Rapid Protection Assessment November-December 2018: South West Cameroon (2) Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Scope ........................................................................................................................................... 2 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 2 Limitations ................................................................................................................................... 2 Key findings ..................................................................................................................................... 2 Security........................................................................................................................................ 4 Basic services ............................................................................................................................... 7 Documentation ........................................................................................................................... 8 Freedom of movement ............................................................................................................... 9 Housing, land and property ...................................................................................................... 10 5.1: Host community tensions .................................................................................................. 11 5.6: Support from NGOs ............................................................................................................ 11 6: Durable solutions: intentions ................................................................................................ 11 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 12 Recommendations for further analysis ......................................................................................... 12 Introduction DRC carried out a preliminary set of Rapid Protection Assessments in Buea, Mutengene and Tiko on November 22, 2018. However, teams faced serious access constraints and the information from Tiko was particularly limited as much of it had to come through phone calls. As such, a follow up mission to Tiko took place on December 5 and a mission to Limbe town (sub-divison Limbe 3) was carried out November 29-30. From secondary data reviews DRC was aware that Limbe had a reputation as a safe haven for IDPs coming from sites across the South West and had a heavy presence of state services. This made it a useful point of comparison for other locations (in this case, Tiko), with lower governmental presence. As per other locations, the Rapid Protection Assessment sought to identify protection risks, threats, vulnerabilities and capacities in more detail in areas where a response program might be feasible. During these missions there were no additional access constraints faced. 1 Scope The assessment was designed to gather community level data in order to better ascertain key protection risks faced by those who were displaced, returned or hosting displaced communities in the South West region. Following a brief review of limited secondary data, a series of protection concerns were recognized as most likely to be identified in targeted communities such as protection of civilians, securitization of civilian areas, movement restrictions and loss of documentation. On the basis of this review, a questionnaire was developed and teams carried out the assessment November 29, 30 and December 5, 2018. A total of 48 key informants (18 male, 30 female) were interviewed across two sub-divisions all located within the Fako Division of the South West. Methodology Key informant interviews were conducted in person using a set questionnaire involving both open and closed questions. This methodology was chosen to avoid any grouping of individuals that might cause safety concerns for participants and to allow for maximum possible comfort in discussions over sensitive information. Where necessary, codes were used to identify particularly sensitive options such as labelling of perpetrators. Key informants were chosen based on their technical specialties, such as teachers’ knowledge of the education system, or area specific knowledge, such as community leaders. A mix of ages and genders made up the total number of key informants with more female than male KIs in total and an average KI age of 39. Assessors primarily used mobile data collection techniques through SurveyCTO although in a few cases, hard copy assessment forms were preferred. Limitations While participants were given the options of both ‘don’t know’ and ‘don’t want to say’, in some cases they did not feel comfortable to give either answer. Assessors were trained on how to approach community members and in how to explain the activities of the Danish Refugee Council. However, the humanitarian crisis in the South West is fairly recent and the presence of INGOs very limited, meaning community members could have misunderstood the purpose of the assessment or their participation. The heavy presence of state services, including civilian security services, in Limbe may have impacted the responses of key informants, some of whom came from interconnected government services such as health personnel or social workers. Key findings In each chart, the percentage of key informants (KIs) is detailed on one axis from a total of 48 (split 27 for Limbe and 21 for Tiko), with the data collected on the other. 2 Key Informants: 1.1 Percentage and count of key informants gender Limbe Tiko 7 11 10 20 Female Male Female Male 1.2 Percentage of groups reported per site by key informants Tiko Limbe 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% % key informant Host community IDPs IDP returnees Refugees As with DRC’s earlier assessments, key informants reported a mixture of host community, IDPs and IDP returnees. The reports of refugees in Limbe may represent an error in data collection. 3 Security 2.1 Percentage of KIs reporting presence of security actors post-crisis 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% % key informant%key 30% 20% 10% 0% Police Gendarmerie BIR Marines Non-state Other Don't know Don't want groups to say Limbe Tiko 2.2 Percentage of armed groups reported by key informants– pre-crisis 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% % key informant%key 30% 20% 10% 0% Police Gendarmerie BIR Marines Non-state Other Don't know Don't want to groups say Limbe Tiko There was a big reported increase of BIR in both locations since the start of the crisis with 60% of KIs reporting them present in Limbe compared to 30% reporting BIR being present pre-crisis. The presence of non-state armed groups was clearly higher in Tiko, correlating with more limited state forces. The overall reports show a perceived increase in militarization although civilian policing is reportedly at a higher level than in Buea or Mutengene, as per DRC’s first RPA. 4 2.3: Types of insecurity in the current location reported by key informant Incidents of security Limbe Tiko Theft 59% 24% Physical assault 44% 19% Abduction/disappearances 4% 10% Threats 37% 5% Armed conflict 0% 10% Don't know 0% 5% Don't want to say 0% 0% The presence of civilian security forces (police) in Limbe did not correlate with reportedly lower incidents of insecurity, with high levels of reported theft and physical assault by KIs. DRC did not ask for a breakdown in perpetrators of insecurity at this level. However, the incidents of abductions/disappearances and armed conflict are clearly reported as higher in Tiko where KIs detail the presence of non-state armed groups. 2.4: Percentage of presence of armed groups reported by key informant Armed groups passing through location Limbe Tiko Yes, often 19% 14% Yes, sometimes 7% 29% No, never 37% 38% Don't know 37% 10% Don't want to say 0% 10% There is a clear discrepancy between the information provided by Limbe KIs as to the presence of armed groups between questions 2.4 and 2.1 (‘Are there armed groups passing through this area?’ And, ‘Are any of the following security forces present in or near the site where you are?’), which may be explained by confusion as to whether the presence of armed groups relates to their current location or their village of origin. In question 2.4, 19% of key informants reported that armed groups “often” passed through their location, where as in 2.1, no KIs in Limbe marked ‘non- state groups’ as present in their area. IDPs in Limbe were reported as coming from a number of areas of Meme and even further North, which have been under control of non-state armed groups for some time. Interestingly 10% of the key informants interviewed in Tiko opted not to tell the DRC assessment team about their knowledge of armed groups indicating some fear of repercussions. 5 2.5: Percentage of hazards experienced by individuals reported by key informant What kind of hazards exist now that affect people? Limbe Tiko Discrimination against certain groups 11% 38% Threats 37% 24% Physical violence 33% 29% Arbitrary arrests 41% 14% Abductions/disappearances 7% 10% Arbitrary executions/murder 4% 5% Forced recruitment into armed groups 0% 0% Don't know 37% 24% Don't want to say 0% 0% While many key informants in Limbe claimed that there were no hazards for people living in their area – reporting