Editorial Board / Comité De Rédaction Advisory Board / Comité Consultatif

Editorial Board / Comité de rédaction

Editor-in-Chief Rédacteur en chef

Robert S. Schwartzwald, University of Massachusetts, U.S.A.

Associate Editors Rédacteurs adjoints

Caroline Andrew, Université d’Ottawa / University of Ottawa, Canada Coral Ann Howells, University of Reading, United Kingdom Daniel Salée, Concordia University, Canada

Managing Editor Secrétaire de rédaction

Guy Leclair, ICCS/CIEC, Ottawa, Canada

Advisory Board / Comité consultatif

Maria Cristina Rosas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico Giovanni Dotoli, Université de Bari, Italie Saturo Osanai, Chuo University, Japan Jacques Leclaire, Université de Rouen, France Bernd Dietz, Cordoba University, Spain Vadim Koleneko, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia Michael Behiels, University of Ottawa, Canada Maria Bernadette Veloso Porto, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Brésil Wolfgang Kloos, Universität Trier, Germany Myungsoon Shin, Yonsei University, Korea Wilfredo Angulo Baudin, Universidad Pedagógica Experimental Liberator, Venezuela Coomi Vevaina, University of Bombay, India Helen O’Neill, University College Dublin, Ireland Jane Moss, Romance Languages, Colby College, U.S. Jiaheng Song, Université de Shantong, Chine Malcolm Alexander, Griffith University, Australia Ines Molinaro, University of Cambridge, U.K. Therese Malachy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israël Erling Lindström, Uppsala University, Sweden Leen d’Haenens, University of Nijmegen, Les Pays-Bas The International Journal of Canadian Paraissant deux fois l’an, la Revue Studies (IJCS) is published twice a year internationale d’études canadiennes by the International Council for (RIÉC) est publiée par le Conseil Canadian Studies. Multidisciplinary in international d’études canadiennes. scope, the IJCS is intended for people Revue multidisciplinaire, elle rejoint les around the world who are interested in the lecteurs de divers pays intéressés à l’étude study of Canada. The IJCS publishes du Canada. La RIÉC publie des numéros thematic issues containing articles (15-25 thématiques composés d’articles (15-25 pages double-spaced), research notes pages, double interligne), de notes de (10-15 pages double-spaced) and review recherche (10-15 pages, double interligne) et essays. It favours analyses that have a d’essais critiques, et privilégie les études broad perspective and essays that will aux perspectives larges et les essais de interestareadershipfromawidevarietyof synthèse aptes à intéresser un vaste éventail disciplines. Articles must deal with de lecteurs. Les textes doivent porter sur le Canada, not excluding comparisons Canada ou sur une comparaison entre le between Canada and other countries. The Canada et d’autres pays. La RIÉC est une IJCS is a bilingual journal. Authors may revue bilingue. Les auteurs peuvent submit articles in either English or French. rédiger leurs textes en français ou en Individuals interested in contributing to the anglais. Toute personne intéressée à IJCS should forward their papers to the collaborer à la RIÉC doit faire parvenir IJCSSecretariat,alongwithaone-hundred son texte accompagné d’un résumé de word abstract. Beyond papers dealing cent (100) mots maximum au secrétariat directly with the themes of forthcoming de la RIÉC. En plus d’examiner les textes issues, the IJCS will also examine papers les plus pertinents aux thèmes des numéros à not related to these themes for possible paraître, la RIÉC examinera également les inclusion in its regular Open Topic section. articles non thématiques pour sa rubrique All submissions are peer-reviewed; the Hors-thème. Tous les textes sont évalués par final decision regarding publication is des pairs. Le Comité de rédaction prendra la made by the Editorial Board. The content décision finale quant à la publication. Les of articles, research notes and review auteurs sont responsables du contenu de essays is the sole responsibility of the leurs articles, notes de recherche ou essais. author. Send articles to the International Veuillez adresser toute correspondance à la Journal of Canadian Studies,75Albert Revue internationale d’études canadiennes, Street, 908, Ottawa, CANADA K1P 5E7. 75, rue Albert, 908, Ottawa, CANADA For subscription information, please see K1P 5E7. the last page of this issue. Des renseignements sur l’abonnement se The IJCS is indexed and/or abstracted in trouvent à la fin du présent numéro. America: History and Life; Canadian Les articles de la RIÉC sont répertoriés Periodical Index; Historical Abstracts; et/ou résumés dans America: History and International Political Science Abstracts; Life;CanadianPeriodicalIndex;Historical and Point de repère. Abstracts; International Political Science ISSN 1180-3991 ISBN 1-896450-22-9 Abstracts et Point de repère. © All rights reserved. No part of this ISSN 1180-3991 ISBN 1-896450-22-9 publication may be reproduced without © Tous droits réservés. Aucune repro- the permission of the IJCS. duction n’est permise sans l’autorisation The IJCS gratefully acknowledges a grant de la RIÉC. from the Social Sciences and Humanities La RIÉC est redevable au Conseil de Research Council of Canada. recherches en sciences humaines du Canada qui lui accorde une subvention.

Cover photo: Untitled, by Gérard Bordeleau Photo de la couverture : Sans titre, de Gérard Bordeleau. International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

22, Fall / Automne 2000 Canada and the World in the Twentieth Century Le Canada et le monde au XXe siècle

Table of Contents / Table des matières

Caroline Andrew Introduction / Présentation ...... 5 Michael Burgess The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism...... 13 Ann-M. Field and François Rocher At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada ...... 37 Brigitte Lévy Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement ...... 67 Karen McPherson Memory and Imagination in the Writings of Nicole Brossard .....87 Kanaté Dahouda Aimé Césaire, Paul Chamberland et le pays de l’exil ...... 103 Yves Laberge Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial ...... 115 Wayne Nelles Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”...... 135 Louis Bélanger Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada...... 163 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Review Essays / Essais critiques

Claude Couture Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux? ...... 199 Peter Stoett Canadian Defence and Security Policy: Recent Literature...... 217

Authors / Auteurs ...... 225

Canadian Studies Journals Around the World / Revues d’études canadiennes dans le monde...... 227

4 Introduction Présentation When the theme for this issue was Au moment de choisir le thème du chosen it seemed clear—we would présent numéro, nous nous receive material on actions attendions clairement à recevoir des undertaken by Canadians or by textes portant sur des actes posés par Canadian governments in the des Canadiens ou le gouvernement international sphere. But, as often canadien dans la sphère des affaires happens—and clearly one of the joys internationales. Mais, comme il of being involved in producing a arrive souvent (et n’est-ce pas l’une scholarly journal, the material des joies que réserve la production received was much more various and d’une revue savante?), la brochette rich and made us realize the multiple de textes reçus a dépassé nos ways in which the relationship attentes en richesse et en variété, ce between Canada and the world can qui nous a fait prendre conscience be understood. des multiples façons dont on peut saisir les relations entre le Canada et The most frequent sense of how le reste du monde. people were interpreting the theme of Canada and the world was in L’interprétation majoritaire du relation to what Canada represents in thème du Canada et du monde se the world in the twentieth century. rapportait à ce que le Canada a What is it about the Canadian représenté dans le monde au XXe experience that makes it noteworthy siècle. Qu’y a-t-il dans l’expérience on a world-wide level? Are there canadienne qui ferait qu’elle aspects that can be seen to be retiendrait l’attention à l’échelle du interesting/useful/appropriate as globe? Y a-t-il des dimensions de models for other countries, cette expérience qui pourraient communities, nations, etc.? For this apparaître intéressantes, utiles ou Journal, this seemed to be an appropriées à titre de modèles dont extremely pertinent definition of the d’autres pays, communautés, place of Canada in the world as the peuples, etc. pourraient s’inspirer? work of international Canadianists Dans l’optique de notre revue, il has done so much to make us more apparaissait que c’était là une aware of the specificities of the définition extrêmement pertinente de Canadian experiment. And what is it la place du Canada dans le monde, about Canada that is seen to be puisque les travaux menés par des interesting? canadianistes étrangers ont tant contribué à nous faire prendre Clearly, judging from the material conscience des particularités propres we received, the Canadian de l’expérience canadienne. Et qu’y experience is seen to provide lessons a-t-il au sujet du Canada qui paraît si in how to govern diversity. Diversity intéressant? of all kinds—both social and spatial—and including the Clairement, à en juger par les textes relationships between reçus, l’expérience canadienne est French-speaking and perçue comme si on pouvait en tirer English-speaking communities, des leçons sur la façon de régir la between Aboriginal and diversité : la diversité sous toutes ses

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes non-Aboriginal populations, and formes – tant sociales que spatiales – those incorporating ethno-linguistic et y compris les relations entre les diversities. Federalism is seen as one collectivités d’expression française of the keys to what Canada et d’expression anglaise, les represents in the world in the populations autochtones et non twentieth century. Implicitly, the autochtones, et aussi celles qui argument would appear to be that the intègrent des diversités experience of trying to figure out ethnolinguistiques. Le fédéralisme governance models for societies est perçu comme l’une des clefs de marked by diversity is one of the ce que le Canada a représenté dans challenges of the twentieth century le monde du XXe siècle. De façon and one in which Canada has had an implicite, un argument semble se interesting experience. Current définir, une suggestion à l’effet que studies of the Canadian federal l’expérience d’élaboration des experience do reflect this modèles de gestion des affaires international perspective—either publiques pour des sociétés through explicit international caractérisées par la diversité comparisons or through a vision of constituerait l’un des défis du XXe Canada as seen through other eyes. siècle et que l’expérience canadienne à cet égard revêtirait un Another dimension of modern intérêt particulier. Les études Canadian experience that is seen as actuelles de l’expérience fédérale noteworthy on a world-scale is that canadienne témoignent de cette of looking at gender relations as a perspective internationale – soit au question of public policy. This is not moyen de comparaisons explicites to say that the Canadian experiment avec les expériences historiques has achieved gender equality but that d’autres pays ou à travers une vision Canadian society, in the recent past, du Canada tel qu’il apparaît aux has looked earnestly at this question yeux d’autrui. in terms of a legitimate public issue. How do we reflect on the experience Une autre dimension de l’expérience of women, and particularly on that du Canada moderne qui paraît digne of diverse groups of women, that de retenir l’attention à l’échelle captures the specificity and diversity mondiale est celle qui consiste à of this experience? And then how do considérer les relations entre les we translate this specificity and sexes comme une question de diversity into public solutions? politique publique. Cela ne veut pas dire que l’expérience canadienne A slightly different sense of the soit une réussite totale dans l’atteinte relationship between Canada and the de l’objectif d’égalité des sexes, world is not so much what Canada mais plutôt que la société represents but what Canada has canadienne, dans un avenir récent, offered or can offer to the world in s’est sérieusement penchée sur cette the twentieth century. Here one question, la traitant comme une example is the rich contribution question légitime d’intérêt public. made by Canadian fiction writers in Comment réfléchissons-nous à the twentieth century. Without l’expérience des femmes et making the argument that these particulièrement à celle de différents

6 Introduction Présentation writers must be seen as “Canadian,” groupes de femmes qui témoignent à one can see in some of the literature la fois de la spécificité et de la reflections of the experiences with diversité de cette expérience diversities that we have described canadienne? Et comment earlier. traduisons-nous cette spécificité et cette diversité en des solutions Finally, the material included in this concrètes de politique publique? issue does also include the perspective of actions taken by Une approche légèrement différente Canadians and Canadian des relations entre le Canada et le governments in the international monde consiste à se concentrer non sphere in the twentieth century. This pas tant sur ce que représente le has been an area where the Canadian Canada que sur ce qu’il a offert ou vision has changed over time. In the peut offrir au monde au XXe siècle. period of the Suez Crisis, Canadians Ici, on peut citer l’exemple de felt that we were, if not a major l’apport considérable des power, almost a major power. In the romancières et romanciers canadiens years following, this image fell apart au XXe siècle. Sans construire un and for many Canadians our argument qui consisterait à dire que international presence was only as a ces écrivains devraient être perçus slavish follower of American policy comme « canadiens », on peut and therefore as no real presence. retrouver dans une partie de la The current period seems to generate littérature des reflets des diversités a new perspective, more modest that que nous avons décrites plus tôt. the first and more capable of a margin of independence than the Enfin, les textes qui composent le second. contenu du présent numéro comprennent également des This kaleidoscope of meanings perspectives sur des actes posés par about the relationships of Canada to des Canadiens ou le gouvernement the world covers a wide variety of canadien dans la sphère perspectives—from articles on internationale au XXe siècle. Lors de writers, comparisons between la Crise de Suez, les Canadiens ont countries, descriptions of Canadian compris que leur pays était, sinon political traditions and Canadian une grande puissance, du moins political models. We thank all the presqu’une grande puissance. Dans contributors for having widened our les années qui ont suivi, cette image view of what this relationship could s’est désintégrée et, pour de and should mean. nombreux Canadiens, notre rôle international se limitait désormais à The issue starts with two texts that celui d’un satellite obéissant du deal with the Canadian experience in géant américain, de sorte qu’on ne governing diversities. Michael pouvait pas véritablement parler Burgess describes “The Federal d’un rôle international du Canada. Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian La période actuelle semble Federalism” and reminds us of a engendrer une perspective nouvelle, whole tradition of moral federalism, plus modeste que la première, mais based on the values of mutual aussi davantage en mesure de nous respect and recognition, tolerance,

7 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes dignity, integrity and reciprocity. reconnaître une certaine marge Burgess goes on to suggest that a d’indépendance que la deuxième. judicious mixture of asymmetry and symmetry not only fits in with the Ce kaléidoscope de significations Canadian tradition but might also sur les relations entre le Canada et le lead to genuine reform. monde couvre une vaste gamme de perspectives – depuis des articles sur The second article, by Ann M. Field des écrivains jusqu’à des and François Rocher, is entitled “At comparaisons entre des pays, en a Juncture? For a New passant par des descriptions des Understanding of Federalism and traditions politiques canadiennes et Citizenship in Canada.” As with des modèles politiques canadiens. Burgess, Field and Rocher argue for Nous remercions tous les auteurs qui greater importance to be given to ont contribué à ce numéro d’avoir federal principles. In addition, their élargi notre vision de ce que cette article looks at the question of relation pouvait et devait signifier. non-territorial identities and the challenge they pose to federalism. Le numéro commence avec deux Indeed, they link the two, in part textes qui traitent de l’expérience through Thomas Hueglin’s argument acquise par le Canada dans l’art de that federalism deals with the régir des diversités. Michael Burgess question of what groups of citizens décrit « l’esprit fédéral comme le are empowered at what levels of fondement moral du fédéralisme government. Therefore, canadien » et nous rappelle toute une non-territorial diversity is also a tradition de fédéralisme moral fondé question of federalism. sur les valeurs de respect et de reconnaissance mutuels, de Brigitte Levy’s article looks at tolérance, de dignité, d’intégrité et professional women in Canada and de réciprocité. Burgess poursuit en the challenges they face in trying to suggérant qu’un dosage judicieux de place themselves in the symétrie et d’asymétrie non knowledge-based economy. Her seulement s’accorderait article looks at the impact of public magnifiquement avec la tradition policies on these women and raises canadienne, mais qu’il pourrait questions about how best to facilitate également mener à des réformes their careers and the factors that are véritables. currently blocking them. Her article provides an overview on the studies Le prochain article, le fruit d’une done in Canada on professional collaboration entre Ann M. Field et women and on the ways in which François Rocher, s’intitule « At a authors have seen the links between Juncture? For a New Understanding public policies and the situation of of Federalism and Citizenship in professional women. Canada ». Tout comme Burgess, Field et Rocher insistent pour Karen McPherson’s article on accorder davantage d’importance Nicole Brossard links the material aux principes du fédéralisme. De on gender relations as a public plus, leur article se penche sur la question with that illustrating the question de savoir quels groupes de

8 Introduction Présentation contributions of writers in Canada. citoyens sont investis d’un contrôle The themes of memory and sur leurs propres affaires et ce à imagination fit extremely well with quels niveaux de gouvernement. En our reflexions on places in the world conséquence, la diversité non as Brossard argues that women’s territoriale constitue elle aussi une memory initiates their presence in question qui ressort de la the world. Certainly Brossard is a problématique du fédéralisme. presence in the world. Dans son article, Brigitte Levy The comparison between Aimé s’intéresse aux femmes des Césaire and Paul Chamberland is the professions libérales au Canada et focus of the next article, by Kanaté aux défis auxquels elles font face en Dahouda. This article illustrates the essayant de se tailler une place dans contributions of writers (and poets) une économie de l’information. Son and the fruitfulness of using article porte sur l’incidence des international comparisons to politiques publiques sur ces femmes illustrate the themes of the work. et soulève des questions tant sur qui serait la meilleure façon de faciliter An interesting antidote appears in leurs carrières que sur les obstacles the article by Yves Laberge who qui se dressent sur leur route à looks at the place given to Canada in l’heure actuelle. Son article constitue the books written on the history of un survol des études menées au sujet world film. His answer is that almost des femmes des professions libérales no place has been given to au Canada et la façon dont leurs Canadians film makers and, in part, auteurs ont perçu les liens entre les this brings us back to our politiques publiques et la situation relationships to American cinema. des femmes dans les professions libérales. Moving to our last section, articles on international activities of L’article de Karen McPherson sur Canadians and Canadian Nicole Brossard établit un lien entre governments, we start with looking ce discours sur les rapports entre les at the international activities of civil sexes à titre de question d’intérêt society. Wayne Nelles examines public et celui qui vise à illustrer la citizen diplomacy through the work contribution des écrivaines au of the Canadian Teacher’s Canada. Les thèmes de la mémoire Federation through the period 1919 et de l’imagination s’ajustent to 1946. This was a period of high remarquablement bien à nos hopes for the possibilities of réflexions sur des lieux dans le education for international social monde, dans la mesure où Brossard change, and Canadians participated soutient que la mémoire des femmes in a North Atlantic Triangle, as a initie leur présence dans le monde. junior partner to the U.S. and Great Brossard elle-même, certainement, Britain. est une présence dans le monde.

Louis Bélanger looks at recent Une comparaison entre Aimé Canadian foreign policy and argues Césaire et Paul Chamberland that the inclusion of culture as the constitue le sujet du prochain article, third pillar of Canadian foreign qui porte la signature de Kanaté

9 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes policy in 1995 has been a failure. Dahouda. Cet article souligne les The attempt emerged from civil contributions d’écrivains (et de society and gave rise to demands for poètes) et le profit qu’il y a à se a plurality of identities to be part of servir de comparaisons the inclusion of culture and this gave internationales pour illustrer les rise to conflict with state actors who thèmes de l’œuvre. preferred a more uniform vision of culture. À cet égard, l’article d’Yves Laberge nous offre un antidote intéressant. On Claude Couture follows this with a y considère la place réservée au review essay, “Continuité et rupture Canada dans les ouvrages portant sur des discours nationaux?,” on recent l’histoire du cinéma mondial. La books on nationalisms and identities réponse de l’auteur est qu’on n’y in Canada. He looks particularly at retrouve à peu près rien au sujet des Gérard Bouchard’s recent Genèse cinéastes canadiens, un phénomène des nations et cultures du nouveau qui, en partie, nous ramène au monde in terms of the ideas of a problème de nos relations avec le rupture with the past and the creation cinéma américain. of something new. This theme allows him to compare several Venons-en maintenant à notre recent books in terms of the ways in dernière série d’articles, sur les which the authors see continuities activités internationales de Canadiens and discontinuities. et de gouvernements canadiens et à travers lesquels nous commençons à And this volume finishes with a considérer les activités internationales second review essay, by Peter Stoett, des citoyens. Wayne Nelles discute on recent literature on Canadian de la diplomatie menée par des defence and security. He examines acteurs de la société civile, dans ce the debates in the recent books and cas-ci, les activités internationales de ends with acknowledging both the la Fédération canadienne des contributions made by the books and enseignants entre 1919 et 1946. Ce the need for more detailed and fut là une période où le rôle de critical scholarly work. l’éducation à titre de moteur de changements sociaux sur le plan This richness and the variety of the international suscitait de grands texts indicate the interest of the espoirs et des Canadiens participaient theme. Canada and the world, in the aux activités d’un triangle de twentieth century—a opening to l’Atlantique Nord, à titre d’associés thinking about Canada as others see mineurs de leurs partenaires it and to reflecting on successes and américains et britanniques. failures of Canada in international arenas. Louis Bélanger jette un regard à la politique étrangère récente du Canada et soutient que l’inclusion de la culture à titre de troisième pilier Caroline Andrew de la politique étrangère canadienne Associate Editor en 1995 s’est avérée un échec. Cette tentative trouvait son origine dans la

10 Introduction Présentation société civile et a donné lieu à des demandes d’inclusion d’une pluralité d’identités dans la définition de la culture canadienne, d’où des conflits avec des acteurs étatiques qui préféraient une vision plus uniforme de la culture.

Et le présent volume se termine avec deux essais critiques. Le premier, « Continuité et rupture des discours nationaux? » de Claude Couture, porte sur des ouvrages récents axés sur les nationalismes et les identités au Canada. Il s’intéresse tout particulièrement au livre récent de Gérard Bouchard, Genèse des nations et cultures du nouveau monde, qui traite d’une rupture avec le passé et la création de quelque chose de nouveau. Le thème choisi lui permet de comparer plusieurs ouvrages récents sous l’angle de la façon dont leurs auteurs perçoivent la continuité et la discontinuité. Le deuxième, par Peter Stoett, sur des publications récentes portant sur la politique de défense et de sécurité du Canada, se penche sur les débats qui caractérisent ces ouvrages récents et conclut en soulignant tant les contributions de ces ouvrages que le besoin d’une réflexion intellectuelle mieux nourrie et plus critique.

La richesse et la variété des textes compris dans le présent numéro fait valoir l’intérêt du thème choisi. Le Canada et le monde au XXe siècle – une ouverture sur la façon dont les autres conçoivent le Canada, de même qu’une occasion de méditer sur les réussites et les échecs du Canada sur la scène internationale.

Caroline Andrew Rédactice adjointe

Michael Burgess

The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism

Abstract Part of the problem of studying federalism is that it is a microcosm of the larger problem of studying political science. This article calls attention to a particular tension within federalism and federation that simultaneously brings into play fundamental moral questions as well as amoral, empirical issues. The former, like issues surrounding social diversity, such as individual and collective identity and minority rights, are highly-charged, emotional matters for many people while the latter usually but not always involve the routine pursuit of economic profit and security which largely reflect calculated and dispassionate self-interest. The moral basis to federalism, as a normative aspect of federal theory, derives from certain inherent values held by the author to be virtues, such as mutual respect and recognition, tolerance, dignity, integrity and reciprocity. These values lead to a particular form of human association, namely, the federal state or federation. Both moral and amoral federalism inhere in Canada, but the former has been a cardinal feature of the Canadian Constitution since 1867, principally with reference to Quebec and its place in the federation. This article examines the moral basis to Canadian federalism and explores its implications for the future of the Canadian state. Its normative focus suggests that both constitutional and non-constitutional reform should be pursued as a federal political strategy that would “federalise” the federation by reinforcing “asymmetrical federalism” and buttressing the legitimacy of the state.

Résumé Une partie du problème que pose l’étude du fédéralisme tient au fait qu’il constitue un microcosme du problème plus vaste que représente l’étude de la science politique elle-même. Le présent article attire l’attention sur une tension particulière au sein tant du fédéralisme que de la fédération canadienne elle-même. Cette tension tire son origine du fait que le fédéralisme traite simultanément de questions morales fondamentales et de problèmes empiriques amoraux. Les questions morales, comme tous les problèmes qui entourent la diversité sociale, telles l’identité individuelle et collective et les droits des minorités, constituent des questions lourdes d’émotions aux yeux de beaucoup de gens, tandis que les problèmes empiriques amoraux engagent habituellement, mais pas toujours, la recherche routinière du profit et de la sécurité économiques qui témoignent, pour l’essentiel, d’un intérêt personnel froidement calculateur. Le fondement moral du fédéralisme, à titre de dimension normative des vertus fédérales, découle de certaines valeurs inhérentes comme le respect mutuel et la reconnaissance, la tolérance, la dignité, l’intégrité et la réciprocité et qui, à

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes leur tour, mènent à une forme particulière d’association humaine, soit l’État fédéral ou la fédération. Les deux formes de fédéralisme – la forme morale et la forme amorale – sont inhérentes au Canada, mais la première a toujours, depuis 1867, constitué un trait essentiel de la Constitution canadienne, principalement en ce qui a trait au Québec et à sa place au sein de la fédération canadienne. Le présent article porte sur le fondement moral du fédéralisme canadien et on y explore ses conséquences sur l’avenir de l’État canadien. Son propos normatif converge sur une suggestion que l’on devrait procéder à des réformes, tant constitutionnelles que non constitutionnelles, à titre de stratégie politique fédérale qui aurait pour effet de « fédéraliser » la fédération en renforçant le « fédéralisme asymétrique » et en soutenant la légitimité de l’État.

The Problem of Studying Federalism Part of the problem of studying federalism is that it is a microcosm of the larger problem of studying political science. This article calls attention to a particular tension within federalism that simultaneously brings into play fundamental moral questions as well as amoral, empirical issues. The former, like questions surrounding social diversity, such as individual and collective identity and minority rights, are highly-charged emotional matters for many, while the latter usually but not always involve the routine pursuit of economic profit and security which largely reflect calculated and dispassionate self-interest. The moral basis to federalism derives from certain inherent values and beliefs held by the author to be human virtues in civil society, such as dignity, respect, tolerance, integrity, consent and mutual recognition. Collectively, these values constitute the basis of a particular form of human association, namely, the federal state or federation. These values and beliefs are “moral” in the sense that they comprise what it means to be a whole person able freely to express a complete personality; what it means, in a nutshell, to be a human being with spiritual, temporal, psychological and material dimensions of the self. Conversely, the amoral foundation suggests that no such selfless qualities inhere in federalism at all. It is something best approached from the standpoint of political economy or rational choice theory, which have as their principal focus the ordering of either entrenched or contingent interests. Here, federalism is little more than a particular constitutional and/or political technique for achieving certain overarching, self-interested goals like territorial expansion, military security or economic gains based upon narrow cost-benefit analysis. The distinction between the moral and amoral dimensions of federalism, however, can be problematic when we seek to operationalise them. Clearly, problems lie inter alia in the search for empirical verifiability and in the disputes that arise from competing historical interpretations, but these obstacles need not deter us from exploring what has recently become a topical subject for students of federalism and federation.

14 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism

This article examines one particular dimension in the dichotomy between these two faces of federalism in Canada. It looks closely at the moral basis of Canadian federalism in order to examine its implications for the future of the Canadian state. As we shall see, the conclusion of our analytical survey suggests that Canadians must “federalise” the federation—or reinvigorate the federal spirit—in order both to strengthen democracy and buttress the legitimacy of the state. Only if efforts are made to renew and restate the moral basis of Canadian federalism will Canadians be able successfully to bind citizens together as a federal community in what is still classified in political science terms as “parliamentary federation.” The empirical focus will therefore shift gradually towards what is called “asymmetrical federalism” as a practical prescription for the renewal of the Confederation. The article suggests that both constitutional and non-constitutional reforms are necessary to reinforce Canada’s asymmetrical provisions and procedures so that all Canadians can return to the “authentic” federal spirit of 1867 rather than continue to live with the Anglophone-inspired federal model of 1982. Our analytical survey will begin with a thumbnail sketch of “the federal spirit” before taking a close look at the detailed aspects of Canadian constitutional and political evolution.

The Federal Spirit In his “Federalism and the French Canadians,” first published in 1968, Pierre Elliott Trudeau referred to the contractual federal basis of the 1867 British North America Act (BNA Act)—now known as the Constitution Act, 1867—as “a law of the Imperial Parliament, but a law based on an agreement between federating parties.” It was quintessentially a law that could be “best understood and interpreted (and eventually amended) by referring to the spirit of that agreement.”1 Moreover, in words which have probably come back to haunt him, Trudeau acknowledged that Canada then was “very much a federal society from the sociological point of view.” Canadians’ own understanding of their political history would be incomplete “if it ignored the existence, for instance, of the Maritimer, the Quebecker or the Westerner.”2 What assumptions underpinned Trudeau‘s prescient statement about the “spirit” of 1867 and what was the nature of the agreement upon which the Constitution Act, 1867 was ostensibly based? Given the intractable nature of the constitutional and political legacy bequeathed by the Liberal Prime Minister’s “patriation” of the Canadian Constitution in 1982, this statement might now seem somewhat ironic. Trudeau appeared to have rejected his own earlier belief in the federal spirit. But what was implied by his reference to this nebulous phrase? In short, what do we mean by the federal spirit? Here we must return to the moral basis of federalism to which we have already referred in the introduction above.

15 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

The federal idea indicates a fundamental predisposition to search for mutual commitment, cooperation and reciprocity in human relations. It suggests a form of human association rooted in the Latin term foedus which is closely linked to the word “covenant” and implies “the promise of commonality and individuality.”3 In other words it recognises the inherent human condition of both individual and shared needs, interests and identities. In this simplified form the basic appeal of the federal state lies precisely in its institutional and structural capacity both to accommodate and reconcile different kinds of unity with different kinds of diversity. Federations exist because they formally acknowledge, via constitutional entrenchment, the sorts of identities and diversities that constitute that sense of difference so essential to a living, breathing, pluralist social and political order of the kind to which Trudeau was presumably referring in his 1968statementsoutlinedabove.Accordingly,thefederalstateispredicated uponwhatRufusDavishascapturedsowellinthefollowingobservations: The idea of covenant betokens not merely a solemn pledge between two or more people to keep faith with each other, to honor an agreement; it involves the idea of cooperation, reciprocity, mutuality, and it implies the recognition of entities—whether it be persons, a people or a divine being. Without this recognition there can be no covenant, for there can be no reciprocity between an entity and a non-entity. . . .By committing themselves to each other through promises, pledges, contracts, vows and treaties, and by calling upon the most potent forces or valued symbols in their society to give moral sanctions to their undertakings, [men] regu- larize or institutionalise their relations with others, and thereby hope to bring some stability into their lives.4 This is precisely what René Lévesque meant when he claimed on behalf of the Québécois that “to be ourselves means to maintain and develop a personality that has lasted for three-and-a-half centuries.”5 The federal spirit, then, is a propensity or predisposition to arrive at decisions in government that are the result of the politics of recognition and involve negotiation, bargaining, cooperation, mediation and ultimately compromise. The decisions have a moral basis in the extent to which they are concerned with the general welfare and well-being of the political community that government serves. Political morality therefore is most assuredly predicated upon taking decisions that serve to strengthen the bonds that unify the political community. And the pursuit of this overall goal of citizens’ welfare and well-being in turn rests upon the reconciliation of individual and collective needs and interests in the political community. It requires the recognition of and respect for the many different identities and diversities that together constitute what it means to be a political community. In Canada, this means the formal, constitutional recognition of Quebec as a distinct political community as well as Canada itself. On the level of the individual—as enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—Canada is a political community but so, too, is Quebec once we

16 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism acknowledge its collective identity; its sense of itself. Context is of pivotal significance here. To recognise context is to recognise social and political reality as it is. In summary, then, the federal spirit is rooted in Daniel Elazar’s shorthand definition of federalism, namely, “self-rule plus shared rule.”6 In the study of federal political systems, the phrase “federal spirit” has attracted much analysis and debate. Conceptually, it is inherent in the very nature and origins of federations. Otherwise, political elites engaged in the process of state-formation would presumably have championed a very different kind of state solution. But the general consensus among scholars of federalism and federation is that in Europe it gradually came to acquire the status of a political and legal sanction on the one hand, and of a recognised constitutional norm on the other. Its origins in this formal sense can be traced back to the confederal treaties of 1866 and 1870 that laid the basis for federation in Germany much later.7 Consequently, the German term Bundestreue encapsulates the meaning of the federal spirit in its allusion to federal trust or comity—something implicit in the relationship between the federal government and the governments of the constituent units that together comprise the federation. For our purposes, it has a double meaning. First, it denotes the duty of all governments in the federation to take each other’s interests into account in the exercise of their respective public responsibilities. And secondly, it refers to the totality of the federal relationship, the well-being of the whole state.8 It is already evident from this skeletal outline that the terms embedded in the discourse of Bundestreue, namely, faith, mutual trust, partnership, respect, friendship, loyalty, public duty, consent, consultation and cooperation resonate with thepreconceptionsandpresumptionsofwhatisatitscoreamoraldiscourse. The application of Bundestreue, this moral discourse, to Canada has implications which are both obvious and profound for its constitutional and political relations not only with Quebec but also with every other province in the federation. Nonetheless, the striking relevance of Bundestreue in contemporary Canada-Quebec relations resides in Bertus de Villiers’ succinct observation which is worth quoting at length: In essence Bundestreue derives from the fact that the constitutional demarcation of powers by the constitution in federal states is limited to the legal allocation of responsibilities and does not reflect the manner in which the responsibilities must be exercised. The principles underlying Bundestreue are therefore aimed at providing the basis for a modus operandi according to which the two levels of government as federal partners use their constitutionally allocated powers and functions in a way that is conducive to the well-being of the whole state.9 Based upon foedus and covenant, we are reminded, federation is a particular kind of state. To retain its legitimacy and survive intact as a viable, liberal democratic state, it must operate continuously and

17 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes consistently according to a widely-recognised set of rules, procedures and conventions, some constitutionally entrenched and some not, that keep alive the federal spirit alluded to by Pierre Trudeau in his reflections of 1968. Mindful of the significance of these reflections and the implications of Bundestreue—the moral basis to the federal spirit—we now turn our attention to certain aspects of the constitutional foundations of the Canadian federation.

Canada: The Imperial Federation The Constitution Act, 1867 is the logical departure point for determining the jurisdictional limits of the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures—the division of powers and competences—that is the characteristic hallmark of all federations. And it was principally sections 91-94 that persuaded Kenneth Wheare famously to label Canada as “quasi-federal in law” in his classic “Federal Government,” first published in 1946.10 The conundrum of Canada for him was expressed in the following way: The federal principle is not completely ousted . . . from the Cana- dian Constitution. It does find a place there and an important place. Yet if we confine ourselves to the strict law of the constitution, it is hard to know whether we should call it a federal constitution with considerable unitary modifications, or a unitary constitution with considerable federal modifications. It would be straining the federal principle too far, I think, to describe it as a federal constitution. . . . For this reason I prefer to say that Canada has a quasi-federal constitution.11 But Wheare did not leave his conclusion about the quasi-federal nature of the law and the constitution where it stood. He elaborated further: The law of the constitution is one thing; the practice is another. . . . The fact is that Canada is politically federal and that no Dominion government which attempted to stress the unitary elements in the Canadian Constitution at the expense of federal elements would survive. . . . although the Canadian Constitution is quasi-federal in law, it is predominantly federal in practice. Or, to put it another way, although Canada has not a federal constitution, it has a federal government.12 Wheare’s important distinction between the law of the constitution and the practice of government was peculiarly relevant to Canada because its constitutional status after 1867 reflected a shift from direct imperial control to a system of “imperial federation” whereby British legal and parliamentary supremacy were maintained although they were exercised astutely. Canadians did not therefore acquire an authentic constitution for an independent sovereign state simply because the Constitution Act, 1867 was an act of the British Parliament. As Ronald Cheffins and Patricia Johnson have emphasised, the majority of Canada’s entrenched constitu-

18 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism tional documents, ranging from the Constitution Act, 1867 down to the Constitution Act, 1982, remain statutes of the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament. What has changed is that “these statutes, though British in their legal origin, can no longer be amended by the UK Parliament.”13 Subsequent to the Constitution Act, 1982, then, constitutional amendments can be introduced only according to the stipulations set out in Part V, Articles 38-49 of that Act. In retrospect, the political contradiction which lay at the root of imperial federation was obviously the collision between two quite distinct doctrines: parliamentary supremacy and constitutional supremacy. The former was a British imperial legacy that underlined the sovereignty of the British Parliament as the final authority in the federation while the latter, as in the United States, construed the popular sovereignty of the people to reside in the constitution itself. The attempt to reconcile the territorial dispersion of power and a dual governmental system, that federation required, with a rival unitary concept of strong, majoritarian, centralised government in the Constitution Act, 1867 was unprecedented. In the absence of a Supreme Court—a judicial umpire acting as an independent arbiter, and with no independent elected senate, a second chamber effectively representing either the provinces/states (as in the United States) or the provincial governments (as in the German tradition)—Canada simply lacked the essential attributes of what Douglas Verney has called “judicial and legislative federalism.”14 Despite the influence of the imperial Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), many of whose decisions in the late nineteenth century assisted in the unanticipated process of decentralisation, the nature of what Verney has called “imperial federalism” remained intact.15 Only as the federation evolved slowly over the next century, gradually reducing the level of British imperial supervision, was the incompatibility inherent in parliamentary federalism fully exposed. In simple terms, Ottawa replaced London as the “imperial” authority in the state, the Supreme Court replaced the JCPC and Canada was left with “a quasi-unitary form of government,” something that evolved later into what Verney dubbed “the pseudo- federalism of majority rule.”16 These profound institutional and structural changes, reflective of the shift from direct imperial control to imperial federation, served effectively to mask the constitutional, political and legal realities of the 1867 transition, and the illusion of parliamentary or executive federalism was sustained up until Quebec’s so-called “Quiet Revolution” in the 1960s. The challenge of Quebec to Verney’s quasi- unitarism was in reality an attempt—at least initially—to reclaim and to restore to Canada the federal spirit that had been slowly and almost imperceptibly eroded for virtually a century.17 Accordingly, Wheare’s distinction between the law of the constitution and the practice of federal government in Canada needs to be carefully reconsidered. In the light of Verney’s detailed analysis of Canada’s

19 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes competing political traditions and his diagnosis of the slow but certain shift in federal-provincial relations toward Ottawa in the century after 1867, Wheare’s claim that the unitary features of the Canadian Constitution “in law” did not prevent the “practice” of Canadian government being predominantly federal must be re-examined with some caution. The claim has to take account of the peculiar sensitivities of Quebec. It has to acknowledge that federal government in Canada—however “federal” it was—nonetheless expanded considerably after the Second World War and acquired new powers, techniques and procedures that have directly and indirectly impinged upon provincial jurisdictions, especially in respect of their economies and societies. Wheare did, it is true, recognise the existence of centralising trends in the Canadian federation, but he seems to have overlooked the extent to which general twentieth century economic and social changes effectively undermined his original distinction.18 The empirical evidence suggests that the vigorous tug-of-war between Ottawa and the provinces over legal competences and jurisdiction—which began almost immediately the ink was dry on the Constitution Act, 1867 and continued largely unabated up until 1914—gradually gave way by the onset of the First World War to an era that witnessed increasing federal dominance in the economy and society as a reflection of the inexorable growth of the state in public policy-making. But the growing centralisation of economic power in Ottawa was never a simple zero-sum equation and it never signified a concomitant “you win we lose” attrition of provincial power and responsibility. Nor was there any sinister conspiracy either by Anglophone Canadians or by Ottawa to pursue a calculated policy of political and administrative centralisation specifically designed to enfeeble provincial governments. The main thrust behind the shift in central-local relations was a combination of largely non-constitutional events and pressures in the polity: huge socio-economic changes; technological and scientific progress; judicial review; and the increasing use of federal spending power in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. The first two sets of pressures were broad trends while the latter two sets of practices, although undoubtedly having constitutional implications, were not part of a carefully constructed blueprint for a centralised federation. Nonetheless, these events and circumstances did signify the gradual attenuation of the federal spirit that had been so self-consciously entrenched in the constitutional fabric of 1867 and their combined impact seemed to legitimise increasingly vocal claims by French-Canadian nationalists that the Confederation deal had been consistently violated by English-speaking Canadians, especially in the federal domain. Before we look in greater detail at growing concern in Quebec about the gradual decline of the federal spirit in Canada, let us return to the Constitution Act, 1867 in order to clarify this particular feature of the constitutional settlement.

20 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism

The Federal Spirit in the Confederation Settlement, 1867 We will recall Wheare’s famous distinction between the law and the practice of the constitution in Canada. He believed that in strictly legal terms its strong, unitary characteristics effectively rendered it neither federal nor unitary, but only quasi-federal in nature. Wheare, however, had also claimed that Canada was in reality “politically federal,” the implication being that it was federal in practice.19 How, then, was the federal spirit formally incorporated into the Constitution Act, 1867? A century after the new constitution had been formally sanctioned by the British Parliament, Donald Smiley linked this question to the controversial debate about whether or not the “federal bargain” of 1867 was the result of a compact, a contract or a treaty: One might grant that Confederation was not in a legal sense a contract and still maintain that, at the time of the consummation of the original federal bargain and when other provinces entered the union, mutual commitments were made and must subsequently be honoured. ...Ifthere was a French-English agreement among the Canadian leaders, how and in what ways are the provinces other than Ontario and Quebec bound by these cultural aspects? What is the “spirit of Confederation”? Is the limited recognition of bilingualism in federal affairs in Section 133 to constitute a maximum or a minimum? Because these matters deemed crucial to the integrity of French-Canadian culture were entrusted to the provinces by Confederation, does it follow that provincial powers should extend to other matters later deemed necessary to this culture by Quebec?20 Smiley had put his finger on what was the nub of the dilemma inherent in Quebec’s constitutional status. The main though not the only driving-force behind the complex circumstances that led to the federal bargain in 1867 was the concern for cultural dualism. And the principal figure who championed the cause of French-Canadian language and culture was George-Étienne Cartier to whom we must now briefly refer. In a recent contribution to the continuing contemporary debate about the origins and purposes of Canadian federalism, Samuel LaSelva has resurrected Cartier in order principally to call attention to the moral dimensions that he claims underpin the Canadian federation.21 Like Donald Smiley, to whom he turns for support, LaSelva construes Cartier’s central purpose to be one of trenchant opposition to the assimilation of French-Canadians into English-speaking Canada coupled with the firm belief that political allegiance should not be determined by linguistic and cultural affiliation.22 In other words, Cartier was searching for a formula, or seeking to legitimise a coherent set of political ideas, that would protect and preserve the French-Canadian culture and prevent what he feared might be its ultimate disappearance in Canada. The phrase that he constructed was “political nationality” which meant in simple terms the establishment of a

21 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes new kind of relation between peoples with different languages and cultures. This was an authentic federal relationship based upon mutual respect, tolerance and recognition and its implications for Canada were deep-seated and profound. United by a common political nationality rooted in common endeavours, pride and a shared identity under the British Crown, Canada would become a country in which different ways of life flourished. By joining in Confederation, as LaSelva has succinctly put it, “French and English agreed both to live apart and to live together.”23 If we summarise Cartier’s significance for our purposes, his federal conception of Canada clearly embraced not only the conventional commercial and military motives for union but also a strong moral compulsion, something that LaSelva refers to as “a new kind of nationality and a new kind of fraternity.”24 The moral foundation of Canadian federalism, according to this interpretation, lies in the kinds of ideas, values and beliefs that we have already identified and these are enshrined in the notion of the “federal spirit.” On this reckoning, we can appreciate more fully what De Villiers meant when in referring to Bundestreue he emphasised the importance of federal comity, the well-being of the whole state and the manner in which governmental responsibilities should be exercised. Cartier’s understanding of what Canada should become was a moral understanding and the basis of the Canadian state was a moral basis. Canada, then, was both an idea and an experiment. But it was an extremely novel idea and a highly complex experiment whose multidimensional features would have huge constitutional, political, economic, social and perhaps even psychological implications for the government and politics of the first modern federation to owe its existence largely to cultural differences.25 The origins of the moral basis to Canadian federalism can be identified even earlier than Cartier and Confederation. For John Ralston Saul its antecedents are several centuries old and many of its elements were “put in place very early on through European-Native treaties.”26 What Saul refers to as the “triangular pact” between English Canada, French Canada and the Natives (who had always been part of the bargain), consecrated in the “LaFontaine-Baldwin handshake in 1842,” was evidence of an early Canadian reformist propensity to share power and cooperate with each other “across geographic divides in cohabitation with a complex culture.”27 Itwastheserelationswhich,accordingtoLaFontaine,hadcreated“notonly mutual sympathies” but also “moral obligations to which our honour alone imposes the imperative duty not to be found lacking.”28 The contemporary implication of this formative political culture is that Canadians must continue to strive to recapture the spirit of reconciliation and reform that remains at the heart of the country’s creation and survival. The cause of reform, according to Saul, runs in “an unbroken line” that stretches back at least to the age of Mackenzie and Papineau, LaFontaine and Baldwin.29 It can easily be identified in the Quebec Act, 1774 that formally recognised

22 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism the cultural dualism so cherished by Cartier. Guy Laforest has also pointed to this important early aspect of the evolving Canadian political culture that he called “the Canadian patriotism of the Québécois.”30 “Historians, politicians and intellectuals in French Canada, Quebec,” he wrote, “are just about unanimous in believing that two founding peoples, two nations, two distinct societies, two majorities gave birth to Canada in 1867.” And this dualist concept of federalism was the project of Étienne Parent, Louis- Hippolyte LaFontaine and George-Étienne Cartier, of Henri Bourassa and André Laurendeau, of Daniel Johnson Sr. and Claude Ryan.31 It was this vision of Canada, in short, that enabled such historical figures to embrace “a certain form of Canadian patriotism.”32 But the “LaFontaine-Baldwin handshake” notwithstanding, Cartier and his federal concept of political nationality in the Constitution Act, 1867 is where we must begin to look for the federal spirit. Smiley, it will be recalled, referred to Section 133 of the new constitution that installed bilingualism in federal affairs in a very cautious manner. He acknowledged the open-ended nature of such a clause that could conceivably lead to future demands by Quebec for stronger provincial powers in other legislative matters that might be deemed to impinge upon its cultural integrity. This was a prescient observation to make in 1967. But it was also something that, if not exactly forseen by the founding fathers in the 1860s, was arguably an implicit assumption in the federal bargain struck in 1867. Clearly, if Cartier’s federal conception of Canada is accepted rather than Sir John A. MacDonald’s unitary goal, the subsequent evolution of the federation could be legitimately challenged at any time if it departed from the moral imperative of inter alia protecting, preserving and promoting French-Canadian culture. In hindsight, we can easily identify the various pioneering, often ingenious, asymmetrical provisions in the Constitution Act, 1867 that sought deliberately and purposively to recognise and accommodate the important differences that existed between Quebec and the predominantly English-speaking provinces in particular and between all of the provinces in general. Asymmetry is, after all, the imprimatur of difference. Let us probe a little further in our search for the federal spirit in the constitutional settlement of 1867. We need not look very far to locate the constitutional politics of difference. The Canadian Constitution was riddled with asymmetrical provisions designed formally to entrench a particular vision of the federal state. If we focus narrowly upon those that particularly but not exclusively concerned Quebec, we can see that the de jure arrangements included the relative scope of provincial powers and autonomy, representation in central federal institutions, provisions for minority rights, and the differential arrangements negotiated for new provinces at the time of their accession or recognition of their provincial status.33 Ronald Watts has recently sketched out the main contours of this de jure symmetry. He notes the following salientfeaturesinrelationtothescopeofprovincialpowersandautonomy:

23 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

1. The exemption of Quebec from any provision to make property and civil rights uniform under Section 94. 2. Provisions for the civil law system only in the province of Quebec under Section 129. 3. The omission until 1930 for Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan to have the power to control their public lands under Section 109. 4. The provision of differentiated subsidies guaranteed to the provinces in Sections 118 and 119. In matters relating to representation in the central federal institutions together with language use and minority education rights, Watts referred to the following examples: 1. The unequal representation of the provinces in the interest of regional balance in Section 22. 2. The variations governing language use and minority education rights relating to Quebec in Sections 133 and 93 (2) and for Manitoba under Sections 22 and 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870. 3. Different denominational education rights set out in Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 were also accorded to Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland. 4. Other differential commitments were made to British Columbia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland when they joined the Confederation of Canada.34 This asymmetrical Canada—a Canada that would enable French Canadians, in Laforest’s words, “to retain their primary allegiance to the society in which they were born” or, in short, for Quebec to “remain itself”—was Cartier’s peculiar concept of political nationality.35 The moral basis to Canadian federalism, then, can be traced back at least to 1867 and is founded upon the rock-solid assumption that Quebec identity—its sense of itself—would be respected and preserved. Translated into practice this meant that Quebec would be able to discharge those functions of government, or self-rule, that were indispensable to the preservation of its own discrete identity. Here, we return to Smiley’s original observations noted above. His chickens have come home to roost. The contemporary implications of this brief survey of the federal spirit in the constitutional settlement of 1867 are, once again, that Canadians must find a way formally to recognise and accommodate the needs of a “distinct society,” a political community that struggles for survival, not for privileged treatment.

24 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism

Competing Conceptions of Political Community The contemporary constitutional reform debate in Canada is multifaceted. Its dimensions include inter alia Canada-Quebec relations, Aboriginal self-government, federal-provincial relations, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the role of judicial interpretation and what Alan Cairns has called “constitutional minoritarianism.” But the problem with each of these dimensions, especially from the perspective of Quebec, lies in the extent to which they significantly affect the federal character of Canada. The 1982 patriation of the Constitution, for example, has always lacked political legitimacy in Quebec precisely because it is deemed to conflict with the federal spirit. It portends a Canadian political community that ignores, with an indifference that has harmful consequences, the peculiar concerns, fears and anxieties of the one province in the federation where French is the majority language. We have already portrayed the federal spirit as the moral basis to Canadian federalism through the eyes of Cartier in 1867, but how did this particular conception of political community evolve in Quebec? If the Trudeau-inspired Charter of Rights and Freedoms conflicts with the federal spirit, what has this come to mean in Quebec? Put another way, how did the idea of the federal spirit survive in the political culture of Quebec? Quebec no doubt viewed Verney’s Canada—as an imperial federation—with much concern. Indeed, the basis of an assertive Quebec nationalism that culminated in the “Quiet Revolution” of the 1960s had its roots at least partly in “the perception in Quebec that Canada had been moving toward a quasi-unitary system as a result of the transfer of London‘s residual authority to Ottawa after the Second World War.”36 Consequently it was against a background of general distrust and disquietthatQuebec’sownRoyalCommissionofInquiryonConstitutional Problems (the Tremblay Commission) reported in 1956. Known widely as the Tremblay Report, it was regarded by David Kwavnick as “one of the most remarkable government documents in Canadian history at that time.” He claimed further that it was “nothing less than an examination in depth of the philosophical and moral basis of French-Canadian society and a restatement of its raison d’être.” What made the Tremblay Commission unique, he believed, was its decision to expound “the unarticulated major premises of a society’s existence and to justify those premises by what it believed to be absolute and immutable standards of eternal verity.”37 The Tremblay Report remains an important intellectual landmark in the evolution of federal theory. It represents and reflects a distinct strand of Roman Catholic social theory—transmuted today into Christian Democracy—that continues to inform the contemporary European federal tradition.38 But it is also significant for our purposes in this article for the way in which it explains and clarifies the essentially moral basis to federalism. It does this by approaching federalism as a system of social

25 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes organisation based upon certain fundamental assumptions about the nature of man and society. Federalism, in this respect, is not only a constitutional, political and juridical fact but also a social fact rooted in the notion of association and having as its main focus the way that social groups determine and fulfil themselves within the constituent units that together comprise the larger federation. Four essential elements constitute the philosophical and sociological bases on which this understanding of federalism rests in the Report. These are the Christian concept of man and society, the variety and complexity of social life, the idea of the common good and the principle of subsidiarity. Together, these four fundamental axioms produce a particular form of federalism which yields a living, pluralist social and political order that builds itself from the ground upwards, constructing its tiers of authority and decision-making to accommodate the greatest possible number of communities and societies, primary and intermediate, without destroying them. Accordingly, the federation is a particular kind of state whose principal purpose is both to accommodate and reconcile different forms of unity with different forms of diversity. The Tremblay Report made a convincing case that federal states exist precisely because they formally acknowledge, via constitutional entrenchment, the sorts of identities and diversities that constitute that sense of difference so essential to a living, breathing, social and political community. But in its concluding remarks about the peculiar nature of the federal order, we must not overlook the Report’s specific remarks about Quebec. It underlined the special difficulties for federations that were “collectivities where several national groups participate as such in the state’s organization.” The role of the federal state remained the same with regard to the social groups that inhabited its territory, but the Report delivered a warning that has echoed down through the years: However, this role is complicated in federations resulting from the union not only of territorial collectivities but of national communities, particularly when the latter, officially recognized by the constitution, participate as such in the system’s functioning. In such a case, actually, the political federation is duplicated by a national federation, with the result that union is thereby found more difficult to realize and to maintain, and the government thereof becomes more delicate and complex, differentiated nationality being more of a divisive than a unifying factor. A federation of this kind has a chance to operate well only on condition that, at all levels of the political order, there reigns the veritable federalist spirit, that is to say, the spirit of partnership, of collaboration, of respect for the variety and complexity of social life.39 The Tremblay Report’s practical recommendations amounted to a wholesale reshaping of the federation that involved returning the powers of

26 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism decision-making in fiscal, social security and education policies to the provinces. It was, in short, an attempt to return to the spirit of 1867. One historian of Quebec summarised the thrust of the Report in precisely these terms: “Significantly the proposal was a return to the past, the past of true federalism in 1867.”40 Kwavnick acknowledged that the Tremblay Report was a document of the 1950s and it is probably true that its recommendations were already dated when it was published, thereby limiting any lasting, practical significance that it might have had. But it should not be summarily dismissed as of purely academic interest when we consider it in the light of the federal spirit as a moral basis to Canadian federalism. To the extent that it conveyed a particular conception of political community—a genuinely federal, political community—it remains a constant reminder of what has been lost. And like the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (widely known as the B and B Report) that followed it a decade later, it also represents an important landmark in the struggle to resist the almost absent-minded drift towards an homogenous, Canadian national identity that would suffocate Quebec’s own specificity. The B and B Commission Report was published in 1967. One of its significant observations was that the increasing conflict in Canada in the 1960s concerned not a majority and a minority. This conventional view was misleading. Rather, it was a conflict between two majorities: one in Canada as a whole and one in Quebec. The report acknowledged that “the two dominant cultures in Canada are embodied in distinct societies. ...We recognised the main element of a French-speaking distinct society in Quebec.”41 The direct legacy of the B and B Report was the passage in 1969 of the Official Languages Act which confirmed the linguistic duality of federal Canada. But in this official acknowledgement of the linguistic duality of Canada—of the equal status of the English and French languages in federal institutions—there was certainly no recognition of the idea of biculturalism.Languagewasseparatedfromculture.Theculturaldualityof Cartier was deemed by Trudeau to be a dangerous policy that would fuel nationalism and lead ultimately to Quebec’s separation from Canada. At stake here was two opposing conceptions of political community: that of the Tremblay Report and that of Trudeau. But two competing conceptions of federalism were also in contention, one an authentic federalism that formally recognised and successfully accommodated Quebec’s specificity and the other a Canadian Dream,” a “pan-Canadian ideology,” a noble but hopelessly impractical vision of a bilingual and multicultural Canada.42 The federal spirit had survived in the Quebec state, society and economy against influences all the more insidious for sometimes being difficult to detect. And it had survived in the Quebec psyche. Quebec had never consciously accepted the homogenising social and political pressures of an expanding Anglophone, federal constitutional and political culture that encroached on Quebec identity, forcing Québécois

27 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes metaphorically to sleep with their collective sword by their side. The failure of Anglophone Canadians fully to appreciate the hazardous context of Quebec’s peculiar circumstances—its inescapable dilemma—in the federation was a lament of Laforest after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990: Quebec belongs to North America. It tries to maintain its identity, to live modernity in a comprehensive way, surrounded by rather perilous circumstances....Quebec does not find itself in the controlled conditions of experimentation typical of a university laboratory. It lives in the real world of North America. ...Ittakes more than goodwill, and a few tens of millions of dollars to maintain the integrity of modern French societies in North America. . . . because we live in America, it would be excessively dangerous for Quebec to succumb to Trudeau’s universalizing and abstract liberalism.43 This simple and lucid explanation of Quebec’s unique plight in Canada amply underlined the all-encompassing threat to its very survival and the enduring tension that typified Canada-Quebec relations. Consequently, the only concept of political community that was widely acceptable in Quebec at the time of patriation was one sensitised to its economic, social, political and cultural vulnerability. And judging by its experience with patriation, this vulnerability could be extended to include constitutional reform as well. In a nutshell, then, competing conceptions of political community in Canada determined whether or not Québécois would survive and prosper as a “political nationality” in a multinational federation or simply disappear as a victim of assimilation.

Constitutional Morality: Standing in Quebec’s Shoes Today, there is a strong body of intellectual thought in Canada that in different ways and with different emphases supports the idea of what J.A. Corry aptly described as a “constitutional morality.”44 It is distilled and condensed in the mainstream literature of both political theory and comparative political science chiefly, though not exclusively, in the established scholarship of Charles Taylor, James Tully, Ronald Watts, Alain-G. Gagnon, Will Kymlicka, Roger Gibbins, Guy Laforest and Kenneth McRoberts and has been ably supplemented more recently by the contributions of Jeremy Webber and Samuel LaSelva.45 The general thrust of this impressive erudition has been broadly to advocate—sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly—a new, pluralist politics of recognition and the accommodation of difference and diversity in which bothdefactoanddejureasymmetricalfederalismfeatureprominently.46 The constitutional morality of which Corry spoke was rooted in the federal spirit. It was a morality that addressed context and was ipso facto sensitised to the peculiar predicament of Quebec in North America. Corry reasoned that Quebec’s pursuit of national self-determination within

28 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism

Canada, with its attendant inter-provincial and federal-provincial conflict, could be understood and successfully accommodated only if Anglophone Canada appreciated more fully its perceived vulnerability: Aside from the strict constitutional law, there is in every country a constitutional morality which must be observed if a tolerant and democratic polity is to survive. ...Ifwespeak of constitutional morality as distinct from constitutional law, I would be the first to say we need a new constitutional morality. . . . Quebec’s objec- tions . . . have not been primarily the distribution of powers under sections 91 and 92 but rather the stamp of English-Canadian preferences and outlook on most of what the federal government does. This is why English Canadians have to think more sympathetically about what it would be like to stand in Quebeckers’ shoes, and try to modify their preferences and outlook to take account of the preferences and outlook of Quebeckers in a wide range of matters. Here indeed we do need a new and more scrupulous constitutional morality.47 Anglophone Canada was certainly not standing in Quebeckers’shoes in 1981-82. What Laforest calls “the spirit of 1982” was perceived in Quebec as a blatant attempt to shoehorn the province into a narrow, uniform Anglophone conception of Canada as a single, indivisible nation based upon popular sovereignty and a procedural liberalism that weakened its powers, ignored its own national claims and failed even to secure its consent.48 James Tully has construed this constitutional morality as the pursuit of justice in terms of what he calls “the three conventions of common constitutionalism,” namely “mutual recognition, continuity and consent.”49 The implication of Tully’s reasoning is that contemporary political elites must resolve constitutional disputes by engaging in a dialogue that is founded upon the following preconditions: self-definition asabasisforreciprocalrecognition;conditionalconsentbaseduponmutual respectandequality;andcontinuityrootedinapeople’scustomsandsettled ways of living. Justice is served by adherence to these three constitutional conventions that “can be applied analogously in different cases.”50 And this also meant that in order to avoid adverse effects upon any of the negotiators in such a dispute the constitutional discourse must be predicated upon quod omnes tangit ab omnibus comprobetur (what touches all should be agreed to by all). As Tully lamented in his “rediscovery of cultural diversity”: No constitutional amendment touching Quebec’s political culture was put through without the consent of the provincial government until 1982, when the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted with the express dissent of the Quebec Assem- bly...theamending procedure violated the convention of consent and the amendment violated the convention of continuity, the very principles on which the federation and the consent of the Quebec people to it, rests.51

29 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

For political theorists in general, the gist of the debate about cultural diversity in multinational states has its main focus on the juxtaposition of procedural and communitarian liberalism. The central theoretical question posited is: can a theory of liberalism reconcile the survival of the nation as a collective good with the rights of individuals?52 It is about group rights and individual rights and it is complex precisely because it is elemental. It engages fundamental issues like justice, equality, liberty, fairness, tolerance, respect, mutuality and morality. Corry’s “constitutional morality” has always informed the basis of Charles Taylor’s position on the question of cultural diversity in general and Quebec’s constitutional concerns in particular. Taylor’s reference to “the politics of recognition” is a morallabelandhis“deepdiversity”isasubtleandsophisticatedconception that can successfully accommodate different ways of being Canadian. Consequently, “second-level or ‘deep’ diversity” is a means that can guarantee “a plurality of ways of belonging.” In other words, it is perfectly possible for Québécois to be Canadian as members of their primary, sub-state, national community.53 Political theorists and philosophers, then, are engaged in a discourse about how to reconcile different notions of identity with different forms of community. It is a vitally important purpose in a country like Canada. The benefit of this theoretical debate by Canadians in Canada lies in its practical implications for constitutional reform. And as Alain-G. Gagnon has perceptively observed, what matters in this public debate is not equality of treatment but equality of outcome. Equitable treatment rather than identical treatment between communities crucially recognises difference as a social and political reality. It both exposes and confronts the peculiar circumstances of Quebec’s existence in North America.54 It is time now to conclude this survey of the federal spirit as a moral basis to Canadian federalism by shifting our focus from diagnosis to remedy.

Conclusion: The Failure of Non-Constitutional Reform When the Liberal Party triumphed in the federal general election of 1993, the new Liberal Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, announced that his government would not continue to pursue an agenda of formal constitutional reform. Canada, he argued, was tired and exhausted by what had become a futile public debate. He was determined to avoid what he construed as a constitutional stalemate that served only to underline the sharp polarisation of the country between an overwhelmingly Francophone Quebec and a predominantly anglophone “Rest of Canada” (known widely as ROC). On the contrary, his preference was for non-constitutional change that would obviate the need to activate an extremely difficult formal constitutional amendment procedure. Since then, Canada has experienced a nail-biting referendum on sovereignty in Quebec in October 1995, the re-election of the Liberal Party

30 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism in the federal election of 1997, a highly divisive and damaging Supreme Court Reference on the “Secession of Quebec from Canada” in 1998 and a third electoral triumph for Chrétien and the Liberal Party in November 2000. Canada has entered the new millennium, it would seem, without having learned much from recent legal and political events. For Chrétien, Canada’s constitutional status quo appears to remain a real option. This position, however, is both short-sighted and misguided. It is short-sighted because it does nothing to resolve the defects and deficiencies in the Constitution Act, 1982. And it is misguided simply because such inertia serves only to buttress a particular vision of Canada that does not accord with Quebec’s national interests. In short, Trudeau’s conception of Canada has been fossilised and remains offensive to Quebec. From the standpoint of procedural liberalism, the constitution is no longer neutral but enshrines a conspicuous ideological bias: The contestation inherent in day-to-day politics is manageable because, or if, political actors assume that no party or interest is constitutionally privileged because they believe that certain expectations about fairness and neutrality inform the constitution. Only when the assumption of neutrality is undermined does contestation become unmanageable. ...Inprocedural liberalism, justice takes its meaning from the constitution; it is assumed that the requirements for justice have been met when the procedures set out in the constitution have been adhered to. When it is those very procedures that are being called into question, when indeed the very idea of a procedural constitution is questioned, what can “justice” mean?55 Chrétien’s mistake is to assume that Canada can turn its back on constitutional reform, return to “politics as usual” and ameliorate—or simply avoid—rather than try to resolve problems that are fundamental to Canada’s continued existence. The pursuit of non-constitutional change is a failure of political will and imagination that reflects a steadfast refusal to accommodate Quebec’s quest for security in a national community that can sit alongside Trudeau’s Canadian vision. Ironically, what Janet Ajzenstat calls “the decline of procedural liberalism” was set in motion by Canadian Liberals in 1982 and has been sustained by them since 1993. Procedural liberalism—the notion of a balanced neutrality—can be restored only if there is an equality of outcome. This means that Canadians cannot either deliberately ignore or stubbornly avoid the reform of the constitution in the future. On the contrary, they must utilise a judicious mixture of both symmetrical and asymmetrical federalism if the federal spirit of 1867 is to be reinvigorated. Constitutional reform, after all, is constitutional renewal. And the coexistence of symmetry and asymmetry, we are reminded, is far from novel in Canada. It has been a cardinal feature of the Canadian Constitution since its ratification by the British Parliament over 130 years ago. Consequently the recent support for constitutional symmetry and provincial equality advocated by those Anglophone forces concentrated

31 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes mainly but not solely in the Western provinces of Alberta and British Columbia is tantamount to an amnesia that conveniently ignores one of the most characteristic hallmarks of Canada s federal history. The Canadian federal experience reminds us that the moral basis to federalism is highly contingent and circumstantial. But the federal spirit must not be construed as merely an extension of familiar democratic norms and practices. It reflects a deliberate and purposive commitment to a fundamental respect for and constitutional recognition of distinct identities in a particular kind of state, namely, a federation. The federal principle of “constitutional entrenchment” provides the legal and constitutional guarantee that recognised identities have the inviolable right to protect, preserve and promote their sense of who they are. It is not something, however, about which it is possible to be passive. Quite the reverse. If the federal spirit—the moral basis to federalism—is to be kept alive it must be persistently pursued. This is Quebec‘s role and now also the role of the Aboriginal peoples. But the Canadian federal experience also strongly suggests that the moral basis to federalism—as a normative dimension—must be much more firmly incorporated into federal theory than has previously been the case. The two faces—both moral and amoral—inherent in federalism therefore signify a permanent tension in federations that must be acknowledged by both constitutional and non-constitutional reform.

