Financing Terror Bit by Bit by Aaron Brantly FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Financing Terror Bit by Bit by Aaron Brantly

october 2014 . Vol 7 . Issue 10

Contents Financing Terror Bit by Bit By Aaron Brantly FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Financing Terror Bit by Bit By Aaron Brantly

Reports 5 Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region By Jacob Zenn 10 Boko Haram’s Regional Cross-Border Activities By Scott Menner 15 The Motivations of Syrian Islamist Fighters By Vera Mironova, Loubna Mrie and sam Whitt 17 Syrian and Iraqi Jihads Prompt Increased Recruitment and Activism in Southeast Asia By James Brandon

20 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

errorism is highly dependent activities.1 While these tools have on cash flows for the purchase gained in popularity, in recent years of everything from munitions their expansion into various terrorist and supplies to domains and organizations has been slow and Tpamphlets. Traditionally, one of the deliberate and has not matched pace more challenging aspects of organizing with transnational criminal uses of these international terrorist activities is same technologies. rooted in financial transactions. The About the CTC Sentinel transfer of money around the world For the purposes of this article, the term The Combating Terrorism Center is an has, in the last decade, fundamentally “terrorist organization” does not include independent educational and research changed the way terrorist organizations the hacktivist community, which has institution based in the Department of Social raise money to support their activities. already demonstrated widespread Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Digital currencies like e-gold, Bitcoin, utilization of these technologies. Here, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses Peercoin, and Dodgecoin provide the term is limited to “international the Center’s global network of scholars and complex yet efficient mechanisms for terrorism” as outlined in 18 U.S.C. § practitioners to understand and confront the transfer of funds, as well as the 2331 - Chapter 113B. This definition contemporary threats posed by terrorism and decentralized collection of donations is an important caveat as it frames other forms of political violence. in a more anonymous manner than the scope of the analysis to a specific conventional banking transactions. community of actors and acknowledges There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the use of these technologies has The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, that terrorists are considering and, the Department of the Army, or any other agency in limited instances, using digital 1 This has been witnessed by tracking conversations of of the U.S. Government. currencies such as Bitcoin to finance jihadists within various internet chat rooms and forums.

1 october 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 10 been demonstrated and documented by time inefficient for the decentralized for financial transactions at both the other actors contained within a broader collection of funds from multiple sources national and international level. Two definition of terrorism. and the disbursement of those funds recent cases have elevated the role of to single or multiple geographically digital currencies in the AML/CFT This article is designed to demonstrate dispersed end points. The limits imposed research space. The first major incident the advantages and limitations of the by a trust-based network constrain the was the investigation, takedown, and use of digital currencies by illicit actors, dynamic collection and disbursement of indictment of Liberty Reserve and its specifically jihadists. Focus is placed funds within a terror network and slow founder. Liberty Reserve was a Costa on the technological problems posed down the process of funding, planning, to terrorist organizations in leveraging and implementing attacks. “Partly due to its novelty these currencies, as well as the benefits associated with their use. Furthermore, In contrast, conventional banking and partly due to its this analysis demonstrates, in brief, systems using ISO 9362 (SWIFT-BIC)4 complexity, the evolving the technical challenges faced by law or other modern commercial banking enforcement and intelligence agencies protocols/standards are efficient world of digital or engaged in anti-money laundering modes for conducting international crypto currencies like (AML) and countering the financing of financial transactions. The challenge terrorism (CFT) endeavors. here for terrorist groups is that these BitCoin and their impact systems adhere to strong regulatory on AML/CFT has been Shortcomings in the Old Way of Doing frameworks within codified national Business and international agreements such given substantially less The U.S. Department of the Treasury as those developed by the Financial attention.” and other government agencies Action Task Force (FATF).5 The use recognize that terrorist organizations of conventional banking systems use a variety of methods to launder unnecessarily exposes terrorist and finance terror activities. Two organizations to oversight by banks, law Rica-based digital currency founded traditional methods that terrorist enforcement, and intelligence officials, in 2006 and the successor to several organizations have used for the which threatens their operational digital gold currencies.7 The second financing and laundering of funds security. incident, also culminating in 2013, are traditional Hawala networks and was the investigation and takedown conventional international banking.2 In summary, the traditional option of of Silk Road, an illicit online market While the possibilities for financing Hawala and the conventional option functioning within the “Deep Web.”8 terrorism extend to a wide array of of international banking pose unique methods ranging from robbery and risks for terrorist groups engaging in Liberty Reserve functioned similarly narcotics to ransom and smuggling, it is international financial transactions. to a conventional bank with a central valuable to limit the scope for analytical The literature on AML/CFT efforts in ledger of transactions. However, purposes to examining the functional these two areas is extensive.6 However, Liberty Reserve embedded tacit and legal/regulatory challenges partly due to its novelty and partly due anonymity by deliberately failing to associated with digital currencies in to its complexity, the evolving world of mandate account holder validation. the context of these historical terrorism digital or crypto currencies like BitCoin In other words, people who opened financing methods. and their impact on AML/CFT has been accounts were not required to provide given substantially less attention. any of the basic personally identifiable A great deal of emphasis has been placed information that a conventional bank on both of these financing typologies. Beyond Convention and Tradition: would require to conduct financial In the case of Hawala networks, the New Methods for Financing Terror transactions. This tacit anonymity Department of the Treasury has provided Much of the literature to date has hid Liberty Reserve account holders’ extensive reports on their use to finance focused on the functional aspects activities from legal and regulatory terror and launder money across of crypto currencies and a narrow oversight by law enforcement and borders.3 These networks implicitly subset has focused on the practical intelligence agencies. rely on the trusted relationships of implications of alternative pathways brokers within the network. While these Liberty Reserve added to the tacit traditional networks are efficient and 4 This system provides unique identification codes for anonymity of its users by requiring all difficult to track for transferring money financial institutions. SWIFT-BIC stands for Society for users to deposit and withdraw funds from point A to B, they are at the same Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication- from third-party “exchangers” to Business Identifier Codes. eliminate a direct paper trail to Liberty 2 Hawala – meaning transfer – is a pre-modern financial 5 Financial Action Task Force. International Standards on Reserve. The central objective was to transfer system that facilitates the conduct of commerce Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terror- through trusted informal networks. ism and Proliferation. (Paris, France: 2013), pp. 1–130. 7 United States of America v Liberty Reserve S.A, No. 3 Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, “The Hawala 6 For a broad overview of the current state of the litera- USA-33s-274 (Ed. 9-25-58), United States District Court, Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money ture on AML/CFL, see Peter Romaniuk, “The State of the Southern District of New York, May 2013. Laundering,” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Art on the Financing of Terrorism,” The RUSI Journal, 8 “Deep Web” refers to the utilization of Tor networks to and INTERPOL/FOPAC, 2003. 159:2 (2014): pp. 6-17. encrypt and hide web traffic.

2 october 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 10 avoid U.S. and international law and non-trust-based currency. Using third- anonymity for transactions, Bitcoin’s in the process create a black-market party money “exchangers” would structure facilitates anonymity through banking system. For terrorist groups, have been inefficient and limited the the absence of personally identifiable the global reach of Liberty Reserve ability to engage in rapid e-commerce information (PII) linking sellers and combined with its ability to avoid transactions. If Silk Road had used a buyers to transactions through the use revealing regulatory practices presented service such as Liberty Reserve, every of public and private key pairs, as will a solution to the problems associated user would have had to register with be examined in more detail below. with more traditional banking.9 Liberty Reserve and one or more third party “exchangers” willing to convert Because each transaction is the result Silk Road, unlike Liberty Reserve, Liberty Reserve currency. To engage of a hash-based (mathematical) was not a financial institution, but in any given transaction, currency proof-of-work requiring significant rather a commercial marketplace would have needed to be converted computational power, it is equivalent to an Amazon or Ebay for or transferred at least three times.13 probabilistically unlikely that any illicit merchandise.10 The marketplace To overcome this problem, the site one user can double spend any given made possible the sale of everything leveraged a new digital currency type Bitcoin. The ability to double spend was from narcotics to weaponry. Similar that had only been conceptualized a a fundamental problem associated with to purchasing a book on Amazon, year earlier. “Unless terrorist “Silk Road would not have Bitcoin14 was designed to eliminate the need for trust through mathematical organizations can been as successful at illicit proof of work. Trust and the ability to sufficiently educate all e-commerce if it used credit ensure the security and reliability of transactions are crucial to sustained members that use crypto cards and bank accounts iterative commerce. The ability to currencies to do so at a which tie users to their ensure trust in a digital currency was a major turning point that has largely very high level, the use of transactions conducted in facilitated the success of Bitcoin. these networks may leave the deep web.” Although Bitcoin was not designed with anonymity in mind, its construction the overall organization provides anonymity to its users as vulnerable.” evidenced in the 2013 indictment of customers of Silk Road could purchase Silk Road founder Ross Ulbricht.15 All drugs and guns from a variety of conventional Bitcoin transactions are private sellers, all of whom connected transparent and by design open for all early concepts of digital currencies, as anonymously to the market and all participants in the Bitcoin network to the validation process might make it of whom used a digital currency to view. In other words, every transaction possible for an individual to essentially engage in transactions.11 The site ever conducted in Bitcoin is recorded purchase things from two different was accessible only to users of Tor12 and distributed to every other user vendors using the same currency and conducted financial transactions in the network. Instead of providing value at the same time without either through an emerging digital currency vendor knowing that the money used to called Bitcoin (BTC). 13 In contrast, Bitcoin requires only one mathematical purchase a good or service had already proof and any given transaction takes between 10 min- been spent. Silk Road would not have been as utes and 24 hours, far less time than a comparable Lib- successful at illicit e-commerce if it erty Reserve transaction. Since there is no central oversight used credit cards and bank accounts 14 In 2008, under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, mechanism like a bank or in the which tie users to their transactions a concept paper for a decentralized cryptographic peer- case of cash, physical currency, the conducted in the deep web. To maintain to-peer digital currency was published. The concepts creators of Bitcoin minimized potential the anonymity of the marketplace presented in this paper led to the creation of a digital manipulation of the system by creating beyond access through Tor networks, currency rooted in cryptographic proofs (mathematical a mathematical means to ensure the the site relied on Bitcoin, a secure, equations) based on a cryptographic hash (the present validity of each transaction in relation block), the hash of the previous transaction (previous to the balances present in a consumer’s 9 A more detailed analysis of the inner workings of Lib- block), and what is called a nonce (a generated pseudo account. Therefore, because every erty Reserve is provided in the 2013 Federal indictment: random number). Together these form what is called the user in the network has a record of United States of America v Liberty Reserve S.A, 2013. “block chain.” To ensure there is security of the mathe- all transactions, it is highly unlikely 10 Kim Zetter, “How the Feds Took Down the Silk Road matical proof, each hash can be solved by only one nonce. that any given user can spoof (falsify) Drug Wonderland,” Wired, November 11, 2013. To complete each stage of the block chain, any given com- transactions so long as the majority 11 United States of America v Ross William Ulbricht, USA- puter in the network must continuously try out different of ledgers in the network indicate a 33s-274 (Ed. 9-25-58), United States District Court, numbers until it finds the correct nonce to complete the transaction has occurred. This creates Southern District of New York, February 4, 2014. segment of the chain. Each segment of the chain is unique a non-trust-based verification that 12 Tor is free software that enables anonymity by en- and formed by adding the preceding portions of the chain provides every user with knowledge of crypting and directing internet traffic through a network to the current block. every transaction that has ever taken consisting of more than 5,000 relays. 15 United States of America v Ross William Ulbricht, 2014. place since Bitcoin started in 2009.

