STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

No. 2

PUBLIC REPORT 2019 www.shish.gov.al 1 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

annual report 2019 TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 Presentation of Public Report 2019 by Director of SHISH 4 Security Situation in the Republic of Albania 4 Organized Crime 6 Economic Crimes 7 Corruption 8 Cyber Threats 9 Energy Security 10 Political and Security Situation in the Region 10 General Insight 12 Terrorism 13 Terrorist Threat in our Country and in the Region 14 Radicalization Towards Violent Extremism 16 Modus Operandi of Terrorist Organizations 17 Illegal Migration 18 A Failed Attempt 20 Activities of Foreign Non-Friendly Intelligence Services 20 What Are Hybrid Activities? 22 Intelligence Product 24 Developments IT&T and Digitalization 25 Fake News and the Threat to National Security 28 Questions and Answers on Fake News 30 Budget and Financial Management of SHISH 31 Human Resources 33 Cooperation Inside and Outside the Country 35 SHISH in Social and Humanitarian Initiatives 37 List of Abbreviations PUBLIC REPORT 2019 2

Presentation of Public Report 2019

Dear readers, In the fulfillment of our legal duties, re- n my capacity as Director of SHISH, quests and priorities by high state institu- I have the pleasure to present to you tions, during 2019, SHISH has reached the Ithe Second Public Report of the Al- objectives in the counter-intelligence and banian State Intelligence Service (hereinaf- intelligence domains, deepening even more ter referred to as SHISH), which is focused the cooperation with central and local ins- on the priorities, challenges, achievements titutions. of 2019, and objectives for the future. The activities of non-friendly services Last year, based on best practices, the and violent extremism, terrorist threats, State Intelligence Service of Albania pub- political and security situation in the re- lished the First Annual Report, presented gion and beyond, organized crime, eco- the legal duties of the Service, management nomic crimes and corruption, continue to and control, inter-institutional and interna- be main threats to national security. In this tional cooperation, as well as the intelligence frame, SHISH has prepared and shared product for high state institutions and law analytic and operational intelligence prod- enforcement agencies, in function of the uct in the central and local level, inside and country’s National Security. I have the plea- outside the country, with law enforcement sure to share with you the fact that, the pub- agencies and partner services, providing a lication of the First Report was welcomed valued contribution in the prevention and by the public opinion, specialists of this disruption of illegal activities. domain, state institutions and international The changing environment of securi- partners, confirming the fact that openness ty, classic, cyber, hybrid and transnational and the extention of transparency, is the threats, extension of illegal activities be- step in the right direction. Our contribu- yond the state borders, requires coopera- tion in strengthening national security goes tion in the regional and international level. through public trust for our Service. In order to face these phenomena, our During 2019, our Service has faced sev- Service has continued and deepened the eral challenges in order that operational and cooperation with partner intelligence ser- analytical structures function well in coun- vices and agencies, with whom we share tering illegal activities. Advancement in the the same values and also the same threats. system of digitalization, improvement of SHISH plays an active role in facilitating technological capacities, recruitment and and deepening the regional cooperation, training of new employees, continuous contributes in the frame of NATO and has training of current employees, increase of moved forward the cooperation with intel- capacities and management of human re- ligence services of EU countries. sources, improvement of the legal frame, The contribution of SHISH has received deepening of cooperation with institutions the highest appreciation by state institu- of national security and law enforcement tions and policy makers, by law enforce- agencies, cooperation with the new justice ment agencies, partner services and secu- structures and partner services, were our rity and intelligence structures of NATO. priorities. During 2019, we are focused in increas- 3 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE by Director of SHISH

ing capacities and management of human resources. Employment of new staff is based in fulfilling the le- gal criteria, the regulations of SHISH and based on the individual qualities of the candidates, selecting suitable individuals, motivated to serve with dedication in the war against the criminal activities, for the security of the citizens and national security. I want to use this opportunity, to make a call and encourage young, edu- cated and motivated individuals ready to face challenges and to sacrifice, to apply to join SHISH. The Service guarantees a professional and trans- parent selection process, giving equal chances to all candidates who will be qualified to pass such procedures. Achievements and results during 2019, compose a very good track to di- rect us in the future. During 2020, SHISH will Albania will be a safer and a more pros- continue its work with devotion and profes- perous country. In this occasion, I want to sionalism to monitor, inform on time and pre- ensure again the state authorities and the vent terrorist acts against individuals, groups public opinion that, SHISH will continue to and different entities, criminal activities, cyber be engaged and dedicated in fulfilling with threats, organized crime, corruption, hostile professionalism and dedication its duties, secret services, which pose a threat to nation- in accordance with the Constitution, legis- al, regional and collective security. Increase in lation and the respect of the fundamental capacities of human resources, technological human rights freedoms. modernization, trainings by competent spe- In the end, I want to express my appre- cialists and logistical support to fulfill these ciation and gratitude to all employees of objectives, are some of the current and future the Service. They are the ones working with challenges of the Service. dedication, responsibility and profession- I want to conclude this brief presenta- alism, to strengthen the civil and national tion, expressing my gratitude for the high security, to safeguard the freedom values, state institutions, law enforcement agencies the constitutional and democratic order in and partner services, for the continuous our country. support given to our agency in successfully accomplishing our mission. Thanks to this Helidon Bendo support and cooperation, the Republic of Director of State Intelligence Service PUBLIC REPORT 2019 4 Sc e urity situation IN THE republic of Albania

ORGANIZED CRIME

rganized crime in Albania, which individuals or groups of organized with regional and internation- crime have acted on behalf or supported Oal connections, has adopted its terrorist organizations. modus operandi in response to the strik- The common feature of all groups and ing force of the law enforcement agen- networks of organized crime remains cies. The most preferred forms of the money laundering or corruption, with Albanian organized crime groups remain aim to strengthen the link between ille- drug trafficking, other illegal trafficking, gal and legal structures. One of the most economic-financial crimes, smuggling dominant forms of organized crime re- and other cross border illegal activities. mains the traffic of narcotics, especially Until now, there have been no cases, in hard drugs. 5 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

This activity is encouraged and facilitated by:

The position of Albanian criminal elements in the countries of origin of drug production and in the key points of distribution and smuggling, part of a chain for control of all the processes, from the origin to destination

Increasing demand by hard drugs trafficking networks, including Al- banians, located in big centers of Western European countries and in the countries of origin

Demand by criminal groups for cannabis sativa cultivated in Albania

Flexibility and high adaptability, “correctness” in relations with groups and individuals which provide/supply drugs

Financial income generated by criminal activity in years

Monetary values and the wealth gained The cultivation of cannabis in the by criminal activities over the years (facili- country, in comparison with recent years, tated by the corruption in the justice sys- has been reduced due to strong measures tem, lack or a low level of punishment), are against the phenomena, deepened coopera- being used by these groups to extend the tion among law enforcement agencies and drug trafficking activities outside the coun- central and local Task Forces. During this try, mainly for hard drugs trafficking. Crim- period, a change of the modus operandi inals who have escaped conviction have has been encountered, which resulted in established themselves in foreign countries the cultivation of small areas. We notice a and from there, they have established links change in the cultivation process in closed with criminals inside our country. Besides areas of the country and in the neighboring European countries, they are active even and European countries. Meanwhile, the in the countries of origin of heroin and cannabis traffic has continued, and coop- cocaine, where they cooperate with local eration has increased with criminal groups criminal elements. and individuals in countries of the region. PUBLIC REPORT 2019 6