Notes 1. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “The Practice and Theory of Federalism,” in Federalism and the French Canadians, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1968), Part Two, 132. 2. Trudeau, “The Practice and Theory of Federalism,” 132-33. 3. S. Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning, (London: University of California Press, 1978), 216. 4. Davis, The Federal Principle,3. 5. Jean Côté and Marcel Chaput, (Eds.), Quotations from René Lévesque, (Montreal: Éditions Héritage, 1977), 14. 6. Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 5. 7. Bertus de Villiers, Bundestreue: The Soul of an Intergovernmental Partnership, (Johannesburg, RSA: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Occasional Papers, March 1995), 9-10. 8. De Villiers, Bundestreue, 13. 9. De Villiers, Bundestreue, 6. The emphasis here, I feel, has a special moral resonance in Canada-Quebec relations. 10. Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 4th ed., 20. 11. Wheare, Federal Government, 18-19. 12. Wheare, Federal Government, 20. 13. Ronald I. Cheffins and Patricia A. Johnson, The Revised Canadian Constitution: Politics as Law, (London: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986), 2.

32 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism

14. Douglas V. Verney, Three Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State: Canada’s Political Traditions, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986), 151. 15. Verney, Three Civilizations, 146-47. 16. Verney, Three Civilizations, 398. 17. For a more detailed account of this argument, see Michael Burgess, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The State of the Canadian Federation,” Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 9 (2), Summer 1999, 1-15. 18. Wheare examined the impact of contemporary socioeconomic change on federal government in Chapter XII of Federal Government, but he acknowledged there that “In the sphere of finance it is clear that the general governments have steadily increased their powers at the expense of the states, and it may be said that . . . this increase in power and the predominant positions they now occupy have come about largely by the exploitation of the powers originally granted to them by their constitutions.” (Emphasis mine), 238. 19. Wheare, Federal Government, 20. 20. Donald V. Smiley, The Canadian Political Nationality, (Toronto: Methuen, 1967), 23. 21. Samuel LaSelva, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism, (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996). 22. LaSelva, Moral Foundations, 24. 23. LaSelva, Moral Foundations, 25. 24. LaSelva, Moral Foundations, 25. 25. It is true that Switzerland, after the resolution of the Sonderbund War of 1847 between the Catholic and Protestant cantons, formed a new federation in 1848 that incorporated distinct cultural differences but neither the civil war nor the structural focus of the new union was reflective of that deeply rooted sense of singular national self-consciousness so characteristic of Quebec in Canada. 26. John Ralston Saul, Reflections of a Siamese Twin: Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century, (New York: Viking Penguin, 1997), 11. 27. Saul, Reflections of a Siamese Twin, 12 & 177. 28. Saul, Reflections of a Siamese Twin, 12. 29. Saul, Reflections of a Siamese Twin, 505. 30. Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream, (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 5. 31. Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream,5. 32. Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream,5. 33. See David Milne, “Equality or Asymmetry: Why Choose?,” in Ronald L. Watts & Douglas M. Brown, (Eds.) Options for a New Canada, (London: University of Toronto Press, 1991), Chap. 15, 285-307. 34. Ronald L. Watts, “The Canadian Experience with Asymmetrical Federalism,” in Robert Agranoff (Ed.), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlag., 1999), Chap. 7, 118-36. 35. Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream,5. 36. Verney, Three Civilizations, 301. 37. Editor’s “Introduction” in David Kwavnick, (Ed.), The Tremblay Report, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 1973), vii. 38. See Michael Burgess, “The European Tradition of Federalism: Christian Democracy and Federalism,” in Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, (Eds.), Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), Chap. 8, 138-53. 39. Kwavnick, The Tremblay Report, 103-4.

33 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

40. Susan M. Trofimenkoff, The Dream of Nation: A Social International History of Quebec, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1982), 275. 41. Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967), xxxiii. 42. The phrases derive from Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream, and Janet Ajzenstat, “Decline of Procedural Liberalism: The Slippery Slope to Secession,” in Joseph H. Carens (Ed.), Is Quebec Nationalism Just?—Perspectives from Anglophone Canada, (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 128. 43. Guy Laforest, “The Meaning and Centrality of Recognition,” in Roger Gibbins, (Ed.), Meech Lake and Canada: Perspectives from the West, (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988), Part III, 79-80. 44. J.A. Corry, “The Uses of a Constitution,” in The Constitution and the Future of Canada, Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, 1978, (Toronto: Richard De Boo Ltd., 1978) 1-15. 45. See the following representative sample of this particular literature: Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Charles Taylor (with an introduction by Guy Laforest), Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism, (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993); James Tully, “Diversity’s Gambit Declined,” in Curtis Cook, (Ed.), Constitutional Predicament: Canada after the Referendum of 1992, (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), Chap. 6, 149-98; James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Ronald L. Watts & Douglas M. Brown, (Eds.), Options for a New Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Ronald L. Watts, “Contemporary Views on Federalism,” in Bertus De Villiers, (Ed.), Evaluating Federal Systems, (London: Juta & Co. Ltd., 1994), Chap. 1, 1-29; Alain-G. Gagnon, “The Moral Foundations of Asymmetrical Federalism: A Normative Exploration,” in Alain-G. Gagnon & James Tully (Eds.), Multinational Democracies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2001), Chap. 1, 1-30; Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Roger Gibbins and Guy Laforest, (Eds.) Beyond the Impasse: Toward Reconciliation, (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1998); Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream, (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995); Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian Constitution, (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994); and Samuel LaSelva, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism: Paradoxes, Achievements and Tragedies of Nationhood, (London: McGill-Queen’s Univer- sity Press, 1996). 46. This distinction formed the basis of a recent collection of essays on asymmetrical federalism. See Robert Agranoff, (Ed.), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States, (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1999). 47. Corry, “The Uses of a Constitution,” 2-10. 48. Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream, 185. 49. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity, Chap. 5, 140-82. 50. Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 117. 51. Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 74 and 163.

34 The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism

52. This question is at the heart of Siobhan Harty, “The Nation as a Communal Good: A Nationalist Response to the Liberal Conception of Community,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXXII: 4, (December 1999), 665-89. 53. Charles Taylor, Shared and Divergent Values, Chap. 4, 53-76. See also his “The Deep Challenge of Dualism,” in Alain-G. Gagnon, (Ed.), Quebec State and Society, (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1993), Chap. 5, 81-95. 54. Gagnon, “The Moral Foundations of Asymmetrical Federalism,” 1-30, (forthcoming). 55. Ajzenstat, “Decline of Procedural Liberalism,” 130-32.

Ann-M. Field and François Rocher

At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada

Abstract The entrenchment of the Charter, by giving staying power to a new set of political actors representing spatially diffuse identities (women, ethnic minorities, lesbians and gays, etc.), has contributed to the emergence of current political tensions. These non-territorial actors challenge federalism and the governance of the Canadian state by subjecting the political landscape to fundamental changes. We will argue that at the root of these current political tensions is a misunderstanding of federal principles and how they should be applied. We will discuss how federalism needs to be understood to reconcile the need for integration and cohesion within the Canadian state with respect for diversity and pluralism. Our paper contributes to the present scholarship by exploring two aspects that are not usually discussed in the literature on federalism. First, rather than looking at federalism simply as a set of institutions, we will discuss how federal principles are key to “good” governance. Second, despite the fact that the essential organizational principle of federalism is territory, our focus will be on non-territorial actors and the challenge they pose to Canadian federalism.

Résumé L’enchâssement de la Charte, en conférant une certaine permanence à un nouvel ensemble d’acteurs politiques représentant des identités éparpillées dans l’espace (les femmes, les minorités ethniques, les lesbiennes et les gais, etc.) a contribué à l’émergence des tensions politiques actuelles. En assujettissant le paysage politique à des changements fondamentaux, ces acteurs non territoriaux représentent un défi pour le fédéralisme et la conduite des affaires publiques par l’État canadien. Nous soutiendrons que, à la racine de ces tensions politiques actuelles, on retrouve une méprise sur la nature des principes du fédéralisme et la façon dont ils devraient s’appliquer. Nous montrerons comment on doit comprendre le fédéralisme pour pouvoir réconcilier le besoin d’intégration et de cohésion à l’intérieur de l’État canadien avec le respect de la diversité et du pluralisme. Notre article contribue à la recherche actuelle en explorant deux aspects rarement abordés dans la littérature sur le fédéralisme. Premièrement, plutôt que de se contenter de considérer le fédéralisme comme un ensemble d’institutions, nous montrerons comment les principes du fédéralisme constituent la clé d’une « bonne » administration de la chose publique. Deuxièmement, en dépit du fait que le territoire constitue le principe organisationnel essentiel du fédéralisme, nous nous concentrerons sur les acteurs non territoriaux et le défi qu’ils posent au fédéralisme canadien.

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Important aspects need to be explored if we are to come to a full understanding of the Canadian political situation. Common problems with Canadian federalism are the misconceptions that surround the concept of federalism itself as well as the increasing presence of non-territorial identities. A survey of literature on Canadian federalism and issues of citizenship primarily emphasizes only two aspects: the challenge of counter-nationalist claims advanced by Québec and Aboriginal peoples andtheestablishmentofaneo-liberalstate.Althoughthesearecentraltothe studyofCanadianfederalism,wewillarguethatifonedoesnotconsiderthe principles of federalism and the realities associated with non-territorial fragmentation, a full understanding of the present political situation is impossible. At the root of present political tensions is a misunderstanding of federal principlesandhowtheyshouldbeappliedintheCanadiancontext.Notonly are we without a common understanding of federalism, the Canadian state is not being governed as a true federation. Unless we identify clearly these principles and obey them, Canada should not be considered a federation. A second challenge to federalism has been discussed widely, but not in the literature on federalism. In the last three decades, changes in the political culture, closely linked to the entrenchment of the Charter, have given staying power to new sets of political actors representing spatially diffuse identities (i.e., women, ethnic minorities, lesbians and gays, disabled persons). Federalism, as traditionally understood, concerns itself with regional diversity. We will claim that non-territorial identities pose a challenge to federalism, and consequently to the governance of the Canadian state, by intensifying conflicts over the division of power; by forcing the inclusion of non-governmental actors in a political arena previously accessed only by governments; and finally, by simultaneously reinforcing and challenging a pan-Canadian identity. Our aim in this paper is to come to terms with the challenge that misconceptions of federal principles and non-territorial identities as political actors pose to the constitutional process and everyday functioning of the Canadian state. Our discussion will make clear that disregarding these two aspects makes it impossible to truly come to terms with present- day political problems. The traditional emphasis on counter-nationalist claims or the impact of the neo-liberal state can only partly explain the problems plaguing the Canadian state. We will ask how a “true” understanding and application of federal principles can change the way the Canadian state is governed. Can understanding federal principles help us overcome the division between the Québec population and the rest of Canada, as well as the rift between Canadians and Aboriginal peoples? We want to examine citizenship in a federal context and ask if and how non- territorial actors can be recognized in a federal state. Can non-territorial actors make legitimate claims as political or constitutional actors on the same basis as federal, provincial or Aboriginal governments? Can, and

38 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada should, a system of government rooted in a territorial division of power be sufficiently expanded to encompass the claims of non-territorial actors without becoming an obsolete concept? In answering these questions, it willbecomeclearthat,toresolveourconstitutionalcrisis,diversityneedsto be understood and accommodated not simply along spatial lines as traditionally advocated, but also along a social axis. Thus, it is important to not simply consider principles of federalism and counter-nationalist claims (spatial axis), but also to acknowledge the challenge brought on by the shift towards the neo-liberal state and entrenchment of non-territorial political actors (social axis). Together, these axes provide a framework for a full understanding of the Canadian political situation. This essay does not attempt to review the literature on the effect of counter-nationalists claims by Québec or Aboriginal peoples, nor the impact of the shift towards the neo-liberal state. Rather, it discusses the principles of federalism, how they apply to the Canadian case and finally, how non-territorial fragmentation exacerbates the challenges to governance of the Canadian federation. The first section will discuss federal principles. The second section will explore how non-territorial political actors intensify the inherent problem in Canadian citizenship. The third section will look at citizenship and set out to reconcile the tensions at the root of the Canadian political tensions.

Understanding Federalism Federalism is an open and flexible approach to governance, sensitive to the complexity of allegiances and values in a diverse society. If properly applied, federalism can be a way of reconciling, rather than destroying, the seemingly conflicting currents of globalization and integration on the one hand, and preserving national and regional identities on the other. Federalism is modeled on a set of institutions based on a division of power among different levels of government. The mechanisms of governance in federal states are organized differently to reflect the particular social fabric of the societies they govern. It is therefore not surprising that there exists several ways of perceiving and understanding federalism and federal institutions. In fact, the interpretations of the circumstances that have given way to the institutionalization of federal regimes remain the subject of academic debates.1 Although the concept of “federation” can be considered a legal concept if it refers to a constitutional agreement that defines the terms of governance, federalism does not per se refer to an institutional arrangement. Rather, it is an organizational framework of politics or a way of thinking about political arrangements. Thus, beyond the structures inherent in federal states, federalism is founded on a number of basic principles. Both the spirit that must necessarily inspire a federal state and the types of arrangements for the social relationship it claims to champion are equally important for

39 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes federalism to truly function as it was intended.2 In sum, structures alone are not sufficient to uphold a state as federal. Denis de Rougemont has enunciated clearly these federal principles: · Federalism is born out of the renunciation of any form of hegemony between the constituent nations. · Federalism must renounce any predetermined division of tasks; it must remain flexible. · The purpose of federalism is not to assimilate minorities. · The purpose of federalism is not to eliminate diversity and meld all nations into a single entity, but on the contrary, to safeguard their inherent characteristics. · Federalism does not deny its complex arrangement which contrast with the brutal simplicity that characterizes totalitarianism (or unitary states). · A federation is formed over time by individuals and groups and not by governments or central institutions. · A federation is not created in order to counter an external threat or for imperial purposes; rather a federation is created to further the survival of the communities of which it is composed, so that together these communities can exercise functions which are beyond the individual capacities of each, furthering the interests of both.3 The institutional arrangements of a federation must be evaluated on the basis of their adherence to federal principles. For example, federalism guarantees autonomy within union. It excludes any quest for hierarchization among entities that choose to federate, be it economic, political or cultural. The unity sought is therefore not a “national” unity, referring to some sort of homogenizing idea of identity, but rather must express common interests and shared advantages through an agreement by mutual consent. Federalism, as an approach, is distinct from what might be described in contemporary terms as unitary. Although de Rougemont is writing at a much earlier period, these principles can still be applied in a contemporary context. In fact, other authors from different academic traditions have come to the same conclusionasdeRougemont.Forexample,DanielJ.Elazar,oneofthegreat thinkers on the issue of federalism, claims that: Federalism is resurfacing as a political force because it serves well the principle that there are no simple majorities or minorities but that all majorities are compounded of congeries of groups, and the corollary principle or minority rights, which not only protects the possibility for minorities to preserve themselves but forces majorities to be compound rather than artificially simple. It serves those principles by emphasizing the consensual basis of the polity

40 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada

and the importance of liberty in the constitution and maintenance of democratic republics.4 The aspect of “contract” is central to federalism. It allows for a double necessity, that of the mutual recognition of the partners involved and the search for a unifying principle around which the various entities can come together. As a political concept, federalism refers to a constitutional division of powers that sustains the political participation of all of the partners, while giving them sufficient leeway to preserve their integrity. Elazar proposed a simple definition of federalism when he suggested that federalism was the combination of self-rule plus shared rule: “Federalism thus defined involves some kind of contractual linkage of a presumably permanent character that (1) provides for power sharing, (2) cuts around the issue of sovereignty, and (3) supplements but does not seek to replace or diminish prior organic ties where they exist.”5 That is to say, if we are to understand fully the concept of federalism, it is not sufficient to study the political institutions. Attention must be given to the organizational framework that, as mentioned earlier, reflects the social fabric of the society. In sum, to have federal institutions is not sufficient; true federalism also involves a way of political organizing. Inspired by similar considerations, Burelle, a former constitutional advisor to the Trudeau and Mulroney governments, outlined the key principles of federalism as follows: subsidiarity, non-subordination and management of inter-dependence.6 It is not within the scope of this analysis to identify the problems associated with each of these principles. Suffice it to say that subsidiarity ought not be understood as merely a method of governance.7 It seeks to empower individuals with respect to their immediate environment, consequently favouring an attachment to the local government. Not efficiency, but rather the best interest of the individuals in the community is what determines the guiding principles defining the responsibilities of each order of government. The principle of non-subordination refers to the very nature of federalism by acknowledging the autonomy inherent in each order of government. Thus, in regards to the organizational structure, there is to be no hegemony by any part of the federation over any other part. Finally, the concept of interdependence requires that the partners of the federation consult one another and decide freely and jointly on opportunities for and limitations on joint decision-making with their respective jurisdictions. This partnership is all the more necessary at a time when globalization no longer allows for an approach to federalism in which each order of government holds powers exclusively. These three principles, as enunciated by Burelle, are inviolable. Interdependence must be managed in partnership within a federation, taking into account the other two principles. This partnership approach excludes any subordination of one order of government to another, and rejects in particular any unilateral imposition of standards and rules of procedure by the central authority.

41 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Are we suggesting here an essentialist understanding of federalism that delineates a single “true” set of principles as federalist? We do not believe so. The concept of federalism is never free of normative interpretations. If one considers scholarship on the concept of democracy, which is not unlike that of federalism in that it proffers a method of governance, we readily see that contemplating the philosophical implications and merits of this mode of governance is an accepted common practice. The same should be true of those who discuss federalism. Federalism is not simply a set of political structures and institutions; it also inspires principles of governance. Despite the fact that most of the literature on federalism discusses the instrumental and institutional aspects, a substantive approach opens up a debate on the political dimension and aims of federalism, an interesting aspect that has too often been neglected. Our discussion of federalism should be understood in this light. Principles aside, federal states have come into existence and evolved for very different causes. Significantly, although Canadian federalism has respected only imperfectly federal principles, the federate model was chosen over a unitary state despite the fact that a number of the Fathers of Confederation, including John A. Macdonald, would have preferred otherwise. The unitary model was rejected in order to preserve, among other things, Québec’s unique position on the American continent.8 In fact, Canadian federalism was born from the desire to protect the inherent diversity of the new Canada. This key dimension cannot be ignored, especially when trying to understand the present-day problems. The principles enumerated above, when applied as stated, should also be compatible with the accommodation of non-territorial identities. However, if we examine more closely the Canadian case, it becomes clear that the principles are understood as referring to territorial units, and even assume the territoriality of political actors and institutions. All political institutions, whether provincial governments, the Canadian Parliament or the electoral system, are rooted in an understanding of the federal principle which assumes their application to territorial entities. This practice of federalism is contrary to the accommodation of social movements that do not have a territorial referent. This is so despite the fact that federalism is fundamentally about recognizing and accommodating diversity. The followingsectionwillexaminethecaseofnon-territorialpoliticalactors.

The Challenge of Non-Territorial Diversity In Canada, the essential organizational principle of federalism is territory. Federalismdoesnotspeaktosocialoreconomiccleavages;itonlyspeaksto the axis of space.9 Since the emphasis has traditionally been on space and territory, why study federalism when aiming to address the challenge of non-territorial diversity? Why not simply speak of citizenship or representation? In fact, why should one think of federalism and citizenship together? Globalization, economic restructuration and immigration have

42 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada altered the political landscape. As a result, the challenge to Canadian federalism is no longer simply defined in terms of counter-nationalism, such as claims made by Québec and Aboriginal peoples, or changes resulting from the shift towards a neo-liberal state. Non-territorial fragmentation is also forcing us to rethink our system of governance. The emergence of social movements over the last three decades, some of which are recognized by the Charter, has changed our traditional conception of Canadian politics. It has pushed us to question how federalism can manage, affirm or accommodate not simply territorial and regional diversity, but also identity and cultural diversity. Federalism provides solutions to the challenges faced by modern states.10 Its framework allows us to reconcile contradictory principles such as majority rule and minority rights, common purpose and local needs, interdependence and autonomy. In this sense, the practice of federalism is not limited to the division of power; it reflects the idea of shared sovereignty, multiple loyalties as well as multiple levels of government.11 Federalism serves to resolve problems not only when they involve territorial cleavages. In fact, as the discussion below will make clear, federalism is central to any rethinking of citizenship which aims to tackle the contemporary challenges linked to accommodating diversity, whether this diversity is expressed territorially or through spatially diffused social movements. How has the challenge of non-territorial identities come about in Canada?Forone,theCharterdirectlycontributesingivingstayingpowerto new “constitutional” actors representing non-territorial identities (i.e., women, ethnic groups, gays and lesbians, etc.). That is not to say of course, as Cairns outlined in “Constitutional Minoritarianism,” that the Charter is the reason these actors exist. Apart from their constitutional identities, several other factors contribute to the establishment of these new political actors. For example, social movements, which are central in articulating these new identities, are not uniquely Canadian phenomena. Changes in immigration patterns, from mostly white Europeans to a large number of non-white immigrants, have helped make ethnic minorities more visible. The global enthusiasm for a culture of rights combined with public policies that address issues of diversity (such as multiculturalism, hate crime legislation, etc.) further the entrenchment of non-territorial political actors.12 And finally, special to Canada, these non-territorial actors have constitutional stakes since they are named in the Charter. In the literature, the challenge of non-territorial actors is often portrayed mainly as one of representation. This leads to an assumption that representation of these political actors in state institutions will accommodatetheirneeds.Yet,theproblemrelatesasmuchtodemocracyas to federalism. The most common suggestion to remedy this problem is mir- ror representation (including individuals sharing identity characteristics of the excluded groups) that is said to correct prior exclusions. Jenson’s

43 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes discussion of citizenship claims is framed around the concept of representation. She looks at constitution-making in Canada and confirms the presence of an increasing number of political actors who are not territorially-defined. Jenson advances the idea that social movements push not only for inclusion in the political and constitutional process, but also aim to expand the democratic space. She concludes from her analysis that inclusion of groups in the Charlottetown Accord process reflects a shift in the citizenship regime of the 21st century that will come to recognize difference.13 Jenson’s understanding of the inclusion of these new actors is problematic.Theclaimthatthe“welcoming”ofthesenewactorsrepresents an expansion of democracy fails to question the basis for the legitimacy of identity-based representation. Although the system of representative democracy has its own limitations and problems, parliamentarians have gained their legitimacy from an electorate to which they are accountable. In contrast, identity groups gain their “legitimacy” from assumptions based on their identity. These actors are not necessarily accountable to those they supposedly represent.14 The inclusion of these groups does not guarantee that their interests will be accounted for, and therefore, does not correspond to an expansion of democracy. What these demands of inclusion and participation by social movements indicate is a crisis linked to the inability of Canadian federalism and Parliament to speak to large segments of its community in meaningful ways. These demands outline how the federalist system has failed to address issues important to political actors who are not territorially-based. Disregarding how non-territorial actors disrupt the traditional political landscape has led to the conclusion that the challenge of non-territorial fragmentation is simply a problem of representation, when in fact the real challenge is to federalism. Hueglin explores this idea of non-territorial diversity as a challenge to federalism when he suggests that non-territorial fragmentation may require a new type of representation. He gives credence to the argument that certain groups should be incorporated alongside governments through the development of new models of representation and consultation.15 Hueglin clearly identifies the challenge posed by non-territorial fragmentation as directly aimed at federalism. As he explains, federalism is not simply about the division of power among governments; it is also about which groups of citizens are empowered at which level of government. Thus, the issues brought forth by non-territorial diversity are questions of federalism and not simply questions of representation and democracy. The awkwardness that characterizes non-territorial actors as challenging federalism reflects the uneasy relationship between federalism and liberalism. For instance, federalism makes it easier to protect some regionally concentrated minorities. However, in doing so, federalism assumes the homogeneity of these entities.16 Thus, to protect those who are not territorially represented, a Charter or a bill of rights becomes a

44 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada necessary complement to federalism. Without it, minimum standards of fundamental freedoms may not be respected. In other words, territorially concentrated minorities maybe protected at the expense of minorities within these regions. The confusion over this relationship can in part be attributed to the fact that the Charter has reversed the relationship between liberalism and federalism. By emphasizing individual rights and claiming that by virtue of these rights Canadians are at home everywhere, parliamentary supremacy and federalism are being contested as the main pillars of the Canadian system of governance. The Charter subordinates diversity to freedom and equality, in turn making federalism a subordinate rather than an equally important pillar of the Canadian state.17 The Charter can help protect the interests of non-territorial identities; however, this does not negate that non-territorial identities challenge federalism. Cairns argues that federalism on its own is no longer sufficient to accommodate the new players who want to be acknowledged and respected. He concludes that a positive and complementary relationship between the Charter and federalism furthers the protection of diversities that are spatially diffuse.18 Although we agree that the Charter protects rights in a way that federalism and Parliament do not, it is important to understand the direct correlation between federalism and non-territorial identities. That is to say that non-territorial identity groups challenge the practice of federalism per se, something that even the addition of the Charter cannot prevent. The examples below will document how non-territorial identity groups pose a challenge to federalism and consequently to the governance of the Canadian state. These examples will demonstrate how non-territorial identities intensify conflicts over the division of power, force the inclusion of non-governmental actors in a political arena previously reserved to governments, and finally, simultaneously reinforce and challenge a pan-Canadian identity. These are all challenges to federalism and must be understood as such. The first justification for considering non-territorial identities as challenging federalism is the way these political actors, like territorial ones, play the division of power. The division of power is approached by non-territorial actors in a variety of ways, sometimes by side-stepping the jurisdictions outlined in the constitution, as a way to obtain protection from one level of government against actions by another; at other times by, strengthening the conflicts between provincial and federal jurisdictions, pressuring one level of government to obtain gains from another government. For example, the women’s movement in English-Canada has centered its effort to preserve social services and safety networks by lobbying not the provincial governments, who are responsible for the administration of social services, but rather the federal government. The women’s movement became institutionalized through efforts initiated by the federal government when the Charter was implemented.19 Today, as the recent discussion on the Social Union demonstrates, the women’s

45 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes movement in English-Canada remains focused in its lobbying effort on the federal government. These women have argued that it is preferable to have national standards and uniform programs across the country protected by the federal government than to have services differing from one province to another.20 We can speculate that by concentrating their efforts as a single and unified group exerting pressure on one target (the federal government), the voices of those women were potentially more powerful. Without denying that the women’s movement may be more successful in putting pressure on the federal government rather than ten provincial ones, especially given its limited resources, this should not obscure what is at issue when discussing the Social Union: the role of the federal government. At Confederation, it was not intended that the federal government should oversee directly welfare provisions. The provinces, and not the federal government, are the mandated guardians of these social welfare provisions according to our Constitution. However, in Canada the establishment of the social welfare state came about in part as a result of the involvement of the federal government in areas of provincial jurisdiction through the spending powers provision. By deciding that it would not turn over the financial powers it had “borrowed” from the provinces during wartime, the federal government embarked on a quest to establish a modern Canada. New programs were developed to build infrastructures (the St. Lawrence Seaway, pipelines, the Trans-Canada Highway, satellites, etc.), to equalize access to resources between regions (transfer payments) and citizens (familyallowance,unemploymentinsurance,healthcare,oldagepensions, welfare, etc.), and to sustain a feeling of belonging or national pride (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, National Film Board, Canada Arts Council, national museums, etc.). These significant changes in the governance of the Canadian state have had an important impact on how federalism has come to be viewed. Federalism and Canadian identity are more or less understood as referring to the principle of redistribution and equalization of resources among provinces and citizens or, in other words, a “sharing community,” to use a term coined by Peter Leslie.21 This understanding has culminated with the inclusion of s. 36 in the Constitutional Act of 1982 that requires the federal and provincial governments to promote equality of opportunities among all Canadians. Since then, the federal government’s intervention has been understood as necessary to promote and strengthen national identity, a key element for social cohesion in Canada. The push towards national norms (or uniform standards for all provinces and citizens) conforms to this logic. As Kennett explains: “the case for national principles and standards rests on the view that a systematic attempt to establish certain core social policy entitlements is a worthwhile undertaking given the importance of these entitlements to individual Canadians and their economic and political role in unifying a defining Canadian society.”22

46 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada

The introduction of the principles of equality, equity and identity in the Canadian imagination has created tremendous tensions with the principles we have discussed above. A new equilibrium must therefore be struck in order to consolidate the idea of this pan-Canadian identity and respect for diversity and pluralism. This tension was present in the debates that led to the adoption of the Social Union Agreement in February 1999. Noël discusses three understandings of the Social Union that were conceptualized around three distinct social projects in the 1990s. One is a “national” project that aims to promote a common identity for all Canadians; the second is an intergovernmental project that favours the interdependent management of social affairs; the third project aims to develop a welfare state that favours the autonomous development of provincial models of social policies.23 That the new Social Union Framework was welcomed by most, provincial governments as well as advocacy groups, reflects that non-territorial identity groups contribute to legitimizing the changing roles of governments.24 In fact, it also confirms that the first understanding of the Social Union has won out over the others. This agreement aims to further a pan-Canadian identity. The Social Union agreement does not respect the original division of power. It works at reducing differences between different communities across Canada by imposing national standards for social services. It contradicts several federal principles by imposing the subordination of provinces to the federal government that ultimately sets the national standards. It also promotes the homogenization of communities by imposing universal services at the expense of recognizing and protecting the diversity of communities.25 Despite all this, the main point of this discussion is to examine how an identity group benefits or loses from this institutional federal arrangement. The example of women’s groups lobbying the federal government rather than provincial governments to uphold social programs is an example of an identity group that gains by disregarding federalism and operating as if Canada were a unitary state. Before concluding that it may be beneficial for spatially diffused identity groups to ignore federal principles, let us look at the case of sexual identity. In 1999, the Alberta legislature reluctantly added sexual orientation to its human rights legislation as a ground on which discrimination would not be tolerated. Following a long court battle initiated by gay rights activists, the Supreme Court in the Vriend decision declared that, since discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited by the Charter, the Alberta Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act must comply and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.26 This is an example of how a federal institution, this time the judiciary, has forced changes in a provincial jurisdiction or, in other words, a case in which an identity group has used the federal division of power to further its cause.27

47 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

We can argue that federalism in the Canadian case contributes to the advancement of a more progressive stance by the various governments on the issue of protecting fundamental rights. It should be noted that unlike federal involvement in social programs, national standards on fundamental rights should not be viewed in contradiction with federal principles of provincial autonomy. Even when imposed, universal rights are clearly subject to interpretations that can vary in order to reflect the context in which they apply. Furthermore, fundamental rights represent a minimum standard for achieving social justice, a goal that is central to Canada as a whole, and therefore not conflicting with federal principles. Unlike women’s groups which have deployed most of their resources towards the federal government in the hope of securing social welfare provisions, lesbian and gay activists have at times mobilized at both the federal level and the provincial level. In fact, the decentralization of political power in Canada has allowed lesbian and gay activists to make gains at the provincial level despite resistance at the federal level, and vice versa. The Alberta example is a case in which the Charter forced changes in the provincial human rights legislation; yet, the federal Human Rights Act was changed as a result of provincial precedents. As Rayside explains: federal decentralization played an important role in easing the passage of the bill adding sexual orientation to the Canadian Human Rights Act. Proponents of the bill could point to the passage of similar measures by most of the provinces and territories, introduced by governments of varying political stripes, which appeared to suffer no losses in the elections following even the most frequently contested legislative battles.28 In some cases, the provincial legislatures create opportunities for lesbian and gay activists to exert an influence that may affect the federal government. Federalism provides lesbians and gays multiple access points to push for changes, something that has been positive in this particular case. Although we referred primarily to legal decisions, these court decisions and ensuing changes in legislation are accompanied by political battles fought outside the courts. The mobilization at different levels of government demonstrates how decentralization of the judicial system and political power can at times benefitidentitygroupsbycreatingopportunitiesforchange.Forexample,it is clear that gay rights activists are unlikely to make political gains when facing the Conservative governments of Klein (Alberta) and Harris (Ontario). Advances were made in Alberta, by playing the division of power and imposing standards recognized elsewhere in the federation. Opportunities may be fewer for lesbians and gays in a unitary state where waiting for a different government may be the only option. At least in Canada, when confronted by hostile governments, lesbian and gay activists have been able to shift their focus to other levels of government or to the courts, an option that may not be readily available in non-federal states.

48 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada

“Playing” the division of power could prove to be a successful strategy for other identity groups as well. The second challenge to federalism is the “democratization” of a political space that was previously reserved for governments alone. Dobrowolsky maps the ascendancy of women’s movements as constitutional actors, demonstrating how non-territorial actors have carved for themselves a place alongside governments.29 Constitutional negotiations have traditionally been the prerogative of governments. The challenge of the women’s movement, as well as Aboriginal peoples, has forced a restructuring of the constitutional process. Constitutional politics no longer includes uniquely government representatives; it has been expanded to consider and consult new actors who had not previously been able to voice their concerns at this level of politics. Through the democratization of political spaces, the constitutional process has been dislodged from the realm of high politics, making the Constitution not only a concern for elites, but for every citizen.30 Although the exclusion of non-territorially based actors was previously disregarded, or viewed as unproblematic, the entrenchment of the Charter combined with other factors has led to a situation where governments are forced to include these new political actors. As Simeon and Robinson point out, “federalism does tend to organize territorial issues into Canadian politics and organize other issues out.”31 Although this was traditionally the case, the politics of the last three decades have challenged the legitimacy of this exclusion from politics and are presently forcing new configurations of representation and consultation beyond that of governmental actors. The third challenge to federalism by non-territorial actors is one that demands we question the idea of a pan-Canadian identity. A two-fold movement is at work in relation to the concept of a pan-Canadian identity. On the one hand, if one examines closely the laws that govern us, belonging to any of these identity groups may have different meanings depending on the province one lives in. Gays and lesbians do not have the same rights across the country. In Québec, Ontario and British Columbia, there is recognition ofsame-sex couples, access tobenefits, eligibility for adoption, child and spousal support and permission for a same-sex partner to make medical decisions on behalf of incapacitated partner.32 In contrast, the inclusion of sexual orientation in Alberta’s human rights legislation has been reluctantly added following a long court battle. Although laws of themselves cannot prevent discrimination, the discrepancies in legal rights between the different provinces indicate that the environment in British Columbia, Ontario and Québec is more welcoming to lesbians and gays than in Alberta. Acloser look at how the different identity groups experience citizenship in different jurisdictions clearly refutes any universal norm. Nevertheless, the myth of pan-Canadian citizenship (a citizenship which corresponds to a national identity) is well entrenched. The discussion on the Social Union

49 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes pointed to the underlying assumption that most Canadians believed that national standards and uniform services are important. In fact, it is assumed that part of what defines us as Canadian are the universal social welfare programs.TheoppositiontotheMeechandtheCharlottetownAccordsalso support this pan-Canadian vision. Women’s group mobilized at first to oppose the distinct society clause, afraid that a culturally sensitive interpretation of the Charter would affect gender equality, especially for Aboriginal women and women in Québec.33 That rights would be interpreted differently depending on the local context, rather than uniformly,raisedupfearsthatequalitywouldbecompromised.Here,itwas claimed that women, to be treated equally, should be treated the same by all governments, regardless of the fact that women experience citizenship in different ways as a result, for example, of race, ethnicity or membership in a national minority. Overall,identitygroupsareachallengetofederalismdespitetheirlackof territorial base. Non-territorial identity groups have challenged the division of power. They have at times used decentralization to their benefit, strengthened the conflicts over the division of power, or simply ignored the federal character of Canada, bypassing the intended division of power. Federalism has also been redefined as a result of non-territorial fragmentation. Whereas before it implied negotiations between governments, the failure of Meech has increased the venues for public input especially when dealing with major constitutional reforms. Lastly, the pan-Canadian identity has been at times reinforced and challenged by these identity groups. For example, women, in their quest for national welfare programssurelyreinforcethepan-Canadianaspectofouridentity.Thiswas evident in their position vis-à-vis Meech and Charlottetown. However, it is apparent that the pan-Canadian identity is being challenged when one looks at how different segments of the population are included in the various citizenship regimes. If to be gay in Alberta and in Québec or British Columbia is a different experience, can we really speak of a pan-Canadian identity? Does this not imply that citizenship is sexed, gendered, racialized and experienced differently depending on location, rather than being universal as would be expected? After having identified the main challenges faced in federalism as a result of non-territorial identities, we suggest that these challenges are anchored in a particular notion of citizenship that focuses on the equal (same) treatment of all citizens. All three challenges linked to non-territorial fragmentation reinforce the notion of universal citizenship, favouring identical treatment of citizens over a fair treatment that would respect diversity. Several factors have contributed to this shift towards a universal citizenship understood through the concept of a pan-Canadian identity. These include the Charter supplanting federalism as a pillar of the Canadian state, consequently subordinating issues of diversity to promote universal individual rights. In contrast, federalism allows for a different

50 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada understanding of citizenship. This is significant, since in the Canadian case, diversity is not limited to non-territorial fragmentation. Diversity is also about Canada as a multinational state. We need to recognize diversity in all itsforms,forhistoricallythechoiceofafederaloveraunitarystatereflected a willingness to recognize and preserve this heritage. Although the challenges of representation, division of power and pan-Canadian identity have as much to do with federalism as with citizenship, they are obsolete concepts without an understanding of citizenship. The next section will discusshowcitizenshipcanberethoughtinlightofthefederalheritage,first by discussing and challenging traditional links between national identity and citizenship, and secondly by rethinking citizenship to accommodate the multinational character of Canada as well as the multiple identities of its citizens.

Citizenship in a Federal State: The Canadian Case In the literature, there is no common understanding of citizenship. Citizenship can be understood as being part of a community with a set of shared institutions that can be changed over time by its citizens. In this way, citizenship is linked to individual rights and to a sense of belonging to a particular political community. Kymlicka and Norman present citizenship theories as reflecting one of two types of understanding.34 The first is that of legal rights which entitle one to participate fully in the political community. The other speaks of participation as a desirable activity, in which case citizenship is assessed on the basis of the degree of involvement in the political community. Although these two ways of considering citizenship rest upon a different understanding, these approaches are not contradictory. In fact, Beiner accounts for both when he presents citizenship as belonging to a political community. Citizenship entails, here, an adherence to common social, cultural, economic and political practices which make tangible this sense of belonging. According to Beiner, “[i]n the ideal case, citizenship is active membership in a political community where the very fact of such a membership empowers those included in it to contribute to the shaping of a shared collective destiny.”35 In multiethnic and multinational states, such as Canada, the feeling of belonging to a political community must transcend the particularisms of their diverse population. One must ask what conditions allow universalism to subsume differences without negating these differences, advancing a set of principles that are universal while recognizing territorial and non-territorial differences. In sum, equality among citizens must concede that some individuals may have strong links to their primary identity group (be it national or cultural) or may choose to identify across territorial boundaries to an identity group and, consequently, may have developed a sense of belonging that does not stem uniquely from the political community. There is a definite tension between universalism, in which all forms of primordial identities are relinquished to give place to a universal

51 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes definition of citizenship, and particularism, which celebrates differences to the extent that citizenship becomes an obsolete concept with no community of reference. Can this tension be resolved to give place to a model of citizenshipthatisviableanddesirableevenwhenthepopulationisdiverse? Liberalism is not incompatible with the recognition of a national community in which rights are exercised. According to Tamir, individual autonomy and belonging to a community go hand in hand. These concepts are complimentary rather than opposites, for individuals are free within a given setting.36 Citizenship distinguishes itself from nationality. In the classic liberal approach, the state belongs to all its citizens regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc. The nation cannot be defined through citizenship for the nation is not the result of governmental structures and policies, as is the legal state, but rather the result of a long historical process of self-recognition which takes place within and beyond the borders of the legal state. Moreover, if citizenship was to be directly linked to a national identity, it would deny the existence of other nations within the borders of the liberal state as well as within that nation, by disregarding the differentiated experiences of citizenship as a result of gender, ethnicity, disability or sexual identity. To have citizenship defined through nationality requires a process of homogenization favouring the dominant ethnic group, which serves as a reference point to define “universal” principles. Yet, ideal citizenship should not depend on the denial of one’s primordial identity, but rather on the freedom of expressing these differences while retaining a sense of belonging to the political community. This section first examines the intersection between nation and citizenship, and aims to discuss how Canada has dealt with its multination status, before returning to a discussion of the challenge of non-territorial identities as a starting point for rethinking citizenship in a federal state. In multiethnic and multinational states, it is difficult to resist imposing a citizenship defined by nationality. National citizenship can either be achievedbynegatingalldifferencesandimposinguniversalvaluesthatwill undoubtedly privilege the dominant national group. In this case, minorities will find themselves forced to comply by assimilating in the dominant culture. All this aims to promote stability and social cohesion. The second approachisoneinwhichthestateacknowledgesthatdifferencesareathreat to social cohesion, and therefore chooses to overcome this situation by creating a new “nation” or a political identity to which all should identify. Although differences gain social recognition, nations are not granted politicalrecognition,astrategyusedtopreserveuniformityincitizenship. In the Canadian case, it is interesting to examine the divergent methods the Canadian state and Québec use to manage diversity and maintain social cohesion. Canadian society comprises several ethnic and national groups. Theoretically, these deserve equal recognition. However, in order to create a common public culture that enables a certain degree of social cohesion, the Anglo-Saxon culture is the main referent point. In contrast, in Québec,

52 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada

French is the language through which integration takes place. Hence, newcomers to Québec society, as a way to integrate, are encouraged to learn French and attend French schools. In order to dislodge the bi-cultural model put forth in the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, the federal government decided to confront diversity through a policy of multiculturalism. This political project that aims to ease the integration of various ethnic and cultural groups into Canadian society is in direct opposition to Québec’s vision, which does not hide its preference for a dominant culture reflecting its national community. In today’s political debates, where issues of differenceandcitizenshipareamainconcern,thevalidityandworthofeach of these approaches is frequently judged. The “Canadian” approach is often perceived as morally superior since it is anchored in the principles of classical liberalism that emphasizes individual rights (also understood as a form of constitutional patriotism). In contrast, the Québec project is said to be “backward” since it rests upon an ethnic notion of citizenship and community.37 “Constitutional patriotism” rests upon a common political culture rather than a common ethnic or national culture.38 Using Switzerland and the United States as examples, Habermas claims that constitutional principles cannot be based on the sharing of a common language or culture.39 Political culture must reflect shared citizenship practices that take place in the public space. Therefore, citizens are not defined by their sense of belonging to an identity group, but rather by their participation in the public space. Political culture serves as a “common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural society.”40 In the case of the European Union, it is clear that citizenship entails a differentiated interpretation within the various national contexts of the universal rights and principles set out in the Constitution. This is an example of a citizenship where the different states share a common political culture, while retaining the ability to interpret these rights and principles in ways sensitive to a given national context. Although this model appears well-suited to the European case, one needs to ask if it is for multiethnic or multinational states. Can this model be adapted to the Canadian case, which includes a national minority represented by a delineated territorial entity possessing its own political institutions (as is the case of Québec)? When citizenship is strictly defined in political terms to include rights and responsibilities that are guaranteed and sanctioned, as it is traditionally understood, citizenship corresponds to a single unified identity. In this case, citizenship is understood as fulfilling a function of social integration by giving individual citizens the sense of belonging to a nation. Here, allegiance to citizenship cannot be divided. In contrast, the example of the European Union proposes a project of citizenship in which national identity and citizenship are disassociated. It therefore allows for multiple levels of

53 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes identification. This post-national citizenship is perceived as a threat to social cohesion, for social integration is no longer dependent upon one’s feeling of belonging, but rather simply is “functional.” Fearing that a “functional” adherence to citizenship is insufficient to protect and promote social cohesion, Schnapper proposes that citizenship contracts be established with new immigrants, granting them citizenship rights in return for their guaranteed commitment to democratic values and national human rights codes.41 Similarly, Habermas proposed “constitutional patriotism” as a model of social cohesion. Here, despite the fact that not everyone speaks the same language or shares the same culture, it is assumed that all share in the same public debate and adhere to the same political culture and values. Otherwise, it is not possible to establish a discursive space for a political dialogue, a pre-condition to democratic practices. In sum, the dilemma before us is the following: Can the traditional national political culture be replaced by a model of citizenship based upon adherence to a set of rights and principles of human rights? Will this adherence be sufficient to engage citizens in the public sphere? According to Schnapper: “The abstract or concrete aspect of nation, let alone the concrete aspect of belonging to an ethnic group, will stir people more than the purely abstract notions of class consciousness, state of law, or humanrights.”42 Theseobjectionstotheprojectofpost-nationalcitizenship are understandable. However, the aim is not to have the nation supplanted by the notion of citizenship. Rather, the goal is to reconcile different public spaces in a way that does not limit the political dialogue to the interest of a specific national group, which more often than not happens to be the dominant national group in the multinational state. Schnapper’s understanding limits itself to that of the nation-state. She links participation in the political arena to certain ethnic characteristics: a common language, a common culture, shared history, shared institutions (educational system, work place). Thus, “[t]he immediate familiarity that exists between nationals, whatever other differences keep them apart, is the product of this specific socialization and the common life within a concrete national society.”43 Individuals are therefore naturally attached to their familiar environment within which they develop their individual identity in relation to the collective identity. In this case, the nation is simultaneously a cultural community as well a place where collective identity and memory becomes entrenched in history and in the civic project. For Schnapper, multinational citizenship cannot happen within the nation-state: “Allegiance to a political community must by nature remain distinct from the participation in the concrete society. [...] Multinational citizenship should only concern marginal groups, for the loyalty to a political organization cannot be split; a double or triple allegiance would always inevitably lead to loyalty conflict.”44 Schnapper is first and foremost concerned with social cohesion within the state and citizenship’s role as a tool of social integration. Legal rights are

54 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada meant to guarantee the dignity of citizenship as well as citizen participation. However, the abstract nature of these rights is perceived as insufficient to maintain cohesion between citizens. Citizenship requires participation in the public sphere. As a result, the democratic nation must rest not simply on a civic understanding of the public space, but also its history. In sum, Schnapper’s understanding is anchored in the logic of the nation-state, and morespecifically,theunitarystate.Itfocusesonrecognitionofthenationas central to the practice of citizenship. This understanding of citizenship is problematic for states which are already multinational, where several languages are spoken, and where cultures, although sharing common values, have different histories and collective visions; also problematic where nations control their own political institutions and have economic and social institutions which may complement or conflict with each other. Such is the case of Québec within Canada. Canada, as a multinational state, is composed of various nations with differing social and political status. There is a Francophone minority found mainly in Québec. Native populations that are spread across the country in communities that vary in size and level or type of organization. For the Canadian state to organize its affairs in a manner that respects and accommodates its multinational character, the majority group must consider itself a nation. This is not the case. The decline of the dualist approach that characterized the political debates of the 1960s has led to a focus on “Canadianizing” policies, advanced mainly by the federal government. Policies of bilingualism, multiculturalism and the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms have all reinforced a vision of Canada as being composed of non-territorial actors, rather than nations. This shift towards a pan-Canadian citizenship prevents and even delegitimizes the recognition of the Québécois nation and, more generally, all forms of nationalism.45 If we consider Canada a multinational state, we clearly cannot impose a model of citizenship that requires an adherence to one national identity. This is counter to the recognition of Canada as multinational. Federalism is one of the political approaches most inclined to recognize diversity; however, the Canadian experience clearly demonstrates that this is not always the case.46 Kymlicka, inspired by the work of Resnick,47 explains this situation by saying that Québec and Canada have adopted different understandings of federalism. In Québec, federalism is understood as referring to equality between nations, while in Canada, federalism emphasizes absolute equality between provinces and between individuals.48 The Canadian approach makes it impossible to recognize that Québec is a distinct society, for this would be viewed as a breach in the equality between provinces as well as individuals. Moreover, the Canadian way denies the possibility of any form of asymmetrical federalism that could serve to reinforce the ability of the national minority in Québec to govern itself according to its own needs. This again would be perceived as a

55 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes betrayal of “absolute” equality. It is therefore not surprising that the majority Anglophone population welcomes federal intrusion in provincial jurisdiction, as the case of the Social Union demonstrated, on the basis that the federal government is in a better position to promote norms and values central to their Canadian identity. In contrast, in Québec, federalism speaks to the coexistence of the two nations; in the principles of federalism the true recognition of nations within Canada becomes possible. According to Jenson, this tension between the different visions of federalism is rooted in two citizenship regimes, which offer definitions of citizenship, outlining legal aspects and ways of belonging, that differ and even conflict with each other.49 Because Canada is a multinational state, and if federalism is based upon the coexistence of nations, there needs to be an established relationship that reflects equality and non-hierarchy between the nations involved.50 When federalism is based upon the relationship between regions, as it is believed in the pan-Canadian vision, a hierarchical relationship exists between the federal government (which claims to represent the national interest) and provincialgovernments.Infact,theideaofequalitybetweenregionsavoids any reference to nationalism. Anglophone Canadians use the idea of equality between regions, and between individuals, to justify the establishment of a pan-Canadian identity and nation. This pan-Canadian vision is at the root of the problem, for it gives no consideration to Québec’s situation, nor does it pave the way to acceptance of any form of asymmetrical institutional arrangements. This discourse prevents Canadians from recognizing Québec as more than a sociological nation. It reinforces the idea that unity is achieved through adherence to a pan-Canadian identity. This vision is inspired by the neo-Jacobin model that cannot conceive citizenship outside the context of the unitary nation-state, where citizenship and nationality are co-terminus.51 In this context, such a citizenship requires a process of homogenization or assimilation into the pan-Canadian identity. Unlike Schnapper, we are suggesting here that it is favourable in a multinational state to reconceptualize citizenship, disassociating it from a national (i.e., pan-Canadian identity). However, as the previous section discussed, the Canadian challenge extends beyond the presence of multiple nations. Also at issue is the challenge of non-territorial, spatially diffuse actors (women, ethnic groups, gays and lesbians, etc.) who have at times, intentionally or not, led a movement towards embracing the pan-Canadian vision. One of the main obstacles in understanding citizenship in a federal state is that most of the literature on this issue, whether examining conditions of pluralism, multinational states or multicultural citizens, has limited itself to a focus on national actors or nations (Québec, Aboriginal peoples) who are territorially bound.52 Kymlicka has justified this focus by claiming that only national groups have staying power. The emphasis on nation fails to

56 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada recognize that national identities, in Canada and other western nations, “are mediated by other cultural or political identities. Nations are constructed in large part through the deployment of other categories: race, religion, language, gender, sexuality, physical ability, etc.”53 This suggests that the primary identity of the citizen may not only be anchored in the national culture. As Cairns explains, “[o]ur abstract citizen status in provincial, territorial, and Canadian communities, in which in certain circumstances we can participate in a majority, does not exhaust our political identities and group memberships.” In fact, they may not even be our primary concern. Further, he concludes that “if our territorial community memberships are considered exhaustive, we experience a sense of constitutional impoverish- ment.”54 In contrast to traditional literature on citizenship, such as that presented bySchnapper,whichmakescitizenshipandnationalitycoterminous,recent work on citizenship suggests that the sense of belonging to a national culture may be maintained when claims are not totalizing or even primary.55 This suggests that belonging to a national community, like Canada, may be fosteredevenifthereisalackofpan-Canadiannationalidentity.Thisiswhy the role of social movements in identity formation must be accounted for even when we negotiate on a terrain such as that of federalism, which has traditionally been the realm of politics for political actors with a territorial referent. As Stychin explains, the Charter has allowed an entry point for non-territorial identities to shape or undermine the nation by making claims of inclusion in a national imaginary that has traditionally excluded large strata of society. In the case of Canada, the constitutional significance of territorial claims made by nations is challenged by competing claims made by non-territorial identity groups. Cairns sums up the Canadian challenge by saying that “Constitutional success will be measured by how we can accommodate the historic territorial realities of federalism reinforced by an emerging Aboriginal third order of government, and the contemporary reality of constitutionally recognized, transregional identities given sustenance by the Charter.”56 What we need to establish is whether federalism is still relevant as a system of government. It should be apparent by now that, if Canada is to be successful in addressing issues raised by diversity, the concept of citizenship needs to be rethought to reflect federal principles in ways that can accommodate both national as well as spatially diffuse political actors, such as women, ethnic groups, lesbians and gays, etc. Thus, we must proceed to ask how can citizenship reconcile these tensions? Citizenship must rest upon some concrete principles and serve as a tool for social integration while recognizing that one’s understanding of citizenship may differ from one national context to another within a same political community. A multinational state must be open to the idea of a particular arrangement, without denying the equality of individuals within the state. According to Kymlicka:

57 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Liberal democracies are deeply committed to the principle of moral equality of persons, and equal concern and respect for their interests. But equality for individual citizens does not require equal powers for federal units. On the contrary, asymmetrical status for nationality-based units can be seen as promoting this underlying moral equality, since it ensures that the national identity of minorities receives the same concern and respect as the majority nation. Insofar as English-speaking Canadians view the federal government as their “national” government, respecting their national identity requires upholding a strong federal government. Accommodating these differing identities through asymmetrical federalism does not involve any disrespect or individuous discrimination.57 In a multinational state, and more so in a federal state, the legitimacy of the central government should be functional. In Canada this is not the case. Because Canadian citizenship refers to a national identity, the federal government assumes the role of speaking on behalf of the interest of all citizens. This, regardless of the fact that provincial governments are, in certain situations, in a better position to speak of the needs of its citizens. In sum, Canadian citizenship opposes any recognition of multinationalism or multiple allegiances for it finds itself based upon a national discourse, centred on the pan-Canadian identity that promotes a universal definition of citizenship. Inafederalstate,allegianceshavetobemultiple,andcitizenshipneedsto be understood using the same logic as federalism.58 To apply this approach, we need to distinguish between a “functional” multinational/federal state which bases its legitimacy of its efficiency, and a federated nation which is legitimated by its capacity to protect the national specificity.59 Functional citizenship applies to this last type and therefore to the Canadian case. Understanding citizenship as “functional” allows us to overcome Schnapper’s reservations concerning a citizenship that is multinational. In this approach, we are not giving up the nation as a referent for social cohesion, nor are we abandoning the possibility that primordial identities need to be given consideration rather than suppressed to adhere to a universal definition of citizenship. This model also allows us to account for Habermas’ “constitutional patriotism,” which prescribes universal principles with respect for differences. When reconciling national identities and respect for diversity through a functional citizenship, the allegiances which citizens must develop towards the nation no longer conflict with allegiance to the federal government. This is so, and only so, when the federal government forgoes its national role, eliminating the hierarchy between the two levels of government and allowing for the possibility that citizens pay allegiance to both orders of government differently at times given their identity. In a multinational state, the best way to promote national cohesion is by accommodating national identities rather than subordinating them. As

58 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada

Kymlicka explains, “[p]eople from different national groups will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as the context within which their national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated.”60 He mentions that in states which are multiethnic and multinational, cultural groups are not only different, they also produce different understandings of federalism. Thus, not only do citizens need to embrace diversity they must respect it and the different approaches that come from it. Is this a sufficient condition to have individuals with a single national identity willing to continue to share the same public space? There is no one answer to this dilemma. In a country like Canada, this sense of belonging stems in part from the willingness to recognize diversity. History is also an important factor structuring this loyalty. For example, a recent survey demonstrated that among Francophone Québécois, 14% perceived themselves to be only Québécois, and a mere 3% perceived themselves only to be Canadian. Most characterized their identity as being anchored in multiple allegiances: 31% saw themselves as equally Canadian and Québécois; 37% defined themselves as Québécois and then Canadian; and 13% confirmed they were Canadian and then Québécois.61 Functional citizenship distinguishes itself from multiple citizenship as defined by Meehan.62 The construction of the European Union is dominated by the economic discourse that speaks to a common market, and an integrated political economy to which all states must conform. Hence citizenship tends to focus on the legal rights that guarantee economic participation. This conception diminishes the emphasis on the nation-state and replaces it by the reorganization of production and the redistribution of wealth. According to Schnapper, “[p]artners are no longer related by a contract of political nature but by their common participation in the social and economic life.”63 Unlike multiple citizenship, the notion of functional citizenship allows us to avoid this drawback by emphasizing the national community as a place for social integration while respecting that in a multinational state it is possible and even preferable that certain activities be performed by different levels of government. If the responsibilities of each order of government are well-established and respected, citizenship will not lose its political function. It is a model that recognizes Canada’s multinational aspect while allowing differentiated arrangements in regards to citizenship, granting Québec the possibility of understanding citizenship somewhat differently. Moreover, by discussing non-territorial actors, the model of citizenship is pushed one step further, disembodying it from its national strait jacket. Here, citizenship distances itself from its past link to nationality. As Cairns said: “If we survive as one country, we must accommodate diversity without so destroying our interconnectedness that we shall be incapable of undertaking future civic tasks together. Since the latter will be more demanding than yesterday’s challenges, we must hope that a citizen body lacking the bond of standardized citizenship but nevertheless participating

59 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes in common civic endeavors is not an oxymoron.”64 Federalism has always allowed for divided loyalties to be accommodated. Although this was traditionally limited to orders of governments and territorially-bound identities, it may well be the case that Canada is already moving towards a sense of loyalty not based upon a homogeneous nation, but rather on the complex allegiance to a concept of citizenship that embodies a terrain where conflict over identity is constitutive of the reference frame within one state.

Conclusion Canada’s situation is unique. It is a federation which must accommodate its multinational aspect, while acknowledging the issue of “constitu- tionalized” non-territorial fragmentation. Over the last three decades, with the introduction of the Charter, a number of “Canadianizing” policies and accompanying changes in the political culture, there has been a shift towards a pan-Canadian citizenship. The imposition of this unified national identity (or universal citizenship) undermines a fundamental aspect of federalism: respect for diversity. The Charter, by reinforcing the concept of pan-Canadian identity, has supplanted federalism as a pillar of the Canadian state. This is reflected in demands for identical treatment of provinces and individuals that not only prevent any kind of recognition for Quebec or any other nationalism, but also explain the current constitutional crisis. What we have argued is the necessary reintroduction of federalism as a central pillar to the governance of the Canadian state. This requires that we no longer confound the notion of identical treatment with equitable treatment, as is usually the case in the traditional model of citizenship associated with the unitary state. In fact, the simultaneous accommodation and recognition of the multinational reality of Canada and its non-territorial fragmentation “commands a notion of equality based, in theory as well as in practice, on equivalent rather than identical treatment of provinces and individuals.”65 It is only when citizenship is understood as belonging to more than one entity that universal rights can be understood differently depending on the context in which they are interpreted. When it is recognized that a citizen can equally be a British Columbian and a Canadian, a Québécoise and a Canadian woman, etc., it becomes possible to treat individuals and regions in a fair manner, rather than identically. Functional citizenship allows for the possibility of having universal rights and principles that are understood in an equitable manner in various settings. It allows us to reconcile the opposing forces at the root of Canadian political tension, addressing at once both the spatial (federal principles and counter-nationalist claims) and social (neo-liberalism and non-territorial fragmentation) axes in federalism. To reconcile these two axes, we must recognize that constraints exist in a federation brought about by the territorial organization of the state institutions. These include the presence

60 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada of national identities. Simultaneously, identity groups attempt to have universal rights understood uniformly, in this way disregarding federal principles. The aim here is not to pit territorial constraints against universal rights. Rather, it should be understood that universal rights can be interpreted differently in one region or another. Moreover, each citizen, including members of identity groups, must adhere to federal principles. There cannot be any advancement of a “unified” national identity at the expense of the recognition of diversity. If and only if we comply with that approach is it possible to recognize both spatial as well as social diversity, an important first step toward resolving the current Canadian political tension.

Notes 1. Valerie Earle (Ed.), Federalism. Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice (Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1968); Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968); Max Frenkel, Federal Theory (Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1986); Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism and the Way to Peace (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1994); Michael Burgess, “Federalism and Federation: A Reappraisal,” in Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, Comparative Federalism and Federation. Competing Traditions and Future Directions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), pp. 3-14. 2. Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1998), p. 7. 3. “La fédération ne peut naître que du renoncement à toute idée d’hégémonie organisatrice, exercée par l’une des nations composantes; Le fédéralisme ne peut naître que du renoncement à tout esprit de système; Le fédéralisme ne connaît pas de problèmes de minorités; Le fédéralisme n’a pas pour but d’effacer les diversités et de fondre toutes les nations en un bloc, mais au contraire, de sauvegarder leurs qualités propres; Le fédéralisme repose sur l’amour de la complexité, par contraste avec le simplisme brutal qui caractérise l’esprit totalitaire; Une fédération se forme de proche en proche par le moyen des personnes et des groupes, et non point à partir d’un centre ou par le moyen des gouvernements; Une fédération ne se crée pas contre une menace extérieure, ni à des fins impérialistes, mais au contraire : pour l’avantage de la survivance des communautés constituantes et pour qu’elles puissent exercer ensemble des fonctions qui dépassent les forces de chacune d’elles.” Fabrizio Frigerio et al., “Fédéralisme (chez Rougemont),” in Denis de Rougemont (Ed.), Dictionnaire international du fédéralisme (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1994), pp. 203-204. 4. Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987), p. 2. Emphasis added. 5. Ibid., p. 12. 6. André Burelle, Le mal canadien. Essai de diagnostic et esquisse d’une thérapie (Montréal: Éditions Fides, 1995), pp. 127-28. 7. Criticism has already been made of the use of this concept in the Canadian context. See François Rocher and Christian Rouillard, “Décentralisation, subsidiarité et néolibéralisme au Canada : lorsque l’arbre cache la forêt,” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de politiques, 24, no. 2 (June 1998): pp. 233-58.

61 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

8. Burelle, Le mal canadien, pp. 34-35. See also Samuel LaSelva, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996); James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995). 9. R. Whitaker, A Sovereign Idea: Essays on Canada as a Democratic Community (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), p.194. 10. Richard Simeon and Katherine Swinton, “Introduction: Rethinking Federalism in a Changing World,” in Karen Knop et al. (Eds.), Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets and Governments in a Changing World (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), p. 11. 11. Ibid, p. 3. 12. Alan C. Cairns, Reconfigurations: Canadian Citizenship and Constitutional Change (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), pp.134-38. 13. Jenson, “Citizenship Claims: Routes to Representation in a Federal System,” Rethinking Federalism; also see Alexandra Dobrowolsky, “Of Special Interest: Interest, Identity, and Feminist Constitutional Activism,” Canadian Journal of Political Science (31, 4 1998), pp. 707-41. 14. François Rocher, “Democratic Discourse and the Canadian Constitution: New Perspectives on an Old Debate?” Paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the British Association for Canadian Studies, University of Cambridge, U.K.: March 1993, p. 5. 15. Thomas O. Hueglin, “New Wine in Old Bottles? Federalism and Nation States in the Twenty-First Century: A Conceptual Overview,” Rethinking Federalism, p. 103. 16. R. Vipond, “From Provincial Autonomy to Provincial Equality,” in J. H. Carens (Ed.), Is Quebec Nationalism Just (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), p. 103. 17. D. G. Lenihan, et al., Reclaiming the Middle Ground (Montreal: IRPP, 1994). 18. Cairns, Reconfigurations, pp. 189-93. Also see Charter versus Federalism: Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform (Montreal-Kingston: McGilll-Queen’s University Press, 1993). 19. Leslie Pal, Interest of the State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism and Feminism in Canada (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993). 20. Patricia Evans and Gerda R. Wekerle, “The Shifting Terrain of Women’s Welfare: Theory, Discourse, and Activism,” in Patricia Evans and Gerda R. Wekerle (Eds.), Women and the Canadian Welfare State: Challenges and Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 15-6. Other important works on women’s relation to the state, although not specifically on federalism include Isabella Bakker (Ed.), Rethinking Restructuring: Gender and Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Caroline Andrew and Sanda Rodgers (Eds.), Women and the Canadian State (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997); Janine Brodie (Ed.), Women and Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996). 21. Peter M. Leslie, “The Fiscal Crisis of Canadian Federalism,” in Peter M. Leslie, Kenneth Norrie and Irene K. Ip (Eds.), A Partnership in Trouble: Renegotiating Fiscal Federalism (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1993), pp. 6-7. 22. Steven A. Kennett, Securing the Social Union. A Commentary on the Decentralized Approach (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1997), p. 6.

62 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada

23. Alain Noël, “General Study of the Framework,” in Alain-G. Gagnon and Hugh Segal (Eds.), The Canadian Social Union Without Quebec: 8 Critical Analyses (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2000), pp. 30-31; “Les trois unions sociales,” in Penser l’union sociale (Cahiers du PEQ, numéro 18, mars 2000), p. 6. 24. Only Quebec did not sign the agreement. Although the political context which has led Quebec to not sign such an agreement does not specifically have to do with the pressures from the women’s movements in Quebec, it should be noted that Quebec’s refusal to sign does reflect the position of women’s lobby groups in Quebec which prefer that social welfare provisions be taken care of by the Quebec government according to that province’s standards, rather than according to pan-Canadian standards which may not reflect the cultural context of Quebec. See Vickers, p. 139 and Evans and Wekerle, pp. 14-7. 25. For a similar assessment, see André Binette, “Principles,” in Alain-G. Gagnon and Hugh Segal (Eds.), The Canadian Social Union Without Quebec: 8 Critical Analyses (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2000), pp. 37-70. 26. Alberta Justice. Report of the Ministerial Task Force, March 3, 1999. 27. Some have interpreted the fact that Klein did not invoke s. 33, the notwithstanding clause, despite demands from pressure groups and members within the government, as a sign that he accepted the consequences of Vriend and was satisfied with displacing the political blame onto the federal court. It should be said that to make use of the notwithstanding clause requires stronger public support than showed following that decision. An historical examination of the use of s. 33 confirms that governments only make use of this clause when strong public support is sustained on the issue at hand. Yet, regardless of one’s understanding of how the Vriend decision was perceived by the Klein government, the point in the context of this article is that the gay and lesbian movement made use of federal institutions to force changes in provincial jurisdiction. In sum, the gay and lesbian movement played the division of power to ensure political gains. See Miriam Smith, “Political Activism, Litigation and Public Policy: The Charter Revolution and Lesbian and Gay Rights in Canada, 1985-1999,” International Journal of Canadian Studies (Number 21, Spring 2000): pp. 81-109; and Smith, Lesbian and Gay Rights in Canada: Social Movements and Equality-Seeking, 1971-1995 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999). 28. David Rayside, On the Fringe: Gays and Lesbians in Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 132. For other examples of political gains made, see EGALE, “Canada Watch,” http://www.egale.ca/features/watch.htm. 29. Dobrowolsky, The Politics of Pragmatism: Women, Representation, and Constitutionalism in Canada (Don Mill, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2000). 30. Dobrowolsky, “Of Special Interest…,” p. 740. 31. Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, State, Society and the Development of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 14. 32. EGALE, “State of the Play,” http://www.egale.ca/features/canada.htm. EGALE. Press Release: Bill 32. June 11, 1999. 33. See NAC’s minutes on the campaign leading to these two accords as evidence of this position. 34. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,” in R. Beiner (Ed), Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 284.