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While the transactions themselves in terror activities) through Bitcoin to individuals have spent time and effort are not hidden, the individuals deconstruct a network. to discuss the problems of financing engaged in the transactions are largely associated with jihad. One user even anonymous. Buyers and sellers using Bitcoin can explicitly writes about the potential enhance their anonymity by changing to purchase weapons and ammunition Even though Bitcoin users do not their public keys associated with and the ability to exchange digital provide any direct PII, they are not various transactions. This is the currency for hard currency. Yet despite completely anonymous. Users can be equivalent of using a different credit this optimism, the same user goes on to tracked by a careful examination of card number for every single purchase discuss the level of technical expertise transactions, primarily by analyzing a traditional consumer might make. required by users to engage in financial the repeated use of specific public Additionally, new services such as transactions using Bitcoin.20 keys that direct funds for payment. Dark Wallet propose to enhance Investigators can use technologically the anonymity of transactions by These forum discussions are important advanced analytical techniques to map allowing illicit transactions to in the context of AML/CFT research user transactions across the network digitally “piggyback” on non-illicit as they highlight a deliberate effort on and pair them across datasets to find transactions, creating a single the part of individuals associated with transaction that obfuscates both.18 jihadist movements to understand a new “Cryptography is a never- These new services, combined with and evolving technology to raise money tools such as Tor, can significantly for terrorist activities. While these ending mathematical and enhance the probability of engaging in discussions indicate an asymmetry computational arms race anonymous transactions online using in the level of knowledge between Bitcoin. more technical jihadists and their and crypto currencies, less technical counterparts, they also such as Bitcoin, are While novice participation in Bitcoin illustrate an effort by more technical is relatively straightforward, the members of the community to inform likely affected as better maintenance of high levels of anonymity and educate their peers on the proper algorithms and more on Bitcoin requires substantial effort use of digital currencies. Moreover, and technical skill. Amateur jihadist there are direct references to using powerful computers are use of Bitcoin poses a technical digital currencies to transfer money developed.” problem for the widespread use of into countries where conventional Bitcoin by terrorist organizations. or traditional methods of financial The amateur (non-anonymous) use of transactions are difficult due to a lack Bitcoin by a participant in a network of network capacity or surveillance and individual network users.16 Essentially, can reduce the anonymity of all network regulation. constructing a pattern of behavior based transactions. Novice users could on transactions can reveal tremendous provide a point of origin for intelligence Although some websites affiliated amounts of information about a user, and law enforcement agencies to begin with terrorist organizations have to include where they shopped, how work on deconstructing a terrorist begun collecting Bitcoin donations, much they spent, the frequency of finance network. Specifically, the this practice appears to be relatively transactions, and any transactions with more transactions made to a single or limited. One example would be http:// a party that collected PII. set of public keys, the less likely it is kavkazcenter.com. It is possible that that the parties involved will maintain as the technical capacity of these These discovery techniques are time- anonymity in a distributed funding organizations increases, their use of consuming and imperfect, but have been or donation network. Unless terrorist digital currencies will also increase. successful in reducing the anonymity organizations can sufficiently educate This increase is likely to be small, of Bitcoin users who use the same all members that use crypto currencies however, in relation to overall terror public key for multiple transactions. to do so at a very high level, the use of financing through other channels Similarly, analysts use these techniques these networks may leave the overall such as hawala, kidnapping, front to reduce or remove the anonymity of organization vulnerable. companies, narcotics sales, oil sales, users who use multiple sets of public and many more. keys to complete transactions in an Jihadists Discuss Crypto Currencies attempt to maintain anonymity.17 Individuals interested in jihad seem to This can provide an opening for law be paying attention to this complexity enforcement and intelligence agencies and have posted YouTube videos, to use amateur users (who either donate discussions links, and links to research to or receive funds to plan and engage on the anonymity of Bitcoin on various on jihadist discussion boards: http://youtube.com/ 19 discussion boards. These same watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Um63OQz3bjo#!, 16 Fergal Reid and Martin Harrigan, “An Analysis of the http://bitcoinweekly.com/articles/how-bitcoin-se- Anonymity in the Bitcoin System,” in Yaniv Altshuler et 18 Andy Greenberg, “‘Dark Wallet’ Is About to Make curity-works-by-analogy, https://shamikh1.info/vb/ al eds., Security and Privacy in Social Networks (New York: Bitcoin Money Laundering Easier than Ever,” Wired, showthread.php?t=200037&highlight=bitcoin. Springer, 2013). April 29, 2014. 20 These discussions were posted to the Shumukh al- 17 Ibid. 19 These are some of the links that have been posted Islam Network on April 29, 2013.

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Conclusion (LGAs) in its self-described caliphate in Given the interest that terrorist Boko Haram: Recruitment, northeastern Nigeria explains why it organizations have shown in leveraging Financing, and Arms increasingly requires forcible recruits digital currencies, their use of such Trafficking in the Lake and financiers in its membership mediums for conducting financial network.5 transactions will only increase in the Chad Region future. The development of digital Ideology, Economic Vulnerability, and currencies poses a long-term challenge By Jacob Zenn Infiltration to law enforcement and intelligence After Nigerian security forces killed agencies as the technical skill of their in july 2014, Cameroon’s Defense Boko Haram founder Muhammad 1 targets and the level of complexity of Ministry announced that Boko Haram Yusuf in clashes with his followers in the currencies available increase. was a growing threat in the Lake Chad July 2009, Yusuf’s deputy, Shekau, region and now has approximately emerged as his successor.6 Shekau’s 2 Yet, because these currencies are 15,000 to 20,000 members. A loyalists included Yusuf’s disciples all based on the mathematics that Nigerian journalist with longstanding who found inspiration in al-Qa`ida’s serve as the foundation for modern contacts with Boko Haram, however, style of militancy and Yusuf’s and cryptography, it is possible that their says that Boko Haram has up to 50,000 3 use might also offer opportunities for members. Even the lower estimate of “The strategic shift of the tracking of illicit behavior. Herein the two would mean Boko Haram has lies the dilemma of using digital similar manpower as militant groups Boko Haram’s armed currencies. As one person develops such as Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and pro- 4 militants to seize and a cryptographic algorithm allowing Russian militias in eastern Ukraine. transactions to be more anonymous, The higher estimate may be correct hold local government another person immediately begins if “members” include not only armed areas in its self-described work on solving it to peel back the militants but also individuals who anonymity. Cryptography is a never- cooperate with Boko Haram, whether caliphate in northeastern ending mathematical and computational intentionally or coerced. Using this Nigeria explains why it arms race and crypto currencies, inclusive definition of “members,” two such as Bitcoin, are likely affected as of Boko Haram’s newest recruitment increasingly requires better algorithms and more powerful profiles are of forcible conscripts, forcible recruits computers are developed. especially teenage boys and girls, and financiers, who are primarily and financiers in its Both terrorists and governments will businessmen, arms traffickers, and membership network.” likely struggle to leverage these tools kidnappers in Cameroon. to their advantage in the coming years. The main takeaway, however, This article reviews Boko Haram’s is that when certain pathways for recruitment from the time its leader, Shekau’s call for a “pure” Islamic financing terrorist activities become Abubakar Shekau, declared jihad state in Nigeria. Boko Haram also more difficult, there are increasingly against Nigeria and the United States in attracted criminals that members going to be alternative means available 2010 until the present. It then discusses recruited in prison and were freed in to finance terror and launder money the role of forcible conscripts and rescue operations, including the first as technology and technological skills financiers in Boko Haram operations in attack under Shekau on Bauchi prison increase. 2014. The article finds that the strategic in September 2010.7 shift of Boko Haram’s armed militants Aaron Brantly is Assistant Professor of to seize and hold local government areas Boko Haram’s operations in late 2010 International Relations and Cybersecurity required minimal training, such as drive- in the Department of Social Sciences, Cyber 1 The group Boko Haram identifies itself as Jama`at Ahl by assassinations of local politicians Policy Fellow at the Army Cyber Institute, al-Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad, which is Arabic for and religious leaders, who were and Cyber Policy Fellow at the Combating “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s “guilty” of mixing Islam with “infidel” Terrorism Center at the United States Teachings and Jihad.” The term “Boko Haram” means notions of democracy, secularism and Military Academy at West Point. “Western education is sinful” in the Hausa language. 2 “Cameroon Furious and Fearful Over Boko Haram In- 5 Nigeria has 774 local government areas (LGAs), in- The views expressed here are those of filtration,”thenewage.za , July 12, 2014. cluding more than 20 in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa that the author and do not reflect the official 3 The journalist mentioned was Ahmed Salkida. See Em- are considered under Boko Haram’s control as of Octo- policy or position of the Department of the manuel Elebeke, “Boko Haram has 50,000 Members in ber 2014. See “Boko Haram Leader Proclaims ‘Islamic Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. its Camp,” Vanguard, August 28, 2014. Caliphate’ in Nigeria,” Vanguard, August 24, 2014. Government. 4 John Hall, “Could ISIS Now be Twice as Powerful? 6 On Shekau’s use of imposters, see Jacob Zenn, “Boko Membership of Extreme Group May Double in Size as it Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau: Dead, Deposed Or Du- Merges with al Qaeda’s 15,000-Strong Syrian Offshoot plicated?” Militant Leadership Monitor 5:5 (2014). on Border with Iraq,” Daily Mail, June 25, 2014; “Ukraine 7 Sani Muhd Sani, “Attack On Bauchi Prison - Boko Imposes New Conditions on Peace Talks with Pro-Rus- Haram Frees 721 Inmates,” Leadership, September 8, sia Rebels,” France24, July 9, 2014. 2010.

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Western education. Boko Haram also similarly has cooperated with several Only after the Chibok kidnapping paid small fees to fruit sellers and rogue customs officers in northeastern did Boko Haram start using women al-majiri8 boys to scout on security Nigeria, who turn a blind eye to cross- in operations, including the wives of forces and burn down churches and border arms trafficking because they (or slain or arrested militants and beggars schools.9 However, when Boko Haram their families) are threatened or bribed who were offered a “few naira notes.”17 began carrying out sophisticated by Boko Haram, or sympathize with its During the month of Ramadan in June bombings, such as on churches on ideology.13 2014, there were six female suicide Christmas Day in 2010 and the Federal Forcible Conscripts: Chibok as a Turning Point “Boko Haram militants The kidnapping of more than 250 “Boko Haram similarly has girls, mostly Christians, in Chibok, and their wives began cooperated with several Borno State, Nigeria on April 14, 2014, kidnapping young girls brought international attention to Boko rogue customs officers in Haram’s forcible recruitment. Yet that in early 2013 to use as northeastern Nigeria, who incident was neither the first nor last assets to trade in prisoner time Boko Haram employed the tactic. turn a blind eye to cross- Boko Haram militants and their wives exchanges, use as decoys to border arms trafficking.” began kidnapping young girls in early lure troops into ambushes, 2013 to use as assets to trade in prisoner exchanges, use as decoys to lure troops and serve as porters and into ambushes, and serve as porters and cooks.” Police Headquarters and UN Building cooks.14 Two days before the Chibok in 2011, and kidnapping foreigners kidnapping, on April 12, 2014, Boko in 2012, it relied on Nigerians who Haram took several girls from a college received funding or training from in Dikwa, Borno State. In addition, on bombers, all under 16-years-old, who abroad with al-Qaìda in the Islamic April 19, May 5, and June 10, 2014, the carried out four attacks at universities Maghreb (AQIM) and who were part of militants took more than 40 girls from and fuel stations in Kano, a military Ansaru’s10 shura (leadership council).11 towns near Chibok, and on October barracks in Gombe, and a fuel station 20, 2014, took 45 more girls from in Lagos. In addition, one 10-year-old Ansaru, in particular, acquired inside Wagga, Adamawa State and “married” girl was detected with a suicide vest in information to carry out key attacks, the young ones after the Nigerian Katsina in July 2014.18 including the ambush of Nigerian government reported an agreement with troops in Kogi before they deployed Boko Haram on releasing the Chibok The explosives were placed under the to Mali in January 2013, the rescue of schoolgirls, which did not materialize.15 girls’ hijabs or clothing and detonated several dozen Boko Haram members Internally displaced people (IDPs) who remotely, possibly without them from the Special Anti-robbery Squad fled Borno estimate that Boko Haram knowing.19 There was media speculation prison in Abuja in November 2012, and may have abducted between 500 and that they were from Chibok. However, kidnappings of foreign engineers in 2,000 women since 2013, but most it appears more likely they were northwest Nigeria in 2012.12 Boko Haram incidents go unreported.16 among the dozens of girls recruited by Boko Haram’s “female wing” in 8 Al-majiri (literally meaning “migrants,” derived from Abuja,” November 30, 2012, available at www.youtube. Kano, which was led by Hafsat Bako. the Arabic word muhajir) are young Islamic students in com/watch?v=_1m5-zV3zfU; “French Man Kidnap: Pos- She is the widow of a deceased Boko northern Nigeria, who beg for alms in return for shelter sibly an Inside Job – Katsina CP,” Vanguard, December Haram commander and was based in and Qur’anic lessons from local leaders. There are mil- 21, 2012. Borno’s Sambisa Forest, where some lions of al-majiri students in northern Nigeria, with many 13 Ola Audu, “Soldiers Nab Top Customs Officer for Al- of the Chibok girls were initially held, in Kano and Borno. See “Al Majiri Education: Journey to legedly Ferrying Arms for Boko Haram,” Premium Times, and her arrest in June 2014 coincided Nowhere,” Vanguard, April 19, 2012. May 28, 2013; JC Finley, “10 Nigerian Generals Ar- with the end of the series of female 20 9 “Boko Haram: Army Arrests Orange Seller with rested for Supplying Information, Ammunition to Boko suicide bombings. Her role in the N600m,” 247UReports, May 20, 2013. Haram,” UPI, June 3, 2014; “Nigeria Officials Held for female wing and in Sambisa Forest 10 Jamaàtu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan - (An ‘Boko Haram Links’,” al-Jazeera, September 30, 2012. therefore suggests an operational link saru) was founded in January 2012 by former Nigerian 14 Joe Brock, “Insight: Boko Haram, Taking to Hills, between the kidnapping in Chibok and AQIM militants, who focused on kidnapping foreigners Seize Slave ‘Brides,’” Reuters, November 17, 2013. the deployment of the female suicide and bombing churches in the Middle Belt in Nigeria. It, 15 Drew Hinshaw, “Boko Haram Kidnaps 20 More Girls however, ideologically opposed Boko Haram’s use of tak- in Nigeria,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2014; “Boko ‘Truce’ Breached,” Reuters, October 19, 2014. firi ideology to justify the killing of Muslims. Haram Seizes 40 Women in Fresh Raid,” PM News Ni- 17 Naira is the national currency of Nigeria. See “Kano 11 These leaders included Yusuf’s former third-in-com- geria, October 20, 2014; “Boko Haram Frees Abducted Bombings Traced to Female Beggars,” This Day, August mand, the Cameroonian Mamman Nur, and U.S. spe- Women, Girls,” Vanguard, October 23, 2014. 4, 2014. cially designated Nigerian terrorists Adam Kambar and 16 Author’s interview of journalists who interviewed 18 Robyn Dixon, “Young Women Used in Nigerian Sui- Khalid al-Barnawi. IDPs in Gombe and Adamawa States. Salihu Garba, “Yan cide Bombings,” Los Angeles Times, July 30, 2014. 12 “Islamists Ansaru Claim Attack on Mali-bound Ni- Boko Haram Sun Sace Mutane Fiye da Dubu Uku Banda 19 “Women, Kids as Suicide Bombers,” Vanguard, Au- geria Troops,” Reuters, January 20, 2013; “Declared of na Chibok,” VOA Hausa, August 19, 2014; Tim Cocks, gust 15, 2014. Jamaàtu Ansaril Muslimina Fibiladis Sudan Garki II “Nigerians Doubtful of Girls’ Release after Boko Haram 20 Ibid.

