and error on the part of the Continental Congress.1 The constant charges of corruption illustrate a particular troupe of anti-establishment ideology deeply connected to the suspicions of the nobility held by Commonwealth ideology adherents. Because of this lack of public support, the departments were administered in such a manner that they were based on skill and merit rather than status and class. This general disrespect can also be linked to decentralization sentiments and to urban middle class fears about rising political power of landowners and political elites.

The bureaucracy also shows another emergent theme of hard work as an important part of the middle class ideology.

The supply departments were responsible for providing and preparing food, equipment, weapons, and supplies for the army. This chapter will discuss the organization of these departments. It focuses on two individuals deeply involved with supplying the Continental

Army, Hugh Hughes and Ephraim Blaine, who were also major purchasers of loan office certificates to examine the parts of the military bureaucracy that owned loan office certificates.

Both individuals came from humble origins, as mechanic and yeoman farmer, respectively. The

1 In this section, “supply departments” and “military bureaucracy” are used interchangeably to refer to the Quartermaster Department and the Commissary Department, as well as the various other minor departments that were involved in the arduous task of supporting the administrative functions of the Continental Army.

question of how they were able to come up with such enormous amounts of money to spend on war bonds is the topic of this section. Evidence supports the supposition that Congress, in fact, was behind these purchases. Blaine owned at least $268,500 worth of loan office certificates while serving as Commissary General of Purchases in the Middle Department.2 Hughes served as the Deputy Quartermaster General for the State of New York, and held approximately $265,800 in Loan Office Certificates, making him the largest purchaser in New York.3 Both men used the capital forwarded to them by the Continental Congress to finance their efforts to feed and arm the soldiers of the Continental Army.

The structure and organization of the military bureaucracy, and the ability of individuals from different classes to work within it and potentially to profit from it, shows the power that the

Continental Army’s internal organization had on the development of American middle class ideology and identity. To better understand these departments, it is necessary to discuss their formation and intricate organization.

The role of the Quartermaster General, as the main supply officer, largely involved gathering information, distributing orders, purchasing supplies, and planning camp. During the

Revolution, the Commissary and Quartermaster departments worked together to procure goods the army needed. The leaders of these departments worked closely with the Commander-in-Chief to plan the army’s path, repair roads and bridges, and as the title of “Quartermaster” suggests, assigning quarters to each soldier in camp. In later wars, the post also included the duties of the

Clothier General, responsible for clothing the army in a uniform, and the Commissary General,

2 National Archives Microfilm Publications, “Records of the Pennsylvania Continental Loan Office 1776-1778” (Microfilm, 1976), Records of the Bureau of the Public Debt, RG 53, National Archives. Many thanks are due to Professor George Hall (ECON), who had these and other National Archives loan office records transcribed, and made them available to me. The data analysis is my original work. 3 National Archives Microfilm Publications, “Records of the New Jersey and New York Continental Loan Offices, 1777-1790.” It is also worth noting that Hughes’ assistant, Udney Hay, was the second largest purchaser in New York at $111,110 worth of Loan Office Certificates.

responsible for feeding the army.4 The Commissary General was primarily responsible for feeding the army.

The colonial context of the government and bureaucracy was very limited and anti- federal, and this was especially true for military matters.5 Just as Congress was wary of taxation and currency, it was skeptical of the idea of a national army, even during a time of war. This attitude can be attributed to the prevalence of the colonial militias that preceded the Army as well as to ideological reasons. In reaction to an overbearing military presence in the Commonwealth

(1649-1660) period of English history, many citizens believed that a citizen militia with extremely limited government management should wield power, and that an organized military order threatened civil liberties.6 The local and state militias were thought of as a civilian force.

Generally containing all able-bodied free men from the age of 16 to 60, militias were expected to serve when called, but never for very long.7 They were fiercely democratic institutions, electing their officers, who were often also town officials or local powerbrokers. State legislatures and local authorities used their militias for maintaining the peace, defending the town during conflicts with Native Americans, and putting down slave rebellions. Soldiers were generally expected to bring enough food with them for a few days, with the colony appointing a temporary commissary agent to purchase additional food if necessary.8 The idea that soldiers would arm and clothe themselves in the Continental Army evolved out of this practice, with their pay

4 Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775-1939 (Quartermaster Historian’s Office, Office of the Quartermaster General, 1962), 1–2. 5 Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure, 6. 6 Ibid., 10–12. 7 Hugh Jameson, “Subsistence for Middle States Militia, 1776-1781,” Military Affairs 30, no. 3 (1966): 121, doi:10.2307/1985367. 8 Erna Risch, Supplying Washington’s Army, Special Studies (Center of Military History) (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, USArmy, 1981), 8.

deducted for these essential costs.9 These expectations also mirrored the policies of the British military at the time. While food was generally provided in the Continental Army, many soldiers were expected to purchase their own food early in the war.10 Town militias had sufficient supplies for these purposes and drilled occasionally, but they were nowhere near prepared to take on the mobilization and equipment needs that would be required to build a true military supply system to fight the British, who had an incredibly well-organized and well-trained military. Thus,

Congress was not prepared to support a proper military supply effort, administratively nor financially.

Lack of experience did not stop the Continental Congress from trying to micromanage the supply commanders during the war. A variety of ad hoc committees were appointed in response to crises.11 One of the most pressing needs that Congress understood was the lack of gunpowder and cannon, the first of which Congress sought to remedy by encouraging production in the home and urging colonies to build public powder mills.12 The reliance on states to organize their own supplies carried on throughout the war, and their role in supplying the army became especially prominent in its later stages. These oversight bodies continued to take on significant responsibility for war management until 1777, when they were replaced with a standing Board of War and other standing committees set up to be proactive, rather than reactive.

On June 16, 1775, Congress recognized the need to formalize the supply process, designating the positions of Quartermaster General, Commissary General of Military Stores and

Provisions, Paymaster General, Chief Engineer, Commissary of Musters, and Adjutant

9 Horgan, Forged in War, 17. 10 Ibid., 14–15. 11 Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 4; Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure, 23. 12 Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure, 22–23; Ford, JCC, 37:84–85.

General.13 Shortly thereafter, a Clothier General and a Hospital Department were also established. On July 19th, Congress appointed Joseph Trumbull of Connecticut as the

Commissary General of Stores and Purchases, to be responsible for buying what the Army needed. It also authorized General Washington to appoint his own Quartermaster General and other officers in the supply departments, although the Quartermaster General was by far the most important of these positions.14 John Adams thought that this move was a grave mistake, as he believed that these officers should serve as a check on the Commander-in-Chief.15 Adams also likely was influenced by Massachusetts Governor Thomas Hutchinson’s practice of filling the few supply posts that existed for the colony’s militia with his family members and friends.16 One way that Congress protected against its fears of corruption in the army was the appointments of

Deputy Quartermaster Generals for each army who, while theoretically under the Quartermaster

General, were responsible directly to Congress and acted with some autonomy.

Washington picked Thomas Mifflin on August 14th to serve in the role of Quartermaster

General. Though considered a “man of ability and republican virtue,” Mifflin would resign following the Valley Forge supply disaster in 1778.17 Born to a Philadelphia Quaker merchant family, Mifflin was commissioned a Colonel by Congress and was later promoted to Major

General. Mifflin served in the provincial assembly and became an outspoken opponent of British taxation policies, gaining a reputation as a radical and becoming a correspondent with Samuel

13 Horgan, Forged in War, 31–32. 14 Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 3. 15 Ibid. On the same day, Adams requested information from a correspondent about the role of various staff officers, which indicates that he and Congress as a whole poorly understood the role of the supply bureaucracy and staff officers in general. See also Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure, 22. 16 Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure, 21. 17 Kurt Daniel Kortenhof, “Republican Ideology and Wartime Reality: Thomas Mifflin’s Struggle as the First Quartermaster General of the Continental Army, 1775-1778,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 122, no. 3 (1998): 179.

Adams of Boston.18 A successful Philadelphia merchant and a prominent patriot politician,

Mifflin was Washington’s first choice for Quartermaster General.19 Mifflin served in the First

Continental Congress, where he often hosted delegates in his home and advocated for greater actions on a continental level against the British. He was particularly active in rousing the people of Pennsylvania to the cause, and John Adams called him “the animating soul” of Philadelphia.20

While he would go on to be a successful politician after the War, he was a republican in the classical sense, as he believed in sacrificing his personal well-being for the public good, abhorred corruption, and believed in the value of disinterest.21 Many other supply officers engaged in unscrupulous, self-interested conduct. This concern was not shared by his successors, who often mixed private mercantile dealings with government business.22 Washington wrote in a letter to

Richard Henry Lee that Mifflin “stands unconnected… with this, that, or t’other Man; for between you and I, there is more in this than you can easily imagine.”23 This extraordinary praise shows that Washington had high expectations. Mifflin understood the importance of the role, and took it on despite the lack of valor associated with it. Mifflin’s professional career as a merchant and his military career very likely coincided, despite his ideological objections to self-interest and political advocacy for republicanism. Working with merchants he knew in Philadelphia, and sometimes even his own interests, Mifflin very likely allocated some of the military supply contracts that he was responsible for awarding to himself.24 It is nearly impossible to know the

18 Kenneth R. Rossman, “Thomas Mifflin-Revolutionary Patriot,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 15, no. 1 (1948): 11. 19 Kortenhof, “Republican Ideology and Wartime Reality,” 187. 20 Rossman, “Thomas Mifflin-Revolutionary Patriot,” 13. 21 Kortenhof, “Republican Ideology and Wartime Reality,” 181–182. 22 Ibid., 183–184. 23 Ibid., 188. 24 Ibid., 191.

true extent of this corruption due to the lousy accounting kept by Mifflin and his various agents, although the allegations will be discussed in more detail below.