63 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

35. Ronald Beiner, What’s the Matter with Liberalism? (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), p. 102. 36. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 14. 37. David J. Bercuson and Barry Cooper, Deconfederation. Canada Without Quebec, (Toronto: Key Porter, 1991); Reed Scowen, Le temps des adieux, (Montréal, VLB éditeur, 1999). 38. Carlo Gamberale, “European Citizenship and Political Identity,” Space & Polity (1, no. 1, 1997), p. 39. 39. Jürgen Habermas, “European Citizenship and National Identities,” in B. Van Steenbergen (Ed.), The Conditions of Citizenship (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 20-35. 40. Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity : Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,” in Beiner (Ed.), Theorizing Citizenship, p. 264. 41. Dominique Schnapper, “The European Debate on Citizenship,” Daedalus (126, no. 3, 1997), p. 209. 42. Ibid., p. 212. 43. Ibid., p. 214. 44. Ibid., p. 216. 45. François Rocher and Miriam Smith. 1997. “The New Boundaries of Canadian Political Culture,” Journal of History and Politics (12, no. 2, 1997), pp. 36-70. 46. Alain-G. Gagnon and François Rocher, “Nationalisme libéral et construction multinationale : la représentation de la ‘nation’ dans la dynamique Québec- Canada,” Revue internationale d’études canadiennes (16, automne 1997), pp. 329-41. 47. Philip Resnick, “Toward a Multinational Federalism: Asymmetrical and Confederal Alternatives,” in F. L. Seidle (Ed.), À la recherche d’un nouveau contrat politique : options asymétriques et options confédérales (Montréal: Institut de recherche en politique publique, 1994), pp. 71-89. 48. Will Kymlicka, “Le fédéralisme multinational au Canada : un partenariat à repenser,” in G. Laforest et R. Gibbins (Eds.), Sortir de l’impasse. Les voies de la réconciliation (Montreal: Institut de recherches en politiques publiques, 1998), p. 22. 49. Jane Jenson, “Reconnaître les différences : Sociétés distinctes, régimes de citoyenneté, partenariat,” in G. Laforest and R. Gibbins (Eds.), Sortir de l’impasse. Les voies de la réconciliation, p. 239. 50. François Rocher and Michel Sarra-Bournet, “La longue quête de l’égalité,” in M. Sarra-Bournet (Ed.), Manifeste des intellectuels pour la souveraineté suivi de douze essais sur l’avenir du Québec (Montreal: Fides, 1995), pp. 43-57. 51. Bruno Théret, Du fédéralisme et de la protection sociale en Amérique et en particulier au Canada. Rapport pour la Convention d’étude no 5 / 1995 du 4 juillet 1995 ( Paris: Commissariat Général du Plan, 1995), p. 14. 52. See for example Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998); James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and LaSelva, The Moral Foundations. 53. Carl Stychin, A Nation by Rights: National Cultures, Sexual Identity Politics and the Discourse of Rights (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), p. 110. 54. Cairns, Reconfigurations, p. 192.

64 At a Juncture? For a New Understanding of Federalism and Citizenship in Canada

55. William Kaplan, “Who Belongs? Changing Concept of Citizenship and Nationality,” Belonging: The Meanings and Future of Canadian Citizenship (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), p. 245. 56. Cairns, Reconfigurations, p. 187. 57. Will Kymlicka, “Le fédéralisme multinational au Canada,” pp. 26-7. 58. Richard Vernon, “The Federal Citizen,” in R. D. Olling et M. W. Westmacott (Eds.), Perspectives on Canadian Federalism (Scarborough: Prentice-Hal, 1988), pp. 3-15. 59. Théret, Du fédéralisme et de la protection sociale, p. 322. 60. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 189. 61. Paul Wells, “Quebecers? Canadians? We’re proud to be both,” The Montreal Gazette (4 April 1998). 62. Elizabeth Meehan, “Citizenship and the European Community,” Political Quarterly (64, no. 22, April-June 1993), pp. 172-186. 63. Schnapper, “The European Debate on Citizenship,” p. 208. 64. Cairns, Reconfigurations, p. 185. 65. André Burelle, “A Canada to Which Québec Could Say ‘Yes’,” Presentation, September 1997, p. 17.

Brigitte Lévy

Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement

Résumé Le présent article se penche sur la situation des femmes professionnelles canadiennes dans les organisations et sur les stratégies visant à mieux les intégrer à l’économie du savoir. Nous constatons que la restructuration sans précédent du monde des affaires et les politiques d’ajustement qui en ont résulté ont eu un impact profond sur les femmes. La mondialisation accrue des marchés, la privatisation, une diminution du rôle de l’État, la recherche de nouveaux modèles de gouvernance et l’émergence de la nouvelle économie du savoir transforment les caractéristiques du marché du travail à travers le monde. Nous envisageons comment, dans un tel contexte, l’accès des femmes aux postes de décision et de gestion pourrait être favorisé et quels sont les facteurs qui l’entravent.

Abstract This paper addresses the role of Canadian professional women in organisations and discusses strategies aimed at helping them participate more fully in the knowledge economy. Of particular note is that the unprecedented restructuring in the business world and the adjustment policies resulting from this process have had a profound effect on women. The increasing globalization of markets, the trend towards privatisation, the reduced role of the State, the search for new models of governance and the emergence of the new knowledge economy are transforming the nature of the labour market throughout the world. We discuss how, in such an environment, one could help women gain greater access to decision-making and senior management positions and we identify the factors that hinder such access.

Les femmes contribuent à la vitalité des économies de par le monde et jouent un rôle de plus en plus important sur le marché du travail. Le virage vers la nouvelle économie du savoir relance le débat sur leur place dans les organisations. De nombreuses législations nationales et internationales visant à promouvoir l’égalité des sexes, particulièrement en matière d’emplois, ont été mises en place dans bon nombre de pays. Ce que ces législations ont permis d’accomplir au Canada a fait l’objet de nombreuses études (dont, entre autres, Alter Chen, 1996; Bégin, 1992; Condition féminine Canada, 1995; Gunderson, 1998; Leck et al., 1996; Shelag, 1998; Tremblay et Andrew, 1997 et 1998). Nous nous proposons de déterminer, dans le cadre de ce travail, jusqu’à quel point ces législations cadrent bien avec la réalité contemporaine. C’est ainsi que, pour Adler et Izraeli (1994),

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

« [l]a concurrence mondiale et le besoin de gestionnaires très qualifiés font que la promotion des femmes à des postes seniors devient une décision d’affaires plutôt qu’une simple question d’équité ». Quelle est la place des femmes sur le marché de l’emploi? Quelle est l’influence des caractéristiques du marché du travail et de l’économie du savoir sur les mentalités, les attentes et les comportements des femmes professionnelles? Qu’en est-il des programmes d’équité en matière d’emploi et de promotion des femmes? Quelles sont les stratégies de succès susceptibles d’aider les femmes à mieux se positionner et à contribuer à la performance d’ensemble de l’économie canadienne? Peut-on établir un lien entre la recherche de l’équilibre famille-carrière, le besoin de satisfaction personnelle en termes d’éthique du travail et la mise en place des politiques de promotion des femmes? Tels sont les principaux points que cet article propose d’aborder dans le cadre de cette étude. Sans prétendre être exhaustif ou systématique, il tente de fournir des éléments de réflexion sur la problématique du changement et de l’intégration des femmes à la nouvelle donne économique.

Mondialisation, caractéristiques du marché du travail et impacts sur les femmes La mondialisation résulte d’une transition systémique mondiale et d’un processus de restructuration économique propulsé, entre autres, par les changements technologiques et la course à la compétitivité des firmes multinationales et des États. Au cours de sa dernière phase de transition, du milieu des années 80 à nos jours, ce processus s’est accéléré (Lévy, 1997). Pour Reid (1996), c’est en 1989 qu’ont convergé trois forces déterminantes qui caractérisent la mondialisation en cours, à savoir les forces économique, technologique et politique (chute du mur de Berlin). L’intégration des marchés, qui accompagne la mondialisation, résulte d’un processus mondial de rationalisation de la production et crée des liens de plus en plus nombreux entre les divers participants aux échanges. L’univers sans frontière devient une source d’interdépendance des États et des firmes, alors que le système économique — libéral et ouvert — laisse un rôle prépondérant aux forces du marché. Il en résulte des répercussions profondes sur le fonctionnement des États. La diffusion rapide des innovations technologiques à travers le monde (le technoglobalisme) provoque,poursapart,desrépercussionstoutaussiprofondessurlemarché du travail.

68 Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement

Tableau 1. Croissance de l’emploi (En milliers d’emplois annuels désaisonnalisés)

Ind. productrices de biens 68 -5

-12 Primaire -25

Manufacturière 16 -53

Construction 70 76

Services publics -6 -3

Ind. productrices de services 357 302

16 Transport, entreposage et communications 15

Commerce 83 87

6 Finances, assurances et immobilier 49

189 Services commerciaux et personnels 118

57 Services communautaires 48

Administration publique 6 -15

1998 (à ce jour) -100 0 100 200 300 400 Juill. 1998-nov. 1998

Source : Moniteur micro-économique, Industrie Canada, 1998, p. J2.

Le taux de participation des femmes au marché du travail, au Canada, est passé de près de 45 p. 100 au milieu des années 1970 à 58,7 p. 100 en 1999 (Développement des ressources humaines du Canada, 2000). L’émergence delanouvelleéconomiedusavoiretlamondialisationprovoquentuneforte croissance de l’emploi dans le secteur des services (cf. Tableau 1) et une diminution des activités de production dans les secteurs primaire (ressources) et secondaire (industrie manufacturière). L’essor du secteur tertiaire suscite un besoin d’adaptation continue à l’économie du savoir, qui de plus en plus interpelle les femmes. Les recherches féministes

69 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes s’entendent sur la nécessité de promouvoir en force l’entrée des femmes dans l’économie du savoir (ou économie de réseaux), cette nouvelle ère dans laquelle serait entrée l’économie mondiale. Tout comme la machine à vapeur et le chemin de fer au XIXe siècle, puis l’électricité et l’automobile au XXe, le réseau mondial Internet et les ordinateurs bouleverseraient la façon dont communiquent les particuliers et fonctionnent les entreprises. La période couverte par les prévisions portant sur les années 1996-2001(Statistique Canada et Développement des ressources humaines du Canada, 1998) laisse entrevoir une augmentation de la demande de personnel dans les professions liées à la gestion et qui requièrent une formation post-secondaire. Une détérioration des conditions du marché du travail pour les professions qui exigent, au plus, une éducation secondaire semble pour sa part inéluctable. Moderniser l’organisation du travail, promouvoir la capacité d’adaptation des entreprises et des employés, savoir anticiper les mutations industrielles et intégrer la société de l’information à nos économies constituent des défis majeurs pour le Canada et les principales économies avec lesquelles il commerce. Notons tout d’abord que les impacts des politiques économiques néo-libérales (compressions budgétaires) mises en œuvre au cours de la décennie 1990 et les retombées non désirables de la mondialisation (développement inégal, marginalisation, etc.) ont rapidement fait ressentir leurs effets sur la société et les femmes. On a constaté une diminution des emplois dans la fonction publique et un manque de satisfaction prononcé chez les femmes professionnelles qui atteignent rapidement le « plafond de verre ». Les auteures, Duxbury et al. (1999), se penchant sur les raisons qui ont incité plusieurs femmes professionnelles canadiennes à quitter la fonction publique et qui ont contribué au départ d’une partie de son élite retiennentcommeprincipauxfacteurs:(1)untauxdesalaireinsuffisant;(2) un manque de respect et de reconnaissance du travail accompli et (3) le sentiment de ne pas avoir contribué suffisamment à la vie de l’organisation. L’étudesouligneaussilefaitquelesfemmesmariéesetmèresdefamilleont moins de chances d’être promues que les femmes célibataires et sans enfants qui sont mieux armées pour faire concurrence aux hommes, dans la course aux promotions. Ces premiers éléments de réflexion tendent à suggérer que les politiques de promotion des femmes professionnelles canadiennes à des postes clés ne sont pas suffisamment adaptées au contexte socio-culturel de celles-ci. Une question fondamentale consiste à savoir si les femmes, qui aspirent à ces postes clés, peuvent les obtenir sans renoncer à leurs aspirations familiales. Faire en sorte que les femmes puissent concilier leurs responsabilités familiales et professionnelles et éviter le conflit emploi-famille nécessite la mise en place de politiques socio-économiques favorables à leur avancement. Ces politiques doivent émaner des gouvernements, aussi bien que des entreprises dans le cadre de leurs programmes d’action en matière d’embauche et de promotion. Notons cependant que les entreprises et

70 Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement organisations (publiques ou privées) doivent vivre avec, notamment, une contrainte à toute fin pratique incontournable dans les postes de direction : avoir une main-d’œuvre hautement disponible, capable de travailler de longues heures, afin de rivaliser avec la concurrence. Plus le poste est élevé dans la hiérarchie de l’entreprise ou de l’organisation, plus l’ampleur de cette contrainte se fait sentir. Cette situation est difficilement compatible avec les responsabilités familiales. Judy Rebick (dans Tremblay et Andrew, 1998) prévoit une intensification, au cours des prochaines années, des mécanismes de défense (backlash) contre les femmes qui occupent des postes de cadre supérieur dans les organisations. Cette réaction serait liée au fait que, souvent, l’obtention de postes de direction par les femmes est perçue comme l’unique résultat de l’application des politiques d’équité en matière d’emplois. Pourtant, nous passons de l’ère industrielle à celle de l’information, et les ressources cruciales relèvent de plus en plus de la connaissance. Dans un tel contexte et comme nous le rappellent Bartlett et Ghoshal (1998) : « [l]’heure est désormais à la redéfinition des relations fondamentales entre les organisations et leurs membres dans un sens qui reconnaisse et recherche la diversité au lieu de s’acharner à la réduire et à la supprimer ». L’adaptation au changement nécessite l’intégration des femmes dans les sphères du pouvoir politique et dans les processus décisionnels des organisations nationales et internationales. L’émergence récente de la société civile, tribune de représentation des femmes (et des minorités), au-delà de l’unité de la sphère politique et économique semble répondre, en partie, à ce besoin. La montée en puissance de la société civile influence les politiques, les valeurs et les pratiques des gouvernements et des firmes, agents principaux de l’économie mondiale. Des changements sociaux sont aussi apparus, suite à la restructuration des économies mondiale et canadienne. On a constaté une forte croissance des petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) et de l’entreprenariat chez les femmes, de même qu’une contribution importante des femmes d’affaires à l’économie du savoir (Moniteur micro-économique, 1998). Ces dernières occupent une place de plus en plus importante dans le secteur des services, qui est axé sur la nouvelle économie du savoir et qui connaît un essor continu. On observe aussi une montée en flèche des femmes entrepreneures dans toutes les branches d’activités et dans toutes les régions du Canada. Les femmes professionnelles canadiennes participent de plus en plus à l’économie du savoir et évoluent dans des organisations et des entreprises qui ont adopté des structures hiérarchiques flexibles et novatrices. Ces nouvelles structures stratégiques sont le produit d’une société orientée de plus en plus vers la performance, la compétitivité et l’excellence. On peut cependant se demander si ces changements organisationnels en cours et l’adoption d’une vision mondiale des marchés conduisent à une véritable amélioration de la situation économique et financière des femmes?

71 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

L’économie du savoir et les femmes dans les organisations : la cage de verre, passé… présent? « Il fut un temps où les femmes qui devenaient entrepreneurs repoussaient le plafond de verre au risque de rester emprisonnées dans une cage de verre, ne pouvant pas tirer pleinement profit de toutes les occasions qui se présentaient à elles (Industrie Canada, 1998). » Sans chercher à minimiser l’impactdespolitiquesd’équitéquiontétédéployéesaucoursdesdernières décennies, on peut se demander si ce temps est révolu? À en juger par Fletcher et Meyerson (2000), « [c]learly, there have been gains, but as we enter the Year 2000, the glass ceiling remains ». Pour l’ensemble des femmes canadiennes qui participent au marché du travail, une première constatation s’impose : la plupart d’entre elles exercent essentiellement leurs professions dans les activités de soutien et ont été parmi les plus touchées par les nombreuses coupures budgétaires. Plus vulnérables aussi, parce qu’elles n’ont pas été à même de se bâtir un réseau de contacts comparable à celui des hommes, elles ont été parmi les premières à être affectées par les grandes restructurations des entreprises privées et publiques. Ceci a contribué, entre autres choses, aux importantes pertes d’emplois dans la fonction publique qui les ont davantage affectées que les hommes. Baker (1996) avance que les femmes ont perdu leurs emplois les plus rémunérateurs en raison de l’érosion et de la restructuration du secteur public. Ce dernier a adopté les pratiques de gestion du secteur privé basées sur la rationalisation financière, la réduction du personnel, l’augmentation du temps de travail et des concessions au niveau des salaires. Karambayya (1998) s’est penchée sur les facteurs qui ont conduit des femmes cadres supérieurs d’une société de la Couronne, en pleine restructuration interne, à quitter leur emploi. Parmi les principales raisonsinvoquées,onnotelebacklashquiauraitpunuireàleurspossibilités d’avancement. Ceci semble confirmer les craintes de Rebick, qui nous met en garde contre les retombées négatives sur les femmes, des stratégies basées sur l’équité en matière d’emplois. Foster et Orser (1994) ont émis l’idée que la nouvelle vague de femmes à occuper des postes de cadre supérieur dans les entreprises utiliseront une approche caractérisée par le consensus, la collaboration et la communication. Ces caractéristiques féminines chez les gestionnaires devraient contribuer à augmenter la productivité, la créativité et l’avantage compétitif. Frank (1999) émet pour sa part des doutes sur la possibilité qu’ont les femmes de changer la culture « macho » des entreprises qui domine le monde des affaires, sans atteindre au préalable le sommet des organisations. On constate depuis plusieurs années qu’au lieu de chercher à monter au sommet des organisations, de plus en plus de femmes se lancent dans l’entreprenariat. Selon Statistique Canada et Développement des ressources humaines du Canada (1998), la montée en flèche des femmes entrepreneures résulterait de plusieurs facteurs : (1) le désir d’être

72 Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement indépendantes et de travailler à la maison; (2) le manque de satisfaction dans des emplois précédents (voir aussi C. et D. Sharp, 1999; Duxbury et al., 1999) et (3) l’essor des nouvelles technologies qui facilitent le travail à domicile. Soixante dix-sept pour cent des femmes qui travaillent à domicile sont mariées et souhaitent en effet pouvoir bénéficier d’un horaire souple. Cependant, les « mompreneurs » gagnent pour la plupart moins de 20 000$ par an, en moyenne (Moniteur micro-économique, 1998) et les emplois à domicile sont aussi les plus sujets à la précarité. De plus, la plupart des femmes se lancent seules en affaires, elles doivent continuellement lutter pour se faire reconnaître et elles sont davantage confrontées à des problèmes de financement que les hommes. Telle est la réalité de la plupart des femmes entrepreneures, et les cas de réussite sont à date peu nombreux. Les femmes continuent, en grande majorité, d’exercer leurs professions dans des emplois peu rémunérateurs et/ou à temps partiel, avec comme unique objectif d’apporter un revenu d’appoint à la famille. Le Tableau 2 présente la situation actuelle des femmes dans la hiérarchie de quelques organisations, par domaines d’activité. Les femmes, bien que toujours en position minoritaire, se trouvent mieux placées pour influencer la culture masculine au sein d’une organisation et la marquer de leurs expériences, qu’il y a 10 ou 20 ans. À titre d’exemple, historiquement, les femmes ont été à toute fin pratique exclues du domaine politique. Elles sont maintenant présentes à la Chambre des Communes et comptent pour 20 p. 100 des députés. Mais, selon Tremblay (1999), la masse critique ne sera atteinte que lorsque les femmes représenteront le tiers des députés. Alors seulement, seront-elles en mesure d’opérer le changement culturel. Au début des années 1990, la moitié des étudiants inscrits dans les programmes d’administration étaient des femmes. Les professeures à temps complet ne représentaient que 17 p. 100 de l’ensemble du corps enseignant dans cette discipline et exerçaient généralement leurs activités à des échelons académiques moins élevés. Bien que les femmes professeures d’université représentent de nos jours, dans leur ensemble, 34 p. 100 du total des professeurs (10 p. 100 en 1957), la plupart plafonnent toujours au rang d’agrégée. Ilyaunfait plus alarmant encore : les facultés de gestion consacrent peu de ressources éducatives à l’enseignement et à la promotion de cours liés à la diversité et aux sexes (Arnold et McKeen, 2000), alors que depuis une décennie la proportion d’étudiantes dans les programmes de gestion se situe à plus de 50 p. 100.

73 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Tableau 2. Représentation des femmes dans différents domaines d’activité au Canada

Pourcentage Domaines d’activité de femmes 9 Ingénieurs 18 Architectes 30 Médecins 31 Avocates 34 Professeures (Universités) 20 Parlementaires (Chambre des Communes) 45 Comptables 9 Gestionnaires et administrateurs, cadres supérieurs Sources: Griffith et al., Closing the Gap. Women’s Advancement in Corporate and Professional Canada, The Conference Board of Canada et Catalyst, 1997; Recensement de 1996; Tremblay, M., Des femmes au Parlement : Une stratégie féministe, Les éditions du Remue-Ménage, 1999; Women in Management, « Scaling the Ivory Tower », Vol. 9, no 3, March/April 1999, p. 2.

En ce qui concerne les professions libérales et les écoles de médecine, davantage de femmes entrent dans ces secteurs et y augmentent ainsi leur représentation. Le pourcentage élevé de femmes comptables reflète pour sa part un taux de succès élevé, chez ces dernières, dans les examens de certification. Le domaine de l’ingénierie connaît une demande élevée de personnel très expérimenté (technologie, science et innovation), mais le nombre de femmes y est encore limité. À titre d’exemple, Nortel Network, principale entreprise canadienne dans le domaine de la technologie compte 80 000 employés à travers le monde, dont 13 000 à Ottawa, parmi lesquels 10 p. 100 seulement sont des femmes. Le pourcentage de femmes occupant des postes de cadre supérieur dans les organisations (2 p. 100 en 1973, 9 p. 100 en 1997) augmente lui aussi de façoncontinuemaisdemeureencorefaibleet,selonAdleretIzraeli,(1994), ceci tient au fait que les conseils de direction des entreprises demeurent très résistants à l’entrée des femmes. Ce n’est qu’à la fin des années 1980 que la société de Madame Liz Claiborne, dessinatrice et confectionneuse de mode, apparaît sur la liste des 500 de Fortune, enregistrant des ventes annuelles de plus de 1 milliard de dollars. Jusqu’alors, la liste des dirigeants d’entreprises ne comportait que des hommes. Deux femmes sont à la tête des firmes General Motors et Ford Motor du Canada1. Ces entreprises figurent parmi les plus importantes sur la liste des 500 du Financial Post (Women in Management, vol. 10, déc-jan. 2000, p. 4). Cependant, à peine 13 p. 100 des femmes siègent sur les conseils d’administration des

74 Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement entreprises de communication canadiennes (Canadian Women in Communication, Toronto, 2000) et de nombreuses femmes qui travaillent dans le domaine de la haute technologie estiment toujours être confrontées à un biais vis-à-vis de leurs collègues masculins, en matière de promotion (Women in Technology International WITI, 1999). Ces données soulèvent des questions quant aux possibilités d’augmenter la représentation des femmes dans les organisations, en l’absence de politiques d’incitations. Selon Catalyst, dans Griffith et al. (1997), la proportion de femmes occupant des postes de cadres supérieurs dans les organisations devrait atteindre 14 p. 100 d’ici 2004. Seul un suivi des politiques déployées et une analyse des résultats obtenus dans le cadre de ces programmes seront en mesured’indiquersileviragedelanouvelleéconomieabeletbienétépris. Dans l’état actuel des connaissances, il est possible d’avancer que les mesuresadoptéesenmatièred’équitéontpermisderéaliseraucoursdesdix dernières années un certain progrès, en ce qui concerne la promotion des femmes au sein de la fonction publique fédérale et des entreprises privées. La représentation des femmes à des postes de cadres supérieurs et proches des processus décisionnels augmente. Mais la mondialisation croissante des marchés relance le débat sur l’égalité des sexes et sur le rôle joué par les femmes dans l’économie mondiale. Les travailleuses (et travailleurs) de la nouvelle économie du savoir doivent posséder certains attributs qui, au-delà des programmes d’équité en matière d’emploi, assureront leur promotion à des postes supérieurs dans les organisations. Ces attributs reposent sur : · un savoir spécialisé lié à l’expérience et à la profession; · une culture générale et une vision globale; · un savoir transférable à divers environnements; · des compétences de gestion et un fort degré d’autonomie; · une aptitude à l’apprentissage et à la recherche; · des compétences en matière de communication; · une maîtrise de la technologie; · une perception des tendances futures, en vue de l’apprentissage et de l’adaptation; · une vision globale, adaptée à l’économie mondialisée. Rinfret et Lortie-Lussier (1997) rappellent que « récemment entrées en nombre dans les postes de cadres, les femmes pourraient contribuer de façon significative à l’innovation en ce domaine et établir l’équilibre entre les valeurs nécessaires à l’exécution des tâches et à la cohésion au sein des organisations ». Juillet et Roy (1999), se penchant sur les nouveaux défis de la gouvernance rappellent que trois enjeux critiques ont fait leur apparition : (1) ouverture et transparence; (2) accès et technologies nouvelles et (3) habilitation et flexibilité, c’est-à-dire instaurer une gestion efficace du

75 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes savoir avec un effectif plus instruit, plus mobile et qui a de plus grandes attentes. Relever ce dernier défi nécessite une réflexion profonde sur les politiques gouvernementales en matière d’insertion des femmes professionnelles au marché du travail et dans les sphères de décision. Une telle réflexion est en cours et ce thème a été abordé lors de la Conférence de l’OCDE (2000) sur l’intégration des questions d’égalité homme-femme, en tant que stratégie visant à garantir l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes dans tous les domaines de prise de décision du secteur public comme du secteurprivé.Cettestratégieapourobjectifdepermettreàtouslesmembres de la société de réaliser leur plein potentiel afin de contribuer à la cohésion sociale, à la compétitivité et à la croissance.

Programmes d’équité en matière d’emploi et promotion des femmes : attentes et éthique des affaires De nombreuses tribunes nationales et internationales (Nations Unies, OCDE) se fixent pour objectif d’augmenter la participation des femmes au développement durable de leur société. La dernière Conférence mondiale desNationsUniessurlesfemmes(Pékin,1995)visait,entreautreschoses,à faire progresser l’égalité entre les sexes dans le monde. De même, dans le Plan fédéral pour l’égalité des sexes (1995), l’égalité économique des femmes est présentée comme prioritaire et bénéfique pour le Canada. Les programmes d’équité en matière d’emplois (PEME) font l’objet de politiques nationales et cherchent à promouvoir les femmes sur le marché du travail : Moderniser la société de sorte que les hommes et les femmes puissent travailler sur un pied d’égalité, avec d’égales responsa- bilités, et exploiter pleinement la capacité de croissance de nos économies. (Rapport annuel de 1997 de la Commission sur l’égalité des chances, Stratégie européenne pour l’emploi) Les PEME peuvent contribuer à une meilleure représentation des groupes jusque-là sous-représentés, en intensifiant les efforts de recrutement dans l’organisation et en modifiant ses pratiques de recrutement et de promotion. Prendre en considération les responsabilités familiales des femmes, s’y adapter et leur dispenser la formation requise pour leur ouvrir les professions généralement dominées par les hommes constituent toujours un défi à relever. Haines, Guérin et St-Onge (1999) se sont penchés sur les conclusions des principales études entreprises à ce jour. Ils soulignent que parmi les facteurs, qui exacerbent l’ampleur du conflit emploi-famille des employés, figurent la participation accrue des femmes ayant des enfants sur le marché de l’emploi et la nécessité de prendre soin de parents âgés. Coderre, Denis et Andrew (1999) démontrent que l’étude des trajectoires familiales permet de mieux comprendre les stratégies des

76 Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement femmes dans le monde du travail et qu’il serait utile, dans l’avenir, de mieux se pencher sur leur besoin d’équilibrer le travail et la vie personnelle. Sidetelsélémentsnesontpasprisenconsidération danslesformulations des stratégies des entreprises et dans l’élaboration des politiques, on risque d’assister au départ de ressources humaines compétentes et à un absentéisme coûteux pour les entreprises. L’adoption d’horaires de travail flexibles est souvent proposée comme la solution à un tel problème. Cette stratégie, pour être efficace, doit conduire à la mise en place de politiques et à la diffusion d’une culture d’entreprise qui tienne compte du contexte socioculturel des femmes. Quels sont donc les programmes d’action et les modalités de fonctionnement des entreprises qui permettent la promotion des femmes à des postes clés, et ce dans le contexte de la nouvelle économie du savoir en gestation? Bien que cruciale, cette question est encore peu cernée dans la littérature. Voir, entre autres, Cardinal (1999) et Lobel, Googins et Bankert (1999). Notons que depuis le début de la décennie 1990, de nombreuses entreprises se sont dotées de PEME, soit volontairement, soit parce qu’elles y ont été contraintes par la loi. Les organisations canadiennes qui bénéficient de contrats fédéraux ou provinciaux sont tenues de se doter de tels programmes. Des législations semblables sont aussi en vigueur dans les autres pays industrialisés. Malgré l’apparition d’un grand nombre de ces PEME, les inégalités entre les sexes restent encore importantes dans de nombreux domaines (Commission européenne, 1998). Les femmes sont davantage confrontées aux problèmes de chômage que les hommes, leurs niveaux de salaires sont plus faibles et leurs possibilités d’accès aux fonctions décisionnelles des entreprises et leur participation à la vie politique sont encore limitées. Leck et al. (1996) ont analysé les résultats de la loi sur l’équité en matière d’emploi pour les femmes, au Canada. De façon à obtenir un échantillon représentatif de la situation des femmes sur le marché du travail, les auteures se sont penchées sur 294 organisations canadiennes, des secteurs des banques, des télécommunications et du transport, des 386 auxquelles s’appliquent la loi fédérale (soit 78 p. 100). Les principales conclusions qui se dégagent de l’étude sont les suivantes : · on observe un effet positif des PEME; · l’effet est cependant très limité, surtout en ce qui concerne la promotion des femmes; · les femmes blanches semblent être celles qui profitent le plus des PEME. L’analyse révèle que la présence des femmes blanches au sein des catégories des cadres supérieurs, cadres intermédiaires et surveillants (postes de pouvoir) a été améliorée. Ces femmes ont, en nombre limité, bénéficié d’un meilleur processus de recrutement et de promotion. La

77 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes représentation des femmes des minorités visibles est meilleure aussi, mais dans des postes fonctionnels et où le pouvoir de décision est moins élevé. Ces résultats bien qu’encore limités, en matière de promotion des femmes, nous conduisent à nous interroger sur le degré d’efficacité des politiques établies. La promotion représente en effet un mécanisme clé de l’équité en matière d’emploi, dans la mesure où de nombreux postes — et surtout les postes de pouvoir — sont comblés à l’interne, en raison du degré d’expérience requis pour faire face aux responsabilités. Pour Leck et al., la Loi de l’équité en matière d’emploi (en vigueur depuis 1987) ne sera atteinte que lorsque tous les groupes de femmes seront représentés en nombre suffisant dans toutes les catégories d’emplois, y compris dans les postes de pouvoir. Notons que selon Catalyst (1999), peu de personnes des minorités visibles et peu de femmes accèdent à des postes élevés dans les entreprises. Le Plan fédéral pour l’égalité des sexes (1995) visait à la création de milieux de travail favorables et flexibles pour les femmes, mais reposait essentiellement sur de simples lignes directrices. Des programmes d’action concrets doivent donc être adoptés pour répondre à la priorité émise par le gouvernement du Canada. En réponse à la controverse qui risquerait de s’ensuivre, Manon Tremblay, 1998 (Le Devoir, 6 nov., A11), se penchant sur la représentation des femmes sur la scène politique, exprimait la pensée suivante : « D’aucuns me rétorqueront que les mesures destinées à favoriser l’élection des femmes sont antidémocratiques. Mais que dire d’une “démocratie sans les femmes”, pour reprendre le titre du célèbre ouvrage de Christine Fauré ». Lorsque nous nous penchons sur les PEME, nous prenons conscience du fait que ces politiques ont permis aux femmes de réaliser certains gains. Toutefois, les études concluent (cf. Orser, 2000) qu’elles demeurent sous représentées dans les postes de gestion supérieure au Canada. Paradoxalement, c’est chez les entreprises où les femmes occupent en majorité des postes de gestion supérieure que l’on a observé la plus forte croissance des ventes. Parmi les facteurs explicatifs de cette tendance, figurent la propension chez les femmes à considérer les répercussions sociales et humaines des décisions d’affaires et à apporter à l’échelon de gestion supérieur un plus vaste éventail de perspectives lorsque les décisions doivent être prises. Les politiques qui devraient aider à faire progresser les changements de mentalité sont cependant le résultat de processus décisionnels et de gouvernance élaborés essentiellement par les hommes. Le mode de société dans lequel nous évoluons continue de refléter les valeurs selon lesquelles la femme a pour vocation première de rester à la maison et de prendre soin des enfants. Cette vision de société, toute légitime qu’elle soit pour celles qui la désirent, ne tient pas compte des changements qui ont affecté la condition socio-économique des femmes : obligation d’entrer en masse sur le marché du travail pour aller chercher un indispensable revenu d’appoint. Il s’ensuit qu’un changement de définition

78 Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement du mode de travail et une révision des structures socio-économiques de nos sociétés s’imposent. Parvenir à un tel résultat nécessite un long cheminement. L’accès des femmes aux processus décisionnels et leur « infiltration » dans les organismes publics et privés, que ce soit par des voies conventionnelles ou par l’action de la société civile, est une condition préalable à toute stratégie de progrès et d’adaptation au changement. Les femmes continuent d’évoluer dans un environnement complexe, où les activités professionnelles et familiales peuvent facilement entrer en conflit. Un rééquilibrage, bien que souhaitable, ne pourra être opéré que dans la mesure où les institutions — et les hommes qui les dirigent encore largement — accepteront non seulement cette réalité mais feront surtout l’effort de s’y adapter. Souhaiter le retour de la femme au foyer, pour régler le conflit travail-famille, ne fait plus partie des options, à moins qu’il ne s’agisse d’un choix personnel. Penser que toutes les femmes ambitionnent d’accéder à des postes élevés n’est guère réaliste non plus. Par contre, ne pas créer les conditions adéquates et ne pas donner des moyens de réalisation à celles qui veulent s’engager dans cette voie, est non seulement anti-démocratique mais aussi nuisible au contexte socio-économique de la nouvelle économie du savoir. Le tableau 3 montre l’importance de la prise en considération des préoccupations liées aux sexes pour promouvoir les changements de mentalité et orienter les processus organisationnels vers l’efficacité.

Tableau 3. Pourquoi apporter autant d’importance à la mixité?

Raisons traditionnelles Raisons liées au rendement Respecter les lignes directrices sur Améliorer l’efficacité, l’efficience l’équité en matière d’emploi et le rendement de l’organisation Répondre aux questions des Faire de l’organisation un actionnaires et des employés employeur de choix pour les concernant le manque de femmes à femmes des postes de direction Traiter les griefs, les poursuites et les plaintes de harcèlement Répondre aux rapports sur le faible nombre de femmes nommées à des postes de direction Source : B. Orser, Créer des organisations à haut rendement, Le Conference Board du Canada, 2000, p. 3.

79 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Griffith et al. (1997) se sont penchées sur la situation des femmes professionnelles, dans le cadre d’une enquête portant sur 1000 femmes occupant des postes de cadres supérieurs dans les plus grandes entreprises et firmes d’affaires canadiennes. Cette enquête fait suite à une étude de même nature, conduite aux États-Unis en 1996, à partir de données de Fortune, et aboutit à des résultats similaires : les auteurs arrivent à la conclusion que peu de femmes parviennent au sommet de l’échelle des organisations. Les dernières données publiées par le Conference Board (2000) sur la proportion de femmes occupant un poste de direction, par secteur d’activité (public et privé) corroborent les conclusions du rapport produit par l’Institut de recherche Catalyst mentionné plus haut : l’inégalité hommes-femmes est généralisée. Pourtant de nombreuses femmes talentueuses exercent leur activité sur le marché du travail, possèdent souvent des compétences complémentaires àcellesdeshommesetutilesàlaprisededécision.Lesfemmesreprésentent aussi un bassin de consommateurs en croissance rapide et continue. Les auteurs se demandent pourquoi, dans un tel contexte, les femmes ne sont pas davantage promues à des postes de direction. Elles identifient quelques obstacles fondamentaux : · les responsabilités familiales; 76 p. 100 des femmes sont mariées, la moitié du reste l’ont été; · 65 p. 100 ont des enfants dont 53 p. 100 âgés de moins de 18 ans; · le manque de mentorat; · un leadership senior qui n’est pas tenu responsable de la promotion des femmes. Nous nous proposons, dans la dernière partie, d’analyser ces éléments qui revêtent une importance particulière.

Stratégies de succès, réussite personnelle et promotion des femmes dans un monde globalisé Contrairement aux anticipations passées, le modèle de gestion masculin continue de dominer la pratique des affaires et la mise en place des politiques. Tuvia Melamed (1999), psychologue et consultante senior pour la firme de recrutement Capita Ras, s’est penchée sur les facteurs de réussite mentionnés par les femmes professionnelles. Elle constate que ces dernières n’attribuent pas leur réussite à des caractéristiques féminines. Bien au contraire, elles affirment qu’adopter une attitude « macho » et aggressive constitue la clé de la réussite : « [f]orget about the caring, sharing 90s and political correctness. That just does not work, toughness does ». Cette conclusion est le reflet d’une étude entreprise pendant une période de 4 ans (1994 à 1997) auprès d’un échantillon de 294 femmes et 949 hommes gestionnaires et semble être en contradiction avec la théorie

80 Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement dominante. Le nouveau paradigme de gestion préconise en effet un style de conduite qui vise le développement de la personne, la flexibilité, la communication ouverte et des rapports harmonieux. Rinfret et Lortie-Lussier (1997) qualifient ces changements de féminisation ou d’humanisation des structures organisationnelles. Seymour (2000), avance que le mode de gestion au féminin est caractérisé par le consensus, le mentorat,lacollaborationetlacommunication.Parmilesattributsféminins inhérents figurent : · une bonne communication; · le travail d’équipe; · le développement de relations de support; · une éthique de vie qui crée une aspiration à améliorer la société. Ce dernier élément, fréquemment cité par les femmes (Leroux, 1999; Duxbury et al., 1999), se traduit par une volonté d’améliorer l’éthique des affaires et de devenir une citoyenne mondiale responsable. L’enquête de Melamed souligne d’ailleurs le fait que les femmes gestionnaires qui adoptent des attitudes « macho » ont beaucoup de difficultés à travailler dans un tel contexte et se demandent si elles ne devraient pas changer d’orientation. Diverses études abordent cette problématique et permettent de définir quelle est la perception des valeurs professionnelles, par les femmes. Ces études font ressortir la nécessité de développer une approche holistique, pour définir le paradigme de gestion des femmes profession- nellesconfrontéesàlamondialisation.Réussirsurleplanpersonnel(estime de soi), apprendre et se perfectionner, désirer un niveau de vie confortable (salaires) sont des aspirations que l’on retrouve tout aussi bien chez les hommes que chez les femmes. Par contre, avoir les moyens de réaliser un juste équilibre entre les obligations professionnelles et familiales est une aspiration plus particulière aux femmes. Les enquêtes les plus récentes (Lee, MacDermid et al., 1998; Duxbury et al., 1999, etc.) effectuées au Canada, aux États-Unis et en Europe démontrent que la plupart des employées ont pour priorité l’équilibre famille-travail. Ce besoin a conduit certaines femmes professionnelles à adopter des horaires de travail réduits. L’étude de Lee, MacDermid et al. (1998) semble démontrer qu’une réduction du temps de travail (de 50 à 32 heures) ne constitue pas un frein à l’évolution professionnelle des femmes. Trente-cinq pour cent des participantes à leur recherche ayant adopté des horaires réduits ont bénéficié d’une promotion et quatre-vingt-onze pour cent d’entre elles se sont dites plus heureuses et satisfaites du nouvel équilibreentreletravailetlafamille.Cettesituationseraitliéeaufaitqueles entreprises adoptent des mesures pour satisfaire les besoins familiaux des employées qui ont des qualifications uniques et un esprit de loyauté envers l’organisation.

81 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Une contribution à la vie des organisations où elles exercent leurs professions et à la société, au sens large, est un autre élément jugé important par les femmes (Duxbury et al., 1999). Ces dernières considèrent cependant qu’ils’agitlàd’unélémentquin’estpassuffisammentàleurportée.Lamise en place de moyens à la disposition des femmes pour leur permettre d’accéder en grand nombre à tous les postes où elles souhaitent exercer leur activité professionnelle constitue un élément central de réussite pour les pays engagés dans la course mondiale à la compétitivité. Les enjeux de la compétitivité qui façonnent la nouvelle économie sont considérés comme « stratégiques » dans la mesure où ils remettent en cause les stratégies concurrentielles des entreprises et les programmes d’action des gouvernements. Quelles sont donc les stratégies susceptibles d’entraîner un certain rééquilibrage dans la répartition décisionnelle et opérationnelle des tâches entre les hommes et les femmes? Les enquêtes, auxquelles nous nous sommes référées, auprès des femmes gestionnaires qui occupent des postes decadresdansleursorganisationsfontressortirtroisélémentsdeprogrès: · dépasser systématiquement les attentes, en termes de performance; · développer un style de gestion qui mette à l’aise les managers masculins; · postuler des emplois qui offrent le plus de visibilité et ne pas hésiter à demander d’effectuer les tâches les plus difficiles. Pour atteindre de tels objectifs et par là-même assurer la relève dans les organisations, il est nécessaire de mettre sur pied un système de mentorat et de réseautage et de développer des programmes de recrutement et de formation qui tiennent compte des aspirations des femmes. Les dernières études consacrées à la situation des femmes professionnelles illustrent aussi que les organisations sont davantage conscientes des besoins des femmes, qui exercent la double fonction de mère de famille et de travailleuse. Des législations adéquates doivent donc être introduites pour protéger les intérêts des femmes qui par choix décident de travailler moins, tout en poursuivant des objectifs de carrière élevés. Dans l’attente d’un programme élaboré de réformes, on peut envisager quelques mesures, telles les avancées qui ont été faites dans le domaine de la durée des congés de maternité et de l’accessibilité aux garderies. Il s’agit là d’un pas dans la bonne direction qui devrait être suivi par l’adoption d’horaires de travail flexibles pour les femmes qui occupent la double fonction de travailleuse et de mère de famille. Des législations, introduites dans le cadre des PEME, pourraient inciter les entreprises à favoriser la promotion des femmes qui désirent bénéficier de tels horaires, au sein de la hiérarchie des organisations.Lesvaleursetlesmentalitésdesentreprisescommenceraient

82 Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement ainsi à s’adapter à une vision plus féminine du monde. D’autres politiques de ce type pourraient être envisagées pour faire en sorte d’avoir des centres depouvoiretdedécisiondeplusenplusouvertsetaccessiblesauxfemmes. En ce qui a trait à la promotion des femmes au sein des organisations, notons que des programmes sont en cours depuis plusieurs années, tel celui de la Banque Toronto Dominion, de 1994. Les femmes cadres supérieurs dénoncèrent à cette époque leur faible représentation dans les instances décisionnelles de la Banque et lancèrent un débat qui aboutit à la mise sur pied d’un comité visant la promotion des femmes. Un programme fut élaboré par la suite, pour identifier les femmes qui disposaient d’un certain potentiel et les aider à planifier leur carrière (mentorat, formation, visibilité). Plus récemment, la firme Shell s’est aussi engagée à favoriser la promotion des femmes et à augmenter le nombre de femmes cadres supérieurs de4à20p.100, pour la période 1999-2004. De tels programmes ne pourront atteindre pleinement leurs objectifs que dans la mesure où il existera un bassin suffisant de femmes méritant des promotions et que celles-ci seront en mesure de concilier leurs obligations professionnelles et familiales. Cette constatation nous conduit à avancer qu’il pourrait encore s’avérer nécessaire de favoriser le recrutement des femmes par des politiques d’embauche faisant appel à des quotas et à des programmes d’équité en matière d’emploi, sous de nouvelles modalités qu’il reste à définir et en fonction de la réalité contemporaine. D’un autre côté, l’environnement concurrentiel mondial des entreprises est tel que ces dernières ne peuvent se permettre d’augmenter sensiblement leurs coûts de production sans perdre leur part de marché. Or, les programmes d’action des entreprises et les politiques d’équité entraînent des coûts à court et à moyen termes pour ces dernières et exercent des pressions sur leur position concurrentielle. La mise en place des programmes doit donc être appréhendée comme une stratégie de progrès dont les effets bénéfiques se feront ressentir à plus long terme.

Conclusion La cage de verre est bel et bien fissurée, mais il serait illusoire de croire qu’il s’agisse d’un phénomène du passé. De nombreux efforts ont été entrepris pour augmenter la participation des femmes à la vie des organisations publiques et privées mais les résultats demeurent encore modestes, notamment parce que les politiques économiques néo-libérales et la restructuration mondiale des marchés ont ralenti le processus au cours de la dernière décennie. Levirageverslanouvelleéconomiedusavoircombinéàl’aspirationàun modèle de développement socio-économique durable et à la recherche de nouvelles structures de gouvernance forment un groupe de facteurs privilégiés pour relancer le débat sur la promotion des femmes et leur accès à des postes de pouvoir et de décision. Une augmentation de la participation

83 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes des femmes au marché du travail, sur une base égalitaire avec les hommes, à l’aube du XXIe siècle devrait normalement renforcer à terme la compétitivité et la croissance économique du pays. Nous avons mis en exergue le fait qu’il est difficile de comprendre les enjeux de la vie professionnelle des femmes en faisant abstraction de leur vie personnelle et familiale. Il convient donc de mettre en place des mesures pour encourager les entreprises à tenir compte de ce facteur et à donner autant de chances aux femmes qu’aux hommes, à l’embauche et lors de leur cheminement de carrière. La question de l’élaboration et de la mise en œuvre de politiques d’équité en matière d’emploi est ainsi toujours d’actualité. Cependant, devant la lenteur des résultats accomplis et les barrières qui subsistent encore, il convient de se demander si des mesures à caractère coercitif sont suffisantes. Ne faudrait-il pas envisager d’autres avenues qui prendraient mieux en considération les contraintes auxquelles les entreprises doivent faire face (coûts, manque de disponibilité de personnel qualifié, etc.) et qui semblent freiner leur adhésion aux aspirations des femmes? Est-il raisonnable de penser qu’en l’absence de moyens incitatifs appropriés on puisse changer la culture des entreprises afin de les amener à prendre en considération les responsabilités familiales des femmes, en matière de promotion? Est-il raisonnable de croire qu’une entreprise puisse accepter que certains de ses cadres supérieurs, dont la contribution est essentielle au bon fonctionnement des opérations, ne puissent pas être autant disponibles et travailler autant d’heures que les autres, en raison de ces responsabilités? Est-il raisonnable d’imaginer pouvoir changer la culture des hommes pour qu’ils acceptent de s’acquitter au besoin de telles responsabilités? Quelles mesures doit-on prendre pour arriver à l’un ou l’autre de ces résultats? La réalité est telle que les entreprises font face à des contraintes de coûts en raison de la concurrence sévère à laquelle elles sont soumises par les autres entreprises, sur leur marché domestique et à l’étranger. Or, dans les autres pays, la promotion des femmes n’est pas toujours aussi à l’avant-garde ou coercitive qu’ici. En effet, malgré la lenteur des résultats obtenus jusqu’à maintenant, le Canada figure au premier rang des pays (PNUD,1999), devant la Norvège et la Suède, en ce qui concerne l’indicateur de la participation des femmes dans les domaines politique et économique.

Notes 1. Madame Debbie Gaunt, Présidente de Ford Motor du Canada, prend sa retraite en décembre 2000.

84 Les femmes professionnelles à l’heure de la mondialisation : défis et stratégies d’ajustement

Références Adler, Nancy J. et Dafna N. Izraeli (ed.) (1994), Competitive Frontiers: Women Managers in a Global Economy. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Alter Chen, Martha (1996), « Engendering World Conferences: The International Women’s Movement and the UN », dans Thomas G. Weiss et Leon Gordenker (eds.), NGO’s, the UN and Global Governance. Lynne Rienner, London. Arnold, Kara et Carol McKeen (2000), « Most Business Schools not Responding to Issues of Gender Diversity Despite Trends in Corporate Canada », Women in Management, Vol. 10, no 2, Décembre/Janvier, p. 1 et 2. Bakker, Isabella (ed.) (1996), Rethinking Restructuring: Gender and Change in Canada, University of Toronto Press. Bartlett, Christopher A. et Sumantra Ghosal (1998), « Trois profils de cadres pour l’an 2000 », Expansion Management Review, Mars, p. 17 à 23. Bégin, Monique (1992), « The Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada: Twenty Years Later », dans Backhouse et Flaherty (ed.), Challenging Times: The Women’s Movement in Canada and United States, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montréal, 1972. Cardinal, Line (1999), « Tendances dans les trajectoires et les motivations professionnelles des gestionnaires », Gestion, Vol. 24, no 2, été, p. 23 à 31. Catalyst, (1999), Census of Women Corporate Officers in Canada, New York. Coderre, Cécile, Ann Denis et Caroline Andrew (1999), Femmes de carrière — carrières de femmes, Collection études des femmes, Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa. Commission européenne (1998), Rapport annuel 1997 sur l’égalité des chances, Europe News, p. 3. Condition féminine Canada (1995), À l’aube du XXIe siècle : plan fédéral pour l’égalité entre les sexes. Développement des ressources humaines du Canada (2000), Bulletin de la recherche appliquée,Vol.6,no 1, Hiver-Printemps. Duxbury, Linda, Lorraine Dyke et Natalie Lam (1999), Le perfectionnement professionnel dans la fonction publique fédérale. Constituer un effectif de calibre mondial, Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor du Canada. Foster, Mary et Barbara J. Orser (1994), « A Marketing Perspective on Women in Management: An Explanatory Study », Revue canadienne des sciences de l’administration, Vol. 11, no 4, p. 339 à 345. Franks, Suzanne (1999), Having None of It: Women, Men and the Future of Work, Granta Books. Griffith, Paulette G., Judith MacBride-King et Bickley Townsen (1997), Closing the Gap. Women’s Advancement in Corporate and Professional Canada,The Conference Board of Canada et Catalyst. Gunderson, Morley (1998), Les femmes et le marché du travail canadien : transitions vers l’avenir, Ottawa, Statistique Canada. Haines, Victor Y., Gilles Guérin et Sylvie St-Onge (1999), « Les effets de l’horaire flexible sur le taux de roulement et l’absentéisme d’employés ayant des responsabilités parentales », Revue canadienne des sciences de l’administration, Vol. 16, no 9, décembre, p. 323 à 333. Juillet, Luc et Jeffrey Roy (1999), « Investir dans les ressources humaines : la fonction publique à l’ère de l’information », Optimum, Vol. 29, no 2/3, p. 71 à 79. Kanter, Rosabeth Moss (1977), « Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women », American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, no 5, p. 965 à 990. Karambayya, Rekha (1998), « Caught in the Crossfire: Women and Corporate Restructuring », Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 15, no 4, p. 333 à 338. Leck, Johanne D., David M. Saunders et Lyne Marcil (1996), « Programmes d’équité en matière d’emploi au Canada : le cas des femmes », Revue canadienne des sciences de l’administration, Vol. 13, no 3, p. 207 à 215.

85 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Lee, Mary Dean, Shelley M. MacDermid et al. (1998), Improving New Careers: Accommodation, Elaboration, Transformation, West Lafayette, IN: The Center for Families at Purdue University. Leroux, Janice (1999), « Mirrors and Motivation: Insights From Women Who Have Been There », dans Montgomery D. (ed.): Educating High Ability Females- Workers, London. Lévy, Brigitte (1997), « Multilatéralisme et régionalisme : interdépendance stratégique des États et des firmes », Management international / International Management, Vol. 1, no 2, p. 1 à 12. Lobel, Sharon A., Poradley K. Googins et Bankert Hélène (1999), « The Future of Work and Family: Critical Trends for Policy, Practice, and Research », Human Resources Management, automne, Vol. 38, no 3, p. 243 à 254. Melamed, Tuvia (1999) citée par A. Frean dans « Succesful Women...»,The Ottawa Citizen, June 6, 1999, p. B2. Meyerson, Debra E. et Joyce K. Fletcher (2000), « A Modest Manifest for Shattering the Glass Ceiling », Harvard Business Review, janvier-février, p. 127 à 136. Moniteur micro-économique (1998), incluant le rapport spécial, La cage de verre : histoire du passé? Les femmes entrepreneurs à l’heure de l’économie du savoir, Industrie Canada, Troisième trimestre, 1998. Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (2000), Compétitivité et croissance. Intégration des questions d’égalité homme-femme, Conférence du 23-24 novembre, OCDE, Paris (Site Internet http://www.oecd.org). Orser, Barbara (2000), Créer des organisations à haut rendement. Mettre à profit le leadership des femmes, le Conference Board du Canada. Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (1999), Rapport mondial sur le développement humain, PNUD, Éditions de Boeck et Larcier SH. Reid, Angus (1996), Shakedown : The Economy is Changing Our Lives, Toronto; Doubleday Canada Limited. Rinfret, Natalie et Monique Lortie-Lussier (1997), « Le style de gestion des hommes et des femmes : convergence ou divergence? », Canadian Public Administration / Administration publique du Canada, Vol. 40, no 4 (Winter/Hiver), p. 599 à 613. Seymour, Rhea, (2000), « Ms. versus Mr. », Profit, 6 octobre, p. 50 à 56. Sharp, Crystal et David Sharp (1999), « Study Shows Women Who Are Unhappy With Corporate Life Plan to Start Own Businesses », Women in Management,Vol.9, no 2, Ivey School of Business, p. 1 à 4. Shelag, Day (1998), Les femmes et le déficit en matière d’égalité : l’incidence de la restructuration et des programmes sociaux du Canada, Ottawa, Condition féminine Canada. Statistique Canada et Développement des ressources humaines Canada (1998), Un milieu de travail en évolution : résultats de l’enquête pilote sur le lieu de travail et les employés. Tremblay, Manon (1999), Des femmes au Parlement : une stratégie féministe? Les Éditions du remue-ménage. Tremblay, Manon et Caroline Andrew (eds.) (1998), Women and Political Representation in Canada, Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa. _____ (sous la direction de) (1997), Femmes et représentation politique au Québec et au Canada, Montréal, Les Éditions du remue-ménage.

86 Karen McPherson

Memory and Imagination in the Writings of Nicole Brossard

Abstract For Nicole Brossard, memory is closely linked to both imagination and desire. In a 1988 paper called “Memory: Hologram of Desire,” she describes the essential role of memory in women’s coming to writing, suggesting that through memory women confront and combat the tyrannies of a patriarchal tradition that has excluded their voices and their stories; memory enables women to “unrecount” the past; women’s memory “initiates presence in the world.” Looking closely at this text and at Brossard’s concept of women’s memory as “actualizing,” “virtual and anticipatory,” the present essay examines the workings of memory in Brossard’s two most recent novels. In Le désert mauve and Baroque d’aube, Brossard brings a feminist perspective to bear on the postmodern “memory crisis.” Discontinuities and disarticulations are not signs of loss and failure but of the possibility of making new connections, remembering and proceeding differently. Memory is not static and nostalgic but dynamic and visionary. And writing is a way to bring together the time of memory and the time of imagination in order to make sense of both present and future.

Résumé Pour Nicole Brossard, la mémoire est étroitement liée à l’imagination et au désir. Dans un texte paru en 1988 et intitulé « Mémoire : hologramme du désir », elle décrit le rôle essentiel de la mémoire dans l’approche féminine de l’écriture, en suggérant que c’est par l’entremise de la mémoire que les femmes affrontent et luttent contre les tyrannies de la tradition patriarcale qui a exclu leurs voix et leurs récits; c’est la mémoire qui permet aux femmes de « déraconter » le passé; c’est la mémoire des femmes qui « initie la présence au monde ». En se penchant de près sur ce texte et sur l’idée que Brossard se fait de la mémoire des femmes comme « actualisante », « virtuelle et anticipa- toire », le présent article examine les mécanismes de la mémoire dans les deux romans les plus récents de Brossard. Dans Le désert mauve et Baroque d’aube, Brossard inscrit « la crise postmoderne de la mémoire » dans une perspective féministe. Les discontinuités et les désarticulations ne constituent pas des signes d’une perte ou d’un échec, mais plutôt de la possibilité d’établir de nouvelles connexions, de se remémorer et de procéder autrement. La mémoire n’est pas statique et nostalgique, mais dynamique et visionnaire. Et l’écriture est un moyen de réunir le temps de la mémoire et le temps de l’imagination afin de conférer un sens tant au présent qu’à l’avenir.

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Tout doit passer par la mémoire et l’imagination. (BA, 137)1

Writing-that-is-memory Memory plays a key role in Nicole Brossard’s “vision aérienne” of women coming to writing. For Brossard, the memory of women is “gyn/écolo- gique” (Brossard 1985b, 51) and intimately connected to both desire and imagination.2 A short paper delivered at the 1988 Third International Feminist Bookfair contains Brossard’s most detailed and explicit account of the unique contours and operations of women’s memory.3 In this text, having described “patriarchal memory” as “[a] bulldozer memory that buries alive the memories of women,” Brossard likens women’s memory to “an orchid that has blossomed in a polar climate” (M, 44). This image eloquently conveys Brossard’s association of memory with both female desire (the orchid frequently representative of women’s sexuality) and visionary imagination. In this text, Brossard suggests that memory enables women to recognize, resist and combat the tyrannies of a patriarchal tradition that would ignore or obliterate their voices and their stories. Women’s memory makes writing possible, even imperative, in the face of death and loss, violence and destruction. The writing of memory is always also, for Brossard, the writing of imagination. The fact that writing-that-is-memory is for women intimately bound up with the imagination of a different outcome and the necessity of fiction is clear in Brossard’s description of how women come to writing: Des femmes arrivent sur la place publique de la Littérature et du Texte. Elles sont pleines de mémoires: anecdotiques, mythiques, réelles et fictives. Mais surtout, elles sont remplies d’une mémoire inédite et globale, une mémoire gyn/écologique qui rendue à sa réalité mise en mots devient comme une théorie fictive. (Brossard 1985b, 51) Of course, one could say that all writing is naturally an operation of memory, the words on the page, traces of and testimonials to what is not there but must now be re-collected and re-presented. However, for Brossard, the writing that memory provokes is in no way memorial. It is neither epitaph nor elegy, for the focus is not on loss but on survival. In the fact of survival, of having endured—like the orchid in the polar climate—, women’s memories cross over the threshold of death in order to speak, to tell their stories. A survivor who speaks becomes a witness, and that witnessing becomes a vital and consequential act. So, for Brossard, writing-that-is-memory ventures into the future quite as boldly as it does into the past. The “gyn/ecological” memory that motivates and informs women’s act of witnessing becomes, through writing, “comme une théorie fictive,” a radical re-vision of reality, a way of imagining women’s past, present and future differently.

88 Memory and Imagination in the Writings of Nicole Brossard

Turning the Page on Death Tourner la page tourner la mort d’un coup d’épaule et de mémoire. (Brossard 1997, 33)

These two lines from Nicole Brossard’s 1997 volume of poetry, Vertige de l’avant-scène, describe a fundamental and dynamic connection between death and memory. One might maintain that all memory is in the face of—and in the place of—death, since a thing remembered must first have ceased to be in the present. Brossard’s poem suggests that memory, in the present, is what keeps shoving death aside, turning the page in order for the story to go on. In Stratégies du vertige, Louise Dupré describes the role of death in Brossard’s poetry as follows: [C]ette « mort énivrante » [. . .] telle qu’on la rencontre chez Brossard, n’est pas cette préoccupation pour le mortel en soi qu’on perçoit [. . .] chez plusieurs poètes masculins de la modernité [. . .]. Car pour [Brossard], la mort est transcendée: elle n’interrompt pas la vie, elle la poursuit plutôt, la recommence à un autre niveau de perfection, elle exprime la victoire du continu sur le discontinu. (Dupré 1989, 143) While still an accurate account of Brossard’s way of thinking about death, in recent years, and especially in her novels Le désert mauve and Baroque d’aube (perhaps in part as a function of their narrativity), death appears to have taken on a political and personal reality for Brossard that makes it much less readily transcendable though no less dynamic. Brossard’s two most recent novels are suffused with an awareness of the fragility and vulnerability of all existence in a violent fin-de-siècle world. Turning the page on death is not so easy. At one point in Baroque d’aube, the writer Cybil Noland and her friend Jasmine talk about “la mort qui commence à partager la réalité en deux,” and literature “qui hésite à faire face avec son oeil bouleversé [. . .]” (BA, 67). The death that is now beginning to divide reality in two—at a certain stage in an individual’s life or at a particular time in the evolution of a civilization—demands an immediate and direct confrontation. This confrontation is the motivating force in Le désert mauve, with Angela Parkins’s murder thematically, formally and theoretically the point of both rupture and suture. The same holds true, in a less punctual way, for Baroque d’aube, whose opening scene is set in the heart of a North American city “armée jusqu’aux dents”(BA, 13). Death is clearly already present and, as in Le désert mauve, it directly relates to the violence of late 20th-century Westerncivilization. Brossard specifically associates this violence with the lethal misogyny of a patriarchal, phallocentric and sexist society. In two texts about the 1989 École Polytechnique killing of fourteen young women

89 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes students by a man who singled them out as “feminists” and accused them of wanting to seize men’s rightful place and property, Brossard makes these connections strikingly explicit. Describing the massacre as a terrorist act with farreaching political implications, Brossard refers to “l’incroyable fossé de mort que les hommes ont creusé, à coup de mensonges misogynes, de privilèges phallocentriques…” (Brossard, 1990, 30). The threat of violence and death in the lives of women is depicted as a pervasive and integral part of phallocentric culture, a reality that cannot be ignored.4 The opening scene in Baroque d’aube is, however, a scene of lovemaking, and the two women making love seem to be sheltered from the death and violence of the armed city that surrounds them. The intimacy between Cybil Noland and the young woman whom she calls La Sixtine is “capable d’arrêter les bruits de la civilisation et de créer un temps fictif propice à l’apparition du visage essential de chacune” (BA, 19). As the women make love, the space within room 43 of the Hôtel Rafale is for a time vaster than the city that contains it. With the young woman’s orgasm, her body “avait fait le tour de la planète comme si le plaisir en elle était devenu un énorme réflexe de vie aérienne” (BA, 13, my emphasis). Afterwards, “[l]’inconnue repose terriblement vivante” (BA, 14, my emphasis). The intimate, physical connection between the two women is life-producing. It is as if, to borrow another line from Vertige de l’avant-scène: “[le] savoir intime fend d’un jaune rare l’idée de la mort” (Brossard 1997, 54). Yet this transcendance of time and space and death is only temporary. When La Sixtine switches on the radio a little later, “une voix grave” spreads the odour of war and its “saletés” through the room (BA, 22): La mort venait de partout, étalait du nord au sud, rayait la planète d’ouest en est, avançait vers les vivants avec un air de patriarche rassurant, puis d’un seul coup disséminait dans la chambre sa logique et d’autres instruments de mort en forme de phallange et de phallus. (BA, 25) ThisdescriptionstrikinglyrecallsapassageinBrossard’s1980text,“Les traces du manifeste”: [N]ous appelons mémoire une forme précise de souvenir qui nous rappelle la mort le feu et la torture traversant les corps femelles la mort le feu et la torture comme trois cavaliers déchaînés chargés de répandre sur nous l’odeur de la peste patriarchale. (Brossard 1985a, 69) The death, fire and torture that have for so long spread their “patriarchal plague” across women’s bodies are, for Brossard, forever inscribed in women’s memory; but Brossard asserts, as we saw earlier, that it is also by way of memory that women may confront and survive these afflictions. Through memory, women come to writing and through writing they may begin to “apprendre à penser l’inimaginable, l’inconcevable” (Brossard 1985c, 82), imagining other outcomes and turning the page on death.