6 october 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 10 bombers, even though the schoolgirls ul-uqab flag behind Shekau and played Forcible Recruitment of Teenage Boys were likely not the bombers. ISIL’s signature nasheed, My Umma, Dawn Since the Chibok kidnapping in April Has Arrived, as background music while 2014, Boko Haram has increasingly Legitimizing the Chibok Kidnapping via Shekau made the declaration, signaling kidnapped teenage boys in northeastern Historical Manipulation and ISIL that Boko Haram sees its caliphate as Nigeria and “re-educated” them at The future of many of the schoolgirls part of al-Baghdadi’s.23 Qur’anic schools that are often in kidnapped in Chibok and other towns in Cameroon.28 Signposts in Arabic northeastern Nigeria is likely as “wives” Boko Haram will legitimize the “slavery” language that Boko Haram erected in of militants (“slaves” in Shekau’s own of the Chibok schoolgirls based on a Cameroonian border towns with ISIL’s words). As “wives,” their value to Boko textual interpretation of the Qur’an and rayat al-uqab insignia on them say, “It is Haram is greater than as bartering the support the kidnapping received a crime and treason not to join jihad.”29 chips in an increasingly improbable from ISIL as well as al-Shabab.24 ISIL This is likely Boko Haram’s justification deal with the Nigerian government cited the “Nigerian mujahidin” in the for the forcible conscription and killing because of Boko Haram’s dispersal of October 2014 edition of its magazine of boys (and girls) who refuse. the girls into multiple groups and their Dabiq as precedent for ISIL’s own kidnapping of several hundred non- The militants use untrained boys to “Even if Boko Haram Muslim Yazidi women in northern Iraq, acquire intelligence and carry out the who ISIL forced to become “sex slaves” first wave of attacks on villages or returned 90% of the of militants.25 Boko Haram therefore barracks. When they gain experience, Chibok schoolgirls, the may not be carrying out kidnappings of women in 2014 for the same purposes it militants would still have kidnapped women in 2012 and 2013.26 “Boko Haram will more than 20 girls from Rather, Boko Haram, like ISIL, may legitimize the ‘slavery’ of be seeking to revive practices that Chibok and hundreds of were virtually non-existent since the the Chibok schoolgirls other girls to leverage in end of the last caliphate era in Nigeria based on a textual (and Iraq and the Levant) in the early future negotiations or keep 20th century. Such practices include interpretation of the enslaved.” kidnapping mostly non-Muslim girls Qur’an and the support the to “contribute their children to the next generation” of the caliphate and kidnapping received from hadd punishments, such as beheading, ISIL as well as al-Shabab.” inability to reconvene all, or even half, stoning, whipping, and hand-cutting of of the girls if a deal were reached.21 “criminals,” which Boko Haram carries Even if Boko Haram returned 90% of out in LGAs under its control.27 the Chibok schoolgirls, the militants they can be part of the second wave would still have more than 20 girls designed to overwhelm the security from Chibok and hundreds of other forces after the first wave weakens their girls to leverage in future negotiations positions and morale.30 Boys may also or keep enslaved. In a potential Releases Video Showing Beheading of Nigerian Air be given a quota of how many security deal, the militants would also likely Force Pilot as Terror Leader Who Was Thought Dead officers or “high value targets” they demand territorial concessions from Reappears,” Daily Mail, October 3, 2014. must attack, and risk death at the hands the Nigerian government that would 23 Jacob Zenn and Allen Grane, “Five Reasons To Pay of their commanders if they fail or show 31 guarantee Boko Haram sovereignty Attention to Boko Haram’s Latest Video,” CFR Africa in “cowardice.” in dozens of LGAs in northeastern Transition, October 7, 2014. Nigeria under its control. Shekau, 24 “Al-Shabaab Expresses Support for Boko Haram Ab- 28 “Boko Haram Kills Three, Abducts 12 in Cameroun,” who praised the Islamic State in Iraq duction,” Somalianewsroom.com, May 13, 2014. This Day, August 20, 2014; Omeiza Ajayi, “Boko Haram and the Levant’s (ISIL) leader Abu 25 Dabiq Magazine, al-Hayat Media Center, October Begins Forced Recruitment,” nationalmirroronline, July Bakr al-Baghdadi in a July 2014 video 2014. 22, 2014. statement, declared these LGAs as 26 Jacob Zenn and Elizabeth Pearson, “Women, Gender 29 The author received a video of a battle between secu- “part” of an Islamic State in a separate and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram,” St. Andrews rity forces and Boko Haram in Fotokol, Cameroon where video statement released in October Journal of Terrorism Research, January 2014. such signposts could be seen. See “Boko Haram: Over 50 22 2014. The video featured ISIL’s rayat 27 For a view on Islam’s abandonment of slavery as a Women Abducted in Gulak Town,” Daily Post, Septem- sign of its adaptability to modern times, the author rec- ber 15, 2014. 21 Ameh Comrade Godwin, “Some Chibok Girls are ommends the Mauritanian Institute for Access to Mo- 30 “Boko Haram ‘Executes’ 2 for Smoking Cigarettes,” Pregnant, Others May Never Return – Obasanjo,” Daily dernity (IMAM); Chris Pleasance, “Hundreds of Yazidi Agence France-Presse, August 21, 2014; “Boko Haram Post, June 13, 2014; “Grave Violations Against Children Women Held in Islamic State Prison Where They are Kidnaps Scores of Villagers in Nigeria: Witnesses,” in Northeastern Nigeria,” Watchlist on Children and Held as Sex Slaves or Sold Off as Jihadi Brides for as Lit- Agence France-Presse, August 15, 2014; “Gunmen Kill Armed Conflict, September 2014. tle as $25,” Daily Mail, August 28, 2014; Paul E. Lovejoy, 16 Villagers, Burn Several Houses, Conscript Youths,” 22 Aminu Abubakar, “Nigerian Town Seized by Boko “Concubinage and the Status of Women Slaves in Early newtelegraphonline.com, April 13, 2014. Haram ‘Part of Islamic Caliphate’,” Agence France- Colonial Northern Nigeria,” The Journal of African History 31 Kingsley Omonobi, “Thousands Flee to Cameroon as Presse, August 24, 2014; Stephanie Lining, “Boko Haram 29 (1988): pp 245-266. Boko Haram Conscripts Youths to Fight Nigeria,” Van-

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Boko Haram also appears to be focusing mainstream Salafist and al-Qa`ida Moulin-Fourniers and ran programs to on Cameroon for its non-forcible funding decreased as a result of Boko prevent recruitment of Cameroonian recruitment of men, possibly because Haram’s massacres, the break-up of youths to Boko Haram (Amadou Ali the destruction of villages in Nigeria Ansaru’s shura in Kaduna in 2012, and was outside of Kolofata so he avoided has alienated youths and caused them the French-led military intervention in being kidnapped).40 The kidnapping to flee to IDP camps outside of Borno or northern Mali in 2013, which disrupted was reportedly motivated in part by join the anti-Boko Haram Civilian Joint the AQIM supply line to Boko Haram.35 Cameroon’s failure to pay the full Task Force (JTF) vigilante group. In However, Boko Haram has made ransom for the Moulin-Fourniers.41 Cameroon, which until 2014 was spared inroads with new financiers, who are from large-scale attacks, locals often from Borno and bordering areas of In October 2014, however, Boko consider Boko Haram “just another Cameroon’s Extreme North Region Haram released the wife of Amadou and are often ethnic Kanuris like Ali and the lamido and his family, along “Boko Haram also Yusuf, Shekau and most Boko Haram with 10 Chinese engineers who were members. These financiers provide kidnapped in April 2014 from Waza, appears to be focusing Boko Haram with weapons and a route after the Cameroonian government paid on Cameroon for its non- to negotiation with the Cameroonian government in kidnapping-for-ransom forcible recruitment of operations.36 “These financiers provide men, possibly because the Boko Haram with weapons One Cameroonian financier, Alhaji destruction of villages Abdalla, is a vehicle exporter based in and a route to negotiation in Nigeria has alienated Amchide whose business operations with the Cameroonian extend to Qatar (the vehicles likely move youths and caused them to from Doha to other ports in Asia).37 He government in kidnapping- flee.” served as a key negotiator for Boko for-ransom operations.” Haram in talks with the Cameroonian government for the release of the French Moulin-Fournier family of religious group” or “the boys.”32 seven, which was kidnapped by Boko approximately $600,000 in ransom According to Cameroonian police, there Haram (likely in coordination with to cover the remaining payment for have been more than 500 new recruits Ansaru) in Waza (a town 16 miles the Moulin-Fourniers.42 In addition, in villages along the border with east of Amchide) in February 2013.38 Cameroon released 30 prisoners, Nigeria, some of whom were “drugged The government paid a $3.14 million including some who were imprisoned or manipulated” in training camps.33 ransom and released Boko Haram in Maroua in July 2014 after being They provide Boko Haram with the prisoners in April 2013 in exchange for caught stockpiling weapons in the ability to use Cameroon as a rear base the family.39 town of Kousseri on Cameroon’s for attacking Nigeria, to raise money border with Chad.43 Others released through kidnapping foreigners, and In July 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped from prison included a leading Boko to traffic weapons into Nigeria from from Kolofata (a town three miles Haram recruiter, the mastermind of Cameroonian border towns. from Amchide) the town’s lamido (local a kidnapping of two Italian priests ruler) and his family and the wife of and a Canadian nun in a town Financiers, Arms Traffickers and Kidnappings Cameroon Deputy Prime Minister north of Maroua in June 2014, and in Cameroon Amadou Ali, who represented the the top Cameroonian Boko Haram When Boko Haram was an above ground Cameroon side in negotiations for the commander, Abakar Ali. Abakar movement before 2009, it had wealthy Ali had been arrested in September members who served as intermediaries 35 “Mali: un Béninois à la tête d’une unité combattante, 2014 in Kousseri and revealed under between financial sponsors, such as une katiba, dans le Nord,” Radio France Internationale, interrogation that he coordinated local government officials or wealthy December 28, 2012; “Barnawi, Kambar: Qaeda-linked arms trafficking with the mayor of Salafists abroad, and Muhammad Militants with Boko Haram Ties,” Agence France- Fotokol (a town on Cameroon’s border 34 Yusuf. Now officials have distanced Presse, June 21, 2012. with Nigeria at Gambarou-Ngala), themselves from Boko Haram, while 36 “Cameroun: 10 millions d’euros de rançon pour who was subsequently arrested with 44 libérer le père Vandenbeusch,” Le Journal International, stockpiles of weapons at his residence. guard, September 1, 2014. February 7, 2014. 32 “Fears in Cameroon of Boko Haram Recruitment,” 37 “Cameroun: La Boko Haram connection,” camer.be, 40 “Biya’s Answer to Boko Haram,” Africa Confidential, IRIN, April 16, 2014. June 2, 2014. August 29, 2014. 33 “Boko Haram Gathers New Recruits in Cameroon,” 38 Ibid. For details on Ansaru’s likely role in the Moulin- 41 “Cameroon/Boko Haram. Was Unpaid Ransom for news24.com, August 8, 2014. Fournier kidnapping, see section on “Evidence of An- French Family Responsible for Kidnap of VPM’s Wife?” 34 Nasiru L. Abubakar, “Video Shows Ex-Commis- saru’s Presence in Borno” in Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Iroko Magazine, July 28, 2014. sioner’s Execution,” Daily Trust, August 4, 2009; “Boko Evolving Tactics and Alliances in Nigeria,” CTC Sentinel 42 Ibid. Haram Gets N40million Donation From Algeria,” Saha- 6:6 (2013): p. 13. 43 Mbenju Mfany, “Over 40 Boko Haram Members De- ra Reporters, May 13, 2012; Eli Lake, “Boko Haram’s Bin 39 “Boko Haram Unleashes Terror in Cameroon,” Sun tained in Maroua,” thecameroonian.com, June 25, 2014. Laden Connection,” Daily Beast, May 11, 2014. News Online, July 28, 2014. 44 “Cameroon Army Arrests Ramat Musa, Nigerian

