Rapid Protection Assessment November-December 2018: South West Cameroon (2)

Contents Introduction ...... 1 Scope ...... 2 Methodology ...... 2 Limitations ...... 2 Key findings ...... 2 Security...... 4 Basic services ...... 7 Documentation ...... 8 Freedom of movement ...... 9 Housing, land and property ...... 10 5.1: Host community tensions ...... 11 5.6: Support from NGOs ...... 11 6: Durable solutions: intentions ...... 11 Conclusion ...... 12 Recommendations for further analysis ...... 12

Introduction

DRC carried out a preliminary set of Rapid Protection Assessments in Buea, Mutengene and Tiko on November 22, 2018. However, teams faced serious access constraints and the information from Tiko was particularly limited as much of it had to come through phone calls. As such, a follow up mission to Tiko took place on December 5 and a mission to Limbe town (sub-divison Limbe 3) was carried out November 29-30. From secondary data reviews DRC was aware that Limbe had a reputation as a safe haven for IDPs coming from sites across the South West and had a heavy presence of state services. This made it a useful point of comparison for other locations (in this case, Tiko), with lower governmental presence. As per other locations, the Rapid Protection Assessment sought to identify protection risks, threats, vulnerabilities and capacities in more detail in areas where a response program might be feasible. During these missions there were no additional access constraints faced.

Scope

The assessment was designed to gather community level data in order to better ascertain key protection risks faced by those who were displaced, returned or hosting displaced communities in the South West region. Following a brief review of limited secondary data, a series of protection concerns were recognized as most likely to be identified in targeted communities such as protection of civilians, securitization of civilian areas, movement restrictions and loss of documentation. On the basis of this review, a questionnaire was developed and teams carried out the assessment November 29, 30 and December 5, 2018. A total of 48 key informants (18 male, 30 female) were interviewed across two sub-divisions all located within the Fako Division of the South West.

Methodology

Key informant interviews were conducted in person using a set questionnaire involving both open and closed questions. This methodology was chosen to avoid any grouping of individuals that might cause safety concerns for participants and to allow for maximum possible comfort in discussions over sensitive information. Where necessary, codes were used to identify particularly sensitive options such as labelling of perpetrators. Key informants were chosen based on their technical specialties, such as teachers’ knowledge of the education system, or area specific knowledge, such as community leaders. A mix of ages and genders made up the total number of key informants with more female than male KIs in total and an average KI age of 39. Assessors primarily used mobile data collection techniques through SurveyCTO although in a few cases, hard copy assessment forms were preferred.

Limitations

While participants were given the options of both ‘don’t know’ and ‘don’t want to say’, in some cases they did not feel comfortable to give either answer. Assessors were trained on how to approach community members and in how to explain the activities of the Danish Refugee Council. However, the humanitarian crisis in the South West is fairly recent and the presence of INGOs very limited, meaning community members could have misunderstood the purpose of the assessment or their participation. The heavy presence of state services, including civilian security services, in Limbe may have impacted the responses of key informants, some of whom came from interconnected government services such as health personnel or social workers.

Key findings

In each chart, the percentage of key informants (KIs) is detailed on one axis from a total of 48 (split 27 for Limbe and 21 for Tiko), with the data collected on the other.

Key Informants:

1.1 Percentage and count of key informants gender

Limbe Tiko

11 10 20

Female Male Female Male

1.2 Percentage of groups reported per site by key informants

Tiko

Limbe

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% % key informant

Host community IDPs IDP returnees Refugees

As with DRC’s earlier assessments, key informants reported a mixture of host community, IDPs and IDP returnees. The reports of refugees in Limbe may represent an error in data collection.

Security

2.1 Percentage of KIs reporting presence of security actors post-crisis

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40% % key% informant 30%

20%

10%

0% Police Gendarmerie BIR Marines Non-state Other Don't know Don't want groups to say

Limbe Tiko

2.2 Percentage of armed groups reported by key informants– pre-crisis

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40% % key% informant 30%

20%

10%

0% Police Gendarmerie BIR Marines Non-state Other Don't know Don't want to groups say

Limbe Tiko

There was a big reported increase of BIR in both locations since the start of the crisis with 60% of KIs reporting them present in Limbe compared to 30% reporting BIR being present pre-crisis. The presence of non-state armed groups was clearly higher in Tiko, correlating with more limited state forces. The overall reports show a perceived increase in militarization although civilian policing is reportedly at a higher level than in Buea or Mutengene, as per DRC’s first RPA.