90 Memory and Imagination in the Writings of Nicole Brossard

Memory Crises Memory has been described by Natalie Davis and Randolph Starn as “a substitute, surrogate, or consolation for something that is missing” (Davis and Starn 1989, 3). Yet in our postmodern age, the reassuring workings of memory have been radically challenged. As Pierre Nora so succinctly puts it: “We have gone [. . .] from a history sought in the continuity of memory to a memory cast in the discontinuity of history” (Nora 1989, 17). Richard Terdiman calls this a “memory crisis,” where memory has become “a site and source of cultural disquiet [and] the very coherence of time and of subjectivity seem disarticulated” (Terdiman 1993, 4). The memory crisis is further exacerbated by the fact that, in the absence of “overarching ideological narratives […] defining what is supposed to be memorable” (Davis and Starn, 1989, 3), memory itself perpetuates the experience of loss, figuring, as it does, its own loss, the loss of a coherent memory. The disarticulations and discontinuities to which Nora and Terdiman refer are certainly present in Baroque d’aube, but Brossard’s feminist vision casts the memory crisis in an entirely different light. Brossard would probably want to remind us that much of what women are missing, after all, was not ever there in the “master narrative” of remembering in the first place. The workings of memory, for women, thus involve a return to a place heretofore “inédit” from which to imagine a different future—a future in which one’s memories will finally be one’s own and intact. We can certainly locate in Baroque d’aube the kind of disarticulation in both time and subjectivity described by Terdiman, but Brossard’s inflection on memory, in its exploitation of this disarticulation, is clearly and decidedly both postmodern and feminist. Brossard’s memory crisis is a crisis embracing itself, for the novel, in the absence of any stable singular external frame of reference, seems to be acting as its own memory. To put the same idea in other terms, the memory, in and of the novel, seems to be inscribing and inscribed in its own legend. In order to elucidate this, let us return briefly to Brossard’s short paper “Memory: Hologram of Desire.” In this essay, Brossard points out that, as women, we find that memory has a way of returning, inhabiting us, marking us “like a repeated testimony to what [. . .] we once were” (M, 42). Likening memory to a creature that has taken shape in a woman’s body, she notes that: it repeats itself endlessly, same scene, same decor, same people, unless there is narration. Without an internal account, without narrative illumination, without its text, memory is an eater of destiny. (M, 43) This is precisely where writing comes in for Brossard, for writing marks a site where our memories and our desires may actually generate change. Brossard puts it this way: “Writing is of the body that lets go, but also of the body that comes, for when memory’s body meets the desiring body, we may then believe that memory works its own legend” (M, 43, emphasis mine).

91 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

The polysemy of the word legend is crucial to Brossard’s concept of memory, referring not only to “text accompanying a picture” but also to “an account which has its basis in fact but which time transforms” (M, 43). If, as Brossard suggests, women’s memory “works its own legend,” this is because: she who works the legend of the images and scenes churning in her will inevitably trace an explanatory map of the wounds and scars scattered over her body, as well as a map of the sudden rushes of joy that impassion thinking. (M, 43) And Brossard notes further that each woman’s memory thus: incit[es] us to act in such a way that the wound is no longer repeated and what is amazing is reproduced. It is only when we speak the legend of our lives that we are able to engender new scenes, invent new characters, produce new replies, thereby making our way into the present. (M, 43) Brossard calls this an “actualizing memory, one that initiates presence in the world” (M, 43). Thisisonlyhalfthepicture,however,forBrossardgoesontoexplainthat even as the thinking body turns itself toward the present, it encounters another memory, what she calls “humanity’s official memory [. . .] a memory that makes law” (M, 44). In this encounter with a memory that has long excluded her, a woman comes up against the necessity of going back in time. The return, as Brossard sees it, is both paradoxical and necessary. Her description of the process might also be a description of the project of Baroque d’aube: women’s memory is like a countdown in the history of humanity [. . .] in women’s memory there is an un-recounting, a narration that goes against the grain. [. . .] Something is told that goes toward point zero, a point of synthesis that comes as a signal of departure, of taking flight, of going beyond. All in all, a countdown is a build up of tension and excitement. This countdown is exciting because for us it opens on creation. In telling her story backwards, she who writes peels away each successive layer of lies [. . .] the more we un-recount, the more our history makes sense; the more we countdown, the more we draw nearer to what really counts for us. The countdown is at one and the same time our virtual and anticipatory memory. (M, 44) The return to and through writing (in order to make our history “make sense” as a point of departure) is a crucial element in Brossard’s two most recent novels. In Le Désert mauve, translation figures just such a “narration [. . .] against the grain.” The middle section, “Un livre à traduire,” is, in a sense, Maude Laures’s “unrecounting” of Laure Angstelle’s text, a process aimed at arriving at a “point of synthesis” that may ultimately make it possibleto“changerlecoursdel’histoire/changerlecoursdelamort”(DM, 187, 220).5 Baroque d’aube, with its elaborately twisted and enfolded

92 Memory and Imagination in the Writings of Nicole Brossard temporal and narrative construction, certainly complicates the idea of returning and “making sense” in any literal or linear way. Yet, in the struggle that it inscribes against nostalgia (the return to the past as an endless return), Baroque d’aube also seems to suggest that “as we draw nearer to what really counts for us” we may approach “a point of synthesis that comes as a signal of departure, of taking flight, of going beyond” (M, 44).

Memorializing Fictions There’s no such thing as autobiography there’s only art and lies. (Jeannette Winterson 1994, 69)

One might assume that the most transparent and obvious intersection of memory and writing would occur in the autobiographical genres (the memoir, the confession, the journal intime) in which the author supposedly translates personal memories of lived experience into prose. Without going into a discussion of the well-known pretensions and subversions of autobiographical genres, however, the memory process that Brossard describes as “actualizing” and productive of writing looks toward a horizon that is associated not with self-representation or historical accuracy, but with fiction. As recent work on both autobiography and the novel has suggested, these two genres are no longer always as distinct and clearly defined as they once may have appeared.6 Much contemporary writing, especially by women, might most productively be considered within the hybrid generic category of “memoir/fiction.” The central place of memory in narrative, and especially in the novel, has been the focus of a great deal of critical work over the past decades.7 As Terdiman puts it: “It is the novel [. . .] that most organizes itself as a projection of the memory function and its disruptions. Novels are exercises in the process of memory” (Terdiman 1993, 25). It may come as no surprise, then, that Baroque d’aube (as a “resolutely postmodern” novel8) raises within the genre of “roman” the spectre and question of autobiography. Baroque d’aube is a novel that pushes self-referentiality so far that it effectively fictionalizes itself—calling all of the standard distinctions between “fiction” and “reality” into question. Generally when the author of a book more or less explicitly inscribes him or herself into that book, we assume this to signal the introduction of an autobiographical element into the work. Many authors have, of course, played quite audaciously with this assumption. What better way to insist upon the authority and authenticity of one’s inventions than to allow the fictional to subvert the autobiographical? Togive the invention the power to call into question the priority (and thus the reality) of the inventor?

93 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Even within this ludic and subversive tradition, however, Baroque d’aube takes a very novel approach to the autobiographical. For what happens when the author of a novel appears within her novel, not as a first-personnarrator,notevenasamerecharacter,butratherasacharacter,a woman writer, who has been invented, created by one of the other charactersinthenovel?Andwhathappensthenwhenthereisanincomplete or problematic identification between the eponymous author inside and outside the text? When some details suggest a correspondance between the author Nicole Brossard and the character Nicole Brossard while others explicitly and dramatically undercut any such coincidence? One is then forced to ask: what’s in a name? And the answer is not simple. Further, one has to interrogate one’s own presuppositions about the meaning and direction (le sens) of all narrative. Who is, finally, behind the story? Where does/did the story start? Which parts are to be believed? What is memory here and what is imagination?9 Significantly the first reference to Nicole Brossard within Baroque d’aube occurs in the context of a London conference on autobiography at which Cybil Noland recalls having met the author. As we read Cybil’s account of this meeting we do not at first have any reason to doubt that the Nicole Brossard romancière whom she met five years earlier in London is one and the same Nicole Brossard, author of Baroque d’aube. When Cybil recalls what Brossard had said to her in the course of their long discussions, we are comfortable with the idea that we are hearing the author herself speaking to the questions of which she is herself, as a fictionalized character, a prime example. For instance, Cybil recalls that Brossard had maintainedthat“ilétaitabsurdedevouloirentrerdanslemondedelafiction en restant soi, même collée à la vérité de ses rêves les plus fous” (BA, 56). We can easily imagine Brossard, novelist and theorist, at that conference on autobiography teasing out the complex threads of referentiality and identity in writing. We recognize here Brossard, author of a Journal intime whose subtitle “ou voilà donc un manuscrit” and whose concluding lines of poetry (“le poème est la certitude/qui me représente/parure d’éclat vertige/élé- mentales vouloir encore”) reveal it to be in constant tension with itself (Brossard 1998a, 95, emphasis added). It is perhaps useful, while reading Baroque d’aube, to recall in passing this Journal intime published almost fifteen years earlier, in which the author plays with autoreferentiality, metatextuality and temporality to produce a dynamic and heterogeneous text of which Barbara Havercroft writes: Si Brossard se sert de ces écarts temporels pour revoir les contraintes du journal intime, pour explorer les divers rapports entre le langage, le “réel” et la fiction, et poursuivre sa quête identitaire – à travers le mélange du passé, du présent et du futur – elle l’utilise également pour construire une sorte de temporalité au féminin [. . .] les sauts dans le temps. [. . .] Ainsi les rapports entre

94 Memory and Imagination in the Writings of Nicole Brossard

les écarts énonciatifs et temporels témoignent des relations entre les femmes, passées et présentes, pour former une généalogie au féminin. (Havercroft 1996, 29) In Baroque d’aube the author clearly seems engaged in a similar “quête identitaire” and again in the potential construction and projection of a “généalogie au féminin.” Yet how are we to read this genealogy? The mother-daughter filiations of authors and characters in Baroque d’aube inevitably produce a crisis of memory, for as each instance of creation or generation is/has been/will be in turn created or generated, so each moment of remembering is itself contained in memory. For Brossard, this crisis of memory does not, however, imply a threat to coherent existence or the confounding and subversion of the “quête identitaire.”Onthecontrary,itsuggeststhevitalandinterconnectedrolesof both memory and imagination within that quest. The complex and fluid genealogies of women writing in the novel open up the possibility of future generations and remind us that for Brossard writing is a way for women to realize their existence.10 Brossard’s fictions are memorializing not in the sense of erecting a memorial in the place of loss (a gesture that would essentially reify the past and give death a convincing finality), but rather in the sense of actualizing the dynamic process of living memory. Brossard’s memorializing fictions enable her to “négocier avec la réalité” (Brossard 1998b, 30) in order to “draw nearer to what really counts” (M, 44). In these ongoing negotiations, she writes always to “faire acte de présence dans la langue. Pour que le vivantl’emporte”(Brossard1998b,132,myemphasis).Memorializingand fiction-making are, for Nicole Brossard, not about death but about living. As she observes in her poem “Ultrasons”: “La prose dit que rien ne meurt vraiment” (Brossard 1992a, 48).11

Thresholds of Memory Concrete memorials erected in the place of loss do nevertheless figure in Baroque d’aube: there occur in the novel no fewer than six visits to cemeteries.12 As monuments to loss, cemeteries might be considered mere vantage points from which to witness “une suite de mortalités” (BA, 64), the progressive decomposition of bodies, tombstones and eventually even the memories that make sense of these. But in Brossard’s novel, the cemetery is clearly not just a place of loss and a repository of relics and reminders, but a threshold. As a privileged locus of personal and collective memory, it is a place of temporal intersection, a place where the living go to remember the dead.13 Here “[l]a vie recommence avec ses dates de naissance, ses noms de baptême et d’épouses.” Here “[l]e temps œuvre, rongeur qui construit son futur,” and Cybil “regarde au loin pendant que le vent du nord, pendant que le dé du désir […] soulève en elle l’extra des pensées permettant de naviguer entre les siècles” (BA, 63, my emphases).

95 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Wherever she travels, Cybil visits cemeteries because they are places open onto both the past and the future, places from which to carry on, to “prendre la relève” in the face of death: Dans un cimetière, on doit pouvoir prendre la relève du temps et des idées, du désir de vie, de tout ce qui entre dans les pensées et les images de chaque génération[…]. (BA, 64) The cemetery, where text and image stand in for bodies and tell the story of lives past, is a prime locus for figuring the tensions between presence and absence, permanence and decay. Cybil’s habit of photographing her living self among the tombs emphasizes these tensions. Ironically, in trying to capture on film the difference between life and death, Cybil can, of course, only approach an erasure of that difference, since a photograph is itself a kind of memorial. But the taking of these photographs nevertheless marks the “present” moment (and the living presence of Cybil in the cemetery) as memorable. Cybil’s photography reminds us that memorials are not merely placemarkers for the missing past; they exist because of the human will to keep on remembering. The cemetery serves then as a place for mourning the dead and recalling the past, but also for surviving that past and venturing into an as yet undetermined future. When Cybil, at the end of one of her cemetery visits, takes several photos “pour plus tard, quand elle voudra, elle ne sait pas encore quoi” (BA, 65), it is apparent that the vast and unpredictable potential of the future is a consequence of interactions of memory, desire and imagination in the present. Furthermore, cemeteries in Baroque d’aube are places of encounter and connection, especially among women. La Sixtine tells of having been taken by her first lover, the admiral’s wife, to visit the grave of that woman’s mother. Walking through the cemetery, the two women stop to read inscriptions and touch marble carvings, and at each stop the admiral’s wife tells La Sixtine stories. These stories lead the two women to become lovers, their intimate connection directly associated with the narrative communion that occurred in the face of, and in the place of, death. Similar associations of intimacy, mortality and narrative are suggested in the other cemetery visits in the novel. Cybil’s sojourns with her friends Jasmine and Lay both include visits to cemeteries and important conversations about life and death. Even when Cybil goes unaccompanied to Père-Lachaise and to the cemetery in Buenos Aires, she is not alone. In Père-Lachaise, she asks a strangertotakeherpictureandsmilesforthephoto“commesielleavaitpris le bras de Proust, ou senti la main de Stein sur son épaule” (BA, 64). In Buenos Aires, she approaches and crosses paths with two women: “Du coin de l’œil, tu devines que les deux femmes, les deux femmes se sont rapprochées, répétant le même geste” (BA, 113, emphasis in original). This image of two women coming together in a cemetery might be read as a mise en abyme of the novel as a whole.

96 Memory and Imagination in the Writings of Nicole Brossard

The emblematic nature of Cybil’s encounter with the two women in the cemetery in Buenos Aires is further suggested by the fact that it is in the context of this scene that the word “baroque” first appears in the text, explicitly connecting the episode to the larger story that contains it. Moreover, if we examine Brossard’s use of “baroque” in the novel, we find that the novel’s title, like the cemetery, indicates a threshold between loss and possibility. In a 1982 interview discussing her book Picture Theory, Nicole Brossard was asked by the editors of La nouvelle barre du jour whether one might not characterize that novel as “baroque.” After all, they suggested, is not one of the hallmarks of the baroque “la mouvance, le changement de perspective”? (Brossard 1982, 193). Brossard rejected such a definition, noting that for her baroque implied an imprecision that did not at all correspond to the kind of sharply changing perspectives inscribed in her work: “À l’analyse,” she added, “on verrait peut-être des correspondences avec le baroque mais dans ma pratique et mon circuit imaginaire, le baroque n’est pas intervenu comme inspiration” (Brossard 1982, 193-4). Thirteen years later Brossard published Baroque d’aube, a novel which might in certain ways be read as a transfigured version, an avatar, of Picture Theory. Before the final section, “Hologramme,” of Picture Theory, one passage seems strikingly to prefigure the voyage and project of Cybil Noland, Irène Mage and Occident Desrives in Baroque d’aube: L’utopie luit dans mes yeux. La langue fiévreuse comme un recours polysémique. [. . .] Je glisse hors-lieu-dit emportée par la pensée d’une femme convergente. Tranche anatomique de l’imaginaire: être coupée des villes linéaires pour entreprendre mon rêve dans la durée, casquée, virtuelle comme celle qui rassemble un jour ses connaissances pour un livre. (Brossard 1989 [1982], 188) And the inaugural scene in Baroque d’aube could be read as a version of the unnarratable “scène blanche” of women’s desire and pleasure that, in Picture Theory, was approached again and again à la dérive and through abstraction. What might it mean, then, to write Picture Theory under the sign of the baroque?14 In a sense, Brossard gives us the answer to this question in her interview with la nouvelle barre du jour. When the editors commented on her “résistance devant le mot baroque,” she elaborated as follows: Je vois le baroque comme une grande exubérance, de relief et de forme. Si on fonctionne avec l’hologramme, c’est le sentiment du relief, et non pas le relief en tant que tel, qui prédomine. C’est un jeu d’images virtuelles et réelles. Simplement le fait de penser en terme d’hologramme et de laser (de lumière cohérente), cela nous place dans un tout autre type de rapports à la réalité, des rapports aux formes, qui transforme notre impression du monde, la connaissance, le savoir et l’illusion du monde. [. . .] Je crois qu’il

97 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

faut faire attention de ne pas connoter des sensations inédites du 20ème et du 21ème siècle avec d’autres sensations qui relèvent d’une toute autre pratique du corps dans l’espace, de l’oeil et conséquemment de l’imaginaire. (Brossard 1982, 194-5) In her latest novel, Brossard is explicitly and purposely juxtaposing the “sensations inédites” of her holographic vision with the very different “pratique du corps” of the baroque. Brossard’s baroque is generally associated with the ways in which the past inscribes itself as excess upon the present. Its excesses take many forms: exuberance, spectacle, hyperbole, nostalgia, clichés of love and death, goût de l’infini. Thus the Buenos Aires cemetery is presented as baroque spectacle: Tu pourrais décrire avec précision chaque mouvement qui te rapproche du cimetière. Tous les clichés de l’amour et de la mort rassemblés au pied des statues te ramènent à la vie. [. . .] À l’entrée: des fleurs. Tu franchis le portail. Le mot baroque s’installe dans tes pensées. Te voilà entre les tombes parmi les anges, les cippes et les seaux de chaux. (BA, 113) Similarly, the padre Sinocchio’s description of the “magnifiques spécimensbaroques”tobefoundinArgentinaemphasizestheirspectacular and excessive nature: Le baroque, oh! la belle mine de spectacles. Saviez-vous, mademoiselle Noland que [here he quotes Gerard de Cortanze:] “l’ensemble de la pensée baroque, animé par la nostalgie du Paradis Perdu (d’Ors) hésite entre le Chaos et le Cosmos”? [Sinocchio then continues:] Hyperboles, métaphores, goût de l’infini, vous ne vous ennuierez pas si vous écoutez votre cœur baroque. (BA, 154-5) In both of these examples the baroque is at the same time clearly associated with memory and memorializing, whether in the form of funerary statuary or the architectural spectacles inspired by a nostalgic desire for a lost Paradise. But this is precisely the kind of memorializing that suggests a present absorbed by the past and a memory process devoid of any “actualizing” potential. We might even recognize these baroque spectacles in a description that Pierre Nora gives of his lieux de mémoire: “moments of history torn away from the movement of history, then returned; no longer quite life, not yet death, like shells on the shore when the sea of living memory has receded” (Nora 1989, 12). But just as Nora’s lieu is, paradoxically, not only “a site of excess closed upon itself, concentrated in its own name, but also forever open to the full range of its possible significations” (Nora 1989, 24), so is Brossard’s baroque radically inflected—by the dawn of the title and by the women coming together throughout the novel—so as to contest its own memorializing limits. A curious and unlikely joining of the past’s leftovers and hints of a possible future, Baroque d’aube reminds us that twilight and daybreak may sometimes be virtually impossible to tell apart.

98 Memory and Imagination in the Writings of Nicole Brossard

Thinking Future Il fallait tourner la langue vers le futur… (BA, 142) In the end, the balance is tipped toward the dawn as a consequence of the imaginative leap that Brossard associates always with writing. In “Memory: Hologram of Desire,” Brossard called writing a “voyage without end”: [W]riting is what always returns to seek me out, warding off death and stupidity, fear and violence. Writing never lets me forget that if life has meaning, somewhere, it is in what we invent with our very lives, with the very aura of some words which, within us, form sequences of truth. (M, 47)15 The language of this simple statement is telling: “writing never lets me forget.” Writing, in other words, is a way to bring together the time of memory and the time of imagination in order to make sense of both present and future. It is this synthesis of memory and imagination, of lives and language, that Alice Parker characterizes as “mythic” in describing Brossard’s most recent work: “Baroque d’aube has the energy of mythic dimensions, of cosmic discoveries that link what appears radically new to what we have always known” (Parker 2001, ms. 12). When Brossard says that any meaning in our lives is located in what we invent with them, she is talking about what she has elsewhere called the “cortex” (“corps/texte”).16 Identifying “sequences of truth” with the coming together of bodies and language—and with the coming together of women in bodies and in language—she emphasizes the essential connection for her between women’s lives and writing. As Parker has noted: “For Brossard everything depends on the act of writing” (185), and in the “spaces of possibility” opened up in the consciousness of women, “any woman has the potential to write, to create, to intervene in language” (189). For Brossard, the boundaries between body and language/text are fluid. “Cortex” says this, but so does “langue,” another potent word in the Brossardian lexical and conceptual universe.17 The opening scene of Baroque d’aube is emblematic of what it means in the “corps/texte” to “tourner la langue vers le futur.” But this scene of women coming together in body and in text is also contained in the “conclusions” of both Le désert mauve and Baroque d’aube. In both novels, the possibility of turning “la langue” towards the future is inscribed in the endurance of connection and the persistence of desire. In Le désert mauve, the translator Maude Laures gestures (in her own tongue) beyond the original catastrophic conclusion to offer a “horizon” to Mélanie’s gaze (DM, 220). In Baroque d’aube, the two women at the end (again, writer and translator) “ne sav[ent] pas comment arrêter de penser futur” (BA, 242). Their physical and textual bodies come together in “un seul corps pour composer avec la jeune lumière du jour” (260), and questions return, questions that open up the future of this coming together to as yet unimagined possibilities. Posing itself on the ending’s

99 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes brink, in a concerted determination to survive that ending, a final question looks beyond its own utterance to ask (as two women are always asking themselves and each other as they head together into the “espace inédit” of a shared past and future): “Qu’allons-nous chercher là dans le réflexe du rapprochement?” (260).

Notes 1. References to Brossard’s Baroque d’aube are indicated in the text as BA followed by page numbers. References to Le désert mauve are indicated as DM followed by page numbers. 2. Brossard’s use of the word “gyn/écologique” is an explicit reference to Mary Daly’s radical feminist treatise Gyn/Ecology. In this seminal work, Daly coins the term “gyn/ecology” to evoke the complexity and interconnectedness of the myriad aspects of women’s relationship to their environment: “gyn/ecology is about women living, loving, creating our Selves, our cosmos […] Gyn/Ecology affirms that everything is connected” (11). 3. References in the present article to the English version of this essay, “Memory: Hologram of Desire” (published in Trivia, Fall 1988, and translated by Lucille Nelson) are indicated in the text as M followed by page numbers. The original French version of this essay was published in La Parole Métèque. A revised version in French, “Mémoire: hologramme du désir,” is forthcoming in a special issue of Québec Studies on memory. 4. Alice Parker aptly notes that Brossard’s novel Le désert mauve, published two years before the Polytechnique massacre took place, seems eerily to have anticipated and prefigured that slaughter (Parker 1998, 152). Parker describes the male figure in Brossard’s novel, l’homme long, as “an emblem of phallic power and in-difference to the planet and its inhabitants” (155). I similarly suggest in my reading of Le désert mauve in Incriminations: Guilty Women/Telling Stories, that l’homme long is, by virtue of his anonymity and universality, an emblematic figure for pandemic, phallocentric violence and destruction (McPherson 1994, 163-165). He is also, Brossard hastens to remind us, all too real. One of the most striking moments in the novel is when Brossard has fictional author Laure Angstelle respond to fictional character Angela Parkins’s question about why Angstelle could not have made the story turn out differently. Why couldn’t author Angstelle keep l’homme long from killing Angela Parkins? The answer is chillingly simple: “Cet homme existe” (DM, 142). 5. In Incriminations, I analyze the significance of these particular passages in Le désert mauve (McPherson 1994, 176). See also one of Brossard’s earliest articulations of the idea of changing the course of History in her essay “La lettre aérienne” (Brossard 1985b [1980], 66). The idea returns in Baroque d’aube, where Cybil recalls a time when “il était alors possible de faire des sauts joyeux dans l’histoire et d’en changer le cours” (BA, 123). Although this is first presented (nostalgically) as a lost and naive possibility, the dynamic rewritings throughout the novel suggest precisely such “sauts joyeux.” The idea is not to return to the past but to dive into the present of history. 6. In a special issue of Voix et images devoted to “Effets autobiographiques au féminin,” Barbara Havercroft and Julie LeBlanc (1996) note that in the course of the last twenty-five years women have transformed literary and autobiographical genres whether “sous forme de récit autobiographique, de livre de souvenirs, de

100 Memory and Imagination in the Writings of Nicole Brossard

mémoires, de journal intime (« réel » ou fictif), de poème en prose, de roman ou de récit autobiographique fictif ou même de journaux intimes enchâssés dans des romans” (8). 7. Recent works touching on questions of the relationship between memory and narration include Mark Philip Freeman, Rewriting the Self: History, Memory, Narrative (Routledge, 1993); James Olney, Memory and Narrative: The Weave of Life-Writing (University of Chicago Press, 1998); and Narrative and Genre (Routledge Studies in Memory and Narrative), eds. Mary Chamberlain and Paul Richard Thompson (Routledge, 1998). 8. A slightly tongue-in-cheek reference to the fact that a generation of Quebec writers (among them Brossard) who wrote for La barre du jour in the late 1960s described themselves as “résolument moderne.” 9. Such ontological and narratological indeterminacy is manifest throughout the novel. One could equally well cite the doubling and unstable ontological status of “Cybil Noland,” not to mention the dizzying effects of the fact that the protagonists invented by novelist Cybil Noland are in turn novelists inventing women protagonists who write. 10. Noting that it was through “La fiction de l’Homme” that women became “fictives,” Brossard declared: “sortons de la fiction par la fiction. Nous existerons dans le récit que nous inventerons” (Brossard 1998b, 98). 11. This passage recurs in She would be the first sentence of my next novel / Elle serait la première phrase de mon prochain roman (Brossard 1998b, 50). 12. BA, 34, 63, 64, 66-7, 106, 112-13. 13. Nora notes that “lieux de mémoire” are lieux in “three senses of the word—material, symbolic, and functional” and that there must, above all, be a “will to remember” (Nora 1989, 18-19). The cemetery is precisely such a place. 14. The formulation of this question is not meant to imply that Baroque d’aube is a rewriting of Picture Theory, nor that the later novel is subsumed under the baroque. I am suggesting, rather, that inasmuch as the later novel might be said to represent a transfiguration of some aspects of the earlier one, this re-presentation is carried out quite literally under the sign “Baroque d’aube.” It is also important to recognize that the baroque that materializes in the title of Baroque d’aube was already present in Picture Theory, though not, perhaps, in the way that the editors of la nouvelle barre du jour seemed to be suggesting. The following passage from Picture Theory might be read as prefiguring the juxtaposition within the title of Brossard’s later novel: “Aux prises avec le livre, baroquante. […] la poésie traverse le quotidien millénaire pour revenir à l’idée d’elle que je poursuis bien au-delà de mon penchant naturel, elle qui pré-occupait la pensée a vu venir les mots comme de prévisibles attentats et elle en changea le cours” (188, underlining in the original, emphases mine). 15. This passage also occurs near the end of the text of a lecture called “L’Écriture comme trajectoire du désir et de la conscience” that Brossard delivered in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia in May 1988. That lecture was translated into English by Alice Parker and published as “Writing as a Trajectory of Desire and Consciousness” (Brossard, 1992b). In Liminal Visions of Nicole Brossard, Parker (1998) gives a penetrating reading of this paper, citing this particular passage in the French of the original manuscript. 16. See Brossard, “Le cortex exubérant” (1974). Parker (1998) gives a good account of Brossard’s concept of the “cortex” (60, 62, 79) and discusses at some length the corporeal nature of Brossard’s writing of desire (especially 191-211), referring to the “corporeality of [Brossard’s] textual practice” (202), and noting further that

101 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

her “corporeal writing” suggests, among other things, “the feminist project of writing and theorizing the body [and the] emphasis on embodiment which remains an important aspect of textuality” (192). 17. Brossard’s incomparable love poem “Sous la langue” (1987b) is, in my opinion, the quintessential instance of “langue” in the Brossardian (or any) corpus.

Works Cited Brossard, Nicole. 1974. “Le cortex exubérant.” La barre du jour 44: 2-22. ——. 1982. “Entretien avec Nicole Brossard sur Picture Theory.” la nouvelle barre du jour 118-119: 117-201. ——. 1985a (1980). “Les traces du manifeste,” excerpt reprinted in La lettre aérienne. (Montréal: Éditions du remue-ménage): 69. ——. 1985b (1980). “La lettre aérienne.” La lettre aérienne. (Montréal: Éditions du remue-ménage): 43-67. ——. 1985c (1982). “Synchronie.” La lettre aérienne. (Montréal: Éditions du remue-ménage): 79-84. ——. 1987a. Le désert mauve [DM]. (Montréal: l’Hexagone). ——. 1987b. Sous la langue/Under Tongue. Bilingual edition. Translated by Susanne de Lotbinière-Harwood. (Montreal: L’Essentielle and Ragweed Press). ——. 1988. “Memory: Hologram of Desire.” [M] Trivia: A Journal of Ideas vol 13: 42-47. ——. 1989 (1982). Picture Theory. (Montréal: l’Hexagone). ——. 1990. “Le tueur n’était pas un jeune homme” and “6 décembre 1989 parmi les siècles” in Louise Malette and Marie Chalouh, eds. Polytechnique, 6 décembre (Charlottetown, PEI: gynergy books): 29-30 and 91-101. ——. 1992a. “Ultrasons.” La nuit verte du parc labyrinthe. (Laval, Québec: Trois). ——. 1992b. “L’écriture comme trajectoire du désir et de la conscience.” Trans. by Alice Parker as “Writing as a Trajectory of Desire and Consciousness” in Alice Parker and Elizabeth Meese, eds. Feminist Critical Negotiations (Amsterdam: John Benjamins). ——. 1995. Baroque d’aube [BA]. (Montréal: l’Hexagone). ——. 1997. Vertige de l’avant-scène. (Trois-Rivières, Québec: Écrits des forges). ——. 1998a. (1984). Journal intime suivi de Œuvre de chair et métonymies (Montréal: Herbes rouges). ——. 1998b. She would be the first sentence of my next novel / Elle serait la première phrase de mon prochain roman. (Toronto: Mercury Press). Daly, Mary. 1990 (1978). Gyn/Ecology. (Boston: Beacon Press). Davis, Natalie Zemon and Randolph Starn. 1989. “Introduction,” Representations 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory: 1-6. Dupré, Louise. 1989. Stratégies du vertige. (Montréal: Éditions du remue-ménage). Havercroft, Barbara. 1996. “Hétérogénéité énonciative et renouvellement du genre: le Journal intime de Nicole Brossard.” Voix et Images 64: 22-37. Havercroft, Barbara, and Julie LeBlanc. 1996. “Présentation.” Voix et Images 64: 6-9. McPherson, Karen S. 1994. Incriminations: Guilty Women/Telling Stories. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Nora, Pierre. 1989. “Between Memory and History: Les lieux de mémoire.” Representations 26: 7-25. Parker, Alice. 1998. Liminal Visions of Nicole Brossard. (New York: Peter Lang). ——. 2001. “Myth and Memory in Nicole Brossard’s Baroque d’aube and Vertige de l’avant-scène” forthcoming in Paula Gilbert & Roseanna Dufault, eds. Doing Gender: Franco-Canadian Women Writers of the 1990s (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press). Terdiman, Richard. 1993. Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Winterson, Jeannette. 1994. Art and Lies. (New York: Vintage).

102 Kanaté Dahouda

Aimé Césaire, Paul Chamberland et le pays de l’exil

Résumé Dans le contexte d’effervescence politique et littéraire des années soixante, au Québec, l’œuvre d’Aimé Césaire (Martinique) sert de source d’inspiration à l’écrivain québécois Paul Chamberland. Il existe cependant très peu d’études entre ces deux poètes francophones. Cette raison est à l’origine de cet article, qui se propose d’établir des parallélismes entre la poésie de Césaire et celle de Chamberland. Suivant cette perspective, nous montrerons que le pays natal est, selon une vision personnelle, circonscrit dans leurs œuvres poétiques comme figure d’exil, comme forme d’une dissonance sociale à laquelle les deux auteurs tentent d’échapper par le recours à une mémoire identitaire.

Abstract During the intense literary and political period of the sixties in Quebec, the works of Aimé Césaire (Martinican writer) were a source of inspiration for Paul Chamberland (Québécois writer). However, there are very few studies connecting Césaire and Chamberland. In an effort to fill that gap, this article will draw parallels between selected works of these two Francophone poets. Building on this double perspective, we will demonstrate how the homeland of each writer emerges in their respective poetic visions as an image emblematic of exile, a form of social discord that both writers try to resolve by calling into play identity-conscious memory.

Bien des critiques ont noté la présence du phénomène de l’exil dans la littérature des Antilles et dans celle du Québec. Dans un article consacré à Césaire, Michael Dash, par exemple, relève que « l’évolution de la poésie antillaise est étroitement liée à l’idée de l’exil » (Aimé Césaire ou l’athanor d’unalchimiste,157).Cetteidéedel’exil,PierreNepveul’identifie,poursa part, sous la forme d’une métaphore filée dans la conscience littéraire québécoise « où elle trouve, selon lui, des appuis chez Miron, Gilles Leclerc,Godbout,bientôtàPartipris»(L’écologieduréel,49).ChezAimé Césaire et Paul Chamberland, dont les œuvres respectives enrichissent singulièrement ces champs littéraires francophones, la figure de l’exil constitue un symbole clé de l’aventure poétique. À la faveur de l’intérêt manifesté, dans les années soixante, pour les pays africains et antillais en voie d’affranchissement et d’affirmation identitaire, la poésie d’Aimé Césaire inspire largement les écrivains québécois1 alors

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes préoccupés par une quête analogue, qui passait, de toute nécessité, par un recours à la fois symbolique et objectif à la terre natale. Voilà ce qui autorise Claude Beausoleil à écrire que « la poésie québécoise d’engagement nationaliste ne se développera pas en dehors de la fraternité et qu’elle entretiendra des signes d’analogie de thèmes et d’écritures avec d’autres poésies de la francophonie » (Le motif de l’identité dans la poésie québécoise, 67). À ce sujet, il convient de souligner que le poète québécois, Paul Chamberland, par exemple, n’omettra jamais de reconnaître sa redevance envers Césaire, de situer sa démarche artistique par rapport à celle du poète martiniquais.2 En effet, dans son fameux « dire ce que je suis », il écrit : « J’accomplis ce que Césaire appelle “un retour au pays natal” » (Un parti pris anthropologique, 178). Aussi en parcourant sa poésie, ne manque-t-on pas de rencontrer, sous des modalités personnelles, des thèmes généraux du pays qui font songer à l’œuvre du célèbre auteur antillais explorant les méandres infinis et les « replis profonds » du territoire natal. Il existe cependant très peu d’études consacrées à la fois à la poésie des deux écrivains francophones. À la suite de rares audaces antérieures3 et en considérant la métaphore de l’exil comme un point essentiel qui rapproche les deux poètes, cet article se propose un objectif précis : montrer, suivant une démarche parallèle, que Césaire et Chamberland recourent à cette figure pour appréhender le pays natal comme forme d’une carence, d’une dissonance existentielle qu’ils cherchent à sublimer dans un effort de transcendance. Danslapoursuitedecetobjectif,sixrecueilsdepoèmesnousservirontde base d’analyse4 : d’une part, nous avons le Cahier d’un retour au pays natal 1939 (1983), Ferrements (1960) et moi, laminaire… (1982) de Césaire; d’autre part, Terre Québec (1964), L’afficheur hurle (1964) et L’inavouable (1967) de Chamberland. Le choix de ces textes repose sur le fait que les aspects de la problématique du pays énoncés dans leurs différents réseaux d’images présentent des points de parallélisme, dont nous voulons étudier les fonctions sociales relativement à deux grands axes de réflexion: le pays sera d’abord perçu sous le sceau d’une temporalité négative avant d’être examiné, en l’occurrence, comme un motif qui se déploie dans un imaginaire nostalgique et utopique.

Le pays dans les dimensions négatives du temps Chez les deux poètes, cette temporalité négative se manifeste d’abord par une sombre représentation du présent que reflète le pays natal dans sa situation d’exil. L’écoulement infini de ce temps est chargé des déboires physiques et moraux vécus par les collectivités qui habitent l’univers social.

104 Aimé Césaire, Paul Chamberland et le pays de l’exil

En effet, le pays natal que Césaire nous fait découvrir correspond à un espace installé dans les dimensions d’un temps affecté par les rigueurs quotidiennes de la colonisation; un temps existentiel qui s’écoule comme un « fleuve de vie / désespérément torpide dans son lit, sans turgescence / ni dépression, incertain de fluer, lamentablement, / vide, la lourde impartialité de l’ennui, répartissant / l’ombre sur toutes choses égales, l’air stagnant sans / une trouée d’oiseau clair » (Cahier, 17). Cette vision désolante de la réalitémartiniquaise,voireantillaiseestnourrieparlefaitquel’écoulement du temps présent est ressenti par le poète comme une expérience malheureuse. La vie se déroule au pays natal sous le signe de la stérilité et de la monotonie, de la déchéance et de la lourdeur. Tout se passe comme si le mouvement de la vie antillaise se trouvait alourdi et ralenti par le poids d’un temps morne et vorace sous lequel toute perspective d’avenir semble promise à l’échec. À l’instar du poète martiniquais, Chamberland voit, lui aussi, le pays, la Terre Québec, sous un jour obscur, dans la lumière terne d’un soleil dont la pâleur reflète le visage crispé du temps vécu dans les dimensions de la patrie. Une telle perception de l’espace natal s’exerce sous le signe d’une figure féminine qui se conjugue avec celle d’une femme que le poète habite comme « la demeure du temps » (L’afficheur hurle, 34). Cette figure de la femme constitue en effet un baromètre essentiel qui permet au poète de prendre l’humeur du temps inspiré par les détresses éprouvées sur la terre natale : « femme saisie et possédée dans le filet des heures / où je t’aime mal comme un homme pressé comme un / homme accablé d’un pays de mauvaise vie » (L’afficheur hurle, 33). Le sujet énonciateur ressent ici l’espace du pays, plus précisément la femme-pays, comme le lieu d’une existence rugueuse qui passe au rythme d’un présent fait d’embâcle et de désespoir. Chez Chamberland comme chez Césaire, ce temps subjectif correspond assurément à un temps d’exil : des moments pénibles durant lesquels ces poètes cernent, jour après jour,le destin malheureux de leur pays à travers des tourments individuels et collectifs. Dans la poésie des deux écrivains, l’imaginaire du temps participe également d’une véritable cosmologie qui fait que la mesure du temps propre au pays natal est, par ailleurs, évaluée au travers des mouvements hostiles de la nature. Aussi, chez Césaire, l’espace d’origine se délite-t-il, soit sous les morsures d’un soleil ardent, soit dans le flanc d’une nuit tantôt gluante tantôt carnivore, quand il n’avance pas au rythme d’un jour marqué du fer rouge de choses sombrées. Le pays se trouve ainsi impliqué et pris dans les vrilles d’un temps tressé de souffrances et de douleurs. Cette figure du temps, qui correspond à une image affligée de l’univers natal, est perçue par l’écrivain martiniquais comme « le non temps qui impose au temps la tyrannie de sa spatialité » (moi, laminaire…, 9).

105 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Chamberland saisit le passage de ce temps négatif à travers notamment l’étirement infini de l’hiver; longue nuit hivernale, dont la sévérité, voire la cruauté s’ouvre et s’étend sournoisement sur les blessures du pays natal. La condition d’exil du pays se donne à lire justement dans ce mouvement de la saison hivernale représentée, en l’occurrence, dans le champ poétique comme un être vivant tenant entre ses serres et ses ronces le destin des sujets québécois. Ce temps sombre du peuple s’incarne, par dérivation, dans les rigueurs du froid, de la glace et du gel pour traduire, sur le plan symbolique, les affres d’une vie sociale soumise aux formes aliénantes de l’idéologie dominante. Ce rythme de vie exprime donc la désolation d’un temps présent qui réfracte l’image déconfite et la figure crispée de la terre natale. Cette réalité inspire au poète québécois un sentiment de répulsion et de haine sous-tendu par la force d’un dur désir d’affirmation. Chamberland exprime de façon décisive ces pulsions opposées dans son projet d’écriture, qui correspond à un projet de vie : « Non, je n’aime pas ce que j’ai été, ce que je suis. Et je cherche passionnément à vouloir ce que je serai. Le présent m’est une brûlure, un coup de fouet; les hommes, les choses, l’espace et le temps me bousculent… » (Un parti pris anthropologique, 171). Chez Chamberland et Césaire, les tristes vicissitudes de la vie quotidienne sont donc appréhendées dans la conscience affective d’un temps présent à valeur négative : le temps de l’exil, et qui correspond à celui du mal être et du non être. Mais chez les deux poètes, cette situation déplorable n’est pas exclusivement liée aux affres du temps présent, elle se conjugue également au passé. En effet, la détresse du pays natal s’ordonne au fil d’un vécu quotidien éprouvant le poids du passé à travers de sombres évocations. Celles-ci perpétuent en fait le souvenir de drames tant individuels que collectifs auxquels Césaire et Chamberland sont confrontés dans l’intimité douloureuse de leur mémoire respective. Dans la poésie de Césaire, cette mémoire douloureuse recrée un triple cadre géographique (Afrique, Amérique, Europe)5 à l’intérieur duquel se lit le désastre sociohistorique du pays antillais. Celui-ci reflète un passé collectif caractérisé par les rapts et la déportation liés au phénomène de l’esclavage, par les dégradations subies dans les cales du bateau négrier, par les humiliations essuyées sur les champs de canne et de coton ainsi que par toutes sortes d’avilissements et de déchéances humaines éprouvés sous le régime colonial. Toutes ces épreuves vécues dans le passé du pays natal remontent à la conscience de l’écrivain martiniquais sous la forme d’un outrage inoubliable : « du fond du temps une insulte mémorable » (Ferrements, 17). La conscience douloureuse du poète se nourrit également des souvenirs de violences meurtrières et d’actes de cruauté (marquages des esclaves au fer rouge, mutilations des jarrets des marronneurs, lacérations des corps à

106 Aimé Césaire, Paul Chamberland et le pays de l’exil coups de fouets) qui ensanglantent la mémoire de l’écrivain : « Que de sang dans ma mémoire! Dans ma mémoire / sont des lagunes. Elles sont couvertes de têtes de / morts […] Ma mémoire est entourée de sa ceinture de cadavres! » (Cahier, 35). Ces visions funèbres du pays expriment la tragédie du peuple antillais à travers la représentation dramatique d’un passé collectif qui correspond à une terrible histoire que le poète ne peut mesurer qu’au compas de la souffrance humaine. La représentation négative du « pays mémoriel6 » n’est pas propre à la poésie de Césaire. Sous des modalités différentes, elle est également à l’œuvre dans l’aventure poétique de l’écrivain québécois. Souvenons-nous des récriminations de ce dernier contre son existence passée : « Je n’aime pas ce que j’ai été […] ». Mais alors que chez Césaire le temps tragique du pays natal se résorbe essentiellement dans des images avilissantes d’un passé collectif, chez Chamberland, la vision négative du passé va fondamentalement se matérialiser dans les saisons de l’enfance. La mémoire de l’enfance est en effet, sinon le lieu par excellence, du moins un espace privilégié auquel l’écrivain recourt pour métaphoriser, avec plus d’acuité, les déboires liés au passé de la terre natale. C’est à l’aune de cette mémoire écorchée qu’il perçoit l’aliénation et l’oppression du pays natal. En effet, quand le poète décide de retourner au cœur noir de sa terre, c’est-à-dire de « rebrousser pas à pas le chemin de nos blessures, remonter le cours de notre malheur… » (Terre Québec, 17), ce voyage au cœur sombre de la mémoire nous mène sur les chemins escarpés d’une mémoire de l’enfance où justement « tout le passé remonte à la bouche / avec un goût de fange et de honte enfantine » (L’inavouable, 65). Tout se passe comme si la mémoire de l’enfance renfermait, au sens figuré, les troubles et les perturbations inscrits originellement dans le passé négatif du pays natal. Chez Chamberland tout comme chez Césaire, la représentation négative des temps présent et passé propres au pays traduit la vision relative d’une condition natale enlisée dans une existence problématique. Les aspérités du temps présent cumulent ainsi avec les laideurs du passé pour traduire la situation d’exil propre à la vie du pays. Dans le souci d’échapper à l’aliénation éprouvée dans l’espace natal, les deux poètes s’inventent, à travers une dérive nostalgique, un espace-temps imaginaire où l’exil pourrait prendre fin. L’écriture de cette aventure invite le lecteur à un voyage au cœur d’un pays constituant, cette fois-ci, l’envers solaire du pays mémoriel, dont le caractère ombreux imposait l’exil. L’imaginaire du voyage, qui se déploie dans cette remémoration positive, s’approfondit corrélativement dans une vision utopique du pays natal.

Le pays comme dérive nostalgique et recours utopique La nostalgie s’exprime généralement dans une conscience insatisfaite ou malheureuse. Elle évoque à la fois un état et un sentiment causés par le

107 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes regret obsédant d’une réalité révolue. Elle peut être également déterminée par une condition qui déçoit une attente, celle, par exemple, d’un sujet éprouvant de la difficulté à se réaliser sous un temps asservi par un régime d’exil. Mais le recours nostalgique constitue l’envers de cette expérience vécue, puisqu’il soumet le sujet en question à un travail de mémoire ou d’imagination par lequel celui-ci tente justement de transcender les décep- tions et les humiliations du temps d’exil au profit d’un rêve évanescent. C’est d’ailleurs au nom de ce rêve que l’essayiste Chamberland, après une saison en enfer, s’avise de cette volonté de puissance : « l’évasion, c’est d’ailleurs tout jugé. Il faut faire sauter les prisons de l’intérieur lorsqu’on est enchaîné dans le seul lieu où l’on puisse vivre » (Un parti pris anthropologique, 171). Dans l’œuvre du poète, le lieu carcéral s’incarne soit dans une chambre hermétiquement close, soit dans le périmètre de l’enclos, géographies de l’interdiction, qui correspondent à l’univers d’une enfance reportant la mémoire vers un passé serti dans la tristesse et l’angoisse. En vue de s’arracher à l’écœurement inspiré par cette enfance assombrie par la grande main d’ombre des pouvoirs adventices, le poète adopte deux attitudes complémentaires. Tantôt, il s’ingénie à construire un éden intérieur au-delà de la demeure familiale : « enfant, je me créais des royaumes à volonté dans les champs / qui succédaient au jardin familial... » (L’inavouable, 20). Tantôt, il conçoit son paradis terrestre à travers une figure double qui lui fait découvrir la vie et les joies vives de l’enfance dont il a été frustré : « la fillette aux yeux clairs qui vient d’entrer dans le parc réinvente pour moi l’enfance… » (L’inavouable, 86-87). Dans les deux cas, l’instance énonciatrice se transporte hors du réel pour se poser dans un monde imaginaire où il vaut la peine de vivre. Dans l’ordre poétique, ce monde appartient à un passé personnel qui a une valeur compensatoire, puisqu’il constitue le lieu d’un refuge où le sujet du discours semble parvenir à une nouvelle conscience de soi et de la vie, au-delà des rudes réalités d’une enfance contrariée. On a ainsi deux moments de l’enfance dont l’un est le versant nocturne de l’autre, deux étapes d’une vie diamétralement opposées qui polarisent la conscience poétique. Les chassés-croisés du poète entre les différents moments de l’enfance correspondent à des aller-retour entre un temps rêvé, celui de l’enfance heureuse, et un temps pauvre, celui de l’enfance sombre, qui s’accom- plissent dans un impérieux désir d’enracinement existentiel où la quête du temps se conjugue avec la quête d’identité. Si chez Chamberland, cette dimension de la repossession de soi passe par le recours à un passé personnel qui se concrétise essentiellement dans la mémoire de l’enfance, chez Césaire, la recherche de l’enracinement va nous faire remonter le cours d’un passé collectif. Cette plongée dans le passé nous conduit dans une espèce de pays imaginaire où le poète

108 Aimé Césaire, Paul Chamberland et le pays de l’exil martiniquais projette les rêves communs frustrés par les avanies du temps colonial. Dans ce royaume imaginaire, le passé est en effet représenté comme le lieu où le pays natal triomphe du temps de l’exil, un lieu mythique où tous les possibles étouffés sont appelés à renaître dans l’innocence des premiers matins du monde. C’est l’Afrique qui épouse l’une des figures symboliques de ce passé. Dans ses œuvres poétiques en effet, l’écrivain martiniquais, transcendant le chaos d’une histoire collective douloureuse, construit dans un regret nostalgique « l’Afrique-mère, le continent perdu [avec connotation de paradis perdu] », pour reprendre les termes de Lilyan Kesteloot (1982 : 92). Si Césaire recourt généralement à cet espace pour faire « revivre l’éclaboussement d’or des instants favorisés » (Cahier, 13), c’est parce que celui-ci est le lieu emblématique d’une affirmation première, celle de la vie avant l’exil antillais. L’Afrique avant l’ère de l’invasion invite alors à un rêve nostalgique qui permet de se situer « hors des jours étrangers » (Ferrements, 81). La nostalgie confine ainsi à une évasion dans le passé qui correspond en quelque sorte à un retour aux sources visant à établir un lien identitaire entre le pays réel (La Martinique, voire les Antilles) et le pays imaginaire (l’Afrique). Le détour par l’Afrique participe donc d’un processus de ressourcement, duprojetdeconstruction«d’unemémoiredereconquêtedesracines»,pour reprendre des mots que Régine Robin utilise en d’autres circonstances (1989 : 101). Ce recours à l’origine possède, de façon concomitante, une saveur utopique, qui fera de l’Afrique une figure nostalgique nourrissant, en l’occurrence, la promesse du pays à fonder : le pays de l’avenir. En effet, les images liées à l’avenir antillais nous font, maintes fois, rebrousser chemin vers une Afrique représentée comme l’espace de référence qui doit sinon régénérer le nouveau monde, du moins lui inspirer l’image de la société à restaurer, « la vision mémorable du monde à bâtir » (Ferrements, 23). La ville que Césaire prophétise, belle (Cahier, 49) dans l’attente du temps de promission (Cahier, 31) celui dans lequel le futur déploiera toute la possible chevelure, épouse les couleurs d’un pays qui pousse sous un soleil nouveau (Ferrements, 83). Et ce pays se confond avec l’image d’une Afrique qui n’est plus au diamant du malheur (Ferrements, 85), mais qui enseigne aux îles antillaises les routes lumineuses de l’avenir. L’Afrique devient ainsi l’horizon lointain d’une quête, un lieu symbolique qui compense les rêves inassouvis, bref, un univers où l’espérance renaît : « la relanceicisefait/parleventquid’Afriquevient»(moi,laminaire…,41). Ceventderenouveauvenud’AfriquedoitdoncpermettreauxAntillesde renouer avec un temps heureux qui apparaît comme la limite dans laquelle doit s’épanouir l’aspiration à un mieux-être dans un monde meilleur; rêve

109 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes difficilement réalisable dans l’âpreté des jours d’exil vécus au présent du pays natal. Ce temps heureux, qui nous reporte à une image idéalisée de l’Afrique, se donne ainsi à lire comme des instants privilégiés où le pays antillais accède aux beautés du paradis terrestre, à défaut probablement des perfections du paradis céleste. Cette vision de l’Afrique est-elle conforme à la réalité qui surgit dans la fraîcheur d’un nouveau soleil à transmettre? Dans le contexte de la décolonisation des années soixante, le continent accouche certes de nouvelles Nations, que le poète perçoit comme des symboles d’espérance pour le pays antillais alors dominé. Mais il n’est pas moins vrai aussi que l’Afrique demeure, par endroits, au diamant de certains maux qui affectent durement ses peuples dans l’ordinaire des jours. S’il faut en croire Lilyan Kesteloot (1982 : 93), le poète n’ignore rien de ce contraste, il espère seulement que, par progression dialectique, l’ère des indépendances déboucherait sur une issue harmonieuse. Ce principe d’espérance fait de l’Afrique le lieu d’un rêve de grandeur susceptible de nourrir l’utopie de l’espace natal, c’est-à-dire un univers à partir duquel le dur destin des collectivités antillaises est projeté en avenir possible. Cette recomposition de la réalité n’est évidemment pas innocente, elle répond à un désir de transfiguration artistique visant sans doute à exorciser, sur le plan imaginaire, un sentiment de frustration personnelle et collective. On aura compris que l’utopie trahit un sentiment d’échec dans le rapport du poète au temps effectif à travers lequel s’écoulent les réalités du pays natal. Pour surmonter ce sentiment d’échec, l’auteur martiniquais s’invente un monde imaginaire, voire mythique, qui correspond tout simplement à un espace intérieur conforme à ses désirs. Tout comme Césaire, Chamberland recourt, lui aussi, à l’écriture utopique pour se créer un ordre différent du réel. Voilà qui ne saurait surprendre de la part d’un écrivain dont la poésie est animée par un vœu forcené qui fait signe au pays de l’avenir : « ah ce que j’ai désiré le paradis terrestre / désiré avec une concupiscence de cocu » (L’inavouable, 10). Pour accéder à cet éden, une exigence s’impose : il lui faut, dans la chaleur de l’amour, réinventer le jour pour saisir le monde nouveau dans la naissance d’un enfant, le nouvel Adam : « je tiens entre mes doigts ton cou lumière blessée biche / ton lever fit mon œil blessure et j’incante nos sources / à sourdre joie debout parmi la sève en chœur / le monde premier dans nos bras est un enfant qui s’éveille » (Terre Québec, 48). Chez Chamberland, l’avènement du pays idéal se produit dans la naissance du nouveau-né qui nous mène nécessairement au royaume de l’enfance. Ce royaume ne se confond évidemment pas avec le jardin- étouffoirenracinédanslaterrequiabritelesdéboiresdel’enfanceécorchée. Celui-ci nous renvoie plutôt à un univers peuplé d’arbres chanteurs (ou enchanteurs) anticipant l’image idyllique d’une société qui compense les

110 Aimé Césaire, Paul Chamberland et le pays de l’exil angoisses et les inquiétudes du temps existentiel, dans le bonheur et la félicité d’une ère nouvelle, où se réaliserait ce qui aurait pu ou dû être et n’a pas encore été. Il est remarquable que Chamberland ne reste pas en effet prisonnier d’un quelconque passé qui renvoie à un jadis merveilleux, obsédé qu’il est par le souci de féconder la terre natale, afin d’y faire germer puis éclore le futur rayonnant d’une nouvelle humanité québécoise; celle qui nourrit la raison d’être de la poétique d’existence qu’il énonce ici : « Notre seule raison d’agir comme québécois, et d’être québécois, plonge dans le futur d’un Québec libéré, là où il nous soit permis d’être homme. À notre tour nous nous exilons, mais dans l’avenir » (Un parti pris anthropologique, 28). L’imaginaire utopique de Chamberland et celui de Césaire présentent un point commun : ils prospèrent tous les deux sur les bases d’une frustration spécifique et d’une humiliation relative inspirées par un sentiment d’exil qu’ils’agitdetranscenderàtoutprixparuneimagepositivedupaysnatal. Mais une différence sépare la vision des deux écrivains : l’utopie de Césaire passe par la valorisation d’une figure originelle qui est logée dans un temps mythifié. En tant que modèle, cette figure inspire la vision mémorable du pays antillais à fonder. Quant à Chamberland, il accorde plutôt la précellence à l’avenir pour condamner les expériences vécues dans le présent au nom d’un principe d’espérance qui annonce l’émergence d’une société québécoise nouvelle, moins obsédée par la référence originelle. Dans le premier cas, nous parlons d’une utopie de référence, dans le second d’une utopie de rupture. Dans des textes relativement récents, l’utopie césairienne semble évoluer vers une nouvelle forme dont nous ne maîtrisons pas encore tous les contours. Ainsi dans un entretien accordé à Frédéric Bobin, Césaire, sans occulter entièrement la figure de l’Afrique, la référence des sources, parle plutôt d’inventer « une utopie refondatrice, mais sur une base fondamentale, l’identité martiniquaise, et en recourant, pour cela, à une nouvelle poussée éruptive de l’imagination martiniquaise » (Le monde, 1994). La perspective utopique semble avoir changé. L’Afrique n’est plus la référence dominante. Le regard est davantage interne, le point de repère fondamental étant maintenant défini à partir de la problématique martiniquaise. Sans parler de mutation complète, il y a évolution. Et ce progrès n’est pas sans rapport avec l’évolution de l’histoire d’une société martiniquaise qui vit au rythme de contingences actuelles, de défis nouveaux, tant sur le plan sociopolitique qu’aux niveaux économique et culturel. Dans le cas de Chamberland, on peut certainement parler de mutation sur l’axe de l’utopie, puisque le discours poétique fonctionne sur la base d’une double exigence : sortir d’une vision du passé caractérisée par le

111 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes conservatisme pour accéder à une nouvelle conscience de modernité orientée vers le futur. Double exigence dictée par le nouveau nationalisme québécois soucieux alors de passer justement « d’un paradigme de la survivance à un paradigme de l’émergence », selon la distinction de Gérard Bouchard (Les convergences culturelles dans les sociétés pluriethniques, 163). Au-delà de ces dernières considérations, soulignons que dans les œuvres poétiques examinées, l’inspiration utopique jouit d’une fonction précise, soit celle d’exorciser et de transcender le temps de l’exil vécu dans le giron du pays natal, à travers une opération compensatoire de l’imaginaire animée par un idéal : la quête de nouvelles modalités d’existence dans un espace pleinement suffisant pour épouser parfaitement la forme d’une « habitation possible, d’une fécondité humaine », pour emprunter une expression de Gilles Marcotte (Le temps des poètes, 217). Cet élan vers la vie répond assurément à un désir de plénitude, qui fait de Césaire et Chamberland des arpenteurs de rêves en quête d’une source d’épanouissement et de liberté : un lieu d’écriture où le pays natal ne serait plus affecté d’une aura d’impossibilité et n’inspirerait plus un sentiment d’incomplétude.

Notes 1. Gaston Miron est généralement considéré comme celui qui joue le rôle de passeur en faisant découvrir aux jeunes poètes québécois d’alors (ceux de l’Hexagone, puis de Parti pris) les œuvres des hérauts de la Négritude que furent Aimé Césaire et Léopold Sedar Senghor. 2. À ce sujet, lire Daniel Lafond, La manière nègre ou Aimé Césaire, chemin faisant. Montréal : L’Hexagone, 1993. 3. Suivant la perspective de la réception, Max Dorsinville, par exemple, esquisse des possibilités d’un rapprochement entre la poésie de Césaire et celle de Chamberland dans son livre Le pays natal. Essais sur les littératures du Tiers monde et du Québec. Dakar : Nouvelles éditions africaines, 1983. 4. D’autres textes poétiques d’Aimé Césaire et de Paul Chamberland auraient peut-être pu servir également d’objets d’analyse. Mais pour les besoins de notre étude et pour une question d’efficacité pratique, nous avons tenu à limiter notre choix à ces six recueils où, nous semble-t-il, la problématique de l’exil occupe une place centrale et majeure. 5. Il n’est peut-être pas inopportun de souligner à ce propos que l’exil de Césaire transcende en effet les limites étroites des Antilles. Cette réalité permet d’établir une distinction entre lui et le poète québécois Chamberland, qui demeure essentiellement une figure symbolique que l’on peut considérer comme un exilé de l’intérieur, du moins dans ses œuvres qui nous occupent. 6. Celui-ci fait référence au pays qui habite la mémoire du poète, le pays qui alimente, anime ses souvenirs. C’est aussi le pays qui nourrit ses réminiscences, positivement ou négativement.

112 Aimé Césaire, Paul Chamberland et le pays de l’exil

Références Beausoleil, Claude, Le motif de l’identité dans la poésie québécoise (1930-1995). Montréal : Estuaire, 1996. Bobin, Frédéric, « Entretien avec Aimé Césaire », dans Le Monde, 12 avril 1994. Bouchard, Gérard, « L’avenir de la nation comme “paradigme” de la société québécoise », dans Khadiyatoulah Fall et al., Les convergences culturelles dans les sociétés pluriethniques. Sainte-Foy : Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1996. Chamberland, Paul, Un parti pris anthropologique. Montréal : Parti pris, 1983. Dash, Michael, « Le bateau ivre césairien et la quête de la connaissance », dans Aimé Césaire ou l’athanor d’un alchimiste. Paris : Éditions caribéennes, 1987. Dorsinville, Max, Le pays natal. Essais sur les littératures du Tiers monde et du Québec. Dakar : Nouvelles éditions africaines, 1983. Kesteloot, Lilyan, Comprendre le Cahier d’un retour au pays natal. Issy les Molinaux : Éditions Saint-Paul, 1982. Lafond, Daniel, La manière nègre ou Aimé Césaire, chemin faisant. Montréal : L’Hexagone, 1993. Marcotte, Gilles, Le temps des poètes. Montréal : Éditions HMH, 1969. Nepveu, Pierre, L’écologie du réel. Mort et naissance de la littérature québécoise contemporaine. Montréal : Boréal, 1999 [1988]. Robin, Régine, Le roman mémoriel : de l’histoire à l’écriture du hors lieu. Montréal : Le Préambule, Collection « L’Univers des discours », 1989.

113

Yves Laberge

Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial

Résumé Durant la dernière moitié du 20e siècle, l’acceptation à l’échelle mondiale du Canada comme pays autonome s’est accompagnée de la reconnaissance internationale d’une partie de sa culture, perçue comme étant originale et spécifique. La comparaison des notices consacrées aux films canadiens dans différents ouvrages et manuels d’histoire du cinéma permet de mesurer l’évolution et la reconnaissance progressive de sa production cinémato- graphique, selon les auteurs et les époques, à l’extérieur du Canada. En général, les ouvrages d’histoire du cinéma publiés à l’étranger (en France, en Angleterre, aux États-Unis) traitaient très peu de la contribution canadienne. Beaucoup d’ouvrages anglo-saxons ont ignoré les œuvres des cinéastes canadiens de langue française, qui formaient pourtant le groupe le plus dynamique et le plus créatif entre 1960 et 1980. Parmi cette énorme quantité d’écrits sur le cinéma universel, les brèves mentions sur le cinéma canadien – provenant de différents pays – nous révèlent, au fil des décennies, une perception subjective et très changeante de la culture canadienne, d’abord perçue comme émanant d’une simple colonie britannique, puis, progres- sivement, d’une nation autonome. C’est seulement depuis les années 1980 que le Canada semble occuper une digne place dans les ouvrages généraux d’histoire du cinéma.

Abstract This article analyses more that ten foreign books about world film history, to see how Canadian films are portrayed, among other countries and national cinematographies. Most of these reference books, published either in France, USA and England, over half a century, mention almost nothing about Canada’s cinema, or they sometimes criticize Canadian cinema from subjective, approximative and partial points of view. Moreover, most books published in English ignore French films made by French-Canadian film makers, although these productions range among the best and most specific Canadian movies. Even top specialists and world-class film historians were not aware of Canadian cinema until the 1980s.

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

« No one knows my country, neither the stranger nor its own sons. (...) My country has not found itself nor felt its power nor learned its true place. It is all visions and doubts and hopes and dreams. » Bruce Hutchison, The Unknown Country. Canada and Her People, New York, Coward-McCann, 1942, p. 3.

Un satellite des États-Unis : le Canada Cette étude rend compte de la place relative du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial.1 L’importance de la contribution canadienne à ce pan de l’histoire culturelle peut sembler impossible à mesurer, mais certains indicateurs peuvent nous aider à décrire l’évolution de sa situation au fil des décennies. Plusieurs approches seraient possibles; nous n’en retiendrons qu’une. Nous distinguerons l’apport d’artistes canadiens ayant œuvré à l’étranger (un aspect que nous laissons de côté mais qui fera l’objet d’un prochain article) et l’évolution de l’industrie du cinéma au Canada, en considérant le rôle de satellite des États-Unis joué par le Canada, dès le début du 20e siècle, dans le domaine du cinéma. Plusieurs aspects seront présentés, en considérant d’abord l’impact de la consommation de films étrangers dans les salles canadiennes et (beaucoup plus tard) l’accueil critique des films canadiens auprès de l’auditoire international, surtout après 1960. Ensuite, et ceci sera le fil conducteur de cet article, nous proposerons une analyse des commentaires sur le Canada qui existent dans les divers manuels d’histoire du cinéma, publiés dans trois pays. Enfin, nous conclurons par quelques remarques à propos des raisons qui expliquent l’apparition tardive au pays d’une industrie de production de longs métrages, elle-même non étrangère à la reconnaissance tardive de la contribution canadienne à l’histoire du cinéma universel.