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Cameroon also reportedly returned to commander and possessed $15,000 Cameroon. This type of recruitment Boko Haram some of the weapons and from deals that he made in Chad.48 Days demonstrates Boko Haram’s need for ammunition it confiscated from Boko before his arrest, Cameroon uncovered more human resources to control Haram in Kousseri.45 weapons stockpiles in Maroua’s central territory in its self-described market.49 In addition, in June 2014, caliphate in northeastern Nigeria, The pattern of Boko Haram kidnappings Cameroon discovered travel documents and increasingly also in Cameroon.54 of foreigners in exchange for ransoms from Libya (Africa’s largest arms market The introduction of new commanders and the release of weapons traffickers since 2011) and Qatar and receipts from other than Abubakar Shekau, who was occurred in several other instances. car exports to Qatar in a Boko Haram previously the only public face of Boko When Boko Haram kidnapped a French camp, which suggests a possible link to Haram, in videos of an attack in Gwoza priest in “coordination” with Ansaru Alhaji Abdalla, who was Boko Haram’s in Borno State and the decapitation of in November 2013 from a town 16 miles negotiator in the Moulin-Fournier and a Nigerian air force pilot in August other kidnappings.50 and October 2014 show Boko Haram’s “The tie between arms intent to reveal new commanders and Across the border in Nigeria, one of the traffickers and Boko financiers of the Chibok kidnapping “Boko Haram’s Haram commanders was and a plotter of the assassination of the amir of Gwoza was a Kanuri recruitment now includes also highlighted in key named Babaji Yaari, who runs a hundreds, if not thousands, arrests in Cameroon.” lucrative cart taxi business.51 He coordinated the Chibok kidnapping of forcibly conscripted with the leader of Boko Haram’s boys and girls, who are female wing, Hafsat Bako, who was south of Amchide, the militants released discussed above. Bako was arrested often taken to and ‘re- him weeks later for a multi-million based on the Nigerian security force’s educated’ in Cameroon.” dollar ransom and a Kanuri weapons interrogation of Yaari.52 The transfer trafficker.46 Boko Haram also released of many of the schoolgirls to Cameroon the two Italian priests and Canadian and Chad after the kidnapping suggests nun after several weeks in captivity in that Bako’s and Yaari’s network and amirs as the militants gain control of June 2014 in another prisoner exchange the network of kidnappers, financiers, more LGAs.55 Moreover, the arrest of and ransom deal.47 and arms traffickers in Cameroon likely Tuaregs from Mali fighting for Boko overlap.53 Haram in Cameroon in September 2014 The tie between arms traffickers and suggests that its kidnapping and arms Boko Haram commanders was also Conclusion trafficking operations may be attracting highlighted in key arrests in Cameroon. This article reveals several new militants who can strengthen the cross- One Chadian weapons trafficker was trends in the Boko Haram insurgency. border insurgency in Nigeria and arrested in Waza in June 2014 working First, Boko Haram’s recruitment now Cameroon.56 on behalf of a Maroua-based Boko Haram includes hundreds, if not thousands, of forcibly conscripted boys and girls, who Second, Boko Haram is increasingly

Mayor of Fotokol, 300 Insurgents,” The Street Journal, are often taken to and “re-educated” in launching operations in Cameroon’s October 4, 2014; “Cameroonian Military Capture Boko Extreme North Region and attempting Haram’s Top Commander, Abakar Ali,” Sahara Report- 48 “Cameroun: Un coursier du Boko Haram aux arrêts à to seize control of Cameroonian ers, September 26, 2014. Waza,” camer.be, June 19, 2014; Moki Edwin Kindzeka, border towns, such as Fotokol, 45 “Amchide: 31 Membres de Boko Haram Livrés au “Cameroon’s Military Seizes War Weapons,” VOA, June Amchide and Kolofata, to secure Nigeria,” Cameroon-Info, December 27, 2012; “40 Sus- 18, 2014. supply lines for receiving weapons pected Boko Haram Militants Arrested in Cameroon,” 49 “Cameroon Arrests 40 Boko Haram Suspects,” Punch, from Chad and Libya for use in 57 Leadership, June 24 2014; “Cameroun: 20 ans de prison June 25, 2014; “40 Suspected Boko Haram Militants Ar- Nigeria. Boko Haram may also seek pour des members,” camer.be, July 31, 2014; “Cameroun: rested in Cameroon,” VOA, June 24, 2014. to gain control of interior towns in Les membres de Boko Haram libérés par le gouverne- 50 “Cameroun: La Boko Haram connection,” camer.be, ment,” camer.be, October 16, 2014. June 2, 2014. 54 “Nigeria’s Female Suicide Bombers: A Show of 46 “Boko Haram: Freed French Priest Arrives in Paris,” 51 Cart taxis (popularly called Achaba or Going) in north- Strength,” War on the Rocks blog, October 16, 2014. PM News, January 1, 2014; “Senior Officials in Cameroon ern Nigeria are imported mostly from China and became 55 “Boko Haram Releases Video Showing Beheading Suspected of Complicity With Nigerian Islamic Sect,” a lucrative business after the government imposed a ban of Nigerian Air Force Pilot as Terror Leader Who Was Cameroon-Info.net, April 11, 2014; “Abducted Chi- on motorcycles as a means of transportation, which the Thought Dead Reappears,” Daily Mail, October 3, 2014; nese Likely in Nigeria – Cameroon,” Vanguard, May 17, government believed are more likely to be used in terror- “Boko Haram Declares Gwoza Islamic Caliphate,” Punch, 2014; Guibai Guitama, “Cameroun – Libération du père ist attacks, such as drive-by shootings. See Jacob Zenn, August 25, 2014. Georges Vandenbeusch: Le négociateur désigné de Boko “Boko Haram’s ‘Borno Kidnapping Duo’: Hafsat Bako 56 “Boko Haram Clashes Disrupt Learning in Camer- Haram réclame son argent,” L’Oeil du Sahel, January 6, and Babuji Yaari,” Militant Leadership Monitor V:VII oon,” Deutsche Welle, September 10, 2014. 2014. (2014). 57 Boko Haram has attacked Cameroonian border towns 47 Kathryn Blaze Carlson, “Release of Canadian Nun, 52 Ibid. such as Fotokol, Ashigashia and Kolofata, and Amchide, Italian Priests Spurs Questions,” The Globe and Mail, 53 “Nigeria: Reports Say Boko Haram Ferried Abducted which connect to Borno’s border towns of Gambarou, June 1, 2014 Girls to Chad, Cameroon,” Daily Trust, April 29, 2014. Gwoza, and Banki, respectively.

9 october 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 10 the Extreme North Region, such as poverty…and creating ethnic problems Maroua, Waza, and Kousseri, not only and political divisions in Chad.”61 Boko Haram’s Regional for their importance in the supply line, Cross-Border Activities but also for their historic value as parts Finally, one of the key questions for of the former Kanem-Borno Caliphate, the Nigerian government is whether By Scott Menner or “Greater Kanoura.”58 The Kanem- a deal for the release of the Chibok Borno Caliphate’s former boundaries schoolgirls, or any type of ceasefire on july 27, 2014, over 200 Boko Haram correspond almost precisely to Boko with Boko Haram, is possible and militants stormed Kolofata, a town in Haram’s current area of operations, whether it would require Nigeria Cameroon’s Extreme North Region. They and Boko Haram may seek to recreate to cede territory to Boko Haram. targeted Vice Prime Minister Amadou According to Muhammed Yusuf’s Ali’s house, kidnapping his wife and “One of the key questions sermons, establishing an Islamic State sister-in-law, as well as Seini Lamine, was a prerequisite for Boko Haram to a senior religious leader and the town’s for the Nigerian have the “independence” to negotiate mayor.1 The night before, Boko Haram on equal footing with the “infidel” killed four Cameroonian soldiers and government is whether a Nigerian government.62 It therefore kidnapped at least 13 others.2 Earlier in deal for the release of the appears that Boko Haram still follows the month, Boko Haram kidnapped two Yusuf’s doctrine, but now also with a sons of Bieshair Mohaman, Cameroon’s Chibok schoolgirls, or any model and legitimacy from ISIL on how traditional leader in Limani on July 15, type of ceasefire with Boko to create this Islamic State through 2014.3 In northern Nigeria, authorities guerrilla warfare and territorial traced4 some of the explosives used in Haram, is possible and control. recent suicide attacks to a quarry in whether it would require northern Cameroon that was raided Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African and by Boko Haram in May 2014.5 Boko Nigeria to cede territory to Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown Haram has targeted Niger as well. In Boko Haram.” Foundation in Washington DC and an December 2013, Nigerien authorities expert on countering violent extremism foiled a Boko Haram plot to kidnap the for think-tanks and international central government representative, the organizations in West Africa and local governor, and the military zone that caliphate through its own newly- Central Asia. Mr. Zenn is the author of commander in Diffa.6 There is also declared caliphate, but with takfiri “Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram: The increasing evidence that Boko Haram ideology replacing the Sufi traditions Prize in al-Qaeda’s Africa Strategy,” may be active in the Central African of the descendants of the Kanem-Borno which was published by The Jamestown Republic (CAR) and Chad. amirs, who Boko Haram has killed or Foundation in 2012, and in November expelled from northeastern Nigeria.59 2013 he provided testimony to the U.S. Boko Haram’s seizure of Abadam on Congress on “The Continuing Threat of 1 “Boko Haram Kidnaps Cameroon’s Vice PM’s Wife, Borno’s border with Niger’s Diffa Boko Haram and Ansaru.” He writes in Kills 3,” Nigerian Tribune, July 28, 2014; “Cameroun: Province in October 2014, which is his capacity as an independent expert 14 Membres de Boko Haram Reçoivent 10 à 20 Ans de also part of the historic Kanem-Borno and his views do not engage any of the Prison,” Cameroon Web News, July 26, 2014; See also empire, could signal future Boko Haram policies or positions of current institutional Javier Blas, “Kidnap Attack Shows an Expanding Boko operations in Niger, where Boko Haram clients. Haram Now Targeting Cameroon,” Financial Times, Au- has supply lines that are currently more gust 1, 2014. often used for receiving food and fuel 2 One soldier who survived the attacks indicated that 60 than weapons. The “reunification” Boko Haram may have kidnapped up to 13 of his com- of the former Kanem-Borno Caliphate rades in the attack. See “Boko Haram Clashes with areas would seemingly erase the Cameroon Soldiers in Cross-Border Attacks,” Reuters, legacy of colonialism that Boko Haram July 26, 2014. See also “Two Cameroon Soldiers ‘Killed founder Muhammed Yusuf criticized in Crossborder Boko Haram Attack,’” Cameroon Web in his sermons for “amalgamating News, July 25, 2014. [Borno] to the infidels…leaving Niger in 3 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Suspected Boko Haram Mili- tants Kidnap Cleric’s Children,” Voice of America, July 58 “Greater Kanoura” is a nationalist term used in the 15, 2014. 1950s that refers to majority Kanuri areas of Nigeria, 4 “Boko Haram: Explosives Used by Female Suicide Cameroon, Chad and Niger in the 1950s. See Minahan, Bombers Traced to Chinese Factory,” DailyPost, August J. Nations Without States (Westport, Connecticut: Green- 2, 2014. wood Press, 1996). 5 This attack resulted in the kidnapping of 10 Chinese 59 Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo, and Nicholas Heras, “The 61 Shaykh Muhammad Yusuf, Tarihin Musulmai, His- nationals. See “Suspected Boko Haram Rebels Attack Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria: Merg- tory of Muslims, video from pre-July 2009, accessed May Chinese Plant in Cameroon,” Reuters, May 17, 2014. ing Local Salafism and International Jihadism,”The RUSI 2014. 6 David Lewis, “Niger Fears Contagion from Nigeria’s Journal, July 2013. 62 Abu Shekau’s (and Muhammed Yusuf’s) tafsir to Boko Haram Islamists,” Reuters, March 19, 2014; Thom- 60 “Boko Haram Seizes 40 Women in Fresh Raid,” PM Boko Haram members, video from pre- July 2009, ac- as Fessy, “Niger Hit by Nigeria’s Boko Haram Fallout,” News Nigeria, October 20, 2014. cessed May 2014. BBC News, April 22, 2014.