In the absence of corruption, however, self-interest was not entirely forbidden. Robert

Morris typified this attitude, when he wrote, “I shall continue to discharge my duty faithfully to the Public and pursue my Private Fortune by all such honorable and fair means as the times will admit of.”25 This public and direct criticism of the management of the Continental Army’s supplies was largely directed at Mifflin. By November of 1775, Mifflin had changed his mind, rejecting the reasoning of the patriot-merchants, and concluded his private dealings in favor of the army. Unlike Morris and many other patriot-merchants, he saw his private dealings as distinct from his public ones, and struggled to create a distinction.

One of the reasons that merchants were picked for the positions in the supply departments was that they had the connections and knowledge to handle procurement, and were experienced in trade. Merchants were often generalists, involved in shipping, banking, wholesale, and retail.26

Personal connections with merchants and others with whom the supply departments would be associated were crucial to organizing military operations. Erna Risch points out that the concept of the “agent” had developed in the eighteenth century, involving a purchaser who worked on commission and on behalf of a merchant.27 This model was also commonly used for military personnel, with supply agents being charged with the duty of purchasing a quantity of a certain good and then keeping a portion of the proceeds. 28 Contracts were an important aspect of the procurement process, with many being “off-the-shelf” purchases from small producers for specific units.

25 Ibid., 194. 26 Risch, Supplying Washington’s Army, 14. 27 Ibid., 15. 28 Horgan, Forged in War, 16–18.

The context of a culture of corruption and profiteering among the merchant class indicates that it is distinctly possible that quartermasters and their agents grew wealthy from supplying the army and decided to invest their newfound personal wealth in something that would increase in value and continue to fund their work and ability to profit. The question of profit motive strikes at the deeper question of why so many supply officers ended up owning loan office certificates, and thus is worth exploring at the different phases of the war. The office of Quartermaster General would come under great scrutiny during the War, and scholars initially believed that this military bureaucracy was corrupt and self-interested, rather than ideologically motivated.29

1776 was a difficult year for the Continental Army, and the supply departments also saw their share of turmoil. The failure of the Army to defend New York led to significant doubt about the fate of the Continental Army. In June 1776, Col. Stephen Moylan briefly replaced Mifflin, as

Mifflin desired an appointment as a line commander for the upcoming New York campaign. This desire speaks to the lack of prestige accorded to the supply departments, particularly among wealthier classes. However, Moylan’s blunders during the retreat from New York and his inability to supply the troops led to calls from Congress for him to be replaced with Mifflin, who was viewed as competent despite the allegations of self-interested actions.30 By late 1776, the

Continental Army was organizing itself more efficiently for supplies by establishing four

“departments,” which were also divisions in the supply chain.31 This allowed regional supply agents to become more prominent, and led to further expansion of the supply departments.

29 Kortenhof, “Republican Ideology and Wartime Reality,” 180–181. See footnote 3 for a good summary of the historical debate on this topic, also discussed in this paragraph. 30 Ibid., 198. 31 Risch, Supplying Washington’s Army, 16.

The winter of 1777 was a crisis point for the Continental Army, for both supplies and finances. The limited “hard money” available had been spent long ago. Mifflin, who attempted to settle the Quartermaster Department accounts of the 1776 campaign, while also managing his own line unit, grew increasingly frustrated with the impossible nature of his job.32 Following the attack on Philadelphia, Mifflin submitted his resignation in October 1777, but because Congress dawdled in finding a replacement, he very reluctantly agreed to continue in the role. This placed much of the burden on his subordinates, but more importantly left the army ill prepared for what would be an incredibly disastrous winter at Valley Forge in 1777-1778.33 Mifflin’s republican ideology and his belief in patriotic sacrifice rendered him less important militarily than he might have been.

Congress did take some action to reform and reorganize the military bureaucracy in 1777.

In May, for instance, the Quartermaster General was allowed to appoint whatever officers he felt necessary.34 These included a Wagon-master General and a Forage-master General, each with several deputies, and more Deputy and Assistant Quartermasters General for each department. In the Commissary Department, Congress eliminated the original management position and appointed a Commissary General of Purchasing and another for delivery to the troops, the

Commissary General of Issues. Each was given several deputies to be based in the other departments, and the deputies could appoint assistants as necessary, who were to be posted at each fort, post, magazine, or other storage location.35 Later, a Commissary General for Military

32 Kortenhof, “Republican Ideology and Wartime Reality,” 202–203. 33 James A. Huston, Logistics of Liberty : American Services of Supply in the Revolutionary War and after (Newark: University of Delaware Press ; London ; Cranbury, NJ, 1991), 72. 34 Horgan, Forged in War, 33. 35 Huston, Logistics of Liberty, 69.

Stores and a Commissary General of Artillery were appointed.36 The position of Clothier General was ultimately abolished, as the task of clothing the Continental Army had become something of a debacle, with many of its tasks being transferred to the Department of the Paymaster General and to Congressional committees. The specific roles and responsibilities of each of these positions created a bureaucratic web at the heart of the Continental Army. Many of these officers were paid a commission of money that passed through their hands, rather than a steady salary.37

Baron von Steuben, a former Prussian quartermaster and senior advisor to Washington, especially detested this commission system, seeing it as corrupt and preferring a contract system.

Yet Commissary General Jonathan Trumbull and others continuously insisted that they be paid in cash commissions, so Steuben’s complaints ultimately made little change.38

Congress made little headway in finding a replacement for Mifflin, and Washington understandably had other matters to attend to. Thus, it was not until March 1778 that Major

General Nathaniel Greene was convinced to accept the top supply job. Mifflin and Greene had long feuded, as Mifflin blamed Greene for the loss of Philadelphia and felt that he was too influential over Washington.39 Greene wrote in November 1778 that “General Mifflin because he could not get Head of the Army has turnd[sic] Legislator again… He is a restless spirit and like

Belzebub would rather be chief in H– than a servant in Heaven.”40 Along with Greene, Congress appointed John Cox, a major purchaser of Pennsylvania loan office certificates, to be his

36 Horgan, Forged in War, 34–35. 37 Huston, Logistics of Liberty, 67. 38 Joseph Lee Boyle, My Last Shift Betwixt Us & Death: The Ephraim Blaine Letterbook 1777-1778 (Bowie, Md.: Heritage Books, 2001), 7. Primary source documents transcribed from the original letters sent and received by Blaine. 39 Rossman, “Thomas Mifflin-Revolutionary Patriot,” 17. 40 Nathanael Greene, The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, ed. Richard K. Showman, vol. 3 (Chapel Hill: Published for the Rhode Island Historical Society by University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 57.

assistant in charge of purchases, along with Charles Pettit, who was to be the chief accountant in the department.41

Allegations of purchasing from themselves plagued both Greene and Mifflin during their respective tenures as Quartermaster General, as did accusations of corruption.42 Historian E.

James Ferguson argues that corruption, or at least waste and inefficiency, came about in the supply departments because they were run by merchants who “speculated with public money, embezzled funds and supplies, used public wagons to transport their own goods, and deliberately bid up prices in order to increase their commissions on purchases.”43 This argument assumes profit-focused motives and minimal ideological investment by the supply department in its own success. Ferguson fails to cite any clear examples of this occurring, and although it is not inconceivable that they did indeed occur, E. Wayne Carp argues that this attitude was based largely on public attitudes toward supply officers as useless and unnecessary at the time and was greatly exaggerated.44 The thousands of men employed in the supply departments over the course of the war seemed excessive, but they were primarily the blacksmiths, carpenters, and other artisans who repaired much of the military’s supplies. It is telling, then, that the mechanic class, which had these skills from civilian occupations, took on these roles in the army, and that they were distained by their wealthier superiors in the fighting ranks. The exact cause of this perception is difficult to trace, but the fact that so many members of the supply departments were from the mechanic class could indicate both concerns. It seems distinctly possible that Members of Congress and society more generally looked down on the supply departments largely due to their class. As Quartermaster General Major General Nathaniel Greene wrote to General

41 Risch, Supplying Washington’s Army, 42. 42 Huston, Logistics of Liberty, 67–68. 43 Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790, 28. 44 Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure, 100–135.

Washington following a dispute between a quartermaster and a commissioned officer, “The repeated instances of violence committed by Officers of inferior rank in the line, upon Waggon

Masters, In direct violation of your Excellency orders, render it necessary that some check should be given to this unwarrantable practice.”45 The letter indicates clear disrespect from commissioned officers for the others. Regardless of cause, this perception dogged the department throughout the War.

Hugh Hughes: The Mechanic as Supply Officer

Hugh Hughes was born to an immigrant Welsh tanner on April 20, 1727 in Upper

Merion, Pennsylvania. Hughes learned his father’s trade and ultimately settled in New York City by 1748, where he became an active member of the Sons of Liberty.46 Hughes left a scant paper trail and perhaps for this reason, historians have barely touched his legacy, but he played an integral role in organizing the supplies and goods of the Continental Army. Hugh’s brother,

John, had served in the Pennsylvania Assembly as a close associate of Benjamin Franklin’s.