Méthodologie Afin de réfléchir et tenter, même approximativement, de mesurer – quantitativement et qualitativement – la place qu’a occupé le Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial au cours de la dernière moitié du 20e siècle, j’ai consulté des outils qui me sont familiers depuis plusieurs années dans mes enseignements et mes recherches en études cinématographiques : les ouvrages d’histoire du cinéma. Il en existe plus d’une vingtaine, en français et en anglais, sans parler de ceux rédigés par des auteurs en d’autres langues (que je n’ai pas consultés, mais qui pourraient sûrement offrir un point de vue complémentaire). Mon intuition initiale était la suivante : m’étant penché sur différents nationaux (France, Allemagne, Italie) dans le cadre d’autres recherches en histoire du cinéma, j’ai remarqué le peu de place généralement consacré (dans les livres de référence d’ambition

116 Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial internationale) à notre cinéma national, mais en même temps, je constatais que celui-ci recevait de plus en plus d’attention dans ce genre d’ouvrage, surtout depuis une dizaine d’années. Je voulais donc vérifier, sur une période d’une cinquantaine d’années, l’augmentation (ou du moins la variation) de la place accordée au Canada dans des livres d’histoire du cinéma, dont le but est de présenter l’évolution de la vie cinématographique dans le plus grand nombre de pays possible. L’ampleur et la proportion de ces commentaires par rapport aux autres pays étudiés auront évidemment autant d’importance que le contenu en soi (qualité de la documentation, favorabilité). On m’a quelquefois suggéré, durant la préparation de cet article, de ne pas oublier de traiter de certains pionniers du cinéma américain qui étaient nés au Canada, comme par exemple le réalisateur Mack Sennet, qui était né à Richmond au Québec en 1880, ou aux acteurs Glenn Ford (né à Québec en 1916), William Shatner (qui incarnait le personnage du Capitaine James T. Kirk dans la célèbre télésérie « Star Trek », reprise au cinéma), qui est natif de Montréal, le regretté John Candy (né à Toronto), le brillant Donald Sutherland (né à St-John, N.-B.) ou encore Dan Ackroyd (né à Ottawa). Ces suggestions bienveillantes visaient bien sûr à m’aider à rassembler tous les grands artisans de l’histoire du cinéma qui seraient en fait nés au Canada et qui seraient, pour la plupart, non seulement devenus célèbres à Hollywood, mais qui en outre ne seraient pour la plupart jamais revenus vivre dans leur première patrie. Ces Canadiens méconnus ont toujours passé pour des artistes nés aux États-Unis, comme d’ailleurs beaucoup de cinéastes émigrants nés en Europe mais ayant connu la célébrité loin de leur patrie : Chaplin, Hitchcock, Sternberg, Capra. Mais ce travail – énorme – d’identification des Canadiens devenus célèbres à Hollywood reste à faire. En fait, il me semble difficile de reconnaître en ces acteurs quelque chose de typiquement canadien, malgré l’apport sûrement non négligeable de leur carrière au cinéma américain. Autrement dit, comment reconnaître ces Canadiens ayant contribué ou apparaissant dans des films étrangers? Nous disposons depuis plusieurs années d’excellentes sources pour nous renseigner sur l’histoire du cinéma au Canada. Nous n’allons donc pas normalement chercher des renseignements à ce sujet dans les ouvrages généraux d’histoire du cinéma mondial. Ces ouvrages généraux – très bien diffusés et accessibles – publiés à l’extérieur du Canada seront étudiés ici. On constate pourtant que beaucoup de lecteurs trouvent d’abord des renseignements sur un cinéma national en consultant des ouvrages généraux plutôt que des monographies, ce qui illustre l’importance et l’influence de ces livres. Au lieu de tenter de reconstituer la trame de notre histoire du cinéma, ce que nous savons déjà assez bien à travers les recherches de plusieurs auteurs qui ont publié sur le cinéma québécois et canadien2, ou de tenter d’établir la liste des grands Canadiens au cinéma, j’ai voulu, dans un tout autre ordre d’idées, me pencher sur la perception étrangère de la contribution

117 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes canadienne à l’histoire mondiale du cinéma, telle qu’elle est racontée par des auteurs de référence dans ce domaine, dans des ouvrages publiés en France, en Angleterre, aux États-Unis. J’ai donc relu les classiques : les histoires générales du cinéma de Jean Mitry, Georges Sadoul, Paul Rotha, Robert Sklar et de quelques autres moins importants, afin de donner un aperçu de ce qui a été retenu du Canada dans les manuels considérés comme étant incontournables et qui constituent en quelque sorte « l’histoire officielle » du cinéma universel. Cette interprétation sera hautement subjective mais en même temps assez instructive, quant à l’image laissée par la culture canadienne à l’étanger. Avant de commencer, j’ajouterais deux remarques préliminaires. Il faut reconnaître que nos grands historiens du cinéma canadien écrivent depuis relativement peu : grosso modo, depuis les années 1950 pour les articles, et la fin des années 1960 pour les livres. De plus, ce sont les productions, et surtout les longs métrages de fiction (par opposition aux documentaires), qui retiennent l’attention de beaucoup d’historiens du cinéma et qui certifient la marque de l’existence d’une quelconque vie cinématogra- phique à un endroit donné. Longtemps réputé pour ses courts métrages d’animation et ses documentaires, le Canada, identifié de manière souvent exclusive à l’Office National du Film (ONF), ne pouvait que passer inaperçu auprès d’un large pan de l’auditoire international auquel on ne sert au contraire que des longs métrages de fiction, provenant généralement des États-Unis, de France, d’Italie et, dans une moindre mesure, d’autres pays européens. En fait, bon nombre d’historiens du cinéma n’ont retenu de filmographie canadienne que la pointe de l’iceberg, et le Canada compte, hélas, beaucoup d’icebergs! Les lignes qui suivent présentent chronologiquement quelques extraits tirés d’une dizaine d’ouvrages portant sur l’histoire du cinéma, en français puisenanglais,enretenanttouslespassagesoùilestquestionduCanada.

Résultats En France : quatre auteurs pour trois ouvrages monumentaux En 1958, René Jeanne et Charles Ford, deux auteurs français qui ont rédigé conjointement ou séparément des dizaines de monographies et de livres sur l’histoire du cinéma mondial, publient leur monumentale Histoire encyclopédique du cinéma, en cinq tomes. De cette somme considérable, un peu plus d’une page sera consacrée au Canada. Au tome 4, qui couvre les années 1929 à 1945, dans la dernière partie du chapitre portant sur l’Angleterre, les auteurs traitent des « Dominions », et dans cette énumération, le Canada précède même l’Australie et l’Inde. Les auteurs résument brièvement les activités ayant marqué les années 1940 : Il n’y aurait donc rien à dire du cinéma canadien des années 1940- 1945 si, dès le début de la guerre, le gouvernement d’Ottawa,

118 Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial

conscient de l’effort que le pays allait avoir à fournir et désireux de soutenir cet effort par tous les moyens possibles, n’avait créé un organisme chargé d’organiser une propagande cinématogra- phique : le National Film Board.3 Plus loin dans le chapitre, un minuscule paragraphe est consacré au cinéma australien. Les chauvins canadiens pourraient ainsi se consoler du mauvais traitement que le Canada a reçu en considérant le peu d’espace occupé par l’Océanie; or, ce paragraphe portant sur les films australiens nous heurtera tout autant, puisqu’il débute en ces termes : Ce qu’on pourrait dire du cinéma australien pendant la guerre serait encore moins intéressant que ce qui a été dit du cinéma canadien.4 Tentonsderetenirdececommentairetoutcequ’iladebon,sipossible... Au tome suivant, consacré aux années 1945-1955, René Jeanne et Charles Ford se penchent à nouveau sur les « Dominions », dans lesquels le Canada occupe dans ce cas près de quatre pages. On mentionne la sortie de quelqueslongsmétragescanadiens-français(dontUnHommeetsonpéché) et on souligne surtout l’essor de la « National Film Board » (ce qui nous rappelle qu’il n’existait pas encore de titre en français pour désigner l’organisme) avec pour seules mentions de cinéastes de cet organisme les Britanniques John Grierson et Norman MacLaren [sic].5 Quelques années plus tard, une version réduite de ces livres paraîtra en format de poche, mais ne comprendra que quelques brèves allusions au cinéma canadien, notamment lorsqu’il est question du documentaire et de l’école britannique.6 En outre, trois lignes de la chronologie située en fin de volume signalent pour l’année 1940 au Canada la fondation de l’ONF.7

Georges Sadoul le bienveillant Le tout aussi prolifique Georges Sadoul écrit, mais seulement à partir de la cinquième édition (datant de 1959) de son Histoire du cinéma universel8,le commentaire le plus détaillé, le plus bienveillant et le plus précis de tous les auteurs d’avant 1980, francophones et anglophones confondus. Dans cette brique de plus de 700 pages relatant la contribution de plus de cent pays à l’histoire du cinéma mondial, il consacre à la production canadienne... deux pages, soit à peu près autant qu’il en accorde à la production filmée de l’Indonésie, la Turquie ou à l’Afrique du Sud. Ces comparaisons ne visent pas à dénigrer les apports respectifs de ces pays, mais servent uniquement à montrer qu’en termes de contribution à l’histoire du cinéma, le Canada peut être comparé à des nations très différentes, auxquelles on ne le compare habituellement pas lorsqu’il s’agit d’autres aspects (économiques, historiques, sociaux). Répétons enfin que les éditions précédentes de ce livre important de Georges Sadoul ne comportaient aucune mention à propos de la production du Canada.

119 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Les remarques de Sadoul sont étonnamment justes pour l’époque. Il identifie la date du premier tournage connu ayant eu lieu au Canada (en juin 1896, aux Chutes Niagara) et les expériences innovatrices d’exploitation de salles de cinéma par Léo-Ernest Ouimet à Montréal en 1906. Il situe l’ère des premiers longs métrages tournés au Québec durant les années 1940 et mentionnequelquestitrespopulaires.9 Enoutre,ilnesurestimepas(comme la plupart des auteurs anglo-saxons) la place de l’ONF dans l’ensemble de la vie cinématographique canadienne.10 Enfin, dans l’édition définitive (la huitième) de ce livre datant de 1966 (l’année de la mort de Sadoul), il ajoute deux autres pages portant respectivement sur le cinéma direct (Brault, Perrault, Groulx, mais aussi Owen et Krotoir, au Canada-anglais) et sur le film d’animation (Norman McLaren).11 Si les commentaires de ce grand historien du cinéma portent d’abord sur lesœuvresnationales,iln’estpaspourautantaveugledevantleproblèmede l’omniprésence de films étrangers au Canada. Cette situation anormale explique en bonne partie non seulement l’inexistence d’une production canadienne, mais aussi l’invisibilité du Canada dans les livres d’histoire du cinéma d’avant 1970. Puisque la plupart des salles de cinéma du Canada appartiennent à des intérêts des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni, leurs propriétaires voudront inévitablement privilégier les productions de leurs affiliés, en évitant d’encourager sur un territoire déjà dominé une production nationale qui risquerait d’entrer en compétition avec la leur. Aujourd’hui encore, la conclusion de Sadoul mériterait d’être méditée pour sa clairvoyance, surtout du point de vue économique : « Il paraît difficile que la production se développe au Canada tant que ses principales salles resteront la propriété de firmes américaines (Paramount, avec 390 cinémas) oubritanniques(100sallesRank,aveclaparticipationdesÉtats-Unis).»12

Les jugements sévères de Jean Mitry Jean Mitry figure comme l’un des plus importants théoriciens et historiens du cinéma du 20e siècle. Il a publié des dizaines de livres et a même enseigné à l’Université de Montréal durant les années 1970. Dans le cinquième tome de son Histoire du cinéma, consacré au thème « Art et industrie », Jean Mitry ignore la période du muet au Canada et fait commencer notre histoire du cinéma au milieu des années 1930. À ce propos, il écrit13 que « [...] ni l’Office (l’Office national du film du Canada) – à l’exception des films de McLaren–nilesproducteursnefirentrienquivailleavant1950».Plusloin, à propos des premiers longs métrages de fiction tournés au Québec (comme LeCurédevillage,Séraphin),ilécritsansindulgenceque:«Plusieursfilms furent entrepris, tous plus médiocres les uns que les autres. »14 Plus loin, Mitry se sent presque forcé de mentionner les titres de certains des premiers longs métrages canadiens-français de la fin des années 1940 : « Pour terminer on citera par acquis de conscience les films produits au Canada par la Renaissance Film. » Il énumère quelques titres : Le Père

120 Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial

Chopin, Docteur Louise, Le Gros Bill, qu’il décrit comme « médiocre [...], bavard [...] et profondément ennuyeux. »15 Si on constate parfois une méconnaissance du cinéma du Canada dans les ouvrages de certains auteurs français, on remarquera en revanche une ignorance presque totale de la production canadienne dans beaucoup d’ouvrages publiés dans les pays anglo-saxons.

Les ouvrages anglophones en histoire du cinéma En Angleterre : Paul Rotha et Richard Griffith Du côté anglophone, les ouvrages d’histoire du cinéma mondial semblent plusnombreux,maisaussipluslaconiquesàproposducinémacanadien.La majorité de ces livres paraissent aux États-Unis, surtout après l’avènement du film parlant. En Angleterre, le cinéaste britannique Paul Rotha publiait en 1930 son pavé intitulé Film Till Now, qui ne contenait pas une ligne sur le Canada, à une époque où, il faut bien l’admettre, la production canadienne était pratiquement inexistante. Réédité en 1949, sa nouvelle préface mentionnait le Canada, en ne traitant uniquement que des courts métrages de l’ONF, une institution fondée par son ami personnel, John Grierson.16 L’épilogue de ce livre, rédigée en 1949 par Richard Griffith, comprenait aussi une page consacrée au Canada, dans la section « British Commonwealth»:onconstatequ’aucunfilmfrancophonen’estmentionné et qu’aucun réalisateur francophone n’est nommé (malgré le tournage d’une dizaine de longs métrages de fiction – dont deux en anglais – au Québec durant les années 1940); on s’attarde sur des courts métrages de cinq cinéastes (dont certains assez obscurs) : Colin Low, Wolf Koening, Julian Biggs, Norman McLaren et Sydney Furie. La production privée canadienne,demêmequelapédiodedumuet,sonttotalementignorées.17

Quelques Américains mal renseignés : Robinson, Kawin, Mast, Ellis, Cook C’est aux États-Unis que l’on a publié le plus grand nombre d’ouvrages généraux d’histoire du cinéma, et parmi ceux-ci, les plus incomplets. Nous ensignaleronsunedizaine,présentéschronologiquement.Dansunouvrage de plus de 400 pages intitulé The History of World Cinema, qui fut maintes fois réédité, le chercheur américain David Robinson réussit l’exploit de ne mentionner nulle part le Canada, sauf dans un paragraphe de son appendice, en complément de volume, intitulé « A Note on Animated Films », dans laquelle il indique au passage quelques courts métrages de Normand McLaren produits par l’ONF.18 Le professeur américain Gerald Mast (1940-1988), qui a enseigné au Richmond College de la City University of New Yorkpuis à l’Université de Chicago (où il avait reçu son doctorat), a publié en 1971 un ouvrage intitulé A Short History of the Movies, dans lequel il néglige totalement la

121 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes contribution canadienne. La réédition mise à jour de 1976 garde tout autant le silence à propos de la cinématographie canadienne, à l’exception d’une mention du film d’avant-garde Wavelength (1967) du cinéaste expérimental Michael Snow, qui n’est nulle part présenté comme étant Canadien.19 Toutefois la quatrième édition (de 1986) consacre une page (p. 486) sur 562 au cinéma canadien, en plus de fournir quelques références filmographiques et bibliographiques sur le cinéma canadien, dans la section « Emerging National Traditions 2 (1968-1985): Germany, Spain, Latin America, Africa, Australia, Canada ».20 La présentation du Canada (faite en seulement trois paragraphes) par Mast mériterait en soi une analyse complète, tant elle foisonne de préjugés et d’erreurs significatives dans ce qu’il nomme les handicaps culturels du cinéma canadien (« Cultural handicaps on a Canadian cinema »). D’abord, on y présente le Canada comme « une nation divisée, de deux cultures et deux langues »21. Non seulement l’auteur limite la contribution cinématographique canadienne d’avant 1960 aux seules productions anglophones de l’Office national du film (ONF), comme les films d’animation de Normand McLaren, mais sa liste des films marquants des années 1960 (qui inclut des œuvres mineures comme Nobody Waved Goodbye de Don Owen, et Outrageous! de Richard Benner) ne mentionne aucune œuvre de « cinéma direct » (le courant y est à peine signalé), ce qui constitue pourtant la principale contribution du Canada au cinéma.22 On peut affirmer que Mast était un chercheur consciencieux, mais vraiment mal renseigné à propos du Canada. Les quatre ouvrages sur le cinéma canadien indiqués en bibliographie sur le cinéma universel (de plusieurs dizaines de pages et comptant plusieurs centaines de titres) sont en soi significatifs. On y retrouve le recueil d’articles de Seth Feldman et Joyce Nelson, Canadian Film Reader (1977), l’essai de Martin Krelman, This Is Where We Came In: The Career and Character of Canadian Film (1978), le remarquable Embattled Shadows: A History of the Canadian Film (1895-1939) (1979) de Peter Morris, et la traduction anglaise du collectif dirigé par l’historien Pierre Véronneau, The Canadian Cinemas (1979).23 Ces ouvrages traitent très peu du Canada français. Dans une annexefilmographiquedulivredeMast,ontrouveunecatégorieportantsur « Australia and British Commonwealth » qui mentionne, dans la sous-catégorie « Commonwealth Miscellany », sept titres de longs métrages tournés par des cinéastes canadiens. Cette liste étonne autant par la médiocrité des titres retenus par Mast que par l’absence des films « importants ». Le manque de discernement y est flagrant, puisqu’on y trouve : Nobody Waved Goodbye (1964) de Don Owen, Goin’ Down the Road, (1970) de Don Shebib, The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz (1974) de Ted Kotcheff, Outrageous! (1977) de Richard Benner, Scanners (1981) de David Cronenberg, Ticket to Heaven (1981) de R. L. Thomas, The Grey Fox (1983) de Philipp Borsos.24 De cette liste approximative, on remarque qu’il n’y a aucun film tourné par un réalisateur québécois ou francophone

122 Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial

(ces œuvres qui dominaient nettement la production canadienne de cette époque ont pourtant été doublées en anglais), et qui compte uniquement des films dont les droits ont été achetés par des distributeurs des États-Unis. Autrement dit, selon cette logique, les œuvres étrangères devraient être accessibles aux États-Unis pour exister. On trouve ailleurs une confirmation supplémentaire de la mauvaise sélection de titres canadiens faite par Mast. Un autre ouvrage de référence plus complet et sérieux, le Guide des films (1990) de Jean Tulard, qui recense 10 000 longs métrages detous lespays, nefait aucune mention dessept titres «représentatifs »dela filmographie canadienne signalés par Mast, mais contient néanmoins une vingtaine de titres de films canadiens plus reconnus, de Family Viewing d’Atom Egoyan à Pour la suite du monde, de Pierre Perrault et Michel Brault.25 Une version revisée de l’ouvrage de Mast paraît chez un autre éditeur en 1996 (Allyn & Bacon), huit années après la mort de son auteur, dans une version augmentée de 150 pages (724 au lieu de 574 pages) et sous un titre légèrement différent, The Movies : AShort History. La révision est confiée à Bruce F. Kawin, de l’Université de Boulder au Colorado. Cette nouvelle édition comporte plusieurs mentions à la fois instructives et révélatrices, non pas tant sur le cinéma canadien que sur ce qui émerge de la culture canadienne et sur la représentation que des chercheurs étrangers peuvent se faire du Canada. Au début du cinquième chapitre, pour la présentation de Mack Sennet initialement rédigée par Mast, Kawin ajoute la mention « born Mikall Sinnot in Canada »26. Le même passage de l’édition originale ne comportait aucune indication du lieu de naissance du célèbre acteur et réalisateur.27 D’autres brèves mentions apparaissent, comme pour signaler que le réalisateur polonais Ryszard Bugajski a réalisé au Canada son long métrage Clearcuts en 199128, ou pour inclure le nom de David Cronenberg dans une courte liste de nouveaux réalisateurs de films d’horreur29, puis on retrouve la page de Mast consacrée au film d’avant-garde Wavelength (1967) du réalisateur canadien Michael Snow, replacée à la fin d’un chapitre consacré à « The Hollywood Renaissance ».30 Plus loin, dans un nouveau chapitre consacré aux traditions nationales émergentes, Bruce Kawin mentionne les problèmes d’identité subis par ce qu’il nomme « les anciennes colonies britanniques (l’Australie et le Canada) ».31 La mise à jour de The Movies : A Short History faite par Bruce Kawin en 1996 reste aussi limitée que les précédentes et marquée non seulement par des insuffisances gênantes mais surtout par de mauvais choix quant aux réalisateurs retenus. Absolument aucune allusion aux « pilliers » du cinéma canadien, aux films de Pierre Perrault, Michel Brault, Gilles Groulx, mais on mentionne toutefois des co-productions internationales – pourtant assez mineures – tournées au Canada durant les années 1970 et 1980 par des réalisateurs européens réputés : Louis Malle, Claude Lelouch, Ettore Scola.32 Seulement deux cinéastes francophones reçoivent une brève présentation de leurs œuvres, signalées pour mémoire : Mon Oncle Antoine

123 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes et Kamouraska de Claude Jutra et Le Déclin de l’Empire américain et Jésus de Montréal de Denys Arcand. Le reste de la section louange le renouveau du cinéma canadien-anglais, en fournissant une analyse étoffée et enthousiaste des films de deux réalisateurs bien connus aux États-Unis : David Cronenberg et Ted Kotcheff.33 Même ignorance à propos d’Atom Egoyan, Gilles Carle, Jean Beaudin ou de Jean-Claude Lauzon, qui ne sont même pas mentionnés. Pour toutes ces raisons, le récent livre The Movies : A Short History de Bruce F. Kawin demeurera le pire ouvrage du genre. La méconnaissance du Canada dont font preuve certains auteurs donne lieu à des situations étranges et à des classements bizarres. Il y a vingt ans, le professeur Jack C. Ellis, de la Northwestern University, accordait dès la première édition (1979) de son ambitieux ouvrage intitulé AHistory of Film presque trois pages au cinéma canadien... dans sa section intitulée « Third WorldCinema and Recent National Movements ».34 Avantde signaler deux ou trois faits marquants (certaines remarques justes et quelques imprécisions) dans notre filmographie nationale, Jack Ellis rédige en termes condescendants cette présentation (datant pourtant de 1979), à la limite du colonialisme : ThenthereisCanada,whichrecentlyhasbeguncallingattentionto itself with a newly emergent feature production. The Canadian situation is scarcely like that of the developing countries of South America and Africa, or of West Germany either, for that matter. [...] For decades now Canada’s economy and Canada’s culture have been not merely dominated by its big neighbor of the south, they have been overwhelmed by it.35 Cette condamnation sans nuance de notre cinématographie par cet universitaire américain est sûrement péremptoire; elle paraît encore plus opiniâtre lorsque l’on constate, onze ans plus tard (en 1990), dans la troisième édition (revue et augmentée) de l’ouvrage... qu’il n’y est même plus question du tout du Canada, nulle part dans le livre!36 Dans son livre intitulé AHistory of Narrative Film, David A. Cook inclut au quatorzième chapitre (sur le thème « European Renaissance West ») une brève section portant sur le « Commonwealth Cinema : Australia and Canada » (pp. 496-499). D’entrée de jeu, l’auteur ne cache pas sa surprise devant le succès imprévu du cinéma canadien : Canada is another Commonwealth nation whose cinema has experienced sudden and unexpected growth. Although Canada is one of the largest and whealthiest countries in the world, its film market was dominated until recently by American productions, much as the British had been during the thirties. Before 1978, film production in Canada was basically a cottage industry under the tight control of the National Film Board (NFB).37

124 Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial

D’autres présentations inégales : Beaver, Sklar, Parkinson, Gianetti et Eyman, Eric Rhode Un autre universitaire américain, le professeur Frank Beaver, de l’University of Michigan, a publié en 1983 un ouvrage d’histoire du cinéma centré principalement sur les cinémas nationaux d’Europe, des États-Unis et d’ailleurs, mais réussit à ne parler du Canada que pour affirmer, assez accessoirement, en présentant certains cinéastes d’animation des États-Unis (le groupe de la United Production of America) que ceux-ci étaient influencés par des réalisateurs d’animation de Yougoslavie et du Canada : The inspiration of UPA artists as well as the influence of work from Zagreb, Yugoslavia and from the Canadian Film Board [sic] (most significantly that of Norman McLaren) promoted further experimentation in animation styles.38 Uneautrementionvagueetlaconique,surlecinémaexpérimental,rendà la fois justice aux cinéastes « underground » des États-Unis, à Norman McLaren et au « Canadian Film Board » [sic], ainsi qu’à des milliers d’étudiants en cinéma.39 En écrivant cette mention finale (on ne peut plus vague), on réussirait difficilement diluer davantage la contribution des cinéastes canadiens. Plus récemment, l’Américain Robert Sklar, auteur en 1975 d’un livre à succès intitulé Movie-Made America, publie en 1993 une gigantesque histoire du cinéma sous le titre Film: An International History of the Medium. De cet ensemble monumental et bien documenté, une page (p. 414) porte sur le Canada (et se limite en fait à une description succinte de l’apport des documentaristes de l’ONF).40 Dans ce texte bref, l’auteur mentionne au passage les documentaires de trois réalisateurs canadiens : Colin Low, Denys Arcand (avec un rappel du cas de la censure du documentaire On est au coton par la direction de l’ONF), et – choix assez inusité et inexplicable – les fictions de Michael Rubbo, cinéaste spécialisé dans le film pour enfants. En outre, soulignons ça et là quelques allusions aux cinéastes du direct, et en fin de volume qu’une colonne entière est consacrée au « Québec Film » (avec un accent aigu!).41 Enfin, dans le récent History of Film de David Parkinson42, on retrouve deux pages sur le Canada, mentionnant quelques figures emblématiques (Brault, Jutra, Lefebvre, Carle, Mankiewicz et Lauzon), mais aussi, du côté anglais : Rozema, Egoyan et Cronenberg.43 Pourtant, un jugement d’ensemble assez mitigé persiste : Canada’s feature output had been negligible, although it had been producing internationally acclaimed documentaries and animated shorts since the establishement of the National Film Board in 1939.44 Même la récente mise à jour du gigantesque Flashback: A Brief History of Film, du professeur Louis Gianetti et du journaliste américain Scott

125 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Eyman45, ne comporte aucune mention du Canada, sauf deux pages (pp. 476-477) consacrées exclusivement à David Cronenberg, identifié comme étant Canadien, dans l’important chapitre portant sur le thème « American Cinema in the 1980s » (!). Les auteurs du livre reprochent à Cronenberg son grotesque dans ses films Scanners (1981) et Videodrome (1983), et son manque de cohérence narrative.46 Aucune autre mention du Canada dans ce livre de plusieurs centaines de pages sur l’histoire du cinéma. La bibliographie comptant plusieurs centaines de titres mentionne uniquement quatre ouvrages (en anglais) consacrés au cinéma canadien.47 On retrouve également en filmographie de cette dernière édition de Flashback une liste des films de Cronenberg (dans la section « Australia and British Commonwealth », puis sept films canadiens (d’Owen, Shebib, Almond, deux de Kotcheff, deux de Jutra), choisis arbitrairement et reproduits dans la section « Commonwealth miscellany ».48 Même la réimpression du livre du journaliste anglais (pour la BBC, à Londres), Eric Rhode, A History of Cinema. From its Origins to 197049, pourtant présenté pompeusement comme étant « the best one volume film history of our time » (sur le quatrième de couverture), ne contient aucune mention du Canada, sauf quelques lignes pour indiquer que le cinéaste britannique John Grierson est parti au Canada durant la Deuxième guerre mondiale pour devenir le Commissaire de l’Office National du Film du Canada.50 Aucune mention des œuvres ou d’un seul film canadien, aucun nomdecinéastecanadien,saufl’exempled’undocumentaired’AllanKing, Warrendale, produit en 1966, qui est signalé au passage (avec une photo tirée du film) et qui avait connu à sa sortie un certain succès dans les salles commerciales du Canada anglais.51 On aurait pu croire à une meilleure connaissancedelacultureduCanadadelapartdesauteursbritanniques. Des dix ouvrages anglophones que nous venons de recenser, seuls ceux de Parkinson et de Sklar montrent une certaine connaissance du cinéma canadien, faisant preuve d’une documentation sérieuse et de choix éclairés, ce qui est somme toute bien peu. Les principales faiblesses de tous ces livres n’est pas tant de ne pas tout mentionner; il est évidemment impossible de traiter de tout à propos de tous les pays. Toutefois, et c’est là que se situe leur faiblesse principale, la plupart de ces livres néglige le plus important et met l’accent sur des œuvres négligeables pour rendre compte du portrait du cinéma canadien. Comme il s’agit d’un problème qui se manifeste dans plusieurs publications de différents auteurs, on peut en déduire que leurs recherches sur le cinéma canadien sont incomplètes, mais aussi que le cinéma canadien n’a pas réussi à bien se faire connaître à l’étranger, et particulièrement aux États-Unis et en Angleterre. Mais la prochaine génération (de livres, mais surtout les nouveaux auteurs), durant les années 1990, allait produire des ouvrages plus complets dans leurs sections consacrées au cinéma canadien. La reconnaissance de cinéastes comme Denys Arcand et Atom Egoyan au Festival de Cannes allait certainement

126 Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial aider la cause du cinéma canadien, devenu désormais un incontournable dans tout livre sur l’histoire mondiale du cinéma.

Des ouvrages plus respectueux et mieux documentés Cette énumération pénible des difficultés (ou du moins du manque de visibilité et de reconnaissance) de notre cinématographie ne constitue pas un exercice de masochisme ou d’autodérision. Il convient davantage de méditer sur les causes de cette situation. Des auteurs mal renseignés ne peuvent rien inventer de neuf. Il est évidemment impossible pour un écrivainétrangerdecommenterunfilmquin’apasétédiffusédanssonpays et qui n’a pas reçu de critiques.52 Mais avant de passer à notre analyse proprement dite de la place laissée au Canada dans les livres d’histoire du cinéma mondial, signalons (au moins pour nous rassurer) quelques ouvrages plus récents représentant dignement et décemment la situation canadienne en matière de cinéma. La notice de Michael Moulds consacrée au cinéma canadien dans l’excellent Oxford Companion to Film, publié en 1976, fournit en moins de deux pages des repères utiles et bien choisis, retraçant l’histoire socioculturelle de notre industrie cinématographique, en identifiant judicieusement des œuvres clés, depuis Evangeline (1914) jusqu’à Réjeanne Padovani (1973), film de Denys Arcand qui venait alors de connaître un immense succès.53 Parmi les ouvrages généraux d’histoire mondiale du cinéma édités plus récemment en France, Gaston Haustrate a publié sur une période de plusieurs années un Guide des films en quatre tomes qui donne au Canada une place inégalée54, et enfin René Prédal, dans son Histoire du cinéma. Abrégé pédagogique, consacre pour sa part deux pages passionnées au Québec (mais ne traite pas du Canada anglais).55 Dansunrécentcollectifsurlecinémamondial,GeoffreyNowell-Smitha eu la bonne idée de confier la rédaction de son chapitre sur le cinéma canadien à un auteur d’ici, Jill McGreal, qui s’occupe de plusieurs festivals de cinéma dans la région de Toronto, et qui synthétise en une dizaine de pages les principales étapes de l’évolution de notre filmographie canadienne. En outre, d’excellentes monographies publiées à l’étranger ont décrit avec beaucoup de précision et de détails l’histoire et l’évolution du cinéma au Canada.56 Puisque ces ouvrages proposent une présentation honorable de la production cinématographique canadienne, nous ne les analyserons pas en profondeur, afin de nous concentrer sur les causes de la méconnaissance du cinéma canadien.

Discussion et remarques complémentaires L’étude de la place de notre culture dans le monde nous montre à quel point les spécialistes de l’histoire du cinéma ont trop souvent oublié de faire état

127 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes de notre production cinématographique au sein d’un panorama à prétention universelle. Cette négligence maintes fois répétée n’est pas malveillante de la part de ces auteurs; elle nous rappelle qu’il fut une époque où, pour bon nombre de Canadiens, la production de films nationaux n’était pas perçue comme étant si importante, dans la mesure où d’autres pays pouvaient nous fournir leurs œuvres et ainsi faire vivre notre industrie de la commer- cialisation des salles de cinéma. Économiquement, nos salles de cinéma étaient tout aussi prospères en présentant des films américains (ou d’ailleurs) qu’en présentant des films canadiens. On préférait alors laisser au savoir-faire de Hollywood le soin de tourner des films pour nos salles, et de mentionner au passage des particularités canadiennes, comme le fit par exemple Alfred Hitchcock, qui tourna le magnifique I Confess à Québec. La passivité de nos élites devant le spectre de la mondialisation nous montre que ces attitudes persistent, peut-être parce que nous n’en voyons pas toujours les conséquences à court et à long termes. On veut faire bonne figure aux jeux olympiques, dans les compétitions d’aviation militaire, dans les missions de paix, mais le secteur culturel, et qui plus est le monde du cinéma, est souvent resté un parent pauvre. Ce même réflexe se répète maintenant dans le secteur des tournages : on encourage de plus en plus les producteurs étrangers à venir tourner au Canada leurs films et téléfilms afin de bénéficier d’un dollar faible, de techniciens expérimentés et conciliants, de beaux paysages et de décors urbains, qui peuvent ressembler à n’importe quelle ville américaine. Généralement, les résultats à court terme sont viables du point de vue économique, mais l’image du Canada ne transparaît pas dans la plupart de ces productions anonymes où l’action se passe « quelques part en Amérique », généralement dans une ville indéterminée des États-Unis.57 Ces problèmes de visibilité révèlent aussi la nécessité de promouvoir la création d’œuvres typiquement nationales, que les auditoires pourront rattacher à nos artistes, à notre spécificité culturelle, à notre identité nationale. Cette absence presque généralisée du Canada dans beaucoup de manuels d’histoire du cinéma d’avant 1980 nous enseigne qu’il faut figurer, au même titre que d’autres, sur la liste des pays ayant contribué à l’histoire ducinéma.Deplus,noussavonsbienquenosgrandscinéastesontaccompli des œuvres originales, mais ce fut souvent dans des secteurs et des genres dont on parle trop peu : l’animation, le documentaire, l’avant-garde et, plus récemment, le « gore » (sous-genre privilégiant le film d’horreur excessif et complaisant dans le mauvais goût : l’œuvre de David Cronenberg). À part quelques réalisateurs au talent exceptionnel comme Claude Jutra, Michel Brault, Pierre Perrault, Jean Beaudin, Colin Low et Denys Arcand, peu de cinéastes canadiens ont réussi à tourner des œuvres typiquement nationales ayant une réelle envergure universelle.58

128 Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial

Conclusion L’étude en soi de la place du Canada dans l’histoire mondiale serait trop vaste pour être incluse dans le présent article. Comme beaucoup de jeunes pays, le Canada a accédé tardivement à sa souveraineté officielle, au 19e siècle.59 Aujourd’hui membre du G-7, il a fallu beaucoup de temps avant que le monde considère le Canada comme un pays souverain, avec une culture et un patrimoine spécifiques. Et pourtant, ce pays avait une vie culturelle et patrimoniale riche et diversifiée. Or, des ouvrages de référence généraux et récents, qui débordent le cadre strict du cinéma, comme l’Histoire du 20e siècle, ne mentionnent même pas le Canada, ou tout juste pour indiquer qu’il est membre de l’OCDE et du G-7!60 À ce titre, le cinéma ne fait pas exception et ne peut occuper plus d’importance que les autres formes artistiques ou que les activités réelles. Il faut également reconnaître que les productions canadiennes durant les premières cinquante années d’existence du cinéma ont été minimes; il devient donc difficile d’y faire écho lorsque l’on raconte l’épopée du cinéma universel. L’histoiredu cinéma retient les productions (les œuvres), et non l’activité cinématographique (réseaux de salles, l’action des distributeurs, les choix des diffuseurs), ce qui justifie de se pencher rétrospectivementsurlaréceptiondesœuvres,lafréquentationdessalles,la critique des films, afin de nous prouver qu’il existait au Canada une vie cinématographique, même passive, puisque centrée sur la consommation de films venant presque exclusivement de l’étranger. Autrement dit, les Canadiensfréquentaientlessallesobscuresengrandnombre,dèslesdébuts du 20e siècle, mais cette fréquentation d’œuvres étrangères ne peut pas vraiment faire partie de notre histoire du cinéma, dans la mesure où nos œuvres nationales étaient continuellement reléguées au second plan, derrière les productions étrangères; cette acculturation s’explique néanmoins en termes économiques et politiques. De plus, comme la plupart des films présentés au Canada provenaient généralement de trois pays (surtout des États-Unis, et dans une moindre mesure de la France et de l’Angleterre), il est difficile de parler dans ce cas d’ouverture sur le monde ou de véritable variété culturelle avec un choix de provenances si restreint.61 Le jugement des historiens du cinéma d’avant les années 1980, face à notre production cinématographique, reste la plupart du temps sévère, au mieux indifférent. Dans pratiquement tous les cas, on constate une méconnaissance (pour ne pas dire une ignorance) de notre production filmée. Les raisons en sont multiples et peuvent en certains points nous servir de leçon pour l’avenir. D’abord, nous n’avions pas nous-même de tradition d’historiens du cinéma, et il n’existait pas d’ouvrage de référence en ce sens avant les années 1960. De plus, à de rares exceptions près, nos œuvres cinématographiques n’étaient pratiquement pas visibles à l’extérieur de nos frontières, ni dans les festivals, ni en salles ou à la

129 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes télévision. L’ONF a bien sûr fait un effort considérable de diffusion parallèle de son catalogue, mais dans des circuits parallèles de l’époque (salles paroissiales, écoles, projectionnistes ambulants, courts métrages projetés en ouverture de séance dans les salles commerciales). On se souvient évidemment des efforts exceptionnels posés par l’ONF pour promouvoir certains films dans des festivals internationaux (les courts métrages de Norman McLaren, ou encore certains longs métrages comme Pour la suite du monde, Mon oncle Antoine, J. A. Martin, photographe), mais ces initiatives servaient seulement une partie de la production canadienne, et n’ont de toute façon pas servi davantage à laisser une marque impérissable dans les livres d’histoire du cinéma d’avant 1980. Le sociologue américain Howard Becker avait élaboré une théorie sur la distribution des œuvres d’art qui illustre parfaitement, sans en faire mention, les difficultés du cinéma canadien à se faire connaître par les auditoires et les spécialistes à l’étranger, et qu’il résume ainsi : « La distribution a une énorme incidence sur les réputations. Ce qui n’est pas distribué n’est pas connu, et ne peut donc jouir d’aucune considération ni revêtir la moindre importance historique. C’est un cercle vicieux, car ce qui n’a pas de réputation ne sera sans doute pas distribué. »62

Le véritable problème de l’industrie canadienne du cinéma Cette méconnaissance généralisée, d’autant plus flagrante que de nombreux pays moins avantagés ou moins populeux que le Canada font bonne figure dans l’histoire officielle du cinéma, justifie une fois de plus les recherches approfondies en histoire du cinéma et en études canadiennes. En outre, cette situation confirme également la place essentielle des études cinématographiques au sein des études canadiennes. Par ailleurs, certains des auteurs mentionnés (comme Sadoul en France, Ellis aux États-Unis) ont décrit le problème central de la culture canadienne, du moins en matière de cinéma : à savoir, l’omniprésence des films provenant des États-Unis sur notre territoire. Comme l’écrivait Manjunath Pendakur, les auditoires canadiens ne peuvent apprécier que les films qui leur sont directement accessibles à travers les réseaux de diffusion qui leur sont familiers.63 Autrement dit, lorsque l’on se rend au cinéma, c’est pour voir un film, qui s’avère la plupart du temps provenir des États-Unis, et ce phénomène s’explique non pas forcément par la qualité ou l’abondance des œuvres étrangères, ni toujours par le choix du spectateur, mais beaucoup plus par des ententes entre réseaux contrôlés par des entreprises qui ne cherchent pas la représentativité nationale mais plus prosaïquement la rentabilité. Nous pourrions ajouter à ces facteurs les habitudes bien ancrées d’une grande partie du public (à un certain modèle de films, à une certaine conception du cinéma), ajoutés au manque de vision générale des critiques ou des chroniqueurs de cinéma, qui n’ont la plupart du temps pas de formation sérieuse en histoire du cinéma (et encore moins en économie de la culture).64 Enfin, beaucoup de chercheurs étrangers

130 Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial négligent des études importantes sur le cinéma canadien parce qu’ils ne comprennent pas le français et qu’ils ne retiennent que des publications en anglais.65 J’ai parfois l’impression que dans le futur, les prochains livres généraux d’histoire du cinéma commenceront à raconter toute l’histoire du cinéma canadien lorsque celui-ci aura obtenu une reconnaissance internationale suffisamment unanime. Cette hypothèse reste pour l’instant impossible à démontrer, mais je remarque déjà un intérêt pour relater de plus en plus l’histoire ancienne du cinéma canadien dans des ouvrages généraux plus récents.66 On me permettra une remarque plus légère pour terminer :si on en juge à la justesse des propos tenus à l’égard du Canada dans plusieurs des ouvrages d’ensemble que nous venons de présenter, je reste pour ma part avec quelques sérieux doutes sur la validité des commentaires de plusieurs de ces auteurs à propos de la production nationale des autres pays étudiés dans leurs manuels, pourtant réputés, traduits et souvent maintes fois réédités!

Notes 1. Cet article se base sur certaines recherches déjà amorcées (sur la perception du Canada dans le cinéma mondial) et publiées (Laberge, dans Easterbrook, 1996) dans le cadre d’un projet de recherche post-doctoral, mené à bien grâce à l’aide du Fonds FCAR du Gouvernement du Québec. Sur la perception du Canada dans le monde et l’accession du Canada vers l’autonomie politique et diplomatique, voir le livre de Cameron, David, Le point sur les études canadiennes. Les années 90, Montréal, Association d’études canadiennes, 1996, p. 17 et sq. 2. Je pense au livre de Lever, Yves, Histoire générale du cinéma au Québec, Boréal, 1986. D’autres historiens du cinéma comme Pierre Véronneau et Peter Morris ont également publié des contributions importantes sur ce sujet. Sur les Canadiens célèbres, voir le livre de George Woodcock, 100 Great Canadians, Edmonton, Hurting Pub., 1980. 3. René Jeanne et Charles Ford, Histoire encyclopédique du cinéma, tome 4, Paris, Laffont, 1949-1960, p. 492. 4. Jeanne et Ford, op. cit., tome 4, p. 493. 5. Jeanne et Ford, op. cit., tome 5, p. 189. 6. René Jeanne et Charles Ford, Histoire illustrée du cinéma. 2. Le cinéma parlant (1927-1945), Marabout Université, 1947 et 1966, pp. 255 et 305. 7. Jeanne et Ford, op. cit., tome 2, p. 305. Dans une réédition ultérieure de trois tomes en format de poche, le troisième tome de cet ouvrage porte, en pages frontispices (pp. 2 et 367), des dessins sur pellicule de Norman McLaren, tirés d’un court métrage produit par l’ONF. Voir Jeanne et Ford, Histoire illustrée du cinéma. Le cinéma d’aujourd’hui, 3, Paris, Marabout, 1966. 8. Sadoul, Georges, Histoire du cinéma mondial, Paris, Flammarion, 1959 (1950). L’ouvrage a été traduit dans plusieurs langues. Nous n’avons pas retenu les autres ouvrages de Sadoul pour la présente étude. 9. Sadoul, op. cit., 1959, 5e éd., p. 489. 10. Sadoul, op. cit., p. 490. 11. Sur McLaren, voir la 8e édition de son Histoire du cinéma mondial, Paris, Flammarion, 1966, pp. 418-9; sur le cinéma direct, voir les pp. 527-8. Dans ce

131 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

nouveau passage, Georges Sadoul attribue erronément à Gilles Groulx (dont il ampute le prénom du«s»)lelong métrage Seul ou avec d’autres, en fait réalisé en 1962 par Denis Héroux et Denys Arcand. Plus loin, Sadoul écorche au passage les noms de Don Owen et de Roman Kroitor, dont il souligne néanmoins la qualité sociologique de leurs films. 12. Ce passage apparaît dans plusieurs éditions du livre de Sadoul, voir la 8e éd., 1966, p. 367. 13. Mitry, Jean, Histoire du cinéma. Art et industrie, Vol. 5. Les années 40, Paris, Jean-Pierre Delarge, éditeur, 1967, p. 42. 14. Mitry, ibid. 15. Mitry, op. cit., p. 516. 16. Rotha, Film Till Now, 1949, pp. 46-47. L’ouvrage a été réimprimé à New York par Twayne en 1960, constituant la troisième édition. Ce livre a eu beaucoup d’influence. 17. Griffith, dans Rotha, op. cit., 1949, p. 761. 18. Robinson, David, The History of World Cinema, Briarcliff Manor, N.Y., Stein & Day, 1974 [1973], p. 353. Ce livre a été traduit en français sous le titre Panorama du cinéma mondial, 2 tomes, Paris, Denoël-Gonthier, 1980. Pour la version française, les mentions sur le cinéma canadien sont dans le deuxième tome, dans le chapitre sur le film d’animation (p. 99) et dans la notice sur Norman McLaren dans la filmographie finale (p. 169). 19. Mast, Gerald, A Short History of the Movies, 2nd ed., Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Educational Pub., 1976, p. 501. 20. Mast, Gerald, A Short History of the Movies, 4th ed., New York & London, Macmillan Pub. & Collier Macmillan Pub., 1986, p. 533. La troisième édition date de 1981. 21. Mast, op. cit., 4th ed., 1986, p. 486. 22. Ibid. 23. Mast, op. cit., 4th ed., 1986, p. 533. 24. Mast, op. cit., 4th ed., 1986, p. 534. 25. Tulard, Jean (dir.), Guide des films, 2 tomes, Paris, Laffont, 1990. 26. Mast, Gerald & Bruce Kawin, The Movies: A Short History, 5th ed., Allyn & Bacon, 1996, p. 87. 27. Mast, Gerald, A Short History of the Movies, 2nd ed., 1976, p. 91. 28. Mast & Kawin, The Movies: A Short History, 5th ed., Allyn & Bacon, 1996, p. 429. 29. Mast & Kawin, op. cit., p. 489. 30. Mast & Kawin, op. cit., p. 500. 31. Mast & Kawin, op. cit., p. 525. 32. Mast & Kawin, op. cit., p. 531. 33. Mast & Kawin, op. cit., pp. 531-532. 34. Jack C. Ellis, A History of Film, 1st edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1979, p. 400. 35. Ibid. 36. Ellis, 3rd ed., 1990. 37. Cook, David A., A History of Narrative Film, 1981, p. 497. 38. Beaver, Frank E., On Film. A History of the Motion Picture, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983, p. 503. 39. Op. cit., p. 199. 40. Sklar, Robert, Film: An International History of the Medium, New York, Harry N. Abrams, 1993, p. 414.

132 Identité culturelle et institutionnalisation : la place du Canada dans l’histoire du cinéma mondial

41. Sklar, Film..., 1993, p. 511. 42. Parkinson, David, History of Film, London, Thames & Hudson, 1996, pp. 225-226. 43. Parkinson, op. cit., p. 226. 44. Parkinson, op. cit., p. 225. 45. Gianetti, Louis, et Scott Eyman, Flashback: A Brief History of Film, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1996, 3rd edition (1re éd. en 1986), 564 p. Une quatrième édition semble être parue en 2000, mais nous ne l’avons pas consultée. 46. Flashback, 1996, p. 476. 47. Ces quatre titres indiqués en bibliographie sont peut-être simplement ceux qui leur sont tombés sous la main (p. 654) : Handling, Piers, ed. The Shape of Rage: The Films of David Cronenberg. Toronto, General Publishing, 1983. James, C. Rodney, Film as a National Art: NFB of Canada and the Film Board Idea, New York, Arno, 1977. Krelman, Martin, This Is Where We Came In: The Career and Character of Canadian Cinema. Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1978. Morris, Peter, Embatled Shadows: A History of Canadian Film, 1895-1939, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1979. 48. Flashback, 1996, p. 656. 49. Rhode, Eric, A History of Cinema. From its Origins to 1970, New York, Da Capo Press, 1985 (1976 pour l’édition originale), 674 p. 50. Rhode, Eric, A History of Cinema. From its Origins to 1970, New York, Da Capo Press, 1985, p. 288 et 371. 51. Rhode, op. cit., p. 561. 52. C’est la raison qu’invoque Manjunath Pendakur pour expliquer la faiblesse du cinéma canadien dans son livre Canadian Dreams, & American Control: The Political Economy of the Canadian Film Industry, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1991. D’autres ouvrages, méconnus, ont abordé ce problème fondamental, comme celui de Magder, Ted, Canada’s Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, The State and Economic Life Series, 1993, 327 p. 53. Michael Moulds, « Canada », dans Bawden, Liz-Anne, (ed.), Oxford Companion to Film, New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1976. 54. Haustrate, Gaston, Guide des films, 4 tomes, Paris, Syros, 1984 à 1996. 55. Prédal, René, Histoire du cinéma. Abrégé pédagogique, CinémAction,no 73, 1994, p. 138 et 148. 56. Nowell-Smith, Geoffrey, (ed.), Oxford History of World Cinema, Oxford University Press, 1996, 824 p. Cet ouvrage est magnifiquement documenté et d’une grande utilité. En outre, citons aussi l’extraordinaire collectif ayant servi de catalogue lors de la rétrospective du Centre Georges-Pompidou : Garel, Sylvain, et André Pâquet (dir.), Les cinémas du Canada, Paris, Centre Georges-Pompidou, 1992, 384 p. 57. Un exemple : Sergio Leone a tourné à Montréal son plus beau long métrage, Il était une fois en Amérique (1984), où il a pu retrouver des lieux évoquant le New York des années 1930. 58. Plusieurs monographies publiées à l’extérieur du Canada ont été consacrées à David Cronenberg, qui demeure à peu de choses près le seul réalisateur canadien sur lequel des chercheurs étrangers se penchent. (J’exclus de ces considérations le domaine des thèses, en raison de leur diffusion plus restreinte). Quant à nos

133 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

grands cinéastes canadiens, quoi qu’on en dise, la contribution des cinéastes québécois reste encore à ce jour inégalée. Dans un autre ordre d’idées, le sociologue Simon Langlois faisait récemment remarquer qu’il n’y avait pas eu au Canada anglais de théoriciens de la trempe de Fernand Dumont et de Michel Freitag dans le domaine des sciences sociales. Ceci illustre la force des chercheurs québécois malgré le fait qu’ils soient peu connus au Canada anglais. Voir Simon Langlois, « A Productive Decade in the Tradition of Canadian Sociology », Canadian Journal of Sociology,25(3),Summer 2000, pp. 391-397. 59. Cameron, David, Le point sur les études canadiennes. Les années 90, Montréal, Association d’études canadiennes, 1996, p. 17. 60. Filippi-Codaccioni, Ange-Marie et al., Histoire du 20e siècle. Dictionnaire politique, économique, culturel, Paris, Bordas, 1991, 416 p. 61. C’est un aspect que j’avais abordé dans une communication restée inédite. Voir Laberge, Yves, « Auditoires et réception face à la distribution des films au Canada », Colloque annuel, Association d’études canadiennes, Congrès des sociétés savantes, Brock University, St-Catherines, 2 juin 1996. 62. Becker, Howard, Les mondes de l’art, Paris, Flammarion, 1988 (1982 pour l’édition américaine), p. 114. Voir aussi Becker, Howard, « La distribution de l’art moderne », dans Moulin, Raymonde (dir.), Sociologie de l’art, Paris, La documentation française, 1986, pp. 435-446. Les aspects typiquement canadiens de ces problèmes (de la présence des films canadiens à l’étranger) sont expliqués dans deux articles, consacrés à la distribution et à l’ONF, dans le collectif de Coulombe, Michel, et Marcel Jean, Dictionnaire du cinéma québécois,3e édition, Montréal, Boréal, 1999, pp. 189 et sq., pp. 474 et sq. 63. Pendakur, Manjunath, op. cit.,p.32. 64. C’est ce qu’explique Michael Dorland dans son excellent So Close to the States, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998. 65. Sur ce problème peu abordé et assez délicat, voir l’article de la Presse canadienne reprenant les propos du président de la Commission d’enquête sur la langue, Gérald Larose, « Le miroir déformant des médias anglos », Le Soleil, Québec, vendredi 19 janvier 2001, p. A-9. 66. Voir mes remarques complémentaires sur la perception du cinéma canadien à l’étranger dans Laberge, Yves, « Préface », dans Canada and Canadians in Feature Films. A Filmography. 1928-1990, sous la direction de Ian K. Easterbrook et al., Canadian Film Project, University of Guelph, 1996, pp. v-vi. Ces questions font partie de mes recherches actuelles.

134 Wayne Nelles

Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

Abstract This paper examines Canada amidst Anglo-American educational ideas and relations during the interwar years and World War II. Since Canada’s federal government could not establish formal educational relations abroad, educational organizations, particularly the Canadian Teachers’ Federation, were significant international actors. After 1919 a new internationalism emerged in educational thought, practice and cooperative activities around the world with the CTF at the forefront in Canada. During the interwar years a “North Atlantic Triangle” of diplomatic and economic alliances involving Canada, Great Britain and the United States grew. Canada, however, remained the underdog among the three. This paper examines Canada’s educational leadership in, and perspectives of, that triangle with implications for contemporary international education policies.

Résumé Cet article examine la position du Canada dans le complexe des échanges d’idées pédagogiques entre les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne et les relations anglo-américaines dans ce domaine pendant l’entre-deux-guerres et la Deuxième guerre mondiale. Comme le gouvernement fédéral canadien ne pouvait pas officiellement établir des relations avec des États étrangers dans le secteur de l’éducation, c’est aux organisations à caractère éducatif, et en particulier à la Fédération canadienne des enseignants qu’il revenait de jouer un rôle important sur le plan international. Après 1919, un nouveau vent d’internationalisme a soufflé sur la pensée et la pratique pédagogiques, et des activités de coopération ont été organisé partout à travers le monde, avec la FCE à l’avant-plan au Canada. Pendant l’entre-deux-guerres, un « Triangle nord-atlantique » de réseaux d’alliances diplomatiques et économiques impliquant le Canada, la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis a pris de l’ampleur. Cependant, à l’intérieur de ce trio, le Canada faisait figure de parent pauvre. Le présent article se penche sur le rôle de chef de file en matière de pédagogie assumé par le Canada à l’intérieur de ce triangle, ainsi que les perspectives qui caractérisaient ce dernier, en soulignant ses incidences sur les politiques internationales contemporaines en matière d’éducation.

ThispaperexaminesCanada’sroleinandperspectivesonAnglo-American educational ideas and relations during the interwar years and World War II.

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

This was a time when educational relations and intellectual exchanges, mainly through non-state actors or “citizen diplomacy,” had more than average significance in international affairs. After World War I Canada increasingly asserted itself as an independent, self-governing nation seeking to reinforce its position through international recognition and in foreign affairs apart from Britain. Since Canada’s federal government could not establish formal educational relations abroad, with education designated a provincial responsibility under the British North America Act of 1867, international activities of individual educators or educational organizations were particularly important. Canada was the weakest and youngest of the three English-speaking nations, but it also faced major domestic, cultural and linguistic differences with Quebec or French Canada, a situation further complicating its imperial or international relations (which the federal government tied to British tradition then called “external relations”). This paper focuses on English Canada. Some research has examined the early history of Canadian and other involvement in “Track Two” or non-state activities in early Asia Pacific diplomacy from the interwar years on.1 This paper complements such work specifically examining the Canadian Teachers’Federation (CTF) linked to Canadian-American-British ideas and relations in the idealist interwar years mainly from 1919 to 1939, but also until 1946 when a substantial reorganization came in international educational organizational relations, partly as a result of World War II. More established Canadian organizations such as the Canadian Education Association (CEA) founded in 1891 and the National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU) from 1911 on were involved internationally to some degree through various relationships, or discussed issues of peace and global cooperation in meetings. However, their work mainly focused on complex domestic issues and administrative challenges, while building and strengthening Canadian education amidst an array of conflicting provincial responsibilities. CEA, NCCU, and other groups’ discussions, conferences and activities also sometimes meant cooperation with American, British and other Empire or Commonwealth members, largely for pragmatic reasons.2 One significant “international” issue in Canada for educational organizations was also the domestic impact of Canadian academics going to the U.S. to study or teach, or bringing back American ideas or teaching methods when they returned.3 This was one of many intellectual and social processes that challenged English Canada’s British roots and encouraged theincorporationofAmericancultureandvalues.AlthoughtheCTFshared many of the CEA’s or NCCU’s domestic concerns about such issues, it was the CTF that highlighted international cooperation and peace-building ideas, activities, program developments and curricular reforms as a priority.4 The CTF also cultivated American partnerships in such work. Amidst a dual set of forces—the legal and historical British link but greater and increasing economic activity with and geographic proximity to the

136 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

United States—Canada also became a de facto mediator culturally and physically. The CTF exploited the myth and reality of the situation. After 1919anewinternationalismemergedineducationalthoughtandpracticein Canada amidst these two forces. This internationalism was a world-view based in part on promoting legal and institutional mechanisms such as the League of Nations. But it also included international intellectual, social and educational cooperation among citizens, voluntary organizations and specifically teachers who advocated international studies, partnerships or peace education as means to prevent new wars and further peaceful cooperation.5 Some of Canada’s intellectual or educational internationalism in the first half of the twentieth century clearly came from American influences, or “Americanization” as much as a broader “internationalism” or internationalization. But it was also conditioned by its formal British relationship first as a colony then as a self-governing Dominion, which was a historical progressionthattheUnitedStates,builtonrevolution, nevershared.During theinterwaryears,a“NorthAtlanticTriangle”ofdiplomatic,economicand political alliances involving Canada, Great Britain and the United States exemplified one form of cooperative and peaceful relations, although Canada was always the underdog among the three.6 Canada also increasingly was drawn into the American orbit as British economic and Imperial power declined and a new American empire emerged. Many Canadians and Americans in the United States shared a common concern about avoiding future involvement in another international war, especially any European conflict.7 This meant a kind of internationalism, which positively promoted peace and cooperation through institutions, but there was also a negative tendency that meant isolationism or avoidance of entanglements that might draw either country into war. This paper focuses principally on Canada’s educational role, but especially on leading Canadian educators’perceptions of their significance and activities, in the triangle as it embraced a new internationalism after the Great War. Canadian views are illustrated mainly through ideas and activities of Harry Charlesworth, the CTF’s principal international spokes- person and actor, who was supported or complemented by others. Except for passing references, American and British perceptions of their own roles in a triangle, or whether Canada’s views or influences were accurate in British or American eyes, goes beyond the scope of this paper. A study of American and British perceptions and activities would, however, be a useful subject for future research.

The Emergence of Canadian and Anglo-American Educational Cooperation During the interwar years a new faith in education for international social change became widespread among educationists, social theorists, and

137 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes international relations scholars around the world.8 This took on a special character in the Canadian-American and British relationship as Canada sometimes served in a mediational role between educationists from the two larger powers, or exaggerated its significance to buttress the national and international importance of the CTF. The CTF was otherwise a weak and fledgling professional association. Nonetheless, from the early 1920s the CTF took pride in its role in Anglo-American educational cooperation as a means to maintain world peace. It did this primarily by demonstrating positive Canadian-American relations, but the initiative and motives came from earlier imperialist links. For teachers, Canada’s first formal attempt at a leadership role in imperial (and to some extent international) educational relations came with the Imperial Conference of Teachers’ Associations in 1921 in Toronto, and only the second ever meeting. It was a specialized outgrowth of earlier League of Empire conferences dealing mainly with educational policy matters among Empire members.9 London’s League of Empire sponsored the Toronto event hosted by the Government of Ontario at the invitation of the Education Minister. Observers from the United States gave it not only an imperial, but a distinctively international and particularly continental flavour.10 After the 1921 Toronto meetings, founding CTF President, Harry Charlesworth, and then CTF Vice-President and British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (BCTF) General Secretary, began acting informally as an educational “ambassador” to the United States representing the CTF. Charlesworth’s initiative built on several decades of British, Canadian and American cooperation after the War of 1812 on a variety of practical matters. Significant treaties, substantial trade and continental economic interdependence involving Canada, Britain and the U.S. within North America alone or trilaterally, came after 1812. This growth, particularly from 1880 to 1917 at economic and formal diplomatic levels, was by no means straightforward or without significant challenges, especially with Canada a much weaker country that had to continually protect its sovereignty, culture and economic interests next to its more powerful American neighbour. Anti-American and protectionist sentiments were a significant and recurring theme in Canada while continental economic and cultural integration proceeded.11 “Imperial” obligations to, or emotional sentiments for, Britain also conditioned Canada’s views. These were complicated by a long history of strained American-British relations after the American Revolution, Britain’s gradual decline as a hegemonic Empire after 1900, closer but problematic Canadian-American economic integration, and Canada’s increasing independence as a self-governing Dominion. After the War of 1812, various disputes and challenges were ultimately resolved through institutional or legal mechanisms and without another major international war between them.12 So despite many complications and contradictions, cooperation resulted generally in an increased level of Anglo-American mutual respect, understanding or at least tolerance.

138 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

At the end of the Great War, Britain, the United States and Canada also sought to cooperate in building more strategic diplomatic ties, as well as specifically continental liaisons, with academics of the period assessing such developments.13 Charlesworth’s work built on aims behind other movements such as the Rhodes Scholarship programme, and the English- Speaking Union formed in 1918. The latter group, based principally in England and the United States, believed “that goodfellowship between the English-speaking peoples is the foundation-stone of the future of the world, its peace, security and progress.”14 Charlesworth’s laudatory comments on aspeechbyOttoKahn,anAmericanbankerandvice-presidentoftheUnion illustrate this: [Since] the subject of British-American relations is of such paramount importance at the present time, and as the educators of British Columbia have taken a prominent part in promoting international friendship through the medium of education; we gladly avail ourselves of the opportunity of giving wide publicity to such a remarkable and eloquent discourse...15 Charlesworth believed Canadian educators served as a natural mediator between British and American traditions, not merely a blending of Canadian and American values. At the same time, he embraced an internationalist outlook based on a North American continentalism involving Canada and the United States. In November of 1921 Charlesworth embarked on a two-week tour speaking to parents, teachers and trustees throughout British Columbia and Washington State. Newspapers reported his tour as “a mission...in connection with the better relations movement in teaching circles.” The highlight of his trip was Bellingham, where he spoke to 1500 delegates at the Washington Education Association annual convention. A joint conference of British Columbia and Washington educators followed “to consider practical steps to increase better relations between the Anglo-Saxon peoples of Canada and the United States.” Other noted British Columbia educators attended that meeting which included discussions on the upcoming disarmament conference in Washington D.C. The Bellingham meeting led to Charlesworth’s invitation to the National Education Association’s 1922 Boston conference.16 Charlesworth often commented on the uniqueness of Canadian-American relations, their common challenges within the broader international arena, as well as their common language, common aspirations and common laws. Referring to parallel developments among governments through the League Nations, he stressed that educators had a diplomatic role and responsibility to create new and innovative forms of international cooperation. He suggested “that a ‘league of teachers’can probably do more for international goodwill than a ‘league of nations.’”17 As plans took shape for an upcoming World Conference on Education in San Francisco, sponsored by the National Education Association (NEA) of the United States, its advocates stressed the significance of the Canadian-

139 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

American relationship for peace and international cooperation. Such dialogue was not unique to educators. A belief in a uniquely Canadian role as a mediator in British-American relations, and Canadian-American relations as a model for world peace, was an aspect of Canada’s new foreign policy and international relations. Canada repeated such themes at Imperial Conferences and in the League of Nations. Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s speech to the 1923 Imperial Conference exemplified the view. King referred to American President Warren Harding’s speech in Vancouver noting the symbolic significance of the Canada-United States International Joint Commission founded in 1909, as “an object-lesson of peace.” Using this educational analogy, King placed Harding’s statement “on record” to contrast new world and old world attitudes. King noted that the Canadian- American relationship was building up a “fund of goodwill,” contributing to a common attitude and the solving of differences. In sum King stressed that Canada in cultivating this relationship was perhaps rendering the greatest service that it is possible for us to render as part of the British Empire in maintaining the friendly relation so essential between the United States and the British Empire.18 Official speeches by Canadian representatives to the League of Nations echoedsimilarperspectives.Emphasizingtheinternationaldimensionover imperial service, they referred to Canada as a mediator or a “linchpin” in Anglo-American unity since it was geographically, culturally and historically rooted in both British and North American soil. Speeches noted the 100 plus years of peaceful cooperation since the War of 1812 as a model for other nations. Such images became a mainstay of Canadian foreign policy during the interwar years. Other nations sometimes referred to this as “the Canadian speech” at Geneva, repeated under both Conservative and Liberal government administrations.19 Public sentiment, educators’ outlooks and Canadian foreign policy were closely aligned on this issue, transcending political partisanship. Some British Columbia educators viewed Seattle as a “sister” city to Vancouver and Victoria, and attended summer courses at the University of Washington, speaking fondly of their administrators and professors. Charlesworth intimated such cooperation was part of a broader social movement, stressing that both Canada and the United States had a moral responsibility to demonstrate leadership. A century of “goodwill and kindly regard” has “set a worthy example for the nations to follow” he said.20 Educational cooperation between Washington and British Columbia continued in the 1930s through joint conferences21 with a pragmatic bent, which went beyond international peace and cooperation. Agenda items included “comparisons and contrasts...drawn between the Canadian and American methods of organization” to learn from one another. Canadian- American links were also deemed important enough that in 1937 the NEA reported on a formal study of the relationship’s educational implications,

140 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle” and what each country knew of the other’s history and culture.22 The report’s American author, University of Maine President, Arthur Hauck, stressed that neither Canadian or American texts contained “menacing” material to “friendly relations” among the two countries. But despite substantial coverage and better understanding of the U.S. in Canadian texts, he criticized U.S. texts for devoting so little space to Canada and for inaccuracies even when information was there. The report also noted hundreds of student compositions that suggested Canada was “ruled by Great Britain” or its “possession” and that Canadians have no free speech, free press or religious freedom. Canadians, however, the report noted “did not display similar confusion concerning the government of the United States.” Americans students knew much less about Canada than Canadians did of the United States. Such studies underscored how much Canada was perceived by many Americans as less important or least understood amidst the other two of the North Atlantic Triangle, a situation reinforced by the American educational system. Nonetheless, what occurred on the ground in textbooks, curricula and student knowledge was countered in small degree at the international organizational level among teachers when American education leaders at times looked to Canadian expertise. The World Federation of Education Associations (WFEA), founded at San Francisco in 1923, believed Charlesworth in particular had the right diplomatic credentials to further understanding and cooperation between Canadian, the United States and Britain. As a British-born but proud Canadian immigrant (able to represent both British and American interests) he was asked to negotiate a cooperative agreement on behalf of the WFEA with the predominantly European IFTA. Charlesworth was not the only prominent Canadian educator to promote Canadian-American educational cooperation as a contribution to world peace, but he was the CTF’s undisputed leader. Charlesworth’s efforts also influenced the WFEAexecutive to pick Toronto for its 1927 meeting.23 The evolution of the WFEA also built on Anglo-American educational cooperation, but given the dominant Anglo- alliance and most other major conferences in the U.S., Canada and Great Britain, it biased its broader international mandate to some degree. This bias was clear in the pattern of initial meetings, the first in San Francisco, the second in Edinburgh and the third in Toronto, completing the “North Atlantic Triangle.” After a successful WFEAToronto conference in 1927, with some 7,000 people attending, more Canadian educators took pride in the WFEA and Canada’s role in it. The CTF after the NEA was the second national organization to join the WFEA, and outlined several characteristics of Canada and Canadian teachers mandating them to take responsibility and moral authority in international educational affairs. CTF President E.A. Hardy’s comments to the predominantly American audience at the 1928 NEA meetings reveal a new and renewed Canadian commitment, the distinctiveness of Canada’s international outlook, and the

141 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes significance of Canadian-American relations. Hardy, also elected Treasurer of the WFEA in 1927, remained in that position until the demise of the WFEA in the 1940s. Hardy emphasized Canada’s “strategic position geographically, politically, and economically” allowing her to “serve as the interpreter of Great Britain to the United States and vice versa.” As he argued, “From our middle position we understand both and can help each other to understand the other,” which is “surely a service of high value to the world.”24 Hardy, Charlesworth and others viewed good international relations among Canadian and American educators as a significant responsibility. The BCTF and CTF thus demonstrated much of their Canadian internationalism through a North American continentalism with theUnitedStates,butespeciallythroughtheAmerican-dominatedWFEA.

