Bosnia-Herzegovina by Jasna Jelisic´
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Bosnia-Herzegovina by Jasna Jelisic´ Capital: Sarajevo Population: 3.8 million GNI/capita, PPP: US$8,770 Source: The data above was provided by The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Electoral Process 4.25 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.25 Civil Society 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 Independent Media 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.75 Governance* 5.50 5.25 5.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a National Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25 5.25 Local Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 Judicial Framework and Independence 5.25 5.00 4.50 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 Corruption 5.50 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 Democracy Score 4.83 4.54 4.29 4.18 4.07 4.04 4.11 4.18 4.25 4.32 * Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects. NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. 126 Nations in Transit 2011 Executive Summary eneral elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 2010 amid anti-Dayton Peace Accords rhetoric from political actors who frequently Gquestioned the sovereignty and constitutional order of the state, resulting in a hostile and polarized political atmosphere. Leadership of the Republika Srpska (RS), one of the country’s two main political entities, openly questioned the sovereignty and sustainability of BiH, referring to the possibility of a “peaceful dissolution.” To the detriment of interethnic relations, RS leaders also challenged rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relating to the Srebrenica genocide of July 1995. Challenges to the integrity of BiH, mostly emanating from the RS, have increased following the July 2010 ruling by the ICJ that Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia did not violate international law.1 Political elites in RS and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), BiH’s other main political entity, still lack a shared vision for the country and a consensus on its political system, which prevents constitutional changes. As a consequence, an estimated 60 percent of the state budget is spent on the upkeep of nonfunctional or ineffective government apparatus.2 After the October 3 general elections, the winning parties organized into blocs in the evident hope of building a coalition. However, disagreements between the two sides over issues such as which party would represent ethnic Croats in the ruling coalition blocked the formation of both the FBiH and BiH (State) governments. BiH’s democratization process remained stagnant throughout 2010, with few successful reforms. Though the European Union (EU) invited BiH into its visa-free travel zone in 2009, the BiH authorities continued to dawdle on reforms critical to EU accession. Meanwhile, ethnicity remained a divisive issue. The Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 Progress Report, an annual report by the European Commission (EC) on BiH’s progress on EU membership, asserts that “the functioning of the state-level executive and legislative bodies has continued to be negatively affected by the prevalence of ethnically oriented considerations.”3 Improvements are still urgently needed in media independence and depoliticization of the education system to provide the conditions for democratization and long-term stability in BiH. National Democratic Governance. The ethnic ruling elite in BiH made no serious headway in improving democratic governance in 2010. RS calls for secession took center stage in pre- and post-election debates. Likewise, sharply opposing views on the future of the country among the election winners blocked the decision-making process entirely, seriously compromising the country’s stability and impeding Bosnia-Herzegovina 127 democratic governance. Though BiH was granted EU visa liberalization, reforms required for EU membership foundered, as did ongoing, vital efforts to improve public administration in BiH. Due to a lack of progress on democratic governance and critical reforms, BiH’s national democratic governance rating remains at 5.25. Electoral Process. Despite some reports of electoral fraud, international observers judged the October general elections as free and fair. However, BiH’s electoral rules continued to violate Protocol 12 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in December 2009 that ethnicity-based limitations on political representation and suffrage in BiH violate the convention, but authorities have not redressed the problem. BiH maintained previous dynamics observed in the electoral process; its rating for electoral process remains unchanged at 3.25. Civil Society. Civil society in BiH was more energetic and effective in 2010, especially in FBiH, where organizations managed to refocus the preelection debate from ugly nationalist rhetoric to socioeconomic issues. However, funding is a critical problem, with civic groups continuing to rely on international financing, and it is unclear whether NGOs can act as an effective government watchdog in the postelection period. Despite the strong preelection performance of some civic groups, BiH civil society is immature. BiH’s civil society rating remains unchanged at 3.50. Independent Media. The media in BiH generally operate under political influence, and their editorial policy is strongly dependent on ownership. A variety of independent media outlets exist, but the majority took sides in the 2010 preelection campaign and continued their partisan editorial policy. Journalists are also subject to political attack and threats. Partisan editorial policies among media outlets and political pressure and violent threats against journalists all contribute to the worsening of BiH’s independent media rating from 4.50 to 4.75. Local Democratic Governance. Local governance in BiH remains at the mercy of the higher levels of government and party hierarchy. Local self-government (LSG) legislation is in place, but it is often ignored in higher legislation. As a consequence, LSG units lack the necessary funds to serve their local communities. The final status of the Brčko District is still unresolved. BiH’s local democratic governance rating remains unchanged at 4.75. Judicial Framework and Independence. The BiH judicial system does not meet European standards of independence, efficiency, or quality, and 2010 saw no substantial improvements in these areas. Authorities made weak efforts to implement the Justice Sector Reform Strategy for 2009–2013. The National War Crimes Prosecution Strategy was also poorly implemented, while the lack of a single body similar to a supreme court has left judicial powers fragmented between independent judiciaries in BiH, RS, FBiH, and the Brčko District. As a result, 128 Nations in Transit 2011 the judicial system is overly complex and inefficient, with a significant backlog of cases. Moreover, the state judiciary lacks an autonomous budget, leaving it open to political influence through budgetary pressure, and BiH has no state prison to incarcerate sentenced criminals. Due to the lack of substantive progress on judicial reform and war crimes prosecution—as well as political entanglement in the judiciary— BiH’s judicial framework and independence rating declines from 4.00 to 4.25. Corruption. BiH continues to confront considerable challenges in combating corruption. No discernible progress toward implementing the anticorruption strategy adopted in 2004 was evident in 2010. Meanwhile, authorities proposed legislative amendments that several civic organizations argued would weaken existing laws to prevent conflict of interests and other areas related to corruption. Patronage hiring for government posts remains common. Due to BiH’s poor record on corruption and the lack of political will to tackle the issue, its corruption rating remains unchanged at 4.50. Outlook for 2011. If institutional reforms are implemented in 2011, they may still have a positive effect on the long-term stability of the country. However, the governance deadlock of 2010 shows signs of continuing into next year, which could lead to social unrest and potentially threaten the survival of the state. Despite 80 percent popular support for EU membership, the enthusiasm of elected officials for the reforms that would bring BiH closer to the EU remains low, and state-level legislation required to prepare BiH for EU membership may continue to be blocked in 2011. Calls for RS secession are likely to continue, as well. In this context, the stability of the country and the region will continue to rely on a meaningful international presence. Bosnia-Herzegovina 129 Main Report National Democratic Governance 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 n/a n/a n/a 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25 5.25 Under the Dayton system of post-conflict power sharing, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has neither the cohesiveness nor the agency of a unified sovereign state.