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This article analyzes Boko Haram’s a market.10 Niger’s army chief General in the country.18 Some rumors, including cross-border activities in Niger, Chad, Seyni Garba said his country avoided a a story in the Premium Times on September and Cameroon, and its presence in “bloodbath.”11 12, 2014, based on Chadian Army the CAR. Although it is difficult to sources and communications obtained ascertain precisely why Boko Haram Boko Haram is also known to recruit between Nigerian field officers and the is undertaking these cross-border Nigerien herdsmen and farmers whose activities, there are at least four livelihoods have been undercut by explanations for how it has carried out severe drought.12 According to an “Chadian President Idriss this activity: the region’s borders are interview with the BBC, some alleged Déby has raised the alarm long and fluid, militaries in the region Boko Haram recruits in Diffa claim that are ineffective, multilateral cooperation they accepted payments of over $3,000 about instability in the is failing, and Boko Haram exploits each to join Boko Haram.13 In February Lake Chad basin and about historic ethno-linguistic cross-border 2014, Nigerien authorities reportedly ties. uncovered a Boko Haram training ‘the permanent threat’ camp.14 from Boko Haram and Niger In the aftermath of the 2012 Malian More recently, Boko Haram members AQIM.” uprising and Nigeria’s implementation in Diffa ambushed an army patrol and of the 2013 State of Emergency to crack escaped to the Nigerian side of the down on Boko Haram, refugees flooded border.15 Three Boko Haram members into neighboring countries, including were captured and the next day nine Nigerian military, allege that Modu Niger, which immediately feared Boko more were arrested in connection to the Sheriff, former Borno State governor, is Haram infiltrations. In southern Niger, attack.16 Similar attacks, comparable to a sponsor of Boko Haram. The rumors Boko Haram members have plotted to the Diffa kidnapping plot mentioned say that he has harbored and trained bomb public places. In 2012, Nigerien above,17 may increase as Boko Haram Boko Haram militants in Abéché, authorities arrested 15 suspected attempts to deter increased Nigerien Chad.19 In addition, arms trafficking Boko Haram members in Diffa, where counterterrorism efforts. If Niger takes routes suggest that weapons intended an increased role in the international for Boko Haram pass through Chad’s coalition to defeat Boko Haram, the territory from Libya, Sudan, and the “In southern Niger, Boko militants may transform Niger into a CAR.20 Haram members have more active theatre of operations. Chadian President Idriss Déby has plotted to bomb public Chad raised the alarm about instability in places. In 2012, Nigerien Although there is little information on the Lake Chad basin and about “the the details of Boko Haram’s activities permanent threat” from Boko Haram authorities arrested 15 in Chad, military sources in N’Djamena and AQIM.21 As a result, Chad is suspected Boko Haram interviewed by the International Crisis sending more troops to the Nigerian Group reveal that Boko Haram elements border22 and receiving support members in Diffa, where are present in N’Djamena and elsewhere from France, which in August 2014 they were planning to launched Operation Barkhane,23 a 24 attack the local military 10 Lewis, “Niger Fears Contagion from Nigeria’s Boko regional initiative headquartered in Haram Islamists.” N’Djamena. Even so, Chad’s expanded garrison.” 11 “Niger Arrests 20 Boko Haram Militants in Suspected Plot,” Reuters, February 17, 2014. 18 Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insur- 12 Nafeez Ahmed, “Behind the Rise of Boko Haram - gency (International Crisis Group, April 2014), p. 25. Ecological Disaster, Oil Crisis, Spy Games,” The Guard- 19 “EXCLUSIVE: Secret Intelligence Report Links Ex- they were planning to attack the local ian, May 9, 2014. Governor Sheriff, Chad President to Boko Haram Spon- 7 military garrison. On October 14, 2012, 13 Chris Agbambu and Seyi Gesinde, “How Boko Haram sorship,” Premium Times, September 12, 2014. news reports speculated that Boko Recruits Niger Republic Youths with $3,000,” Nige- 20 “Arms Smuggling to Boko Haram Threatens Camer- 8 Haram or al-Qa`ida in the Islamic rian Tribune, April 23, 2014; See also “Boko Haram Pays oon,” IRINnews, February 21, 2014; Sagir Musa, “How Maghreb (AQIM) militants kidnapped N500,000 to Niger Recruits — Gang Members,” Van- Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram Smuggle Arms into Nigeria,” 9 five Nigeriens and a Chadian in Dakoro. guard, April 24, 2014. Vanguard, May 11, 2013. In 2014, the Nigerien government 14 The specific location of the camp was not identi- 21 Ely Karmon, “Boko Haram’s International Reach,” arrested 20 Boko Haram members in fied. See Fidelis Soriwei and Kamorudeen Ogundele, Perspectives on Terrorism 8:1 (2014), p. 78. Diffa and Zinder for plotting to attack “B’Haram’s Anti-Aircraft Training Camp Uncovered in 22 “Africa’s Jihadists, on Their Way,” The Economist, July Niger,” Punch, February 19, 2014. 26, 2014. 7 Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? (International 15 “Niger Arrests Fourteen Suspected Boko Haram Gun- 23 “François Hollande’s African Adventures,” The Econ- Crisis Group, September 19, 2013), p. 41. men after Patrol Ambushed,” Reuters, May 7, 2014. omist, July 19, 2014; Marcelle Balt, “Operation Barkhane 8 “Le Niger et Le Nigeria Renforcent Leur Coopération et 16 Ibid. Increases French Influence in the Sahel,” RFI, July 22, Signent Un Accord de Défense,” RFI, October 19, 2012. 17 Lewis, “Niger Fears Contagion from Nigeria’s Boko 2014. 9 “Gunmen Kidnap Five Aid Workers, Driver in Niger,” Haram Islamists”; Fessy, “Niger Hit by Nigeria’s Boko 24 Conway Waddington, “Understanding Operation Vanguard, October 15, 2012. Haram Fallout.” Barkhane,” African Defence Review, August 1, 2014.

11 october 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 10 role in French-led counterterrorism in Nigeria near Lake Chad. Reports on in Cameroonian territory emerged in operations is likely a double-edged this incident vary, including those that early 2012,36 Cameroonian President sword. According to a United Kingdom suggest Boko Haram militants loaded Paul Biya only reorganized border travel warning, Chadian participation the victims into speed boats and ferried security in March 2014, deploying an in counterterrorism operations with them to an island under Chadian con- additional 700 troops to patrol the France increases the “risk that trol29 where Chadian security officials border.37 terrorist groups may cross into Chad intercepted a convoy of buses, rescu- to carry out attacks.”25 The U.S. ing 85 hostages and arresting six men In March 2014, three Boko Haram arms State Department addressed border accompanying them.30 These incidents dealers were arrested in the Extreme suggest that a shrinking Lake Chad and North Region for trafficking arms “The cracks in Chad’s its archipelagic geography increases the through Chad into Cameroon on their porousness of the border region and cre- way to Nigeria.38 In a second incident, border security widened on ates a transit corridor for Boko Haram August 6, 2014, when Boko and potentially other violent non-state “While Cameroon was at Haram militants crossed actors to move between Nigeria and its neighbors. first a victim of spillover into Chad and gunned violence from Nigeria and down six Nigerians in Further evidence shows that Boko Haram may intend to carry out more a transit state for arms Dubuwa village.” attacks in Chad. After the May 2014 Paris Summit for Security in Nigeria in trafficking, it has now which President Déby agreed to launch become a rear base from a “total war”31 against Boko Haram, concerns for Chad on June 30, 2014, an audiotape surfaced on Alwihda which to attack Nigeria and saying, “[d]espite recent stability, Info that threatened Chad for its an arena for Boko Haram’s Chad’s historically volatile security participation in the military coalition.32 environment could deteriorate The tape threatened President Déby and kidnapping-for-ransom unexpectedly, particularly in border an attack in N’Djamena. The speaker’s activities.” areas.”26 voice was identified as a Chadian.33 In response, Chad deployed security forces The cracks in Chad’s border security in N’Djamena and the French Embassy widened on August 6, 2014, when Boko installed protective measures.34 in June 2014, 40 Boko Haram members Haram militants crossed into Chad and were arrested in Maroua and accused gunned down six Nigerians in Dubuwa Cameroon of using a market to conceal a large village. The Nigerians fled an attack two Cameroon has the longest and perhaps stockpile of weapons to be used in weeks prior on Kirenowa,27 a Nigerian the most vulnerable border with cross-border incursions into Nigeria.39 town close to the Cameroonian border.28 Nigeria, and Boko Haram has been able Also in June 2014, Cameroonian In a more brazen attempt to enter Chad- to operate relatively easily in Cameroon, authorities discovered a large Boko ian territory, on August 16, 2014, Boko carrying out logistics operations, Haram weapons cache and arrested a Haram kidnapped at least 97 young assassinations,35 kidnappings, and Chadian arms dealer.40 men and boys, as well as several wom- recruitment. Even though the first signs en from the Doron Baga fishing village of Boko Haram’s cross-border activities

25 “Chad Travel Advice - GOV.UK,” available at https:// 29 “Boko Haram Dumps Kidnapped Doron Baga Villag- www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/chad/terrorism. ers Around Lake Chad,” Sahara Reporters, August 15, 36 Cameroon first began to fear Boko Haram incursions 26 “Chad Travel Warning,” U.S. Department of State 2014. after the April 10, 2012, attacks on the Nigerian border Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Passports & Interna- 30 Ibid.; See also Aminu Abubakar, “Chadian Troops town of Banki. See: Grégoire Djarmaila, “Boko Haram tional Travel, (June 30, 2014), available at http://travel. Rescue 85 Nigerian Hostages from Boko Haram,” CNN, Frappe À La Frontière Du Nigeria Avec Le Cameroun,” state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings/ August 17, 2014. Cameroon-Info.net, April 11, 2012; “Timeline of Boko chad-travel-warning.html. 31 “African Leaders Pledge ‘Total War’ on Boko Haram,” Haram and Related Violence in Nigeria,” IRINnews, 27 Kirenowa was the one of the first places that Nigerian Al Jazeera America, May 17, 2014. February 22, 2013; “CrisisWatch Database - Interna- forces removed a Boko Haram camp in 2013 following 32 Abu Adil, “Boko Haram Menace Le Tchad,” Alwihda tional Crisis Group - Cameroon,” International Crisis the State of Emergency declared by President Goodluck Info, May 23, 2014. Group, 2014. Jonathan. A fisherman from Kirenowa said that all in- 33 “L’enregistrement de Boko Haram Qui Menace Le 37 “CrisisWatch Database - International Crisis Group dications point to a return of Boko Haram in full force Tchad,” Alwihda Info, June 5, 2014. - Cameroon.” to Marte and “other local government areas along the 34 Ibid. 38 “Cameroon Arrests Three for Trafficking Arms to shores of the Lake Chad.” Boko Haram reportedly hoist- 35 Boko Haram has assassinated 20 informants in Cam- Boko Haram,” Vanguard, March 27, 2014. ed its flags and indoctrinated children in these villages in eroon since the beginning of the year. See Stephanie 39 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “40 Suspected Boko Haram 2013 and may be poised to do it again. See Hamza Idris, Gosk, “Nigerian Neighbor Cameroon Faces ‘Phantom Militants Arrested in Cameroon,” Voice of America, June “Boko Haram Trails Nigerians to Chad, Kills 6,” Daily Enemy’ Boko Haram,” NBC News, May 20, 2014. See 24, 2014. Trust, August 6, 2014. also, Yuh Timchia, “Boko Haram ‘Informant’ Killed in 40 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Cameroon’s Military Seizes 28 Ibid. Cameroon,” Africa Review, January 21, 2013. War Weapons,” Voice of America, June 18, 2014.