The CTF and the World Federation of Education Associations The CTF played a significant role in founding and building the World Federation of Education Associations. However, National Education Association of the United States (NEA) leadership provided the primary impetus for the citizen-initiated WFEA, just as U.S. President Wilson’s vision launched a League of Nations for governments. The WFEA provided a rich climate for educators’ idealism, dialogue and advocacy about internationalism, and appropriate international educational programs and relations. And the WFEA was especially significant for American educators who embraced the peace movement since the U.S. never joined the League. Americans had discussed plans for an organization like the WFEA since 1884, when the NEA struck a committee to plan a proposed “international council of education.”25 After the Great War scholars looked more concertedly for solutions to international problems, and the causes and prevention of war partly by creating the modern “science” or academic discipline of international relations.26 School-based educators similarly called for the study of international problems tailored to different age and grade levels. A diverse peace education movement grew up after the war in many countries, but various groups had different ideological foundations.27 This international education was by no means a simplistic or unified vision. It combined a variety of idealist assumptions and beliefs about the power of the mind, education, goodwill, public opinion, morality and reason, with practical tools such as teaching the efficacy of international law and institutions as well as supporting disarmament. A common notion, however, was that some form of new international education was needed, and it implied helping create an “international mind,” “disarmament of the mind,” or a “world outlook” and a common international ethic or morality in the public and youth in particular.28 The “international mind” required an idealism partly based in American Wilsonian values, but especially a faith in tools such as the League of Nations.29 Many American and Canadian teachers saw Wilson as one of their own, exemplified in an article from the NEA’s

142 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

Journal, headlined “Woodrow Wilson–The Educator,” which The B.C. Teacher reprinted.30 In 1919, backing President Wilson’s vision, the NEA wholeheartedly supported the new League of Nations saying “no country can preserve its ideals in isolation from the rest of the world.”31 The NEA and the United States Commissioner of Education were instrumental in establishing the Geneva-based International Bureau of Education associated with the League of Nations, which was ostensibly not a political body, but mainly devoted to the exchange of educational information. The NEA however, also aimed to further democratic ideals and societies internationally, through education. As part of reconstruction efforts after World War I, the NEAagain in 1919 recommended that an “international organization of the great national education associations of the free nations” be founded.32 In 1920 the NEA passed a resolution establishing a committee on “international educational relations which shall have authority...to cooperate with like committees from other countries...”33 This resulted in the NEA’s new “Committee on Foreign Relations.” No such “like committee” existed in Canada then. Organizationally Canada was far behind the United States. The CTF had yet to hold its first annual convention. However, as plans for the World Conference on Education and the WFEA unfolded, Harry Charlesworth acted both unofficially and semi-officially for the new CTF by promoting internationalism among Canadian teachers and relations outside Canada. This internationalism was closely connected to the CTF’s new and growing professionalization serving Canadian teachers’ welfare and the self-interest evident in Charlesworth’s Presidential Report to the 1922 CTF Annual Meeting reviewing CTF objects. The first was “to establish professional consciousness throughout the Dominion, and...that has been done...”34 Charlesworth also implied a connection between CTF professionalization and international responsibility. As he said: one of the works which I have been particularly interested in for our own organization, and for the Canadian Teachers’ Federation is this: we must give the impression that the Teachers’ organizations are interested in not only public and community affairs, but in national affairs, and in international affairs...in international affairs at the present juncture the teachers of any country–the teachers of Canada, can show in a very practical way their national importance. If we show our national importance we will get national respect...35 Most scholarly assessments of Canadian foreign policy, international law and international relations would support Charlesworth’s conclusions on the value of “international recognition” for asserting a sense of national identity and power. During the interwar years, Canada through its foreign policy, the pattern of its international relations, and its formal diplomatic representation abroad sought to affirm its status as a nation state in such

143 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes international forums as the League of Nations.36 CTF internationalism, and its organizational “foreign policy” or international relations as Charlesworth’s rationalized them, thus have parallels in Canadian diplomaticandpoliticalhistory.CTFinvolvementintheWFEAwasakinto Canada’sparticipationintheLeagueofNations.InthisrespecttheCTFwas built on more than a pure altruistic internationalism. Self-interest in transforming CTF members’ own social and economic conditions was also a significant driving force. Also at the CTF’s 1922 Annual meeting Charlesworth reported on his recent travels, speaking engagements and cooperative efforts with American educators planning an upcoming world conference on education “as a means of promoting and fostering international goodwill.” On behalf of the CTF he wired NEA officials in July 1922 saying that “Canadian teachers will readily join” in any such “movement.”37 The NEAresponded with a note saying they adopted a formal resolution in favour of a world conference “after receiving the warm greetings and goodwishes” from the CTF. Charlesworth’s support probably did not influence the NEA decision in a significant way, but clearly added to the momentum already building in the NEA, and insured that Canada was a player at a new international table under formation. The NEA’s response also included a message from Dr. William Bagley noting their special Canadian-American relationship based on “a type and pattern of the mutual trust, mutual respect, and the mutual goodwill that some day will characterize the relationships one to another of all truly civilized nations.” Bagley asked if they might “not make this the symbol of that educational co-operation which will do more than anything else to speed that day?” and offered “fraternal greetings and heartiest good wishes to our fellow-workers of the great Dominion.” Charlesworth, assessing the importance of the still very new CTF then, pointed to the international dimension as foundational. He remarked that if the CTF could “be responsible for a movement” leading to an international educational conference “with the object of preserving the peace and bringing about disarmament, it has not existed in vain, if only on that account.”38 The NEA also believed it was entering upon an “era of world- fellowship” led by an “association of nations” demanding “a new kind of education.” The Great War, they suggested, demonstrated America’s leadership and altruism, in that they “fought not for dominion, nor increased power, but for justice and for humanity and ‘to make the world safe for democracy’...” Thus they argued: It is entirely fitting also that the National Education Association of the United States be the instrument of means in promulgating a world-movement for universal education among free peoples; for the inculcation of spiritual values; for the promotion of internationalgoodwill,forbetterunderstandingofnations,andfor instruction which may lead to universal peace. The National

144 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

Education Association with its seventy-five thousand members, the most influential organization which meets anywhere, with its power to shape the policy of education that in turn directs the current of civilization cannot afford to neglect its responsibility...39 The Americans had no modesty to be sure. The NEA and its new committee set out to act on their international education vision with missionary zeal. The believed they were global leaders, charting a new course in “international education relations.” The NEA promoted such work believing other nations’ educators should and would share their goal of building world-wide democracy through universal education.40 They approached their work as a diplomatic exercise, working through the U.S. consular office to issue invitations so that “nations” (not just individuals or organizational representatives) would send representatives to an “international congress of education” in conjunction with the 1923 NEA meetings. It became a joint effort of a voluntary educational association, and an extension of the increasing dominance of United States foreign policy and political power in world affairs following World War I.

The 1923 San Francisco World Conference on Education and After The San Francisco World Conference on Education in 1923, became the founding meeting for the new WFEA and under American leadership the WFEA’s new headquarters were in Washington D.C., housed in the NEA offices which provided financial and in-kind support.41 The San Francisco meeting included 7,000 delegates from fifty-four countries and the meeting resolved that the primary purposes for “a permanent federation of educational associations” would be: to secure international co-operation in educational enterprises, to foster the dissemination of information concerning education in all its forms among nations and peoples, to cultivate international good-will, and promote the interests of peace throughout the world.42 This statement and more detailed resolutions became in effect a form of “international educational policy” or a kind of “treaty” among non-state actors which many national organizations through attending representatives agreed to, and was to be taken home to be implemented. Among non- governmental organizations and individuals this paralleled discussions and resulting international law agreements, declarations or statements of principles between and among national governments. Although such statements carried no juridical force, they nonetheless carried moral weight, drawing participants into a sense of common obligation and relationship, and encouraging practical action.43 Augustus Thomas and the NEA’s Foreign Relations Committee prepared many draft resolutions before the conference, with similar intentions appearing in earlier NEA proceedings, and those of such voluntary societies as the American School

145 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Peace League.44 Despite the obvious American influence these ideas took hold and became action-oriented policies, reintroduced at subsequent conferences in Canada, Britain and elsewhere during the 1920s and 1930s. Canada’s San Francisco delegates were few but their influence and follow- up responsibility was larger than their numbers. Charlesworth became chairman of a special committee of a group on “International Cooperation” which developed recommendations concerning “educational attachés” to embassies and legations. The committee’s rationale and mandate were as follows: WHEREAS, it is conducive to that mutual national understanding, friendship, and interchange of ideas which form the true basis of international peace and good-will, that the educational experience and ideals of each nation should become known to all other nations; and WHEREAS, This can most fully and successfully be accomplished through the medium of a personal channel, Therefore be it resolved: 1. That an educational attaché, who shall be a recognized educational expert of the highest rank should be provided for each embassy or legation. 2. That in cases where, owing to various national circumstances, such a plan is not possible or is not deemed desirable the prominent educational organizations of the country should provide an educational representative of outstanding ability. Canada’s Charlesworth was a principal drafter and mover of the resolution,46 Mexico was the first country to implement the resolution,47 and the American Federation of Teachers sponsored a bill that it hoped would pass through Congress.48 Canada, however, did nothing officially. This is logistically understandable since other than its High Commission in London and the Washington legation, Canada did not establish diplomatic offices abroad until 1927 in Paris and Tokyo.49 The proposal was also hamperedbythestructureoftheCanadianeducationsystemwithnofederal authority. Unofficially though, Charlesworth during the 1920s and 1930s played the role of Canada’s educational ambassador. He launched his “diplomatic” career in San Francisco by becoming a temporary Executive member and advisor to the organizing committee that devised the WFEA membership structure, goals and overall mandate.50 Following the San Francisco meetings, Charlesworth and his Canadian colleagues furthered the World Conference on Education objectives through various domestic implementation programs such as curriculum reform or furthering the international education cooperation agenda through regular conferences, committees and projects.

146 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

The CTF and the WFEA: World Progress, Politics and Educational Diplomacy Periodically WFEA educators assessed their progress in international work. Canada’s Charlesworth believed they were making real advances when the CTF received fraternal greetings from teachers in other countries at the CTF’s 1924 national convention. He noted “significant development” and “remarkable growth” in “the spirit of goodwill and fellowship between the teachers of the various countries of the world, and particularly between those of the Anglo-Saxon race...”51 He suggested “this spirit was exemplified” in greetings from The League of the Empire; The Educational Institute of Scotland; New Zealand Institute; South African Teachers’ Association; Australia Teachers’ Federation; Secondary Associations of England and Wales; American Federation of Teachers; National Education Association of the United States; and the World Federation of Education Associations. Charlesworth interpreted such comments as indicative of a collective enterprise “spreading enlightenment” leading to a better world. Referring to their collective membership he suggested that over one million educators had the same ideals, and “that a common bond of professional goodwill and brotherhood has been developed in the interests of world progress and international amity.”52 Charlesworth also remarked that this phenomenon raised “the status and efficiency of their profession,” also highlighting professional self-interest as a motive. Augustus O. Thomas, WFEA President writing to a CTF convention in Victoria, British Columbia, reinforced a shared belief among participating teachers that through the WFEA “the schoolmaster has taken his station along side the diplomat and statesman and will direct the nations to co-operation, justice and goodwill...”53 After the 1927 Toronto meeting, the BCTF, not the CTF, at Charlesworth’s initiative, took on what it viewed as an important new task and responsibility. The Toronto convention appointed the BCTF “to carry out a survey of the question of Teachers’Tenure and allied questions as they exist throughout the world.”54 Charlesworth headed this new WFEA subcommittee of BCTF members T.W. Woodhead, W.H. Morrow, G.W. Clarke, A.H. Webb,G.S.Ford, L.E. Morrisey, and J.G.Lister. Their motives were not entirely altruistic. Uncertain tenure and related issues such as poor working conditions, salaries and pensions were still problematic for British Columbia teachers.55 The committee also reported in 1929, the same year the Teachers’ Pensions Act was passed in British Columbia.56 The BCTF members involved probably felt that such work raised the profile of the issue at home, securing their own profession better security and recognition, as well as potentially helping others abroad. The committee’s ideas were also not original. Its report freely borrowed from an earlier NEA study of American problems. Such borrowing aside, Charlesworth began his report by emphasizing that it would formulate

147 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

“some definite, concrete fundamental principles which might be applied to the question of Teacher Tenure in all countries...”57 Not so coincidentally the report was adopted at the WFEA conference in 1929 in Geneva, home of the International Labour Organization (ILO). WFEA professionalization and labour concerns fit closely with ILO objectives for international social transformation, towards better working conditions, financial compensa- tion and professional recognition which many more teachers sought world-wide. Charlesworth also had contact with former UBC professor, Mack Eastman, who worked for the ILO, and sought to make its work better known to educators and students.58 Canadian coordination of the WFEA Teacher Tenure Committee was especially significant and symbolic of the CTF’s early international work, for it dealt with a home-grown professional issue. It served Canadian teachers’ interests while contributing to a larger international effort. So-called “protective” domestic interests of salaries, pensions and job security thus were as much an international matter as peace education or curricular reform. Despite such efforts, relations between the CTF and WFEA were strained after 1929 in Geneva. The CTF, more involved in national matters, sometimes made decisions without considering WFEA responsibilities. During the 1931 CTF Annual meeting in Moncton, representatives debated whether or not to maintain WFEA affiliation. Although some CTF members questioned its value, CTF’s British Columbia representatives were most supportive.59 The CTF ultimately stayed “within the fold” and Charlesworth continued as its most vigorous supporter in Canada, with solid backing from the CTF’s E.H. Hardy, also WFEA Treasurer. Aside from national organizational politics, and some controversy over Charlesworth’s international work during the 1930s, a significant development in the WFEA’s progress, CTF international educational relations, and British Columbia’s contribution to educational diplomacy came with Charlesworth’s 1935 Oxford trip. A key agenda item during the WFEA’s 1935 Oxford conference was “to explore the possibility of a rapprochement” between the WEFAand the European-based International Federation of Teachers’ Federations (IFTA). “The aims and objects of the two bodies,” WFEA President Frederick Mander noted, “are similar, and they cover the world between them, the W.F.E.A. being strong outside Europe and the I.F.T.A. particularly strong in Europe...”60 As Thompson recounts the IFTA’s history, an International Committee of Primary School Teachers was founded in Belgium in 1905, but World War I disrupted its work. In 1926 the IFTA was founded jointly by representatives from French and German teachers’groups. Their goal was “pedagogical collaboration and the preparation of peace through the cooperation of free peoples.” IFTA leadership during the interwar years remained in French hands, especially with Hitler’s rise to power in 1933. It kept close ties with the continent, so that by 1939, it had thirty-five national members, with only seven outside Europe.61 Neither Canada, Britain or the

148 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

United States (the “big three” within the WFEA) became members of the IFTA in its formative years, however.62 Instead, as part of a “North Atlantic Triangle” among educators, they remained principal leaders of the WFEA, and it was through this triangle that they applied most of their international cooperation efforts in education. Charlesworth seemed to play a pivotal role in those WFEA-IFTA discussions of 1935, and prepared a detailed report for the 1936 CTF annual meeting, underscoring his role as educational “diplomat,” negotiator and mediator representing Canada abroad.63 Charlesworth reviewed these events with obvious pride at his own participation and the CTF’s role.64 He stressed a Canadian approach was welcomed since “a Canadian delegate was probably more appreciative of the respective viewpoints...by reason of geographical proximity and neighbourly understanding in one case, and by historical and traditional bonds and ties in the other.” As WFEA President, but also England’s National Union of Teachers General Secretary, Frederick Mander, chose Charlesworth to represent the WFEA in part for those reasons.65 The resulting agreements affirmed greater cooperation, but maintained the groups’ separate identities and independence. They acknowledged for reasons of economic “rationalization” that “the W.F.E.A. shall continue to place its major emphasis on general educational questions” whereas the “I.F.T.A. shall continue to place its major emphasis on the professional and corporative interests of teachers.” When Charlesworth presented this report to the CTF’s 1936 Annual Meeting, he recommended CTF affiliation with the IFTA. Proximity to the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation’s (UNESCO’s precursor) Paris offices and access to “remarkably excellent” publications was a primary reason for the suggestion, but also that the CTF might get assistance for some of its own problems.66 Part of Charlesworth’s argument was also a comparative one, that “we might follow the lead of the Educational Institute of Scotland.”67 After 1936, however, political conditions in Europe worsened, and for the WFEA it became increasingly difficult to maintain international links. The CTF felt a responsibility to keep some structure in place to rebuild after the war. This was the aim of the WFEA’s “Wartime Program,” noting that it was “the only international organization of teacher organizations which functions in the United Nations.”68 When then WFEA President, Paul Monroe, first asked CTF directors to host a WFEAmeeting in Montreal for 1942 they agreed. As CTF Secretary-Treasurer Charles Crutchfield wrote: It is the least that we teachers on this side of the Atlantic can do to keep the torch of freedom burning through our support of the one Federationwhichrepresentstheteachersoftheworld.Weteachers of Canada feel that there will be a great need for a World Federation after the present disastrous war is won by our allies. The teachers of the devastated areas will be looking to us for leadership, and if we really have faith in Democracy as a living

149 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

pulsating force we should unhesitatingly give that leadership when the necessity arises.69 “Educating for Democracy” had been a familiar theme in both the CTF and WFEA from their inception. Educators saw democracy, internation- alismandpeaceascloselylinkedassumptions.FortheCTF,andtheWFEA, democracy was an international moral vision, an international ideal, and a shared standard that grew out of the Western nations’ strategic alliance during World War I. Canadian internationalism implied support for democracy, and its notion of international education was built on that assumption beginning with the cover page of The B.C. Teacher’s premier issue.70 UBC’s Dean H.J. Coleman followed this in a subsequent issue with an article elaborating on the democracy theme.71 The 1923 resolutions of the WFEA’s San Francisco conference also referred to the need for universal democratic education throughout the world, a subject raised at subsequent NEA and WFEA meetings.72 Only through democracy could peace and “brotherly love” among nations be attained and maintained. With Fascism and Nazism on the rise in Europe in the 1930s and with the onset of war finally in 1939, such issues gained a new importance within the CTF, and internationally on the WFEAagenda. As World War II approached, the source for anti-fascist ideals sometimes came not from British or Canadian authorities,butAmerican.B.C.TeacherEditor,NormanBlack,referredtoa speech by President Roosevelt at a recent NEAconvention expressing “his conviction that the ultimate victory would be with democracy and that it will be attained through education.” Black affirmed that “in these sentiments the teachers of British Columbia concur.” During World War II, the BCTF and CTF increasingly emphasized education’s role in safeguarding existing freedoms and post-war reconstruction, and Canada’s and the United States’ special role in those efforts. J.M. Thomas a CTF vice-president from Victoria promoted a renewed democratic thrust during Education Week activities in November 1939. He stressed that our “political safety lies in education,” and that teachers “must educate for democracy and be democratic in our education.”73 Thomas stressed that “the schools of the world are the battlefields where Democracy is to be won or lost for the world of tomorrow.” One battle as Thomas described it was conquering Canada’s backwardness in educational finance and administration compared to “other great British Democracies.” The situation was especially unjust for rural and small-town teachers who worked in “sweatshop conditions.” In sum, Thomas argued that “the world” situation should not undermine democracy at home. “Merely to talk of democratic patriotism is not enough.” Rather, equality of education opportunity with federal government support, was essential for Canada as a democratic state. In 1942, the BCTF also finally passed a resolution declaring “Total War” against the axis powers. A new Committee to implement this resolution affirmed that schools should be able to defend the democratic way of life

150 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle” and “above all to improve it.” It stressed the need to keep schools open during the war, but asked the Department of Education to go beyond “talk about...building better worlds.” As a contribution to war morale it called for decent salary scales for teachers and better teaching conditions.74 As another weapon in this fight for “political safety” and safeguarding or improving local freedoms it established an Education and Democracy Committee in 1942 to promote study, research, discussion and spreading democratic ideals in the schools. It also sought to assess present trends of social progress, agree on future directions and assess how well schools fit that vision.75 Nationally, the CTF emphasized similar themes, speaking of reconstruction based on a “new order” and the democratic foundations of theAtlanticCharter.76 Ironically,itwassignedinAugust1941byRoosevelt and Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland, but without direct Canadian involvement.77 Britain and the United States never invited Canada to participate in this meeting or its preparation despite Canada’s otherwise significant contribution to the war effort as Britain’s senior ally in 1940-41, and many other bilateral diplomatic, defence and military preparations between Canada and the United States prior to that. Once the Americans entered the war effort, Canada’s role became, as Creighton has argued, more that of a “submissive satellite.”78 Even so Churchill throughout the war continually told Mackenzie King that “We all look to you as the link with America. Canada is the interpreter.”79 Whether such statements were part lip service or genuine sentiment on behalf of the British, the CTF indeed saw itself and acted as a kind of “interpreter” or mediator on international education matters for most of the interwar years and throughout the World War II crisis. It avoided the obvious complexities and political undertones of official diplomatic relationships, but placed itself ideologically in the centre of, and building on, this initially otherwise British and American vision to fight fascism and restore world peace, symbolized by the Churchill and Roosevelt Atlantic Charter. The North Atlantic triangle remained a significant image and focus for the CTF and its partners until the demise of the WFEA. But the triangular relationship receded and was also complicated during the war as Russia participated in the Western alliance. Meanwhile, Charlesworth prepared what was likely his final brief on the WFEA. Democracy was foundational to the BCTF and CTF when he helped found them, and he now repeatedtheinternationaldemocraticidealasfundamentaltotheWFEA: the greatest task ahead for education is to bring the peoples of the world to know the democratic way of life and in a large measure accept that way of life....The World Federation of Education Associations is democratic in principle and intention. It will have an opportunity after the war to present to the world the best ideals and patterns of life that have been developed anywhere up to this time.80

151 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

In the end, Charlesworth remained on the WFEA’s Canadian “Committee of Arrangements” which tried to organize the 1942 Montreal meeting, and was one officer who “by grace and grit” held the WFEA together during the war.81 International educational relations of any kind, however, became increasingly difficult. Even short trips between the U.S. and Canada were prohibitive due to gas rationing. Holding such an international or even North American conference was next to impossible. It was also problematic to educate for peace amidst war effort. Finally, the WFEAbuilt from the ashes of WorldWar I, became a casualty of WorldWar II. The CTF executive by late 1946, saying it could not support two organizations, abandoned the WFEA discontinuing affiliation in favour of another American, Washington D.C.-based group, the World Organization of Members of the Teaching Profession (WOTP).82 By then there was also confusion within the CTF as to Canada’s leadership in the WFEA, and poor communication between the WFEAand the CTF. Montreal’s Jessie Norris, a past CTF president as well as principal CTF representative and Canadian WFEA director from 1937, had diligently prepared for the proposed Montreal conference. Norris was finally squeezed out to make way for a new group and a new organization. The WOTPwas a new organization for a newinternationalorder.TheWFEAbecameavictimofaninternationalwar and power politics among two rival factions.83 The old guard who had kept the WFEAalive during the interwar years and through part of World War II had either passed on, or was unable to continue due to age and health. Charlesworth among them, died in 1944. The WFEA survived, struggling until late 1946, but with the onset of war in 1939, it was never the same.

Conclusions: Implications for Canadian and International Studies In conclusion, this paper has shown that CTF work with the WFEA from 1923 to the mid 1940s was important for Canada’s international educational relations and was a good demonstration of citizen diplomacy at work, and especially an “interpreter” or mediator between the British and Americans. Charlesworth helped shape the WFEA as its vice-president, through such special committees and projects as the tenure study, and adopting and promoting many WFEA international policies and programs at home.84 British Columbia, in particular modeled Anglo-American relations with Washington State educators, and in Charlesworth’s diplomatic negotiations for the WFEA. Reasons for such activity were based mostly on an altruistic internationalist outlook that sought to disseminate peace, democracy and social justice through education. However, BCTF and CTF organizational self-interest also clearly played a role in these developments, especially through work on the teacher tenure issue in the WFEA and Charlesworth’s rationalization of supporting CTF relations with the WFEA. More generally, this paper has illustrated that a North Atlantic Triangle existed between Canadian, American and to a

152 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle” lesser extent, British, educators. Canada and the CTF played a significant role in nurturing and supporting the triangle and the WFEA. More research is needed to examine similar themes and issues in the American NEA and British teachers’ organizations as well as national differences within Canada from different provincial perspectives and teachers’associations. In particular, we need to know more about American and British roles and perceptions of their own international education leadership, as well as their views of Canada’s role. Clearly Canada borrowed many internationalist ideas and initiatives from the Americans and the British, but Charlesworth and the CTF made every effort to highlight Canadian views and achievements. This was partly to compensate for the fact that Canadian teachers were the weakest and most recently organized among them. For Canada, and specifically British Columbia, the birth and evolution of the WFEAwas also part of a transition from imperialism to a stronger Canadian nationalism, a wider and more inclusive and “mature” internationalism, coloured by a United States- dominated North American continentalism in educational relations. All three elements–imperialism, nationalism and internationalism–remained in overlapping play for the CTF throughout the interwar years and were reflected in the economic, political and cultural dynamics of a North Atlantic triangle. But for teachers, internationalism in particular represented “progress” at home and on the world stage. Progress in the acceptance of international ideals was revealed through ongoing WFEA cooperation, debates about key internationalist issues and fundamental beliefs, and organizational and societal politics. Other studies, for example, have even argued that racism and imperialism dominated interwar years education in Canada, especially in British Columbia, until the mid 1920s, but say little of what occurred after 1925 while ignoring internationalist outlooks.85 My paper provides a counter to such interpretations showing that internationalist and cooperative ideas began to arise in the interwar period, especially after 1923 and the WFEA’s founding.86 The WFEA’s spirit of internationalism, and its varied international education programs, ultimately added a softening effect to a previously more exclusive and even jingoistic imperialism for Canadians. This new internationalism arose in part due to the characteristics of and relationship synergies in a North Atlantic triangle and no doubt some American anti-imperialist sentiments. While the WFEA was not an overt platform for anti-imperialism it could not help but provide a significant contrast to international relationships based solely on imperial ties, the model most familiar to Canadians before the Great War. The WFEAand its largely American, British and Canadian leadership together in a shared geographical, intellectual and English-speaking alliance tempered or helped to redefine both imperialism and nationalism among educators. Canadian teachers’roles in, and their organizational growth as aresult of, this triangle with the WFEA at the centre, were distinct and important. It

153 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes was mainly the CTF (not, for example, the CEA or NCCU as organizations or their members) that participated in the WFEA and related activities.87 E.A. Hardy, the Canadian WFEA Treasurer from 1927, particularly underscored WFEA and CTF cooperation as a sign of historical progress. He traced the steps where he saw teachers organizing in Canada, provincially, nationally, and then with “some measure of imperial consciousness” through work with the Overseas Education League and the League of Empire. The final step, he noted was “international relationships” begun with the San Francisco conference, the NEA and the WFEA. These remarks from Hardy’s 1940 report to the CTF Annual Meeting were qualified with a comment that he was still an imperialist with a “conviction of the greatness of the part which Canada is destined to play in the affairs of the British Empire...”88 A transition was occurring, but internationalism not replacing imperialism outright. Internationalism was growing of a still fertile Empire soil, especially evident during World War II. What are the implications of such developments for contemporary Canadian studies of international educational relations among teachers and governments? Or for a better understanding of current theoretical issues and debates concerning culture, education and civil society in foreign policy and international relations? Those are subjects of another paper but questions raised here might be a starting point for future research. Since the 1940s, with the WFEA’s demise and the founding of the WOTP, the role of teachers’ and other educational organizations has changed and expanded dramatically. During the interwar years, the now defunct League of Nations also spawned the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, the precursor to UNESCO. Although the League of Nations had national committees or commissions similar to those that exist in UNESCO today, their function, influence and diplomatic roles were different and warrant closer comparison. However, Canada played a minuscule role in the League’s Education work compared to its influence within the WFEA. For the United States, which never joined the League, the WFEAalso played an even more significant role, with its offices in Washington and presumably some, even if minor, influence on international relations and foreign policy whether or not they had “educational attachés” in embassies. For Britain, the WFEAwas important partly to maintain imperial links with Canada as it was being drawn closer to the United States by physical proximity if nothing else. Britain also had one of the world’s strongest League of Nations societies, as a citizen-based NGO and likely wanted to maintain its moral and intellectual leadership in English-speaking democracies through internationalism. These are all questions and issues requiring further research with a more comprehensive look at Anglo-American-Canadian cooperation. Finally, comparisons between educational NGOs and governmental foreign policy agendas of the interwar years with the period following

154 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

World War II and the post Cold War era require much closer analysis. This paper grew out a longer historical and sociological study of education and internationalisminBritishColumbiafrom1900to1939thattriedtoexplain contemporary developments from the 1980s and 1990s.89 That study revealed that some of the organizations and ideas of the interwar years were clearly unique and, despite some politically self-interested motives, idealism and altruism prevailed. However, a more selfish, institutional and economically driven form of educational internationalization arose not so coincidentally in the 1980s and 1990s the same period that “globalization” also became important, when government and business leaders said everyone must adapt or be left behind. Some Canadian educators and NGOs, however, have been harshly critical of globalization for its economic determinism over moral or cooperative values and especially the increasing pressure to privatize education, support free trade in educational services and involve corporations in the class-room at all levels, from primary through post-secondary.90 This trend has been developing over the past decade or so with many Canadian provinces actively recruiting foreign (mainly Asian) students through “marketing” educational services abroad. This was the same period that public education budgets came under increasing pressure from global economic recession, conservatism and budget restraint in the era of Thatcher, Reagan and Mulroney, continuing with Chrétien for the Liberals. As such, international education has recently become a more focused and strategic foreign and domestic policy tool responding to globalization. Peace education has become a distant memory and “international education” is now more about political economy or gaining world market share for basic institutional survival. Marketing educational services to international students has grown amidst declining public funds for education and calls for more revenue-generation and cost-recovery programs. Other countries, especially the United States, Australia and Great Britain are now viewed as educational “competitors” of Canada, while North Atlantic Triangle cooperation is all but irrelevant. For Canada the new era has been focused more on the Pacific Rim, seen as a horizon for the new economy since the mid-1980s. The Vancouver-based and government-founded Asia Pacific Foundation (APF) has hosted workshops, done feasibility studies and pioneered discussions of such issues among Canadian education stakeholders with ongoing support from Canada’s Foreign Affairs Department. It also began an aggressive campaign to market Canadian educational institutions abroad by establishing a network of new educational centres in the Asia Pacific Region.91 For the Canadian government, and post-World War II domestic alliances such as Council of the Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC), this is where much of the new educational foreign policy and diplomacy lies. More work is needed to address particular activities and roles of Canadian

155 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes educational associations and alliances after 1946, particularly the international work of the CMEC. The CMEC, especially since the 1980s, played an important coordinating function for provincial inputs to international education policy and official representation at world conferences in cooperation with Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT). More research is also required to document the extent, dimensions and impact of such developments and the role of teachers’ and other educational associations in Canada, the United States, Britain and elsewhere in responding to globalization. Many new and more specialized international educational organizations have also grown since World War II, including Education International (replacing the earlier WOTP and similar groups) as well as the International Association of Universities (IAU) and others requiring closer analysis. However, it is clear that the idealist,halcyoninter-waryearsaregone.ManyCanadianteachers,atleast, are also not happy with federal and provincial government involvement in this economic dimension of educational internationalization as they have both withdrawn public funding for education and are relying more on private sources, including international students to supplement budgets. This is clearly a new, distinctive and recent trend in Canada and around the world raising significant pedagogical concerns, ethical issues and foreign policy implications. More work is needed to compare developments in the interwar years with contemporary trends and teachers’ organizations in other countries.

Notes 1. Lawrence T. Woods, Asia Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993). 2. For general background to the CEA (originally the Dominion Education Association or DEA until 1918) and the NCCU, see G.E. Malcolm MacLeod and Robert Blair, The Canadian Education Association The First 100 Years: 1891-1991. (Toronto: The Canadian Education Association, 1992); and Gwendoline Evans Pilkington, Speaking with One Voice: Universities in Dialogue with Government (Montreal: History of McGill Project, McGill University, 1983). 3. Discussed in Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing: 1900-1970 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), esp. in Chapter 6 “A North American Nation,” 137-159. 4. I have documented Canadian teachers’ leadership in such developments more thoroughly in Wayne Nelles, From Imperialism to Internationalism in British Columbia Education and Society – 1900 to 1939. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Department of Educational Studies, 1995). 5. For the broad Canadian historical and political context see Thomas P. Socknat, Witness Against War: Pacifism in Canada 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). Also see Norman A. M. MacKenzie, “Frederic H. Soward and the Development of International Studies in Canada,” in Harvey L. Dyck and Peter Krosby, Eds., Empire and Nations: Essays in Honour of Frederic H.

156 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

Soward (Toronto: University of Toronto, Press, 1969), pp. xvii-xxi for an introduction to these issues among academics and universities. 6. Note John Bartlet Brebner’s classic study North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain (New York: Columbia Univer- sity, 1958/Original 1945) for a general overview. 7. For a useful updated review of these and related issues also raised by Brebner see Gregory A. Johnson and David A Lenarcic “The Decade of Transition: The North Atlantic Triangle during the 1920s,” in B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American- Canadian Relations, 1902-1956 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 81-109; B.J.C. McKercher, “World Power and Isolationism: The North Atlantic Triangle and the Crises of the 1930s,” in B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo- American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 110-146. 8. For a good overview see Elly Hermon, “The International Peace Education Movement, 1919-1939,” in Peace Movements and Political Cultures, Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen, Eds., (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), pp. 127-142. 9. Frederick Pollock, “Kindred Societies—Past and Present VIII—The League of Empire,” United Empire: The Royal Colonial Institute Journal, n.s., 6 (1915), pp. 736-741. 10. See Programme of the Second Meeting of the Imperial Conference of Teacher’s Associations, Toronto, August 10th-13th, 1921 (University of British Columbia Library Main Stacks, Vancouver); and Harry Charlesworth, “Imperial Conference of Teacher’s Associations,” B.C. Teacher’s Federation Magazine 1, Nos. 1-2 (Sept.-Oct. 1921), p. 7. 11. For historical background see J.L Granatstein, Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1996). 12. See Brebner, (1958/1945), op. cit., pp. 244-272, for background on the formation of the triangle. 13. Discussed in Michael G. Fry, Illusions of Security: North Atlantic Diplomacy, 1918-22 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972); and Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing: 1900-1970 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976). 14. A.E. Johns, “The English-Speaking Union—Its Origins and Objectives,” The B.C. Teacher 9, No. 9 (May 1930), p. 21. 15. From Charlesworth’s Editorial on p. 201 introducing Otto Kahn’s speech, “Concerning British-American Relations,” in The B.C. Teacher 2, no. 9 (May 1923), pp. 201-203. 16. B.C. Teacher, “Annual Meeting of Canadian Teachers’ Federation—President Charlesworth’s Report,” The B.C. Teacher 2, no. 3 (November 1922), pp. 54-57. 17. Harry Charlesworth, “The School as a Vital Factor on National Life,” The B.C. Teacher 1, No. 8 (April 1922), pp. 2-5. 18. Noted on pages 9 & 10 of the document “Mackenzie King at the Imperial Conference, 1923,” in J.L. Granatstein, Ed., Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), pp. 7-20. 19. Discussed by John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1985), pp. 53-54. 20. “Greetings from Canadian Teachers,” Speech to the 1926 Convention, National Education Association of the United States, BCTF Archives, II-2/15.

157 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

21. “International Education Conference,” in The B.C. Teacher 9, no. 9 (May 1930), pp. 46-47. 22. Arthur A. Hauck, “Education and Canadian-United States Relations,” in I.L. Kandel and Guy Montrose Whipple, Eds., The Thirty-Sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II—International Under- standing Through the Public-School Curriculum (Bloomington: Public School Publishing Co., 1937), pp. 271-279. 23. E.A. Hardy, “World Federation Conference, Toronto, August 7-12, 1927,” The B.C. Teacher 6, no. 6 (February 1927), pp. 4-5; and John Marr, “World Federation Conference, Toronto, August 7-12, 1927,” The B.C. Teacher 6, no. 6 (February 1927), pp. 5-7. 24. E.A. Hardy, “Greetings from the Canadian Teachers’ Federation to the National Education Association,” Proceedings of National Education Association of the United States (1928), pp. 20-22. 25. See Thomas Bicknell, President of the NEA discussing this as part of their organizational history in National Education Association of the United States, Journal of Proceedings and Addresses (hereafter, abbreviated as NEA Proc for specific years) of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, July 6-12, 1912, p. 145. 26. For context see especially Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919- 1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1964/original 1939). 27. See Elly Hermon, “The International Peace Education Movement, 1919-1939,” in Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen, Eds., Peace Movements and Political Cultures (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), pp. 127- 142; Charles Howlett, “John Dewey and Nicholas Murray Butler: Contrasting Conceptions of Peace Education in the Twenties,” Educational Theory 37, no. 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 447-461; and Sondra R. Herman, Eleven Against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898-1921 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969). For some Canadian and specifically British Columbia primary sources discussing this “movement” see W.G. Cove, “The New Education,” The B.C. Teacher 2, no. 1 (September 1922), pp. 3-6; George Pringle, “The Schools and International Peace: A Schoolmaster’s Profession of Faith,” The B.C. Teacher 3, no. 9 (May 1924), pp. 201-202. See also the unauthored (but probably Harry Charlesworth’s) summary building on material from The Schoolmaster and Woman Teachers’ Chronicle, “The Schools and World Peace,” The B.C. Teacher 7, no. 10 (June 1928), pp. 30-33; Frank A. Hoare, “The English Teacher and the Peace Movement,” The B.C. Teacher 8, no. 2 (October 1928), pp. 4-6; and “Peace and the Teacher,” by Norman Fergus Black in The B.C. Teacher 18, no. 4 (December 1938), pp. 180-182. 28. For the early theory and practical background to such notions see Nicholas Murray Butler, “The International Mind: Opening Address of the Presiding Officer of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, May 15, 1912,” Association for International Conciliation, Proceedings (New York: 1912), pp. 3-15; Nicholas Murray Butler, The International Mind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913); and Nicholas Murray Butler, “The Development of the International Mind: An Address Delivered Before the Academy of International Law at the Hague, July 20, 1923,” International Conciliation, no. 192 (November 1923), pp. 775-785. For links to the WFEA and Canada see: “World Conference on Education—Resolutions,” The B.C. Teacher 3, no. 2 (October 1923), p. 34;

158 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

Augustus Thomas, “Report of Committee on Foreign Relations,” NEA Proc, (1923), p. 403; “The World Federation of Education Associations—The President’s Address (Continued),” The B.C. Teacher 5, no. 2 (October 1925), p. 30; E.A. Hardy, “Greetings from the Canadian Teachers’ Federation to the National Education Association,” NEA Proc, (1928), pp. 20-22; and “Inter- national Education—An Interview with Prof. Mack Eastman,” The B.C. Teacher (October 1928), p. 41. 29. See Harry Charlesworth’s editorial note “The League of Education,” in The B.C. Teacher 9, no. 1 (September 1929), p. 40 for specific mention, but also scores of other allusions in The B.C. Teacher and elsewhere. 30. “Woodrow Wilson—The Educator,” The B.C. Teacher 3, no. 8 (April 1924), p. 181. 31. NEA Proc (1919), p. 26. 32. Ibid, p. 27. 33. NEA Proc (1920), p. 26. 34. P. 54 of “Annual Meeting of Canadian Teachers’ Federation—President Charlesworth’s Report,” The B.C. Teacher 2, no. 3 (November 1922), pp. 54-57. 35. Ibid, p. 55. 36. For background see C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume I: 1867-1921 (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1977). For the interwar years esp. see Ch. 3, “The Empire, America, and The League,” of John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1939 Decades of Discord (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1985), pp. 38-57; Richard Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 64; and H. Gordon Skilling, Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945). 37. P. 57 of “Annual Meeting of Canadian Teachers’ Federation—President Charlesworth’s Report,” The B.C. Teacher 2, no. 3 (November 1922), pp. 54-57. 38. Ibid. 39. NEA Proc (1920), pp. 178-79. 40. “Report on the Committee on Resolutions,” NEA Proc (1920), p. 26. 41. Ibid, pp. 739-740. 42. NEA Proc (1923), pp. 415. 43. Detailed discussion of international law and policy goes beyond this study. The issues and interpretations are complex. For relevant background see Marvin Soroos, Beyond Sovereignty: The Challenge of Global Policy (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986); Ralph Pettman, “Moral Claims in World Politics,” in Ralph Pettman, Ed., Moral Claims in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 17-35; and any number of introductory texts on international law discussing standards “sources” and historical precedents such as N.A. Maryan Green, International Law: Law of Peace (London: MacDonald & Evans, 1973). 44. NEA Proc (1915), pp. 25-30. 45. NEA Proc (1923), p. 415. 46. As reported by James F. Hosic, Conference Secretary, in “World Conference on Education,” in The B.C. Teacher 3, no. 2 (October 1923), p. 27. 47. Noted by Augustus Thomas, in “Report of The Committee on Cooperation with The World Federation of National Education Associations,” NEA Proc (1924), p. 273. 48. “Educational Attachés Backed by Federation,” The B.C. Teacher 5, no. 4 (December 1925), p. 86 (reprinted from The American Federation of Teachers’

159 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Monthly Bulletin); and J.W. Crabtree, “Biennal Report—World Federation of National Education Associations,” NEA Proc (1935), pp. 739-740. 49. Discussed in H. Gordon Skilling, Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945), pp. 235-244. 50. NEA Proc (1923), p. 416. 51. From p. 118 of “Greetings Received by the Canadian Teachers’ Federation at the Victoria Convention,” The B.C. Teacher 4, no. 5 (January 1925), pp. 118-119. 52. Ibid, p. 118. 53. Ibid, p. 119. 54. See p. 18 of M.J. Coldwell, “The Canadian Teachers’ Federation Convention,” The B.C. Teacher 7, no. 1 (September 1927), pp. 16-18. 55. See various references in Timothy Dunn, “The Rise of Mass Public Schooling in British Columbia,” J. Donald Wilson and David C. Jones, Eds., Schooling and Society in Twentieth Century British Columbia (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises, 1980), pp. 23-52; “Resolutions Adopted at Annual General Meeting,” The B.C. Teacher 5, no. 8 (April 1926); and “Conventions,” The B.C. Teacher 7, no. 1 (September 1927), p. 43. 56. “Editorial—The Teachers’ Pensions Act,” The B.C. Teacher 8, no. 7, (March 1929), p. 3. 57. “Teacher Tenure,” by Harry Charlesworth in The B.C. Teacher 9, no. 1 (September 1929), p. 18. 58. Mack Eastman, “The International Labour Organization in Education,” in The B.C. Teacher 6, no. 3 (November 1926), pp. 44-47. 59. “Public Opinion is Lifeblood of League of Nations,” Victoria Daily Times (27 June 1927), p. 13; and for general background see “Some Important Appoint- ments—Mr. Ira Dilworth,” The B.C. Teacher 14, no. 1 (September 1934), pp. 1-2. 60. “The International Federation of Teachers’ Federations,” by F. Mander, in The B.C. Teacher 13, no. 4 (December 1933), pp. 26-29. 61. Discussed in Edward Thompson, “International Teachers’ Organizations and Their Activities,” in Albert Blum, Ed., Teacher Unions and Associations: A Comparative Study (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969), pp. 336-337. 62. See the list in “Report of the World Federation of Education Associations for C.T.F. Conference to be held in Ottawa, August, 1935,” BCTF Archives, XII-2/12, 2541. 63. “Canadian Teachers’ Federation: Report of the Oxford Conferences, August, 1935,” July 25th, 1936, BCTF Archives, XII-2/12, 3311-3321. This report included two addenda detailing the background to the WFEA and other international education associations, and documentation of the WFEA-IFTA negotiations in Oxford: “Relation of the World Federation of Education Associations to Other International Bodies,” July 25th, 1936, 3316-3321; and “Canadian Teachers’ Federation: Memorandum Concerning Suggested Co-operation with the International Federation of Teachers’ Federations (I.F.T.A.),” (July 29th, 1936), pp. 3322-3326. 64. “Relation of the World Federation of Education Associations to Other Intern- ational Bodies,” (July 25th, 1936), p. 3317. 65. Ibid, p. 3316. 66. “Canadian Teachers’ Federation: Memorandum Concerning Suggested Co-operation with the International Federation of Teachers’ Federations (I.F.T.A.),” (July 29th, 1936), p. 3323; and “Minutes of the Fifteenth Conference of The Canadian Teachers’ Federation, held in Saskatoon, August 4th to 7th 1936” (Canadian Teachers’ Federation Library, Ottawa), p. 6.

160 Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a “North Atlantic Triangle”

67. “Canadian Teachers’ Federation: Memorandum Concerning Suggested Co-operation With The International Federation of Teachers’ Federations (I.F.T.A.),” (July 29th, 1936), BCTF Archives, XII-2/12, p. 3328. 68. “The Wartime Program of the World Federation of Education Associations,” n.d., National Archives of Canada (Ottawa), Canadian Teachers’ Federation Collection, MG 28 I 102, Vol. 102, File #1350. 69. Crutchfield to Monroe, September 16, 1941, National Archives of Canada (Ottawa), Canadian Teachers’ Federation Collection, MG 28 I 102, Vol. 102, File #1351. 70. Quoted from Wm. Howley Smith, “All the Children of All the People,” in B.C. Teachers’ Federation Magazine 1, nos. 1-2 (September, 1921), p. 1. 71. Dean H.J. Coleman, “Democracy and the Schoolmaster—An Allegory,” The B.C. Teacher 1, no. 4, (December 1921), pp. 1-4. 72. See, for example, “World Conference on Education Resolutions,” The B.C. Teacher 3, no. 2 (October 1923), p. 38. 73. J.M. Thomas, “Education and Democracy,” The B.C. Teacher 19, no. 4 (December 1939), p. 200-202. 74. B. Mickleburgh, “Report of Chairman, B.C.T.F. Committee on Total War,” The B.C. Teacher 22, no. 5 (February 1943), p. 166. 75. “Education and Democracy Committee,” The B.C. Teacher 22, no. 5 (February 1943), p. 167. 76. “Minutes of the Twenty-First Conference of The Canadian Teachers’ Federation, held in the King Edward Hotel, Toronto, August 10th to 14th 1942,” (Canadian Teachers’ Federation Library, Ottawa), p. 3. 77. Note especially J.L Granatstein, “The Man who Wasn’t There: MacKenzie King, Canada, and the Atlantic Charter,” in The Atlantic Charter, Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther (New York: St. Martin’s Press), pp. 115-128. 78. Discussed in Donald Creighton, The Story of Canada (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1959), pp. 244-246. 79. The Churchill quote is reported in James Eayrs, “The Atlantic Conference and its Charter: A Canadian’s Reflections,” in The Atlantic Charter, Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther (New York: St. Martin’s Press), pp. 151-171, excerpted from The Dictionary of Canadian Quotations and Phrases. 80. Harry Charlesworth, “The World Federation of Education Associations: Its Past and Future Plans” (the date is unclear, but the references indicate it was written sometime in late 1942 or early 1943), UBC Archives (Special Collections), Harry Charlesworth File, pp. 14-15. 81. Ibid, p. 8. 82. See correspondence: Charles Crutchfield to Jessie Norris, December, 27th, 1946; and Crutchfield to Norris, January 10th, 1947. NAC, Canadian Teachers’ Federation Collection, MG 28 I 102, Vol. 102, File #1352. 83. This discussion goes beyond this study, and I’ve found no archival data yet in the CTF and National Archives in Ottawa, or with the BCTF records or provincial archives. Further research in NEA and WOTP archives (probably in Washington D.C.), however, might uncover useful detailed material on such developments. 84. Noted on p. 29 of James F. Hosic, “World Conference on Education,” The B.C. Teacher 3, no. 2 (October 1923), pp. 26-29. 85. Concerning the British and/or racist emphasis in the Canadian education system and B.C.’s in particular see: Jo-ann Archibald, “Resistance to an Unremitting Process: Racism, Curriculum and Education in Western Canada,” in J.A. Mangan, Ed., The Imperial Curriculum: Racial Images and Education in the

161 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

British Colonial Experience (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 93-107; Robert M. Stamp, “Empire Day in the Schools of Ontario: The Training of Young Imperialists,” in Alf Chaiton and Neil McDonald, Eds., Canadian Schools and Canadian Identity (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1977), pp. 100-115; and Timothy Stanley, “White Supremacy and the Rhetoric of Educational Indoctrination: A Canadian Case Study,” in Jean Barman, Neil Sutherland, and J. Donald Wilson, Eds., Children, Teachers and Schools in the History of British Columbia (Calgary: Detselig, 1995), pp. 39-56. 86. For a much more comprehensive analysis of this transition see: Nelles, (op. cit.) 1995. 87. More research would be helpful to examine international ideas, linkages and activities of other education organizations and leaders in Canada, particularly the CEA and NCCU. But it seems clear the CTF was on the forefront of promoting internationalism through education. 88. “WFEA—Dr. E.A. Hardy’s Report,” attached to Minutes of the Nineteenth Conference of the Canadian Teacher’s Federation held in the Royal Connaught Hotel—Hamilton, August 12 to 16, 1940 (Canadian Teachers’ Federation Library, Ottawa). 89. Wayne Nelles, (op. cit.) 1995. 90. For more discussion of recent trends see: Wayne Nelles, “What’s New? Understanding Internationalization and International Education in British Columbia,” Learning Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 7-9; and Marita Moll, Ed., Tech High: Globalization and the Future of Canadian Education. Halifax/Ottawa, (Fernwood Publishing/Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1997). 91. For background to these developments see: Catherine Cameron, International Education: The Asia Pacific Region: A Marketing Study for the Asia Pacific Branch Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1993); Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (1994) Canadian Education and the Asia Pacific Region: A Vision For The Future (Workshop Programme), meeting held in Vancouver, March 9-11, 1994. (Ottawa: Asia Pacific Divison, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1994); and John Graham “Third Pillar or Fifth Wheel? International Education and Cultural Foreign Policy,” in Fen Osler Hampson, Michael Hart, and Martin Rudner, Eds., Canada Among Nations 1999: A Big League Player (Don Mills, Oxford University Press Canada, 1999), pp. 137-154.

162 Louis Bélanger

Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

Abstract In this era of globalization, it is increasingly difficult to present cultural and national identities as given, and this challenges how foreign policy has traditionally managed its relationship to culture. This paper analyses this problem at the micro-level and explores how, in this context, culture is defined or redefined by societal and state actors as a legitimate object of foreign policy in Canada. Borrowing from public policy literature, the study focuses on an attempt by a policy network, the New Conversations initiative, to penetrate a policy community, here the foreign policy community, in order to institutionalize culture as a legitimate object of foreign policy.

Résumé Dans le contexte actuel de la mondialisation, il est de plus en plus difficile de présenter les identités culturelles et nationales comme étant données, et ceci s’oppose à la conception traditionnelle de la relation entre politique étrangère et culture. Cette étude explore cette problématique au niveau micro et analyse comment, dans ce contexte, la culture est définie ou redéfinie par les acteurs sociétaux et étatiques en tant qu’objet légitime de la politique étrangère au Canada. S’appuyant sur des travaux en politique publique, l’étude se penche sur une tentative de pénétration de la communauté de politique publique (policy community), ici la communauté de la politique étrangère, par un réseau de politique publique (policy network), l’initiative New Conversations, dans le but d’institutionnaliser la culture en tant qu’objet légitime de la politique étrangère.

The globalization of trade in cultural products and services has served as the backdrop for a redefinition of international cultural policies in recent years. However, although a new cultural agenda is clearly emerging on the international stage, it seems difficult for the time being to precisely define the interests, norms and issues around which this new agenda revolves. One likely reason for this apparent confusion, as suggested in this paper, is that the definition of culture as a legitimate object of foreign policy poses problems and generates political tensions. This new international cultural agenda is first structured by the tension continually mounting over the last few years between states which deny that the cultural content of products has any relevance in the application of international trade rules—primarily the United States—and others which

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes seek to have cultural industries exempted from the application of agreements on economic liberalization—the European Union and Canada. As suggested by Donna Pennee recently in this Journal, this agenda is new in the sense that it is shaped by global economic forces that are actually shaping cultures and differs in that respect to the old international cultural agenda of the old Cold War era that was structured by East-West and North-South ideological struggles (Pennee 1999). This new tension between two conceptions of what has real cultural value and what is merely entertainment was particularly evident during the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), the now defunct Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) and WTO preparatory work for an eventual Millennium Round. More recently, a number of states which support the principle of cultural exemption have formed a coalition, lead by Canada, to lay the groundwork for a new international regime which would both provide the framework for and legitimize intervention by governments in the field of culture. Discussions and negotiations about the creation of such a regime, held at UNESCO and within the International Network on Cultural Policy,1 also showed signs of tension. Behind a common desire to promote “cultural diversity” to counter the standardizing effects of globalization, positions on which diversity and which culture are to be promoted vary or, at least, are less firm. It is not clear whether the goal should be simply to consolidate and protect existing national cultures or to open them up to foreign and minority cultural realities.2 At the foreign policy level, the new challenges of globalization and the emergence of a new international cultural agenda have contributed to a general crisis in cultural diplomacies (Roche 1998). On the one hand, the importance of a cultural presence abroad and within international networks of communication (Nye and Owens 1996; Rothkopf 1997) is recognized by states and has led some of them to create, and others to maintain or reform, their international cultural services.3 On the other hand, the fact that culture has become an object in itself of state foreign intervention, and can no longer be merely an instrument of their diplomatic and trade relations, as in the Cold War era, seems to have provoked a malaise. At first, this malaise manifested itself as a bureaucratic tension. For example, since the international cultural policy of a state is now thought of more as an extension of its domestic cultural policy rather than simple prestige diplomacy, should it not be entrusted to cultural affairs rather than foreign affairs departments? This gave rise to a struggle over administrative control, albeit with varying intensity. Even though it is still too early to judge the outcome of this conflict, surprisingly enough, it seems that the institutions responsible for cultural projection and co-operation have generally remained dependent on national diplomacies whereas responsibility for managing issues related to cultural exception and diversity belongs to the domestic national departments responsible for culture (Roche 1998, 49-53).

164 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

In Canada, the attempt to redefine federal cultural diplomacy began in 1994, during an extensive foreign policy review in which cultural questions received unprecedented attention (Canada 1994; Hay 1995). Following these consultations, culture was given a new place in the official foreign policy of the government, which decided to make culture the third pillar of its foreign policy (Canada 1995a). Some experts have underlined the novelty of this invasion of culture in the debate surrounding the review process, pointing to the presence of an effort to link cultural questions to the issue of “security” as a way to integrate them into the realm of foreign policy. For example, Janice Stein, who observed the review process very closely, noted a degree of consensus between the views of the pressure groups devoted to defending culture and those of the political decision-makers on the need to conceive of culture in terms of national security (Stein 1994-95, 56-60). While Stein seems to doubt the viability of such an approach, John Kirton (1996, 270) considers that the emphasis put on themes such as cultural security, when accompanied by a repudiation of thetraditionalliberalconceptsofsovereigntyandinterdependence,asisthe case in the new policy, indicates a major change in direction of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, prior to 1995, culture had never figured as a priority in any foreign policy statement by the Canadian government (Kirton 1996: 262). Donna Palmateer Pennee, on the other hand, argues that culture has always been considered as a security issue in federal foreign policy documents. What was new in 1995, according to her, was the shift in the security narrative from one dominated by ideological threats to one dominated by economic threats (Pennee 1999). I have shown elsewhere that if security is certainly a key element in the framing of culture as a foreign policy issue in Canada, the “foreign-politicization” of culture also raises problems of articulation between culture and many other dimensions of the discourse of foreign policy like identity and national interest that make it very difficult to accomplish (Bélanger 1999). Indeed, I will present evidence in this article that years after the 1995 decision to make culture the third pillar of Canada’s foreign policy, the graft still looks frails. This paper argues that the movement of reform or redefinition of the external cultural mission of the Canadian state is still causing more than a problem of bureaucratic territoriality. As elsewhere, the emergence of a new international cultural agenda overtly places foreign policy in a relationship with culture and identity that challenges the terms on which the legitimacy of foreign policy was traditionally built. Whereas foreign policy is presented as the external political expression of an independent identity and culture, thus contributing to the reification of the political and national character of this cultural reality (Campbell 1992), cultural insecurity associated with globalization is generating demands on the state, suggesting that the independence of culture vis-à-vis foreign policy is being called into question. And in fact, the state’s emerging new international cultural mission implies a foreign policy which is no longer satisfied with simply promoting an already existing culture abroad, but which is actively

165 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes defending it and ensuring its development internationally. This is likely to create a tension between the state’s need to pursue a foreign policy as an expression of a prior cultural and political identity and the growing need for a foreign policy in which this cultural reality is an object for intervention. Thistensionisallthestrongerandpoliticallysignificantwherepoliticaland cultural identities do not coincide, as in the case of multinational states. This study thus focuses on the political tensions, at the foreign policy level, surrounding the emergence or re-emergence of culture as an object of international policy. My analysis will focus specifically on the fate of the project to make culture the “third pillar” of Canadian foreign policy between 1995 and 1997. I will first present the analytical framework and the hypotheses underlying my research and then introduce the case study.

The “Foreign-Politicization” of Culture: The Role of Discourse and Policy Networks Cultural Identity and the State My starting point is that what the state defines as part of its foreign policy (and that which it does not) is not a given nor left to cognitive hazard. In fact, I adopt a starting point that has been explored in recent years mainly by those who examined security policies from a constructivist perspective. Many authors have called into question the traditional approach to security studies that interpreted these policies as a response to a real (objective) or perceived (subjective) threat. They instead have sought to understand the constitution of a threat as an intersubjective process through which political actors succeeded in legitimizing the mobilization of resources in favour of a specific form of social and political identification and organization (Campbell 1992; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup, and Lemaître 1993). What I propose to explore here is the idea that what is true for security policies is also true, at a different level, for foreign policy as a whole. In other words, as long as there is no pre-established, objective, realm of foreign policy4 and considering the interestandidentityformationissueslinkedtothedesignationofsomething as a foreign policy issue, there is room for a power politics study of “foreign-politicization” (Bélanger 1996). The constructivist framework of analysis of Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) was used in this study. Although their framework deals specifically with security, its scope extends far beyond that of security policies per se. Buzan et al. examined the securitization processes that occur as soon as a political act designates an object as the target of an existential threat that justifies recourse to exceptional and “irregular” political measures: Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non politicized (meaning the state does not

166 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations, or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure) (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 23-24). I propose that the spectrum should also include a special category of politicization, which I call foreign-politicization, meaning the issue is recognized as being the concern of state national interest and identity on the world political stage. For Buzan et al., the securitization act involves the identification of a referent object, i.e., “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 36). Similarly, it should be possible to define the referent objects of foreign-politicization, i.e., things that are presented as an element contributing legitimately to national interest and the external identity of the polity. Most foreign-politicization would imply securitization but not always nor equally.5 The analytical framework of the “Copenhagen school” is useful because it provides the means to examine, within the same society, different objects of securitization which cohabit and are synthesized and prioritized through the political action of securitizing actors, i.e., “actors who securitize issues by declaring something—a referent object—existentially threatened” (Huysmans 1998). But even more importantly, it provides a typology of the functional areas within which the same type of objects are securitized and that can be easily transposed to the broader field of foreign policy: the military, the environment, the economy, society and politics. Since I am focusing on the foreign-politicization of culture, the sector of interest here is the societal sector: “The organizing concept in the societal sector is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community ” (Huysmans 1998, 119). In general, this threat takes the form of assimilation, cultural penetration and migratory movements. Since the boundaries of societal communities such as the nation rarely coincide with those of the state, as in the case of securitization, societal foreign- politicization implies a duality: the community’s interest and identity are no longer necessarily or directly compatible with the state’s interest and sovereignty. Consequently, the way that a state reacts to demands for securitization and foreign-politicization of societal referent objects like culture will depend not only on the way identities are constructed within a state, but also on the initial linkage between identity and citizenship in the process of defining its position within the international system. On the basis of this analytical framework, it is possible to make a number of assertions about the redefinition of the state’s external cultural mission. It

167 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes is possible, for example, that the cultural penetration of societies as a result of globalization has given rise to demands that foreign policy accept culture as a referent object and no longer as an instrument for policies directed toward referent objects in traditional sectors such as the military, the economy and politics. This effort of foreign-politicization of culture may or may not necessarily be accompanied by securitization attempts (Bélanger 1999). Faced with these kinds of demands, foreign policy agents must come to terms with the risk of duality; their behaviour will be strongly influenced by the presence or absence of societal references in the existing foreign policy agenda and, above all, by the possible impact of culture’s accession to the rank of a legitimate element of the state’s national interest and external identity.