Franklin in fact recommended him to be the stamp master of Pennsylvania, responsible for collecting stamp duties, which ultimately led to his downfall politically.47 Hugh Hughes appears to have practiced a variety of trades in the lead-up to the Revolution, but following the French and Indian War, the prices of domestic goods plummeted, and this impacted small artisan merchants such as Hughes.48

Hughes appears to have fallen upon some debt, at one point advertising “A Certain Forge consisting of four fires and two hammers… with about 1800 acres of land, and conveniently

45 Greene, The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 3:73. 46 Bernard Friedman, “Hugh Hughes, A Study in Revolutionary Idealism,” New York History 64, no. 3 (July 1, 1983): 231–232. Somewhat ironically, Hughes grew up very close to what would later be Washington’s camp at Valley Forge. 47 Ibid., 232. 48 Ibid., 235.

situated to several furnaces. There will also be rented, with the works, seven Negro men, who have been employed for many years past in the Forge, and understand the making of Iron.”49

Hughes also ran a “Day and Night School,” at which “the Pupil is taught, not by precept alone, but by ocular Example,” and learned reading, writing, mathematics, spelling, and accounting.50

By the early 1770s, Hughes became involved with fellow tradesmen down on their luck. He joined the Sons of Liberty in New York City. While the economic situation may have influenced them, Hughes and his fellow artisans were also victims of an evolving economic system gradually moving away from small-scale production to a more industrialized and mercantile system, which the struggle against Great Britain represented.51 Hughes came from the mechanic class and exemplified many of its values. Hard work, a commitment to public service, and a distrust of aristocracy and government were all key parts of his evolving political ideology.

On February 16, 1776, Hughes was appointed by “the convention of the State of New

York, a commissary of military stores &c. in the city of New York… with a reference to

Congress for pay.”52 Washington appointed him Assistant Quartermaster General on May 11th, to serve under Mifflin.53 Most critically, his service impressed upon him the notion of patriotic sacrifice in the line of service. Hughes also represented the mechanic class’s significant contributions to the war effort, both in terms of manufacturing and the military bureaucracy.

The tasks that Hughes undertook generally involved purchasing or producing the goods needed for the army. His letter book reveals significant discussions with various artisans who served in the Corps of Artificers, as well as correspondence with other quartermasters and orders

49 “Rent a Forge,” Pennsylvania Chronicle, December 12, 1768. 50 “Day and Night School,” New-York Journal, January 5, 1769. 51 Friedman, “Hugh Hughes, A Study in Revolutionary Idealism,” 236–238. 52 Hugh Hughes, The Memorial and Documents in the Case of Colonel Hugh Hughes, Deputy Quarter Master General, During the War for American Independence. Respectfully Submitted to Congress, by the Memorialist., 3332, 1802, 3. 53 Risch, Supplying Washington’s Army, 34.

from a number of other officers, including Washington.54 A critical component of his job as a

Deputy Quartermaster was producing and purchasing necessary goods. For example, Hughes corresponded with the New York Provincial Congress in March 1776, and was authorized to purchase 10,000 flints and two tons of lead.55 Shortly thereafter, Hughes put a great deal of effort into organizing the American retreat from Long Island, ferrying troops across the Hudson, for which he was later commended by Washington.56 Hughes dealt with his share of deserters: two skippers had deserted under him without unloading their cargo, which he described as critical for producing soap and candles for the Army.57 Hughes was also involved in forage that bordered on eminent domain. In April 1777, he requested that he be allowed to take over a civilian farm to keep beef cattle for the army. After some consideration by the Provincial Congress, permission was granted.58 For the most part, however, Hughes was primarily consumed with the thankless task of procuring basic goods for soldiers, ranging from boards to horses to canteens, despite a constant lack of money.59

It seems that in exchange for at least some of these goods that he purchased, he gave loan office certificates as payment. He seems to have cared about his purchasers, and urged them not to sell their certificates for less than they were worth. On December 18, 1784, Hughes published an advertisement to his creditors in a newspaper, saying that they should refrain “from disposing of their certificates for less than the real value, and convince them that their interest has not been

54 Hugh Hughes, Mahlon Dickerson, and Philemon Dickerson, “Hugh Hughes Papers” (Microfilm), Library of Congress. 55 William Seward, ed., Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New-York : 1775-1775-1777. (Albany : Printed by Thurlow Weed, printer to the State, 1842), 1:389, http://archive.org/details/journalsofprovin01newy. 56 Friedman, “Hugh Hughes, A Study in Revolutionary Idealism,” 243. 57 Seward, Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New-York, 1:631. 58 Ibid., 1:899. 59 Hughes, Dickerson, and Dickerson, “Hugh Hughes Papers”; Friedman, “Hugh Hughes, A Study in Revolutionary Idealism,” 244.

unattended to, by their most obedient, Humble Servant, HUGH HUGHES, Late Deputy Q. M. for the State of New York, &c.”60 The reason for Hughes’ optimism was that he had received a letter from Quartermaster General Timothy Pickering that he had received funding to pay down the debt in New York. There is no particular evidence, however, that the creditors believed this claim. Hughes was critical of the constant lack of funds and the pattern of taking on debt, and grew frustrated at the lack of acceptance of paper money. Even loan office certificates seemed to be not good enough, only hard money would suffice. These experiences of anger at the population for their refusal to accept anything other than soft money shows that during the war, outweighed ideological concerns that leaned against money and debt.

Begging for Supplies: Ephraim Blaine’s Story

Perhaps the largest impact of the reorganization was the opening of administrative positions to people outside of the merchant class. One of these men was Ephraim Blaine, who would go on to be a major purchaser of loan office certificates and was primarily responsible for feeding Washington’s army at Valley Forge. Blaine had served in the French and Indian War and as sheriff of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania in 1771. Blaine was a miller, and also traded with Native American tribes in the area. Although he came from an immigrant family of modest means, he married Rebecca Galbraith, whose family was one of the most prominent Scotch-Irish families in the region. In the years between the Revolution and the French and Indian War,

Blaine had prospered and had been able to acquire a significant amount of land. He served as a member of county’s Committee of Correspondence, and was involved in a 1776 mission to make a treaty with local Native Americans.61 Early in the war, he was appointed by Congress to bring

60 “Pickering for Hughes,” New-York Journal, February 10, 1785. Ibid. 61 John Ewing Blaine, The Blaine Family James Blaine, Emigrant and His Children, Ephraim, Alexander, William, Eleanor (Cincinnati, Ohio: Ebbert & Richardson, 1920), 23.

blankets and shoes to a company in Virginia, and was later asked to supply a company with provisions.62 On April 1, 1777, he was ordered to the Commissary Department by Congress, and put in charge of a powder magazine at Carlisle. In August, he was promoted to Deputy

Commissary General of Purchases for the Middle Department, which included Delaware,

Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and part of New York.63 Blaine faced many challenges throughout his tenure, including movements of the British Army, who captured Philadelphia in late September. For several months in the summer and fall of 1777, he was responsible for New

England, in the Eastern Department, as well as his own, due to the delay of the appointment of an officer for that department.

By late autumn, Blaine and his associates were nearing crisis. Food was running dangerously low at camp, money was in short supply, and the Continental Army was rapidly loosing its credit with the public. The army particularly needed beef cattle and salt in order to produce salt beef, which stored well and was essential to feeding the starving army. In

November, Blaine wrote to his assistant, Joseph Hugg, saying, “You cannot be two[sic] Active in

Securing salt upon every Occasion as we Shall fall short of a Quantity sufficient to supply our

Magazines—The Unreasonable demands of the importers have obliged me to write Congress and the Commissary General to fix a price.”64 To aid in the procurement effort, the Pennsylvania government passed price rates for critical army goods.65 These rates were well below market rates, and assistants continuously complained that people refused to sell to them at government- mandated prices. For some goods, including beef, salt, and whiskey, the Commissaries began to practice impressment, or “forage,” through much of Pennsylvania if the inhabitants refused to

62 Ibid., 24. 63 Boyle, My Last Shift Betwixt Us & Death, 9. 64 Ibid., 40. 65 Ibid., 82.

sell at these prices. In early January, Blaine told John Chaloner, his assistant with Washington at

Valley Forge, that “I have been in this County [Marhaim] and Bucks this Eight Days purchasing and seizing beef Cattle and Whiskey, but meets with very little of the Latter… have to break open Stable doors windows etc… the Cattle I take this day they steal them to morrow.”66 Even with this impressment, however, Blaine had very limited success in obtaining enough cattle to help the army. Washington’s desire to have the soldiers inoculated for smallpox, of which many were dying, required corn meal, which added to Blaine’s burden for supplies. On January 20th,

Blaine asked Washington to require the famers in the region to each supply at least one ox, and asked Washington to cut the rations for each soldier.67

Blaine repeatedly had to send increasingly large quantities of money to his purchasers, which had constantly reducing purchasing power. Ultimately, it seems that he decided that cash was insufficient, because on January 10th, he purchased his first set of loan office certificates, valued at 2700 dollars face value and bearing 66 dollars in interest over a number of years.

Blaine’s situation dictated that he must have needed the certificates in order to buy provisions.

