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The Response of the Moroccan Legislature to the Jerada Crisis

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The Response of the Moroccan Legislature to the Jerada Crisis ISSUE BRIEF 05.30.18 The Response of the Moroccan Legislature to the Jerada Crisis Laila Elimam, Research Associate, Women’s Rights in the Middle East Program In December 2017, the inhabitants of Jerada, where teachers and doctors demanded Morocco, began protesting the deaths of higher wages.4 two brothers who were killed scrapping coal In the past, much attention has focused in the abandoned mines. Their deaths are on the responses of MENA regimes to an occurrence that is far too familiar in the displays of protest—particularly those of mining town, where young men repeatedly violence—with little attention afforded to risk—and lose—their lives in the mines out the roles of legislative representatives. One of desperation and lack of employment exception includes the responses of deputies options. In fact, the protests and ire of of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood in Jerada’s residents echo the frustrations Egypt, which welcomed labor protests felt throughout Morocco’s rural districts, in 2008—albeit outside of the legislative including al-Hoceima, which experienced arena—in the textile-producing town of its own protests during the last year. These al-Mahalla al-Kubra as signs of political sentiments also echo the grievances of dissent.5 Other researchers have addressed citizens across the Middle East and North the roles of the leftist Worker’s Party6 in Africa region (MENA), who have continued Tunisia, which historically was responsive to struggle economically. Dire economic to displays of discontent by workers.7 Yet conditions have been amplified by the strict few analyses have looked beyond these International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity cases to better gauge the reactions of MPs Dire economic measures imposed in exchange for loan in the MENA region. This issue brief will conditions have been packages in Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, examine the responses of deputies from amplified by the strict and more recently, Lebanon. the Moroccan House of Representatives International Monetary to the Jerada protests by assessing their In Egypt, for instance, high inflation Fund (IMF) austerity and unemployment rates have resulted legislative activity and questions posed to in exorbitant price increases of goods the government. measures imposed and services. Meanwhile in Tunisia, in exchange for loan demonstrations sprouted up throughout LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN THE packages in Morocco, the country in early 2018, with citizens Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, demanding that the government revoke MENA AND THE MOROCCAN CASE the Finance Act, which increased taxes and Lebanon. Many scholars increasingly question and fuel prices.1 More recently in Tunisia’s the roles of legislative assemblies and southern phosphate-mining city of Gafsa, electoral processes in the MENA given workers and youth marched in protest that many incumbents seem to have little of the worsening economic conditions.2 or no capacity to push for meaningful Demonstrations also emerged in Jordan in democratic reforms.9 One of the most response to price increases3 and in Algeria, prevalent explanations for the existence RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.30.18 of democratic institutions is that autocrats to form cohesive coalitions, the legislature use these institutions as tools to stabilize and political party system are relatively their regimes—namely by distributing well established, particularly compared to rents to co-opt elites that may pose a the assemblies of neighboring countries. threat to their rule. In this way, electoral Denoeux and Desfosses20 argue that the institutions actually offer incumbents Moroccan parliament deserves “more credit” greater permanence by allowing them to given its performance and the context it monitor challengers and shielding them operates in. from threats.10 This argument suggests Morocco’s lower house performs a that legislative assemblies in the region dual role as a monitoring and legislating are rubber-stamp institutions that are institution.21 To perform its monitoring characterized by a lack of autonomy or function, MPs ask questions to cabinet policy impact. members and the government on a However, this approach fails to range of topics to hold them accountable acknowledge the connections between for their performances. The process of legislative representatives and constituents. asking questions is relatively accessible Legislators in the MENA As stipulated by Geddes11 and Lust-Okar,12 to representatives. Though they may not region can assume a legislative elites tend to have direct necessarily be proactively sponsoring mediating role, given relationships with constituents since legislation, MPs have the opportunity deputies can be a source of services for to respond to events impacting citizens the lack of space for citizens.13 Moreover, legislators in the MENA through posing oral and written questions. dialogue between region can assume a mediating role given In contrast, passing bills involves citizens and the the lack of space for dialogue between consideration by the specialized lower house regime. In particular, citizens and the regime.14 In particular, the committee and deliberation by the upper the responsiveness responsiveness of legislative representatives house, before being returned to the lower may contribute toward diffusing public house and eventually to the monarchy for of legislative anger or displays of protest if constituents final ratification.22 representatives may feel they are being acknowledged. This Research by Shalaby and Aydogan23 contribute toward relationship may contribute toward indicates high levels of congruency diffusing public stabilizing the regime as well through less between the issue priorities of citizens and direct means. legislators based on public opinion data anger or displays of Morocco offers an interesting case for and oral questions asked by MPs. They find protest if constituents examining legislative dynamics in the MENA less congruence in proposed bills, owing to feel they are being region more closely. The country has held the more complicated process and the fact acknowledged. multiparty elections since 1963.15 Its political that bills are more frequently driven by the system includes two legislative houses: the monarchy. Their findings also point to the House of Councilors—which is the upper necessity of moving beyond the narrative house with 120 indirectly elected members— of legislative assemblies as rubber-stamp and the House of Representatives, or institutions; in incidents such as the Jerada the lower house, with 395 deputies. The event, the question becomes if and how lower house has two quota provisions16 deputies reacted to the event and the formalized in the 2011 electoral law as part implications for the regime, deputies, of a series of reforms introduced in response and citizens. to sweeping popular unrest across the country.17 As in the rest of the MENA and in other authoritarian regimes, scholars argue THE JERADA INCIDENT AND INITIAL that Morocco’s electoral system is a way LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 18 for the monarchy to co-opt elites and The Jerada protests are regarded as that the political party system suffers from an extension of the Rif Movement or Hirak 19 “fragmentation.” While there are many al-Shaabi, an activist movement that parties—for example, there were 32 parties started in 2016 in al-Hoceima, a region competing for seats in the 2016 elections— north of Jerada, in response to the death and they have indeed struggled in the past 2 of a fishmonger who was killed trying to THE RESPONSE OF THE MOROCCAN LEGISLATURE TO THE JERADA CRISIS retrieve his confiscated fish from authorities. speaker of the assembly opened the floor for Like Jerada, demonstrators in al-Hoceima three oral questions, which were followed were met with police violence and arrests. by an opportunity for open commentary in To mollify protesters and at the urges of response to the prime minister’s government the palace, authorities proposed a major performance report. Though the three initial development project meant to offer more questions came from the parties holding the employment opportunities in al-Hoceima. greatest number of seats in the assembly— Officials claim that the project is on track,24 the PJD, the Authenticity and Modernity Party though progress is questionable. (PAM), and Istiqlal—subsequent commentary Authorities likewise proposed a came from across the political spectrum with development project for Jerada earlier seven of the 12 legislative parties participating in 2018. Nonetheless, the magnitude of in the debate. Many deputies emphasized demonstrations in the mining town has the need to provide services and create escalated. In early February and March, employment opportunities on a broader scale two more men died in the coal mines, in rural areas given the presence of rural prompting additional protests and demands communities in their provinces. For example, for “economic alternatives.”25 According Sharqawi Zanaydi of the Socialist Union for to the Moroccan High Commission for Popular Forces (USFP) commented on the Planning, the Oriental region where Jerada employment needs of rural areas, adding is located suffers from an unemployment that the victims of the Jerada incident are the rate of 17.1 percent, compared to the 10.2 most significant evidence of this. percent national average, while estimates put Jerada’s unemployment rate at 32 In incidents such as percent.26 In March, the Ministry of Interior QUESTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE
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