The most used routes and itineraries for are pragmatic, involved in some illegal ac- the cannabis traffic remain the land, sea tivities and with links which enable the drug and even air routes. There are cases of ex- traffic cycle, from the purchase in producing changes of cannabis with hard drugs like countries, traffic, distribution and counter heroin and cocaine. measure capabilities to avoid any risks. There has been an increase in conflict They use different identities and have and rivalry in certain criminal activities, authentic and forged passports form Euro- such as money laundering, facilitation of pean countries. illegal migration, ransom etc. For assassina- Prevention and disruption of this crimi- tions, criminal groups use hit men. nal activity is accompanied with seizure of Criminal groups have fluid organizations, property generated by this activity in years.

ECONOMIC CRIMES

conomic crimes remain a high risk Among the most common economic crimes Efactor for a steady economic growth, are fraud in taxation and customs, compiling trust and stability of the financial and eco- false bills, creation of false economic opera- nomic system in the country. Ad- tors, smuggling excise products and vancement of economic glo- money laundering. Facilitating balization, supported by factors are corruption and global financial markets the level of informal- and strategy of the free ity in the economy. De- market, have reduced spite serious attempts the importance of to reduce informality borders and have en- through the modern- abled the possibilities ization of services for economic crimes. and the increase in the level of punishment, it remains a problematic phenomenon making diffi- cult not only the level of the identification of assets of illegal origin but also their seizure and con- fiscation. In our country, a considerable amount of the “dirty” money originates from criminal activities over the years of the criminal indi- viduals and groups. Income obtained illegally is invested in the pursuit of criminal activi- ties, as well as in legal businesses. The domi- nant sectors for money laundering, remain the construction business, real estate, hotels and tourism, etc. Meanwhile, the coastal and urban areas remain the most attractive ones due to their potential to return the initial in- vestment in a multiplied form. 7 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

C RRUPTI N

orruption (even perception on its Due to the increase of measures against Clevel) undermines the trust of the corruption and the reform of the justice sys- public in good governance and the rule of tem, certain elements of the judicial system law, impedes the country’s development, seem cautious to avoid their exposure and strengthening of the institutions, steady their links with trusted elements who have economic growth. It remains a high risk fac- direct access to the vetting process. They tor which slows and harms the reforming have also demonstrated the will to perform processes to reach standards towards the well in the judicial proceedings directed by European integration as well as discourages them, in the formulation of charges against local and foreign the defenders, investments, nec- by dragging out essary to create legal procedures job opportunities or by imposing for all. maximum pen- Despite posi- alties stipulated tive steps in by law. the war against SHISH gives corruption, in- concrete con- creased state fo- tribution on the cus in the frame potential in- of reforms and volvement of el- concrete initiatives, these phenomena con- ements of the judicial system in corruption tinue to be problematic in the justice sys- and as well as in the frame of the vetting tem and some segments of the public ad- process of the judicial system and State Po- ministration. lice.

C O R R U P T I O N : undermines the trust of the public in good governance p and the rule of law

impedes the country’s development, strengthening of the @ institutions, steady economic growth

slows and harms the reforming processes to reach stan- G dards towards the European integration

F discourages local and foreign investments, necessary to create job opportunities PUBLIC REPORT 2019 8 CYBER ~ THREAT he increase in cyber capabilities, cooperation nication technologies. The Tcapabilities of our between relevant state and increase in speed, perfor- opponents, means an in- non-state actors, have in- mance in encrypted com- creased threat for the secu- creased. The pressure in munications, reliability of rity, political and economic the storage, communication computer systems, will en- stability. Increased cyber and transmission networks, able and enhance new indus- activities in the global lev- in the distribution of clas- trial processes, advanced lo- el reach even our country, sified information, as part gistics, artificial intelligence where digitalization pro- of the critical national in- and applications for security. cesses are evolving rapidly frastructure will increase Potential opponents alleg- in state and non-state ser- with the development of edly will try to exploit these vices. Opponent countries information and commu- weaknesses. and their intelligence ser- vices have cyber capabilities for operations in computer networks, develop offen- sive cyber capacities mainly for espionage activities and intelligence collection. In front of these phe- nomena, we need to in- crease awareness on the level of risk and threat, used methodologies to pro- tect the classified informa- tion, update of protection procedures in connection to forms and used meth- ods. Also, each new state or private digitalization pro- cess should be accompa- nied with adequate protec- tion measures. To empower the cyber protection, the cooperation and exchange in the cyber field, invest- ment in human resources, development of technical 9 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

ENERGY SECURITY

utdated technology, interdepen- of EU on energy, as well as guarantees and Odence, the need for resource diver- consolidates the projects and cooperation sification are the real challenges to- guar among regional countries. antee energy supply of economic sectors Albania has contributed in creating suit- in the countries of the region. Securing able conditions and markets for clean energy alternative resources is in the attention of in South-Eastern Europe and EU countries. governments. The diversification of energy Albania has supported the TAP project in resources and minimization of dependence the frame of strategic alliances and partner- on imports remain a priority, since the ship with the EU. TAP (Greece-Albania-Ita- countries of the region are dependent on ly), as one of the most competing projects in energy imports for their internal consump- the Southern Gas Corridor will have a posi- tion and, consequently, are economically tive effect in the diversification of energy. due to disturbances in furnishings. It is assessed to be of special importance Regional countries are the oil and gas to the EU, the gas transport from the Cas- transportation line to western countries. As pian to the European market. TAP will im- consumers, but even as part of transit cor- prove energy supply and security in the re- ridors, energy projects increase co-operation gion. The project was welcomed by the local of the Balkans countries. residents and the public opinion in Albania. Albania has improved legal infrastructure Energy networks have not been target of on energy resources, approving laws and terrorist organizations. We assess that the regulations on alternative energy resources. threat for terrorist attacks against energy in- National Energy Strategy (2014) pays special frastructure remains relatively low. Risk for attention to energy security. National Ener- cyber-attacks by hostile state actors against gy Strategy (2018) is based on legal criteria this infrastructure is not excluded. PUBLIC REPORT 2019 10

PL O ITICAL AND Security situation IN THE reGION

GENERAL INSIGHT Western Balkans continues to face a series of common threats like:

Fragile internal political Organized crime with regional and developments broader links Influencing activities by geo- political and regional actors to Corruption harm, slow down or block Euro-Atlantic integrations Extreme nationalistic rhetoric Weak governance

Internal factors enabling radicalism and tendencies for violent extremism Difficult economic situation

All these factors impact social instability making on important political developments and impede democratic reforms. and divide the national policy makers vis-à- The activities of global actors, oppo- vis international organizations. They exploit nents of the pro-western orientation of internal problems, old interstate issues, in- regional countries, through hybrid and cite nationalism, extremism and try to create intelligence activities, aim to undermine geo-economic advantages with long term integration processes, influence decision political objectives. 11 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The main issues are:

Fragile political and security developments in the region, increased nationalistic rhetoric and refractory stances.