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In addition, while Cameroon was at 2014, Boko Haram has killed more than The Central African Republic first a victim of spillover violence from 30 civilians and abducted nearly 70 In January 2013, the UN assistant Nigeria and a transit state for arms others from the border towns,51 and at secretary general for peacekeeping trafficking, it has now become a rear least 25 Cameroonian soldiers died at operations asserted that the CAR base from which to attack Nigeria and the hands of Boko Haram during August resembles northern Mali in 2012 – a an arena for Boko Haram’s kidnapping- 2014 alone.52 complete absence of central government for-ransom activities. Boko Haram, in which al-Qa`ida-affiliated militants which once preferred to profit from Boko Haram’s presence in Cameroon can operate. He speculated about Boko kidnapping foreigners like a French has renewed fears of widespread Haram’s involvement in the CAR saying, family in February 2013,41 a French recruitment activities. Because “[W]e have some indications that priest in November 2013,42 two Italian Cameroon is facing a refugee crisis on there is some kind of presence here.”56 priests and a Canadian nun in April two fronts, one from Boko Haram’s Furthermore, an alleged Boko Haram 2014,43 and ten Chinese nationals in violence in Nigeria and another from statement that appeared on the website May 2014,44 has diversified to targeting the sectarian violence in the CAR, Chechen UmmaNews on February 14, locals like the Cameroon vice prime Boko Haram may see the refugees as 2014, “vowed to avenge the spilled blood minister’s wife, the sons of traditional vulnerable targets and has allegedly of Muslims massacred by the Christian leaders, and soldiers.45 begun to kidnap youth to force them to anti-balaka militia in the [CAR].”57 join its ranks.53 However, some recruits In recent months, Boko Haram has have joined Boko Haram willingly and Since then, Alwihda Info reported that intensified46 its cross-border assaults received their parents’ permission.54 In French and Chadian intelligence believe in order to ensure safe passage to fact, Boko Haram may have intended that Boko Haram has connected with Cameroonian border towns by to capture or kill Amadou Ali instead Séléka rebels and that it is supporting establishing a buffer zone between of kidnapping his wife because he led them with weapons in exchange for its territory in Nigeria and the an effort to rescue 500 youth that had diamonds.58 Furthermore, the Central Cameroonian military. This marks a recently disappeared and were thought African group Revolution and Justice major shift in Boko Haram’s behavior to have been kidnapped by Boko (RJ), whose self-proclaimed purpose as Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s Haram.55 is to protect northern CAR’s territory leader, had not ordered attacks in from Séléka and elements of the Cameroon since 2010, aside from Fighters in One Week,” Punch, June 8, 2014. Chadian rebel group Baba Laddé’s 59 assassinating individuals who had 51 Civilian deaths and kidnappings were calculated Popular Front for Recovery (FPR), 47 quit his group. After Boko Haram using information from International Crisis Group’s claims that it captured several Séléka increasingly clashed with Cameroonian CrisisWatch Database for the months of July and Au- militants as well as “two jihadists from troops throughout early 2014, and after gust along with corroborating news stories. See “Cri- Boko Haram” when Séléka militants the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls, sisWatch Database - International Crisis Group - Cam- attempted to cross the border between President Biya sent approximately eroon,” available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/ the towns of Boguila, CAR and Goré, 48 60 1,000 special forces troops to the publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database. Chad. Jeune Afrique claims that French 49 border in May. Cameroon’s increased aspx?CountryIDs=%7B5C2283AD-398B-4CEB-8ED9- intelligence confirmed that Noureddine security posture gave Cameroonian B322B29F7E9A%7D. See also Ezekiel Attah, “Camer- Adam, the Séléka former second-in- 61 troops an advantage for only a short oon Fortifies Border as Boko Haram Kill Four in Fresh command, traveled to Nigeria, which 50 time. From late July to early August Clash,” TODAY, July 27, 2014; “‘Islamist Militants’ Kill 10 in Northern Cameroon,” BBC, August 6, 2014; Em- 56 Hannah McNeish, “Lawless CAR Attracting Terror- 41 Comfort Oseghale, “Boko Haram Releases Video of manuel Uzodinma, “Boko Haram Abducts 15 Persons ists’ Attention,” Voice of America, November 22, 2013. Kidnapped French Family,” Punch, February 26, 2014. in Cameroon Village, Kills Three,” DailyPost, August 19, 57 “Nigeria Islamist Boko Haram Vows to Avenge 42 “French Priest Kidnapped in Cameroon,” France 24, 2014; “Cameroon Kills 27 Boko Haram Members in Bor- Spilled Blood of CAR Muslims,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 15, 2014. der Clashes,” Nigerian Tribune, August 28, 2014. February 15, 2014. 43 “Canadian Nun and Italian Priests Kidnapped in 52 “Le Cameroun Rend Hommage À 25 Militaires Tués 58 Johnny Yannick, “Chadian Comment Raps France for Northern Cameroon,” Standard-Tribune, April 5, 2014. Par Boko Haram,” Africatime.com, August 29, 2014. Omitting CAR from Boko Haram Summit,” BBC Moni- 44 James Bwala and Johnson Babajide, “Boko Haram 53 “Boko Haram Said Recruiting Fighters in Cameroon,” toring Africa, May 21, 2014; Johnny Yannick, “Sommet Kills 29 in Borno, Abducts 10 Chinese in Cameroon,” Ni- BBC Monitoring Africa, April 17, 2014; Damien Gayle, Spécial Boko Haram : Ce Que La France N’a Pas Fait Est gerian Tribune, May 18, 2014. “Boko Haram Snatch Young Boys from across Border Grave,” Alwihda Info, May 18, 2014. 45 “‘Islamist Militants’ Kill 10 in Northern Cameroon,” in Cameroon,” Mail Online, June 19, 2014; Chris Stein, 59 Jamil Ahmat, “Centrafrique: ‘Révolution et Justice’ BBC, August 6, 2014. “As Muslims Flee Central African Republic Fury, Fears Dément Être Un Groupe Rebelle,” Alwihda Info, January 46 “Boko Haram Steps up Cameroon Raids,” IRINnews, of Radicalization; Thousands Are Threatened as Chris- 13, 2014; “Un Nouveau Mouvement Politico-Militaire En July 24, 2014. tian-Dominated Militias Take Retribution for Atrocities Centrafrique,” Radio Ndeke Luka, March 21, 2014. 47 Jacob Zenn, “Northern Cameroon Under Threat from Blamed on a Muslim-Dominated Former Government. 60 Issa Abakar, “RCA: Violents Combats À La Frontière Boko Haram and Séléka Militants,” Terrorism Monitor Many Worry the Mass Displacement Will Further De- Tchadienne, ‘2 Hommes de Boko Haram’ Capturés,” Al- 12:1 (2014), p. 8. stabilize CAR,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 29, wihda Info, January 20, 2014; Issa Abakar, “RCA/Tchad 48 Bate Felix, “Cameroon Sends Troops to Nigeria Bor- 2014. Une Section Motorisé de La Séléka Attaque Une Ligne de der to Tackle Boko Haram,” Reuters, May 27, 2014. 54 “Boko Haram Starts Fresh Recruitment,” Nigerian Défense Des FS-RJ, ‘de Sérieuses Pertes,’” Alwihda Info, 49 “CrisisWatch Database - International Crisis Group Tribune, April 19, 2014. January 20, 2014. - Cameroon.” 55 “Biya’s Answer to Boko Haram,” Africa Confidential 61 “Nigeria-Centrafrique, La Dangereuse Connexion,” 50 Niyi Odebode, “Cameroon Kills 102 Boko Haram 55:17 (2014). Jeune Afrique, March 12, 2014; “Séléka: La Présence de

13 october 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 10 stoked fears in Paris over the potential Second, regional militaries are the multinational force due to be in birth of an alliance between Adam and deficient. Chad’s military has been place by November 20, 2014, but this Boko Haram.62 These connections may relatively effective at preventing could be another of a series of recent have encouraged Séléka to carry out incursions by Boko Haram, but Niger, agreements since May 2014 that have attacks63 and kidnappings64 of their own Cameroon, and Nigeria are suffering yet to come to fruition.74 in Cameroon. from poor communications and a lack of patrol vehicles, equipment, Fourth, Boko Haram has strong ethno- A high-level French diplomat described training, and motivation to counter linguistic cross-border ties. The historic the CAR as an “explosive cocktail” Boko Haram activities.68 Nigerian ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties of the where Boko Haram, Séléka, Arabs troops in particular have mutinied region, particularly the Sunni Muslim from Darfur, Janjaweed, mercenaries and refused to fight due to the lack cohesion of Kanuri, Hausa, and Shuwa from Chad, and the Lord’s Resistance of firepower, deficient pay, and low Arab groups that transcend national Army (LRA) are likely crossing morale.69 Similarly, Cameroon’s Rapid boundaries facilitates cross-border paths.65 Some observers on the ground Intervention Battalion (BIR), created movement and makes policing the have witnessed regions overtaken by to fight violent highway robbery, only area extremely difficult.75 Boko Haram Islamist militants where churches are began receiving training from United takes advantage of this, penetrating the attacked and alcohol consumption and States Africa Command in 2012 and borders along with the regular flow of pork are banned.66 has been deemed “not very competent” refugees and people participating in by the director of Yaoundé’s War cross-border trade. Authorities have Conclusion College.70 trouble distinguishing Boko Haram Boko Haram’s intensified cross-border members from other citizens, which activities in the last two years have been Third, multilateral cooperation is consequentially can backfire if harsh enabled in part by four components. failing. Despite the May 2014 Paris measures are used against individuals Summit for Security in Nigeria where mistakenly associated with Boko First, the region’s borders are long Nigeria and its neighbors agreed to Haram. and shifting, allowing Boko Haram cooperate on security issues,71 all to escape capture, evade the Nigerian of the parties have a long history of Without collectively addressing these Army’s offensives, and develop havens failing to establish clear measures for four components that have allowed where they can plan attacks and recruit multilateral cooperation to address Boko Haram’s cross-border activity new members. The 2,000-mile border cross-border vulnerabilities.72 Some to expand, the group will continue to Nigeria shares with Niger, Chad, and also hold historical grudges from inflict human casualties and significant Cameroon has almost 1,500 illegal border conflicts. The two major issues economic damage, not just in Nigeria, or unmonitored crossing routes.67 preventing effective cooperation are but throughout the broader region. Moreover, the shrinking of Lake Chad the right of pursuit across international has made what had historically been boundaries and intelligence sharing. Scott Menner is a Research Associate for a difficult border to traverse more While Nigeria was granted the right the National Consortium for the Study of permeable and enables the movement of pursuit in Niger, joint border Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism of Boko Haram and potentially other patrols have yet to start.73 Nigeria’s (START) and is currently a Masters violent non-state actors in ways that other neighbors fear Nigerian troops Candidate in the Security Studies Program were heretofore impossible. operating on their territory because (SSP) at Georgetown University’s Edmund they have a reputation for human A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. The rights violations. Nigeria and its views and conclusions presented are those

Nourredine Adam Au Nigéria Inquiète Paris,” Journal de neighbors are currently hashing out of the author and should not be interpreted Bangui, March 13, 2014. legal agreements for pursuit and for as necessarily representing the official 62 Ibid. policies, either expressed or implied, of the 63 See “Affrontements Sanglants entre Rebelles Séléka 68 Tim Cocks, “Cameroon Weakest Link in Fight against U.S. Department of Homeland Security or et les Elements du BIR,” Camer.be, February 18, 2014; Boko Haram: Nigeria,” Reuters, May 30, 2014; “Multilat- START. “Cameroon Cracks Down on CAR Rebels,” Voice of eral Action against Boko Haram,” National Mirror, Au- America, December 30, 2013; “Criminalité Transfrontal- gust 25, 2014. ière: La Séléka Abat Deux Militaires et Un Chef de Vil- 69 “Nigerian Troops Charged with Mutiny,” BBC, Oc- lage Camerounais,” Journal Du Cameroun, December 31, tober 16, 2014; Alroy Menezes, “Nigerian Soldiers Mu- 2013. tiny, Refuse To Fight Boko Haram Claiming They Are 64 “Cameroon Blames Séléka Rebels for Hostage Tak- Ill Equipped,” International Business Times, August 20, ing,” Voice of America, May 15, 2014. 2014. 65 John Irish, “France Wants Action on Central Africa 70 Stephanie Gosk, “Nigerian Neighbor Cameroon Fac- ‘Sectarian Poison,’” Reuters, October 11, 2013. es ‘Phantom Enemy’ Boko Haram.” 66 Jean-Paul Passi, “Commentary Slams ‘Unconscious- 71 “Nigeria, Neighbours ‘Declare War’ on Boko Haram ness’ of CAR’s Ex-Rebel Group,” BBC Monitoring Africa, over Abducted Girls,” i24news, May 18, 2014. 74 Adekunle Aliyu, Ben Agande, and Favour Nnab- November 27, 2013. 72 Oghogho Obayuwana, “How Abandoned Pact Fuels ugwu, “We’ll Wipe out Boko Haram - Cameroon,” Van- 67 Adelani Adepegba, Friday Olokor, and Tunde Ajaja, Insecurity in Nigeria,” The Guardian, May 5, 2014. guard, October 14, 2014. “Ebola: Nigeria’s 1,479 Illegal Borders May Spread Vi- 73 Thomas Fessy, “Niger Hit by Nigeria’s Boko Haram 75 Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Growing Presence in Ni- rus,” Punch, August 2, 2014. Fallout.” ger,” Terrorism Monitor 10:20 (2012). pp. 4–5.