These were used up by March 6th, 1778, and on that date Chaloner wrote to Thomas Smith, the

Pennsylvania loan office commissioner, requesting that he give Azariah Dunham, one of

Blaine’s Principal Assistant Purchasers of Live Stock, who was “very largely in advance for the

Publick—he now waits on you for a considerable sum in Loan Office Certificates—If convenient for you to spare him to the amount of Twenty Thousand pounds on Acct. of Col, Ephraim Blaine

D.C.G. of Ps, it will particularly oblige him & render essential Service to the Army.”68 The loan

66 Ibid., 86. 67 Ibid., 96. 68 Ibid., 152.

officer recorded these as purchases, in Dunham’s name, for $21,800 on March 14th. These debts remained with Blaine after he resigned from the army in 1782.

Blaine clearly disliked his post, but stayed out of loyalty. He had written to Washington in 1781:

It has not been in my power to obtain a single shilling of money from the Treasury Board. My people are so much indebted that their credit is quite exhausted… the general change in the system of the Quatermaster and the Commissary General departments has made my office one of the most disagreeable man ever experienced. Indeed, nothing would induce me to continue under present appearances but the duty I owe my country, and regard for Your Excellency, which shall be motives to command my best services, and surmount every other difficulty.69

Blaine’s job, like Mifflin’s and Hughes’, was miserable. He faced significant personal ruin, difficult and dangerous tasks, and massive public disrespect, and yet he remained in his position and resolved himself to hard work. His impossible task, made worse by the lack of acceptance of

Continental dollars, hardened him to develop a strong patriotic sentiment for the cause of liberty.

The organization of the supply departments occurred in such a way that it limited the effects of class and “station” in its development. Men like Hugh Hughes and Ephraim Blaine were given their positions not because they were connected or wealthy, but because they were able to do what was needed. They were both strongly ideologically committed to the patriot cause, and a cultural spirit and demand for hard work only served to deepen this commitment.

69 Anna A Hays, Colonel Ephraim Blaine: Commissary General of the Revolutionary Army ; a Paper Read before the Hamilton Library Association, March 8, 1935 (Carlisle, Pa.: Hamilton Library Assoc., 1935), 14.

50 Chapter 3

Military Proto-Industrial Complex: The Case of the Iron Industry

The need to build the private manufacturing system that developed around the

Continental Army to produce weapons and other necessary goods for the troops was a pressing concern for the Continental Congress. Like merchants, artisans saw the war as an opportunity to profit from government and military expenditure. State governments as well as Congress invested enormous amounts of money into the development and manufacturing processes of weaponry, but the lack of an efficient industrial production system meant that artisan manufacturers were overwhelmed by the demand.1 During the war, the military industry facilitated social and economic mobility. Economic wealth, political power, and social status were all transferred to those who had the skills to manage and operate successful ironworks, irrespective of social origin. In his Report on Manufactures in December 1791, Alexander

Hamilton discussed iron manufacturing extensively. “The manufactures of this article are entitled to pre-eminent rank. None are more essential in their kinds, nor so extensive in their uses. They constitute, in whole, or in part, the implements or the materials, or both, of almost every useful occupation.”2 This optimism about the prospect and power of the iron industry shows a great respect for the power that it would give to the economy, and gave to the war effort previously.

As a case study of this mobility, I will examine the iron industry that developed in

Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey around the dawn of the Revolution. The area around

Morris County, New Jersey was particularly attractive to the iron industry due to near-surface iron ore deposits, streams that could be controlled and turned into power sources, and ample

1 Robert F. Smith, “‘A Veritable... Arsenal’ of Manufacturing: Government Management of Weapons Production in the American Revolution” (Ph.D., Lehigh University, 2008), 44. 2 Alexander Hamilton, “Report on Manufacturers,” vol. 1, American State Papers: Finance (Library of Congress, 1791), 138, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsp&fileName=009/llsp009.db&Page=15.

firewood available for creating the charcoal fires, all necessary for the creation of iron.3 While geography and economic opportunity contributed to the initial development of the industry, war mobilization and the need for weaponry caused a huge expansion in production of iron materials, beyond simple raw iron production for export to Britain.

John Jacob Faesch of Morristown, New Jersey (sometimes spelled Faisch or Faish) was born near Basel, Switzerland and came to America in 1764 to work in the iron industry.4 In exchange for passage for himself, his wife, servants to be paid by the company, and his household goods, in addition to twenty-five hundred guilders (Dutch hard currency) per year,

Faesch agreed to serve as the deputy of Peter Hasenclever, a shareholder in the American

Company (also known as the London Company) and the general manager of its iron operations in North America.5 Hasenclever was one of only a few people to attempt an industrial-scale enterprise in America before the Revolution. Before turning to Faesch and examining his case, the story of Hasenclever’s misadventures in the colonial iron industry provides important context.

British mercantile regulations restricted the initial development of the iron industry in

North America. The Iron Act of 1750 was intended to limit iron manufacturing in America to pig iron and bar iron while requiring colonists to purchase rolled iron, steel, and manufactured iron goods from the mother country, although the Act was not always well enforced.6 Still, proponents of the law saw it as a model application of mercantilist policy because it eliminated tariffs on imported colonial goods and required the colonies to buy British manufactured goods.

3 Theodore W. Kury, “Labor and the Charcoal Iron Industry: The New Jersey-New York Experience,” Material Culture 25, no. 3 (1993): 19–21. 4 Angela Colagiuri, “John Jacob Faesch -- a Colonial Andrew Carnegie” (M.A., Columbia University, 1954), 2. 5 Lewis Publishing Company, Biographical and Genealogical History of Morris County, New Jersey, vol. 1 (Lewis Publishing Company, 1899), 258. 6 Joseph E. Walker, “The End of Colonialism in the Middle Atlantic Iron Industry,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 41, no. 1 (1974): 5.

It also restricted trade with the Swedish and Russians, against whom the British were fighting in the War of Spanish Succession.7 Bar iron and pig iron, therefore, were the primary types of iron manufactured in pre-Revolutionary America. These were the primary products of the American

Company, and indeed, likely due to the company’s British investors involved with the Court, they remained within the letter of the law.8 The company fully expected profitability, however, despite the manufacturing restrictions. Hasenclever calculated that it cost him £4 8s 8d to produce a ton of pig iron in America and to transport it to London, including capital costs and salaries. Selling at £7 per ton in 1764, the pig iron earned £2 11s 4d in profit. Bar iron was more expensive but also more profitable, costing £9 17s to produce and transport per ton, and sold for

£17 10s, netting £7 13s in profit.9

Hasenclever had grown up in a relatively well-off Polish merchant family with connections to trade and the iron industry.10 Following a successful merchant career that took him across Europe and into contact with royalty and nobility, Hasenclever co-founded the

American Company with two other merchants and a number of prominent investors.11 He came to America in 1764, shortly after the British victory in the French and Indian War. Hasenclever had worked with British General Thomas Gage and future Continental General Phillip Schuyler, among others, to obtain tens of thousands of acres of land stretching from Nova Scotia to the

7 Ibid., 6. 8 Neil Longley York, Mechanical Metamorphosis: Technological Change in Revolutionary America, Contributions in American Studies. No. 78 (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1985), 13. 9 Despite my best attempts, I could not find good comparisons to these prices to give them context. Peter Hasenclever, “The Remarkable Case of Peter Hasenclever, Merchant; Formerly One of the Proprietors of the Iron Works Pot-Ash Manufactory, &c. Established, and Successfully Carried on under His Direction, in the Provinces of New York, and New Jersey, in North America, ’till November 1766. In Which the Conduct of the Trustees of That Undertaking, in the Dismission of the Said Peter Hasenclever, and Their Unprecedented Proceedings against Him in America, and in the Court of Chancery, since His Return to England Are Exposed.” (London, 1773), 77. 10 Gerhard Spieler, “Peter Hasenclever, Industrialist,” Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society 59, no. 4 (October 1941): 231. 11 Ibid., 235.

Delaware River.12 Under Hasenclever, Faesch took on the primary responsibility for managing the Ringwood furnace, Long Pond furnace, and Charlotteburg furnace, each of five thousand acres.13 The Ringwood site as had a furnace and four forges with eleven fires; various support buildings including mills, storehouses, and shops; and a barracks for the workers.14 Other locations contained community features, such as a church or school.15 The American Company operated 53 different mines, forges, and furnaces, each with dams, mills, auxiliary buildings, and communities around them, three furnaces and seven forges of which were in New Jersey.16

It is worth noting the various classes of workers who served in the iron industry.