Lack of advancement in Kosovo-Serbia dialogue with EU mediation.

The instrumentalisation of minorities with the aim the keep the status quo and for political gains.

Involvement in corruption of political elites.

Unresolved problems in interstate relations, impacting on extreme nationalistic rhetoric, activities of political movements, associations and organizations with extreme nationalistic agendas and pressure on their respective governments.

Organized crime as a threat to the region, which remains a transit road for multi-ethnic groups with international connections. Individuals and groups from Balkan Diasporas are a bridge between regional and international organized crime.

Illegal migration which aims to use the region as a transit towards the EU. Groups involved in human trafficking have increased their activities, exploiting the situation in the sheltering centers, reduced capacities, and use of forged documents, coopera- tion with criminal elements and human trafficking networks and exploitation of weak points in the green border.

Arms trafficking, military munition or products with dual use remains a feature of the criminal activity for financial gains. It is noticed an increased interest by individuals and criminal groups for sophisticated weapons, for criminal interests.

Difficult social economic situation accompanied by many issues, despite the attempts by governments for a stable economic development. High level of corruption, infor- mality, unemployment, undermine the trust of the public on institutions and reforms. Impact of economic reforms are intangible for the public.

Some of the positive developments, which are a strong evidence of the failure of the global and local actors with nationalistic agenda to impede euro-Atlantic processes, are:

Prespa Agreement

Membership of Montenegro in NATO

Expected membership of North Macedonia in NATO PUBLIC REPORT 2019 12

tErrM risM

errorism nancial expense Tcontinues but with an im- to pose a threat to pact to the online security in the lo- audience. Terror- cal, regional and ist activities in the global level. digital space and ISIL/DAESH, social networks Al-Qaeda and are probably go- groups connected ing to be the to them will con- most likely Modus tinue to pose the Operandi for the main threat to in- incitement, coor- ternational secu- dination and sup- rity. ISIL/DAESH port of the ter- even though it rorist acts. ISIL/ has lost the self- DAESH will con- declared Islamic tinue to benefit State, a series of from terror acts commanders and conducted by lo- senior operatives cal terrorists, radi- and also reduced calized individu- significantly the als, the returnees fighting human who operate as resources, is as- lone actors or part sessed to have threatening capacities for of sleeper cells, to increase its propaganda the international security. The organiza- and to further radicalize and recruit other tion is assessed to be in a individuals. Loss of terri- transition phase, focused tories from ISIL/DAESH in surviving, reorganizing, gives the opportunity to Al- keeping high the morale of Qaeda to regain its former supporters, presenting the status as a global leader of losses as temporary. the jihadist, terrorist move- We asses that ISIL/DAESH ment. Despite ideological is financially capable to cover differences and rivalries for operational expenses for ter- domination, pragmatic ap- rorist activities. It still con- proach and cooperation be- tinues with calls for acts of tween them will increase the terror, without too much fi- level of the threat. 13 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

tHREAT IN OUR COUNTRY TERRORIST AND IN THE REGION

here have been no acts of terror help from their families in the countries Tin our country or in the region. of origin. Kosovo is among the first coun- Strengthening of the counter terrorism tries of the region which has repatriated a measures, legal reforms, the implementation number of family members of FTF, mostly of the strategies against violent extremism, women and children, who are being treated the increased focus of law-enforcement on a case by case scenario, and who are un- agencies, increase of regional and interna- dergoing de-radicalization processes. Other tional cooperation have had their preven- countries are looking at the possibility of tive effect. repatriation of the captured individuals in The two abovementioned organizations the Kurdish camps, treating them accord- continue to target our region through pro- ing to their national legislation. The return paganda, calls and incitement of their sup- of all FTF families to the countries of the porters for acts of terror. Foreign influences region will require concrete commitments, and internal factors, pushing radicalization special de-radicalization programs and re- towards violent extremism are still present integration in the society. Legal frameworks although at reduced levels. The participa- enable a selective treatment. There must be a tion of FTF from the region in terrorist or- balance between the restrictive and rehabili- ganizations in conflict zones poses a long tation measures. Increased attention should term security threat. Reports on the killing be paid to the large number of children, of high-level ethnic Albanian FTF form our with specific, long-term de-radicalization, country and the region, active in coordina- integration, education and counseling proj- tion and incitement of their former con- ects to avoid the challenge of a new threat- tacts for acts of terror, their arrest, trial and ening group. Addressing different problems their sentence, the conviction of recruiters of this category of individuals requires a of individuals to join terrorist organization whole society approach of state and non- have significantly reduced the activities and state actors. calls for acts of terror. We assess that the activation of other like-minded individuals or their contacts in the region and diaspora is not excluded. The situation of the FTF families is seri- ous. There are calls among them for repa- triation to the countries of origin. Most of them are accommodated in camps in Syria, in very difficult conditions, asking financial PUBLIC REPORT 2019 14

RALADIC IZATION TOWARDS VIOLENT EXTREMISM

he official Islamic communities in exploiting their financial needs. Some orga- Tour country and the region have nizations in the region, involved in radical openly condemned violence and extremism activities are shut down and their activities manifested in the name of religion, but we suspended. The number of private worship assess much remains to be done to coun- religious venues, out of the jurisdiction of ter the narrative of extremism and terror- the Islamic communities is reduced due to ism and to train the clergy that represent the measures of the governments and the the official line of the Islamic communities. Islamic communities. There are certain individuals, mainly from The implementation of strategies to coun- some Arab countries, who represent and ter violent extremism strategies, the mecha- support the radical schools and lines and try nisms put in place to execute the Action Plan to intervene and influence religious com- against violent extremism have already had munities under religious and relief cover, their preventive effect. 15 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

General profile of the plotters

Radicalized 2 FTF in individuals the ground 1 from the linked to Activation region ISIS/DAESH of low radical leadership profile individuals, old links 3 to FTF Individuals with Involvement 4 regional of early links returnees, Communication 5 supporters of via secure extreme social media ideology and platforms 6 Compart- 7 mentalized Use of an and event with uncoordinated high media cells coverage Targeting of security 8 institutions

Target 10 selection Attacks from one 9 planned Means and 11 country in by individuals, methods similar to another country, groups not those used in some which have good coordinated with European countries with bilateral state each other explosive materials relations (TATP), com- bined with 12 Use of fire arms Use of social diplomatic cover and cultural to collect intelligence organizations for and to plan intelligence, acts of counter- terror 13 14 intelligence purposes PUBLIC REPORT 2019 16

MODUS OPERANDI OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

From the activities of subversive actors with terrorist objectives we highlight the following characteristics:

1. Calls, incitement and coordination of FTF on the theater of operations with their old contacts in the countries of origin.