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The Motivations of Syrian This article proceeds by presenting a FSA fighters are risking their lives series of questions as the authors gave for similar reasons: to take revenge Islamist Fighters them to the interview subjects. It then against al-Assad forces (79% FSA vs. discusses the implications that arise from 79% Islamists), to defeat the al-Assad By Vera Mironova, Loubna Mrie, and Sam Whitt their answers. To briefly summarize regime (69% FSA vs. 90% Islamists), the findings, the interviews reveal and to defend their communities (71% with the syrian civil war now well into that in contrast to foreign fighters, FSA vs. 84% Islamists). its third year, there are scores of armed who have generally come to Syria on rebel forces fighting against the Bashar a quest for spiritual fulfillment and to al-Assad regime, as well as against one build an Islamic state through jihad, another. In the marketplace of rebel Syrian fighters are joining Islamist groups vying for support, rebel fighters groups primarily for instrumental are offered incentives and face coercive purposes. Islamic groups are perceived pressures to join one group over as better equipped, led, and organized, another. The weakening of the Free and therefore are seen as more capable Syrian Army (FSA) over the past year of defeating the al-Assad regime, which has led many Syrian rebels to rethink remains the primary goal of Syrian their allegiances on the battlefield. rebels. However, while organizational Possible suitors include nominally strength appears to initially attract “Islamist” groups, including moderate individuals to Islamist groups, this revolutionary organizations like Ahrar research shows that individuals who al-Sham. A growing concern, however, are part of Islamist groups become more is that rebels may be driven into the radical over time. This increases the ranks of more extremist organizations importance of preventing individuals such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and the from joining these groups. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This leads to a key question: Why Are You Fighting? what inspires thousands of ordinary Why do “prospective” Islamists decide Syrian people to join up with Islamist to participate in the fighting in the groups in Syria and Iraq? first place?2 Islamists were asked why they joined their group, and many To understand who these Syrian responses were quite consistent with fighters are and what motivates them, views expressed by rebel fighters from the authors have been conducting the reportedly more moderate FSA.3 As survey research from inside Syria. can be seen in Table 1, the most common Over the past year, the authors have rationales for joining are to defend surveyed more than 300 FSA fighters their community, to defeat the al-Assad as well as Syrian civilians and refugees regime, and to take revenge against al- and 50 Syrian Islamist fighters in the Assad forces. Islamic Front (Ahrar al-Sham) and While Islamists claim unanimously to JN, the latter of which is al-Qa`ida’s Of course, many Islamists also claim support the goals of their group, they 1 affiliate in Syria. that they are fighting for Islam and may also intentionally over-represent to build an Islamic state, but this is their own religiosity and attachment to not among the top three responses. the group. In a clarifying question “what Instead, the authors find that is the most important reason for joining,” 1 The survey was conducted in Idlib and Aleppo prov- underlying social-community ties only a quarter (25%) claimed that “fight inces, in locations where fighters were stationed based and sectarian-political grievances for Islam, and to build an Islamic State” on local knowledge. The interviewer was granted per- may be an important predictor of was their main reason for fighting. mission to conduct surveys with FSA rebel fighters by who joins and who does not. People their superiors and by an informal “Islamic court” for who volunteer to fight have strong Another interesting result from the interviews with Syrian Islamist fighters (including fight- attachments to their communities and discussions with Syrian Islamist ers from Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front/Ahrar nurse grievances against the al-Assad fighters is how they view the al-Sham). Unknown population parameters and secu- regime. Religious ideation is secondary motivations of other individuals who rity concerns preclude random sampling, so the study or even a tertiary motivation for joined their group. For example, relies on non-probability, cluster sampling surveying joining. Many Islamists and moderate when asked, “Why do you think no more than five per cluster. Samples are well-balanced others joined your group?” (see Table across gender, age, education, and whether the subject 2 To be clear, unless otherwise specified, the term “Isla- 2), the religious reason “to fight for was employed before the war began (a proxy for pre-war mists” in the context of this article refers to the 50 Syrian Islam” is not even among the top three income/savings). The study received human subject ap- Islamist fighters whom the authors were able to- inter most popular responses. The main proval from High Point University. Some of the informa- view. reasons listed by Islamist fighters tion in this article appeared on the blog Political Violence 3 Respondents were asked to mention all reasons that are remarkably similar to those of @ a Glance on August 13, 2014. apply. FSA fighters (first, to defend their

15 october 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 10 community; second, because al-Assad a collective obligation (fard kifayya). must be defeated; and third, to take Answers to the question “Is the Syrian revenge against al-Assad forces). War a Jihad?” and “What is Jihad?” range from the overtly religious (“Jihad is giving your soul for the name of God”) to responses which are only distantly related to religion (“When you see a woman being raped just because she is against the government, you know that it’s the time for jihad”). Despite being in an Islamist rebel group, only 76% of surveyed fighters claim that the war in Syria is about jihad. Also, Islamists were unanimous in agreement that the war in Syria, jihad or otherwise, is about revenge. This underscores how underlying grievances against the al- Assad regime could still be driving Syrian rebel fighters into Islamist groups.

Therefore, while some rebels are fighting under an Islamist banner and some are not, they may share similar goals. If more people in Syria are joining Islamist groups today, it may have less to do with religious ideation or extremism, and more to do with the Why Did You Join this Islamist Group as perception that Islamist groups are Opposed to Other Groups? better organized and better equipped The marketplace of rebel groups in than the struggling FSA. As a matter of Syria has been growing for some What Are Your Views on Islam? recruitment strategy, entrepreneurial time.4 Even those with strong Islamist The adoption of radical Islamic views Islamist group leaders appear to be preferences have many options to could be a consequence of joining better at using religion to channel choose from. In asking fighters Islamist groups rather than a root collective sectarian grievances. All about why they avoided joining other cause. Many fighters are aggressively the Islamist fighters interviewed in groups, the authors find that “fighting socialized and exposed to radical this study report strong trust in their for Islam” or “to build an Islamic religious preaching once inside group leadership, receive most of their state” are not the only rationales for the group. Approximately 74% of news and organization from within why fighters selected one group over surveyed Islamists claim that they their group, and tend to tune out another. For many fighters, their group have become more religious since other sources of information (only one preferences are based on structural fighting (compared to 37% of FSA respondent said, for example, that he and organizational cues: they think fighters) and now, three years into the trusted news from Western sources like their group has better resources, better conflict, 96% indicate that religion the BBC). training and better services (Table 3). For plays a very important role in their example, many indicate that their group life (compared to 43% among FSA). All Of course, this could mean that rebel takes good care of injured fighters, and but one Islamist said that they attend fighters can be easily manipulated if a fighter gets killed, the group will religious lectures, study, and recite the to serve a wide range of goals and compensate his family. In interviews Qur’an daily. Also, all the Islamists claim functions. Elite competition may also with fighters who first joined FSA and to feel much closer to the people of their explain why, despite many common then switched to Islamist brigades, same religion (compared to 20% of FSA) goals, there is fierce in-fighting among almost all mentioned non-religious and 92% think that religion should have various Islamist groups and the Free reasons: “My friends left my old group a crucial role in future Syrian politics Syrian Army. Most (81%) of Islamists and I left with them,” “I didn’t like (compared to 60% among FSA). think that the goals of their group are people in my old group,” “My friend got not compatible with those of other rebel injured and they didn’t support him,” Are You Fighting for Jihad? groups and 58% agree that even if al- “I was with my old group [FSA] until I Many Syrian Islamist fighters have Assad is removed from power, their fought with Ahrar al-Sham. I liked their conflicting views on what “jihad” group will have to fight other rebel way of treating fighters and I joined.” means and whether they are waging groups. jihad in Syria. Many (63%) believe 4 “Syria Crisis: Guide to Armed and Political Opposi- that participation in jihad is not an tion,” BBC News, December 13, 2013. individual requirement (fard ayn), but

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Conclusion Syrian and Iraqi Jihads the Bali bombers were educated there.3 At present, the authors’ research Prompt Increased After this, he attended the al-Iman suggests that rebel fighters are generally University in Yemen, run by Abdul- revenge-seeking and driven to Islamist Recruitment and Activism Majeed al-Zindani, a longstanding groups not primarily due to ideological in Southeast Asia senior leader of al-Islah, the Yemeni motivations, but rather for instrumental branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. reasons. However, once inside the By James Brandon Fardi then traveled to Syria to join group, they are vulnerable to elite the small Suqour al-Izz jihadist group, manipulation. Consequently, their during the last three years, jihadist mainly composed of Saudi Salafists, desire for revenge against al-Assad groups in Syria and Iraq have developed before being killed while fighting could be channeled in other directions a strong international component, against Syrian government forces. by calculating and competitive elites attracting around 12,000 foreign through ideological and religious fighters from 50 countries.1 Among Other Indonesian jihadists have died indoctrination. In addition, rebel these are Southeast Asian jihadists who in Iraq conducting suicide attacks with fighters no longer just blame the al- have joined the Islamic State in Iraq and ISIL. Wildan Mukhollad bin Lasmin, Assad regime for the conflict in Syria. the Levant (ISIL) and a range of other 19-years-old, died carrying out a suicide They also cast blame on Iran and jihadist groups. car bomb attack in Iraq in February Lebanese Hizb Allah as well as the 2014, having earlier fought in Aleppo.4 United States and Western powers, This article outlines how these He too had previously studied at a who many feel have abandoned them in volunteers, who mostly hail from hardline Islamist school in Indonesia, this conflict. Islamist groups appear to Indonesia and Malaysia, have become followed by study in Egypt.5 In July, ISIL be having great success harnessing and involved with ISIL and other groups, exploiting Syrian anger for purposes and the likely implications of this in well beyond fighting the al-Assad their home countries, in Syria and “The head of the regime, which is why the current drive Iraq, and further afield. The article Indonesian National Police, in Islamist recruitment in Syria could also examines how events in Syria and have important spillover consequences Iraq have impacted existing Southeast Gen. Sutarman, said in for conflict elsewhere. Asian jihadist and militant groups, August 2014 that at least 56 including the potential for ISIL and Vera Mironova is a Graduate Research other organizations to inspire increased Indonesians were believed Fellow at the Harvard Program on militancy in the region. to have joined ISIL.” Negotiations and a fifth year Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science Indonesia Department at the University of The head of the Indonesian National Maryland. Police, Gen. Sutarman, said in August published a video titled Join the Ranks that 2014 that at least 56 Indonesians were featured alleged Indonesian members Loubna Mrie is a Magnum Fellow at New believed to have joined ISIL, of whom calling for volunteers to “migrate to the York University. three have been killed, although this Islamic State as an obligation decreed by figure may also include those who Allah”; however, it is unclear from the Sam Whitt is an Assistant Professor have joined other jihadist groups.2 content (which features seven gunmen of Political Science at High Point Most fighters seem to have traveled to on a tropical-looking beach) if it was University. Syria from Salafist-influenced religious even filmed in Iraq or Syria.6 On October schools in the Middle East, although 12, 2014, jihadist websites published they often have prior involvement in Indonesian-language statements saying radical Indonesian circles. Typical of that another Indonesian ISIL volunteer, these is Riza Fardi (aka Abu Muhammad Hanzhalah al-Indunisi, had died al-Indunisi), who was killed in East conducting a suicide attack near Beiji in Ghouta, near Damascus, in November Iraq “killing dozens of Shi`a soldiers.”7 2013. According to the radical Indonesian website “Voice of al-Islam,” Fardi was 3 “Keluarga Besar Ponpes Al Mukmin Bergembira born in West Kalimantan and attended dengan Kesyahidan Alumninya (Al-Mukmin Boarding the hardline al-Mukmi boarding school School rejoices),” Voice of al-Islam, November 30, 2014. in Solo. The school is closely associated 4 “Indonesian Man’s Death in Iraq Jihad Evokes JI,” The with Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and six of Jakarta Globe, February 20, 2014. 5 “Rakyat Indonesia sayangkan nyawa jihadis yang ter- sia-sia,” Khabar South-East Asia, March 14, 2014. 1 “Americans Among 12,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria: 6 “ISIS Recruitment Video Join the Ranks Urges Indo- US,” Agence France-Presse, August 21, 2014. nesian Muslims to migrate to the Islamic State,” ABC 2 “ISIL Recruiter in Video Linked to Santoso,” Jakarta (Australia), July 29, 2014. Post, August 4, 2014. See also: “Indonesians and the Syr- 7 “Hanzhalah Al-Indunisi, Pelaku Istisyhad Yang ian Conflict,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Tewaskan Puluhan Tentara Syiah,” Al-Mustaqbel.net, January 30, 2014. October 12, 2014.