2.3: Types of insecurity in the current location reported by key informant

Incidents of security Limbe Tiko Theft 59% 24% Physical assault 44% 19% Abduction/disappearances 4% 10% Threats 37% 5% Armed conflict 0% 10% Don't know 0% 5% Don't want to say 0% 0%

The presence of civilian security forces (police) in Limbe did not correlate with reportedly lower incidents of insecurity, with high levels of reported theft and physical assault by KIs. DRC did not ask for a breakdown in perpetrators of insecurity at this level. However, the incidents of abductions/disappearances and armed conflict are clearly reported as higher in Tiko where KIs detail the presence of non-state armed groups.

2.4: Percentage of presence of armed groups reported by key informant

Armed groups passing through location Limbe Tiko Yes, often 19% 14% Yes, sometimes 7% 29% No, never 37% 38% Don't know 37% 10% Don't want to say 0% 10%

There is a clear discrepancy between the information provided by Limbe KIs as to the presence of armed groups between questions 2.4 and 2.1 (‘Are there armed groups passing through this area?’ And, ‘Are any of the following security forces present in or near the site where you are?’), which may be explained by confusion as to whether the presence of armed groups relates to their current location or their village of origin. In question 2.4, 19% of key informants reported that armed groups “often” passed through their location, where as in 2.1, no KIs in Limbe marked ‘non- state groups’ as present in their area. IDPs in Limbe were reported as coming from a number of areas of Meme and even further North, which have been under control of non-state armed groups for some time. Interestingly 10% of the key informants interviewed in Tiko opted not to tell the DRC assessment team about their knowledge of armed groups indicating some fear of repercussions.

2.5: Percentage of hazards experienced by individuals reported by key informant

What kind of hazards exist now that affect people? Limbe Tiko Discrimination against certain groups 11% 38% Threats 37% 24% Physical violence 33% 29% Arbitrary arrests 41% 14% Abductions/disappearances 7% 10% Arbitrary executions/murder 4% 5% Forced recruitment into armed groups 0% 0% Don't know 37% 24% Don't want to say 0% 0%

While many key informants in Limbe claimed that there were no hazards for people living in their area – reporting ‘don’t know’ to indicate that these options did not apply to them – others clearly stated that arbitrary arrests and threats were at relatively high levels. This may demonstrate a difference in opinions of those connected with state services and KIs with no governmental ties. However, this would require further analysis to be able to substantiate. Arbitrary arrests in Limbe were reported a much higher level than Tiko, correlating with increased presence of security forces. The discrepancy in reported threats between 4.14 and 4.8 in Tiko (5% and 24%) demonstrates that key informants were not always consistent in their reports.

2.6: Percentage of reported perpetrators by key informant

Current main perpetrators Limbe Tiko Police 15% 19% Gendarmerie 4% 14% BIR 19% 19% Military/marines 4% 5% Armed 4% 5% Civilian criminals 26% 14% Don't know 52% 48% Don't want to say 0% 5%

Key Informants reported that police and/or BIR were most likely to be perpetrators of hazards in Tiko with those in Limbe more likely to blame civilian criminals. This is in contrast to DRC’s previous assessments covering Mutengene and Buea where the gendarmerie were more likely to be the reported perpetrator.

Basic services

3.1/2 Percentage of primary schools available by key informant, pre and post crisis

Primary school available in location Limbe Tiko Pre-crisis 100% 100% Current 86% 95%

Unlike in Buea and Mutengene, KIs reported a high level of access to primary school education even after the start of the crisis although there was clearly a drop in overall service provision. There were gaps in the information provided by KIs on what was blocking access to schools, which would require further investigation to understand.

3.3/4: Percentage of health clinics available by key informant, pre and post crisis

Health clinic available in location Limbe Tiko Pre-crisis 85% 57% Current 89% 76%

Key Informants reported an overall increase in health service provision in both Limbe and Tiko. However, as with other questions, there may have been some confusion around whether the pre- crisis access related to their current location or to their village of origin.

