DOCSLIB.ORG

CMA CGM Acquires NOL for $2.4Bn

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
CMA CGM Acquires NOL for $2.4Bn Find our latest analyses and trade ideas on bsic.it Submerged shipping companies can do nothing but merge: CMA CGM acquires NOL for $2.4bn Neptune Orient Lines Ltd. market cap as of 29/04/2016: SGD3.346bn (c. USD2.49bn) In the light of the slump in global trade caused by the economic crisis, the once-profitable container-shipping industry has been subject to a wave of consolidation in an attempt to recover from constant losses of the last five years. In order to do so, shipping companies have been forming alliances and merging with each other. The most recent example of this quest for consolidation is represented by the approved $2.4bn acquisition of Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) by CMA CGM. Industry Analysis The container-shipping industry’s revenues are to a great extent bound to the $/TEU rate: they are indeed able to charge a price per carried Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, being this the main measure for a company’s shipping capacity (1 TEU = 1 20ft-long ISO container). These firms are price takers: the rates they can charge are established according to the China Containerized Freight Index (CCFI) or the Baltic Dry Index (BDI). Container-shipping had been highly profitable thanks to the huge amount of global trade, especially in the form of exports and imports in Asia: in this period the CCFI was trading at multiyear highs above $1000/TEU and carriers were exploiting the situation by increasing their capacity, ordering new and larger vessels. However the global financial crisis and the consequent slump in global trade, together with the commodity prices rout, reduced drastically the volumes of freight exchanged around the world. Another factor that contributed to depressing profits even more is to be traced into the large orders that shipping companies had made when the rates were still high: confident that global trade – and therefore the demand for container- shipping – would continue to grow exponentially, they eventually found themselves with new vessels being delivered to them, thus increasing overcapacity and pushing the $/TEU rates down even further. Recently the index is quoted around $650/TEU and therefore shipping companies tend to sell their services only slightly above – or even below – their average cost. Substantially unprofitable for the last 5 years, some of the companies didn’t make it, with one notable example being Hanjin Shipping which, having a D/E ratio of 850%, had to ask for restructuring of debt to its creditors. These firms are now target of specific distressed debt funds. The All the views expressed are opinions of Bocconi Students Investment Club members and can in no way be associated with Bocconi University. All the financial recommendations offered are for educational purposes only. Bocconi Students Investment Club declines any responsibility for eventual losses you may incur implementing all or part of the ideas contained in this website. The Bocconi Students Investment Club is not authorised to give investment advice. Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgment at its original date of publication by Bocconi Students Investment Club and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. Bocconi Students Investment Club does not receive compensation and has no business relationship with any mentioned company. Copyright © May-16 BSIC | Bocconi Students Investment Club Find our latest analyses and trade ideas on bsic.it container-shipping companies however are trying to recover from the crisis by enacting different strategies. One of the them consists in the so-called “scrapping”: in order to reduce the excess capacity generated by the lack of demand, some shipping companies have decided to dismantle some of their oldest vessels and gain proceeds from the amount of steel they were made of. However this is not viable in the long term, since fleets’ average age is now reduced and scrapping is not possible anymore. The other way companies are coping with the slump in rates is by replacing smaller vessels with larger ones, carrying more than 14,000 TEU (Ultra large container vessels), like the Triple-E vessel class recently expanded by Maersk. This allows to ship bigger quantities of containers spreading fixed costs and reducing