Culture and the Foreign Policy Community While Buzan et al.’s model constitutes a sound theoretical basis for those who want to investigate the evolution of security and foreign policy agendas, it proves insufficient when it comes to operationalizing the concepts involved. Its focus on “speech acts” and securitizing actors is interesting but falls short. Fortunately, however, we can benefit from more general studies of the politicization processes from the public policy perspective, which is close to that of foreign policy, in terms of level of analysis. As my research problem refers here to the relations between the state and civil society, this study uses the concepts of policy network and policy community developed specifically for explaining the influence of the arrangements between the state and societal actors on the definition of public policies (Coleman and Skogstad 1990; Le Galès and Thatcher 1995; Pross 1992) and foreign policies (Katzenstein 1978). “A policy community is that part of a political system that has acquired a dominant voice in determining government decisions in a field of public activity” (Pross 1992, 119) and a policy network “is a concept reserved for describing the properties that characterize the relationships among the particular set of actors that form around an issue of importance to the policy community” (Coleman and Skogstad 1990, 26). Since the very existence of a policy field or sector provides coherence to the policy community, it should be possible to identify a foreign policy community, made up of “government agencies, pressure groups, media people, and individuals, including academics” (Pross 1992, 119) which, through their involvement, ensure the coherence of foreign policy as a field of state intervention. This allows us to structure and restrict our area of investigation of foreign-politicization. In contrast, the policy networks mobilize around a specific issue and bring together actors who share a similar point of view on the policy to be adopted in relation to this issue. Thus, when the question concerns opening up a policy field in order to incorporate a new object of intervention, in this case culture into foreign policy, policy networks should be activated. Such networks will attract

168 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada actors who are not initially members of the community but “plug into” the policy community, then stay or leave depending on the foreign policy community’s acceptance or not of the new issue or object as a legitimate element of concern. What I am suggesting is that for a referent object such as culture to be legitimately incorporated into the foreign policy field, the presence of societal agents from the cultural community must be institutionalized within the foreign policy community. In the language of public policy analysis, this means making the transition from the “attentive public” role, one in which emerging networks are confined, and entering into the “sub-government”: In effect, the sub-government is the policy-making body of each community. It processes most routine policy issues and is seldom successfully challenged by dissident members of the policy community. It consists primarily of government agencies and institutionalized interest groups. These alone have the resources and the incentive to meet demands of sub-government work: day-to-day communication between agency officials and representatives of companies or groups; automatic group inclusion on advisory committees and panels of experts; invitations to comment on draft policy; participation on committees or commissions charged with long-range policy review; and continual formal and informal access to agency officials (Pross 1992, 120-121). The sub-government performs important legitimation functions. It allows the state to exert influence on strategic segments of civil society and to validate its policies; it grants recognition to groups thereby giving them access to the resources they need to consolidate their dominant position (Merrien 1990). It is therefore possible that the process of foreign- politicization of culture will be subject to more or less conflictual incursion from the representatives of culture in the sub-government, especially when duality exists between political-state and societal referent objects. In other words, when the state’s political legitimacy does not include societal legitimacy. Policy community, policy network, attentive public and sub-government thus appear to be useful meso-level concepts for monitoring the foreign-politicization process. If demands for a foreign-politicization of culture originate from the societal sector, as I have described, they should be expressed through the activation of a policy network dominated by societal actors who were not initially members of the foreign policy community but who will seek to become part of it on a permanent basis. My hypothesis is that the success or failure of the foreign-politicization of culture partly depends on the degree of observable convergence or dissonance (duality) between the societal identity, to which “culture” refers and whose actors strive to have their interest defended by the state on the international stage, and political identity, to which foreign policy necessarily refers. This duality should be

169 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes manifested by the degree to which the foreign policy community is open or closed to the cultural policy networks which are activated in the context of concern over globalization, in terms of both discourse and mutual recognition as well as institutionalization of their relations.

Case Overview: The Ambiguous “Third Pillarization” of Culture in Canada Until very recently, the government of Canada had never regarded culture as something that should be an integral part of its foreign policy, despite the fact that, throughout the last century, the need to protect the country’s “cultural sovereignty” from widespread penetration by American culture prompted the implementation of protectionist measures and government support for cultural creation and diffusion through public networks such as the CBC/Radio-Canada (Thompson 1994). Although commissions of inquiry have repeatedly recommended that Canada establish a true cultural diplomacy, these recommendations have never been acted on (Cooper 1985; Schrœder-Gudehus 1989), and prior to 1995, no Canadian government had included culture among its foreign policy priorities.6 So much so that in 1994, even though Canada already had the distinction of being a country that devoted the least resources to cultural diplomacy, the Department of Foreign Affairs nevertheless intended to hand over its international cultural relations program to the Canada Council.7 Then, suddenly, during the 1994-95 foreign policy review process, the government was pressured by groups and experts into making culture the third pillar8 of Canadian diplomacy (Canada 1994; 1995a; 1995b). This occurred in a context of growing concern over American cultural penetration following the implementation of the CUSTAand the American government’s attacks against measures to protect Canadian cultural industries, in particular the magazine sector.9 At the same time, the internal political context was marked by increased polarization between the two national projects—Canada’s and Quebec’s—following the failure of two successive attempts to reshape the Constitution in a way that would be acceptable to Quebecers and by the prospect of a second referendum on Quebec sovereignty on October 30, 1995.10 But the fact remains that the new 1995 Canadian foreign policy innovated by making culture one of its three major priorities. However, two years later, nothing much remained of this union between culture and foreign policy. Right from the beginning, the resolve and real sense of commitment of Canadian foreign policy to culture was ambiguous. While the members of Parliament who had held public consultations on the new foreign policy recommended that it should be conceived as an integral part of a cultural development strategy of the state (Canada 1994), the government chose to assimilatecultureintoasystemofcivicvalues,thusdilutingthespecifically cultural and societal dimensions of its commitment in favour of a more

170 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada political or statist definition of “culture” (Canada 1995a, 43; Bélanger 1999). It soon became apparent that the government’s will to make culture a newpriorityofitsforeignpolicywouldnottranslateintoconcreteaction. Thus, although culture was matched with “global issues” at the top of DFAIT’s organization chart for two years following the adoption of the new Foreign Policy Statement, by 1997, culture had disappeared from the list of the Department’s main branches. Already in 1996, a proposal came to abolish the International Cultural Relations Bureau (ICRB). It was brought to a lower rank in 1997 and cultural relations became a simple sub-activity of what was from then on called “open diplomacy.”11 As for budgets, the new cultural priority did not have a significant impact on the approximately $26 million Ottawa spends annually on cultural diplomacy (DFAIT1994 to 1999). This abdication did not go unnoticed. In its 1999 report on the evolution of the federal government’s role in supporting culture in Canada, the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage reiterated the testimonies of those who came to complain that no concrete actions had been taken by DFAIT with regard to the third pillar initiative (Canada 1999). Thus, 1997 was a turning point not only in terms of organizational restructuring but also in terms of discourse and policy orientations. It was in 1997 that the government had to hastily hold public consultations on its position with regard to the negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on Investments and that a new discourse and new international initiatives also emerged around the necessity to preserve “cultural diversity.” In early 1997, the Minister of International Trade caused a great commotion by questioning publicly the advisability of Canada’s protectionist measures for cultural industries (Eggleton 1997). Apparently, a complete withdrawal on the part of the foreign policy apparatus from cultural issues followed, leaving the department responsible for culture (Canadian Heritage) to deal with them. The defence of cultural diversity on the international stage soon became the favourite cause of the Minister of Canadian Heritage, Sheila Copps, while Foreign Affairs completely lost interest in the issue. For example, while the Minister Sheila Copps has used every international forum available to advance the idea that cultural diversity is threatened by trade liberalization and globalization, and that this situation must be rectified collectively at the international level, the Minister of Foreign Affairs recently used the opportunity to speak before the Canadian Commission for UNESCO to defend his human security agenda and did not mention culture at all (Axworthy 1999). Once again, DFAIT’s refusal to considerculturalissueswasevidentinthereportoftheStandingCommittee on Canadian Heritage on federal cultural policy, which urged the government to place the protection of cultural diversity at the centre of the federal government’s foreign policy (Canada 1999, recommendation No. 29). What has been happening in the years that followed the official third pillarization of culture in 1995? How can the removal of culture from the

171 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes field of foreign policy and the 1997 turning point be explained? These questions will be examined in light of the theoretical framework presented above.

Methodology To identify the actors involved in the attempt to achieve the foreign-politicization of culture, I have adopted a typical analytical approach of policy communities/network and epistemic communities studies (Knoke et al. 1996, 13; Haas 1992). A list of groups and individuals who participated in consultations, commissions, conferences and coalitions on culture and foreign policy between 1994 and 1998 was used to identify a body of actors who had at one time or another joined the Canadian foreign policy community defending a cultural agenda. Various cross- reference techniques were then used to identify the cultural sector actors who had joined in the foreign policy related issues or had shown an interest in foreign policy issues during activities specific to the cultural policy community. For example, a computerized search was performed on a selection of briefs submitted to the 1994 Special Joint Committee to Review Canadian Foreign Policy and on hearings transcripts in order to identify 84 actors who, during the work of the Committee, had addressed cultural issues (63 representatives of groups and 21 experts) (Bélanger 1999,684-686).Asimilaroperationwasperformedonasmallerscaleusing testimonies before the Sub-Committee on International Trade, Trade Disputes and Investments during consultations regarding the MAI. Using this method, I was able to clearly identify a cluster of stakeholders who had participated, during the period examined, in the policy process surrounding the emergence and difficult survival of culture as an object of foreign policy. I then examined the evolution, within this cluster, of a network which had been activated specifically to direct and defend the new government commitment. As will be seen later, the principal actors in this network baptized it New Conversations. The evolution of this network and its relations with the foreign policy community were analyzed by retracing the participation of network members in the policy process activities (see Annex I) and by analyzing the content of the written and recorded material generated by these activities.12 Contacts were made with the network’s actors and semi-structured interviews were conducted with four key actors.13 Andrew Terris, one of the main animators of the network and Executive Director of Visual Arts Nova Scotia gave me access to some archives.

172 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

The New Conversations Policy Network and the Failure of the Foreign-politicization of Culture Creation, Life and Death of a Network The network was created a few months after the government made its new Foreign Policy Statement14 public, that is, after the consultation process that led to the decision to make culture a new priority of Canadian foreign policy. Around March 1995, a group of artists and arts administrators from the Halifax region decided to organize a forum on strategies for implementing the new policy and the recommendations of the Committee Reviewing Foreign Policy. Since this group had not participated in the 1994 consultation process, their initiative and network were quite distinct from those that had previously attempted to put forward the principle that culture should be given priority as an object of foreign policy. Those who were at the centre of the 1994 consultation process15 kept the group informed of developments. The group then decided to mobilize the cultural community in order to take advantage of this window of opportunity while fully realizing that the government’s commitment16 was fragile. This was unprecedented; it was the first time in Canada that a policy network emerged in defence of international cultural policies. In April 1995, with the support of the Nova Scotia Coalition on Arts and Culture (NSCAC) and a few public and private sponsors,17 the initiators invited the cultural community at large, representatives of the business community and the government to participate in a first forum which was held on the eve of the G7 Summit,18 from June 9 to 11, 1995 in Halifax.

Figure 1. The New Conversations Logo

173 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

The theme of the Halifax Forum was “Marketing Canada.” It explored strategies for linking cultural expression, national imagery, cultural exports and foreign policy (New Conversations 1995). Even though there were concerns—for example, culture being used for propaganda purposes or the integrity of artistic work being sacrificed for the sake of its exportability— the participants agreed on a joint statement in which they endorsed the third pillarization of culture in Canadian foreign policy and a set of recommendations, the first of which referred to the development of new technologies as a means to distribute Canadian culture worldwide. Thus, the principal concern of the first New Conversations forum related to the projection and export of culture as foreign policy instruments. The approach to cultural diplomacy was rather traditional, with an emphasis on theroleofmarketing(sales,tradediffusion)culturalproductsintheshaping of Canada’s image abroad. In the words of one of the organizers: “(…) the thrust of the first New Conversations forum was about foreign sales and exports and marketing Canada abroad. That was the focus of it. It wasn’t about protecting ourselves against importations and foreign products” (Terris 1999). The final declaration was faxed to the Ministers of Canadian Heritage, Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Industry Canada and called for the “conversations” to be continued. The declaration also proposed that an institutionalized consultation mechanism be created on the model of the Cultural Foreign Strategies Committee, as suggested by author John R. Saul in his brief to the Review Committee (Canada 1994, 92-93). The proposed International Cultural Relations Strategic Committee would be established “with equal representation from the arts, cultural industries, business, and the relevant federal ministries.” Its mandate, according to the Halifax discussions, would be to allow the cultural community to enter the foreign policy decision-making process. It would no longer have to be content with reacting to the policies once they were established. This proposal gave rise to intense debates between the NSCAC representatives, DFAIT’s International Cultural Relations Bureau (ICRB), officials in the Department of Canadian Heritage, and representatives of the cultural industries. During these debates, the New Conversations initiators defended the idea of a consultation mechanism devoted exclusively to international cultural relations and opposed proposals that organizations of the cultural policy community, such as the Canadian Conference of the Arts which was at the same time developing its own position on the implementation of the third pillar initiative, be entrusted with the responsibility of following up the Halifax recommendations. They pointed out that, if there was no distinct mechanism in place, the domestic and international issues might be confused. In this respect, they had strong support from the ICRB officials who were clearly the most proactive government actors within the network. The network’s principal actors thus agreed during a meeting in Toronto on a

174 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada plan to create a permanent “Network for International Cultural Affairs” (NICA). This plan was then submitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, André Ouellet, by the New Conversations representatives.19 The NICA project was presented to the Minister as a way to “help bring the government closer to the cultural community for the conduct of both cultural diplomacy and the promotion of Canada’s cultural achievements abroad,” and its mission was: To provide general advice and counsel on programs and strategies for the promotion of Canadian interests abroad through: (1) the use of the Canadian cultural sector as a significant element of Canadian diplomacy, and (2) the promotion and support of Canadian cultural activities, products and services internationally. (Sparling 1995) Minister Ouellet was not closed to this idea but wanted it to be “test-driven” through the organization of a second forum following the one in Halifax. This forum “would examine a specific list of agenda items relating to culture and international affairs” (Ouellet 1995). The second forum, which was held in Ottawa in late January 1996, was thus entirely funded by DFAIT and seen by the organizers as a test for the creation of a permanent consultation mechanism. The forum’s theme, “Building the Third Pillar,” was broader than that in Halifax but the final report was limited to focusing on the means rather than the ends of the state’s international cultural action. It is interesting to note that full participation was reserved for a number of artists and arts administrators (“cultural workers”) whereas representatives of associations participated as observers. The resulting vision was less inspiring and less bold than that of the Halifax Forum. The recommendations came as a list of specific demands related to government assistance in the distribution of cultural products instead of defining the parameters that would link culture to the general objectives of Canadian foreign policy. The need to establish an advisory committee on international cultural relations was, of course, reaffirmed (New Conversations 1996b). Atthesecondforum,thereactionofthenewMinisterforForeignAffairs, Lloyd Axworthy, was not very positive. On July 9, a meeting was held between the Minister and the New Conversations organizers to discuss actions to be taken as a result of the Halifax and Ottawa recommendations. At the meeting, the Minister was not receptive to the idea of creating a permanent consultation mechanism and, although the idea of a third forum was brought up, the meeting did not yield anything concrete. The network was abandoned by the government actors and disintegrated, and thus without any support, the third pillar initiative died a slow death.

175 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Discourse Analysis During its short existence, the New Conversations network attempted to become institutionalized by seeking to define a common language in terms of referent object and shared values and to gain access to and participate in the foreign policy community. They failed on both counts. This failure precipitated the collapse of the third pillar initiative. In what follows, I will first analyze the discourse and then the structure of relations with the foreign policy community. The actors involved in New Conversations were unable to formulate a coherent and unifying discourse on culture as a referent object of foreign policy.TheNewConversationsepisodecanberegardedasanattempttouse consultation and dialogue to construct a referent object on the basis of two very different conceptions of culture. While government agents sought to legitimize a citizen and “political” conception of culture through the support of the cultural community, the societal agents referred to a culture that is primarily defined by artistic activity itself and, secondarily, as an expression of different levels of identity—local, national and cosmopolitan. When the network was created in spring 1995, the government had already stated its position vis-à-vis the third pillar initiative. To a certain extent, this position broke from what had been proposed by the Parliamentary Committee and the Senate in late 1994. The Committee had recommended that cultural foreign policy should be conceived as an integral part of a cultural development strategy of the state that would encompass regulating, subsidizing, producing and distributing Canadian culture (Canada 1994, 69-70). However, the government, while appropriating the idea of cultural pillar, shifted the focus of cultural foreign policy by defining culture as a set of political values rather than as an artistic and intellectual reality with which a community identifies: “Our principles and values—our culture—are rooted in a commitment to tolerance; to democracy; to equality and to human rights; etc.” (Canada 1995a, 9). Thus, the culture that appeared to be the referent object of the new foreign policy was the one that embodied Canadian civic values. However, this subtlety waslargelyignoredbytheculturalcommunity,whichinterpretedorwanted to interpret the government’s position as an acceptance of the more general recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee. The documentary analysis shows that government and societal actors entered into a dialogue with differing arguments: for government actors, the third pillar initiative was the one included in the government’s statement whereas for societal actors, the initiative was the one described in the parliamentary report. ICRB officials attempted to defend, within the network, the government’s conception of Canadian cultural identity based on a civic attitude towards pluralism. For ICRB Director Robert Higham, the question of what is exactly Canadian culture was resolved as follows: “Our cultural identity

176 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada is specifically its plurality” (Higham 1999). However, this plurality is not meant to be a purely cultural characteristic, but the expression of a distinct political attitude towards multiculturalism, based on peaceful coexistence. In this sense, cultural identity is a political identity and what Higham would have wanted was some kind of support from the cultural and artistic community for a definition of Canadian culture as an expression of Canada as a political model: “[W]e, our society, need our artists to promote the idea that the way to peaceful coexistence amongst diverse peoples is through culture, not ethnic culture but culture which generates tolerance and respect, and humanity, and universality (…).” In retrospect, the head of the ICRB considered that, in this respect, the experience of the New Conversations was a failure: [I]n Canada, we’re sneaking up on the idea that actually treating [plurality] as a positive characteristic in the society, protecting plurality, and yet keeping some kind of social cohesion through citizenship. Now, those new conversations of New Conversations didn’t get that far. […] We were talking specifically about how to project Canadian culture, about the mechanics of doing it rather than (…) the substance of it. (Higham 1999) For government actors, inasmuch as Canadian culture displays itself as a representation of the Canadian political model, a strong link can be made with foreign policy. During the discussions, Robin Higham insisted that the network articulate its demands by pointing out how culture could be useful to foreign policy and not only how foreign policy could be useful to cultural development. According to Higham, it was obvious that this should be done by emphasizing the way that the projection of the constituent values of Canadian identity creates receptive foreign audiences for the recruitment of international support for Canadian political and economic objectives (Higham 1996). A number of actors within the network defended positions that were close to the government’s conception but without establishing such a direct relationship of instrumentality between culture and the traditional objectives of foreign policy. Author John Saul, for example, defended the view that the government need not indulge in propaganda to benefit from the effects of a greater projection of Canadian culture. According to Saul, Canadian culture quite naturally represents the image of Canada as a model of nationhood based on pluralism and respect, which is different from the nationalist cultural model inherited from the 19th century, and this image gives Canada a unique international identity. Many participants in the Halifax Forum supported this point of view, which generated considerable debate. They not only discussed the way in which culture sells the Canadian model abroad but also the fear that the penetration of American culture into Canadian culture might lead to the disappearance of this model.21 At the same time, several of the societal actors expressed their misgivings about viewing culture as a non-critical expression of the Canadian political

177 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes reality. The Halifax declaration reflects this tension. While it was asserted in the preamble that “Canada manifests a form of cultural expression that is highly desirable in the international marketplace of ideas,” or, further on, that “(…) the promotion of Canadian style of democracy can promote Canadian security,” the summary of discussions leaves room for a critical perspective: What images should be projected abroad? Opinions on this theme differed. Many participants felt that Canada should present itself as the centre of a very different idea of nationhood, a different social, economic, and political model. In the words of one participant, “Let’s show what we have been building here.” Many people debated the truth of such an image, arguing that Canada was not unique, or even an enviable, model. They argued instead that we should not accept or promote our own clichés and should resist any presentation of them abroad. (…) In projecting Canadian culture abroad, Canada should not make the mistake of being sanctimonious, should not preach to other countries. (New Conversations 1995) The agents of the cultural and artistic community countered the conception of culture as supporting a political identity and image with a conception of culture as being in itself a legitimate object of intervention. This became very clear during the Ottawa Forum where from the very start, the debate revolved around the necessity to impose the view that cultural activity possesses its own international logic that is distinct from the logics of the economy or diplomacy. As an art gallery director put it at the time, “Artists have their own map of the world.”22 People in the cultural community were clearly not very interested in the identity aspect of culture and more interested in their own artistic and professional recognition. For example, one of the main recommendations of the Ottawa Forum, the one which at least created the most debate among the participants, was to involve DFAITin the implementation of a policy of cultural openness. This policy would be open to foreign artists to meet the need to reciprocate with regard to the countries and institutions which regularly invite Canadian artists and to stimulate local cultural development through contact with creations from abroad. Obviously, this type of dialogue-oriented policy serves to achieve the objectives of cultural development and cannot be as easily linked to a policy of protection of Canadian identity. The artists’ and cultural workers’ reluctance to articulate their demands in a discourse which would coincide with the government conception of culture as an expression of a system of civic values, as well as their misgivings about artistic activity being subjected to political and commercial logics, seems to have contributed significantly to the network’s collapse. Just after the Ottawa Forum, Robin Higham was clearly disappointed about what he perceived as part of a lobbying stigma. In his view, the fact that cultural sector groups always have trouble looking

178 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada beyond their immediate interests prevented the network from breathing life into the third pillar initiative: I would say the input from New Conversations was probably the highest profile initiative [for culture] that got most ministerial attention over a period of a couple of years. (…) But (…) the cultural argument is undermined by a fatal flaw. (…) It was, if you like, a pressure group with the disadvantage of being too easily assigned the stigma of lobbying for the professional artists. (…) They hadn’t gotten better at casting their arguments in term of why it is good for foreign policy. Not why it’s good for international touring of the cultural community. And we’re still searching for that safe middle ground where culture could be an instrument of other objectives without being captured by these other objectives. (Higham 1999) Beyond the question of instrumentality, it is interesting to note, in tensions arising from the discourse of participants in the network, that the societal actors did not at first oppose the political and civic definition of cultural identity promoted by government actors and members of the intellectual elite that posited one societal conception of Canadian identity. Rather, they were concerned about a proposed type of belonging or loyalty which would conceal or transcend the controversial nature of Canadian identity. In other words, no Canadian societal or civic culture can be the object of a foreign politicization, but only an ongoing debate within cultural and artistic activity over what it means to be Canadian. This reaction is significant because it showed and confirmed to government agents that a civic conception of cultural identity aimed at transcending and reaching beyond the different societal identities which coexist in Canada did not provide a sufficient base to construct a legitimate foreign politicization of culture—or, at the very least, a non-controversial foreign politicization of culture as part of the national interest and identity of the state on the world political stage. However, the societal actors’ discourse was not entirely negative. It showed a real willingness to define a common public policy object with government agents but without necessarily referring to a civic conception of identity nor a monocultural one. As a writer and composer from Vancouver said during the Ottawa meeting: There are no two words that will make a person shatter, whether it’s in the Canadian cultural community or anywhere else, as the words “Canadian culture” (…) because we want to avoid the connection of culture and identity. Nobody wants to deal with it, nobody wants to touch it. So instead, what we do is we try to cover it all up in these kind of vague moral superior notions of tolerance, that we are more tolerant than anybody else, which we all know is nonsense. We are not more tolerant than anybody else. (…) The point is that at a time where we are avoiding the issue, it is clear that we have become kind of model citizens of the global village (…) It

179 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

seems to me I am just hearing a tremendous irony here, that we have to continue to avoid the fact that to be Canadian is to have a number of identities which one brings out according to the circumstance. That’s what to be Canadian is.23 Culture by itself, beyond its political or economic spinoffs, should deserve international public intervention.24 However, viewed in this way, culture resisted the attempts to objectivize it in a national context. As artists, the societal actors of New Conversations remained true to a cosmopolitan loyalty and code of ethics while asserting their sense of belonging to society.

Membership and Structure The discourse analysis above suggests that the New Conversations network did not survive and was not successful in foreign-politicizing culture because the actors failed in their attempt to bring out and institutionalize a common conception of culture as a referent-object consistent and compatible with the civic and essential notion of culture conveyed in Canada’s official foreign policy. The analysis of the network’s membership and structure suggests that this failure was partly due to the Canadian foreign policy community’s resistance to the intrusion of new actors demanding a place for culture among the referent objects of foreign policy. For culture to be truly established as a referent object of foreign policy, it must be brought into the sub-government of the foreign policy community by societal actors who are recognized as legitimate representatives of this new cultural reality. However, in this case, as we will now see, the network created to defend and support the third pillarization of culture did not succeed in becoming part of the sub-government. A few general comments about the policy community structure of Canadian foreign policy will help us understand this phenomenon. It is known that the policy communities in the foreign policy field are generally less open to group actions than the policy communities organized on the basis of domestic issue areas (Rosenau 1967). One reason for this is that foreign policy is generally seen as a concern of national interest and therefore the costs and benefits of foreign policy would be widely distributed within the community. Since the costs and benefits are not concentrated, they would not give rise to action from interest groups. But is this accurate? It can be questioned whether foreign policy generates both costs and benefits which are effectively better distributed and less concentrated than for domestic policies (Milner 1997). However, in this particular case, the question can ultimately be considered as of secondary importance. Legitimacy rules when it comes to foreign-politicization. Since foreign policy is defined as the expression of the state’s interest and external identity, it cannot simply countenance the institutionalization of patterns of group-state relations that would openly give access to organized groups according to a pluralist or corporatist model. This contrasts with the

180 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada case of purely sectoral policy issues like agriculture or social welfare where it is common for the state to actively encourage the development of participation channels for societal actors. Thus, the foreign policy agents will attempt to maintain the networks which become established in the foreign policy community in a state of “state-directness,” that is, high state coordinating capacity, low organizational development of societal actors andinclusiveassociationalsystem(ColemanandSkogstad1990,27-29). In Canada, the policy community of foreign policy is state-directed but at the same time, Canadian foreign policy bases its legitimacy on the claim of being highly democratic. Over the years, the Canadian government has instituted the practice of public consultation aimed at involving NGOs and othersocietalactorsinthedevelopmentofCanadianforeignpolicy.AsKim Nossal pointed out, even though this fact allows the state to describe its foreign policy as democratic, the societal actors have been included through participation rather than through democratization, with the state overseeing the political management of the consultation process through intermediary organizations that are directly under its control, for example, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (Nossal 1993). Thus, the process itself, that is, the type of relations between the state and the societal actors which make up the foreign policy community, performs important legitimation functions.25 As the legitimacy of foreign policy is, at the very least, symbolically rooted in national interest, the sub-government cannot officially adopt pluralist or corporatist ways. Therefore, the government must maintain a delicate balance in the policy community structure: few societal actors participate in the sub-government and they operate on the basis of consensus,26 while the diverse attentive public is both kept out of the sub-government and involved in the permanent consultation and legitimation process by intermediary bodies. In such a context, although it is difficult to penetrate the sub-government, it is relatively easy to become part of the attentive public. However, as was already pointed out, the New Conversations network developed on the fringe of the foreign policy community which, nevertheless, had grown considerably during the 1994-95 review process, and it never really managed to establish links with other actors of the attentive public. Based on the analysis of testimonies heard by the parliamentary committee responsibleforthe1994-95reviewprocessandofthesubmittedbriefs,alist of 63 groups and 21 individuals who came to defend positions on culture can be drawn up. Fifteen organizations stood out because of their well-formulated plea that culture be given higher priority in Canadian foreign policy.27 However, there were only three of these organizations among the 43 participants from civil society in the New Conversations meetings and forums (see Annex 1). They were the Canadian Conference of the Arts (CCA), the Canadian Museum Association (CMA) and Les Deux Mondes Theatre Company.

181 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Other important organizations such as the Professional Art Dealers Association of Canada, the International Council for Canadian Studies, the Canadian Music Centre and the Association des producteurs de films et de télévision du Québec never responded to the New Conversations network invitation to engage themselves in favour of the third pillar. As regards individuals, primarily John Ralston Saul and former Minister Serge Joyal helped maintain continuity between the debate that had started with the parliamentary consultation and the network. However, it is clear that they themselves were not deeply rooted in the foreign policy community. The network thus did not attempt or manage to attract other groups and individuals who had nevertheless contributed to the emergence of the third pillar during the review process and who would continue to periodically express their interest in the international dimension of cultural policies. These groups were, for example, the Alliance of Cinema, Television, and Radio Artists (ACTRA), the Writers’ Union of Canada, the Playwrights’ Union of Canada and the Association of Canadian Publishers which had participated in 1997 in the consultations of the Foreign Affairs Sub-Com- mittee responsible for studying the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) project and thus manifested an interest in culture as an object of foreign policy. Nor had the network enlisted support from the policy community of foreign policy in general, that is, from the societal agents of the policy community who, without appearing at first to be concerned about cultural affairs, would have liked to support, in one way or another, the movement to broaden the agenda to include culture.28 The societal actors who were members of New Conversations thus remained on the fringe of the attentive public, being confined to the status of “nascent groups” (see Figure 2). According to Pross: Even less organized, and generally less welcome [than the academic groups], are the nascent groups whose spontaneous eruption into a policy field shatters the carefully contrived appearance of consensus and challenges both the routinization of policy and the conventional wisdom prevalent in the sub- government and, to a large extent, in the attentive public (Pross 1992, 124). The network had not developed links with other societal actors within the foreign policy community and thus had to rely mainly on government agents for the institutionalization of its relations with it. Here again, the network was unable to mobilize more support because the ICRB had a quasi-monopoly over government participation in the network, with the support of the Minister’s Office at strategic points. In general, the testimonies showed that, outside the IRCB, the Department’s public servants were openly hostile to the third pillar initiative (Hay 1995, 31-32). According to Andrew Terris of the NSCAC:

182 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

Figure 2. The Canadian Foreign Policy Community and the “New Conversations” Network

I think there were a few people at Foreign Affairs who took [the third pillar initiative] up for a while. (…) The entrenched bureaucracy basically wasn’t interested and just kind of squashed it (Terris 1999). The ICRB’s participation in the network was nevertheless extremely important. After the 1995 Forum, it was the ICRB which funded the meetings in Toronto and Ottawa and also bore part of the preparation costs

183 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes for the organizers based in Halifax. Moreover, Robin Higham, having shownsomeleadershipduringtheHalifaxForum,interveneddirectlyinthe strategic planning of the network’s activities as well as in the development of positions.29 In this context of relative isolation, the network’s integration into the sub-government could only be achieved through the creation of a new permanent institutional link, the NICA. The NICAproject was submitted to Minister Ouellet following a meeting between the network’s principal societal and government animators in September 1995. However, it displayed a will to be independent, which went against DFAIT’s traditional practices in dealing with the societal actors of the sub-government. Indeed, eventhoughtheNICA’sstatedobjectivewastobringthegovernmentcloser to the cultural community for the conduct of international cultural relations, the planned committee was essentially made up of fifteen representatives from the cultural community, thus relegating government representatives as well as those from organizations such as the CCA to the position of advisors (New Conversations 1996a). Following the Ottawa Forum, the network had to reconsider this position and proposed equal participation by government and societal actors. NICA’s mandate would not be limited to reporting to the Minister only. It would also be able to transmit its recommendations to the authorities that it deemed appropriate. Given the legitimation functions associated with participation in the sub-government of foreign policy, the Minister’s suspicion about this project was not surprising. The uncertainty surrounding the definition of culture as an object of foreign policy did not allow the cultural community to participate in the sub-government, at least not under these conditions. The openness of the foreign policy-making process to societal actors was still subject to respect for the principle of projection of national interest and identity; foreign policy is officially the expression of a Canadian culture and values inherent in the existence of a coherent cultural reality. In contrast, what the societal actors proposed as a foreign-politicization of culture was quite different, that is, to present a conception of Canadian culture as an ambiguous and internationalized reality and to involve foreign policy in the cultural mission of the state.

Conclusion This article tells the story and analyzes a failed attempt to make culture a foreign policy object in its own right. During the two years that followed the tabling of a new government statement announcing that culture would henceforth constitute the third pillar of Canadian foreign policy, societal and government actors in this country attempted to lay the groundwork for building this pillar. A public policy network, called New Conversations, created initially by individuals and groups from civil society to pressure the centralpolicyagenciesoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsintorespecting

184 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada the government’s new commitments, was the principal forum for dialogue and negotiation between these actors. Within this network, they fought for the institutionalization of culture as an object of foreign policy on two interrelated and essential fronts. First, they sought to define a discourse, a common referent object that would allow them to conceive of a legitimate foreign-politicization of culture. Second, they attempted to install culture within the sub-government of foreign policy by developing its own policy-making channel. The experience of the New Conversations failed on both fronts and the network was dissolved. The third pillar initiative was stillborn. Referring to the efforts made by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy to abolish the use of landmines, a key actor of New Conversations said: “He just never ventured into the mined territory of culture” (Sparling, 1999). The question then is why? The resistance to foreign-politicization of culture in Canada brought to light in this study has provided support for the underlying assumptions of this research while introducing a more nuanced interpretation. First, in a context of cultural penetration and globalization, the societal actors effectively transmitted to the state demands for internationalization of cultural policies. In a previous article on the 1994-95 foreign policy review process, I maintained that the initiative for this internationalization came from civil society (Bélanger 1999). This is confirmed in the examination of the emergence of the policy network New Conversations. Foreign- politicization of culture was a way to respond to these demands. As expected, the attempt to accomplish this gave rise to conflict between state actors,whosupportedacivicandunifyingconceptionofacommonculture, and societal actors, who defended not just one but a non-finite plurality of identities. The establishment of a policy network was an institutional materialization of the crystallization of this duality which evolved in a particular way here. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the representatives of the cultural community, although concerned about the role of culture in the preservation of societal (national, ethnic, etc.) identities, were at the same time bearers of an identification with the cosmopolitan and critical nature of cultural activity. Thus, to refer again to the sectoral analytical framework of Buzan et al. (1998, 75-76), it seems clear that the referent-object culture defended by civil society actors contains characteristics that are both societal (related to the identity of groups) and environmental (achieved level of civilization, human enterprise). This question should be explored further in future studies. The societal, non-civic conception of culture conveyed by the societal actors was not only at odds with the position advocated by the government, but it also seemed to clash with the dominant paradigm30 which regulated, within the Canadian policy community of foreign policy as a whole, the very legitimacy of demands as foreign policy demands. This is at least what the relative isolation in which the network was confined would suggest.

185 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

This resistance not only on the part of the state but the policy community as a whole lends credibility to my assumption that, because it places culture and identity in a relationship to foreign policy that challenges the terms on which the latter’s legitimacy is based, the societal demand for a foreign- politicization of culture is evaded by the state. In the case of Canada, government actors tried to evade the issue by attempting to legitimize a civic and political conception of culture as a referent-object of foreign policy. It remains to be seen whether such a strategy of evasion will be able to satisfy a civil society that is subject to increasing interpenetration of cultures as a result of trade globalization.

Aknowledgements I would like to thank the two anonymous assessors and the Editorial Board of this Journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this text were presented at the 2000 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Los Angeles and at the 2000 National Policy Research Conference in Ottawa. I am also thankful to Marijke Breuning, Evelyne Dufault, Vincent Lemieux and Robert Wolfe for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. This research was made possible by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Fonds pour la formation des chercheurs et l’aide à la recherche du Québec. Étienne Cantin, Evelyne Dufault and Francis Villeneuve provided extremely valuable assistance for this project and Élise Lapalme helped to assemble the manuscript. I would like to thank all the persons who agreed to share information with me and/or to be interviewed for the study.

Notes 1. The Network, created at the initiative of Canada and Sweden, now includes 46 states. See http://www.pch.gc.ca/network-research/eng.htm. 2. The major outlines of what an eventual international treaty on cultural diversity should contain were defined by several stakeholders. In Canada, the Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (CI-SAGIT) project emphasizes the preservation of “cultural sovereignty” and “access to a wide range of national cultural products,” whereas in France, if we were to believe the Minister of Culture, a less “national” approach to accessibility is favoured (CI-SAGIT 1999; Trautman 1999). On the plurality of views on what “cultural diversity” means for different states, see Baeker (2000). 3. States which did not have central institutions responsible for international cultural relations have established them, for example, Spain created the Cervantès Institute in 1990 and Portugal, the Camoes Institute in 1992. European states such as Germany, France and Great Britain, which have a solid tradition of cultural diplomacy, have carried out reforms that have not called their commitment into question in any significant way. The United States, however, last year put an end (temporarily?) to the uncertainty surrounding the future of the United States Information Agency by integrating it into the Department of State. 4. This does not mean that foreign policy is only a subjective construction or a reality that is essentially discursive. The discursive activity is only one element which contributes to the structuring of what foreign policy is and contains, with

186 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

other structuring economic and social or even geopolitical forces (Larsen 1997, chap. 1). 5. Furthermore, while Buzan et al. accurately described how an existential threat is empirically identified, they were much less clear about the emergency criterion. Thus, it seems that there is an implicit hierarchy within the category of issues which are securitized, some being the subject of emergency measures and others not. Using France as an example to illustrate the scope of their model, they pointed out that some government elites have promoted the idea of cultural defence of France without presenting the corresponding emergency measures. 6. Thus leaving the field open to the provinces (Bélanger 1994; Kirton 1996, 262). 7. A transfer that was blocked by a Senate vote thus killing the bill authorizing this measure. 8. The expression “third pillar” as applied here to culture was forged in the 70s under the Brandt/Scheel German government. See N. Werz (1992). 9. The “Sports Illustrated Affair” was touched off in 1993 when the magazine’s publisher undertook to print the Canadian edition in Canada, though the magazine’s content would be sent to the printer electronically from the American head office. Since the magazine would not cross the border physically, it would avoid Canadian protectionist measures, such as minimum requirements for Canadian editorial content which grant the right to certain tax advantages and to lower postal rates. The Canadian government reacted by strengthening its regulation, which was then immediately contested by the United States. It became obvious that the future of the Canadian system for protecting cultural industries was being threatened, both by the new communication technologies and by trade liberalization. From that point on, the issue of culture became, definitively, a foreign policy issue (Gingras 2000; Gagné 1999). 10. The result of the October 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty was close (49.4% for the “Yes” side and 50.6% for the “No”). The current PQ government, reelected in 1998, promises another referendum on sovereignty as soon as “winning conditions” materialize. 11. The analysis of DFAIT expenditure plans for the years 1994-95 to 1999-2000 helped to reconstruct this evolution. As of 1997, the principal operational sectors of the Department no longer officially corresponded to the three “pillars” even though the third pillar was the only one which was no longer a part of an operational sector. But the way each organizational “activity” contributed to the achievement of objectives based on the pillars was identified. Only “Open Diplomacy” was exclusively devoted to the projection of values and Canadian culture. See DFAIT (1997, 7). At the time that this paper was written, it could not be confirmed whether or not there was still a Cultural Relations Branch at DFAIT. 12. Testimonies before parliamentary committees, reports, briefs and interviews were archived in a computerized data bank on Canadian cultural diplomacy. 13. Robin Higham, a career diplomat, was Director General of the DFAIT International Cultural Relations Bureau from 1995 to 1997. He is now a fellow at the Centre on Governance, University of Ottawa, where he was interviewed on October 19, 1999. Andrew Terris served as moderator for both New Conversations forums and was at the time Executive Director of Visual Arts Nova Scotia and is now Director of the Nova Scotia Coalition on Arts and Culture (NSCAC). He was interviewed in Halifax on June 15, 1999. Mary Sparling was the principal spokeperson for New Conversations. She is

187 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

involved in many activities of the Nova Scotian cultural community and was at the time President of Venture Hydraulic Limited as well as a member of the NSCAC. She was interviewed in Halifax on June 16, 1999. Chris Zimmer is a film producer and President, Imagex Films. He was a participant at the first New Conversations forum. He was interviewed in Halifax on June 17, 1999. 14. The new Foreign Policy Statement was made public by Minister André Ouellet on February 7, 1995. 15. It appeared that Shelagh Mackenzie, a film-maker and active member of the NSCAC, was a contact person. She knew Adrienne Clarkson, who was John Raston Saul’s partner. The Review Committee commissioned a report from Saul on the theme of culture and foreign policy, a study which had a great impact during the consultation process. 16. “I’m not even sure whether there had been any responses to those briefs [by John Ralston Saul] at the time we did the New Conversations, but it seemed like an interesting initiative that wasn’t really going anywhere. So we started New Conversations as a way to build community support for the third pillar initiative, to make people in the community put pressure on the people at Foreign Affairs to do something. […] One [objective] was just educating the community, because our people didn’t really know about the third pillar initiative. My sense is that Foreign Affairs wasn’t exactly champion of the band in saying this is a wonderful thing. So it was partly educating the people and it was partly to put pressure on Foreign Affairs.” (Terris 1999). 17. Financial support was provided by NSCAC, the Bronfman Foundation, Power Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Heritage, Keltic Incorporated, Clearwater Fine Foods and Ardenne International. 18. It should be noted that the NSCAC had acquired a great deal of experience in mobilizing the cultural community and intervening on cultural public policy issues provincially and nationally. In 1986, NSCAC actors organized a National Forum on Canadian Cultural Policy and, in 1990, a similar activity was organized on the theme of Public Policy and Cultural Development in Nova Scotia. 19. The meeting was held in Toronto on September 6, 1995 and the project was submitted to Minister Ouellet on September 26. 20. This letter was distributed to all participants in the second forum. 21. “What worries me is that I think cultural expression is one of the primary ways in which values are transmitted. So if you have a Canadian market that is dominated by American cultural products, therefore American values, you are going to change Canadian values and I see it happening and it makes me very nervous, because I think there are certain humanistic values that are emphasized more in Canada and less so in the States. I see this kind of onslaught of American culture, that is, Canadians are becoming more and more acceptant of American values. And that scares the hell out of me!” (Terris 1999). 22. Comments made at Ottawa Forum, January 28, 1996. 23. Comments made at Ottawa Forum, January 28, 1996. 24. As one participant put it: “Somehow, by no ill-design, what you are trying to do doesn’t quite fit. It’s wonderful that the third pillar exists, but I would like to see from the Department a kind of two-stage shuffle side-step in the decision to support culture and the reasons to support culture. Culture has its own reasons for being and its own values, period. (…) I think that rather than trying to make the third pillar in response to (…) the aims and goals and objectives of the Department (…), it might be advisable to consider a double shift: ‘We support

188 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

culture in general AND one of the reasons we’re involved in it is this,’” comments made at the Ottawa Forum, January 28, 1996. 25. On the legitimation function and the most recent foreign policy review process, see Stairs (1995). 26. Stairs gave two examples of organizations with the characteristics of a member of the sub-government, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, which represents Canadian NGOs working in the field of cooperation and development, and the Conference of Defence Association (Stairs 1995, 97-101). 27. These are organizations which referred to projection or the protection of culture in their presentation (Bélanger 1999). 28. Furthermore, among the network’s membership, there were many organizations and individuals belonging to the cultural policy community. For example, ten or so of them were involved in the public consultation process on cultural policies. 29. “I kind of ended up taking, in a way, leadership role may be the wrong word, but a primary role in the discussion, because I had some ideas based on thirty years of foreign service, and we were talking of foreign policy and culture. So I became a key player for them and they kept me in the circuit a lot and I worked a lot for them and I worked along with them. I helped them a lot assembling the first paper and then, there was a second meeting further on, and I helped them, we had a preparatory meeting in Toronto for that second meeting and we drafted a lot of things that became part of the conclusions” (Higham 1999). 30. On the notion of paradigm applied to the analysis of relations between actors, see Jenson (1989).

References Axworthy, L. (1999) Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Canadian Commission for UNESCO Annual General Assembly, March 26. Baeker, G. (2000) Inventory on Cultural Diversity Challenges and Opportunities, International Network on Cultural Policy, May 20 (http://www.pch.gc.ca/ network-research/cdg-gdc/Invntry-e.htm. Bélanger, L. (1994) “La diplomatie culturelle des provinces canadiennes,” Études internationales, Vol. 25, No. 3 (September), pp. 421-452. Bélanger, L. (1996) Les dehors de l’État: Problématique et analytique de la politique étrangère (Québec: Université Laval), unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Bélanger, L. (1999) “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in Canada,” Political Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 677-699. Buzan, B., O. Wæver, and J. de Wilde (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Campbell, D. (1992) Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press. Canada (1994) Canada’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Canada (1995a) Canada in the World. Foreign Policy Statement (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Canada (1995b) Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Canada (1999) A Sense of Place, a Sense of Being. The Evolving Role of the Federal Government on Support of Culture in Canada. Report of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, available at http://www.pch.gc.ca.

189 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Coleman, W. D. and G. Skogstad (1990) Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach, (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd). Cooper, A. F. (Ed.) (1985) Canadian Culture: International Dimensions (Toronto: Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, University of Waterloo/Wilfrid Laurier University and Canadian Institute of International Affairs). Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (CI-SAGIT) (1999) New Strategies for Culture and Trade. Canadian Culture in a Global World, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/canculture-e.asp. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (1994) Estimates. Part III-Report on Plans and Priorities (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (1995) Estimates. Part III-Report on Plans and Priorities (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (1996) Estimates. Part III-Report on Plans and Priorities (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (1997) Estimates. Part III-Report on Plans and Priorities (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (1998) Estimates. Part III-Report on Plans and Priorities (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (1999) Estimates. Part III-Report on Plans and Priorities (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Eggleton, A. (1997) Notes for an Address by the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister for International Trade, on the Occasion of a Panel Discussion “Can Canada Maintain Its Cultural Identity In the Face of Globalization?,” North York, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, January 27. Gagné, G. (1999) “Libéralisation et exception culturelle: le différend canado- américain sur les périodiques,” Études internationales, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September), pp. 571-588. Gingras, A.-M. (2000) “Culture in a Global Environment: The Case of Split-Run Periodicals in Canada,” International Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 21, Spring, pp. 177-194. Haas, P. M. (1992) “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 1-35. Hay, J. (1995) “Projecting Canadian Values and Culture: An Episode in the Making of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 21-32. Higham, R. (1996) Letter to New Conversations Organizing Committee, January 12. Higham, R. (1999) Interview, October 19. Huysmans, J. (1998) “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 479-505. Jenson, J. (1989) “Paradigms and Political Discourse: Protective Legislation in France and the United States Before 1914,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXII, No. 2, pp. 235-258. Katzenstein, P. J. (1978) Between Power and Plenty. Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press). Kirton, J. (1996) “Une ouverture sur le monde: la nouvelle politique étrangère canadienne du gouvernement Chrétien,” Études internationales, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June), pp. 257-279. Knoke, D. et al. (1996) Comparing Policy Networks: Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Larsen, H. (1997) Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis. France, Britain and Europe (London and New York: LSE/Routledge). Le Galès, P. and M. Thatcher (Eds.) (1995) Les réseaux de politique publique: Débat autour des policy networks (Paris: L’Harmattan).

190 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

Merrien, F.-X. (1990) “État et politiques sociales: contribution à une théorie ‘néo-institutionnaliste,’” Sociologie du travail, October, pp. 267-294. Milner, H. V. (1997) Interests, Institutions and Information. Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press). New Conversations (1995) Exploring How Culture Sells the Image of Canada Abroad. Report of the New Conversations Forum, Halifax, June 29. New Conversations (1996a) Letter to Minister André Ouellet, September 26. New Conversations (1996b) The Ottawa Forum: Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Halifax, March. Nossal, K. R. (1993) “The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy?,” Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 95-105. Nye, Joseph S. and W. A. Owens (1996) “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March/April), pp. 20-36 Ouellet, A. (1995) Letter to Mary Sparling, November 10. Pennee, D. P. (1999) “Culture as Security: Canadian Foreign Policy and International Relations from the Cold War to the Market Wars,” International Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 20, Fall, pp. 191-213. Pross, P. A. (1992) Group Politics and Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press). Roche, F. (1998) La crise des institutions nationales d’échanges culturels en Europe (Paris: L’Harmattan). Rosenau, J. N. (1967) “Foreign Policy As an Issue-Area,” in J. N. Rosenau (Ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York/London: The Free Press/Collier Macmillan Limited), pp. 11-50. Rothkopf, D. (1997) “In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?,” Foreign Policy, No. 107 (summer), pp. 38-53. Schroeder-Gudehus, B. (1989) “Les relations culturelles, scientifiques et techniques,” in P. Painchaud (Ed.), De Mackenzie King à Pierre Trudeau. Quarante ans de diplomatie canadienne (1945-1985) (Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval), pp. 581-607. Sparling, M. (1995) Letter to André Ouellet on behalf of New Conversations, September 26. Sparling, M. (1999) Interview, Halifax, June 6. Stairs, D. (1995) “The Public Politics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews,” Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 91-116. Stein, J. G. (1994-95), “Ideas, Even Good Ideas, are Not Enough: Changing Canada’s Foreign and Defence Policies,” International Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 40-70. Terris, A. (1999) Interview, June 15. Thompson, J. H. (1994) “Canada’s Quest for Cultural Sovereignty: Protection, Promotion, and Popular Culture,” in R.D. Francis and D. B. Smith (Eds.), Readings in Canadian History, Post-Confederation (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada), pp. 508-521. Trautman, C. (1999) Intervention en introduction de la table-ronde organisée par l’UNESCO “La diversité culturelle face à la mondialisation,” November 2nd. Wæver, O., B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and P. Lemaître (Eds.) (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd.). Werz, N. (1992) “External Cultural Policy: Continuity or Change,” Aussenpolitik, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 246-255.

191 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Annex 1. Cultural Groups in the Foreign Policy Community

Groups Foreign Policy New MAI Review Process Conversations Consultations Aikins, Suezan a Alliance of Canadian Cinema, a Television, and Radio Artists Art Gallery, University of a Lethbridge Asia Pacific Foundation of a Canada Association des exportateurs a canadiens Association des producteurs de a films et de télévision du Québec Association for Canadian a Studies in the United States Association for the Export of a Canadian Books Association of Canadian a Community Colleges Association of Canadian a Publishers Association of Universities and a Colleges of Canada Attic Music Group a Aucoin, Yvon a Belkin Art Gallery, University a of British Columbia Brookes, Chris a Canada World Youth a Canadian Artists’ Network: a Black Artists in Action Canadian Artist’s a Representation Canadian Association of a Artist’s Managers Canadian Association of a University Schools of Nursing Canadian Bulgarian Association a Canadian Bureau of a International Education Canadian Conference of the aaa Arts Canadian Institute of Ukrainian a Studies Canadian Museum Association a Canadian Music Centre a Canadian Opera Company a Canadian Recording Industry a Association

192 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

Groups Foreign Policy New MAI Review Process Conversations Consultations Canadian Teacher’s Federation a Canadian-Italy Academic a Association Capilano College International a Bureau Centre de solidarité a internationale Centre for Asia-Pacific a Initiatives Centre for North American a Business Studies Chinese Cultural Society a Cinemateque Ontario, Festival a of festivals Clarke, George Elliott a Commonwealth of Learning a Commonwealth Sport a Development Program Concentrics Communications a Canada Conseil culturel acadien a Conseil québécois du théâtre a Design + Communications a Electronic Visual Arts Journal a Fédération internationale des a instituts des hautes études Festival des films du monde a Festival international pour la a nouvelle danse FOCAL-West a Fondation Jean-Pierre Perrault a Frenkel, Vera a Gray, John a Great World Artists a Green Thumb Theatre a Harbourfront Centre a Higham, Robin (Foreign a Affairs) Horizon Pacific International a Imagex Films a Institute of Public a Administration of Canada Inter-American Organisation a for Higher Education International Council for a Canadian Studies Joyal, Serge a

193 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Groups Foreign Policy New MAI Review Process Conversations Consultations Karen Jamieson Dance a Company Kultural Econometrics a International Landry, Johanne a Landry, Rosemarie a Latin America Area Studies a Program (Carleton University) LATITUDE 45, Arts Promotion a Liscia, Laurent a Macy, Christine a Mount Royal College a Nebooktook Tour Promotions. a Noah, Gwen a Nova Scotia Coalition on Arts a and Culture Nova Scotia College of Art and a Design Nova Scotia Global Education a Project Peace Research Institute a Playwrights Union of Canada aa Productions La Fête a Professional Art Dealers a Association of Canada Projet Marquis a Punter, Dennis a Regroupement des profes- a sionnels de la danse du Québec Rhombus Media a Saskatchewan Indian Federated a College Saul, John Ralston a Shim, Brigitte a Society of Composers, Authors a and Music Publishers of Canada Suttles and Seawinds a Tafelmusik a Théâtre des deux mondes aa Thorngate – Carleton a University Tritt, Robert (Canadian a Heritage) Ukrainian Canadian Congress a Ukrainian Dance Company a Ulesco, Corina a

194 Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of “Third Pillarization” in Canada

Groups Foreign Policy New MAI Review Process Conversations Consultations Union des artistes a Université du Québec a University of Alberta a University of British Columbia a University of Calgary a University of Toronto a Vancouver Chamber Choir a Wilfrid Laurier University a Woodland Cultural Centre a World Association of a Community Radio Broadcasters Writer’s Union of Canada a

195

Review Essays

Essais critiques

Claude Couture

Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux?

Gérard Bouchard, Genèse des nations et cultures du nouveau monde, Montréal, Boréal, 2000, 503 p. Yvan Lamonde, Histoire sociale des idées au Québec (1760-1896), Montréal, Fides, 2000, 575 p. Louis Balthazar et Alfred O. Hero Jr., Le Québec dans l’espace américain, Montréal, Québec-Amérique, 1999, 375 p. Christopher Edward Taucar, Canadian Federalism and Quebec Sovereignty, New York, Peter Lang, 2000, 256 p. Himani Bannerji, The Dark Side of the Nation, Toronto, Canadian Scholar’s Press, 2000, 182 p. Gerald Friesen, Citizens and Nation, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000, 308 p.

Depuis le référendum de 1995 au Québec, la littérature sur les nationalismes et les identités au Canada n’a cessé de proliférer. Au Québec en particulier, les accusations de nationalisme ethnique proférées par les adversaires de la souveraineté ont provoqué une vive réflexion chez les universitaires et les intellectuels, notamment les intellectuels fascinés par la question du nationalisme et de ses liens, ou de son absence de liens, avec le libéralisme1. Ces débats ont été concomitants aux débats sur la question du multiculturalismeetdesidentitésnationalesetculturelles,particulièrement en France, en Grande-Bretagne et, surtout, aux États-Unis2. Il sera question dans le présent essai critique de six ouvrages, trois en français et trois en anglais, qui portent sur les questions des identités, nationales ou culturelles, et des projets politiques sous-jacents à ces identités. Au cœur des problèmes étudiés dans la littérature francophone se trouve la question du Québec et de sa relation au Canada, notamment le Canada anglais (défini dans cet article comme un Canada issu du colonialisme britannique lui-même dominé par l’élément anglais, dont la langue anglaise et les institutions politiques dominantes en Angleterre encore aujourd’hui) et les autres Canadas souvent rassemblés sous le terme de multiculturalisme. La relation aux États-Unis est aussi fondamentale et fascine les auteurs qui cherchent à comprendre la spécificité du Québec. Au Canada, la question d’une identité nationale confrontée aux discours sur la diversité est un thème qui revient régulièrement dans la littérature.

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

En bout de piste, nous verrons que malgré des écarts en apparence importants parmi les auteurs recensés et des angles d’interprétation fondamentalement différents, il est possible de dégager quelques points communs, voire un point commun fondamental, à savoir une certaine ambivalence, pour reprendre l’expression d’Homi K. Bhabha3, dans l’analyse des phénomènes identitaires présentés ou des idées disséquées. Par ambivalence, Homi K. Bhabha désigne le décalage entre la certitude des discours d’historiens ou des praticiens des sciences sociales sur l’aspect nouveau de la nation, indiquant l’avènement d’une modernité qui favorise une grande diversité et, dans la même narration, cette autre certitude que la nation repose cependant sur un système culturel immémorial et/ou sur une seule identité. Les discours nationaux sont généralement empreints de cette ambivalence. Ainsi, la nation québécoise serait issue de la modernité de la Révolution tranquille mais son histoire commencerait avec la Nouvelle-France… Pour sa part, la nation canadian serait caractérisée par une culture nationale civique tellement développée et moderne, favorisant la diversité à travers le fédéralisme, qu’on ne pourrait parler justement de nation canadienne, ou canadienne-anglaise… même si dans les faits l’espace public dans ce pays dénommé Canada est façonné par les institutions politiques d’une culture pourtant très spécifique, la culture britannique, par la domination d’une langue, en l’occurrence l’anglais, et qu’à l’intérieur de cet espace culturel canadien il y a de constantes pressions pour en arriver à une seule identité nationale. Ce sont ces aspects ambivalentsquenousessayeronsdefaireressortirdanscetessaicritique. Enfin, pour terminer cette introduction, précisons que nous avons accordé dans cet essai une place centrale à l’ouvrage de Gérard Bouchard sur les sociétés neuves et que les autres ouvrages, au demeurant aussi importants que celui de l’historien québécois, seront présentés pour les fins de ce texte en fonction de la théorie des sociétés neuves et de leur rupture ou, au contraire, de leur continuité par rapport aux sociétés coloniales métropolitaines.

La genèse des nations et cultures du nouveau monde Depuis 1995, l’historien Gérard Bouchard a délaissé le terrain de l’histoire sociale pour produire une œuvre plus audacieuse sur le plan théorique et interprétatif. La dernière parution, couronnée par le prix du Gouverneur général, Genèse des nations et cultures du nouveau monde4, est en quelque sorte l’œuvre majeure annoncée par plusieurs parutions des années 1990, notamment Entre l’Ancien et le Nouveau Monde (Ottawa, Presses de l’Universitéd’Ottawa,1995),l’introductionàl’ouvragecollectif,co-dirigé avec Yvan Lamonde, La nation dans tous ses états (Montréal/Paris, Harmattan, 1997), enfin La nation québécoise au futur et au passé (Montréal, VLB, 1999) et Dialogue sur les pays neufs (Montréal, Boréal, 1999).

200 Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux?

La première caractéristique fondamentale de cet ouvrage sur la genèse des pays neufs est l’approche d’histoire comparée qu’adopte l’auteur. En effet, deux modèles comparatifs généraux sont présentés : le modèle référentiel et le modèle intégral. Dans le premier modèle, la comparaison porte sur plusieurs unités, mais l’une d’entre elles sert de « point de départ », de « référence ». Dans le second modèle, au contraire, toutes les unités sont traitées également. Le but du premier modèle vise à faire ressortir la spécificité d’une société par rapport à d’autres unités. La comparaison peut rendre plus claire la spécificité d’une unité. L’objectifdu second modèle est au contraire de trouver des aspects communs dans différentes unités égales et comparables. Pour construire sa genèse des nations et cultures du Nouveau Monde, Gérard Bouchard a emprunté aux deux modèles, d’une part, en se servant du Québec comme « point de départ » et, d’autre part, en accordant une importance égale à la reconstruction des récits nationaux des autres unités comparées. Ces paramètres de l’histoire comparée étant posés, Gérard Bouchard a décrit la dynamique de l’évolution identitaire des pays neufs. L’étude porte donc sur le Québec, comme élément de référence, et sur les États-Unis, l’Amérique latine, le Canada, la Nouvelle-Zélande et l’Australie. Deux éléments dialectiques caractérisent la genèse des pays neufs : la continuité et la rupture, à partir desquelles Gérard Bouchard a construit deux modèles. Ainsi, le modèle A, celui de la continuité, constitue une reproduction de la mère patrie. Le discours identitaire au sein d’une société neuve qui émane du modèle A favorise le maintien du lien avec la métropole, un lien défini par le passé mais aussi en fonction de l’avenir. Au contraire, dans le modèle B, une collectivité neuve « tourne le dos»àlamère-patrie et cherche à se reproduire dans la rupture et la différence. L’auteurprécise que ces modèles interagissent constamment et ne peuvent être conçus et appliqués que dans une perspective dialectique. En somme, il y a deux types de modèles dans l’analyse de Gérard Bouchard : d’une part les modèles théoriques dits intégral et référentiel et les modèles de description des processus de développement des pays neufs, c’est-à-dire la continuité et la rupture. Le cas de l’Amérique latine, tel que présenté par Gérard Bouchard, est très intéressant. L’évolution de l’Amérique latine depuis le 16e siècle, contrairement au Québec, serait davantage associée à la rupture plutôt qu’à la continuité. Mais le parcours ne fut pas linéaire. Après une première période « continuiste », les Créoles (Blancs nés en Amérique) en arrivèrent à développer une américanité opposée à la culture européenne. L’imaginairenationaldéveloppélorsdesguerresd’indépendanceacherché à inclure les Autochtones. « Au Mexique, comme ailleurs en Amérique latine, écrit Gérard Bouchard, il est remarquable que les plus anciennes expressions du sentiment de l’identité nationale incluaient l’indianité comme composante essentielle. »5 Toutefois, même si la rupture avec les métropoles espagnoles et portugaises a été complétée au 19e siècle lors des mouvements

201 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes d’indépendance politique, plusieurs éléments de continuité ont perduré après l’acquisition de cette souveraineté politique, notamment la langue, la religion, de nombreux emprunts à la culture savante européenne, etc. La complexité sociale, culturelle et politique du continent a par la suite freiné l’élan de l’américanité et de l’indianité pour faire place à l’échec du processus de rupture, voire à l’avènement d’une période de « ré-européani- sation ». Cela dit, selon Gérard Bouchard, la différenciation et la rupture restent des acquis de l’Amérique latine. L’américanité, certes, demeure inachevée et fragile mais réelle. L’acquisition de l’indépendance politique, comme aux États-Unis et en Amérique latine, constitue une immense différence par rapport au Québec. Alors que l’Amérique latine vivait une période d’indépendance politique au 19e siècle, le Québec, entre 1840 et 1940, selon Gérard Bouchard, donc après l’échec des Rébellions de 1837-38, entrait au contraire dans une longue période continuiste. Ainsi, le Québec aurait traversé un certain nombre de périodes toutes marquées par le processus de continuité et de rupture. Premièrement, de 1608 à 1700, la Nouvelle-France aurait été une expérience de continuité, laquelle fut de plus en plus remise en question de 1700 à 1760. La Conquête a tout chambardé, créant une période de transition de 1760 à 1791. Ce fut au cours de cette période de transition qu’une identité « canadienne » s’est formée au contact du colonialisme britannique, provoquant une période de rupture entre 1800 et 1838. Mais l’échec des Rébellions en 1837-38 entraîna, pour plus d’un siècle, une fixation de l’identité nationale dans le culturel, dans l’attachement aux origines françaises et dans l’a-politique. La période suivante, de 1940 à 1960, vit apparaître une nouvelle expression de l’objectif de rupture qui fut affirmé lors de la Révolution tranquille des années 1960. L’identité québécoise moderne serait depuis « vraie », puisque politique, par opposition à la « fausse identité canadienne-française » fondée sur le culturel6. Mais cette « vraie » identité ne s’est pas encore complètement affranchie de l’ancienne. « L’identité nationale n’est plus canadienne- française (à l’ancienne manière) mais elle n’est pas encore intégralement québécoise. »7 Un peu plus loin, il écrit : « [l]e champ des allégeances est plus fragmenté que jamais. On dirait que le Québec est arrivé à un carrefour où toutes les fidélités, toutes les options, anciennes et nouvelles, se trouvent réunies : celles qu’il avait écartées, celles qu’il n’avait qu’empruntées qu’à moitié et celles qu’a fait émerger son histoire récente. »8 Le Québec est-il la seule collectivité neuve dont l’avenir est hypothéqué par un lourd passé continuiste? De fait, Gérard Bouchard montre que la voie continuiste a été suivie par d’autres collectivités neuves et présente trois exemples : l’Australie, la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Canada. Du 19e siècle jusqu’aux trois dernières décennies du 20e siècle, ces trois collectivités neuves ont vécu une relation de continuité avec leur métropole. Le déclin de l’Empire britannique après 1945, l’immigration massive et la combativité autochtone pour la

202 Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux? reconnaissance notamment de leurs droits territoriaux ont amené ces sociétés à redéfinir leur identité sans toutefois que la rupture politique avec la vieille métropole soit complétée. En ce qui concerne les États-Unis, Gérard Bouchard a repris l’idée selon laquelle ils ont développé une identité et une culture fondées sur l’individualisme et la liberté, rompant ainsi avec les mentalités collectives de la vieille Europe. Toutefois, l’historien québécois reconnaît aussi un « autre » récit américain, celui des exclus de la société américaine, descendants d’esclaves, Autochtones et immigrants, qui ont été longtemps marginalisés par un discours national fondé sur la « mission civilisatrice des Anglo-Saxons d’Amérique » (p. 357). Gérard Bouchard en arrive à la conclusion que ces deux récits américains sont liés dialectiquement et offrent la possibilité d’un dépassement, d’une utopie sans cesse reportée (p. 366). Pour chacune des reconstitutions des discours nationaux, Gérard Bouchard a beaucoup puisé dans les historiographies nationales et les traditions littéraires de ces collectivités neuves. Il en résulte une construction narrative qui reprend, malgré certaines nuances, les grands discours nationaux établis par ces collectivités neuves. Ainsi, alors que les autres collectivités ont réussi à obtenir leur indépendance politique malgré le caractère parfois inachevé de leur processus de rupture, le Québec serait la seule nation du nouveau monde, parmi les nations étudiées, à ne pas jouir de l’indépendance politique. Il est aussi la seule nation d’Amérique au 19e siècleàs’êtreenferméedansundiscoursuniqueetcontinuiste,etcede1840 à 1940. En fait, cette longue période continuiste a sans doute beaucoup contribué à retarder l’avènement au Québec d’une identité « vraie », fondée sur l’objectif de rupture. Cette narration de l’histoire du Québec et de son identité nationale a été confirmée par Yvan Lamonde dans un ouvrage d’une remarquable érudition qui fut publié quelques mois après l’ouvrage de Gérard Bouchard.