Furnaces, forges, and mills all required substantial numbers of employees, in addition to the iron miners and the woodcutters needed to supply the raw materials. Each forge required many unskilled and semi-skilled laborers, a number of skilled craftsmen, a few clerks and supervisors, and a manager.17 Initially, indentured servants were brought over from England and Wales to serve this purpose, but the costs of this and the fact that most servants left the industry after their terms of service expired, meant that many turned to slavery as an alternative source of labor.18

While never a majority of workers, the iron industry was the largest user of slavery in the Mid-

Atlantic region.19 The remoteness of iron forges and mines meant that slaves were often isolated, and so no plantation culture developed like it did in the Chesapeake. Ultimately, ironmasters began to transition to free labor, but the process was gradual, and slavery was used to coerce free

12 Ibid., 238. 13 Ibid., 237. 14 Hasenclever, “The Remarkable Case of Peter Hasenclever,” 6–7. 15 Theodore W. Kury, “Labor and the Charcoal Iron Industry: The New Jersey-New York Experience,” Material Culture 25, no. 3 (1993): 22. 16 John Bezís-Selfa, Forging America : Ironworkers, Adventurers, and the Industrious Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 121. 17 Kury, “Labor and the Charcoal Iron Industry,” 1993, 24. 18 Bezís-Selfa, Forging America, 102–103. 19 Ibid., 102.

laborers to work for less compensation and less consistent employment.20 There is no evidence that Hasenclever or Faesch used slavery, although, as I describe below, they did use some form of indentured servitude and certainly used prisoner labor during the war. They preferred German laborers, Faesch’s native tongue, likely because many had experience working in the iron industry in Europe. German immigrants were largely protestant and white, and they did not face the cultural dislocation suffered by African-American slaves.21 The exact number of people transported by Hasenclever is unknown, but by November 1765, his brother had assisted in recruiting approximately 535 German ironworkers to join him.22 One can safely assume, however, that more would have followed. Hasenclever ran his iron business somewhat like a plantation, building a majestic manor house for himself. His friends and employees referred him to as “Baron Hasenclever”, although he had no such title.23 He seems to have had a number of labor disputes. Many of his German workers refused to honor the terms of their indentures:

the Country People put many chimeras in their heads, and made them believe, that they were not obliged to stand to the contract and agreements, made with them in Germany; they pretended to have their wages raised, which I refused. They made bad work, I complained, and reprimanded them; they told me, they could not make better work at such low wages; and if they did not please me, I might dismiss them.24

An advertisement from 1766 indicates that at least some of these workers had run away from the ironworks, and they were bound to their jobs as indentured servants. While some smaller forges required only small labor forces, these operations were complex and to scale. The fifty workers

20 Ibid., 107–109. 21 Ibid., 121. 22 Edward J Lenik, “Peter Hasenclever and the American Iron Company,” Northeast Historical Archaeology 3, no. 2 (2014): 11; Spieler, “Peter Hasenclever, Industrialist,” 242. Lenik, “Peter Hasenclever and the American Iron Company,” 11; Spieler, “Peter Hasenclever, Industrialist,” 242. 23 Raymond H. Torrey, “Peter Hasenclever: A Pre-Revolutionary Iron-Master,” New York History 17, no. 3 (1936): 309. 24 Hasenclever, “The Remarkable Case of Peter Hasenclever,” 9.

that Faesch requested to exempt form militia service during the war seems to be the bare minimum required to run the operations of the furnace.25

The immense labor costs, extensive land investment, and improved economic conditions of the 1760s meant that Hasenclever’s time in America was limited. By October of 1766,

Hasenclever learned that his partners were in financial distress. Hasenclever was in personal financial distress, and his partners had borrowed far beyond what they were able to pay.

Hasenclever was also charged with mismanagement, for which he was acquitted in 1768, and ultimately became involved in a protracted legal battle with his co-owners which was decided shortly following his death in 1793.26 Politics also seems to have interfered with the Hasenclever business operations. In a letter to Sir William Johnson, he mentioned “the Severe Zeal which the

Bostonians Shew to [English] Manufactures… I look upon their conduct as a bravado or

Gasconade.”27 In 1771, Hasenclever was replaced with Robert Erskine, who would later serve as the Surveyor General and Geographer of the Continental Army. Initially, Erskine expressed faith in Faesch’s work as a manager at Charlotteburg, believing that Faesch’s ethnic ties with his

German workers allowed him to control their loyalty.28 The risk that Faesch would leave and take labor with him was a concern to Erskine’s superiors because he spoke fluent German and had developed a strong bond with his workers, although he himself was confident that the

American Company offered better pay and more consistent work than Faesch could.29 Erskine ultimately grew critical of Faesch, most likely out of professional jealousy due to his ability to

25 See below as well as Kury, “Labor and the Charcoal Iron Industry,” 1993, 24. 26 Spieler, “Peter Hasenclever, Industrialist,” 248. 27 Torrey, “Peter Hasenclever: A Pre-Revolutionary Iron-Master,” 311. 28 Bezís-Selfa, Forging America, 123. 29 Ibid.

influence the workers, and sued him for some minor damages to the furnace.30 In 1772, Faesch was fired, and began focusing on his own iron manufacturing business.

Upon his firing from the American Company, Faesch leased a tract of land, called Mount

Hope, with substantial iron deposits close to the surface and built a furnace on his own land nearby. Mount Hope would be one of the most productive iron mines and furnaces during the

Revolutionary War era.31 Faesch validated the American Company’s fear that he would take workers with him when he ultimately split off. His linguistic and cultural connections meant that he was able to give them clearer instructions, and was able to be ultimately more relatable to his workforce.32 Little is recorded of Faesch’s early enterprises and the three years that he operated prior to the war. Both of his properties required significant improvements in order to be profitable, and Faesch made these improvements and built a manor house for himself. His ability to make these investments shows that he was already reasonably comfortable financially.33 Yet he seems to have lacked the social status that might have been conferred upon him due to his increasing wealth. For instance, other ironmasters had special laws passed by the New Jersey legislature prohibiting the sale of “any strong Drink” and any tavern within four miles of their works, and Faesch does not appear to have had such a law passed for his forge, indicating that he did not have the same level of political influence.34

The outbreak of the Revolutionary War was a major turning point for Faesch. In January

1776, Faesch wrote to the New Jersey delegates to the Continental Congress and bid to cast

30 Colagiuri, “John Jacob Faesch -- a Colonial Andrew Carnegie,” 11–12. 31 Alfred Philip Muntz, “Forests and Iron: The Charcoal Iron Industry of the New Jersey Highlands,” Geografiska Annaler 42, no. 4 (1960): 317, doi:10.2307/520299. 32 Bezís-Selfa, Forging America, 124. 33 Colagiuri, “John Jacob Faesch -- a Colonial Andrew Carnegie,” 14. 34 Bezís-Selfa, Forging America, 128.

cannons for the Continental Army.35 Faesch continued to work throughout the war. In 1780, for instance, he was given a contract to produce “about two hundred tons of shells and cannon shot” for use this campaign.36 Much of his payment came in the form of loan office certificates.

Congress authorized a payment on April 17, 1780 “in favour of John Jacob Faesh [sic], for four hundred and seventy eight thousand two hundred and eighty four dollars and 36/90 of a dollar, to be charged to the commissary general of military stores.”37 This does not appear to have fully settled his accounts, for Robert Morris wrote to Faesch in January 1784 to discuss his remaining account.

Faesch had labor supply problems during the war, as many ironmasters and merchants did.38 Perhaps due to his military contracts, Faesch had substantial influence in local and national politics. In October of 1777, the New Jersey Assembly passed a bill to exempt fifty of Faesch’s workers from militia service. The text of the act gives some hint to what exactly Faesch was producing. “WHEREAS it is highly expedient that the Army and Navy of the United States of

America should be furnished as speedily as possible with a Quantity of Cannon, Cannon-Shot, refined Bar-Iron, Shovels, Axes, and other Implements and Utensils of Iron…”39 His workers were only required to serve in the case of Morris county being invaded. In exchange, Faesch was required to arm and train his workers, which he did as much for the protection of his business as anything else. Other furnaces and forge sites were targets of British soldiers and Tory bandits,

35 Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters to the Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1976), 172–173. 36 Ibid., 3:15:459. 37 Ford, JCC, 16:370. 38 Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise : Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 202. 39 “AN ACT to Exempt a Number of Men to Be Employed at Mount-Hope Furnace, and the Forges Thereunto Belonging, and the Hibernia Furnace, All in the County of Morris, from Actual Service in the Militia, under the Restrictions and Regulations Therein Mentioned.,” in Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a Session Begun at Princeton on the 27th Day of August 1776, and Continued by Adjournments till the 11th of October 1777., vol. 2 (Burlington, NJ: Isaac Collier, 1777), 115–16.

5 8

and several attempts were made against his forge.40 This does not seem to have solved Faesch’s labor problems, however, because he made a similar request to Congress in 1780.41

As of April 1782, another option for labor presented itself. Faesch retained the services of thirty- five prisoner-laborers from Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Hanau.42 These soldiers were rented from the army in exchange for cannons and supplies. This presented a number of problems, however.

In November 1782, Captain Selin, a German-American immigrant in the Continental Army, arrived and told the workers that they could choose between enlistments in the Continental

Army, ransom payments, or their return to the Philadelphia jail. By February 1783, the soldiers had yet to make a decision, so they were marched back toward Philadelphia. Faesch paid thirty dollars in Pennsylvania currency per head to keep the soldiers, who then returned at worked voluntarily for him. The soldiers alleged later that they were threatened and some beaten by officers. On April 15, 1783, the Continental Congress ratified a preliminary peace treaty, which included a provision to return all prisoners of war. Faesch, however, refused to let his remaining prisoners leave (some had purchased their freedom). They were treated as indentured servants and forced to work off their debt.