opex/TEU (operating expenses per TEU, the smaller it is the more cost efficient the company). Perhaps not surprisingly, scale could be the solution to the industry crisis, either through mergers or alliances. Almost every player targets costs reduction and, as in the CMA CGM – NOL case, efficiency and scale advantages are fostered through mergers. In China Cosco Shipping and China Shipping Group merged with the help of the government, freeing the two groups from competing one against the other in the Transpacific route, while Hapag Lloyd and United Arab Shipping Group are still in talks for a potential tie up. However, since mergers in the industry typically take years and job cuts to generate synergies, companies are exploring the concept of alliances. This allows to reduce the burden of overcapacity, increasing the utilization rate of each vessel by sharing it with other peers in the alliance. Before the deal between CMA GCM and NOL was approved, the container-shipping industry was split among four major alliances: the first one, holding 28% market share, was 2M (composed by Maersk and MSC); the second one, called G6 and including among the others NOL, held 17% market share; the third one was CKYHE with 16% market share while the last one, with 15% market share, was the alliance including CMA CGM, Ocean3. Following the approved merger with NOL, CMA CGM has recently announced it will form a new alliance with COSCO Container Lines, Evergreen Line, Orient Overseas Container Line and the newly acquired NOL of course, “to offer competitive products and comprehensive service networks covering the Asia-Europe, Asia-Mediterranean, Asia-Red Sea, Asia-Middle East, Trans-Pacific, Asia-North America East Coast, and Trans-Atlantic trades”. This new alliance is expected to be larger than 2M, thus appropriating more than 30% market share and substantially weakening the other existing alliances. About CMA CGM CMA CGM is a privately held shipping group headquartered in Marseille, France. It was founded in 1978 by Jacques R. Saadé who is as of today also the group’s chairman and CEO. The company is present in more than 160 countries, through a network of 765 agencies, and employs more than 22,000 people. With a young and diversified fleet of 471 vessels and 200 shipping lines, CMA serves 420 of the world’s 521 commercial ports and holds the 3rd position in the shipping line market by capacity. Its fleet boasts 1.8m TEU capacity in 2015, behind the Danish industry leader Maersk Group (c. 3m TEU) and Mediterranean Shipping Company (c. 2.6m TEU). In 2015 CMA CGM transported an estimated volume of 13m TEUs, achieving a 6.3% growth with respect to the previous year. As of FYE2015, CMA reported revenues of $15.6bn, showing a 6.3% decrease compared to the previous year; however the revenues 5-years CAGR is positive with a value of 1.1%. Compared to FY2014, the company has experienced an abrupt All the views expressed are opinions of Bocconi Students Investment Club members and can in no way be associated with Bocconi University. All the financial recommendations offered are for educational purposes only. Bocconi Students Investment Club declines any responsibility for eventual losses you may incur implementing all or part of the ideas contained in this website. The Bocconi Students Investment Club is not authorised to give investment advice. Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgment at its original date of publication by Bocconi Students Investment Club and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. Bocconi Students Investment Club does not receive compensation and has no business relationship with any mentioned company. Copyright © May-16 BSIC | Bocconi Students Investment Club Find our latest analyses and trade ideas on bsic.it 44% decline in cash & equivalents, but thanks to the purchase of new securities and a decline in total debt, the group’s net debt has decreased by 7.2%, reaching $2.9bn. About NOL Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) is a Singaporean shipping company founded in December 1968 as national shipping line in order to foster the economic development of the newly-born Republic of Singapore. Wholly owned by the government at the moment of its foundation, NOL was listed on the Singapore Exchange in 1981: the Singapore government now owns c. 66% of the company through its investment arm Temasek Holdings, while the rest is split among several institutional investors. In 1997, NOL acquired APL – an American shipping company which was eventually adopted as the major container shipping brand for customers. In this way, the Singapore-based company was able to broaden its geographical scope and thus to compete with other well-established global competitors. Furthermore, this merger also gave NOL the access to key terminal hubs in Asia and North America. As of today, Neptune Orient Lines owns 88 vessels with an average age of 9 years and an overall capacity of 0.5m TEUs. In FY2015, Neptune Orient Lines made a net profit of c. $707m after numerous years of net loss evident from a 5-year revenue-based CAGR of -8.06%. Although a net profit after years of net loss could be seen as a good sign of recovery for the company, this was actually caused by the disposal of APL Logistics (sold to the Japanese airfreight forwarding company Kintetsu World Express Inc.), which made NOL earn $888m.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Factbook 2011
    ◇◆◇◆◇◆ ＩＮＤＥＸ ◆◇◆◇◆◇ 1. Management Plan and Improvement of Business Structure 3-5. Emerging Markets (China) ④ Chinese Economic Disparities between Regions P21 1-1. "K"Line Vision 100 General View (as Announced in April 2008) P1 ⑤ Gap of the No. of Durable Goods Owned between Urban and Rural Area 1-2. April 2011, "K"Line Vision 100 ①Review of the Mid-term Management Plan KV100 P2 4. Bulk Carrier Business -New Challenges- ②Target for Financial Index 4-1. "K"Line Fleet ① "K"Line Dry Bulk Fleet P22 ③Trends of Business Performance (P/L) P3 ② "K"Line Energy Transportation Fleet ④Improvement in Financial Position ③ Ship Price as of Placing Order (Dry Bulkers, Tankers) ⑤Changes in Income and Major Financial Indicators ④ Ship Price as of Completion (Dry Bulkers, Tankers) ⑥Fleet Upgrading Plan and Investment P4 4-2. Drybulk Business Expansion into the World P23 ⑦Fleet Size Transition 4-3. Demand on Dry Bulk ① Transition of Crude Steel Production P24 ⑧New Buildings (Results and Plan) ② Global Main Trades of Coal P25 1-3. Trends of Financial Indices ①Net Income and Dividend per Share P5 ③ World Coal Consumption ②Consolidated ROE/ROA ④ Iron Ore Import into Major Asian Countries ③Consolidated Assets Turnover ⑤ Iron Ore Stocks at Chinese Ports ④Consolidated EV/EBITDA ⑥ BDI & Port Congestion in Australia ⑤Operating Cash Flow 5. Car Carrier Business ⑥Consolidated Interest Coverage Ratio 5-1. Fleet and Cargo Movements ① "K"Line PCC Fleet P26 1-4. History of Management Plans P6 ② Cars/Trucks Transported by Our Fleet 1-5. Effort for Structural Reform ①No. of Seafarers/ "K"Line Employee P7 ③ Total Cars/Trucks Exported from Japan ②Our Fleet Scale, Revenures & Ordinary Income 5-2.
    [Show full text]
  • Market Position in the Industry[111KB/2Pages]
    Market Position in the Industry MOL operates a large and balanced oceangoing fl eet. In terms of its total fl eet size and presence in individual market categories, MOL ranks among the world’s largest shipping companies. World Major Carriers’ Fleets (All Vessel Types) (Number of vessels) 0 200 400 600800 1,000 1,200 947 MOL (Japan) 68 NYK (Japan) COSCO (China) K Line (Japan) China Shipping (China) APM-Maersk (Denmark) Oldendorff (Germany) MSC (Switzerland) Swiss Marine (Switzerland) CMA-CGM (France) Fredriksen (Norway) Teekay (Canada) 0 20 40 6080 100 120 (Million deadweight tons (DWT)) ■■ Number of vessels ■■ Million deadweight tons (DWT) Source: MOL internal estimation based on each companies’ published data, Clarkson and Alphaliner (March 2015) World Major Carriers’ Revenue Portfolio by Segment (%) 0 2040608010047 43 10 MOL NYK K Line APM-Maersk COSCO NOL OOIL MISC Frontline Teekay Pacifi c Basin Golar LNG ■ Bulkships ■ Containerships and related business ■ Other businesses Source: MOL calculations based on each company’s fi nancial statements and/or news. MOL’s containerships and related business includes revenue from Containerships, Terminals and Logistics. NYK’s containerships and related business includes revenue from Containerships, Air freighters and Logistics. APM-Maersk’s containerships and related business includes revenue from Terminal business. COSCO’s containerships and related business includes revenue from Terminal business. 38 Mitsui O.S.K. Lines 115mol_英文0723入稿PDF.indd5mol_英文0723入稿PDF.indd 3838 22015/07/23015/07/23 117:337:33
    [Show full text]
  • The Last 23 Years Progression of Asia-Europe Carrier Alliances
    The Last 23 Years Progression of Asia-Europe Carrier Alliances Number of Providers Grand Alliance Global Alliance 1996 Tricon-Hanjin Hapag-Lloyd Nedlloyd HMM DSR-Senator OOCL Maersk MSC CMA COSCO K Line Evergreen NYK 23 Sea-Land Yangming Choyang LLoyd Triestino MISC Norasia Hanjin NOL APL P&O MOL Grand Alliance Global Alliance 1997 CYK Consortium Hapag-Lloyd Nedlloyd Maersk MSC COSCO Evergreen OOCL HMM CMA NYK MISC 20 Sea-Land Norasia K Line LLoyd Triestino NOL Yangming APL P&O MOL Grand Alliance New World 1998 CKY Consortium United Alliance Hapag-Lloyd Alliance COSCO Choyang NYK Maersk MSC Norasia Evergreen APL 21 Sea-Land CMA K Line Hanjin-Senator LLoyd Triestino OOCL MOL Yangming UASC MISC P&O Nedlloyd HMM 1999-2000 Grand Alliance New World Maersk- CKY Consortium United Alliance Evergreen-LT Hapag-Lloyd Alliance Sealand COSCO Choyang NYK MSC Norasia APL 19 Maersk acquired CMA CGM K Line Hanjin-Senator OOCL MOL Sea-Land Yangming UASC MISC P&O Nedlloyd HMM United Alliance Grand Alliance New World 2001 CKY Consortium CSCL Hanjin-Senator Evergreen-LT Hapag-Lloyd Alliance COSCO NYK Maersk- MSC CMA CGM UASC APL 20 Sealand Zim K Line CSAV Norasia OOCL MOL Yangming Choyang Bankrupt MISC P&O Nedlloyd HMM 2002-2004 Grand Alliance CKYH Alliance Evergreen-LT New World CSCL COSCO Hapag-Lloyd Alliance NYK Maersk- MSC CMA CGM UASC K Line APL 20 Sealand OOCL Zim Yangming MISC MOL Hanjin-Senator CSAV Norasia P&O Nedlloyd HMM CKYH Alliance Grand Alliance New World 2005 Maersk- CSCL Evergreen-LT COSCO Hapag-Lloyd Alliance Sealand MSC CMA CGM UASC K Line
    [Show full text]
  • PAUL KENT, PHD Senior Vice President/Global Advisor for Ports and Logistics Nathan Associates Inc
    EASTERN PA FREIGHT SUMMIT Global Logistics Drivers and Implications for Freight Logistics 21-22 June 2018 PAUL KENT, PHD Senior Vice President/Global Advisor for Ports and Logistics Nathan Associates Inc. [email protected]/+1-703-516-7830 Importance of Ports • Important (English) • Importante (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) • Important (French, Romanian) 2 Strategic Drivers Shaping Logistics Global Economy and Trade Growth • Gap between GDP growth and trade 0.2 growth narrowing 0.15 0.1 • Excess fleet capacity/liner 0.05 concentration 0 • Global urban population growth 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 -0.05 • Disruptive technologies -0.1 TEU Growth GDP Growth 4 Liner Consolidation Year of Formation Q4 2009 Q1 2012 Q2 2015 Q2 2017 NWA G6 Alliance G6 Alliance THE Alliance • New and larger alliances APL/NOL APL/NOL APL/NOL MOL MOL MOL MOL K-Line emerging, largely driven HMM HMM HMM NYK Line Grand Alliance IV Hapaq-Lloyd Hapaq-Lloyd Yang Ming by excess capacity Hapag-Lloyd NYK Line NYK Line Hapag-Lloyd NYK OOCL OOCL Ocean Alliance • Of top 20 carriers, only 2 OOCL CKYH CKYHE CMA CGM have not joined an CKYH Hanjin Hanjin COSCO CS Hanjin K-Line K-Line OOCL alliance, with Maersk K-Line Yang Ming Yang Ming Evergreen Yang Ming COSCO COSCO 2M recently acquiring COSCO MSC/CMA CGM Evergreen MSC MSC 2M Maersk Line Hamburg Sud CMA CGM MSC HMM Maersk Line • Top 5 carriers control 62% Ocean Three CMA CGM of container trades China Shipping • Increased from 44% just 4 UASC years ago Top 20 Carriers Not Part of Alliance Maersk Line Maersk Line PIL, Zim Line PIL, Zim Line MSC Hamburg Sud Hamburg Sud CMA CGM Wan Hai Wan Hai Evergreen Evergreen Source: Notteboom, Theo, PortEconomics, Rounds of alliance formation in container shipping, May 2016, revised by Nathan 5 Associates Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • Review of Maritime Transport 2016 Review of Maritime Transport
    UNCTAD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT For further information on UNCTAD’s work REVIEW on trade logistics, please visit: http://unctad.org/ttl OF MARITIME and for the TRANSPORT Review of Maritime Transport 2016: http://unctad.org/rmt E-mail: 2016 [email protected] To read more and to subscribe to the UNCTAD Transport Newsletter, please visit: http://unctad.org/transportnews 2016 UNITED NATIONS ISBN 978-92-1-112904-5 Layout and printed at United Nations, Geneva 1623510 (E)–November 2016 – 2,102 UNCTAD/RMT/2016 United Nations publication Sales No. E.16.II.D.7 : © Jan Hoffmann Photo credit UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2016 New York and Geneva, 2016 ii REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2016 NOTE The Review of Maritime Transport is a recurrent publication prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat since 1968 with the aim of fostering the transparency of maritime markets and analysing relevant developments. Any factual or editorial corrections that may prove necessary, based on comments made by Governments, will be reflected in a corrigendum to be issued subsequently. * * * Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Use of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. * * * The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
    [Show full text]
  • Review of Maritime Transport 2014
    UNCTAD UNITED N ATIONS CONFERENC E ON T RADE A ND D EVELOPMENT For further information on UNCTAD’s work REVIEW OF MA on trade logistics, please visit: http://unctad.org/ttl REVIEW and for the Review of Maritime Transport 2014: OF MARITIME http://unctad.org/rmt E-mail: TRANSPORT [email protected] To read more and to subscribe to the UNCTAD Transport Newsletter, please visit: R 2014 http://unctad.org/transportnews ITI M E TR ANSPO R T 2014 UNITED NATIONS ISBN 978-92-1-112878-9 Layout and printed at United Nations, Geneva 1418912 (E)–November 2014–2,062 UNCTADRMT2014 United Nations publication Sales No. E.14.II.D.5 : © Jan Hoffmann Photo credit UNITED N ATIONS CONFERENC E ON T RADE A ND D EVELOPMENT REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2014 New York and Geneva, 2014 ii REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2014 NOTE The Review of Maritime Transport is a recurrent publication prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat since 1968 with the aim of fostering the transparency of maritime markets and analysing relevant developments. Any factual or editorial corrections that may prove necessary, based on comments made by Governments, will be reflected in a corrigendum to be issued subsequently. * * * Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Use of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. * * * The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
    [Show full text]
  • Interim Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements
    INTERIM CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS * * * Three-month period ended March 31, 2017 The accompanying notes are part of the interim condensed consolidated financial statements. Contents Interim Condensed Consolidated Statement of Profit & Loss ........................................................................... 3 Interim Condensed Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income .......................................................... 4 Interim Condensed Consolidated Statement of Financial Position - Assets ....................................................... 5 Interim Condensed Consolidated Statement of Financial Position - Liabilities & Equity .................................... 6 Interim Condensed Consolidated Statement of changes in Equity ..................................................................... 7 Interim Condensed Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows .............................................................................. 8 Notes to the Interim Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements ............................................................... 9 Note 1 - Corporate information .................................................................................................................. 9 Note 2 - General accounting principles ....................................................................................................... 9 2.1 Basis of preparation ................................................................................................................. 9 2.2 Change
    [Show full text]
  • The Complex Network Analysis of Liner Shipping Networks: Lessons from the Merger Between COSCO and CSCL Liehui Wang, Nanyi Zhang, Fei Ye, Yui-Yip Lau, César Ducruet
    The complex network analysis of liner shipping networks: Lessons from the merger between COSCO and CSCL Liehui Wang, Nanyi Zhang, Fei Ye, Yui-yip Lau, César Ducruet To cite this version: Liehui Wang, Nanyi Zhang, Fei Ye, Yui-yip Lau, César Ducruet. The complex network analysis of liner shipping networks: Lessons from the merger between COSCO and CSCL. Growth and Change, Wiley, 2020, 10.1111/grow.12428. halshs-02955149 HAL Id: halshs-02955149 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02955149 Submitted on 6 Dec 2020 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. The complex network analysis of liner shipping networks: Lessons from the merger between COSCO and CSCL Liehui Wang, Nanyi Zhang, Fei Ye, Yui‐yip Lau, César Ducruet Pre-final version of the article published in Growth and Change, 51(4): 1877-1893. Abstract: COSCO and China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) are leading enterprises in China’s shipping industry. They merged and reorganized as COSCO Shipping Lines in 2016. Through using a complex network methodology, we analyze the spatial patterns of their shipping networks before and after the merger. We evaluate the integration effects based on two main dimensions: network and hub economies.
    [Show full text]
  • Investor Presentation – Full Year Results 2015
    Investor Presentation – Full Year Results 2015 123 -24 March 2016 Disclaimer Forward-looking Statements This presentation contains forward-looking statements that involve a number of risks and uncertainties. Such statements are based on a number of assumptions, estimates, projections or plans that are inherently subject to significant risks, as well as uncertainties and contingencies that are subject to change. Actual results can differ materially from those anticipated in the Company´s forward-looking statements as a result of a variety of factors, many of which are beyond the control of the Company, including those set forth from time to time in the Company´s press releases and reports and those set forth from time to time in the Company´s analyst calls and discussions. We do not assume any obligation to update the forward-looking statements contained in this presentation. This presentation does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation or offer to buy any securities of the Company, and no part of this presentation shall form the basis of or may be relied upon in connection with any offer or commitment whatsoever. This presentation is being presented solely for your information and is subject to change without notice. 2 Opening remarks Our deliverables We made very good progress and delivered what we promised Our industry The market is tough, but there are some encouraging signs Our position Hapag-Lloyd is well positioned to be successful in the future Our track record Hapag-Lloyd achieved its ambitious earnings targets in
    [Show full text]
  • Market Position in the Industry
    MARKET POSITION IN THE INDUSTRY MOL operates a large and balanced oceangoing fleet. In terms of its total fleet size and presence in individual market categories, MOL ranks among the world’s largest shipping companies. WORLD MAJOR CARRIers’ FLEETS (ALL VESSEL TYPES) (Million deadweight tons (DWT)) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 MOL (Japan) 68 958 NYK (Japan) COSCO (China) A.P.Møller-Mærsk (Denmark) K Line (Japan) China Shipping (China) Oldendorff (Germany) Zodiac (U.K.) Teekay Shipping (Canada) Swiss Marine (Switzerland) Frontline (Norway) BW Group (Singapore) 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 (Number of vessels) DWT Number of vessels Source: MOL internal calculation based on each company’s published data and others. As of March 2013 WORLD MAJOR CARRIers’ REVENUE PORTFOLIO BY SEGMENTS (%) 0 20 40 60 80 100 MOL 48 40 11 NYK K Line A.P.Møller-Mærsk Evergreen NOL OOIL MISC Frontline Teekay Pacific Basin Golar LNG Bulkships Containerships and related business Other businesses Source: MOL calculations based on each company’s financial statements and/or website. MOL’s containerships and related business includes revenue from Containerships, Terminal and Logistics. NYK’s containerships and related business includes revenue from Containerships, Air freighters and Logistics. 24 DRY BULKERS (Thousand deadweight tons) 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 NYK MOL 34,928 K Line Source: Companies’ published data and Clarkson Research COSCO Services Limited 2013 China As of March 2013 Shipping TANKERS (Thousand deadweight tons) 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 MOL 15,458 Fredriksen SCF NYK MISC Teekay NIOC Source: Clarkson A.P.Møller-Mærsk Research Services Dynacom Tankers Limited 2013 Angelicoussis As of March 2013 LNG CARRIERS (Number of vessels) 0 20 40 60 80 MOL 69 NYK Nakilat* K Line *Qatar Gas Transport Company Ltd.
    [Show full text]
  • CMA CGM: Your Shipping Expert in XXL Cargo
    Group Corporate Presentation Led by its founder, Mr Jacques R. Saadé, CMA CGM is a leading worldwide shipping group. CMA CGM Group is today a global carrier operating on all the world’s shipping routes and offers the full range of logistics and transportation services to its customers. Founded in 1978 by Jacques R. Saadé, today CMA CGM is the world’s third largest container shipping group and number one in France. CMA CGM is headquartered in Marseille (France), and operates out of over 600 offices and agencies in more than 160 countries. With regular services on over 200 shipping lines, the Group manages a dense network capable of meeting the expectations of its customers all over the world. The CMA CGM Group’s primary objective is to meet the growing needs of its customers from a sustainable development perspective. CMA CGM provides customers with tailor-made solutions to meet all their transport requirements, on land as well as at sea. Our main recent achievements JUNE 2016 APRIL 2016 APRIL 2016 MARCH 2016 MARCH 2016 DECEMBER 2015 CMA CGM signs a CMA CGM Takes CMA CGM, COSCO Launch of the new Financial results 2015: CMA CGM TO ACQUIRE Carbon Pact with DB control of NOL Group Container Lines, Evergreen REEFER advertising CMA CGM has known a NOL Group: If the Schenker, the German and APL Brand on Line and Orient Overseas campaign. The ad strong increase of the acquisition is validated by logistics provider. The June 10th 2016. Container Line to establish highlights the expertise volumes (+6,3%) and a competent authorities, CMA agreement aims to Temasek and its “OCEAN Alliance”.
    [Show full text]
  • Merger Review in the Container Liner Shipping Sector
    Merger Review in the Container Liner Shipping Sector 16th EU-China Competition Week Beijing, 12 March 2018 Prof. Dr. Stephan Simon1 Senior Expert Mergers/ Case Manager Transport Directorate 1 The views expressed are those of the author and cannot be regarded as stating DG Competition an official position of the European Commission These slides are part of a presentation and cannot be fully understood separately from that presentation. Ideas presented here are intended to promote further discussion and analysis. They may not represent a complete or well-articulated picture of the author‘s view. Outline Market Structure & Consolidation Market definition Market share calculation Assessment – the free market Recent cases: With remedies Unconditional clearance Verticals – Terminals Question time 2 Market Structure • Global industry increasingly concentrated • After latest merger wave top 5 carriers account for around 65% of global tonnage • Five leading carriers with global scale • Ten small global carriers with market shares of 2- 5% trying to catch up with five industry leaders • Carriers with scale in a certain region • BUT: Commission looks at legs of trade • Product is a commodity • Standardised container 3 Market Structure 4 Market trends • Structural Overcapacity • Despite massive scrapping, increase in capacity: +5.6% in 2018 according to Alphaliner. Due mainly to continued delivery of mega ships > 13.000 TEU • Capacity growth > demand growth over past decade • Declining freight rates • Industry incurs losses • Bankruptcy of then world's number 7, Hanjin, in autumn 2016 • However, signs of recovery since May 2017 • Consolidation • Since 2014: new merger wave, and reduction of global alliances from 4 to 3.
    [Show full text]