As in DRC’s previous assessment, market access was not reported as a major constraint, with around 80% of key informants in both locations reporting current access. At the same time, the majority of KIs reported that there was “not enough” available at markets (63% in Limbe and 83% in Tiko). As with previous assessments, this merits further investigation to see what specific items are lacking and any changes pre and post crisis.

3.5 – Percentage of market availability by key informant

If yes, is there enough available at the market? Limbe Tiko Enough 32% 17% Not enough 63% 83% Don't know 5% 0%

There were major discrepancies in WASH facilities in the areas covered in Limbe and Tiko. In Limbe there was relatively high access to water points (85%) and latrines (78%), whereas this was significantly less in Tiko (43%). This would lend itself to further investigation in order to determine whether this access has significantly dropped due to the crisis.

Documentation

4.1/2 – Percentage of availability of birth and land and property documents by key informant

Limbe Tiko Land and Land and Birth property Birth property documents documents documents documents They are widespread 44% 37% 48% 24% It's about half and half 11% 22% 19% 19% Only a limited number of people have them 11% 7% 10% 14% Very few people have them 15% 15% 10% 24% Don't know 19% 19% 14% 19% Don't want to say 0% 0% 0% 0%

Both in Limbe and in Tiko there were reported lack of civil documentation for both birth registration papers and land ownership documents, with land documents slightly lower in Tiko (24%). Secondary data review shows that some displaced persons lost documents after their houses were burned while others may have been coerced by non-state armed actors into destroying their documents in order to demonstrate their allegiances.

4.3 - Percentage of barriers to documentation access reported by key informants

80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30%

% % key informant 20% 10% 0% The The fees for People are People don't Don't know Don't want to transportation documents are scared to go to know the say costs are too too high government procedures high to get to services services

Limbe Tiko

Document fees and transportation fees were the most prevalent reasons reported by KIs as barriers to accessing civil documentation. This varies slightly from previous assessments in Buea and Mutengene where a significant proportion of KIs reported fear of accessing government services as blocking people from access. From secondary data reporting, ‘fees’, may include both official and non-official costs. Transportation costs would require further investigation to understand how far displaced people have to travel to get to their nearest state office.

4.4: Percentages of risks of not having documentation reported by key informants

Risks to documentation access Limbe Tiko Restrictions on freedom of movement 81% 95% Harassment by security forces 67% 67% Barriers to accessing services 33% 19% Barriers in accessing land and property 7% 5% Don't know 4% 0% Don't want to say 0% 0%

Nearly 70% of KIs in both locations reported harassment by security forces as prevalent among the risks associated with not having documentation. This was despite Tiko reporting lower presence of civilian security forces to those in Tiko.

Freedom of movement

5.1: Percentage of barriers to freedom of movement for IDPs reported by key informants

Barriers on freedom of movement Limbe Tiko Lack of documentation 89% 76% State run checkpoints 33% 19% Armed group checkpoints 0% 5% Direct armed conflict 7% 5% Risk of forced recruitment 0% 5% Risk of sexual harassment or sexual exploitation 15% 0% Curfews 30% 29% Natural hazards e.g. landslides, flooding etc 0% 0% Don't know 0% 5% Don't want to say 0% 0%

Most key informants in both locations listed lack of documentation as the biggest barrier to IDP movement. In Limbe, KIs were more likely to report state run checkpoints as blocking movement which correlates with the increased presence of state forces and lack of reported presence of armed groups. Limbe KIs also reported that the risk of sexual harassment or sexual exploitation was deterring IDPs from freely moving.

Housing, land and property

6.1: Percentage hazards related to property reported by key informants

Types of hazard in location Limbe Tiko

Theft or confiscation of properties 19% 14% Robbery or banditry on the roads 26% 19% Land occupied by armed groups or armed forces 4% 0% Reduced land available because of conflict 4% 0% Destruction of properties 0% 5% Don't know 63% 67% Don't want to say 0% 0%

A high number of KIs in both locations did not know about property hazards. However, those that did, reported that theft of property and/or robbery on the road were prevalent. A small number of KIs in Limbe also reported that armed groups or armed forces were occupying civilian property.

IDPs were currently listed as most likely to be staying with the host community or in a rented accommodation.