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Hardline and militant Islamist has been no perceptible increase in the Other notable members of the Hama organizations in Indonesia have number or scope of reported militant group included Zainan Harith (aka Abu meanwhile provided rhetorical plots in Indonesia. The above pledges Turab), a 52-year-old veteran jihadist support for Syrian jihadists, and for are likely to have a limited real-world from the Malaysian militant group ISIL in particular. Most prominently, impact, largely because those involved Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), according to local media, on July 18, are generally veteran Islamists already who was killed by Syrian government 2014 Abu Bakar Bashir, the jailed committed to radical agendas. shellfire in the town of Arzeh, near former leader of the regional terrorist Hama, in August 2014.17 Another KMM group JI, along with 24 other convicted Malaysia veteran, 47-year-old Zainuri Kamarudin, terrorists in Pasir Putih prison, publicly According to the Malaysian police, was injured in the same incident. Other announced support for ISIL fighters. It around 40 Malaysians are believed to members are more diverse, including is reported that he did so in a message have joined armed groups in Syria and Akel Zainal, a former drummer in 1990s to Mochammad Achwan, chairman of Iraq as of August 2014.12 Meanwhile, Malaysian rock band “The Ukays,” and Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), JI’s the Syrian government has said that several younger volunteers, including a successor group, although Achwan 15 Malaysian jihadists have died 21-year-old who first contacted Ariffin said this fell short of a formal pledge in the conflict, but this cannot be by messaging him on Facebook.18 As independently confirmed.13 Of these, this illustrates, this Malaysian group the most visible and active Malaysian sees social media as a key recruiting and “Hardline and militant fighters are based around Hama, in propaganda tool. Both Ariffin and Zainal Islamist organizations in western Syria, where they operate have regularly posted photos, short as a self-contained group within Salafist-tinged ideological admonitions, Indonesia have meanwhile the relatively small Ajnad al-Sham and updates on their current activities provided rhetorical Ittihadiyya al-Islamiyya (Soldiers of in Syria on Facebook, although both the Levant Islamic Union) jihadist their accounts were taken offline in support for Syrian group, sometimes in conjunction with September/October. Their posts, which jihadists, and for ISIL in al-Qa`ida’s official affiliate Jabhat showed not only combat images but also al-Nusra.14 From their prolific social the Malaysians’ apparently relaxed and particular.” media output, this Malaysian group friendly interactions with local Arab appears to be composed of around 15 fighters, had a relatively limited but fighters, grouped around a core of older enthusiastic following of Malaysian individuals, but including others from a online sympathizers. Ariffin had 16,000 of allegiance to ISIL’s leader Abu Bakr wide range of backgrounds. The group’s “likes” and Zainal had 1,600 “friends” al-Baghdadi.8 Soon afterwards, Achwan main leader, until his death in early on Facebook. and other senior JAT members left JAT September 2014 following a Syrian to set up their own group after refusing government airstrike in Hama, was By contrast, very few Malaysians are to follow Bashir’s public declaration of 49-year-old Mohammed Lotfi Ariffin, known to have joined ISIL. According to support for ISIL.9 Other smaller militant a preacher who fought in Afghanistan an ISIL statement in Malaysian entitled groups, such as the East Indonesia in the 1980s and Tajikistan in the early Malaysian Mujihadeen’s Martyrdom Operation Mujahidin, also pledged allegiance to 1990s; upon his return to Malaysia (Mujahidin Malaysia Syahid Dalam al-Baghdadi.10 he was detained under the Internal Operasi Martyrdom), Ahmad Tarmimi Security Act from 2001 to 2006.15 He Maliki, a Malaysian former factory Elsewhere, small-scale pro-ISIL subsequently joined the Islamist Pan- worker, drove an explosive-packed demonstrations have occurred Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), and SUV into the local headquarters of an sporadically, while in Bekasi city was a leader of its youth wing in the Iraqi special forces unit near Ramadi in in August 2014 supporters of JAT northern state of Kedah; PAS publicly al-Anbar Province on May 26, 2014, in publicly swore allegiance to ISIL at a expelled Ariffin when news of his conjunction with an ISIL conventional local mosque, underlining divisions in involvement in Syria became widely assault on the facility.19 ISIL claimed JAT over ISIL.11 Although such stunts known, although after his death some extensive Iraqi casualties, but this could can raise broader public awareness PAS officials hailed him a “martyr.”16 not be confirmed. Malaysian media of ISIL, notwithstanding occasional reported Maliki had received ideological arrests of suspected militants there 12 “Malaysian Militants Plotted ISIL-Inspired Attacks, training and some militant training in Say Police,” The Star Online, August 20, 2014. Malaysia, notably at Port Dickson in 8 “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Calls on Followers to Support 13 “Wisma Putra: 15 Malaysian ISIS Militants Allegedly 2013, before heading to the Middle East ISIL,” The Jakarta Post, July 14, 2014. Killed in Syria,” Malay Mail, June 24, 2014. 9 “Sons, Top Aides Abandon Ba’asyir Over ISIL, Form 14 “Lotfi On a Do-Or-Die Mission,” The Star Online, June 17 “Bank Robbers, ISA Detainee Among Malaysian Jiha- New Jihadist Group,” The Jakarta Post, August 13, 2014. 28, 2014. dists Killed, Wounded in Syria,” Malay Mail, August 22, 10 “Government Bans Support, Endorsement of ISIL,” 15 Wong Chun Wai, “Of Facebook, Selfies, Jihad and 2014; “Killed Jihadist was KMM Member,” New Straits The Jakarta Post, August 5, 2014. PAS,” The Star (Malaysia), July 1, 2014. Times, August 22, 2014. 11 “Bekasi Group Swear Allegiance to ISIL,” The Ja- 16 “PAS pecat Lotfi Ariffin yang sertai gerakan bersenja- 18 “No Going Back to Malaysia,” New Straits Times, June karta Post, August 06 2014; “Sons, Top Aides Abandon ta di Syria, kata Mustafa Ali,” The Malaysian Insider, June 21, 2014. Ba’asyir Over ISIL, Form New Jihadist Group,” The Ja- 26, 2014; “PAS Leader Labels Fallen Jihadist a Martyr,” 19 “ISIS and the First Malaysian Suicide Bomber,” The karta Post, August 13, 2014 The Star Online, September 14, 2014. Star (Malaysia), June 14, 2014.

18 october 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 10 in April 2014.20 Although officials did the group had been “inspired” by ISIL, heading to Syria or Iraq. Although not explicitly connect the cases, in May and that some of the suspects intended government documents leaked in 2014 one individual in Port Dickson to travel to Iraq or Syria for further August 2014 estimated the number of was charged with “promoting acts of training, although the exact nature Filipinos with ISIL at “close to 200,”28 terrorism” in Syria.21 of their link to ISIL remains under the country’s influential armed forces investigation.25 responded that they were unaware of Although evidence is necessarily any Filipinos fighting in Iraq or Syria, limited, there are some important Philippines 29 and the Foreign Ministry has said differences between the Malaysians In the Philippines, the response from any numbers were “hypothetical.”30 active with Ajnad al-Sham and those existing jihadist groups to events in In contrast to Malaysia and Indonesia, with ISIL in Iraq. For instance, Syria and Iraq has been enthusiastic there is no evidence from Iraq or Syria the former have been permitted to but largely rhetorical. On July 23, 2014, of Filipinos fighting alongside ISIL organize themselves in a small unit, supporters of Abu Sayyaf, the country’s or other groups; likewise, no related engaging in mainly conventional most hardline jihadist organization, domestic plots have been reported. fighting, running their own social uploaded a video to YouTube of one media operations, and enjoying friendly of its leaders, Isnilon Hapilon, and a The Rest of the Region relations with Arab fighters.22 By group of apparent fighters collectively Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there is contrast, as with Indonesians, there is only fragmentary evidence of other no evidence of Malaysians engaging in nationals taking up jihad in Iraq and conventional fighting in ISIL or of any “Given the large size of Syria. For instance, in one English- quasi-independent Malaysian grouping Southeast Asian Muslim language ISIL video, There Is No Life within ISIL, as is the case with Ajnad Without Jihad, a British jihadist claimed al-Sham. Moreover, the lone recorded populations, the number of that the group included a volunteer Malaysian suicide bomber with ISIL recruits to jihadist groups “from Cambodia.”31 Although the likewise does not appear to have country has no significant history been part of any wider Malaysian or in Iraq and Syria are of Islamist radicalism and this claim Southeast Asian group. In addition, the relatively low, even lower was dismissed by Cambodian Muslim fact that within approximately a month leaders, this could feasibly refer to a of his arrival, ISIL used him as a suicide than those from European member of the country’s small Cham bomber possibly suggests they regarded countries.” Muslim minority.32 Similarly, a lone the training he had received in Malaysia Japanese individual was involved as of little or no utility. with the Islamic Front militia in early- to mid-2014 near Aleppo, Unlike in Indonesia, there is some pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi. before being captured by ISIL during evidence that ISIL and other groups They promised al-Baghdadi “loyalty fighting between the rival groups on are inspiring increased militancy in and obedience in adversity and in August 14, 2014; his motivations are Malaysia. Most notably, in August 2014 comfort,” although adding this would be unclear.33 police arrested 19 suspected militants void if they “see in him any obvious act for allegedly planning attacks on several of disbelief.” It is unclear if this bay`a Conclusion targets in Putrajaya, near Kuala Lumpur, represents the whole of Abu Sayyaf, Given the large size of Southeast Asian including pubs, discos and a prominent particularly given its fragmented Muslim populations, the number of Carlsberg brewery.23 Although the leadership.26 recruits to jihadist groups in Iraq and authorities said the group’s plans Syria are relatively low, even lower than were still at the “discussion” phase, Separately, the Bangsamoro Islamic those from European countries.34 While the suspects had reportedly purchased Freedom Fighters (BIFF) pledged aluminium powder, a potential bomb- loyalty to ISIL, although a spokesman 28 Arlyn dela Cruz, “More Filipino Militants Fight in 24 making ingredient. The police claimed said the group would not impose ISIL- Iraq,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 9, 2014. style Islam in the Philippines, somewhat 29 “Filipino Muslim Fighters Not Training with jihad- 27 20 “Local Militants Undergo Extensive Training Be- undermining the pledge’s credibility. ists: Philippine Military,” Xinhua, August 20, 2014. fore They Arrive in Syria,” The Star (Malaysia), June 24, Despite these statements, however, 30 “DFA Cannot Monitor Muslim Filipinos Going to 2014. there is no clear evidence of Filipinos Iraq, Syria for Supposed Terror Training,” InterAksyon. 21 “Four Linked to Terrorism Face Rap in 3 Courts,” New com, August 27, 2014. Straits Times, May 24, 2014. to Attack Carlsberg Brewery, Say Cops,” Malay Mail, Au- 31 “Cambodian Jihadists Among Us: ISIS video,” Phnom 22 See for instance, “Malaysian Jihadists in Syria,” gust 21, 2014. Penh Post, June 23, 2014. YouTube, June 25, 2014. http://www.youtube.com/ 25 “Malaysian Militants Plotted ISIL-Inspired Attacks, 32 “Hun Sen Denies ‘Muslim Extremists,’ Pledges Rama- watch?v=rFb6sw4UvRg. Say Police,” The Star Online, August 20, 2014. dan Funds,” Cambodia Daily, July 19, 2014. 23 “Malaysia Says Putrajaya, Brewery, Discos, Pubs on 26 “Alert raised vs Pinoy ‘jihadists’,” Manila Standard 33 “Japanese Believed Held by Islamic State in Syria Said Militants’ Target List,” The Straits Times, August 16, 2014; Today, August 10, 2014; “Shaikh Isnilon Hapilon (ASG) he Planned to Support Rebels,” Japan Times, August 20. “Malaysia Foils Islamic State-Inspired Plot to Bomb Made Bay’ah to ISIS,” YouTube, https://www.youtube. 2014. Pubs, Discos and Carlsberg Brewery,” South China Morn- com/watch?v=xCOA97_o1nU. 34 See, for example: Joesph A. Carter, Shiraz Maher and ing Post, August 19, 2014. 27 “BIFF, Abus Pledge Allegiance to ISIS,” Philippine Peter R. Neumann, #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance 24 “Malaysian Militants Bought Bomb Material in Plot Daily Inquirer, August 16, 2014. and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks (London:

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this may partly reflect the difficulties to ISIL, particularly following ISIL’s CTC Sentinel Staff and cost of traveling to the Middle East, declaration of a caliphate. The presence levels of engagement with pro-jihadists of Southeast Asian jihadists in Syria and Editorial Board at events and on social media are also Iraq may have other impacts, however, COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. low, suggesting limited overall support as shown by the British jihadists’ Department Head for jihadist groups compared to levels video references to a Cambodian Department of Social Sciences (West Point) of interest in the other Middle East volunteer. Exotic foreign fighters can conflicts such as the Israel-Palestinian be used to powerfully reinforce jihadist COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. issue. At present, it appears unlikely narratives that Muslims worldwide Deputy Department Head that events in Iraq and Syria will trigger are rallying selflessly to the jihadist Department of Social Sciences (West Point) a broader, popular revitalization of cause. It is therefore quite possible that Southeast Asian jihadism, particularly the appearance of Southeast Asians MAJ(P) Bryan Price, Ph.D. as Malaysia, Indonesia and other in Syria and Iraq may prompt more Director, CTC countries enjoy strong – if uneven – radicalization in third countries than in economic growth, while their maturing their home nations. political systems also allow outlets for peaceful dissent. Likewise, ISIL’s rise James Brandon is an Associate Fellow at has mostly been used by local jihadist the International Centre for the Study of groups to rhetorically underline their Radicalisation and Political Violence existing ideological positions rather (ICSR) in London and is the former than to radicalize local populations Director of Research at the Quilliam or mount fresh attacks. That said, the Foundation. He presently works in Malaysia plot and the increased activism Singapore for an international risk of some Indonesian groups demonstrate consultancy. Contact the continuing potential for ISIL, Combating Terrorism Center particularly through its use of evocative U.S. Military Academy concepts like the caliphate, to trigger a 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall limited uptick in regional militancy. West Point, NY 10996 Indonesian veterans of the anti-Soviet Phone: (845) 938-8495 Afghan jihad played an important role Email: [email protected] in inspiring the 1990s-2000s wave of Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ militancy in Indonesia. This illustrates the potential for even small numbers * For Press Inquiries: (845) 938-8495 of jihadist returnees from the current conflicts to trigger a significant increase in domestic militancy.

In the Middle East itself, the small numbers of Southeast Asian fighters are unlikely to significantly alter support the military balance. However, as The Combating Terrorism Center would shown by ISIL’s use of Malaysian and like to express its gratitude to its financial Indonesian suicide bombers in Iraq, supporters, for without their support and foreign volunteers can also bolster shared vision of the Center products like the groups’ unconventional capabilities, CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you potentially preserving better-trained are interested in learning more about how local Arab fighters for other tasks. to support the Combating Terrorism Center, That said, available evidence suggests please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call that, so far, most Southeast Asians who Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association are fighting in the region have joined of Graduates at 845-446-1561. smaller, relatively less extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ajnad al-Sham rather than ISIL, perhaps because these groups have existing, visible, and contactable Southeast Asian members with a strong social media presence. By contrast, Southeast Asian radicals safe in their home countries seem more The views expressed in this report are those of likely to offer rhetorical verbal support the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2014).