Faesch primarily made cannon balls, producing thousands of them, as well as over five tons of “grape shot.”43 During the war, Faesch expanded from raw production of iron to manufacturing of iron products. By the end of the war, Faesch was producing weapons for the

40 Colagiuri, “John Jacob Faesch -- a Colonial Andrew Carnegie,” 26. 41 Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters to the Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, vol. 15 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1976), 459. 42 Daniel Krebs, “Approaching the Enemy: German Captives in the American War of Independence, 1776--1783” (Ph.D., Emory University, 2007), 402–406, http://search.proquest.com.resources.library.brandeis.edu/pqdtft/docview/304746255/abstract/44C4C144AE624F14 PQ/8. 43 Smith, “‘A Veritable... Arsenal’ of Manufacturing,” 214.

navy. He manufactured kentledge, iron used as a permanent ballast to balance ships.44

Apparently this contract did not go well for Faesch. In April of 1798, he wrote the Secretary of

War asking “that there may be a final issue to this very unprofitable business, for we are threatened with a prosecution by the Comptroller, if it is not done before the 1st of July, this we should wish to avoid, tho we have nothing to fear from its issue.”45 The issue to which Faesch refers is unclear, and it is unclear why he is in debt to the United States when he also owned a substantial number of loan office certificates. Faesch also corresponded with his friend Samuel

Hodgeson, who had been a commissary during the war, and he took on the task of clearing the debt owed by Faesch.46 Hodgeson wrote to the Comptroller and asked him to not prosecute.47 No records indicate that he proceeded. Faesch did not live to see the process completed, however, for he died in 1799, owning substantial amounts of land but having debts to the federal government.48 His account with the government was settled in November of 1799,49 but he appears on a list as owing money to the federal government as of January 1, 1800.50

The overall impact of the war on the iron industry is debatable. Hamilton remarked in his

Report on Manufactures, “Iron-works have greatly increased in the United States, and are prosecuted with much more advantage than formerly. The average price, before the Revolution, was about sixty-four dollars per ton; at present, it is about eighty—a rise which is chiefly to be

44 Tench Coxe to Alexander Hamilton, “Founders Online: To Alexander Hamilton from Tench Coxe, 22 December 1794,” December 22, 1794, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-17-02-0448. 45 John Jacob Faesch to Samuel Hodgdon, “Final Resolution of This Unprofitable Business,” April 24, 1798, Post Revolutionary War Papers, RG94, National Archives and Records Administration, http://wardepartmentpapers.org/document.php?id=26137. 46 Samuel Hodgdon to John Jacob Faesch, “Plans Trip to Inspect Castings in York, Elizabeth, and New York,” April 26, 1799, http://wardepartmentpapers.org/document.php?id=31527. 47 Samuel Hodgdon to David Ford, “Inspecting the Castings of John Jacob Faesch & Co.,” June 27, 1798, http://wardepartmentpapers.org/document.php?id=27243. 48 It is not clear where these debts came from. 49 John Steele to William Simmons, “Closed Accounts,” November 27, 1799, http://wardepartmentpapers.org/docimage.php?id=36803&docColID=40017&page=2. 50 It seems plausible that this is an accounting error. “Balances Due the United States, 1st of January 1800,” January 1, 1800, http://wardepartmentpapers.org/document.php?id=37298.

attributed to the increase of manufactures of the material.”51 This remarkable rise, as Hamilton suggested, came from war spending and investment in the industry and the shift in the industry from producing raw materials to producing finished products. Hamilton identified an ideological as well as pragmatic reason for supporting the domestic iron industry and building protective tariffs around it, proposed at fifteen percent on weapons, given that “there are, already, manufactories of these articles, which only require the stimulus of a certain demand to render them adequate to the supply of the United States.”52

Joseph Walker argued in 1974 that while legal restrictions on the American iron industry ended with the close of the Revolution, practical restrictions and technological disadvantage kept

American iron manufacturing at a severe disadvantage.53 But the ability for iron producers to expand into manufacturing, and to be supported in doing so by public dollars to such a large extent, suggests that the industry saw significant social mobility, as is the case of Faesch, an immigrant who, through significant entrepreneurialism, became a social elite in his rural community. This rags-to-riches tale would not have been possible were it not for the military’s purchases from Faesch, and thus the story also shows how the war impacted at least one middle class manufacturer. Despite Faesch coming from a relatively middling background, he was able to enter a higher class, developing a disdain for the common folk whose ranks he was so recently among.54

51 Hamilton, “Report on Manufacturers,” 138. 52 Ibid., 139. 53 Walker, “The End of Colonialism in the Middle Atlantic Iron Industry,” 13. Ibid. 54 Rev. Joseph F. Tuttle D.D., “The Early History of Morris County,” Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society, 2, 6 (1869): 37. Ibid.

61 Chapter 4

Constitutional Politics: An Ideology Tested

The backlash to tariff, among many other problems resulting from a lack of centralized power and government ability to act, was the proposal for a set of amendments to be made to the

Articles of Confederation at a 1787 convention in Philadelphia. Rather than revising the Articles, the convention decided to start over with what would become the Constitution of the United

States of America. Thus far, this thesis has explored the impact on the development of the

American identity due to military bureaucratic organization, political status shifts, and wartime economic development. Here, I examine how these factors manifested themselves in the views expressed in and around the ratification debate. Many of the characters already discussed, such as Abraham Yates, Jr., Hugh Hughes, and John Jacob Faesch, had strong and sometimes divergent views on federal power, democracy, and the federal assumption of state debt. Yet they were focused on similar ideological goals around the possibility of economic advancement and a concern for the welfare of the middle class.

The role of the economically secure but politically and socially ambiguous middle class in shaping the development of the Constitution was significant. Most importantly, middle class ideas and values shaped the formation of the American system of government. Many historians have attempted to characterize the Constitution as “elitist” or “egalitarian,” “conservative” or

“radical.” I do not attempt to enter this well-worn debate, nor do I suggest that ownership of loan office certificates influenced support one way or the other in the constitutional debate, as Beard did.1 Rather, I argue that American middle class ideology influenced the debate on both sides, and that they had a major impact on the shaping of the Constitution.

1 Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States with New Introduction., 24.

Yates’s opinions on the Constitution are the most easily distilled of the men discussed in detail. While there is some debate over who wrote exactly which of the Antifederalist Papers of

New York, Yates seems to have been a prominent author, likely publishing under the name

“Rough Hewer” and “Sidney,” and according to some historians, “Cato.”2 Yates also wrote, but never published, his own “History of the Movement for the United States Constitution.”3 In it,

Yates compares “The Tories who under the former [government] went under the name of High

Perogative Men and joined the Whigs against Britain now came out under the [name] of federal

Men [and] cooperated with [the aristocrats] in its propagation.”4 Staughton Lynd considered

Yates’ critique as a predecessor to Beard’s, for he followed similar lines of logic. Like Beard,

Yates lays at the feet of the aristocracy a conspiracy to profiteer off of a stronger national government.5 Yates’ disgust at the Philadelphia convention is clear and stinging: “Under an

Injunction of Secrecy they carried on their works of Darkness until the Constitution passed their usurping hands.”6 This skepticism of government, bordering on paranoia, reflects traditional republican ideologies discussed earlier, and also foreshadows Jeffersonian and Jacksonian skepticism of big government, and hints at what David Hackett Fisher calls the “backcountry” ideology.7 It also plays on republican fears of corruption in government, the same fears that led

Congress to take such an active role in administering the Continental Army.

2 Generally ascribed to Clinton, there is reason to think that Yates may have written these papers, and is at least more probable than Clinto to have done so. See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 489n; De Pauw, The Eleventh Pillar; New York State and the Federal Constitution., 1966, 283–292. 3 This unpublished manuscript is housed in the Abraham Yates Papers, New York Public Library. Unfortunately, they were being digitized while this thesis was being prepared and I was unable to access them, so I rely instead Staughton Lynd’s transcription, ante, Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution.” 4 Ibid., 232. 5 Ibid., 224. 6 Ibid., 242. 7 David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 754–758.

Yates had no love for the document produced by the Convention, and even less for the ratification process. As a Senator, he attempted to delay the ratification convention into the future, arguing that the people were too poor to buy newspapers and “too remote from the common opportunities of information.”8 He generally viewed the Constitution as an amorphous conspiracy against the people. In his history of the Constitution, Yates wrote that “besides that

[the Constitution] was filled with ambiguity and duplicity, and the far greater number of the

Inhabitants were apprehensive that, unless amended, it would sooner or later turn out the greatest curse that ever befell the Rights of Mankind in America.”9 Yates particularly protested the insistence that state interests be secondary to federal interests. Federalists had adopted the idea of a single, unified nation, where states would act to the federal government as counties acted to states in the status quo.10 Yates and the Antifederalists disagreed fervently.

The paralyzing fear at the heart of Yates’ objections was the fear that an American nobility would rise to prevent men like him from engaging in politics.

We find that those who have Led the People have Carried them Estray and have Loaded them with unnecessary Burthens, to obtain which they have turned a Convention into a Conspiracy, and under the Epithet Federal have destroyed the Confederation. It is yet apprehended that under the name of the Community they will erect a Nobility.11

The concept of emergent nobility was anathema to Yates, like most Antifederalists. Gordon

Wood points out that “because the many “new men” of the 1780’s… [like Yates]… had bypassed the social hierarchy in their rise to political leadership, they lacked those attributes of social distinction and dignity that went beyond wealth.”12 The fear that these distinctions would

8 Maier, Ratification, 327. 9 Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution,” 243. 10 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 472–473. 11 Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution,” 244. 12 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 487.

once again become a barrier to political office was significant to them because it would block them, and their fellow “middling sorts” who had the wealth but not the social capital, from political power in the new system. This is why Yates also criticized Congress for ignoring the

Articles of Confederation’s requirement that there be a rotation of Members of Congress.13 He also cited the creation of the Board of Treasury as an example of elitism, which consisted of five

Commissioners and two Members of Congress, as an example of how “aristocrats” took power away from Congress.14 This situation indicates an intertwining of self-interest and ideology that shaped Yates’ views on the constitution.

A connected area of concern was likely the size of the franchise of voters, although Yates does not explicitly detail this issue. It is also an area where the Constitution was remarkably quiet. As Alexander Keyssar points out in his book, The Right to Vote, the Convention only minimally addressed the right to vote, so little that the only references to the qualifications of voters was, as Article 1, Section 2 states, “the Electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”15 Prior to the

Revolution, in most colonies, some sort of property requirement existed, with the Blackstonian justification that those without property were dependent upon others and were likely to be influenced by others, or that they would be too easily swept up by demagoguery.16 One reason that Yates does not speak on the issue extensively could be that universal male suffrage seemed close enough for him. On a state level, it seems that Yates supported universal manhood suffrage and a secret ballot, both of which were unheard of. Ultimately, anyone who owned a £20

13 “Avalon Project - Articles of Confederation : March 1, 1781,” accessed April 5, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/artconf.asp. 14 Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution,” 234–235. 15 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (Basic Books, 2009), 30. 16 Ibid., 31–35.

freehold or who paid state taxes and 40 shillings in rent was qualified to vote for Assembly elections, or who paid for “freemen” status in Albany or New York City, which most artisans did for the associated professional privileges.17 This property requirement existed until 1821, when it was replaced with a taxation requirement. This was removed for whites in 1826, but remained for “men of color” until the passage of the 15th Amendment. It is worth noting that for the ratification convention itself, New York adopted universal manhood suffrage with almost no debate, including, at least in theory, free African Americans.18

“Upon the whole,” Yates wrote, “If upon comparing the usurpation of the Crown of

Great Britain upon the parliamentary Rights, with the usurptions of the American Congress upon the sovereignty of the individual states,” through the Constitution, “American Rulers, if not worse than British, are every way as likely to abuse their powers, to act the wolf in sheeps

19 cloathing [sic].” Gordon Wood has argued that Yates and his fellow Antifederalists feared a conspiracy behind the Constitution, and were not explicitly able to label or identify it.20 Yates wrote that he was greatly worried about the lack of a Bill of Rights. He was highly skeptical that the promised reforms would ever be passed as promised because he distrusted the government so much. Yates feared “the curse (Next to that of Adam) which we will Engail upon our

Descendants without Amendments.”21 This line, more than any other, shows that Yates viewed the Constitution as a conspiracy designed to strip power away from men like him. Because he believed in the power of power to corrupt so deeply, he felt that a federal authority, linked to the aristocracy, would inevitably invoke its newly consolidated power to strip the middle class of the

17 De Pauw, The Eleventh Pillar; New York State and the Federal Constitution., 1966, 143. These requirements were ultimately converted to fifty dollars and five dollars, respectively, in 1811. 18 Ibid., 141–142; Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 43. 19 Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution,” 245. 20 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 488. 21 Lynd, “Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States Constitution,” 245.

citizenship rights that it had won in the Revolution. His personal experience with the

Confederation government through his firing as loan officer and his fights with Hamilton and

Morris add a personal element to this ideological objection. He reacted to a perceived threat to their rights as Englishmen and indeed, to use the Enlightenment parlance, their natural rights as men.22 This skepticism and fear of centralized government can be seen throughout American history, across the political spectrum.

Carl Becker saw the Revolution as the moment when the mechanics, as well as other disenfranchised groups, could enter the political arena, and describes them generally as democrats.23 Becker’s contemporary, Charles Beard, ignores mechanics completely in his analysis of the Constitution, preferring to paint the Antifederalists as proto-Jeffersonian agrarian democrats. This is a serious oversight on the part of Beard, for the mechanics were active in the ratification fight. New York radical Hugh Hughes served a single term in the state legislature following his service in the Quartermaster General’s department.24 While he represented New

York City and mercantile interests, he was loyal first to his mechanic friends, and in 1785 wrote,

“how absolutely requisite it is, to continually guard against power, for when once Bodies of Men, in Authority, get Possession, or become invested with, Property or Prerogative, whether it be by

Intrigue, Mistake, or Chance, they rarely ever relinquish their claim, even if in Iniquity itself.”25

Clearly, Hughes shared the radical inclination against corruption and against centralized government power. The important connection that Hughes made, however, is between property and power. This was at the core of Antifederalist fears. Jennifer Nedelsky has argued that the

22 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 12. 23 Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776., 5; Lynd and Young, “After Carl Becker,” 216. 24 Friedman, “Hugh Hughes, A Study in Revolutionary Idealism,” 253. 25 Ibid., 254.

protection of property was the fundamental purpose of the Constitution, as advocated for by

Gouverneur Morris, a key New York Federalist.26 As a New Yorker, Morris would have been keenly aware of the Clintonian resentment for the propertied class, exemplified by Hughes and

Yates, and as a relative elite would have wanted to protect against this redistributive tendency.

Yet it would not be fair to assume that he opposed the making of money or the protection of private property. Hughes wrote that he was “not greatly in Favour of corporate Bodies,” and wished that the political system were generally more democratic.27 After all, Hughes himself was a mechanic at heart, and was from a generation when artisans were still independent and small.

Part of the reason for being skeptical of big businesses sanctioned by the state was probably personal interest, as an artisan in a rapidly industrializing world. Like a modern factory workers trying to beat back the tide of globalization, Hughes undoubtedly sensed that his livelihood as a small, independent artisan would be seriously challenged in the near future.

While Beard painted the Federalists as a more socially elite group, there is substantial evidence that many members of the middle class were among them. Beard believed that the

Federalists were primarily motivated by protecting their economic investments, and wanted a strong federal government designed to give power to elite minorities.28 The Hamiltonian

“American Dream” ideology, that one can rise above his station and achieve political and social power, appealed to the middling sorts because of concerns about protecting status and property, once achieved. The converse can be seen in the ranks of the Antifederalists. Cecelia Kenyon argued that Beard was wrong to assert that the Antifederalists were democrats, per se.29 Wood

26 Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism, 151–152. 27 Friedman, “Hugh Hughes, A Study in Revolutionary Idealism,” 255. 28 Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States with New Introduction., 154. 29 Cecelia M. Kenyon, “Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government,” The William and Mary Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1955): 42.

said that while they were generally Federalist, leaders like Elbridge Gerry and George Mason were prominent and wealthy Antifederalists who feared the “excess of democracy” just as much as any Federalist, but felt that the states and local elites were better equipped to deal with these problems.30

One example is John Jacob Faesch, who served as a delegate at the New Jersey ratification convention, which rapidly and unanimously approved the Constitution.31 Faesch had been slightly politically active from the early years of the war, obviously supporting the cause strongly as evidenced by his work for the Continental Army. From 1776 to 1786, he served as a

Justice of the Peace in Morris County, New Jersey.32 He served as a county judge from 1786 until his death in 1799.33 There is some evidence that Faesch had strongly aristocratic tendencies, for he grew to be quite wealthy (although ultimately ended up bankrupt), building what is described as a remarkable manner house and giving extensively to a local church, despite being skeptical of religion.34 A nineteenth century historian quotes him as saying that “religion is a very good thing to keep the lower classes in proper subordination,” although no attribution is given for the quote.35 Given his tendency to favor elitism despite not being “well-bred,” Faesch can be described as a member of the “Hamiltonian middle class,” the men who considered themselves to be elite even if they were not aristocratic in birth.

The impact on both sides of the Constitutional debate from the middle class is evident.

With men of new status, like Hamilton and Faesch, supporting the document, and others, like

Yates, Clinton, and Hughes, opposing it, differences of opinion were prominent. Yet beneath it

30 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 484. 31 Richard P. McCormick, “The Unanimous State,” The Journal of the Rutgers University Libraries 23, no. 1 (May 8, 2012), http://jrul.libraries.rutgers.edu/index.php/jrul/article/view/1384. 32 Colagiuri, “John Jacob Faesch -- a Colonial Andrew Carnegie,” 31. 33 Ibid., 32. 34 Tuttle, “Hibernia Furnace,” 37. 35 Ibid.

all, a similar set of beliefs can be identified: a fear of mobocracy and of oligarchy, a belief in social mobility and in property, and a concept of political egalitarianism among citizens.

70 Conclusion: Middle Class Nationalism

John Shy provocatively asks in his essay, “The Military Conflict Reconsidered as a

Revolutionary War,” “did the Revolution change American society? Although wars are notoriously effective agents of change, the war of the American Revolution has received little attention from [historians]…”1 Shy primarily focuses on the military history, and particularly on

British tactics and organizational difficulties. But his key conclusion is that “the prudent, politically apathetic majority of white American males was not eager to serve actively in the militia, but many of them did nonetheless,” and then goes on to show that the war acted as a political education for the masses.2 Michael McDonnell questions this theory, arguing that feelings of localism, inter-state animosity, and aversion to continental authority meant that the war itself was not nationalist in nature, and that it was only made so by a few committed nationalists after the war.3 Yet McDonnell misses a key concept that I have proven throughout this thesis. An American ideology, developed among the middle class, was not Federalist in character, but it was certainly nationalist, or at the very least served as the seeds of nationalism.

In this concluding chapter, I will consider whether the ideology amounts to American nationalism in the form of the American Dream.

To evaluate this claim, a stronger definition of “nationalist” is needed. At the dawn of the

Revolutionary War, most Americans considered themselves citizens of their hometown and perhaps their colony, with the degree of localism that McDonnell suggests. John Murrin, in “A

Roof Without Walls,” suggests, “The Revolution, in short, was a crisis of political integration

1 John W. Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 195. 2 Ibid., 217–222. 3 Michael McDonnell, “National Identity and the American War for Independence Reconsidered,” Australasian Journal of American Studies 20, no. 1 (2001): 3–17.

and centralization that Britain could not master… They had show that they would fight and even confederate to protect the rights of the parts.”4 Something needed to unite the colonies, as a single language had in Germany and a cultural tradition of the Crown and Parliament did in

Britain.5 He suggests that the war itself was able to do that. I argue that the war was able to bring together these components, particularly among the middle class, to create these shared beliefs.

These values can now be explicitly identified. The first is the idea of united identity.

While the divide between the Federalists and the Antifederalists can be seen as great, the chasm was not as disparate ideologically as might be assumed. As Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out,

“Both parties of the Americans were in fact agreed upon the most essential points; and neither of them had to destroy a traditionary [sic] constitution, or overthrow the structure of society, in order to ensure its own triumph.”6 A consensus developed, especially among the middle class, about the American spirit and the values associated with it. This is not to say that there were not significant ideological differences between the different political factions that developed, but rather that a set of core American values are included. For instance, Tocqueville commented on the desire of the wealthy to appear to be middle class:

Mark, for instance, that opulent citizen… His dress is plain, his demeanor unassuming; but the interior of his dwelling glitters with luxury, and none but a few chosen guests whom he haughtily styles his equals, are allowed to penetrate into his sanctuary. No European noble is more exclusive in his pleasures, or more jealous of the smallest advantages which his privileged station confers upon him.7

4 John M. Murrin, “A Roof without Walls: The Dillemma of American National Identity,” in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard R. Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward Carlos Carter (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 340. 5 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 400– 402. 6 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. John Canfield Spencer, trans. Henry Reeve (G. Adlard, 1839), 170. 7 Ibid., 174.

This attempt to appear to be “one of the people” while carrying on an elite lifestyle fascinated

Tocqueville. Wealth was encouraged, but publicly flaunting wealth was repulsed, as Abraham

Yates expressed in his “History of the Constitution,” discussed extensively in the previous chapter. The ability to rise up in status was the critically important for both groups, particularly among the middling folk. Gordon Wood suggests that it was no longer possible, by 1788, to refer to the people as “a common herd,” as Edmund Randolph did during the Virginia ratification convention. Patrick Henry rebuked him, saying that he had reduced Virginians “from respectable independent citizens, to abject, dependent subjects or slaves.”8 This power elevation, and political status change, reflects a greater cross-class unity of American society that developed during the war years. From the number of new politicians who came from common stock, to the newly-powerful merchants and military officials who built their wealth on the war effort itself, the middle classes came to believe that the Revolution had successfully transformed American social life and obliterated distinctions.

Building on this idea is the concept of political egalitarianism. “If he meets his cobbler upon the way,” Tocqueville wrote of the same opulent citizen, “they stop and converse; the two citizens discuss the affairs of the State in which they have an equal interest, and they shake hands before they part.”9 Bernard Bailyn discussed this change in his book on The Ideological Origins o the American Revolution. He argued that the changing nature of representation, away from a

Blackstonian model of the delegate as a trustee, into a delegate of the people, can be seen in the ratification debates and the writing of Constitutional Convention delegate James Wilson, who believed “that the only reason why a free and independent man was bound by human laws was

8 Gordon S. Wood, The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 279. 9 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 175.

this—that he bound himself.”10 This concept of political egalitarianism would not have come about were it not for the circumstances of the Revolution, which allowed men like Abraham

Yates and George Clinton to seek high public office. The right of citizens to all have an equitable voice in the political process represents a key example of the ideology of egalitarianism.

Beyond political equality, economic opportunity represents a critical aspect of the

American Dream. The entrepreneurial spirit, so central to the story of John Jacob Faesch, represents the possibility of the “rags-to-riches” story. Artisans contributed hugely to the war effort, from manufacturing weapons to serving in the military supply bureaucracy. The ability of men to rise above their station, and ultimately the mythical idea of a “classless” society, is the other fundamental component of American nationalism. Gordon Wood points out that most of the Revolutionary leadership was first-generation gentlemen, from Hamilton to Jefferson, whose father had married into a prestigious family.11 This can also be seen in the operations of the supply departments. Through chaos, men of differing backgrounds came together to support the

Continental Army. There was significant transformative power in the interactions of men like

Hugh Hughes, an urban mechanic, with men of elite rank like Nathaniel Greene or Timothy

Pickering. The entrepreneurialism of immigrants like John Jacob Faesch to come over as an indentured servant, create a business, and retire a member of the community elite shows the remarkable achievements celebrated by the American middle class ideologies.

Not everyone, of course, embraced Yates’ view of centralized government and increasing government power as a conspiracy, but at the heart of the Revolutionary movement was a skepticism, if not deep distrust, of government.

10 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. (Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 170–174. 11 Wood, The Idea of America, 278.

Success was by no means guaranteed for the Revolutionary middle class, just as it is not in the American Dream. The case of Hughes has a particularly tragic ending. Tragedy struck in

November 1782, when Hughes was purchasing wooden boards on the eastern side of the Hudson

River, opposite Albany.12 Returning home late at night, Hughes needed to cross the river, and the ferry was on the Western side. He had 1001 dollars in his saddlebag. After searching for a boat with which to cross, Hughes returned to his horse and crossed the river. Upon returning the horse to the Quartermaster General’s office, he found that his pistols and the 1001 dollars were missing. After frantically searching, he reported them stolen, and was ultimately charged for them. To make matters worse, in 1789, a fire consumed Hughes’ papers, including a number of pay vouchers and “vouchers for the expenditure of public monies, with which he had been trusted.” Hughes wrote to military leaders and fellow veterans, and asked for them to write letters of support for him, and he received letters from Washington, Governor Clinton, and

Quartermaster Generals Thomas Mifflin, Stephen Moylan, and Timothy Pickering, among others. All added notes about how well Hughes had performed his duty, in the words of Mifflin,

“with cheerfulness and pleasure, that during the most critical period of the war, Col. Hughes executed the trust thus confided to him, with integrity and abilities; and, in general displayed the warmest and most disinterested zeal and activity in support of the revolution.”13 Yet it was all for naught, and Congress rejected his plea for relief, leaving him ill and indebted. This story shows that all the care in the world, the support of military and political leaders, and the purest, most disinterested republican ideology was not enough to secure for him prosperity.

I cannot conclude without making a brief reference to Alexander Hamilton and the recent craze surrounding his “American dream” story. His story of a bold, passionate drive for power

12 Hughes, Memorial and Documents in the Case of Colonel Hugh Hughes, 5–6. 13 Ibid., 10–18.

served as the basis for Lin-Manuel Miranda’s Broadway hit, and the story is intimately linked with the narrative presented here. His nationalistic Federalism and strong support for the

Constitution and the elite provide evidence against my primary examples about the middle class.

Yet a few factors around Hamilton’s narrative stand out and provide evidence that he, too, subscribed to some version of the American middle class ideology. While he was clearly of the middling sort by status from birth, his marriage into the Schuyler family and his drive to be associated with the aristocratic class suggests that he might, in fact, exemplify the ideal of social mobility and the belief that change in economic and social status is possible. His ability to join the political elite and serve in such a high position, despite his status of birth, would not have been possible a generation prior and would continue to become easier as the new nation progressed. As Washington’s Aide-de-Camp, Hamilton was involved in advising the

Commander-in-Chief about the administration of the military bureaucracy. He was hugely involved in financing the war and devising methods of military procurement. These military roles allowed him to “rise up” and enter into positions of power, just like they did for many others. Hamilton’s connection with commerce and industry are another factor in his story. As

Secretary of the Treasury, in his Report on Manufactures, Hamilton advocated that Congress should support manufacturing with a protective tariff.14 His argument was fundamentally based on the premise that increased trade would add security to the economy and build the amount of wealth present, and also employ more people and allow more people to receive the benefits of wealth.

In his 1818 letter to Hezekiah Niles, John Adams wrote, “The Revolution was effective before the war commenced. The revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people… This

14 Hamilton, “Report on Manufacturers.”

radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people was the real

American Revolution.”15 While ideological shifts may have occurred in the 1760s, it was the war itself that caused the dramatic change that allows the American War for Independence to be termed a “Revolution.” The dramatic social changes that brought about a new identity for many colonists, of “American,” originated from the disruption of an old political elite alienating their constituents and being overthrown in favor of a strong middle class. The war effort, and particularly the investment poured into the economy, meant that it was able to grow rapidly, and elevate many Americans economically. For Americans who were not enslaved, and who were not parts of the old elite, the Revolution meant that social position reduced in importance dramatically. These changes had occurred by 1787 when the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia, and they greatly influenced both the opponents and the proponents of the Constitution. The idea of “life, liberty, and property” being protected by the Constitution from populist governments spoke to not only elite fears, but also to middle class anxieties about power being taken from them. These ideologies combined to create a core belief that would become central in American political development, the idea of the “American people” as a nation, able to rise despite not being well bred.

15 Adams, The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States, 10:282–283. Emphasis in original.

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