6.2: Percentage of accommodation types reported by key informant

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% % % key informant 30% 20% 10% 0% Rented shelter Collective Staying with Tent Don't know Don't want to informal host population say shelter

Limbe Tiko

Host community tensions

7.1: Percentage of key informants reporting tension between host community and IDP groups a

Tiko

Limbe

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% % key informant

Yes No Don't know

From the key informants interviewed, many more reported tensions between IDPs in Tiko than in Limbe. This may also reflect the number of state service employees interviewed in Limbe compared to those in Tiko. In Limbe, 26% of KIs reported that there were tensions over rental payments compared to only 5% in Tiko. This is despite similar number of KIs in both locations reporting that IDPs mostly live rented accommodation. A smaller number of KIs in Limbe (15%) and Tiko (10%) reported tensions over food allocation. This points to the need to address shelter concerns in Limbe as a priority.

Support from NGOs

In contrast to DRC’s previous assessments in Buea and Mutengene, there were some key informants who reported that people in their community had received support from NGOs (11% in Limbe and 5% in Tiko). This may reflect the increased presence of humanitarian assistance and a longer time frame in which to respond.

Durable solutions: intentions

Similarly to previous assessments, key informants primarily reported that some IDPs did not want to return. When asked why they wanted to stay, most KIs stated that the security situation in their area of origin was a barrier to return, indicating that they would be keen to go back following a significant improvement in the security environment. However, from secondary data review it seems that some host community members believe not all displaced persons are ‘real’ IDPs and may have moved for economic reasons.

9.1: Percentage of reasons why IDP community want to remain in current location by key informant

Reasons for remaining Limbe Tiko

Better security situation here 45% 60% Better access to natural resources here 0% 0% Better access to basic services here 0% 20% Insecurity in their place of origin 45% 20% More economic opportunities here 0% 0% More humanitarian aid here 0% 0% Family reasons 9% 0% Other 0% 0% Don't know 0% 0% Don't want to say 0% 0%

Conclusion

As with DRC’s previous assessments in Buea and Mutengene, there is a clear increase in the militarization of civilian areas. In Limbe, there is a greater presence of civilian policing and state services in general but this does not correlate with reduced insecurity overall. This would lend itself to the conclusion that at least some of the time, security forces are the perpetrators of insecurity or at least allowing insecurity to continue. The picture in Tiko is different with more limited state presence and incidents associated with non-state armed groups such as abductions. KIs also report that NSAGs pass through the area from time to time. As in Buea and Mutengene, the lack of civil documentation is putting IDPs at risk of harassment by security forces, with similarly high levels in Limbe, despite its reputation as a safe haven for displaced persons. While access to services such as primary schools and health facilities remain relatively high in both locations, IDPs appear to be at greater risk of tensions with host communities, particularly over rental payments. This, in part, seems to be supported by secondary data suggesting some host community members consider IDPs to be economic internal migrants. Their perceptions are not backed up by information gathered in IDP intentions, however, with nearly all KIs stating that insecurity in the areas of origin was the main barrier to return, indicating that economic opportunities did not factor into their decision to flee.

Recommendations for further analysis

 The relatively high levels of criminal insecurity, such as theft and physical assault, in Limbe warrant further investigation as they correlate with higher levels of civilian policing. Further research could establish possible perpetrators.  WASH facilities in Tiko were reportedly significantly less accessible than those in Limbe, despite other similarities between the two urban areas. Further research could establish if this has changed since the beginning of the crisis and other reasons for the disparity. 12

 Unlike in Buea and Mutengene, KIs reported transportation fees and the second most prevalent reason communities not being able to access civil documentation. From additional assessments, this could be triangulated to understand the precise distances involved and the reason for the heavy costs.  Information collected contained gaps in reasons why primary school access was now blocked. This would merit further investigation as, in Buea and Mutengene, fear of accessing state services was a significant barrier to access.  As in DRC’s previous assessment, market access was not reported as a major constraint with around 80% of key informants in both locations reporting current access. At the same time, the majority of KIs reported that there was “not enough” available at markets (63% in Limbe and 83% in Tiko). As with previous assessments, this merits further investigation to see what specific items are lacking and any changes pre and post crisis.  No KIs reported forced recruitment as an issue but from secondary reporting, DRC is aware of this happening in the South West. Further research could establish both reported prevalence and the methodology needed to collect this information.  A more detailed analysis of KI professions may reveal a further pattern of responses across the board that appear to correlate state service professions with a more favorable view of IDP access to basic services and insecurity levels.