2. Activation 1 3. Activation of Returnees, for logistical mainly those support of who maintain individuals with radical a low radical 3 profile and 2 background, continue to supporters follow the of extrem- propaganda ist networks and extreme who declare their reli- ideology. 4 5 gious affilia- tion.

4. Instructions given on social 5. Plans to commit media networks via secure acts of terror in the communication and online ac- countries of origin tivation of the second chain of and in the neigh- command elements, exploiting boring countries. their support for the extremist religious ideologies. 17 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

ILLEGAL MIGRATION

he Balkan route continues to be an trafficking of human beings from Turkey Timportant route for illegal migra- to Greece, Albania and then Western Eu- tion towards European countries. In this rope. Increased border security measures context, Albania continues to be a transit and successful cooperation with Frontex country for the passage of illegal migrants. have eased the monitoring process of il- The influx of illegal migrants that have en- legal migration. tered the country through the green border, We believe that, the possibility of the use in the southern of this route and southeastern by individu- part of Albania als with false has increased. documents Human traffick- provided by ing networks organized use this category crime cannot of individuals be excluded. for illegal cross- It can be ing of the green used to infil- border or along trate terrorist their movement operatives in in other coun- other west- tries for financial ern coun- gains, facilitating tries. In one their equipment case, one with false docu- ex-terrorist ments and giving operative, instructions on wanted by their itinerary. INTERPOL It is also no- was detained ticed that there for illegal are increased entry in our cases where ille- country via gal migration is the green organized by cer- border with tain individuals Greece. De- and groups who spite mul- provide online guidance and instructions tiple identities used by the operative, the to the target groups using social media net- Albanian law-enforcement agencies in co- works, in exchange for financial benefits. operation with the regional and European There are leads that certain non-govern- partners managed to identify and arrest mental organizations declared as relief or- him. Extradition procedures followed his ganizations are favoring and organizing the arrest by the law-enforcement agencies. PUBLIC REPORT 2019 18

A failed attempt (Case of Russian terrorist)

SHISH has continued INTERPOL. the interview, the Anti-Ter- its activities to monitor the The terrorist Rasoul- ror Police Directorate re- influx of illegal migration. Visanievitch MISLAEV, ferred the case at the Serious One of the objectives of the arrested in July 2019, was Prosecution Office in Tira- Service is to prevent cases also known as AbdAlsalam na, based on the legal argu- when the illegal migration Al MOUSA, AKA DIEGO. ments that the detained for- route can be used for en- The suspect was initially de- eign national was suspected trance in our country or tran- tained and interviewed by to be a member of terrorist sit passage to other European the border police authorities. organizations, participant in countries of terrorist opera- During the interview, the armed conflicts in Syria and tives. In this framework, in detainee declared that his Iraq, an offence that is stipu- July 2019,a successful op- name was Diego and he told lated by the Criminal Code eration was finalized, with the police authorities that he of the Republic of Albania. the identification and arrest wanted to travel to Italy, to The terrorist was extradited of Russian national, wanted join his wife. The detained based on international legal for terrorism. The identifica- individual was cooperative procedures. tion and subsequent arrest of until the investigators start- We assess that the arrest the suspected terrorist came ed asking him questions in of an ISIL/DAESH opera- after an intensive coopera- Arabic. At this moment he tive, who entered into Alba- tion between SHISH and stopped the communication nia through the green border the Albanian State Police. with the authorities. Because with Greece, is the first case In building the case, SHISH of the wounds identified in identified in our country, cooperated with other the his body during the physi- when terrorist individuals partner services to corrobo- cal medical check, he was use the routes of illegal mi- rate intelligence leads and prioritized as a potential risk gration. The initial spotting carry our further verifica- individual among the illegal of the suspected individual tions. Case study and analy- migrants coming form the and the further verifica- sis confirmed the suspicion MENA countries. tions of the multiple identi- that that the suspected ille- Based on the initial suspi- ties used by him are a result gal refuge was an operative cions, the intelligence infor- of a careful monitoring and of the terrorist organization mation collected by SHISH, preventive work, and con- “Islamic State”, wanted by intelligence obtained during tinues inter-agency and in-

THE TYPOLOGY OF THE USE OF THE

Presenting themselves as Entering the coun- Avoidance of regis- Syrian refugees and illegal 1 try through the green 2 tration in the refugee 3 passage through human traf- border with false camps and centers ficking networks from - Tur identities. along the itinerary of key towards Greek islands. their movement. 19 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

ternational cooperation. His organizations that Albania is the illegal migration route arrest and the publication of not a safe place. It is also an and the influx of refuges can the news is a preventive step indicator and a helpful mes- be used by terrorist organi- and a message to the terrorist sage to other countries that zations.

Who is Diego?

tions in Arabic, the inter- viewee stopped communi- cation. Scars and wounds caused by fire arms and shells were identified in his body during the physi- cal medical check. After the suspected individual was relocated and accom- Diego identified as AbdAl- modated in the closed ref- he told the other refugees at salam Ahmed Al Mousa, uge center in Tirana, he de- the camp that he had made born in 1979 in Homs, Syr- clared to the authorities that them himself, as a sign of re- ia. Abd Alsalam Ahmed his name was Diego Dar- volt against the authorities Al Mousa entered Albania vish, the son of Adam and for not fulfilling their living through the green border Hava, born on 15 May 1993 conditions. He also used to with Greece. He declared and that he was a Syrian na- say that he did not have any to the police authorities that tional. After several inter- brothers or sisters and that his name was “Diego” and views conducted in the fol- his parents were dead. Dur- that he was from Syria. He lowing weeks, he changed ing the stay at the closed also initially declared that his previous statements and refuge center he carried out he wanted to travel to Italy, declared that his name was regularly the religious rites where his wife and children Abdurahman Darvish. Dur- and took continues care of were waiting for him. Ini- ing the period of detention his physical condition by tially he communicated in in the closed center he tried exercising regularly. Form several foreign languages, to make friendship with for- further verifications, it was such as in English, Russian, eign nationals, mainly the found out that the so-called Italian and Arabic. When ones coming from Syria, Diego was the terrorist Ra- the interviewers form the Iraq, Pakistan, Morocco and sul Visanievitch MISLAEV, Service and Albanian State Algeria. For the wounds and born in Norilsk, Russian Police continued their ques- scars that he had in his body, Federation.

M IGRATORY ROUTE BY TERRORISTS

Manipulation of move- Use of false docu- Changes of outer 4 5 ment and expression of 6 ments, multiple iden- appearance dissatisfaction for the treat- tities. ment of refugees in the refugees camps in Turkey. PUBLIC REPORT 2019 20

ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN NON FRIENDLY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES he intelligence services of countries ments related to the integration processes Thostile to the north-Atlantic alliance, and the inherited interstate relations. Apart to the euro-integration processes of our from the classical intelligence collection country and the region continue their con- methods, use of their security and intelli- stant activities with a tendency to increase gence personnel, a combination of classical during the moments of important develop- and hybrid means is noticed.