Une histoire sociale des idées au Québec Ce premier tome de Histoire sociale des idées au Québec : 1760-1896, soit dit en passant le trente-deuxième ouvrage du professeur Lamonde, s’avère à la fois une narration minutieuse, très érudite, mais aussi dynamique des grands courants d’idées civiques qui ont parcouru le Québec, de la Conquête à Laurier : monarchisme, républicanisme, démocratie, conservatisme, ultramontanisme, etc. Il s’agit aussi d’une histoire sociale puisque l’auteur a cherché à dévoiler non seulement le contenu de ses idées et leur structure, mais aussi leur production, leur diffusion et leur réception. La période étudiée est découpée en quatre sous-périodes : 1760-1815; 1815- 1840; 1840-1877; et 1877-1896. Ce découpage du temps dans la narration de l’histoire des idées au Québec correspond grosso modo au découpage suggéré par Gérard Bouchard, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la période de nationalisme culturel qui s’ouvre après 1840. Les deux

203 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes ouvrages, bien que de facture différente et de propos légèrement différent, sont néanmoins, me semble-t-il, complémentaires dans la mesure où la présentation, par Yvan Lamonde, à la fois vivante et détaillée, des idées au Québec entre 1760 et 1896 pourrait très bien s’inscrire dans le cadre théorique présenté par Gérard Bouchard. D’ailleurs, le professeur Lamonde, qui a collaboré à de nombreux ouvrages avec le professeur Bouchard, partage en effet la thèse d’une période continuiste après l’échec des Rébellions de 1837-38. Il écrit : Ce nationalisme [de conservation] […] que [Étienne] Parent a commencéàformulervers1837etdontlacaractéristiquepremière est d’être apolitique et de se limiter à une revendication culturelle. Ce nationalisme est apolitique [c’est nous qui soulignons] parce qu’il refuse d’associer une revendication nationalitaire à une description des caractéristiques culturelles de la nationalité, de faire appel au principe des nationalités pour donner à une communauté nationale identifiée par sa langue, ses mœurs, sa religion et son régime juridique une entité territoriale et étatique souveraine.9 Par ailleurs, YvanLamonde insiste, avec raison, sur l’influence des deux empires, la France et la Grande-Bretagne, sur le Québec. Un troisième empire, les États-Unis, a aussi joué un rôle important dans la formation identitaire des Canadiens et plus tard des Québécois. Ainsi, pendant les quinze premières années de sa formation identitaire, le Canada (français) auraconnutroisformesd’institutionpolitiqueoccidentale:lamonarchiede droit divin, la monarchie constitutionnelle et le républicanisme. Il en résulta, selon YvanLamonde, que les Canadiens français furent, entre 1760 et 1896, des Franco-Britanniques catholiques vivant en Amérique ( p. 485). L’identité était donc ambiguë et oscilla pour un temps entre le libéralisme radical et le conservatisme ou le libéralisme réformiste à la britannique. Les périodes de 1815 à 1840 et de 1840 à 1877 furent des périodes d’essouf- flement du libéralisme radical, revendicateur de la souveraineté nationale. Lorsque Laurier prononça son fameux discours en 1877 sur le libéralisme canadien (au sens de libéralisme canadien-français), le libéralisme réformiste britannique servit de modèle au détriment du libéralisme révolutionnaire français. La cause du libéralisme radical fut entendue et le Canada français/Québec fut ni plus ni moins enfermé, pour un certain temps, dans un nationalisme apolitique et un libéralisme conservateur sur la plan social (on imagine que dans les prochains volumes de cette Histoire socialedesidées,lemomentdel’abandondecemodèle,s’ilyajamaiseuun tel moment, sera précisé).

Le Québec dans l’espace américain En somme, cette Histoire sociale des idées nous rappelle avec force que l’appel de Papineau à partir des années 1830 ne fut pas entendu et que le Canada français en général a tourné le dos au républicanisme américain et

204 Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux? au libéralisme révolutionnaire français et est resté attaché aux institutions britanniques et au libéralisme réformiste britannique. Or, les auteurs Louis Balthazar et Alfred Hero Jr. soulignent, dans leur ouvrage, que le Québec a néanmoins subi au 20e siècle la force d’attraction des États-Unis et de l’espace américain. La narration, certes succincte, de l’histoire du Québec que l’on retrouve au début de cet ouvrage épouse les grandes lignes de la narration plus érudite que l’on retrouve dans les ouvrages de Gérard Bouchard et d’Yvan Lamonde : Conquête, échec des Rébellions, nationalisme conservateur du Canada français entre 1840 et 1960,Révolutiontranquille.Cependantlesauteurssesontsurtoutattardésà décrire la relation entre le Québec et les États-Unis au cours du dernier siècle. Ainsi, les États-Unis ont-ils montré beaucoup d’intérêt pour le Québec depuis les années 1960, à la fois sur les plans politique, médiatique, culturel et économique. Le Québec, au 19e siècle, a peut-être tourné le dos au républicanisme, il n’en reste pas moins que son économie fut de plus en plus intégrée à celle des États-Unis. À titre d’exemple, de 1988 à 1992, les exportations du Québec vers les États-Unis dans les domaines touchés par l’Accord de libre-échange de 1988 ont augmenté de 43 p. 1000 alors que l’augmentation au niveau canadien a été de 33 p. 100 (p. 174). Par ailleurs, selon le recensement de 1990, on comptait aux États-Unis près de 13 millions de personnes qui auraient des origines francophones (nord-américaines ou autres), dont 1,7 millions de personnes qui parlent encore le français. Cependant, les Franco-Américains d’origine canadienne auraient conservé leur identité canadienne-française et seraient peu enclins à appuyer les revendications nationalistes du Québec. Les auteurs écrivent : Parmi les Franco-Américains, descendants de familles québécoises, dont une très forte majorité ne parle plus le français, très peu entretiennent quelque sympathie pour le Québec moderne, sécularisé, pluraliste et autonomiste. Dans la mesure où ces populations tiennent encore à s’identifier comme French Canadians et conservent des liens avec leur patrie d’origine, ils entretiennent surtout l’image du Québec traditionnel.10 Par contre, les auteurs reconnaissent qu’en fait, les milieux politiques et économiques américains entretiennent, de façon générale, très peu de sympathie pour le projet de souveraineté du Québec, et ce même si le niveau de tolérance envers ce projet semble plus grand aujourd’hui par rapport à ce qu’il était en 1980. Le conservatisme américain semble un facteur important, et les auteurs n’ont pu s’empêcher de remarquer : Le pays fondé par des puritains est toujours demeuré marqué par l’effervescence religieuse et n’a cessé d’appuyer, en dépit de la séparation des Églises et de l’État, une affirmation publique de la croyance en Dieu.11

205 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Dans l’ensemble, ces trois ouvrages convergent dans leurs récits de l’évolution globale du Québec depuis 1760 et voient nettement une coupure entre la vieille identité canadiene-française et la nouvelle identité issue des années 1960 au Québec. Dans l’un de ces ouvrages toutefois, l’auteur insiste sur l’échec de Papineau et de son ralliement au républicanisme américain. Pour leur part, Balthazar et Héro montrent, chiffres à l’appui, l’intégrationduQuébecau20e siècledansl’espaceaméricain.Ensomme,si les élites libérales du Québec sont devenues, après 1877, plus enclines à appuyer le libéralisme réformiste britannique, il apparaît assez clairement qu’au 20e siècle l’attraction américaine fut irrésistible, et ce même si les élites américaines sont toujours peu sympathiques au projet du Québec de rompre avec ses attaches coloniales. Nous reviendrions plus loin sur ce dernier aspect car il est loin d’être assuré que les États-Unis, même avec l’indépendance politique, aient rompu de façon si draconienne avec l’héritage colonial européen, un héritage raciste et antidémocratique.

Le discours de l’Autre La question de la souveraineté du Québec aux États-Unis à travers le prisme canadien Comme nous venons de le voir, dans la littérature francophone sur les idées et les identités nationales, la référence à l’Autre, anglo-américain, est omniprésente. À l’autre bout de la lorgnette, des auteurs anglo-américains ont témoigné depuis fort longtemps d’un grand intérêt pour le Canada en général et le Canada français en particulier. Un indice récent de cet intérêt a été le développement des études sur le Canada aux États-Unis. Le livre de Christopher Edward Taucar est typique du genre de publication américaine dans ce domaine12. Sans être hostile au Québec, l’auteur croit néanmoins que le fédéralisme canadien a répondu aux aspirations du Québec depuis les années 1960 et que la province de Québec s’est très bien tirée d’affaire dans un régime fédéral pourtant très compétitif. Voilà une thèse qui fera sans doute sourire plusieurs partisans de la souveraineté du Québec. Pourtant un aspect intéressant du livre se trouve dans la narration de l’évolution historique du Québec depuis la Conquête. Cette narration emprunte en effet beaucoup à la structure narrative des grandes fresques historiques de la littérature francophone : Nouvelle- France, Conquête, échec des Rébellions de 1837-38, nationalisme conservateur et culturel, Révolution tranquille, avènement de la modernité. En d’autres mots, le récit historique présenté par un fédéraliste canadien (l’auteur est en effet un expert de droit constitutionnel à Toronto avec, de toute évidence, des liens avec le réseau des études canadiennes aux États-Unis) est identique, au moins jusqu’à l’étape de la Révolution tranquille, au récit linéaire souverainiste13 qui voit la fin du processus de modernisation et de rupture avec le passé colonial dans la souveraineté. Pour un auteur comme Taucar, la rupture avec le passé colonial s’est plutôt

206 Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux? produite avec la Révolution tranquille. La demande d’indépendance, selon lui, n’est pas rationnelle et s’expliquerait par le phénomène du Conquêtisme, c’est-à-dire par la trace indélébile laissée par la Conquête dans la mentalité des Canadiens français. Citant Guy Laforest et Christian Dufour, il écrit : English-French relations are structured on the Conquest, which implies that francophones are a conquered people even today, at least on a symbolic level.14 En somme, le phénomène d’incompréhension de la question du Québec par le public américain en général, décrit par Louis Balthazar et Alfred Hero Jr., s’apparente de près à cette attitude bienveillante mais perplexe d’un auteur comme Taucar. Comment expliquer, encore une fois, que dans une culture républicaine comme celle des États-Unis, on y trouve très peu de sympathie pour ce projet de rupture avec les institutions du colonialisme anglais? Enfin, il importe de rappeler que cette thèse de l’oppression symbolique rejoint l’idée, défendue par d’autres auteurs qui ont publié en anglais mais qui refusent d’être associés au Canada anglais et selon laquelle le Canada a été construit à partir de deux empires coloniaux qui se font toujours compétition dans un appareil étatique et à travers d’une lutte d’identités qui exprimeraient essentiellement le caractère raciste du Canada comme nation.

Le Canada raciste et colonial Himani Bannerji représente parfaitement bien cette littérature qui situe la ligne de partage entre les oppresseurs et les opprimés au Canada entre, d’une part, le Canada dit anglais et le Québec et, d’autre part, les Premières Nations et les Autres, qui ne sont ni d’origine française ni britannique, en particulier les « minorités visibles ». Dans une série de cinq essais qui sont un prélude à une étude plus exhaustive sur la question du multiculturalisme et du nationalisme, Himani Bannerji fait ressortir les nombreux aspects contradictoires de la dimension cachée du nationalisme au Canada, entre autres la marginalisation des « minorités visibles », en particulier les femmes de ces minorités. Très inspirée par les travaux de David Theo Goldberg (1993) sur les dimensions profondément racistes du libéralisme occidental, elle décortique les concepts de multiculturalisme et de diversité dans le contexte canadien et en arrive à un constat plutôt sombre quant à la nature raciste du Canada. L’auteure s’attaque aussi aux notions de Canada anglais et de Canada français/Québec qui reposeraient sur des imaginaires nationaux conçus dans un contexte colonial et axé sur la suprématie. Ainsi, pour elle, l’idée du Canada anglais fait essentiellement référence à la réalité orangiste et « blanche » du Canada et à la domination de la langue anglaise, laissant ainsi dans l’exclusion les minorités pourtant dites visibles. Le Canada français ou le Québec ne seraient que l’image, dans une autre langue coloniale, du Canada dit anglais. Elle écrit :

207 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Colonialism remains as a vital formational and definitional issue. […] The adjective English stamped into “Canada” bares this reality, both past and present. It shows us who stands on the other side of the Pan-Canadian project. Quebeckers know it well, and their colonial rivalry continues. And the “the visible minorities”– multiculturalism notwithstanding–know our equidistance from both of these conquering essences.16 Le discours au sujet du multiculturalisme constitue un autre aspect de cette rivalité coloniale. Ainsi, un doigt accusateur est pointé en direction du Québec et de son nationalisme ethnique. Par opposition à ce nationalisme ethnique, la politique de multiculturalisme du Canada est agitée comme preuve d’une supériorité morale et du nationalisme civique du Canada. Sur ce point, observe Bannerji, il faut remarquer que le multiculturalisme canadian n’est qu’une politique de reconnaissance de façade dans un Canada toujours dominé par la langue anglaise et par des institutions britanniques recouvrant une réalité raciale sournoisement occultée. Par conséquent, l’expression Canada anglais est problématique selon Bannerji parce qu’elle contraint au silence les groupes non hégémoniques. Leur identité et leur diversité disparaissent sous le vocable de Canada anglais. Aussi, en vertu de cette approche déconstructive de la notion de Canada anglais et de son reflet colonial, le Canada français/Québec, l’utilisation même de l’expression Canada anglais serait suspecte. Cette vision, évidemment, tranche avec la quête presque désespérée d’identité commune chez certains auteurs canadiens-anglais.

L’identité canadienne et les nouvelles narrations Le propos de Gerald Friesen17 diffère tout à fait de celui d’Himani Bannerji. Son projet, ambitieux sur le plan intellectuel, du moins dans l’état actuel de la pratique historienne au Canada, cherche à intégrer certaines pratiques d’histoire culturelle au besoin de synthèse historique qui a souvent manqué dans les travaux d’histoire sociale des dernières décennies. Friesen se dit en effet d’accord avec l’historien Jack Granatstein qui fustigea la nouvelle histoire sociale pour son manque de synthèse. Aussi, Friesen a-t-il conçu un projet de synthèse historique inspiré d’une pratique répandue en histoire culturelle qui consiste à céder la parole à ceux qui sont traditionnellement exclus18 afin de confronter les grandes narrations identitaires au Canada. Pourlui,ledébatentreleshistorienspolitiquesnationauxetlespraticiensde l’histoire sociale forme un faux débat puisque les deux groupes ont eu tendance à se concentrer sur des domaines spécifiques et à négliger les facteurs d’intégration comme les différents modes de communication à différentes époques. Conscient, de plus, des critiques post-modernes concernant l’histoire comme narration, Gerald Friesen a cherché à reconstituer les grands récits de l’histoire canadienne mais à partir des narrations de gens ordinaires. Ces narrations ont permis à Gerald Friesen de contester certains aspects des métanarrations sur l’ethos canadien, notammentcellesd’HaroldInnis,deNorthropFryeetdeMargaretAtwood.

208 Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux?

L’importance accordée par ces auteurs à l’influence autochtone dans l’identité canadienne et celle de l’espace ne sont pas contestées par Friesen. C’est l’articulation de ces dimensions qui est contestée. Cinq narrations individuelles sont donc présentées pour illustrer quatre différentes périodes de l’histoire canadienne, c’est-à-dire : 1) la période des traditions orales et des sociétés traditionnelles; 2) celle des sociétés de colonisation et de communication contextuelle; 3) la période des communications écrites et de l’édification des imaginaires nationaux; et enfin 4) l’ère des médias électroniques.Pourchacunedecespériodesacorresponduunrécit,d’abord celui de la famille autochtone André, ensuite l’histoire d’Elizabeth Goudie, celle de Phyllis Knight pour la première moitié du 20e siècle enfin les témoignages de Frank et Roseanne, aussi celui de Simonne Monet- Chartrand pour la seconde moitié du siècle. Inspiré par l’approche de Charles Tilly dans sa synthèse sur le phénomène des identités19, Friesen prétend qu’il est possible d’avoir une identité commune en fonction de facteurs relationnels, culturels, historiques et contingents. Les récits qu’il présente dans ce livre illustreraient justement ces aspects relationnels entre Canadiens au cours des quatre grandes périodes identifiées. L’état d’être canadien (la Canadian-ness) se définirait donc en fonction de ces relations particulières entre individus où la continuité historique est assurée en raison des choix et des stratégies élaborés dans l’espace canadien par ces différents individus afin de répondre aux changements survenus depuis deux siècles. Les choix de la vie quotidienne auraient donc forgé des expériences à la fois communes entre individus et uniques par rapport à d’autres collectivités. Il conclut : My purpose in writing this book has been to explain in new terms why “Canada” is a meaningful public identity. I wanted to demonstrate that the various groups of Canadians who express such a variety of responses to the world and seem to be divided also share much.20 En somme, selon Friesen, malgré leurs différences, Autochtones, Canadiens français, Québécois et Canadiens d’origine britannique, chinoise, sud-asiatique et autres ont en commun de vivre la merveilleuse expérience de la canadianité.

La convergence des discours La littérature recensée laisse donc apparaître des points de vue très différents sur le Canada, le Québec et les identités nationales. Pour essayer de débusquer quelques points communs, il m’apparaît important de rappeler certains aspects des débats des dernières décennies au sujet du caractère narratif de l’histoire, voire des sciences sociales en général. Au début des années 1970, Hayden White21 avait choqué la communauté des historiens en montrant la relation entre la pratique de l’histoire et la

209 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes structure narrative des métanarrations historiques. Selon White, les historiens reprennent inconsciemment les structures narratives que l’on peut identifier dans toutes les grandes narrations du monde. Ces métanarrations auraient trois principaux modes : le mode du complot, celui de l’argument et enfin le mode idéologique. Chaque historiographie est donc contingente à une époque et reproduit l’un des modes de métanarrations constitutives de ces époques. Pour sa part, Peter Novick22, cherchant à invalider les théories de Hayden White, concéda cependant, presqu’à regret, après un examen minutieux de la question de l’objectivité, que l’idée même d’un progrès historiographique repose sur un mode narratif, celui de l’idéologie, et que d’une époque à une autre, il n’y a aucun progrès d’une métanarration historiographique à une autre. En d’autres mots, il n’y a pas de vérité historiographique absolue, mais différentes pratiques discursives révélant les modes discursifs dominants des différentes époques. Ce qu’Hayden White a révélé pour l’historiographie pourrait s’étendre à l’ensemble des sciences sociales23. Par exemple, l’utilisation systématique du couple tradition-modernité dans la littérature sur le nationalisme, en particulier dans les travaux d’Ernest Gellner24, d’A.D. Smith25,deYael Tamir26 et de Liah Greenfeld27, peut très bien s’apparenter à la forme organiciste du mode de l’argument, reproduisant ainsi une métanarration où les éléments décrits sont dits fonctionnels (au sens d’organes sociaux complémentaires). Pour différents auteurs associés au post-colonialisme28, la structure narrative contenue dans l’utilisation du couple tradition- modernité doit être interprétée en fonction du colonialisme occidental du 19e siècle et de sa tendance à se définir comme moderne par comparaison à l’Autre, l’Asiatique ou l’Oriental, dit traditionnel. Dans la mesure où des théoriciens du nationalisme des années 1990 ont continué à réfléchir en termes de tradition et de modernité en s’inspirant de la littérature en sciences sociales du 19e siècle, les racines coloniales des discours récents sur le nationalisme seraient donc très visibles. Ces propos apparaîtront un peu obtus, mais en se remémorant les six ouvrages recensés dans cet essai, il importe de retenir deux propositions qui ressortent des débats théoriques brièvement présentés plus haut : 1) que les sciences sociales et l’histoire obéissent à des modes discursifs qui reflètent certaines préoccupations idéologiques de l’époque; et 2) que ces préoccupations idéologiques sont inséparables de la question du colonialisme occidental des derniers siècles. Il serait sans doute amusant et intéressant de montrer plus en détail la structure narrative de chaque texte recensé dans cet essai en utilisant la méthode d’Hayden White. Mais dans le contexte de cette recension, attardons-noussimplementàfaireressortircertainsaspectsliésàlaseconde proposition.

210 Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux?

Ainsi, par rapport à cette deuxième proposition générale, les travaux d’Himani Bannerji ont certes le mérite de rappeler les origines coloniales du Canada, y compris celles du Canada français. Risquons, cependant, une critique. Il m’a en effet semblé que les travaux d’Himani Bannerji en arrivent, paradoxalement et sans doute par effet pervers, à s’inscrire parfaitement bien dans le discours nationaliste canadian qu’elle prétend dénoncer et dont la principale caractéristique discursive est de nier justement son fondement ethnique et raciste. Expliquons-nous. En fait, le raisonnement est simple : si l’on considère comme raciste l’expression Canada anglais parce que celle-ci provient du colonialisme et fait ressortir le côté orangiste et « suprémaciste » du Canada sans le Québec, laissant sans voix et sans identité les Autres, le même principe devrait donc s’appliquer aux expressions Canada français ou Québec qui laissent sans voix les francophones, au Québec ou ailleurs au Canada, qui ne sont pas des descendants des colonisateurs français du 17e siècle. Pourtant l’auteure elle-même lorsqu’elle parle du Canada français ou du Québec semble assez clairement faire référence aux seuls descendants « gaulois » de la Nouvelle-France, laissant ainsi sans voix les descendants des quelques milliers d’esclaves noirs de la Nouvelle-France, et les autres minorités visibles et francophones d’aujourd’hui. Cela me semble ambivalent en ce sens qu’elle ne semble pas concevoir qu’il puisse y avoir des francophones qui ne sont pas des « pure laine » québécois. Ce faisant, elle reproduit à son insu des éléments de la métanarration nationale Canadian. D’où l’ambivalence. Depuis les années 1960 en particulier, quand une identité de plus en plus canadian a remplacé l’identité canadienne-britannique, il s’est développé une véritable culture de l’amnésie collective au Canada. Pourtant dominé par la langue anglaise et les institutions britanniques, ce Canada est cependant décrit, notamment dans les discours politiques dominants et les médias, comme étant essentiellement une société de nationalisme civique, comme si le passé colonial britannique n’avait jamais existé et n’avait plus aucun effet. Dans ce contexte, il faudrait donc s’interroger un peu plus sur ce phénomène d’une auteure se réclamant du marxisme29 et de l’antiracisme qui en arrive, elle aussi, à contribuer à rendre invisible, puisqu’il devient sous sa plume innommable, cet insaisissable Canada anglais qui ne cesse de nier sa propre réalité coloniale (les analyses sur le multiculturalisme canadien et sur Charles Taylor sont par contre très pertinentes). Par ailleurs, sur le fond, il semble se dégager, dans ces analyses, rien de moins qu’un concept très ambivalent de classe-ethnie. Ainsi, malgré certaines nuances apportées ici et là, la lecture de ce livre par Himani Bannerji peut donner l’impression que le prolétariat canadien est par essence composé de « minorités visibles », alors que sa bourgeoisie, grande ou moyenne, serait uniquement d’origine anglaise ou française. Ce n’est pas si sûr, ou du moins pas si simple. Comme l’ont rappelé récemment

211 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Abu-Laban et Stasiulis (2000), dans les milieux qui ne sont ni d’origine française ni d’origine britannique, on retrouve aussi une profonde inégalité sociale où souvent les membres des classes moyennes de ces groupes s’intègrent à la structure dominante, qu’elle soit française ou, de façon générale, anglaise. Inversement, en particulier au 19e siècle, pour les membres, hommes ou femmes, du prolétariat canadien-français, juif ou irlandais catholique, les privilèges d’appartenir à la « race » blanche colonisatrice n’ont pas effacé leur oppression. Aussi, dans le procès de dé- construction de la rhétorique coloniale au Canada, il y aurait peut-être lieu de tenir compte des différentes dimensions d’exploitation (la question du racisme bien sûr, mais aussi les exclusions fondées sur la langue, la religion ou les genres sexuels, etc.) afin de mieux comprendre le phénomène de la continuité des phénomènes d’exclusion. Or, justement, par rapport au phénomène de continuité, les narrations présentées par Taucar et Friesen ne font aucune référence au caractère conflictuel des identités nationales. Certes, il est question chez Taucar de fédéralisme compétitif, mais cette compétition semble se dérouler sans antagonisme de classe ou sans conflit entre groupes qui partagent un même État mais avec des identités nationales différentes. Taucar présente le nationalisme québécois comme le résultat du Conquêtisme, comme si, entre 1760 et 1960, le nationalisme canadien-britannique et impérialiste n’avait eu aucun effet quant à l’éventuelle formation du nationalisme québécois. Tout est présenté en termes de compétition pour des ressources à l’intérieur du système fédéral canadien sans analyse de la dynamique des identités nationales conflictuelles au Canada. Friesen, pour sa part, fait écho à cette incapacité à penser le conflit en cherchant à dépeindre une essence canadienne justement sans conflit. En d’autres mots, c’est comme si l’identité nationale canadienne était essentiellement civique et inclusive. Une telle proposition me semble très contestable et n’est pas sans rappeler la dichotomie « nationalisme civique- nationalisme ethnique ». Depuis quelques années, il est en effet de bon ton lorsqu’il s’agit d’aborder la question du nationalisme de recourir aux notions de nationalisme ethnique et de nationalisme civique. Pour des auteurs anglo-américains, ou du moins chez plusieurs auteurs en provenance des États-Unis ou de Grande-Bretagne, notamment Liah Greenfeld (1992), la culture politique de ces pays serait essentiellement une culture nationaliste civique par opposition aux autres cultures nationales, la plupart étant ethniques. Ainsi, la nation britannique, américaine et, par extension, la nation canadienne-britannique ou anglaise seraient des lieux d’inclusion pour des individus d’origine diverse. Lacanadianité décrite par Friesen correspond tout à fait idéologiquement à ce modèle et cherche, consciemmentounon,àleconfirmerparunenarrationissuedemilieuxplus populaires. Mais en quoi cinq narrations individuelles, aussi intéressantes qu’ellessoient,peuvent-ellesévacuerlaquestiondesconflits?Pourquoi,au contraire, la canadianité ne serait-elle pas définie par ses conflits

212 Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux? identitaires spécifiques? Il me semble que dans le projet même de trouver un ethos canadien commun aux Autochtones, aux Québécois et aux Canadiens d’origines diverses se trouve toute l’ambivalence de la métanarration du nationalisme dit civique où tout est pensé en termes d’intégration (à un ensemble forcément dominant mais qui n’est pas nommé) et non en termes de dialogue entre des identités en perpétuel conflit. Cela dit, les ouvrages de Friesen et de Taucar semblent confirmer d’une certaine façon l’analyse de Gérard Bouchard selon laquelle le Canada anglais n’a pas vécu de rupture avec son passé colonial dans sa quête d’identité unique. Mais la littérature sur l’identité nationale produite dernièrement au Canada anglais n’est pas monolithique. Des auteurs comme Ian Angus (1997), Samuel LaSelva (1996) et Ken McRoberts (1997) ont au contraire fait ressortir la multiplicité des dimensions politiques et nationales dans l’espace identitaire canadien. Ces auteurs ont aussi en commun d’avoir vu le rôle du Canada français comme étant progressiste dans la construction du Canada moderne dans la mesure où ce rôle fut déterminant dans l’obtention du gouvernement responsable et de la résistance à un projet de nation-building strictement protestant et anglo-saxon. En d’autres mots, le nationalisme canadien-français, loin d’être apolitique et strictement culturel, comme l’ont soutenu Gérard Bouchard et Yvan Lamonde, a empêché l’édification d’une nation culturellement et politiquement homogène par la reconnaissance, même partielle, de son existence dans les institutions de 1867. Il est donc intéressant de constater qu’alors que des auteurs francophones importants continuent à voir dans le nationalisme canadien-français des années 1850-1960 un nationalisme apolitique (au sens d’une absence de revendicationdesouveraineténationale)etstrictementculturel,desauteurs anglophones tout aussi importants mais critiques des tendances à l’intégrationdeleurpropresociété,voientaucontraireunrôleéminemment politique joué par ces Canadiens français qui ont bloqué un projet national monolithique protestant, impérialiste et anglo-saxon. Cet exemple montre qu’il peut donc y avoir plusieurs narrations nationales et qu’un projet d’histoire comparée devrait non pas chercher à reconstituer une narration et à associer cette narration à une époque précise mais plutôt à faire ressortir la dynamique des narrations contradictoires à différentes époques. Les perceptions contradictoires de l’Autre devraient être aussi considérées et intégrées à la reconstitution des narrations. Mais la définition de la rupture avec la métropole coloniale utilisée par Gérard Bouchard est encore plus ambivalente. Celui-ci cite un exemple percutant, celui des États-Unis. Certes l’auteur est prudent et relève la liaison complexe et dialectique entre la continuité et la rupture dans l’histoire américaine. Il n’en reste pas moins qu’en dernière instance, les États-Unis sont présentés comme un exemple de société correspondant au modèle de rupture puisque les Treize Colonies ont obtenu leur

213 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes indépendance politique. Mais est-ce si sûr? L’avènement d’une république comme aux États-Unis est-il nécessairement une rupture avec le passé colonial? La Constitution américaine du 18e siècle a maintenu, voire renforcé, le pouvoir des propriétaires terriens masculins, blancs, esclavagistes, racistes et antidémocratiques. Thomas Paine ne s’était trompé lui qui quitta les anciennes colonies américaines après 1787, dégoûté par le caractère profondément rétrograde des institutions de la nouvelle Constitution. Même des auteurs contemporains célèbres comme Ronald Dworkin (2000), qui croyaient dans le caractère progressiste de la Constitution américaine, ont aujourd’hui des doutes assez sérieux après les dernières élections présidentielles de l’an 2000, lesquelles ont finalement porté au pouvoir un candidat nommé par une institution, le collège des Grands Électeurs, toujours dominée par une élite blanche, et non un candidat élu par la majorité des électeurs américains. En somme, et pour conclure, on peut donc sérieusement se poser la question à savoir si la rupture avec le passé colonial européen se limite nécessairement et uniquement à l’acquisition de l’indépendance politique. Sur ce point Himani Bannerji a raison d’insister sur le lourd héritage du colonialisme au Canada, et ce malgré les ambivalences de son propre discours qui l’amènent à faire disparaître d’une certaine façon le Canada anglais en refusant ni plus ni moins de le nommer en vertu justement de son angle dominant et colonial, c’est-à-dire la langue anglaise et les institutions politiques britanniques.

Notes 1. Seymour, Michel, « Le libéralisme, la politique de la reconnaissance et le cas du Québec », dans Will Kymlicka et Sylvie Mesure (dir.), « Comprendre les identités culturelles », Revue de philosophie et de sciences sociales,no 1, 2000, p. 119-138. 2. Kymlicka, Will, « Les droits des minorités et le multiculturalisme : l’évolution du débat anglo-américain », dans Will Kymlicka et Sylvie Mesure (dir.), « Comprendre les identités culturelles », Revue de philosophie et de sciences sociales,no 1, 2000, p. 119-138. 3. Homi K. Bhabha, Nation and Narration, London/New York, Routledge, 1990, p. 1. 4. Gérard Bouchard, Genèse des nations et cultures du nouveau monde, Montréal, Boréal, 2000, 503 p. 5. Op. cit., p. 195. 6. Op. cit., p. 178. 7. Idem. 8. Idem. 9. Yvan Lamonde, Histoire sociale des idées au Québec, Montréal, Fides, 2000, p. 319. 10. Louis Balthazar et Alfred O. Hero Jr., Le Québec dans l’espace américain, Montréal, Québec-Amérique, 1999, p. 222. 11. Op. cit., p. 35.

214 Continuité ou rupture des discours nationaux?

12. Christopher Edward Taucar, Canadian Federalism and Quebec Sovereignty, New York, Peter Lang, 2000, 256 p. 13. Labelle, Gilles, « Le “Préambule” à la “Déclaration de souveraineté” : penser la nation au-delà de la matrice théologique-politique? », Revue canadienne de science politique / Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXX : 4, Décembre 1998, p. 659 à 682. 14. Op. cit.p.35. 15. Himani Bannerji, The Dark Side of the Nation, Toronto, Canadian Scholar’s press, 2000. 16. Op. cit., p. 105. 17. Gerald Friesen, Citizens and Nation, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000, 308 p. 18. Burke, Peter, Varieties of Cultural History, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997. 19. Charles Tilly, « Citizenship, Identity and Social History », dans International Review of Social History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 1-17, cité dans Gerald Friesen, op. cit., p. 225. 20. Ibid., p. 227. 21. Hayden White, Metahistory, Baltimore, John Hopkins University, 1973. 22. Peter Novick, That Noble Dream. The Objectivity Question and the American History Dream, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 23. Claude Couture, « Le faux débat du “révisionnisme” dans l’historiographie québécoise des années 1990 », Colloque « Les mutations de la sensibilité historique », Université McGill, 2 mars 2000. 24. Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1994. 25. A.D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1983. 26. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993. 27. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992. 28. Voir, entre autres, Edward Said, dans W.T.J. Mitchell, The Politics of Interpretation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983, et Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti et Ella Shohat (ed.), Dangerous Liaisons. Gender, Nation and Postcolonial Perspectives, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 29. Gramsci, Walter Benjamin et Althusser sont en effet tour à tour cités, ce qui semble, soit dit en passant, à tout le moins discutable, dans la mesure où Gramsci et Benjamin sont difficilement compatibles avec Althusser, les deux premiers insistant sur l’importance de l’interprétation des cultures alors que le second a voulu faire ressortir le caractère scientifique et objectif du marxisme et de la loi du déterminisme matérialiste.

Autres ouvrages cités Abu-Laban, Yasmeen et Daiva Stasiulis, « Unequal Relations and the Struggle for Equality : Race and Ethnicity in Canadian Politics », in Michael Whittington and Glenn Willliams (ed.), Canadian Politics in the 21st Century, Toronto, Nelson Thompson, 2000, p. 327-355. Angus, Ian, A Border Within. National Identity, Cultural Plurality and Wilderness, Montreal/Kingston, McGill/Queen’s University Press, 1997. Bhabha, Homi K., Nation and Narration, London/New York, Routledge, 1990. Bouchard, Gérard et Yvan Lamonde (dir.), La nation dans tous ses états. Le Québec en comparaison, Montréal, Harmattan Inc., 1997.

215 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

Bouchard, Gérard, « Entre l’Ancien et le Nouveau Monde. Le Québec comme population neuve et culture fondatrice », Conférence Charles R. Bronfman en Études canadiennes, Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, 1996. Bouchard, Gérard, La nation québécoise au futur et au passé, Montréal, VLB Éditeur, 1999. Burke, Peter, Varieties of Cultural History, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997. Claude Couture, « Le faux débat du “révisionnisme” dans l’historiographie québécoise des années 1990 », Colloque « Les mutations de la sensibilité historique », Université McGill, 2 mars 2000. Dworkin, Ronald, « A Badly Flawed Election », New York Review of Books, January 11, 2000, p. 53-55. Gellner, Ernest, Encounters with Nationalism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1994. Greenfeld, Liah, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992. Goldberg, David Theo, Racist Culture. Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1993. Kymlicka, Will, « Les droits des minorités et le multiculturalisme : l’évolution du débat anglo-américain », dans Will Kymlicka et Sylvie Mesure (dir.), « Comprendre les identités culturelles », Revue de philosophie et de sciences sociales,no 1, 2000, p. 119-138. Labelle, Gilles, « Le “Préambule” à la “Déclaration de souveraineté” : penser la nation au-delà de la “matrice théologique-politique”? » Revue canadienne de science politique / Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXX : 4, Décembre 1998, p. 659 à 682. LaSelva, Samuel, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism, Montreal/ Kingston, McGill/Queen’s University Press, 1996. Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti et Ella Shohat (ed.), Dangerous Liaisons. Gender, Nation and Postcolonial Perspectives, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1995. McRoberts, Ken, Misconceiving Canada, Don Mills, Oxford University Press, 1997. Traduit en 1999 au Boréal sous le titre Un pays à refaire. Nairn, Tom, The Enchanted Glass: Britain and Its Monarchy, London, Radius, 1988. Novick, Peter, That Noble Dream. The Objectivity Question and the American History Dream, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988. Seymour, Michel, « Le libéralisme, la politique de la reconnaissance et le cas du Québec », dans Will Kymlicka et Sylvie Mesure (dir.), « Comprendre les identités culturelles », Revue de philosophie et de sciences sociales,no 1, 2000, p. 119-138. A.D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1983. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993. White, Hayden, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1973.

216 Peter Stoett

Canadian Defence and Security Policy: Recent Literature

Blanchette, Arthur, Ed. Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-2000: Major Documents and Speeches. Ottawa: Golden Dog Press, 2000. Griffiths, A., P. Haydon, and R. Gimblett, Eds. Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy. Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1998. Haglund, David. The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End. Toronto: Irwin and the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 2000. Holman, D.F. NORAD in the New Millennium. Toronto: Irwin and the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 2000. Legault, Albert. Canada and Peacekeeping: Three Major Debates/Le Canada et la maintien de la paix: trois grands débats. Canadian Peacekeeping Press of Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, 1999. Off, Carol. The Lion, the Fox, and the Eagle: A Story of Generals and Justice in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Toronto: Random House, 2000.

It is indeed a tall order to take a snapshot of Canada’s immediate defence and broader security policies at this point in time. Beyond internal divisions, we are often as incoherent when it comes to external allegiances and future direction. In addition, the separation between defence and security studies makes more sense in the Canadian context than it does in many others. This brief review will attempt to do minimal justice to both, with reference to some interesting books and monographs published within the past two years. Atonetimeitwouldhavebeenconsideredheresytoseparatedefenceand security policies. However, in today’s setting Canada needs both a defence policy, concerned essentially with the protection of borders and, in the larger sense, the omnipresent concerns related to the United States; and a security policy (currently nicknamed “human security” in Ottawa) which encompasses Canada’s many multilateral commitments to peacebuilding exercises. The confluence, of course, is the necessary participation of the Canadian armed forces in both. This is not, however, always a happy

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes marriage. The Canadian military has been subject to dramatic cutbacks in recent years, and is ill-equipped to deal with either. While some would suggest that Canada should maintain a defensive capability and, even, a war-fighting capability, others maintain that Canada’s chief contribution to global security will always be through human security-oriented exercises. Thus it should develop its already impressive logistical and humanitarian capabilities to promote Canada’s peacekeeper image (one Ottawa has certainly gone to some pain to embellish over the years), with commensurate investment in rescue- oriented vehicles and other forms of training for peacekeeping as a whole. Indeed, Canada is one of the few states world-wide with its own peacekeeping training centre, in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. Though many adequate textbooks on the general theme of Canadian foreign policy have emerged in recent years, trade has become such a fixture that there is less material devoted to defence and security issues. However several recent texts tackle the issue-area from a variety of standpoints. Readers interested in a concise summary of the post World-War II history of Canadian foreign policy can consult a recent publication, edited by Arthur Blanchette, entitled Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-2000: Major Documents and Speeches. This is not, by any means, a comprehensive history of Canada’s relations in the world; rather, it serves as a carefully selected collection of key addresses given by the major Canadian players in several issue-areas, from the usually positive relationship with the United Nations, to the commitment to NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Association), to a chapter on the Quebec question. Some of the chapters appear mislabelled, and we might argue that some of the material is misplaced (for example, the International Civil Aviation Organisation is not really an environmental agreement, though we certainly could use one dealing with aviation-related air pollution). This being said, the editor’s task for such a synopsis is unenviable, and he has succeeded in composing an educational and illustrative text (aided by his own occasional interventions); one quibble would relate to the inadequate bibliography. Beyond this, several more concentrated works deserve mention because they give credence to the complexity of the issue-areas and allow us to broaden our focus. Since the rise of the United States as a major industrial and military power, Canada has been lodged quite firmly between its American commitment to (and dependency on) the United States, and its evolving relationship with former colonial powers, the United Kingdom and France, across the Atlantic. In the 1980s and 1990s, a window of opportunity opened to expand this external horizon to the far east (Asia) as well, and many government officials and policy analysts believed Canada should move quickly to make sure it was part of Asia’s century. Still others argue that the emergence of a Free Trade Area of the America’s focuses Canadian attention to the south. This repositioning of external focus is what politicalscientistDavidHaglundreferstoasthe“geopoliticaljamboree.”

218 Canadian Defence and Security Policy: Recent Literature

Haglund has written a very concise, and smoothly argued, monograph suggesting that Atlanticism—Canada’s European links and, of course, its allegiance to NATO—is still alive and well, despite other regional foci. In The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End, he maintains that the Atlantic metaphor has always been useful, mainly as a counterweight to the strong pull of the United States; and that, despite the end of the Cold War, this will continue to be the case. No doubt, Canada’s commitment to NATO has always been the subject of debate, though there are fewer observers advocating a pull-out from NATO today, even after the bombing of Belgrade in 1999. Haglund employs many devices, even an uncharacteristic foray into social contructivism, to illustrate that the Atlanticist metaphor is alive and well, and he certainly succeeds in warning us that it would be premature to abandon its centrality at this point, despite Canada’s repeated bouts with “Euro-fatigue.” Haglund’s work is a prime example of clearly-written argumentation, and well worth a read for those who believe Canada is in a position to form a grand strategy reflecting its generalized value-commitments, though it could be argued that Canadian policy will remain largely reactionary, especially with a pronounced shift in the values and defence-policy orientation of the new Bush administration in the United States. In the end, Haglund accepts the premise put forth by David Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown that instead of a harshly-obliging collective security it makes more sense to discuss an emerging grand strategy based on co-operative security, wherein “it is assumed not that states will subjugate their national interests on behalf of some higher good ... but rather that they will define their interests with at least partial, and non-negligible, regard to the community within which they see themselves situated” (page 92). Globalization and regionalization aside, it is a sensible argument that Canadian decision-makers will continue to see themselves situated within the Atlantic triangle, albeit one with a heavy shadow cast northwards. One might argue, as alluded above, that Haglund underestimates the enormous influence of American concerns. There is certainly at least one area of defence policy where it is impossible to do so: air defence. On this topic, retired Major-General D.F. Holman has written a useful, if somewhat limited, monograph on NORAD In the Next Millennium. Few Canadians are aware of the North American Aerospace Defence Command, or how closely integrated the American and Canadian forces became during the Cold War. In fact, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) was formed in 1940 with an agreement signed at Ogdensburg by Roosevelt and Mackenzie King. A decade later, the threat of a nuclear attack from Soviet bombers, which would fly over Canadian airspace in the process, encouraged both states to seek a mutual understanding. Holman provides a concise overview of the NORAD evolution. He is not, by any means, prone to political theorization, and his writing certainly reflects his previous career as a military strategist. Achapter on “the threat environment” makes

219 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes it clear that he regards a robust air defence system (invariably, despite bureaucratic and diplomatic niceties, primarily under American control) essential. The benefits far outweigh the costs. One would expect this from the former Director of Operations for NORAD headquarters at Colorado Springs, though his assessment is fairly clear and straightforward. Not for those afraid of multiple acronyms, the book rarely delves into political undercurrents, nor the links between the aerospace industry and the defence establishment. But it does provide much-needed background on NORAD operations, which are surprisingly complex. One might argue he is techno- logically optimistic in places, as when he espouses the success of the patriot missile against Iraqi SCUDs during the Gulf War. Related, and of crucial importance here will be the Bush administration’s determination to develop a National Missile Defence (NMD) system, which the Russians and others claim contravenes the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Canada initially expressed opposition to this notion but has already begun backtracking on this commitment. Though Holman does discuss this controversy, one wishes he had done so—or perhaps will do so—in more depth. In the end, the NORAD and NMD debates come down to whether or not one accepts the proposition that “[i]f Canada is likely to be defended in any event by a system deployed by the United States, it would seem morally responsible to participate in the system” (page 70). Not necessarily: if Canada believes such a system merely enhances American first-strike capability and thus will encourage an even more expensive arms race, or if Canada believes there are no credible threats to be “defended” from, then we might have a moral responsibility to oppose it. At any rate, those concerned with contemporary defence policy would do well to read Holman’s book as a primer on NORAD and as a reflection of the continued centrality of American strategy and circumstance in Canadian policy- making. Beyond grand strategy and air defence, an often-overlooked dimension of Canadian defence policy is that of the naval situation. Not only does Canada have three coasts to protect (though who we need to protect them from today is a matter of some dispute, beyond Spanish fishermen and migrant smugglers) but the Canadian navy usually participates in UN or NATO-led military campaigns as well. A recent compilation of essays edited by Ann Griffiths, Peter Haydon and Richard Gimlet draws attention to the surprisingly active Canadian naval tradition. Thus the title, Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy. The Royal Canadian Navy, first formed from the Fisheries Protection Service in 1885, has had a surprisingly busy history as these essays make clear; and it faces an uncertain future. Several of the articles are written by military historians interested in the uses and/or threats of naval power before and after WW II. Here was an area where Canada’s ties to imperial Britain were most obvious; as Serge Durflinger writes, Canadian naval intervention in El Salvador in 1932 “exemplified the extent to which the RCN was meant to, and did, serve as an adjunct to the

220 Canadian Defence and Security Policy: Recent Literature

Royal Navy in the Western Hemisphere” (page 41). This would shift dramatically as the Canadian navy became part of NATO strategic thinking and became engaged in UN collective security operations. A wide-ranging essay by Fred Crickard and Gregory Witol suggests that Canada, much like Australia, has developed a medium-power, “alliance navy,” designed to fight alongside great powers but with an increasingly significant oceans management role. Many of the essays appear rather partisan; lamenting, for example, Ottawa’s traditional preference for the Department of External Affairs over the DND. Peter Haydon argues that politicians themselves should stay away from naval organizational questions, but that today, “they are up to their armpits in it, trying to micro-manage aspects of defence policy with which they have no need to concern themselves” (page 99). Apart from this bias there islittle intheway ofcritical literature here. But thenavy remains a vital component of Canada’s ability to contribute to peacekeeping operations, arms embargoes and collective defence, and it needs more, not less, attention and scrutiny. One of the better essays is by Peter Jones, who argues that a naval capability is important for peacekeeping operations because naval forces, “by their nature, can sail into a situation prior to the outbreak of fighting, or shortly after it erupts, and be ready to contribute almost immediately. They can also, to be blunt, leave as quickly” (page 358). Leaving aside the implications this has for landlocked states, Jones’ implication that getting out of peacekeeping roles is as important as getting into them is certainly timely. In fact, an increasing amount of literature is being devoted to the difficulties involved in what we might term Canada’s global security, as opposed to simply defence, policy, and particularly the realm of United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping. Students interested in a short summary of the relevant debates are advised to turn to a recent monograph written by Albert Legault (in collaboration with Manon Tessier) entitled Le Canada et la maintien de la paix: trois grands débats. The book comes with an English translation, Canada and Peacekeeping: Three Major Debates, as well. Legault tackles the question from three vantage points: debates over reforming the UN, so as to avoid debacles such as the Rwandan genocide; the theoretical debates over the validity and techniques of preventive diplomacy; and, most relevant to this review essay, the “debate at home” over the extent of Canada’s commitment to overseas peacekeeping operations. All three sections serve as well-written, researched and reasoned introductions to their respective topics, and the suggestions for reform are well-conceived. However, as Legault acknowledges throughout the text, positive change is notoriously easier said than done. Certainly, UN peacekeeping abilities would improve if “the organs of the UN become more democratic and representative; the mandates of operations are clarified; and the Organization acquires a rapid reaction capability”

221 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes

(page 23). There is fairly widespread agreement that these reforms are necessary,andthattheyaremutuallyinclusive:arapidreactionforcewould be regarded with suspicion were it deemed representative of narrow, great powerinterests,anditwouldnotattractcontributorsifitwereanambiguous project susceptible to what the experts call “mission creep.” But implementing these changes is tantamount to inviting a serious case of frustration. Canada’s own 1995 study, “The Peacekeeping Operations of the UN: Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability,” has attracted the support of many other countries and the UN itself, but is still nowhere near actual fruition. Of course one might see this as quite reasonable, given the increased likelihoodthatpeacekeeperswillbekilledinduty.Somalia,Rwanda,Sierre Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo: none of these zones of conflict have adhered to the traditional peacekeeping scenario. It is unlikely that Canadians will abandon the positive image their contributions have made over the years, despite the ugly incident in Somalia. Legault goes so far as to suggest that “the fact of being peacekeeping specialists helped Canadians forget that they were neither a major economic nor a major political force” (page 72). Of course one might argue the Canadian military has pushed for such participation as well, lending it purpose in the post-Cold War era, but this would be an oversimplification. Military leaders are quite often upset by Ottawa’s willingness to send their personnel into unsafe regions. Legault takes pains to include the evolution of peacekeeping policy in Ottawa, including the policy perspectives of the various political parties. Legault’s contribution is timely and should be required reading for all with an interest in peacekeeping and Canadian commitments; my only complaint is that too little effort is made to bridge the three debates he introduces. At least one more important publication deserves mention here because it will no doubt sell more copies than all of those described above put together and because it takes a step away from academic treatment of the topic of peacekeeping and delves into the personal lives of Canadians involved. Journalist Carol Off’s The Lion, the Fox, and the Eagle is an engrossing depiction of the activities of three Canadians who, because of Canada’s multilateral commitments abroad, were forced to look genocide in the face during the 1990s. The lion is Brigadier General Romeo Dallaire, who initially commanded troops of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). Dallaire’s efforts were largely in vain as the largest-scale massacre of the decade proceeded in 1994, and he has been accused of abandoning his soldiers. The fox is Major General Lewis MacKenzie, sector commander of Sarajevo for the first months of the Bosnian civil war, and subsequent media darling. The eagle is Justice Louise Arbour, who would become Chief Prosecutor for the International Tribunals for both the Rwandan and the Yugoslaviangenocides, struggling to make an improvised and severely challenged court system effective and, as difficult, legitimate.

222 Canadian Defence and Security Policy: Recent Literature

This is by all means a fascinating read even if, beyond a surprisingly unflattering portrait of Mackenzie, there is little new here. Off does spend a great deal of time on the wider implications of the experiences of these three people for Canadian foreign policy as a whole, though the tragic circumstances behind the failure in Rwanda may certainly act as forewarnings to not get involved in circumstances where the international community is unwilling to match its rhetoric with actual troop commitments. She is harsh on Ottawa, as well, for failing to back up promises. More generally, troop cutbacks have reduced the forces to 60,000, and equipment continues to deteriorate. As Off suggests, all of this “would matter less if Canada had decided it was no longer an international do-gooder. But Canada has actually expanded its original commitment to peacekeeping” (page 361). In this light, Arbour’s non-military contribution to a broader international criminal law regime is perhaps the most fruitful yet. Off’s book is a page-turner, full of graphic detail and blow-by-blow accounts, but thin on analysis. This is of course quite expected from a journalist (though a proper bibliography might have been appropriate) and overall the book is an informative and important read. Off has a strong point: we should not underestimate the morale problem emanating from the Department of National Defence and amongst the rank and file itself. Coping with peacekeeping situations, as Off and others illustrate, is one thing; returning home to a normal life can be as trying an experience. Despite the sorry state of much of DND’s equipment, plans to reduce the military infrastructure by nearly one-third over the next 20 years are in the works. While I personally see little need for a strong war-fighting capacity for Canada’s armed forces, I certainly recognize its importance for the broader security issues such as peacebuilding and Arctic monitoring as global warming proceeds (on the latter see the essay by Huebert in the Griffiths volume). If we expect Canadian soldiers to participate in conditions that are themselves life-threatening, we need to ensure their safety as far as possible. For now we continue to expect the soldier to bridge the gap between adequate preparation and Ottawa’s commitment. Defence policy will suffer a similar fate. On the one hand it is clear that Canada is not presently equipped to fight a major war; nor is there any overriding reason why it should become so. Our greatest enemies, when it comes to political unity, are ourselves. There is no immediate enemy, despite Canada’sinvolvement in the Gulf War and other American-inspired military excursions. Of course, this does not deter those who argue that Canada should nonetheless retain as optimal a warfighting capacity as possible, since we never know when international instability will either hit home or force us to participate in a major military effort abroad. Haglund’s argument is certainly well-received and we should be cautious about Ottawa subscribing to a major change in grand strategy; our relationship with the U.S. will still have the most visible impact on defence and security policy, but our multilateral engagements must be properly supported or

223 International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes they will become objects of division, not admiration. These books are a good start to a broader study of the defence and security policies taking shape in Canada today, but we need more detailed and critical scholarly work as well.

224 Authors / Auteurs

Louis BÉLANGER, Professeur, Département de science politique et Directeur de l’Institut québécois des hautes études commerciales, Université Laval, Pavillon Charles-De Koninck, Cité universitaire, Québec, Québec, G1K 7P4. Michael BURGESS, Professor of Politics, Department of Politics, University of Hull, Hull, HU5 4BD, England. Claude COUTURE, Professeur titulaire, Centre d’études sur le Canada, University of Alberta, Room 1-37, Humanities, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2E5. Kanaté DAHOUDA, Professor, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Modern Languages Department, 4166 Scandling Center, Geneva, New York, 14456 USA. Ann-M. FIELD, Ph.D. Candidate, Carleton University, Department of Political Science, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1S 5B6. Yves LABERGE, Boursier post-doctoral du Fonds FCAR (Québec) et chargé de cours à l’Université du Québec à Chicoutimi. Brigitte LÉVY, Professeure agrégée, Faculté d’administration, Université d’Ottawa, 136, Jean-Jacques Lussier, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5. Karen S. McPHERSON, Assistant Professor of French and Francophone Studies, Department of Romance Languages, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403-1233 USA. Wayne NELLES, Senior Associate, Sustainable Development Research Institute, University of British Columbia, Ponderosa Annex ‘B’, Room 224, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, B.C. V6J 4L6. François ROCHER, Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1S 5B6. Peter STOETT, Professor, Department of Political Science, Concordia University, 1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd West, Montréal, Québec, H3G 1M8.

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 22, Fall / Automne 2000

Canadian Studies Journals Around the World Revues d’études canadiennes dans le monde

The American Review of Canadian Studies. Quarterly/Trimestriel. $60; $25 (Student/Étudiant; retired membership/membres retraités); $105 (Institutions). Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, 1317 F Street NW, Suite 920, Washington, DC, 20004-1105, U.S.A. Editor/Rédacteur: Robert Thacker (St. Lawrence University). The Annual Review of Canadian Studies. Yearly/Annuel. Japanese Association for Canadian Studies, Department of English Literature and Languages, Tsuda College, 2-1-1 Tsuda-machi, Kodaira-shi, Tokyo 187, Japan. Editor/Rédactrice: Masako Iino (Tsuda College). Australian-Canadian Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. Subscription information to be obtained from/Pour tout renseignement sur les abonnements, veuillez contacter: Associate Professor Jan Critchett, School of Australian and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, P.O. Box 423, Warmambool, Victoria, Australia, 3280. Editors/Rédacteurs: Hart Cohen (University of Western Sydney Nepean), Wendy Waring (Macquarie University). British Journal of Canadian Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. Available through membership to the British Association for Canadian Studies/Disponible aux membres de l’Association britannique d’études canadiennes. BACS, 21 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, Scotland. Editor/Rédacteur: Colin Nicholson (University of Edinburgh). Canadart. Annual/Annuel. Associaçao Brasileira de Estudos Canadenses - ABECAN, Universidade do Estado da Bahia - UNEB. Estrada das Barreiras, s/n, - Narandiba - Cabula. CEP 41195-001 - Salvador - Bahia - Brasil. Editor/Rédactrice: Denise Maria Gurgel Lavallée (UNEB). Canadian Issues/Thèmes canadiens. Annual/Annuel. $Can15 per copy/ l’exemplaire (plus 7% GST in Canada/TPS de 7 p. 100 en sus au Canada). Association for Canadian Studies, P.O. Box 8888, Station Centre-Ville, Montreal, Qc, H3C 3P8/Association d’études canadiennes, C.p. 8888, succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal (Qc) H3C 3P8. Études canadiennes : revue interdisciplinaire des études canadiennes en France. Semestriel/Biannual. 220 FF. Association française d’études canadiennes, Maison des sciences de l’homme d’Aquitaine, Domaine Universitaire, 33405 Talence, France. Rédacteur en chef/Editor-in-Chief: Pierre Guillaume (Université de Bordeaux III). Indian Journal of Canadian Studies.Yearly/Annuel. Indian Association of Canadian Studies, 32A, Gandhi Road, P.O. T.V. Koil, Tiruchirapalli - 620005 (T.N.), India. Publisher/Éditeur: Chandra Mohan (University of Delhi). The Journal of American and Canadian Studies. Yearly/Annuel. The Journal of American and Canadian Studies. Sophia University, Institute of American and Canadian Studies, 7-1 Kioicho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102, Japan. Editor/Rédacteur: Kazuyuki Matsuo (Sophia University). Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d’études canadiennes. Quarterly/ Trimestriel. $Can35; $Can15 (Student/Étudiant); $Can55 (Institutions). Plus 7% GST in Canada/TPS de 7 p. 100 en sus au Canada. Outside Canada, payment is required in American dollars/À l’extérieur du Canada, les frais sont en dollars américains. Journal of Canadian Studies, Trent University, P.O. Box 4800, Peterborough, Ontario, K9J 7B8. Editor/Directeur: Robert M. Campbell (Trent University). The Korean Journal of Canadian Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. Articles are published in Korean/Publication de langue coréenne. Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Room 528, Seoul 120-749, Korea. Editor/Rédacteur: Myung Soon Shin (Yonsei University). Québec Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. US$45; US$35 (Student/ Étudiants); US$50 (Libraries/Bibliothèques). Outside the U.S., please add US$6/ Abonné à l’extérieur des É.-U., prière d’ajouter 6$US. Professor Jane Moss, French Department, Colby College, Waterville, ME 04901 USA. Editor/Rédacteur: Patrick Coleman (University of California at Los Angeles). Revista Española de Estudios Canadienses. Yearly/Annuel. 4.000 ptas; 8.000 ptas (Institutions). Asociacion española de estudios canadienses, Espronceda, 40, 28003, Madrid, Spain. Editor/Rédacteur: Kathleen Firth (Universidad de Barcelona). Revista Mexicana de Estudios Canadienses. Biannual/Semestriel. 70$. Asociación Mexicana de Estudios Canadienses. RMEC, Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, Ciudad Universitaria, UNAM, C.P. 04500, México. Directora: María Cristina Rosas (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México). Revista Venezolana de Estudios Canadienses. Biannual/Semestriel. 500 Bs. Asociacion Venezolana de Estudios Canadienses. Subscriptions/ Abonnements: Embajada de Canadá, Torre Europa, Piso 7. Ave. Francisco de Miranda. Apartado 63.302. Caracas 1060, Venezuela. Editor/Rédacteur: Vilma E. Petrash (Universidad Central de Venezuela). Revue internationale d’études canadiennes/International Journal of Canadian Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. $Can40 (Institutions); $Can30 (Regular/ régulier); $Can20 (ICCS Members, retirees and students/Membres du CIEC, retraités et étudiants). Outside Canada, please add $Can5/Abonnés à l’extérieur du Canada, prière d’ajouter 5$can. Plus 7% GST in Canada/TPS de 7 p. 100 en sus au Canada. IJCS/RIÉC, 75 Albert, S-908, Ottawa, Canada K1P 5E7. Rédacteur en chef/Editor-in-Chief: Robert Schwartzwald (University of Massachusetts Amherst). Rivista di Studi Canadesi. Annual/Annuel. 30.000 lire; Foreign/Étranger, 40.000 lire. Rivista di Studi Canadesi, Grafischena, n. 13147723, Viale Stazione 177-72015 Fasano di Puglia, (Br-Italia). Director/Directeur: Giovanni Dotoli (Università di Bari). Zeitschrift für Kanada Studien. Biannual/Semestriel. DM25. Zeitschrift für Kanada Studien, Pädagogische Hochschule, Kunzenweg 21, D-79199 Freiburg, Germany. Editors/Rédacteurs: Udo Kempf (Universität Freiburg), Reingard Nischik (Universität Konstanz). INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CANADIAN STUDIES

Call for Papers Post-Canada Issue Number 25 (Spring 2002)

Postmodernism, postnationalism, postcolonialism, postfeminism–all these have been applied to Canadian culture and institutions pre- and post- the new millennium. How meaningful is the ‘post’ in relation to Canadian identity, to discourses of nationhood, to social and foreign policy, to culture and to history in the Canadian context? What is the relation between postmodernism and postcolonialism, or between nationalism, postnationalism, and globalization? Does post-feminism shift the emphasis in gender studies? How does tradition figure in contemporary cultural discourse? Does the “post” point in the direction of breakup or of redefinition for Canada?TheIJCSinvitessubmissionsforthisthematicissuefromtheareas of social and political thought, international relations, history, cultural studies, literature, architecture, and the visual arts. Please forward paper and abstract (100 words) before August 15, 2001 to the IJCS at the followingaddress:75Albert,S-908,Ottawa,Ontario,CanadaK1P5E7. Tel.:(613)789-7834;fax:(613)789-7830;e-mail:[email protected]

REVUE INTERNATIONALE D’ÉTUDES CANADIENNES

Soumission de texte Post-Canada Numéro 25 (Printemps 2002)

Le postmodernisme, le postnationalisme, le postcolonialisme, le postfé- minisme – on a appliqué tous ces termes à la culture et aux institutions canadiennes avant (pré-) et après (post-) le nouveau millénaire. Quelle signification véritable revêt le préfixe « post » dans ses rapports avec l’identité canadienne, avec les discours de la nationalité, avec les politiques sociales et étrangères, avec la culture et avec l’histoire dans le contexte canadien? Quelle relation peut-on établir entre le postmodernisme et le postcolonialisme, ou entre le nationalisme, le postnationalisme et la mondialisation? Le postféminisme a-t-il pour effet de déplacer l’accent à l’intérieur des études de la condition féminine? Quelle place la tradition occupe-t-elle dans le discours culturel contemporain? Ce « post » nous oriente-t-il vers un éclatement ou vers une redéfinition du Canada? En vue d’un numéro thématique consacré à cette question, la Revue internationale d’études canadiennes sollicite des soumissions dans les secteurs de la pensée sociale et politique, des relations internationales, de l’histoire, des études culturelles, de la littérature, de l’architecture et des arts visuels. S.v.p. faire parvenir votre texte et un résumé (100 mots maximum) d’ici le 15 août 2001 au Secrétariat de la RIÉC : 75, rue Albert, S-908, Ottawa, Canada,K1P5E7.Tél.:(613)789-7834;téléc.:(613)789-7830;courriel: [email protected] INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CANADIAN STUDIES

Call for Open Topic Articles

The Editorial Board of the IJCS has decided to broaden the format of the Journal. While each future issue of the IJCS will include a set of articles addressing a given theme, as in the past, it will also include several articles that do not do so. Beyond heightening the general interest of each issue, this changeshouldalsofacilitateparticipationintheJournalbytheinternational community of Canadianists. Accordingly, the Editorial Board welcomes manuscripts on any topic in the study of Canada. As in the past, all submissions must undergo peer review. Final decisions regarding publication are made by the Editorial Board. Often, accepted articles need to undergo some revision. The IJCS undertakes that upon receiving a satisfactorily revised version of a submission that it has accepted for publication, it will make every effort to ensure that the article appears in the next regular issue of the Journal. Please forward paper and abstract (one hundred words) to the IJCS at the following address: 75 Albert, S-908, Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5E7. Fax: (613) 789-7830; e-mail: [email protected].

REVUE INTERNATIONALE D’ÉTUDES CANADIENNES

Soumission d’articles hors-thèmes

La Revue internationale d’études canadiennes a adopté une politique visant àmodifierquelquepeusonformat.Eneffet,laRevuecontinueraàoffrirune série d’articles portant sur un thème retenu, mais dorénavant elle publiera aussi des articles hors-thèmes. Le Comité de rédaction examinera donc toute soumission qui porte sur un sujet relié aux études canadiennes indépendamment du thème retenu. Bien entendu comme toute soumission, celle-ci fera l’objet d’une évaluation par pairs. La décision finale concernant la publication d’un texte est rendue par le Comité de rédaction. Une décision d’accepter de publier un texte est souvent accompagnée d’une demande de révision. Une fois qu’elle aura reçu une version révisée qu’elle jugera acceptable, la Revue essaiera, dans la mesure du possible, d’inclure cet article dans le numéro suivant la date d’acceptation finale. S.v.p. faire parvenir votre texte et un résumé (100 mots maximum) au Secrétariat de la RIÉC : 75, rue Albert, bureau 908, Ottawa, Canada, K1P 5E7. Téléc. : (613) 789-7830; courriel : [email protected]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CANADIAN STUDIES REVUE INTERNATIONALE D’ÉTUDES CANADIENNES

SUBSCRIPTION/ABONNEMENT Rates per year (for subscriptions in Canada, please add 7 % GST; for subscriptions outside Canada, please add 5 dollars)/Tarif par année (au Canada, prière d’ajouter 7 p. 100 de TPS; les abonnés à l’étranger prièrent d’ajouter 5 dollars: $40 Institutions $30 Regular subscription/abonnement régulier $25 Members of associations affiliated with the Learned Societies/membres des associations affiliées aux Sociétés savantes $20 Members of ICCS Associations, retirees or students, include proof/membres des associations du CIEC, retraités ou étudiants, joindre une preuve

Please indicate year of subscription/Veuillez indiquer l’année d’abonnement désirée :

1996 No13 Canada in the Americas/Le Canada dans les Amériques No 14 Citizenship and Rights/La citoyenneté et les droits 1997 No15 Time, Space and Place/Le temps, l’espace et le lieu No 16 Nationalism and Globalization/Nationalisme et mondialisation 1998 No17 Representation/La représentation No 18 Diaspora and Exile / La diaspora et l’exil 1999 No19 Articles from Foreign Canadian Studies Journals / Articles de revues d’études canadiennes à l’étranger No 20 Rebellion and Resistance / Rébellion et résistance 2000 No 21 Sexuality / La sexualité No 22 Canada and the World in the Twentieth Century / Le Canada et le monde au XXe siècle 2001 No 23 Spirituality, Faith, Belief / Spiritualité, foi et croyance No 24 Territory(ies) / Territoire(s) 2002 No 25 Post-Canada No 26 To be confirmed / sera confirmé sous peu

Name/Nom ......

Address/Adresse ......

...... o Credit card #/N decartedecrédit:...... MasterCard Visa

Expiry Date/Date d’expiration ......

Signature......

Please return coupon and payment to/S.v.p., retourner ce coupon accompagné du paiement à :

IJCS/RIEC 75 Albert, S-908, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5E7, Canada Ê (613) 789-7830 ¿ [email protected] http://www.iccs-ciec.ca International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes