Poland, the International Monetary System and the Bank of England, 1921–1939
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NBP Working Paper No. 328 Poland, the international monetary system and the Bank of England, 1921–1939 William A. Allen NBP Working Paper No. 328 Poland, the international monetary system and the Bank of England, 1921–1939 William A. Allen Narodowy Bank Polski Warsaw 2020 William A. Allen – National Institute of Economic and Social Research London, England; [email protected] Acknowledgements This paper was inspired by discussions with Zbigniew Polański. I am extremely grateful to him, and to Cecylia Leszczyńska, for their encouragement and valuable comments on earlier versions of the paper, for collecting data and making them available to me, and for reviewing the data in the paper. I am also extremely grateful to Mikołaj Szadkowski for help with editing the paper, and to Mike Anson, Margherita Orlando and the other staff of the Bank of England archives for their expert help. Finally, I would like to acknowledge Susan Howson’s very useful advice. All errors of fact and interpretation are my own. Further comments would be welcome. Published by: Narodowy Bank Polski Education & Publishing Department ul. Świętokrzyska 11/21 00-919 Warszawa, Poland www.nbp.pl ISSN 2084-624X © Copyright Narodowy Bank Polski 2020 Contents Abstract 4 List of abbreviations 5 1. Introduction 6 2. The Brussels and Genoa conferences 7 3. Infl ation, the Hilton Young mission, and the advent of Grabski, 1923–1924 10 4. The foundation of the Bank Polski and the fi rst stabilisation programme, 1924–1925 19 5. The depreciation and re-stabilisation of the złoty, and the loan negotiations, 1925–1927 26 6. Post-stabilisation 70 7. Defl ation, 1929–1935 86 8. Danzig, Germany, Poland and the sterling bloc proposal, 1934–1936 114 9. Exchange restrictions, default and debt settlement, 1936–1937 138 10. Collapse and disaster, 1938–1939 164 11. The Bank Polski’s account with the Bank of England 179 12. The foreign exchange market in the 1920s 188 13. Concluding remarks 193 Cast of characters 198 Appendixes 203 Appendix 1. The Bank of England’s role in the stabilisation loan 203 Appendix 2. Post-stabilisation gold policy 207 Appendix 3. Adam Koc’s appointment as President of the Bank Polski, February 1936 210 Appendix 4. External debts and debt servicing costs, 1934–1936 212 Appendix 5. Claims of London banks pursued by the Bank of England and the British government, 1936–1939 215 Appendix 6. Statement of the Polish government to the paying agents of the stabilisation loan, June 1936 222 References 224 NBP Working Paper No. 328 3 Abstract Abstract The paper uses archive material, mainly from the Bank of England, to give an account of the relationship between Poland and the international monetary system between 1921 and 1939, as seen from the United Kingdom. It describes the 1923 – 1924 Hilton Young mission of ‘money doctors’ and its role in the establishment of the Bank Polski and the introduction of the zÏoty in 1924; the abandonment of the zÏoty’s gold parity in 1925; the tortuous negotiations leading to the stabilisation programme and stabilisation loan of 1927, including the Bank of England’s unsuccessful efforts to induce Poland to accept the oversight of the League of Nations; Poland’s gold purchases after the stabilisation loan; the process of deflation during the Great Depression; the abortive discussions in 1934 – 1936 of the possibility of Danzig, Germany and Poland pegging their exchange rates to sterling; the imposition of exchange restrictions in 1936; debt default in 1937; and the approach of war. It also provides information about the management of Poland’s gold and foreign exchange reserves. The narrative makes clear that it is impossible to understand Poland’s international financial affairs without reference to the international political tensions of the period. JEL codes: E42, E58, F33, F34, F52, N34, N44. Keywords: Poland, United Kingdom, international monetary system, Bank Polski, Bank of England, zÏoty, gold exchange standard, foreign exchange, sterling bloc, exchange restrictions, default, Genoa conference, money doctors, stabilisation, League of Nations, Polish Corridor, Federal Reserve, Bank of France, Reichsbank, J.P. Morgan, Council of Foreign Bondholders, Danzig, Germany, France, Norman, Hilton Young, Grabski, KarpiÑski, MÏynarski, BaraÑski, Koc, Strong, Harrison, Moreau, Niemeyer, Siepmann, Schacht, Kemmerer. 4 Narodowy Bank Polski List of abbreviations List of abbreviations AHC Accepting Houses Committee (United Kingdom) BIS Bank for International Settlements BOB British Overseas Bank BOE Bank of England BP Bank Polski CFB Council of Foreign Bondholders (United Kingdom) DOT Department of Overseas Trade (United Kingdom) ECGD Export Credits Guarantee Department (United Kingdom) FBPC Foreign Bondholders’ Protective Council (USA) FO Foreign Office (United Kingdom) FRBNY Federal Reserve Bank of New York HMG His Majesty’s Government GDP Gross Domestic Product PKKP Polska Krajowa Kasa PoĂyczkowa PKO Powszechna Kasa Oszcz¸dnoäci NBP Working Paper No. 328 5 Chapter 1 1. Introduction This paper gives an account of the relationship between Poland and the international monetary system between 1921 and 1939, as seen from the United Kingdom. It brings to light information from the Bank of England’s archives, and draws also on information from other archives, and on published accounts of related aspects of Polish financial developments in this period.1 The latter include, in particular, Pease’s (1986) exploration of the relationship between Poland and the United States from 1919 – 1933, Lojkó’s (2006) description of Poland’s financial relationship with the United Kingdom, up to 1925, and LeszczyÑska’s (2013) account of Polish monetary policy from 1924 – 1936. As all of them implicitly or explicitly acknowledge, no complete account of Poland’s international financial affairs can ignore contemporary political developments in Europe.2 Poland, which had disappeared from the map in 1795, regained its sovereignty in 1918 after Russia, Austria and Germany had collapsed and the First World War had ended. Poland’s borders with Germany were settled by the Treaty of Versailles (1919), but its other borders were determined only after a series of military conflicts with Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, which continued until 1921. A transitional national currency, the Polish Mark, had been introduced in 1917, and in 1919 it was enacted that the future currency would be the zÏoty, to be issued by a Bank Polski. 1 I have photocopied the great majority of the papers in the BOE files (leaving out only those which seem of little or no interest), and some papers from the British National Archives. They are available to view on Google Drive. User name: Polandinterwarproject1; password: Warsaw12. There are also extensive BOE files on Danzig, which I have not copied. Fforde (1992, appendix B) gives an account of the Bank of England’s post-1939 relationship with the Bank Polski. 2 Rothschild (1974, chs 1 and 2) provides an excellent summary of political events in central and eastern Europe in general, and in Poland in particular. 6 Narodowy Bank Polski Chapter 2 2. The Brussels and Genoa conferences The pre-1914 international monetary system had no codified rules. It was based on the gold standard. London was the centre of the world’s financial system, and sterling its main currency, because the United Kingdom had large external assets, comfortably larger than its liabilities, and London had the most active financial markets. Moreover the British government was conducted according to classical liberal principles: the government was small, and public spending in 1913 amounted (according to current estimates) to 13% of GDP. The government had very little control over either the volume or the direction of British overseas investment.3 During the war, Britain’s net external assets were dissipated, and extensive economic and financial controls were introduced.4 In all the belligerent European countries, prices rose greatly. The value of the stock of gold, relative to that of global output and demand, was greatly reduced. After the war, therefore, things were completely different. Nevertheless, there was a widespread desire to return to ‘the world of yesterday’, at least in monetary affairs. The post-war international monetary system was designed at the Brussels (1920) and Genoa (1922) conferences, but the United States took part in neither. 5 The Brussels conclusions urged sound public finances, a return to gold and a return to free trade. They acknowledged that some countries would need to borrow for longer than the usual period of commercial credit to re-establish their finances, but rejected the idea of inter-government loans. The more detailed Genoa resolutions reiterated the desirability of currency stability. For European countries, that meant returning to gold, but the choice of parity was 3 Atkin (1970, p 324). 4 Morgan (1952, ch II and VII C). 5 Nurkse and Brown (1944, ch II), Myers (1945, p 493), Clarke (1973), Sayers (1976, pp 153 – 163), Kindleberger (1984, pp 333 – 336), Orde (1990, pp 104 – 107, 204 – 207), Eichengreen (1992, pp 154 – 162), Schuker (2003), Boyce (2009, pp 38 – 45). NBP Working Paper No. 328 7 left to their individual discretion. Central banks should be free from political pressure and conducted solely on lines of prudent finance. They should co- operate among themselves, and the Bank of England was enjoined to call a meeting of them to decide how co-operation should be brought about.6 Stabilisation of currencies