WHAT ARE H Y B R . I D ACTIVITIES

ybrid activities are a combination of ger impact. Non-friendly countries and their Hcovert and overt methods, conven- intelligence services identify vulnerabilities tional and non-conventional means, includ- in the diplomatic, political, social, economic, ing disinformation, propaganda, cyber attacks, financial, military, intelligence and infrastruc- collection of sensitive information through in- ture domains of the target country/coun- trusion and access in computer networks, use tries, prepare and implement hybrid activities of cyber espionage, influencing intelligence tailored to the specific social, economic and and psychological operations and economic political situation of the target country. Open pressure. Hybrid methods are blurring the influencing activities can be informative op- boundaries between peace and war and their erations connected with propaganda, disin- speed and intensity have increased during the formation and influencing the public opinion recent years. These methods are used not only of the opponent countries. by state actors but also by non-state actors, A non-stabilized region, which goes through who operate as proxies, for financial gains cycles of crises during certain political and inte- and whose activities are coordinated and con- gration processes is permissible and suitable to ducted on behalf of the respective intelligence the goals of the non-friendly countries. Geo- and security services. Ways of engagement political actors who oppose the regional inte- vary from the level of involvement, complex- gration processes through influencing activities ity of the mission and sophistication. Hybrid and amplify past and current problems, in their activities are used for certain geo-political and attempts to present the region as undesirable geo-economic aims and have as their primary to the West, with threatening capabilities for objective instability of the targeted country, European stability ate targeting international political and economic dependency. organizations as failed entities in their policies Hybrid threats have taken another dimen- towards the region. For every important devel- sion and to a certain extent are substituting opment in the region there is a counter narra- the classical intelligence collection methods. tive of the opponent countries, which is part This is favored by the development of infor- of their strategic objectives. This is done with mation technology and low cost of opera- open public statements, through publication tions compared to the deployment of intel- in certain printed and online media, republica- ligence agents, the possibility of distribution tion by third parties. These activities continue of the message to a wide audience and its big- to increase progressively. Fake news, widely 21 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE used for influencing purposes is playing its role get of hybrid activities are also certain cultural too. Printed and online media, social media non-governmental, educational, friendship networks are used to distort and manipulate organizations, business entities, religious com- the reality through disinformation with certain munities, printed and online media groups and goals. The objective is to influence the public platforms, research institutes, fan clubs etc. opinion, to damage the social cohesion, divide Projects for investment in the economic the national and international decision making strategic sectors in our country and in the processes vis-à-vis fundamental developments, region demonstrate their long term geo-eco- target and discredit international actors and nomic objectives and economic dependency, factors and their stances and recommenda- which would thereof lead to certain political tions to our country and the region. modifications. In this context, our country is Apart from the constant and classical es- not excluded as a target country for such ac- pionage methods, attempts to approach and tivities. The clear western and Euro-Atlantic recruit individuals who have access to classi- orientation of our country, its role and per- fied information, the hybrid approach includes formance as a stability factor in the region will other means such as influencing certain po- continue to be in the focus of the classical litical movements/parties and their leadership and hybrid methods and activities of non- with nationalistic and ethnic agendas. The tar- friendly intelligence services.

Elona - field officer

I am Elona. During my university studies in social sciences, I wanted to get evolved in civil society on issues of women rights, in particular in the protection of violated and trafficked women. Af- ter graduation, I started working in SHISH, which enabled me to contribute on this matter in a to- tally different way that I thought before. Working as a field officer on countering organised crime, narcotics and human trafficking, I am contribut- ing against these negative phenomena in which, unfortunately, women and girls are exploited in the drug traffic or are trafficked for prostitution. During the years, I have grown professionally and I am proud that I did my part to put under criminal procedures individuals and criminal groups involved in these activities. I often found myself part of operations which I used to read once in espionage books. They are real part of our lives, even in more difficult ways, without the fictional tint given to characters by the authors. When it is told, it may sound as an attractive adventure, but is completely different in real life. Besides being fearful and nervous, the responsibility of fulfilling the mission prevails. Often, after the end of such mission, you wish to run home and tell to a relative what you experienced, but you have to continue with the routine, calmly, as if nothing has happened. It is something that makes you feel worthy some, but silent and anonymous. The security and protec- tion of the source of information is in my hands and in no way, I would endanger women and girls who have chosen to fight against their exploitation. I feel fulfilled in regards to my dream as a student because my contribution is concrete. The challenge which I have chosen makes me feel complete. PUBLIC REPORT 2019 22

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

n the preparation of the intelligence ers inside and outside the country. Compar- Iproduct, SHISH maintains as its main ing to 2018, there are 486 more intelligence standards quality, objectivity, continuity and information reports, or 13% more. utility. During 2019, SHISH has continued to dy- namically inform the main authorities, the President, the Prime Minister, MFA, MIA and other ministries. The cooperation has increased with and among institutions and law enforcement agencies, such as Albanian State Police, General and Serious Crimes Prosecution, General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering (GDPML) etc. Likewise, the cooperation has increased even with foreign partner services (FPS). SHISH has produced during 2019, 4087 intelligence information reports for custom- Intelligence product by SHISH over the years

Intelligence products by SHISH in 2019 As illegal phenomena and activities now The biggest part of the Intelligence Prod- take place in a broader regional and inter- ucts destined for customers inside the coun- national level and context, the Intelligence try consists in informing the central level au- Products destined for FPS-s has increased, thorities with 1090 intelligence information, being the biggest part with 2366 of them, which is 63% of the total, while the local or 58% of the total, while for clients inside level authorities with 631 intelligence infor- the country 1721 intelligence information or mation or 37% of the total. 42% of the total. For the internal customers, the intelligence product by SHISH served to inform high state institutions, President of the Republic, with 248 intelligence information, compared to 243 in total during 2018; Prime Minister of Albania, with 290 intelligence informa- tion compared to 278 in total during 2018; the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs 42% with 137 intelligence information, compared 58% to 154 during 2018; the Ministry of Inter- nal Affairs with 108 intelligence information, compared to 80 in total during 2018. Also, MD 15 intelligence information, MJ 18 intel- ligence information, MIE 17 intelligence in- formation, DATAK (Department for Trans- The intelligence sharing parency and Countering Corruption) 28 Inside the country and Outside the country intelligence information as well as other line 23 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

ministries according Law Enforcement President and to their specifics. Agencies Prime Minister The positive trend of informing high state institutions, and in the central, level the law enforcement agencies continues. SHISH has con- tinued to provide its Others Ministries contribution, in the field of investigation and law enforce- ment, in the cooper- ation with the Pros- Intelligence product for High State Institutions 2019 ecution and State Police, GDPML and other institutions. Intelligence product for the Prosecution Local Police Department LPD Office is in total 312 intelligence informa- tion, where the main General State Police (GSP) intelligence product is for the Serious Crimes Prosecu- Prosecution Office tion with 184 intel- ligence information; General Prosecution GDPML with 76 intelligence information; Dis- tricts Prosecution Others with 52 intelligence information; GSP GDP with 431 intelligence information com- pared to 346 during IACS 2018, LPD with 597 intelligence infor- mation compared DISA to 325 during 2018; GDPML with 50 Intelligence Product 2019 for the Prosecution, for ASP and other intelligence informa- LEA (Law enforcement agencies) tion, as well as other institutions. PUBLIC REPORT 2019 24

DEVELOPMENTS IT&T AND DIGITALISATION

urther evolution of the technology of tions by cyber-attacks. Finformation and telecommunication During 2019, compared to 2018, increased systems (IT&T) and possibilities offered by hostile and threatening activity has been en- the utilisation of the cyber space during 2019, countered against SHISH public infrastruc- brought the need to approach and use more ture. In order to identify the threats and cor- these possibilities and techniques by our Ser- roborate information about hostile actors vice. To be in the same pace with these de- and factors, SHISH has further developed velopments, SHISH has further developed capacities from the point of view of analysis IT&T capacities, from an infrastructural per- and intelligence of cyber threats, implement- spective, human resources, as well as in the ing systems and platforms of open sources, procedure and regulation aspects. modified accordingly. During 2019, SHISH has digitalised some Likewise, during 2019, SHISH has ad- work processes, bringing facilitations for the vanced further in the development of hu- employees, thus increasing significantly the man resources, where a good level ahs been speed of interaction among different sectors achieved in time and quality with the techno- which are part of the processes. Generally, logical changes. Special emphasis is put in the digitalisation is a long and difficult process to implementation, administration and develop- implement, in the technical and regulation as- ment of the platforms “Private Cloud”, re- pect. Significant progress in 2019 in this area, ducing this way the cost in investment, main- obliges and motivates us to continue even fur- tenance and consulting for the infrastructure ther the rapid and secure stages of this im- IT&T and its safeguard. portant contemporary and future challenge In-house developments, use/modification and process. During 2019, the improvement of open source software and strict implemen- of IT&T infrastructure has continued, keep- tation of security policies and procedures re- ing the pace of contemporary developments garding IT&T infrastructures were in focus and best practices in this field, paying special even during 2019. IT&T team of SHISH importance to cyber security aspects. In this continues to professionally self-advance in or- perspective, during 2019, SHISH has applied der to be updated and keep the pace of tech- new methods and technology in safeguarding nological novelties and their implementation perimeters and preventing catastrophic situa- in a reasonable way. 25 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

FAKE NEWS and the threat to national security

he phenomena of fake news is seen today around the world as a serious threat Tto democracy. The creation and dissemination of fake news has incited tensions among people and groups, manipulation of political campaigns, dissemination of pro- paganda by radical and terrorist groups or indirect assistance to criminal groups or individuals. Fake news could bring chaos, panic, terror acts, violence and other types of reactions which harm the individual, society and the state institutions. All these are valid reasons to impose necessary regulations in social media.

Background What is called fake news? Before massive use of internet, dis- The problem of defining fake news is that seminating fake news was more difficult, it can take many forms, produced by many slow and costly, because traditional me- authors, have many different reasons. The dia was more regulated by law and the most common types of fake news are: market. The appearance of social me- - news with sensational content, to generate dia broke the framework which impeded network traffic for commercial purposes fake news, allowing anyone to produce, - news with ideological motivations, in order exchange and disseminate information. to influence people In substance, the barriers for fake news - news categorised as state disinformation, were lifted. with mixed information, true and fake. PUBLIC REPORT 2019 26

Definition

Fake news is an untrue story or news, often sensational, created to look as a true journalistic report, to be broadly disseminated in the traditional media (newspaper, television, radio) or by social media in the internet with the aim: to generate income from the network traffic, to discredit public figures, political movements, companies etc., to influence the public opinion on certain matters.

Features of fake news

Fake news aims to touch the hearts and minds of the audience, to indirectly brainwash individuals and groups, making them to believe something that is not true. Fake news usually is written in superlative and sensational wording, to incite emotional response by the reader. This form of manipulation is so broadly presented in the social media and disseminated so fast, that it is very difficult for the specialists to identify credible sources of information from fake news. Another feature is that these fake news are created by dark web pages, then to be disseminated by social media and supporters aware of these news or by innocent readers who cannot distinguish them from the real news. Specific platforms are created which are used to target certain geographic areas or re- ligious, gender, education and social-economic groups with messages which reach the targeted public.

Most suitable means to disseminate fake news are: - Social media which work with texts, images or videos and through a high number of followers - So called “guerrillas” news pages , which mix facts, opinions and clear fabrications, in support of parties, positions, alternatives, doctrines or certain individuals - So called “parody” pages, which imitate known me- dia pages. 27 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

How fake news harms security? to intelligence analysts by fake news is the process of distinguishing fake news Cyber space criminals exploit this from the one of credible sources, in an broad field of possibilities, not only to attempt to extract quality information transform the dissemination of fake news from open sources. in a profitable business. Fake news dis- The difficulty is the identification, as- seminated by state entities could harm na- sessment and obstruction of fake news tional security of other countries through to prevent unwanted or harmful effects influencing the broad public opinion on national security. Our specialised units there, or the decision making process of for open sources are continually updating institutions. their knowledge, through identification So, an identified problem in the world of social pages and portals which mostly is the utilisation of fake news in electoral produce and disseminate fake news for campaigns by actors inside and outside unfair gains or political influence and by the country, while in our country fake understanding how this phenomena func- news is disseminated mostly for financial tions. gains or political and social credo. The difference between real and fake news is not always easy to identify. So, What does SHISH do to counter SHISH employees and candidates have this phenomenon? undergone during this year a specific training regarding fake news, its risks and Governments, companies, users are ways to identify and block its dissemina- becoming aware of how serious is today tion. the manipulation of the public opinion, The work of SHISH in countering fake expressed in the form of fake news. news, follows measures taken by partner Even the Albanian government services of NATO and EU has started to admit the fact countries, which work to that fake news has to be present clear warning signs countered actively. Other in the struggle to distin- governmental institutions guish the truth from the and agencies are joining fake, respecting the law, this stance by working the constitutional prin- to impose rules on infor- principles and the need mation disseminators and for balance between two punishment for disseminators clashing interests: the need of fake news. SHISH is working to avoid unwanted effects in this direction too. FAKE NEWS of this phenomenon, in the SHISH collects information benefit of decision-making and from open sources, which means democratic processes and to that it is faced every day with fake safeguard democratic values. news found there. The challenge posed PUBLIC REPORT 2019 28

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON FAKE NEWS

What fake news is? Fake news is disinformation, misinformation and propaganda. It is important to distinguish between intentionally wrong information, satirical or not entirely factual stories and information that is factual but is being described as fake so that people don’t believe it.

Why people spread fake news across social media? Different studies aim to estimate how people are exposed every day to fake news and to understand how many people are likely to believe as true a piece of fake news, and thus, are likely to spread it. The studies show that, being exposed to plenty of fake news can over time wear down a person’s resistance and persuade them to share unverified content, especially if it comes from an influential source.

Which are the three fastest spreaders? 1. Trolls - Trolls are humans who spread provocative, emotional, untrue stories. They generally support fake news stories that they’re ideologically aligned with, by generat ing comments, insulting or intimidating users and public figures, and undermining the credibility of ideas they don’t like. They create many social media accounts, put fake names, photos and descriptions of themselves online, they make friends and followers and then start supporting fake news or creating and spreading their fake news stories. Trolls can be better at persuading groups of people who are less con- vinced and want information about specific subjects. 2. Bots - Bots, or robots, are computer algorithms simulating the behav- ior of human beings in a social network and they are good for spreading massive num- bers of emotional messages with little informational content. These message are spread then by those who already agree with the basic sentiment. Bots spread fake news among people who are already like-minded. Social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Ins tagram, etc.) have become home to millions of social bots spreading fake news. In 2017, there were 23 million bots on Twitter (around 8.5% of all accounts), 140 million bots on Facebook (up to 5.5% of accounts) and around 27 million bots on Instagram (8.2% of accounts). 190 million bots on just three social media platforms! 3. Power-law - The so-called “power law” of social media shows that messages replicate rapidly if they are targeted at relatively a small number of influential people with too many followers.

What kinds of people are targeted by fake news? Evidences show that the young, the elderly and the lesser educated are prone to be the first victims to fake news. Then follow political partisans and all kind of extremists, who have the tendency to believe stories that confirm their convictions.

Can we fight back fake news? Disinformation will be always present. But we can slow and hinder its spread by three main means. 29 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

1. Social 2. Being able to evaluate and separate fake media plat- news from real news is a part of media lit- 3. Fake forms may eracy. There are strategies we all can use to news dan- spot much spot fake news, especially in social media. ger should quicker the Some key questions may help us under- be analyzed untrue con- stand better before we decide to share a as a strate- story in social media: tent and at- gic manage- Who created this? tach warn- ment risk by Why did they make it? ings or even Who is the message for? media, gov- quarantine What techniques are being used to make ernmental the disinfor- this message credible or believable? agencies and mation. What details were left out, and why? private sec- How did the message make you feel? tor, too.

In the era of disinformation campaigns, deepfakes and clickbait, being able to identify quality information has become an essential part of being a responsible citizen.

Drini - Officer of Open Sources and Cyber Crime

I am Drini. After graduating university in the field of Information Technology, I started working in a pri- vate business which was selling computer devices. But over the years, despite financial income, I no- ticed that professionally I was not advancing. One day, I met one of my university colleagues, who had started working in the security structures, in the IT section. After general and work discussions he asked me: “Drini, have you thought of chang- ing your job? Why don’t you file an application in SHISH? There is a notification in their official page, on free job positions for IT specialists. There, you will have the possibility to update you knowledge not only in our field, but even as a cyber-specialist”. I have read many books and seen many movies on classic espionage, but developing such a battle in the cyber space was something new which attracted me. I decided to file an application. After security verifications, I started working in the Service. In essence, our task is to safeguard the systems from unauthorised interven- tions, carry out vulnerability tests, risk assessments and evaluating different incidents in the cyber space and online. There have always been attempts for attacks, hackings, intrusions, but we are always there, after the virtual curtain, ready to act and prevent. To keep the pace of developments in the online media and technology which are used by criminal networks, we follow closely the developments of the field and are involved in specialised trainings in partner countries, but at the same time training our colleagues. Likewise, we filter informa- tion from open sources, taking into consideration the space taken today by the phenomena of fake news in the social media, helping in this way for an objective analysis and unbiased decision making process on some sensitive issues. I am very happy today with the choice I made. I have grown professionally and I also serve my country. PUBLIC REPORT 2019 30

BUDGET AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF SHISH

he State Intelligence Service, during In the beginning of this year, the Council T2019, has administered a budget in of Ministers approved with decision no. 259, the amount of around 1,64 milliard ALL, dated 24.04.2019, the raise of salaries for compared to 1,55 milliard ALL last year. SHISH employees. Classification of salaries From this amount, around 70% is for salaries according to the level and difficulty of em- and social security for the employees and the ployees was realised in respect to the annual other part for investments and for the needs financial effects put in place by the Ministry of the institution for goods and services. of Finance. Procurement for a part of these goods During 2019, the State Intelligence Ser- and services, are realised at the Agency for vice drafted the register and the risk strategy, Concentrated Purchases where the proce- which is an obligation from Articles 10 and dures of public procurement are carried out 21 of the Law no. 10296, dated 08.07.2010 while requests for purchases of Information “Financial Management and Control”. Technology devices are sent to the National The purpose of the strategy is to as- Agency for Information (AKSHI). Invest- sure that the concept of risk management ments are mainly dedicated to the improve- is the essence of the organisational culture, ment of work conditions for SHISH em- through the idea of risk reduction and its as- ployees and the purchase of contemporary sessment, for every activity carried out by the devices of operational techniques. State Intelligence Service. This document defines general principles of risk in the State Intelligence Service, according to a system- atic method used to identify, analyse, asses, treat, monitor and communicate the main risks which are responsibility of SHISH in order to minimise unforeseen negative events in the financial field. During 2019, SHISH has managed bud- getary funds with prudence and efficiency. For 2020, SHISH was allocated a fund in the amount of 1.87 milliard ALL. 31 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

H UMAN RESOURCES Current state of Human Resources he structure of SHISH, in the end of T2019, is completed at 94% of the to- tal number of employees, where 5% of va- cant positions have passed all processes of tests and now the new recruits are undergo- 23% ing a 6 month training. FEMALES In SHISH, 77% of employees are males 77% and 23% females, which shows progress in MALES the respect of gender equality, despite the fact that a lot remains to be done. Leading positions in SHISH are 13% of the total number of employees, while 3% of them are females. The average age of SHISH employees during 2019 is 44 years old.

Recruitment of Human Resources in 2019 Recruitment of Human Resources is following phases: one of the main challenges of the work of The recruitment process goes through SHISH, to attract human resources of high the initial study of vacant positions, at the professional capacities, focused in results time of assessment, in the average number and in fulfilment of different roles, to meet of employees who for family, medical or the needs and keep the balances. other reasons, may ask to leave SHISH, in The recruitment procedure is based on the number of employees who fulfil the re- approved regulations and passes through the tirement criteria as well as the Service needs PUBLIC REPORT 2019 32 for capable potential candidates and individ- and detailed statistics on the data of all can- uals with special abilities and rare languages. didates, selection of candidates who fulfil the The recruitment of an officer in SHISH criteria and will be put under written and oral for 2019 has lasted for 6 months, until the test, as well as the definition of winning can- winning candidates are defined, after passing didates who will be submitted to the verifica- all phases foreseen by the legal acts, specifi- tions of the security conditions. cally: Besides the admissions with tests, SHISH Publication of the needs for employees recruits even nationals which present direct in two national newspapers with large circu- job-applications, through the e-mail address lation, publication in the official web page [email protected] or when are rec- of SHISH, collection of documentation of ommended by SHISH employees and have candidates (applicants), preparation of full special qualities requested by our side.

Recruitment Phases

Presented after publication

Qualified according to criteria

Passed the oral test

Shortlist

Selected for employment

Trainings To fulfil the tasks and objectives, different For 2019, 3,6 % of the employees have SHISH units have the obligation to undergo attended long term trainings from 1 up to 4 continuous on-job training, provided by in- months period, and around 4% of the total ternal structures of SHISH, by the country’s number have attended the 6 months training security institutions and partner services, in for SHISH officers. the framework of cooperation with other in- Short term trainings of 1-3 days were at- stitutions and agencies. tended by 40 % of the current employees.

Study on the refreshment of Human Resources for the period 2020-2023 SHISH is preparing a strategic study on state of age of the Service staff and in par- the refreshment of human resources for 3 ticular the operational personnel; year period, where the emphasis will be on: - To provide guidance, work directions and - Identifying and presenting the current priorities for staff refreshment and reform. 33 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

COOPERATION INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY n the framework of the fulfilment of - laundering of the criminal product Iits duties and priorities, during this pe- - smuggling and fiscal evasion riod SHISH has enhanced cooperation with - high level corruption in the state admin- institutions and law enforcement agencies istration and in the justice system, etc. for the prevention and disruption of the Cooperation with law enforcement agen- criminal and illegal activities such as: cies during 2019 has brought concrete and - international terrorism tangible results in the war against organised - international trafficking of narcotics crime, which has been finalised with opera- - networks of illegal migration and hu- tions and concrete results. man trafficking

International cooperation

SHISH in the frame of mutual interests, has significantly increased. The main focus has further enhanced relations with intel- for 2019 was still the cooperation in the ligence partner services, deepened exist- field of counter intelligence, mainly the ing cooperation, established new ones and activities of non-friendly secret services raised the contribution in analysis and as- against our country and the North Atlantic sessments for intelligence and security Alliance, organised crime, traffic of narcot- structures of NATO, EU etc. ics, activities of violent extremism and ter- During 2019, the exchange of informa- rorism, regional security and stability etc. tion in the strategic and operational level Taking into consideration the strategic PUBLIC REPORT 2019 34 position of our country in the region, SHISH It is worth mentioning the concrete con- has aimed and realised the deepening of the tribution of SHISH in the frame of Civilian intelligence and operational cooperation in Intelligence Committee of NATO, in the the regional level, on matters connected to field of terrorism in the Western Balkans, regional security, organised crime, terrorism activities of rival services and their proxies, etc. In the frame of regional cooperation, hybrid activities etc. SHISH has hosted regional conferences in In the frame of enhancing bilateral rela- the experts’ level, where expertise has been tions, SHISH has increased the number of shared on organised crime, illegal migration representatives, liaison officers in countries and challenges of intelligence services for which we share same security challenges the prevention and interruption of these and threats. This had an effect in increas- phenomena. International cooperation has ing and deepening the cooperation and deepened in the management and experts’ strengthening the relations with the partner level, in bilateral and multilateral meetings, intelligence services of the countries where as well as being active part of international they were accredited. conferences and seminars on security and In this frame, SHISH has deepened in- intelligence. telligence and operational cooperation even The Service has also continued to offer through liaison officers of partner services contribution in plenary meetings in regional accredited in our country. and international multilateral formats such From a regional approach and expertise, as, “SEEIC”, “MEC”, “ADRIACLUB” SHISH has played and is playing a positive etc., where were treated issued of terrorism role in the regional security, in countering threats, illegal migration, energy security, ac- extremism and terrorism and continuously tivities of third actors and their intelligence has received positive feedback from partner services in the region etc. services. 35 STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

SHISH in social AND humanitarIAN INITIATIVES

he State Intelligence Service is in- Tvolved in social and humanitarian ini- tiatives and activities. SHISH promotes vol- untarism and humanitarian activities among its employees. In 2019, SHISH staff joined the Al- banian Red Cross initiative for voluntary blood donation. With the help of Red Cross structures, several dozen employee donations have helped to address a very serious con- cern, such as the lack of blood in our hospitals. This is also an expression of humanism and support for children with thalassemia. Donat- ing blood means giving hope, saving lives, and SHISH employees recognize that blood is vital, that it is never enough, and that it is need- ed at all times for immediate use. and their contribution and support are ap- For the past few years, SHISH employees preciated and welcomed by the Albanian have been considered regular blood donors Red Cross.

* * *

Blood donation is not the only social commitment of SHISH. At the end of the year, SHISH employees waged a multi-day campaign to collect and donate funds to citi- zens damaged by the November 26 earth- quake. In each SHISH unit, a certain amount of funding has been collected to help to a certain extent families who have lost their homes, or who found themselves in difficult socio-economic conditions, after this natu- ral disaster. The total amount collected by SHISH was deposited into the bank account opened by the Albanian government to sup- port families damaged by the earthquake. PUBLIC REPORT 2019 36

New Year Celebration

On the occasion of quarters on the eve of the New Year’s celebrations, New Year, to celebrate to- SHISH opened its doors gether. Children brought for the children. SHISH delight in our agency, does pay attention to the they celebrated for several situation and treatment hours among different of its employees and their artists dear to them, their families, trying to stimu- toys and dreams. That was late the best values of a reminder to us that we our society through so- owe them a lot. They de- cializing. We are aware that, during the year, serve a better and a safer country, while their we have created a big time gap towards the parents strive every day to accomplish the mis- younger ones and our families, and that is why sion of an agency, like SHISH, which is of we decided to invite them at SHISH Head- paramount importance to national security. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALL - Albanian Lek ASP - Albanian State Police DATAK - Department for Transparency and Countering Corruption DISA - Defece Intelligence and Security Agency EU - European Union FPS - Foreign Partner Service FTF - Foreign Terrorist Fighter GDPML - General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering GSP - General State Police IACS - Internal Affairs and Complaints Service INTERPOL - International Criminal Police Organisation ISIL/DAESH - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria IT&T - Information Techniology and Telecommunications LEA - Law Enforcement Agency LPD - Local Police Department MD - Ministry of Defence MEC - Middle European Conference MENA - Middle East and North Africa MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs MIA - Ministry of Internal Affairs MJ - Ministry of Justice NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation SEEIC - South East Europe Intelligence Conference SHISH - Albanian State Intelligence Service TAP - Trans Adriatic Pipeline TATP - triacetone triperoxide (explosive)

This document is property of SHISH. It is published to inform the general public on the activities of SHISH, and on the challenges and threats our country is facing. The document is public, and can be found in an electronic format at website www.shish.gov. al. The text and pictures can be used for research and information purposes, creditting the original source.

Contact: Tel: +355 69 4138387 Email: [email protected] Postal Address: Rruga “Kongresi i Manastirit”, Tirana, Albania www.shish.gov.al

TIRANA - 2020